

Migration and the Demand for Transnational Justice

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Online Appendix

Note: Because of *APSR* page limits for supplemental materials, the theoretical models that support our paper and additional empirical results are available (with our replication files) at <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/PATI3W>.

Contents

Descriptive data on stages of universal jurisdiction	2
Robustness to Alternative Migration Measures	3
Alternative lag structures for atrocity measures	6
Examining the non-interpolated data at the decade mark	7
Sensitivity Analysis	9
Examining later case stages	12
Alternative measures for domestic universal jurisdiction legislation	16
Alternative measures of relative power between the sending and receiving state	19
Interaction effect of NGOs and migration	20
Diffusion	21
References	22


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Descriptive data on stages of universal jurisdiction

Figure A1: Universal Jurisdiction Measures, 1957–2017



Note: Each figure shows the distribution of the associated variable with a loess line to depict the general trend over time.

Robustness to Alternative Migration Measures

We use several different migration measures. First, we examine the UN Population Division’s migrant stock data. This data is available for 1990–2019 at five year intervals and we linearly interpolate the data for the years in between.

Second, we also examine migrant flows, which are the number of migrants entering a receiving state from a sending state in a given year, in case the arrival of new migrants is more salient than the overall migrant stock. For this analysis, we begin with migrant flow data from Fitzgerald, Leblang and Teets (2014) and updated by Leblang and Helms (Forthcoming). This data—which we call FLT—includes all OECD members as receiving states and all states as sending states for 1970–2016. The data are collected from the United Nations, Eurostate, the OECD, and national statistics bureaus. In some robustness checks, we use the FLT measure of annual immigrant flows. Because yearly inflows may not represent recent migrants well, we create two additional variables from the FLT data: IMMIGRANT FLOW LAST 5 YEARS (FLT), which sums the immigration flows for the last 5 years, and IMMIGRANT FLOW LAST 10 YEARS (FLT), which does the same for the last 10 years. Next, we construct similar measures using the immigrant flow data from the DEMIG C2C dataset (DEMIG, 2015), which we denote as IMMIGRANT FLOW (DEMIG). This flow data is available for 34 receiving states and most sending states for 1946–2011. It is compiled from the United Nations Population Division, national statistics agencies, and various historical records. Similar to the FLT data we create an IMMIGRANT FLOW LAST 5 YEARS (DEMIG) and IMMIGRANT FLOW LAST 10 YEARS (DEMIG) variable. To test this alternative explanation, we replicate our results using several alternative measures in figure A2.


Third, we consider the impact of stocks of refugees, which are migrants who demonstrate that they were persecuted in the sending state. For our first measure of refugees (REFUGEE STOCK), we use data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which has extensive missing data. For our second two measures of refugees (REFUGEE STOCK (INTERPOLATED) and REFUGEE STOCK (LASSO)), we use the two imputed measures from Marbach (2018). Finally, we consider the ECONOMIC MIGRANT STOCK, which we calculate as the migrant stock minus the refugee stock (lasso).

Each panel in Figure A2 shows the coefficient estimates of each migration variable from separate regressions. Each panel begins with the coefficient estimate from the MIGRANT STOCK measure in our main analysis. In panels (a) and (b), it displays the coefficient estimate for this same measure when receiving state fixed effects are included; fixed effects measures are not included in


panels (c) and (d) as they would restrict our analysis to states with at least one universal jurisdiction case, leading to selection bias. Each panel then displays the coefficient estimate from each of our ten alternative measures of migration. For each measure, a marker represents the point estimate, while the thick (thin) bars represent the 95% (90%) confidence interval. Each panel includes a dotted vertical line is at 0. So coefficients whose confidence interval does not cross the 0-line are statistically significant at conventional levels. We then repeated this exercise using control variables. Regardless of which migration measure that we use, the effect of migration is almost always positive and significant at conventional levels.

Figure A2: Effect of Alternative Migration Measures on ANY INITIATION and FIRST INITIATION


(a) ANY INITIATION excluding controls




(b) ANY INITIATION including controls



(c) FIRST INITIATION excluding controls




(d) FIRST INITIATION including controls



This figure plots the coefficients for different measures of migration from separate regressions. Each regression replicates Model 1 or 3, respectively, from our main results but replaces migrant stock with another measure. Dots represent the point estimates, thick bars represent the 90% confidence interval, and thin bars represent the 95% confidence interval. The dotted vertical line is at 0. Coefficients whose confidence interval does not cross the 0-line are statistically significant at conventional levels.

Alternative lag structures for atrocity measures

Figure A3: Comparing the Impact of Alternative Lag Structures




Note: This graph plots the coefficients on the different measures of democracy and political terror, respectively. The coefficients come from regressions that replicate Model 1 but replace the atrocity variables for both democracy and political terror.

Examining the non-interpolated data at the decade mark

We also examine whether the effects of migration are driven by the imputation of migration data. We regress an indicator of whether there were any initiations in the decade on the values from the start of the decade. For example, DV takes a value 1 if there was any initiation from 1970 through 1979. We then regress that on the level of migration and the rest of the variables from 1970 and drop all the years in between. Table A1 and Figure A4 present the results of dropping all data except the decade mark.

