SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION for "When do Männerparteien Elect Women? Radical Right Populist Parties and Strategic Descriptive Representation"

Appendix A1: Additional Tables and Figures

Table A1: Radical Right Populist Parties Included in Analysis

Country	Party
Austria	Freedom Party
Belgium	Flemish Interest
Bulgaria	National Union Attack
Croatia	Croatian Democratic Union
Denmark	Danish People's Party
	Progress Party
Estonia	Pro Patria and Res Publica Union
Finland	True Finns
France	National Front
Greece	Golden Dawn
	Independent Greeks
Italy	Italian Social Movement – National Right / National Alliance
	Northern League / League
Luxembourg	Action Committee for Democracy and Pension Justice /
	Alternative Democratic Reform Party
Netherlands	Party of Freedom
Norway	Progress Party
Poland	Law and Justice
Romania	Greater Romania Party
Slovakia	Slovak National Party
Slovenia	Slovenian National Party
Sweden	Sweden Democrats
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party

Notes: The following parties have name changes, but are coded as the same party in the dataset by MARPOR: (Italy) Italian Social Movement – National Right and National Alliance; (Italy) Northern League and League; (Luxembourg) Action Committee for Democracy and Pension Justice and Alternative Democratic Reform Party.

Table A2: Summary Statistics for RRP Party Models

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
% Women MPs	58	19.206	10.776	0	12.1	27.2	50
M/F Ratio$_{(t-1)}$	58	1.926	2.397	0.384	1.237	1.729	18.471
Vote Change$_{(t-1)}$	58	0.788	5.886	-16.900	-2.475	3.414	17.486
Time	58	2,008.914	6.757	1,990	2,005.2	2,014.8	2,018
Woman Leader$_{(t-1)}$	58	0.172	0.381	0	0	0	1
Cabinet Party$_{(t-1)}$	58	0.224	0.421	0	0	0	1
Women in Parliament$_{(t-1)}$	58	25.866	10.266	7.300	18.975	36.250	44.700
District Magnitude	58	19.421	36.294	1.000	7.690	13.605	150.000
PR Electoral System	58	0.914	0.283	0	1	1	1
Quota Law	58	0.172	0.381	0	0	0	1
Western Europe	58	0.759	0.432	0	1	1	1

Table A3: **Determinants of Women's Representation in RRP parties, OLS models**

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
M/F Ratio$_{(t-1)}$	-0.102	-0.259	-0.432	-0.373	-0.234
	(0.608)	(0.595)	(0.584)	(0.529)	(0.523)
Vote Change$_{(t-1)}$	-0.025	1.273	1.187	1.476*	1.227*
	(0.247)	(0.669)	(0.652)	(0.590)	(0.586)
Time			0.424*	0.455*	-0.016
			(0.207)	(0.186)	(0.215)
Woman Leader$_{(t-1)}$				9.939**	4.468
				(3.311)	(3.384)
Cabinet Party$_{(t-1)}$				-5.853	-3.816
				(3.017)	(2.887)
Women in Parliament$_{(t-1)}$					0.632***
					(0.177)
Dis. Mag.					-0.005
					(0.034)
PR electoral system					-2.366
					(5.057)
Quota Law					6.600
					(3.766)
Western Europe					-5.352
					(3.395)
M/F Ratio$_{(t-1)}$*Vote Change$_{(t-1)}$		-0.885*	-0.803	-0.998*	-0.915*
		(0.426)	(0.416)	(0.377)	(0.371)
Constant	19.421***	19.122***	-831.291	-894.263*	39.986
	(1.875)	(1.827)	(415.863)	(374.170)	(429.486)
N	58	58	58	58	58
R-squared	0.001	0.075	0.142	0.335	0.501
Adj. R-squared	-0.036	0.023	0.078	0.257	0.382
N countries	19	19	19	19	19
N parties	22	22	22	22	22

$^{***}p < .001$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{*}p < .05$

Notes: Dependent variable is the percentage of women among the radical right populist party's MPs in the national, lower-chamber legislature. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Note that the p-value for the interaction term in Model 3 is 0.06.

