Supplementary Materials

Senators at Home: Local Attentiveness and Policy Representation in Congress

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A Predicting Selection into the Travel Data

Table A.1: Predictors of Reporting Per Diems

	Reports Per Diems	
	(1)	(2)
Power Committee	−0.010	−0.031
	(0.048)	(0.042)
Majority	−0.043	−0.041
	(0.038)	(0.038)
Chair	0.129*	0.076
	(0.073)	(0.055)
Seniority	−0.004	0.047**
	(0.005)	(0.011)
First Dim. Nokken-Poole Score	0.048	−0.120
	(0.145)	(0.187)
Senator's Election Year	−0.056	−0.071**
	(0.035)	(0.029)
Republican	−0.014	
	(0.133)	
Logged State Square Miles	0.149**	
	(0.026)	
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Senator Fixed Effects		✓
Observations	795	795
Adjusted R^2	0.161	0.585

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors (clustered on senator) shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether the senator reports any per diems. * indicates $p < 0.10$ and ** $p < 0.05$ (two tailed tests).

B State-Level Trip and Staff Allocation in the Senate

In this section I investigate senator characteristics that are associated with local attentiveness.[1] To determine the total number of trips a senator makes to their state, I pull out all transportation receipts that include the phrase "WASHINGTON DC TO." I draw off of the hypotheses enunciated

[1]See Bond (1985) and Goodman and Parker (2010) for a thorough investigation of this for the House.

in Fenno (1977), which posit that district focus may be affected by electoral safety, seniority status, and region.[2] As a result, I include previous general election vote percentage, chamber seniority, and distance from Washington D.C. in an OLS regression predicting both the number of trips home that a senator makes and the percentage of staff a senator allocates to state offices in a given Congress. I also include state size (in square miles) and population size based upon the suggestions of Fenno (1981) and Lee and Oppenheimer (1999). Finally, I incorporate variables into the model that have grown in importance since the 1970's. These characteristics fall into three categories: demographics, institutional position, and ideology.

First, the Senate has become increasingly diverse, with 26 women and 9 people of color serving in the 116th Senate. It has been posited that female legislators will have more district focused home styles, and as a result allocate more staff to the district (Lazarus and Steigerwalt 2018).[3] Second, ideology may play an important role, as it has been shown that extreme members focus more on policy than their moderate counterparts (Grimmer 2013). Finally, I also include whether the senator is up for election, majority party status, chairmanship status, and membership on a powerful committee in the regression in order to investigate the role of power in Congress beyond just seniority. All standard errors are clustered by senator.

The results from the regression predicting trips home are displayed in Table B.1. The first column includes traditional predictors of local attentiveness and the second column adds in the additional variables described above. While Fenno (1977) argues that trips home will be influ-

[2]Although Fenno (1977) also suggests that location of family is a predictor of trips home I do not include this variable in my analysis. Senators often have dual residency in their home state and Washington DC, making it difficult to determine where their family spends most of their time.

[3]Specifically, Lazarus and Steigerwalt (2018) find that women members of the U.S. House do not spend significantly more on travel, but that women senators do employ more in-state staff in the 103rd - 110th Congress. See pages 76-85.

enced by seniority and region of origin, he finds that they are not influenced by previous electoral performance. First, as shown in Table B.1, *Previous General Election Vote Share* is a positive but not significant predictor of visits. Second, *Seniority* is a negative and significant predictor of trips home with a coefficient of -0.021. This result is likely due to the fact that increased seniority comes with more responsibility within the legislature, leaving the lower seniority senator to spend more time at home among constituents. Third, *Logged State Square Miles* is negative and significant, suggesting that senators from larger states travel home less frequently. Fourth, *Logged Distance from Washington D.C.* is positive and significant, indicating that senators from farther states travel home more frequently. This is possibly due to the fact that these senators are less likely to simply drive home, therefore leading their receipts to reflect more trips. Finally, *Republican* and *Chair* are also positive and significant.

Table B.2 recreates Table B.1 using the percentage of staffers placed in the state as the dependent variable. In regards to staffing, Fenno argues that region is an important predictor, while electoral safety and seniority are not. These predictions are somewhat reflected in the data. *Logged State Population* is the only positive and significant predictor besides *Chair*, indicating the senators from more populated states place more staff at home. Finally, the coefficient on *Woman Legislator* is significant and negative.