Figure A4: The effect of migration on initiation of UJ cases sequentially adding additional controls; only for data at the decade mark



This figure plots the coefficient on MIGRANT STOCK from separate regressions. Each regresses any or first initiation on migration but sequentially adds in additional variables. All regressions with the first initiation include years since 1957, its square, and cube. Dots represent the point estimates and bars represent the 95% confidence interval. The dotted vertical line is at 0. Coefficients whose confidence interval does not cross the 0-line are statistically significant at conventional levels.

Table A1: Regressions of INITIATIONS on Explanatory Variables at the Decade

	Any			First RS		
	All Model 1	No J. Doe Model 2	All Model 3	No J. Doe Model 4		
Migration (SS → RS)						
Migrant Stock	0.00084** (0.00029)	0.00084** (0.00029)	0.00048** (0.00019)	0.00062*** (0.00016)		
Atrocities (SS)						
PTS (mean, DoS, past 10 years, SS)	0.0037*** (0.00066)	0.0037*** (0.00066)	0.00057 (0.00037)	0.00096*** (0.00026)		
Democracy (mean past 10 years, SS)	-0.0059*** (0.0016)	-0.0059*** (0.0016)	-0.0027* (0.0011)	-0.0018* (0.00073)		
Responsiveness (RS)						
Democracy (RS)	-0.0038** (0.0013)	-0.0038** (0.0013)	-0.0014 (0.0011)	0.00064 (0.00072)		
Population (RS)	-0.0018*** (0.00047)	-0.0018*** (0.00047)	-0.00074* (0.00034)	-0.00041 (0.00023)		
Center (RS)	-0.00078 (0.0014)	-0.00078 (0.0014)	-0.00028 (0.0011)	-0.00081 (0.00063)		
Left (RS)	-0.00020 (0.0013)	-0.00020 (0.0013)	-0.00030 (0.00076)	0.00027 (0.00056)		
Rome Statute (RS)	0.0044*** (0.0011)	0.0044*** (0.0011)	0.0012 (0.00069)	0.00076* (0.00035)		
Private Prosecutions (RS)	0.0042*** (0.0011)	0.0042*** (0.0011)	0.00087 (0.00075)	0.00031 (0.00035)		
British Legal Origin (RS)	-0.0042** (0.0014)	-0.0042** (0.0014)	-0.00075 (0.00098)	-0.0011** (0.00042)		
Cost (RS)						
GDPpc (RS)	0.00047 (0.00057)	0.00047 (0.00057)	0.00039 (0.00047)			
OECD (RS)	0.0026* (0.0010)	0.0026* (0.0010)	0.0011 (0.00079)			
Prior Initiation (RS)	0.17 (0.11)	0.17 (0.11)				
Prior Success (RS)	0.016 (0.011)	0.016 (0.011)				
Cost (Dyadic)						
GDPpc (SS)	0.00057 (0.00041)	0.00057 (0.00041)	-0.00029 (0.00025)			
Trade	0.0028* (0.0012)	0.0028* (0.0012)	0.00099 (0.0010)			
Alliance	-0.0047 (0.0026)	-0.0047 (0.0026)	0.00024 (0.0022)			
Major Power (RS)	-0.026* (0.010)	-0.026* (0.010)	-0.0069 (0.0094)			
Major Power (SS)	0.035*** (0.0090)	0.035*** (0.0090)	0.011* (0.0057)			
Shared language	0.0072** (0.0026)	0.0072** (0.0026)	0.0018 (0.0018)			
Controls						
NGOs (RS)	0.00018*** (0.000049)	0.00018*** (0.000049)	0.000050 (0.000039)	0.000026 (0.000015)		
International Prosecutions (SS)	0.038* (0.015)	0.038* (0.015)	0.012 (0.010)	0.0019 (0.0019)		
Amnesty (SS)	-0.0032 (0.0027)	-0.0032 (0.0027)	-0.0011 (0.0014)	-0.0011 (0.00074)		
Former Colony (dyad)	0.028* (0.013)	0.028* (0.013)	0.014 (0.012)	0.021* (0.0089)		
Former Colony (any)	-0.0016 (0.0012)	-0.0016 (0.0012)	-0.0010 (0.00078)	-0.00083 (0.00051)		
Distance	0.0000047 (0.00076)	0.0000047 (0.00076)	0.000098 (0.00048)	0.00070* (0.00034)		
Cold War	0.000078 (0.0011)	0.000078 (0.0011)		0.0027** (0.0010)		
Observations	16604	16604	15146	30323		
R ²	0.049	0.049	0.012	0.011		

Standard errors in parentheses. All models have robust standard errors clustered by dyad. Data for Models 1 & 2 are available 1976-2007. Data for Models 3 & 4 are available to 2012. Contiguity variables included but not shown. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Sensitivity Analysis

We have shown, thus, that migration robustly predicts universal jurisdiction cases and the steps to and through trial. We have also shown that migration robustly predicts the first time that a receiving state uses universal jurisdiction. This suggests that there is unlikely to be reverse causation, unless the migrants know of some unobservable characteristic of the state that will lead it to use universal jurisdiction. While we have controlled for explanations in the literature, we now turn to sensitivity analysis to help understand what additional threats to inference there may be.