Table A4: **Determinants of Women's Representation in Parties, Excluding Outliers**

	Model 1 (RRP parties)	**Model 2 (All parties)**
M/F Ratio$_{(t-1)}$	1.134	0.081
	(1.212)	(1.129)
Vote Change$_{(t-1)}$	1.014	0.274
	(0.522)	(0.287)
Time	0.098	0.015
	(0.179)	(0.092)
Woman Leader$_{(t-1)}$	2.079	0.830
	(3.356)	(1.495)
Cabinet Party$_{(t-1)}$	-3.381	-0.363
	(2.481)	(1.063)
Women in Parliament$_{(t-1)}$	0.559**	0.698***
	(0.175)	(0.088)
Dis. Mag.	-0.021	-0.010
	(0.035)	(0.023)
Modified PR electoral system		1.336
		(6.232)
PR electoral system	-0.201	2.964
	(4.319)	(5.705)
Quota Law	6.192	2.943
	(3.364)	(1.638)
Western Europe	-3.413	2.185
	(3.561)	(2.466)
M/F Ratio$_{(t-1)}$*Vote Change$_{(t-1)}$	-0.754*	-0.320
	(0.334)	(0.268)
Constant	-190.803	-24.667
	(357.634)	(184.573)
Random effect party	0	102.2
Random-effect country	14.52	0
Random-effect residual	42.70	105.7
N	57	612
Log Likelihood	-194.125	-2413.332
AIC	418.250	4858.665
BIC	448.896	4929.332
N countries	19	29
N parties	21	174

$^{***}p < .001$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{*}p < .05$

Notes: Models exclude extreme values of M/F ratio (above 10). Model 1 includes RRP parties only. Model 2 includes all party families. Results are based on multilevel analyses with random intercepts for the country and party levels of the data. Dependent variable is the percentage of women among the party's MPs in national, lower-chamber legislature. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.

Table A5: **Determinants of Women's Representation in Radical Right Populist Parties (No Interaction)**

M/F Ratio$_{(t-1)}$	-0.630
	(0.448)
Vote Change$_{(t-1)}$	-0.164
	(0.169)
Time	0.206
	(0.185)
Female Leader$_{(t-1)}$	-2.102
	(3.650)
Cabinet Party$_{(t-1)}$	-2.049
	(2.504)
Women in Parliament$_{(t-1)}$	0.407*
	(0.200)
Dis. Mag.	-0.005
	(0.042)
PR	-1.280
	(4.324)
Quota Law	7.356*
	(3.696)
Western Europe	-1.316
	(4.416)
Constant	-402.827
	(369.645)
Random-effect party	0
Random-effect country	36
Random-effect residual	40.67
N	58
Log Likelihood	-201.332
AIC	430.664
BIC	459.510

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05

Notes: Results are based on multilevel analyses with random intercepts for the country and party levels of the data. Dependent variable is the percentage of women among the party's MPs in national, lower-chamber legislature. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.

Table A6: **Determinants of Women's Representation in All Party Families (Excluding Women in Parliament)**

M/F Ratio$_{(t-1)}$	-0.778
	(0.711)
Vote Change$_{(t-1)}$	0.153
	(0.286)
Time	0.414***
	(0.073)
Female Leader$_{(t-1)}$	0.859
	(1.521)
Cabinet Party$_{(t-1)}$	-0.447
	(1.075)
Dis. Mag.	0.010
	(0.041)
Modified PR electoral system	4.432
	(9.492)
PR electoral system	7.718
	(8.929)
Quota Law	6.052***
	(1.786)
Western Europe	10.070**
	(3.483)
M/F Ratio$_{(t-1)}$*Vote Change$_{(t-1)}$	-0.202
	(0.267)
Constant	-819.602***
	(147.451)
Random-effect party	116.61
Random-effect country	41.65
Random-effect residual	105.24
N	613
Log Likelihood	-2437.769
AIC	4905.537
BIC	4971.813

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05

Notes: Results are based on multilevel analyses with random intercepts for the country and party levels of the data. Dependent variable is the percentage of women among the party's MPs in national, lower-chamber legislature. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.

Figure A1: Gender Differences (Male/Female Voter Ratio) in Voting Behavior for Different Party Families, Europe 1985 – 2018 (extreme values of Male/Female Voter Ratio over 20 excluded)



Figure A2: **Gender Differences (Male/Female Voter Ratio) in Voting Behavior for Radical Right Populist Parties, Europe 1985 – 2018**



Figure A3: **Marginal Effects of Party Vote Change on Share of Women in Radical Right Populist Parties as a Function of Male/Female Voter Ratio**



Notes: Estimated coefficients are based on regression results shown in Table 1, Model 5.