Table B.1: The Relationship between Legislator Characteristics and Trips Home

	ln(Number of Trips to State)	
	(1)	(2)
Previous General Election Vote Share	0.611	0.182
	(0.525)	(0.497)
Seniority	−0.018**	−0.021**
	(0.005)	(0.006)
Logged State Square Miles	−0.110	−0.183**
	(0.083)	(0.089)
Logged State Population	0.078	0.096
	(0.069)	(0.065)
Logged Distance from Washington D.C.	0.242**	0.247**
	(0.121)	(0.118)
Woman Legislator		0.143
		(0.120)
|Nokken-Poole Score|		0.064
		(0.228)
Republican		0.354**
		(0.100)
Senator's Election Year		0.017
		(0.056)
Majority		−0.022
		(0.067)
Chair		0.252**
		(0.112)
Power Committee		0.102
		(0.101)
Congress Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Observations	396	396
Adjusted R^2	0.110	0.176

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors (clustered on senator) shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is logged number of trips a senator makes home in a given Congress. * indicates $p < 0.10$ and **$p < 0.05$ (two tailed tests).

Table B.2: The Relationship between Legislator Characteristics and Staff Allocation

	Percentage of Staffers in State Offices	
	(1)	(2)
Previous General Election Vote Share	−0.011	−0.029
	(0.058)	(0.058)
Seniority	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Logged State Square Miles	0.009	0.008
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Logged State Population	0.015**	0.016**
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Logged Distance from Washington D.C.	−0.006	−0.005
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Woman Legislator		−0.020*
		(0.012)
|Nokken-Poole Score|		0.000
		(0.034)
Republican		0.004
		(0.012)
Senator's Election Year		0.006
		(0.005)
Majority		−0.006
		(0.006)
Chair		0.023**
		(0.011)
Power Committee		−0.008
		(0.010)
Congress Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Observations	396	396
Adjusted R^2	0.093	0.110

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors (clustered on senator) shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is the percent of staff placed in state offices in a given Congress. * indicates $p < 0.10$ and **$p < 0.05$ (two tailed tests).

C Robustness of Tables 2

In Table C.1 *Greater than 55 Past 3 Elections* indicates if the senator's party received an average of at least 55% of the vote in the previous three senate elections (across both seats). *SD Party Vote Past 3 Elections* is the standard deviation of the vote won by the senator's party in the past three senate elections (across both seats). *SD Party Vote Past 3 Elections* is negative and significant in the regression predicting any visits at the county level while *Swing* is not significant in any of the regressions predicting visits in the original analyses.

Table C.1: The Relationship between Local Characteristics and Senator Resource Allocation using Alternative Measures of Core and Swing

	Any Visits	Total Visits	ln(Visits + 1)	Any Staff	Pct. Staff	ln(Pct. of Staff + 1)
Panel A: County						
Greater than 55 Past 3 Elections	0.008	0.017	0.007	0.018**	0.392**	0.049**
	(0.010)	(0.143)	(0.019)	(0.006)	(0.102)	(0.014)
SD of Party Vote Past 3 Elections	−0.237*	−0.806	−0.213	0.028	0.447	0.045
	(0.132)	(0.688)	(0.142)	(0.026)	(0.470)	(0.062)
Above Avg. Donations to Party	0.131**	1.216**	0.253**	0.151**	1.504**	0.329**
	(0.016)	(0.200)	(0.029)	(0.013)	(0.159)	(0.026)
Log Population	0.065**	0.434**	0.100**	0.052**	0.404**	0.101**
	(0.006)	(0.086)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.070)	(0.015)
Median Household Income	−0.011**	−0.026	−0.012	−0.030**	−0.300**	−0.064**
	(0.005)	(0.053)	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.049)	(0.008)
Percent White	−0.040	−0.314	−0.065	−0.037	−1.174**	−0.139**
	(0.033)	(0.384)	(0.064)	(0.022)	(0.282)	(0.051)
Senator-County Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	49,597	49,597	49,597	49,423	49,423	49,423
Adjusted R^2	0.335	0.187	0.385	0.363	0.374	0.420
Panel B: Metropolitan Statistical Area						
Greater than 55 Past 3 Elections	0.010	1.252**	0.077	0.047**	1.092**	0.137**
	(0.025)	(0.487)	(0.049)	(0.020)	(0.315)	(0.043)
SD of Party Vote Past 3 Elections	−0.353	−3.532	−0.549	−0.182**	−0.776	−0.294
	(0.245)	(2.594)	(0.392)	(0.082)	(1.405)	(0.184)
Above Avg. Donations to Party	0.066**	3.505**	0.366**	0.129**	3.415**	0.479**
	(0.027)	(0.788)	(0.071)	(0.039)	(0.758)	(0.087)
Log Population	0.130**	1.729**	0.287**	0.186**	2.658**	0.487**
	(0.013)	(0.402)	(0.033)	(0.014)	(0.280)	(0.036)
Avg. Median Household Income	−0.039**	−0.707**	−0.093**	−0.052**	−0.420**	−0.135**
	(0.011)	(0.206)	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.149)	(0.023)
Percent White	−0.016	1.520	0.145	−0.088	−1.244	−0.208
	(0.107)	(2.138)	(0.255)	(0.111)	(1.435)	(0.223)
Senator-MSA Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	6,657	6,657	6,657	6,636	6,636	6,636
Adjusted R^2	0.421	0.430	0.567	0.566	0.629	0.672