To examine the sensitivity of MIGRANT STOCK, we examine how large an unobserved confounder would need to be to change our results using the procedure in Cinelli and Hazlett (2020). Assume that there is an unobserved confounder such that our estimate of the effect of MIGRANT STOCK is greater than 0 but the true effect is 0. In this case, our estimated coefficient would be biased. Cinelli and Hazlett (2020) show that this bias can be calculated from the amount of variation (R^2) that the confounder explains in both the outcome and explanatory variables. Their procedure then allows us to calculate how much variation this confounder must explain such that the bias in our estimate is large enough that the true estimate is 0. It also allows us to examine how large a hypothetical confounder would need to be in comparison to other variables.

We examine the sensitivity in the following way. For ANY INITIATION and FIRST INITIATION, we examine the sensitivity of the estimate in Model 1 and 3, respectively, from our main analysis (Table 3), using the DEMOCRACY (SS) as our benchmark.¹ We use DEMOCRACY (SS) as it has a large effect on both universal jurisdiction initiations and MIGRANT STOCK.²

We compare the effect of a hypothetical confounder to our benchmark of DEMOCRACY (SS) in Figure A5. The red line shows when the point estimate on MIGRANT STOCK would equal zero. A confounder would have to have as large an effect as that of three times DEMOCRACY (SS) for ANY INITIATION and four times DEMOCRACY (SS) for FIRST INITIATION to decrease the size of the coefficient on MIGRANT STOCK to zero. A hypothetical confounder that had 3 times the effect of DEMOCRACY (SS) would have to explain about 25% of the remaining variation in MIGRANT STOCK, but all the variables already explain 63% of the variation. Thus, an unobserved confounder would have to have quite a large effect on *both* universal jurisdiction cases and migration to reduce the effect of migration to zero. It is unlikely that such a confounder exists.

¹We estimate the sensitivity parameters using **sensemakr** (Cinelli, Ferwerda and Hazlett, 2020) in stata.

²Using standardized coefficients, DEMOCRACY (SS) has the second largest effect on the outcome, after MIGRANT STOCK. It also has a large effect on MIGRANT STOCK, when MIGRANT STOCK is regressed on DEMOCRACY (SS) and other controls.


Table A2: Sensitivity Analysis

Outcome: ANY CASE					
Treatment:	Est.	S.E.	t(H0=0)	$R_{Y \sim D \mathbf{X}}^2$	$RV_{q=1}$
MIGRANT STOCK	0.0001	0.0000	4.59	.01%	1.14 %
df = 161530	BOUND 1X DEMOCRACY (SS): $R_{Y \sim Z \mathbf{X}, D}^2 = .01\%$, $R_{D \sim Z \mathbf{X}}^2 = 8.47\%$				
	BOUND 2X DEMOCRACY (SS): $R_{Y \sim Z \mathbf{X}, D}^2 = .02\%$, $R_{D \sim Z \mathbf{X}}^2 = 16.94\%$				
	BOUND 3X DEMOCRACY (SS): $R_{Y \sim Z \mathbf{X}, D}^2 = .03\%$, $R_{D \sim Z \mathbf{X}}^2 = 25.41\%$				
Outcome: FIRST CASE					
Treatment:	Est.	S.E.	t(H0=0)	$R_{Y \sim D \mathbf{X}}^2$	$RV_{q=1}$
MIGRANT STOCK	0.0001	0.0000	4.22	.01%	1.12 %
df = 141768	BOUND (1X DEMOCRACY (SS)): $R_{Y \sim Z \mathbf{X}, D}^2 = .01\%$, $R_{D \sim Z \mathbf{X}}^2 = 8.84\%$				
	BOUND (2X DEMOCRACY (SS)): $R_{Y \sim Z \mathbf{X}, D}^2 = .01\%$, $R_{D \sim Z \mathbf{X}}^2 = 17.68\%$				
	BOUND (3X DEMOCRACY (SS)): $R_{Y \sim Z \mathbf{X}, D}^2 = .02\%$, $R_{D \sim Z \mathbf{X}}^2 = 26.53\%$				

This table displays the results of the sensitivity analysis. The quantity $R_{Y \sim D | \mathbf{X}}^2$ shows what happens in an extreme case in which a confounder that is orthogonal to all the covariates and also explains 100% of the residual variance of ANY INITIATION and FIRST INITIATION (RS). In this extreme case, the unobserved confounder would have to explain 0.03% and 0.02%, respectively, of the residual variance of MIGRANT STOCK. The rest of the covariates already explain 62% of the variation on MIGRANT STOCK. Perhaps, it is possible that such an extreme confounder exists.