95% confidence intervals are shown, along with a rug plot along the x-axis.

Support for our theory of strategic descriptive representation continues to emerge when we consider the results of the above marginal effects plot.

Here we see that vote change has a negative effect on level of women's representation when the RRP party has a men-dominated electorate; when gender gaps are 1.8 and higher, a vote-losing RRP party will elect more women MPs. On the other hand, if the party already attracts more women than men, vote loss will be associated with a lower percentage of women MPs; this result emerges as statistically significant for M/F voter ratio values of 0.6 and lower.

This result is consistent with the idea that electorally vulnerable parties are seeking to increase their representation of under-tapped constituencies; those vote-losing parties with a deficit of women will employ strategies to remedy that gap, by increasing the number of female faces. Those that have a deficit of men will be less likely to incorporate more women MPs, and may include more men MPs.

Figure A4: **Marginal Effects of Male/Female Voter Ratio on Share of Women in a Party (All Party Families) as a Function of Party Vote Change**



Notes: Estimated conditional coefficients are based on regression results shown in Table 2, Model 5. 95% confidence intervals are shown, along with a rug plot along the x-axis.

Figure A5: **Marginal Effects of Male/Female Voter Ratio on Share of Women in a Party (Christian Democrat Party Family) as a Function of Party Vote Change**



Notes: Estimated conditional coefficients are based on regression results shown in Table 3, Model 1. 95% confidence intervals are shown, along with a rug plot along the x-axis.

Appendix A2: Qualitative Case Study Methods

We select two "typical" or representative cases on the basis of our regression results, with the aim of assessing the plausibility of our observed statistical relationships and examining the mechanisms behind an increase in women MPs (Coppedge 1999; Gerring 2006; Lieberman 2005, 2015; Seawright and Gerring 2008). These typical cases are well-predicted by the regression models presented in Table 1. Case selection is thus intentional; random selection would not serve our purpose of confirming the findings and probing causal mechanisms behind why RRP parties increase the percentage of women MPs. As recommended by Lieberman (2005), we select two cases of strategic inclusion that are located "on the line," where the key conditions underlying our theory of strategic descriptive representation (male-dominated gender gap in voting and electoral threat) are present, but with the key variables at different value levels. Our intentional approach to case selection is conventional in mixed-methods research. In their review of case selection in mixed-methods studies, Rohlfing and Starke (2013) note that, "nobody uses random selection" (p. 496). We use the common benchmark of one standard deviation to separate typical and deviant cases, a method also used by Lange (2009), among others.

We use the full model with all controls (Model 5 of Table 1) to calculate residuals and standard deviation. The full model controls for other factors besides strategic descriptive representation that could influence women's representation within political parties, and thus provides a more accurate model of the data generating process than less complex models. As a robustness check, we calculate the residuals and standard deviation for all relevant models included in Table 1 (Models 2-5, which all include the key interaction of M/F Ratio and Vote Change). Rohlfing and Starke (2013) note that different models and results can yield different classifications of the same case – a case classed as typical based on the results of one model might be classed as deviant on the basis of another model. This is a problem especially when results are not consistent across models, which is not true of our analysis. Still, to guard against this pitfall, we ensure robust case classification by classifying all cases as typical or deviant across all four relevant models, and choosing cases from the set of robust typical cases only.

Table A7 presents a list of cases classified as robust typical across all four models, which also meet the criteria of a gender gap in voting (M/F Ratio greater than 1) and electoral loss (negative vote change). Because we do not have space to explore all 11 cases, we select 2 of the 11 cases listed in Table A7 for qualitative analysis: SVP 2015 and PVV 2017 (with a shadow case of strategic exclusion by the PVV in 2012). We select these two cases because they involve the most recent elections available in our typical case data, for which we have language proficiency (Table A7). In addition, they involve different levels of our central explanatory variables – the PVV 2017 case is characterized by greater electoral loss and more male-dominated electorate than the SVP in 2015.