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors (clustered on senator) shown in parentheses. The dependent variables are various transformations of the number of resources a senator allocates to an area. * indicates $p < 0.10$ and ** $p < 0.05$ (two tailed tests).

Table C.2: The Relationship between Local Characteristics and Senator Resource Allocation using an Alternative Measure of Donations

	Any Visits	Total Visits	ln(Visits + 1)	Any Staff	Pct. Staff	ln(Pct. of Staff + 1)
Panel A: County						
Core Area	0.012	0.145	0.020	0.024**	0.386**	0.058**
	(0.013)	(0.183)	(0.026)	(0.009)	(0.138)	(0.021)
Swing Area	0.003	0.079	0.010	0.021**	0.116	0.037**
	(0.010)	(0.137)	(0.019)	(0.008)	(0.103)	(0.017)
Same Party Donations per Population	0.006**	0.033**	0.009**	0.005**	0.085**	0.014**
	(0.001)	(0.015)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.033)	(0.005)
Log Population	0.084**	0.604**	0.136**	0.073**	0.621**	0.148**
	(0.007)	(0.100)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.078)	(0.016)
Median Household Income	−0.007	0.022	−0.003	−0.025**	−0.265**	−0.054**
	(0.006)	(0.057)	(0.011)	(0.003)	(0.048)	(0.008)
Percent White	−0.054	−0.528	−0.101	−0.054**	−1.277**	−0.172**
	(0.033)	(0.398)	(0.066)	(0.026)	(0.324)	(0.060)
Senator-County Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	49,133	49,133	49,133	48,959	48,959	48,959
Adjusted R^2	0.328	0.182	0.373	0.340	0.361	0.399
Panel B: Metropolitan Statistical Area						
Core Area	0.000	0.804*	0.039	0.068**	0.914*	0.129*
	(0.029)	(0.479)	(0.062)	(0.029)	(0.503)	(0.067)
Swing Area	0.006	−0.180	−0.002	0.072**	−0.155	0.087
	(0.025)	(0.396)	(0.047)	(0.024)	(0.477)	(0.058)
Same Party Donations per Population	0.015**	0.336**	0.046**	0.008*	0.147	0.027**
	(0.004)	(0.112)	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.093)	(0.011)
Log Population	0.141**	2.347**	0.350**	0.206**	3.233**	0.565**
	(0.012)	(0.389)	(0.032)	(0.013)	(0.287)	(0.033)
Avg. Median Household Income	−0.047**	−0.710**	−0.104**	−0.048**	−0.275	−0.116**
	(0.010)	(0.225)	(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.184)	(0.028)
Percent White	−0.028	0.922	0.079	−0.098	−1.838	−0.262
	(0.107)	(2.171)	(0.257)	(0.114)	(1.533)	(0.241)
Senator-MSA Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	6,579	6,579	6,579	6,558	6,558	6,558
Adjusted R^2	0.423	0.423	0.563	0.560	0.614	0.659

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors (clustered on senator) shown in parentheses. The dependent variables are various transformations of the number of resources a senator allocates to an area. * indicates $p < 0.10$ and ** $p < 0.05$ (two tailed tests).