The quantity $RV_{q=1}$ is the robustness value and shows that unobserved confounders (orthogonal to the covariates) that explain more than 1.57% for ANY INITIATION and 1.26% for FIRST INITIATION of the residual variance of both the treatment and the outcome are strong enough to bring the point estimate to 0 (a bias of 100 percent of the original estimate). This may not seem like a lot but it is very difficult to predict these cases because they are so rare: the R^2 of the regression on ANY INITIATION is 0.026 and on FIRST INITIATION is 0.0007. Thus this confounder would have to explain more than half the variation of ANY INITIATION and 26 times more variation of FIRST INITIATION than is currently explained.

Figure A5: Sensitivity of Migration Effect to Confounders



This figure plots the coefficient on MIGRANT STOCK from a regression of ANY INITIATION (Table 3 Model 1) and FIRST INITIATION (Table 3 Model 3) given the inclusion of a hypothetical confounder that is one to three or four times as strong as DEMOCRACY (SS), respectively. The x- and y-axes are expressed in the partial R^2 of the treatment (MIGRANT STOCK) and the outcome (ANY INITIATION or FIRST INITIATION) and the red line is when the point estimate would be equal to zero.

Examining later case stages

Table A3: Regressions of Case Stages using MIGRANT STOCK

	Initiation	Investigations	Formal Proceedings	Arrests	Trials
Migration (SS → RS)					
Migrant Stock	0.00013**	0.000030	0.0000071	-0.0000021	0.0000047
Atrocities (SS)					
PTS (mean, DoS, past 10 years, SS)	0.00040***	0.00012*	0.000058	0.000023	0.0000026
Democracy (mean past 10 years, SS)	-0.00078***	-0.000079	0.0000029	0.000098	0.0000028
Responsiveness (RS)					
Democracy (RS)	-0.00039**	-0.000044	-0.0000047	-0.000072	-0.0000048
Population (RS)	-0.00023***	-0.000022	0.000037	0.000033	-0.0000020
Center (RS)	-0.00015	-0.000023	0.000097	0.000091	0.0000022
Left (RS)	-0.00018	0.000059	0.00011	0.000096	0.0000044
Rome Statute (RS)	0.00069**	0.00022	0.00013	0.00015	-0.000052
Private Prosecutions (RS)	0.00036**	-0.000042	-0.000064	0.000012	0.0000034
British Legal Origin (RS)	-0.00063***	-0.00012	-0.000041	0.000093	-0.0000048
Cost (RS)					
GDPpc (RS)	0.00020	0.000039	0.000064**	0.000013	0.0000053
OECD (RS)	0.00019	0.00013**	0.00012*	0.000060*	0.0000085
Prior Initiation (RS)	0.070**	0.092***	0.084***	0.060***	0.000038
Prior Success (RS)	0.00011	-0.0014*	-0.0014*	-0.0014**	0.033**
Cost (Dyadic)					
GDPpc (SS)	0.00012**	0.000013	-0.0000091	-0.000024	-0.0000023
Trade	0.00025	0.00016	0.00013	0.00011	0.000036
Alliance	-0.00069*	-0.000097	0.000096	0.00031	0.00012
Major Power (RS)	-0.0016	0.0000012	0.00033	0.00039	0.00028
Major Power (SS)	-0.00096*	-0.000077	0.00034	0.00056	-0.00027
Shared language	0.0010*	0.0000031	-0.000028	-0.00012	0.000099
Controls					
NGOs (RS)	0.000011**	-0.00000039	-0.0000016	-0.0000011	0.000000078
International Prosecutions (SS)	0.0061	0.0035	0.0025	0.0019	0.0013
Amnesty (SS)	-0.00087*	-0.00053*	-0.00029	-0.00028	-0.00024
Former Colony (dyad)	0.0026	0.0019	0.0018	0.00099	0.0012
Former Colony (any)	-0.00036*	0.000079	0.000091	0.00010	0.000066
Distance	0.00022*	0.000065	0.000046	0.000043	0.000019
Cold War	-0.000020	-0.000056	-0.00012*	0.000056	0.000060
War on Terror	-0.00017	-0.00023	-0.00022	-0.000094	-0.000015
Observations	161213	161213	161213	161213	161213
R ²	0.026	0.068	0.066	0.051	0.034

Standard errors in parentheses. All models have robust standard errors clustered by dyad. Contiguity variables included but not shown. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A4: Regressions of Case Stages using REFUGEE STOCK