Recent elections are valuable for our purposes of investigating campaign tactics via primary and secondary sources and accessing online newspaper archives. Investigating cases that occurred relatively recently offers the practical advantage of social media data availability (not available, for example, in the case of the Italian Social Movement in 1992 or the Danish Progress Party in 1994). Language ability also played a role in our case selection. Proficiency in French, German and Dutch made the cases of the SVP and PVV more attractive, because we are better able to search for and interpret primary and secondary sources in those

languages. This is not the case for the Norwegian case of Progress Party, or the Greek case of Golden Dawn, which would otherwise have been of interest given their recent elections. The other cases below offer significant potential for future research on strategic descriptive representation. For example, Rashkova and Zankina (2017)'s study of the National Union Attack in Bulgaria suggests that the party's gender balance was often discussed in tabloids precisely in 2014, as our theory predicts, with media outlets calling the party's women MPs, "Volen's Angels".

The qualitative analysis uses evidence from published primary and secondary data sources, including newspaper articles and candidate-level position data, to construct detailed descriptions of whether and how the actions of party elites in each case align with our theory; see the source list at the end of this section. First, we gather candidate list data from the Switzerland Federal Statistics Bureau and the PVV party's own candidate list announcements. We consult this data to determine whether the party included more or fewer women compared to the previous election (where our key conditions predicting strategic descriptive representation did not hold). These data also allow us to identify the placement of women within lists and across seats – were women placed in more electable positions, suggesting that the party is intentionally promoting their election in line with our theory, or not? Second, we searched Swiss and Dutch media sources, including newspapers and social media, for evidence of party elites' attention to and description of women candidates.[1] We were especially interested in campaign materials, which can provide evidence of whether and how parties intentionally featured women candidates. Additionally, we scoured these media sources to understand how party leaders themselves described women candidates and/or voters. If party elites linked women candidates with the need to increase votes from women, this provides compelling evidence that they employed strategic descriptive representation in the way our theory predicts.

Table A7: **Robust Typical Cases for Case Selection, Descending Order by Election**

Country	***Year***	***Party***	***M/F Ratio$_{(t-1)}$***	***Vote Change$_{(t-1)}$***	***% Women***	***Residual (Model 5)***	***Robust typical?***
Netherlands	2017	Party of Freedom	1.6	-5.4	30	4.7	Y
Norway	2017	Progress Party	1.6	-6.6	26.9	4.4	Y
Greece	2015	Golden Dawn	18.5	-0.05	11.8	-2.3	Y

[1] These media searches were conducted in these countries' languages. Search terms in those languages included the party name or abbreviation, women, women voters and the election years. For the Netherlands, we found references in 2017 to the PVV's prioritization of women candidates in the newspapers *De Telegraaf*, *De Volkskrant*, and *Trouw*, as well as the TV News *RTL Nieuws*. We did not find similar references to the prioritization of women MP candidates or women voters by the PVV in these publications for the 2012 elections. We also examined the Twitter feed of the party leader, Geert Wilders. For Switzerland, we searched national and regional (canton-specific) newspapers including *Aargauer Zeitung, Radio Télévision Suisse*, *Solothurner Zeitung, SWI (swissinfo.ch), Tages Anzeiger*, *Tribune de Geneve*, as well as Twitter and Facebook feeds associated with the SVP party.

Switzerland	2015	Swiss People's Party	1.3	-2.3	16.9	1.4	Y
Belgium	2014	Flemish Interest	1.3	-4.2	33.3	1.2	Y
Bulgaria	2014	National Union Attack	2.5	-2.1	27.3	2.9	Y
Estonia	2011	Pro Patria and Res Publica Union	1.4	-6.7	18.2	2.7	Y
Italy	2006	Northern League	1.2	-6.1	9	3.5	Y
Norway	2005	Progress Party	1.7	-0.7	15.7	-4.3	Y
Denmark	1994	Progress Party	1.2	-2.5	27.2	0.1	Y
Italy	1992	Italian Socialist Movement	2.6	-0.9	6	-2.9	Y

Swiss and Dutch Case Study Primary and Secondary Sources

SVP candidate data come from the Switzerland Federal Statistics Bureau:

https://www.bfs.admin.ch/.

National Council 2015 (politik-stat.ch)

PVV candidate list data come from the PVV's website:

2012: https://www.pvv.nl/36-fj-related/geert-wilders/5825-pvv-presenteert-kandidatenlijst-tweede-kamerverkiezingen-2012.html

2017: https://www.pvv.nl/36-fj-related/geert-wilders/9405-pvv-kandidatenlijst-15-maart-2017.html

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