Table C.3: The Relationship between Local Characteristics and Senator Travel Behavior using Transportation Receipts

	Any Visits	Total Visits	ln(Visits + 1)
Panel A: County			
Core Area	0.020^{*}	0.564	0.056^{**}
	(0.010)	(0.394)	(0.028)
Swing Area	0.005	-0.263	-0.008
	(0.008)	(0.330)	(0.021)
Above Avg. Donations to Party	0.154^{**}	2.876^{**}	0.355^{**}
	(0.018)	(0.461)	(0.038)
Log Population	0.082^{**}	1.089^{**}	0.150^{**}
	(0.007)	(0.213)	(0.016)
Median Household Income	-0.015^{**}	-0.201	-0.023^{*}
	(0.005)	(0.128)	(0.013)
Percent White	-0.066^{**}	-5.152^{**}	-0.311^{**}
	(0.030)	(2.520)	(0.104)
Senator-County Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Observations	49,133	49,133	49,133
Adjusted R^2	0.363	0.292	0.485
Panel B: Metropolitan Statistical Area			
Core Area	0.033	1.056	0.127^{*}
	(0.031)	(1.265)	(0.065)
Swing Area	0.020	-0.502	-0.022
	(0.027)	(1.159)	(0.058)
Above Avg. Donations to Party	0.090^{**}	9.468^{**}	0.587^{**}
	(0.032)	(1.931)	(0.108)
Log Population	0.151^{**}	4.338^{**}	0.464^{**}
	(0.012)	(0.749)	(0.035)
Avg. Median Household Income	-0.037^{**}	-0.023	-0.086^{**}
	(0.012)	(0.717)	(0.029)
Percent White	-0.042	-2.810	-0.013
	(0.111)	(5.109)	(0.283)
Senator-MSA Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Observations	6,579	6,579	6,579
Adjusted R^2	0.428	0.490	0.662

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors (clustered on senator) shown in parentheses. The dependent variables are various transformations of the number of trips a senator makes to an area. * indicates $p < 0.10$ and $^{**}p < 0.05$ (two tailed tests).

D Issues Used in Policy Disagreement Measure

Table D.1: CCES Questions included in Disagreement Measure by Year

CCES Year	Issue	Question Label	Congress of Vote	Roll Number
2011	Raising the debt ceiling	CC340a	112	123
2012	Ryan Budget Bill	CC332A	112	77
2012	Middle class tax cuts	CC332C	112	183
2012	Tax Hike Prevention Act	CC332D	112	184
2012	Birth Control Exemption	CC332E	112	259
2012	US-Korea free trade agreement	CC332F	112	161
2012	Keystone Pipeline	CC332H	112	34
2013	Repeal Affordable Care Act	CC332C	113	34
2013	Marketplace Fairness Act	CC332E	113	113
2013	Violence Against Women Act	CC332F	113	19
2013	Background checks	CC13_320a	113	97
2013	Prohibit publishing owners' names	CC13_320b	113	104
2013	Ban high-capacity magazines	CC13_320c	113	103
2013	Ban assault riffles	CC13_320d	113	101
2013	Easier to obtain concealed carry permits	CC13_320e	113	100
2014	Tax Hike Prevention Act	CC14_325_4	113	655
2014	Debt Ceiling	CC14_325_5	113	219
2014	Agriculture Bill	CC14_331_1	113	312
2014	NSA phone surveillance	CC14_331_2	113	573
2014	Cloture	CC14_331_3	113	243
2014	Birth control exemption	CC14_331_4	113	519
2014	Background checks	CC14_320a	113	97
2014	Prohibit publishing owners' names	CC14_320b	113	104
2014	Ban high-capacity magazines	CC14_320c	113	103
2014	Ban assault riffles	CC14_320d	113	101
2014	Easier to obtain concealed carry permits	CC14_320e	113	100
2015	Repeal Affordable Care Act	CC15_327A	114	329
2015	Keystone Pipeline	CC15_327B	114	49
2015	USA Freedom Act	CC15_327F2	114	201
2015	Trans-Pacific Partnership	CC15_327D	114	218
2015	Trade Adjustment Assistance Act	CC15_327G	114	220
2016	Trans-Pacific Partnership	CC16_351B	114	218
2016	Education Reform	CC16_351E	114	334
2016	Repeal Affordable Care Act	CC16_351I	114	329
2016	Medicare Accountability and Cost Reform Act	CC16_351H	114	144
2016	Highway and Transportation Funding Act	CC16_351F	114	331
2017	Repeal Affordable Care Act	CC17_340A	115	169
2017	Confirm appointment of Neil Gorsuch	CC17_340B	115	111
2017	Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act	CC17_340F	115	175
2017	Confirm appointment of Betsy Devos	CC17_340H	115	54
2017	Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017	CC17_340I	115	121
2018	Grant legal status to DACA children, spend $25 billion	CC18_322d_new	115	358
2018	Confirm appointment of Neil Gorsuch	CC18_328b	115	111
2018	Require the president get approval from Congress to ease sanctions	CC18_328d	115	144
2018	Impose sanctions on countries doing business with North Korea	CC18_328e	115	175
2018	The nomination of Brett Kavanaugh	CC18_328f	115	548
2018	Tax Cuts and Jobs Act	CC18_326	115	323