	Initiation	Investigations	Formal Proceedings	Arrests	Trials
Migration (SS → RS)					
Refugee stock	0.00041	0.00023	0.00015	0.00019	0.00015
PTS (mean, DoS, past 10 years, SS)	0.0020***	0.00064*	0.00044	0.00022	0.0000052
Democracy (mean past 10 years, SS)	-0.0052***	-0.00043	0.000086	0.00071	0.000036
Responsiveness (RS)					
Democracy (RS)	0.0049	0.0026	0.0025	0.000076	-0.00017
Population (RS)	-0.0012*	-0.00023	-0.000081	-0.00021	-0.00013
Center (RS)	0.0015	0.00078	0.00058	0.00066	-0.00032
Left (RS)	0.0012	0.00082	0.0010	0.00060	-0.00041
Rome Statute (RS)	0.0024*	0.00079	0.00053	0.00051	-0.00012
Private Prosecutions (RS)	0.0022	-0.00012	-0.00026	-0.00041	-0.00041
British Legal Origin (RS)	-0.0038*	-0.0017	-0.0015	-0.0014	-0.00023
Cost (RS)					
GDPpc (RS)	-0.00026	0.0000060	0.000029	0.00022	-0.000018
OECD (RS)	0.0013	0.00014	-0.000064	-0.00024	-0.00014
Prior Initiation (RS)	0.057*	0.082***	0.067***	0.043***	0.027*
Prior Success (RS)	-0.0025	-0.0024	-0.0013	-0.0015	-0.00097
Cost (Dyadic)					
GDPpc (SS)	0.0011***	0.000018	-0.000052	-0.00021	-0.00021
Trade	-0.0041	-0.0040*	-0.0039*	-0.0027*	-0.0020*
Alliance	0.000052	-0.00019	-0.00041	0.000097	0.00070
Major Power (RS)	-0.0013	0.00095	0.0016	0.0018	-0.00090
Major Power (SS)	-0.0035*	-0.0018	-0.0012	-0.00022	0.00019
Shared language	0.0062**	0.00078	0.00041	-0.00018	-0.00090
Controls					
NGOs (RS)	0.000026**	0.0000096	-0.0000010	0.00000041	0.00000021
International Prosecutions (SS)	0.0074	0.0049	0.0032	0.0028	0.0024
Amnesty (SS)	-0.0044**	-0.0026**	-0.0017*	-0.0015*	-0.0011
Former Colony (dyad)	0.0056	0.0053	0.0051	0.0028	0.0043
Former Colony (any)	-0.0015	0.00074	0.00096	0.0012**	0.00064*
Distance	0.0022***	0.00088*	0.00063	0.00027	0.00023
Cold War	-0.0014*	-0.0011	-0.00083	-0.00044	-0.00030
War on Terror	0.00010	-0.00060	0.00025	0.00040	0.00033
Observations	21856	21856	21856	21856	21856
R ²	0.029	0.062	0.052	0.036	0.031

Standard errors in parentheses. All models have robust standard errors clustered by dyad. Contiguity variables included but not shown. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A5: Regressions of First Case Stages using MIGRANT STOCK

	Initiation	Investigations	Formal Proceedings	Arrests	Trials
Migration (SS → RS)					
Migrant Stock	0.000048*	-0.000016	(0.000010)	0.000015	(0.0000084)
PTS (mean, DoS, past 10 years, SS)	0.000027	0.000094	(0.000022)	0.000025	(0.000012)
Democracy (mean past 10 years, SS)	-0.00020	0.000086	(0.000082)	-0.000031	(0.000031)
Responsiveness (RS)					
Democracy (RS)	-0.00014	0.000030	(0.000083)	-0.000052	(0.000048)
Population (RS)	-0.000034	0.000021	(0.000024)	-0.000026*	(0.000012)
Center (RS)	0.00010	0.000015	(0.00011)	0.000014	(0.000038)
Left (RS)	-0.000017	0.000047	(0.000037)	0.000032	(0.000027)
Rome Statute (RS)	0.00016	0.00010	(0.00010)	0.000012	(0.000031)
Private Prosecutions (RS)	-0.00012	-0.000039	(0.000059)	0.000012	(0.000049)
British Legal Origin (RS)	0.00092	0.000053	(0.000072)	-0.000090	(0.000028)
Cost (RS)					
GDPpc (RS)	0.000021	-0.000054	(0.000036)	-0.000028	(0.000023)
OECD (RS)	-0.000041	0.000092	(0.000066)		
Prior Initiation (RS)		0.33*	(0.17)		
Prior Success (RS)					
Cost (Dyadic)					
GDPpc (SS)	-0.000012	-0.0000034	(0.000070)		
Trade	0.00012	0.000060	(0.000067)		
Alliance	0.00026	0.00022	(0.00016)		
Major Power (RS)	-0.00073	-0.00048	(0.00054)		
Major Power (SS)	-0.00028*	-0.000017	(0.000068)		
Shared language	-0.000043	0.000025	(0.00011)		
Controls					
NGOs (RS)	0.0000042	0.0000041	(0.000032)	0.000027	(0.000016)
International Prosecutions (SS)	0.00047	0.0012	(0.00061)	0.00041	(0.00024)
Amnesty (SS)	-0.00016*	-0.000075	(0.000066)	-0.000079	(0.000048)
Former Colony (dyad)	0.00056	0.00038	(0.00051)	0.00033	(0.00041)
Former Colony (any)	-0.00021*	0.000023	(0.000062)	-0.000030	(0.000033)
Distance	0.000099	-0.000012	(0.000044)	0.000045	(0.000025)
Cold War	0.000086	0.00010	(0.000059)	0.000078	(0.000062)
War on Terror	-0.000020	-0.000083	(0.00013)	-0.00010	(0.000088)
Observations	141403	143555	281818	283668	294453
R ²	0.00092	0.19	0.00058	0.00064	0.00057

Standard errors in parentheses. All models have robust standard errors clustered by dyad. Contiguity variables included but not shown. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A6: Regressions of First Case Stages using REFUGEE STOCK

	Initiation	Investigations	Formal Proceedings	Arrests	Trials
Migration (SS → RS)					
Refugee stock	0.00013	0.00014	0.00020*	0.000064*	0.00010*
Atrocities (SS)					
PTS (mean, DoS, past 10 years, SS)	0.00028	0.0000030	0.00017	0.000038	-0.000043
Democracy (mean past 10 years, SS)	-0.0013	0.00020	-0.00018	-0.00029	-0.00011
Responsiveness (RS)					
Democracy (RS)	0.0021	0.0027	0.00043	0.00032	0.00012
Population (RS)	-0.00039	-0.00017	-0.00020*	(0.000085)	-0.00014
Center (RS)	0.0012	0.00032	0.00037	(0.00031)	0.00026
Left (RS)	0.00038	0.00038	0.00025	(0.00028)	-0.000056
Rome Statute (RS)	0.00056	0.00061	0.00029	(0.00056)	-0.00020
Private Prosecutions (RS)	0.00057	-0.00076	0.00030	(0.00020)	0.00083
British Legal Origin (RS)	0.00078	-0.00016	-0.00070*	(0.00027)	-0.00017
Cost (RS)					
GDPpc (RS)	-0.00069	-0.00057	(0.00064)		-0.00053*
OECD (RS)	0.00032	0.00029	(0.00043)		
Prior Initiation (RS)		0.25	(0.14)		
Prior Success (RS)					
Cost (Dyadic)					
GDPpc (SS)	0.00014	-0.00029	(0.00014)		
Trade	-0.00018	-0.00071	(0.0012)		
Alliance	0.0012	0.00049	(0.0012)		
Major Power (RS)	-0.0049	-0.0018	(0.0061)		
Major Power (SS)	-0.00082	0.00032	(0.00061)		
Shared language	0.00052	0.00097	(0.0012)		
Controls					
NGOs (RS)	0.00021	0.0000098	0.0000078	0.0000059	0.0000014
International Prosecutions (SS)	-0.00054	0.0021	0.0014	0.0012*	0.0014*
Amnesty (SS)	-0.00077	-0.00076	-0.00061*	-0.00020	-0.00035
Former Colony (dyad)	-0.00071	-0.00089	-0.00079*	-0.00077*	0.0036
Former Colony (any)	-0.00082	0.00065	0.00023	-0.00010	0.00016
Distance	0.00045	0.00023	-0.00037	0.000040	0.000093
Cold War	-0.0015	-0.00050	-0.00014	-0.00055	-0.00022
War on Terror	-0.0011	-0.0013	-0.00050	0.00084	0.00033
Observations	10668	11640	25036	49219	32063
R ²	0.0032	0.13	0.0025	0.0017	0.0033

Standard errors in parentheses. All models have robust standard errors clustered by dyad. Contiguity variables included but not shown. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Alternative measures for domestic universal jurisdiction legislation

To examine the robustness of our migration controls to alternative measures of domestic legal systems, we used two approaches. First, we included receiving state fixed effects, which control for all time invariant aspects of a state that might affect universal jurisdiction cases. These effects could include aspects of the legal system that do not change over our time span. Second, we performed additional regressions that controlled for whether and what types of international crimes are defined in a receiving state's domestic law using data from Berlin (2020).

Table A7: Regressions of ANY INITIATIONS on Domestic UJ Legislation

Migrant Stock	0.00013* (0.000052)	0.00015* (0.000065)	0.00018** (0.000070)	0.00013* (0.000054)	0.00013* (0.000051)
Dom Leg: Genocide	0.000100 (0.00012)				
Dom Leg: War Crimes		0.00012 (0.00021)			
Dom Leg: Humanity			0.00035 (0.00024)		
Dom Leg: Any UJ Crime				0.00042*** (0.00012)	
Dom Leg: Sum of UJ Crimes					0.00012* (0.000057)
Observations	140615	112564	105352	130791	144737
R^2	0.026	0.028	0.029	0.026	0.026

Standard errors in parentheses. All models have robust standard errors clustered by dyad. Data are available 1976-2007. Other controls included but not shown. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A8: Regressions of FIRST INITIATIONS on Domestic UJ Legislation