Figure D.1: Policy Disagreement Measure over Time

E Robustness of Table 4

Table E.1: The Relationship between Local Attentiveness, Policy Representation, and Approval Excluding "Not Sure"

	Dependent Variable: Approval (0/1)					
	Any Visits	Total Visits	ln(Visits + 1)	Any Staff	Pct. Staff	ln(Pct. of Staff + 1)
Panel A: County						
Policy Disagreement	-0.177^{**}	-0.179^{**}	-0.175^{**}	-0.178^{**}	-0.182^{**}	-0.179^{**}
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Local Activity	0.007	0.000	0.004	0.002	0.002^{*}	0.004
	(0.009)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.007)
Policy Disagreement x Local Activity	-0.025	-0.002^{**}	-0.017^{**}	-0.012	-0.000	-0.003
	(0.019)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.001)	(0.005)
Senator-County Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Party-Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	504,492	504,492	504,492	502,812	502,812	502,812
Adjusted R^2	0.294	0.294	0.294	0.294	0.294	0.294
Panel B: Metropolitan Statistical Area						
Policy Disagreement	-0.204^{**}	-0.198^{**}	-0.193^{**}	-0.217^{**}	-0.226^{**}	-0.229^{**}
	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.039)
Local Activity	-0.001	0.000	0.003	-0.005	0.000	-0.002
	(0.010)	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.001)	(0.006)
Policy Disagreement x Local Activity	-0.006	-0.001^{*}	-0.012	0.019	0.001^{**}	0.013^{**}
	(0.024)	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.005)
Senator-MSA Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Party-Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	427,276	427,276	427,276	425,728	425,728	425,728
Adjusted R^2	0.284	0.284	0.284	0.283	0.284	0.284

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors (clustered on senator) shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary measure of constituent approval. * indicates $p < 0.10$ and $^{**}p < 0.05$ (two tailed tests).

Table E.2: The Relationship between Local Attentiveness, Policy Representation, and Approval Using a 4-Point Measure of Approval

	Dependent Variable: Approval (0/1)					
	Any Visits	Total Visits	ln(Visits + 1)	Any Staff	Pct. Staff	ln(Pct. of Staff + 1)
Panel A: County						
Policy Disagreement	-0.380^{**}	-0.383^{**}	-0.375^{**}	-0.382^{**}	-0.396^{**}	-0.387^{**}
	(0.096)	(0.093)	(0.096)	(0.092)	(0.093)	(0.092)
Local Activity	0.019	0.001	0.013	-0.007	0.003^{*}	0.008
	(0.021)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.028)	(0.002)	(0.014)
Policy Disagreement x Local Activity	-0.053	-0.005^{**}	-0.037^{*}	-0.033	0.000	-0.007
	(0.043)	(0.002)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.002)	(0.011)
Senator-County Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Party-Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	504,492	504,492	504,492	502,812	502,812	502,812
Adjusted R^2	0.336	0.336	0.336	0.336	0.336	0.336
Panel B: Metropolitan Statistical Area						
Policy Disagreement	-0.417^{**}	-0.411^{**}	-0.400^{**}	-0.441^{**}	-0.465^{**}	-0.469^{**}
	(0.103)	(0.095)	(0.101)	(0.095)	(0.099)	(0.098)
Local Activity	0.004	0.001	0.006	-0.012	0.000	-0.009
	(0.024)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.029)	(0.002)	(0.014)
Policy Disagreement x Local Activity	-0.019	-0.003	-0.026	0.025	0.003^{*}	0.022^{*}
	(0.056)	(0.002)	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.002)	(0.012)
Senator-MSA Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Party-Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	427,276	427,276	427,276	425,728	425,728	425,728
Adjusted R^2	0.327	0.327	0.327	0.327	0.327	0.327

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors (clustered on senator) shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is a 4-point measure of constituent approval. * indicates $p < 0.10$ and $^{**}p < 0.05$ (two tailed tests).