Migrant Stock	0.000045 (0.000023)	0.000047 (0.000025)	0.000067* (0.000032)	0.000050* (0.000025)	0.000045* (0.000022)
Dom Leg: Genocide	-0.000077 (0.000056)				
Dom Leg: War Crimes		0.000069 (0.000061)			
Dom Leg: Humanity			-0.00010 (0.000071)		
Dom Leg: Any UJ Crime				-0.000037 (0.000059)	
Dom Leg: Sum of UJ Crimes					-0.0000023 (0.000018)
Observations	120932	94335	87769	111108	125054
R^2	0.0011	0.0012	0.0014	0.0011	0.00100

Standard errors in parentheses. All models have robust standard errors clustered by dyad. Data are available 1976-2007. Other controls included but not shown. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A9: Regressions of INITIATIONS on Explanatory Variables and Receiving State Fixed Effects

	Any			First		
	All Model 1	No. J. Doe Model 2	All Model 3	All Model 3	No. J. Doe Model 4	No. J. Doe Model 4
Migration (SS → RS)						
Migrant Stock	0.00014** (0.000051)	0.00014** (0.000051)	0.000052* (0.000022)	0.000052* (0.000022)	0.000052* (0.000022)	0.000052* (0.000022)
Atrocities (SS)						
PTS (mean, DoS, past 10 years, SS)	0.00040*** (0.000084)	0.00040*** (0.000084)	0.000029 (0.000024)	0.000029 (0.000024)	0.000029 (0.000024)	0.000029 (0.000024)
Democracy (mean past 10 years, SS)	-0.00081*** (0.00022)	-0.00081*** (0.00022)	-0.00021 (0.00011)	-0.00021 (0.00011)	-0.00021 (0.00011)	-0.00021 (0.00011)
Responsiveness (RS)						
Democracy (RS)	-0.00052** (0.00017)	-0.00052** (0.00017)	0.000022 (0.00015)	0.000022 (0.00015)	0.000022 (0.00015)	0.000022 (0.00015)
Population (RS)	-0.0021*** (0.00047)	-0.0021*** (0.00047)	0.00043 (0.00043)	0.00043 (0.00043)	0.00043 (0.00043)	0.00043 (0.00043)
Center (RS)	0.00014 (0.00014)	0.00014 (0.00014)	0.000091 (0.00011)	0.000091 (0.00011)	0.000091 (0.00011)	0.000091 (0.00011)
Left (RS)	0.00012 (0.00019)	0.00012 (0.00019)	-0.000073 (0.000078)	-0.000073 (0.000078)	-0.000073 (0.000078)	-0.000073 (0.000078)
Rome Statute (RS)	0.00077** (0.00025)	0.00077** (0.00025)	0.00017 (0.00013)	0.00017 (0.00013)	0.00017 (0.00013)	0.00017 (0.00013)
Private Prosecutions (RS)	-0.013*** (0.0028)	-0.013*** (0.0028)	0.0022 (0.0024)	0.0022 (0.0024)	0.0022 (0.0024)	0.0022 (0.0024)
British Legal Origin (RS)	-0.011*** (0.0025)	-0.011*** (0.0025)	0.0029 (0.0025)	0.0029 (0.0025)	0.0029 (0.0025)	0.0029 (0.0025)
Cost (RS)						
GDPpc (RS)	0.000083 (0.00025)	0.000083 (0.00025)	0.00040 (0.00025)	0.00040 (0.00025)	0.00040 (0.00025)	0.00040 (0.00025)
OECD (RS)	-0.0025 (0.0037)	-0.0025 (0.0037)	-0.00059 (0.00067)	-0.00059 (0.00067)	-0.00059 (0.00067)	-0.00059 (0.00067)
Prior Initiation (RS)	0.069** (0.024)	0.069** (0.024)				
Prior Success (RS)	-0.0015 (0.0017)	-0.0015 (0.0017)				
Cost (Dyadic)						
GDPpc (SS)	0.00013* (0.000051)	0.00013* (0.000051)	0.0000067 (0.000012)	0.0000067 (0.000012)	0.0000067 (0.000012)	0.0000067 (0.000012)
Trade	0.00038* (0.00017)	0.00038* (0.00017)	0.00022 (0.00012)	0.00022 (0.00012)	0.00022 (0.00012)	0.00022 (0.00012)
Alliance	-0.00028 (0.00027)	-0.00028 (0.00027)	0.00039 (0.00022)	0.00039 (0.00022)	0.00039 (0.00022)	0.00039 (0.00022)
Major Power (RS)	-0.0013 (0.0022)	-0.0013 (0.0022)	-0.0040 (0.0021)	-0.0040 (0.0021)	-0.0040 (0.0021)	-0.0040 (0.0021)
Major Power (SS)	-0.00100* (0.00043)	-0.00100* (0.00043)	-0.00028* (0.00011)	-0.00028* (0.00011)	-0.00028* (0.00011)	-0.00028* (0.00011)
Shared language	0.00100* (0.00044)	0.00100* (0.00044)	-0.000038 (0.000099)	-0.000038 (0.000099)	-0.000038 (0.000099)	-0.000038 (0.000099)
Controls						
NGOs (RS)	0.000014 (0.0000086)	0.000014 (0.0000086)	0.000011 (0.0000076)	0.000011 (0.0000076)	0.000011 (0.0000076)	0.000011 (0.0000076)
International Prosecutions (SS)	0.0062 (0.0034)	0.0062 (0.0034)	0.00049 (0.00062)	0.00049 (0.00062)	0.00049 (0.00062)	0.00049 (0.00062)
Amnesty (SS)	-0.00083 (0.00043)	-0.00083 (0.00043)	-0.00016* (0.000071)	-0.00016* (0.000071)	-0.00016* (0.000071)	-0.00016* (0.000071)
Former Colony (dyad)	0.0022 (0.0028)	0.0022 (0.0028)	0.00035 (0.00077)	0.00035 (0.00077)	0.00035 (0.00077)	0.00035 (0.00077)
Former Colony (any)	-0.00038* (0.00018)	-0.00038* (0.00018)	-0.00022* (0.000087)	-0.00022* (0.000087)	-0.00022* (0.000087)	-0.00022* (0.000087)
Distance	0.00046*** (0.00013)	0.00046*** (0.00013)	0.00017* (0.000075)	0.00017* (0.000075)	0.00017* (0.000075)	0.00017* (0.000075)
Cold War	-0.00030 (0.00016)	-0.00030 (0.00016)	0.000087 (0.000067)	0.000087 (0.000067)	0.000087 (0.000067)	0.000087 (0.000067)
War on Terror	0.000067 (0.00030)	0.000067 (0.00030)	0.0000094 (0.00014)	0.0000094 (0.00014)	0.0000094 (0.00014)	0.0000094 (0.00014)
Observations	161213	161213	141403	141403	141403	141403
R ²	0.026	0.026	0.0015	0.0015	0.0015	0.0015

Standard errors in parentheses. All models have robust standard errors clustered by dyad. Data for Models

1 & 2 are available 1976-2007. Data for Models 3 & 4 are available to 2012. Contiguity variables included

but not shown. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Alternative measures of relative power between the sending and receiving state

Table A10: Regressions of INITIATIONS on Explanatory Variables with the CINC Ratio

	Any		First	
	All Model 1	No J. Doe Model 2	All Model 3	No J. Doe Model 4
Migrant Stock	0.00011* (0.000048)	0.00011* (0.000048)	0.000038 (0.000021)	0.000038 (0.000021)
CINC ratio (RS/SS)	-0.00000027 (0.00000019)	-0.00000027 (0.00000019)	-0.000000025 (0.000000071)	-0.000000025 (0.000000071)
Observations	160913	160913	141108	141108
R^2	0.025	0.025	0.00086	0.00086

Standard errors in parentheses. All models have robust standard errors clustered by dyad. Data for Models 1 & 2 are available 1976-2007. Data for Models 3 & 4 are available to 2012. All other variables from Table 3 are included but not shown. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Interaction effect of NGOs and migration

Table A11: Regressions of INITIATIONS on Interaction of Migration and NGOs

	Any			First		
	All Model 1	No J. Doe Model 2	All Model 3	No J. Doe Model 4		
Migrant Stock	0.00015*** (0.000043)	0.00015*** (0.000043)	0.000043 (0.000025)	0.000043 (0.000025)		
NGOs (RS)	0.000019* (0.0000079)	0.000019* (0.0000079)	0.0000021 (0.0000045)	0.0000021 (0.0000045)		
Migrant Stock \times NGOs (RS)	-0.000000088 (0.00000074)	-0.000000088 (0.00000074)	0.000000025 (0.00000049)	0.000000025 (0.00000049)		
Observations	161213	161213	141403	141403		
R^2	0.026	0.026	0.00094	0.00094		

Standard errors in parentheses. All models have robust standard errors clustered by dyad. Data for Models 1 & 2 are available 1976-2007. Data for Models 3 & 4 are available to 2012. All other variables from Table 3 are included but not shown. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Diffusion

Finally, we examine whether universal jurisdiction cases diffuse across states in five different ways. First, we include two global time trends, which are coded as the sum of all cases initiated globally and the sum of all trials that have occurred globally. Second, we include two spacial lags. For each year and for each state i , we calculate $\sum_j \frac{cases_j}{distance_{ij}}$ using the INITIATION and TRIALS variables separately. Cases that occur in closer states are therefore weighted more than cases in states farther away. We take the sum of each measure over the previous 5 years. Third, we examine the number of cases in the region (minus the cases in the receiving state) in the previous 5 years, defining regions as the Correlates of War project does. Fourth, we examine the number of cases in states that share an official language (minus the cases in the receiving state) in the last five years.³ Fifth, we examine legal diffusion or the number of cases (trials) in states that share the same legal system in the last five years.

Note: Because of *APSR* page limits for supplemental materials, we omit the ten statistical tables generated by this analysis. Interested readers can obtain the table using the replication code. <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/PATI3W>

³Language data is from Graham and Tucker (2021).

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