Table E.3: The Relationship between Local Attentiveness, Policy Representation, and Approval Excluding States with Ten Counties or Less

	Dependent Variable: Approval (0/1)					
	Any Visits	Total Visits	ln(Visits + 1)	Any Staff	Pct. Staff	ln(Pct. of Staff + 1)
Panel A: County						
Policy Disagreement	-0.071^{*}	-0.073^{*}	-0.069^{*}	-0.074^{**}	-0.078^{**}	-0.075^{**}
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Local Activity	0.007	0.000	0.003	0.005	0.002^{*}	0.006
	(0.009)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.001)	(0.007)
Policy Disagreement x Local Activity	-0.025	-0.002^{**}	-0.017^{**}	-0.013	-0.000	-0.004
	(0.017)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.001)	(0.005)
Senator-County Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Party-Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	580,576	580,576	580,576	578,407	578,407	578,407
Adjusted R^2	0.260	0.260	0.260	0.260	0.260	0.260
Panel B: Metropolitan Statistical Area						
Policy Disagreement	-0.095^{**}	-0.090^{**}	-0.085^{**}	-0.108^{**}	-0.118^{**}	-0.120^{**}
	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Local Activity	-0.002	0.000	0.002	0.004	0.001	0.002
	(0.010)	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.001)	(0.006)
Policy Disagreement x Local Activity	-0.007	-0.001^{**}	-0.013	0.016	0.001^{**}	0.011^{**}
	(0.022)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.005)
Senator-MSA Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Party-Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	491,106	491,106	491,106	489,120	489,120	489,120
Adjusted R^2	0.248	0.248	0.248	0.248	0.248	0.248

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors (clustered on senator) shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary measure of constituent approval. * indicates $p < 0.10$ and $^{**}p < 0.05$ (two tailed tests).

Table E.4: The Relationship between Local Attentiveness, Policy Representation, and Approval Excluding Maryland and Virginia

	Dependent Variable: Approval (0/1)					
	Any Visits	Total Visits	ln(Visits + 1)	Any Staff	Pct. Staff	ln(Pct. of Staff + 1)
Panel A: County						
Policy Disagreement	-0.085^{**}	-0.087^{**}	-0.083^{**}	-0.088^{**}	-0.092^{**}	-0.089^{**}
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Local Activity	0.009	0.000	0.004	-0.000	0.002^{**}	0.004
	(0.009)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.001)	(0.007)
Policy Disagreement x Local Activity	-0.027	-0.002^{**}	-0.018^{**}	-0.018	-0.000	-0.006
	(0.018)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.001)	(0.005)
Senator-County Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Party-Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	569,323	569,323	569,323	567,154	567,154	567,154
Adjusted R^2	0.257	0.257	0.257	0.256	0.256	0.256
Panel B: Metropolitan Statistical Area						
Policy Disagreement	-0.106^{**}	-0.101^{**}	-0.096^{**}	-0.118^{**}	-0.128^{**}	-0.129^{**}
	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Local Activity	0.000	0.000	0.003	-0.001	0.001	-0.000
	(0.011)	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.001)	(0.006)
Policy Disagreement x Local Activity	-0.011	-0.002^{**}	-0.014	0.012	0.001^{*}	0.009^{*}
	(0.023)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.005)
Senator-MSA Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Party-Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	479,455	479,455	479,455	477,469	477,469	477,469
Adjusted R^2	0.245	0.245	0.245	0.245	0.245	0.245

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors (clustered on senator) shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary measure of constituent approval. * indicates $p < 0.10$ and $^{**}p < 0.05$ (two tailed tests).

Table E.5: The Relationship between Local Attentiveness, Policy Representation, and Approval Controlling for Any Attentiveness

	Dependent Variable: Approval (0/1)	
	Total Visits	Total Staff
Panel A: County		
Policy Disagreement	-0.082^{**}	-0.085^{**}
	(0.037)	(0.036)
Local Attentiveness	0.000	0.002^{*}
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Any Attentiveness	0.001	-0.008
	(0.008)	(0.014)
Policy Disagreement x Local Attentiveness	-0.002^{**}	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Policy Disagreement x Any Attentiveness	-0.007	-0.024^{*}
	(0.017)	(0.015)
Senator-County Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Party-Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Observations	597,277	595,108
Adjusted R^2	0.259	0.259
Panel B: Metropolitan Statistical Area		
Policy Disagreement	-0.105^{**}	-0.118^{**}
	(0.039)	(0.037)
Local Attentiveness	0.000	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.001)
Any Attentiveness	-0.011	0.009
	(0.010)	(0.013)
Policy Disagreement x Local Attentiveness	-0.002^{**}	0.002^{*}
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Policy Disagreement x Any Attentiveness	0.015	-0.017
	(0.022)	(0.020)
Senator-MSA Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Party-Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Observations	504,641	502,655
Adjusted R^2	0.247	0.247

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors (clustered on senator) shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary measure of constituent approval. * indicates $p < 0.10$ and $^{**}p < 0.05$ (two tailed tests).

Table E.6: The Relationship between Local Visits, Policy Representation, and Approval Excluding Senators who Report Zero Per Diems

	Dependent Variable: Approval (0/1)		
	Any Visits	Total Visits	ln(Visits + 1)
Panel A: County			
Policy Disagreement	−0.055	−0.055	−0.051
	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.037)
Visits	0.009	0.000	0.004
	(0.008)	(0.001)	(0.005)
Policy Disagreement x Visits	−0.020	−0.002**	−0.016**
	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.007)
Senator-County Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Party-Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Observations	424,834	424,834	424,834
Adjusted R^2	0.264	0.264	0.264
Panel B: Metropolitan Statistical Area			
Policy Disagreement	−0.093**	−0.079**	−0.072*
	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.041)
Visits	−0.006	0.000	0.001
	(0.009)	(0.000)	(0.005)
Policy Disagreement x Visits	0.002	−0.002**	−0.014*
	(0.016)	(0.001)	(0.007)
Senator-MSA Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Party-Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Observations	351,009	351,009	351,009
Adjusted R^2	0.249	0.249	0.249

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors (clustered on senator) shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary measure of constituent approval. * indicates $p < 0.10$ and ** $p < 0.05$ (two tailed tests).

Table E.7: The Relationship between Local Visits, Policy Representation, and Approval using Transportation Receipts

	Dependent Variable: Approval (0/1)		
	Any Visits	Total Visits	ln(Visits + 1)
Panel A: County			
Policy Disagreement	-0.085^{**}	-0.090^{**}	-0.087^{**}
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Visits	0.007	-0.000	0.002
	(0.008)	(0.000)	(0.004)
Policy Disagreement x Visits	-0.014	-0.000	-0.004
	(0.017)	(0.000)	(0.006)
Senator-County Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Party-Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Observations	597,277	597,277	597,277
Adjusted R^2	0.259	0.259	0.259
Panel B: Metropolitan Statistical Area			
Policy Disagreement	-0.116^{**}	-0.112^{**}	-0.119^{**}
	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.037)
Visits	-0.003	-0.000	-0.003
	(0.009)	(0.000)	(0.005)
Policy Disagreement x Visits	0.011	0.000	0.005
	(0.018)	(0.000)	(0.005)
Senator-MSA Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Party-Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Observations	504,641	504,641	504,641
Adjusted R^2	0.247	0.247	0.247

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors (clustered on senator) shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary measure of constituent approval. * indicates $p < 0.10$ and $^{**}p < 0.05$ (two tailed tests).



Figure E.1: Placebo Test

Note: The figure presents linear regression coefficients with standard errors clustered on senator. Horizontal lines are the 90% and 95% confidence intervals associated with the estimated effects. The vertical dashed line is the null hypothesis of no effect.

F Robustness of Table 6

Table F.1: The Relationship between Local Attentiveness, Policy Representation, and Vote Choice

	Dependent Variable: Vote for Incumbent (0/1)			
	Any Visits	Total Visits	Any Staff	Pct. of Staff
Panel A: County				
Policy Disagreement	-0.271^{**}	-0.283^{**}	-0.279^{**}	-0.288^{**}
	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.079)
Local Activity	0.048^{*}	0.004^{**}	-0.001	0.010
	(0.027)	(0.001)	(0.017)	(0.008)
Policy Disagreement x Local Activity	-0.108^{**}	-0.004^{*}	-0.019	0.000
	(0.047)	(0.002)	(0.019)	(0.002)
Senator-County Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Party-Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	94,157	94,157	94,157	94,157
Adjusted R^2	0.608	0.608	0.608	0.608
Panel B: Metropolitan Statistical Area				
Policy Disagreement	-0.261^{**}	-0.299^{**}	-0.286^{**}	-0.287^{**}
	(0.071)	(0.074)	(0.076)	(0.083)
Local Activity	0.054^{*}	0.001^{*}	0.065	0.008
	(0.032)	(0.001)	(0.040)	(0.007)
Policy Disagreement x Local Activity	-0.141^{**}	-0.003^{**}	-0.023	-0.001
	(0.055)	(0.002)	(0.025)	(0.002)
Senator-MSA Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Party-Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	80,532	80,532	80,532	80,532
Adjusted R^2	0.600	0.599	0.599	0.599

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors (clustered on senator) shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary measure of constituent vote choice. * indicates $p < 0.10$ and $^{**}p < 0.05$ (two tailed tests).

Table F.2: The Relationship between Local Attentiveness, Policy Representation, and Vote Choice, Subset by Copartisan Status

	Dependent Variable: Vote for Incumbent (0/1)			
	Copartisans		Non-Copartisans	
	ln(Visits + 1)	ln(Pct. of Staff + 1)	ln(Visits + 1)	ln(Pct. of Staff + 1)
Panel A: County				
Policy Disagreement	−0.015	−0.011	−0.321**	−0.314**
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.107)	(0.114)
Local Activity	0.011	0.182*	0.052**	−0.049
	(0.012)	(0.105)	(0.022)	(0.036)
Policy Disagreement x Local Activity	−0.031*	−0.009	−0.049	−0.019
	(0.018)	(0.007)	(0.030)	(0.019)
Senator-County Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Party-Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	47,150	47,150	47,007	47,007
Adjusted R^2	0.115	0.118	0.144	0.143
Panel B: Metropolitan Statistical Area				
Policy Disagreement	−0.026	−0.011	−0.332**	−0.335**
	(0.058)	(0.064)	(0.104)	(0.132)
Local Activity	0.010	0.337**	0.043*	−0.080
	(0.018)	(0.089)	(0.023)	(0.064)
Policy Disagreement x Local Activity	−0.035*	−0.011	−0.047	−0.007
	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.030)	(0.025)
Senator-MSA Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Party-Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	40,864	40,864	39,668	39,668
Adjusted R^2	0.095	0.102	0.099	0.098

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors (clustered on senator) shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary measure of constituent vote choice. * indicates $p < 0.10$ and **$p < 0.05$ (two tailed tests).

G Media Market Level Analysis

Table G.1: The Relationship between Local Attentiveness, Policy Representation, and Constituent Evaluations at the Media Market Level

	Approval (0/1)		Vote for Incumbent (0/1)	
	ln(Visits + 1)	ln(Pct. of Staff + 1)	ln(Visits + 1)	ln(Pct. of Staff + 1)
Policy Disagreement	-0.076^{*}	-0.101^{**}	-0.260^{**}	-0.266^{**}
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.073)	(0.085)
Local Activity	0.004	-0.003	0.030^{**}	-0.039
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.028)
Policy Disagreement x Local Activity	-0.013^{*}	0.004	-0.034^{**}	-0.006
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Senator-Media Market Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Party-Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	566,950	564,781	90,628	90,628
Adjusted R^2	0.238	0.237	0.610	0.610

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors (clustered on senator) shown in parentheses. The dependent variables are binary measures of constituent aproval and vote choice. * indicates $p < 0.10$ and $^{**}p < 0.05$ (two tailed tests). Note that this analysis only includes respondents living in counties contained within one media market.

H Potential Mechanism and Issue Heterogeneity for Local Staff



Figure H.1: Potential Mechanism: News Attentiveness

Note: This figure shows linear marginal effects with fixed effects. The model includes senator-county/msa and party-year fixed effects, with standard errors clustered on senator. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of constituent approval.



Figure H.2: Analysis by Issue Area for Staffing Decisions

Note: The figure presents linear regression coefficients with standard errors clustered on senator. Vertical lines are the 90% and 95% confidence intervals associated with the estimated effects. The horizontal dashed line is the null hypothesis of no effect.

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