

Supplemental Materials
**Social Groups as the Source of Political Belief Systems:
Fresh Evidence on an Old Theory***

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1 Knowledge

1.1 Knowledge of Group Positions

The tables below show, for the key political knowledge questions in the main text, the proportion of respondents that placed the racial groups and parties on the correct side of one another, on the incorrect side from one another, and at the same point/selected “don’t know.” The proportion of respondents placing the groups on opposite sides of one another is generally negligible; those who do not give the correct response almost entirely place the groups at the same point or respond that they don’t know.

Table 1: Know Group Positions, 1972/1976

	Correct	Same/DK	Incorrect
Race: Gov’t Guarantee Jobs	0.68	0.27	0.05
Party: Gov’t Guarantee Jobs	0.51	0.38	0.10
Race: Gov’t Health Ins	0.57	0.41	0.02
Party: Gov’t Health Ins	0.42	0.52	0.06
Race: Ideology	0.68	0.26	0.06
Party: Ideology	0.68	0.23	0.10
Race: Rts Accused	0.55	0.40	0.05
Party: Rts Accused	0.31	0.59	0.11
Race: Aid Black	0.74	0.23	0.03
Party: Aid Black	0.42	0.48	0.10
Race: Busing	0.57	0.38	0.05
Party: Busing	0.33	0.53	0.14

The “correct” column includes the percentage of respondents that place the more conservative group to the right of the more liberal group. The same/DK column includes the percent of respondents who place the groups at the same position or say they do not know at least one of the group’s positions. The “incorrect” column includes those people that place the more liberal group to the right. For example, the first row (“Race: Gov’t Jobs”) shows that 68% of respondents believe that most whites hold more conservative position on government guarantee of jobs than most blacks. The second row (“Party: Gov’t Jobs”) shows that 51% of respondents believe that Republicans are more conservative on government guarantee of jobs than Democrats.

Table 2: Know Group, 1997

	Correct	Same/DK	Incorrect
Race: Aid Black	0.75	0.14	0.11
Party: Aidblack	0.64	0.22	0.14
Race: Gov Serve/Sp	0.51	0.42	0.07
Party: Gov Serve/Sp	0.68	0.19	0.13
Race: Ideology	0.61	0.31	0.07
Party: Ideology	0.76	0.10	0.15

Table 3: Know Group, 2021

	Correct	Same/DK	Incorrect
Race: Gov't Guarantee Jobs	0.71	0.20	0.09
Party: Gov't Guarantee Jobs	0.80	0.09	0.10
Race: Gov't Health Ins	0.71	0.24	0.05
Party: Gov't Health Ins	0.86	0.10	0.04
Race: Aid Black	0.72	0.25	0.03
Party: Aidblack	0.80	0.15	0.04
Race: Police	0.79	0.15	0.05
Party: Police	0.83	0.08	0.09
Race: Environment	0.24	0.62	0.14
Party: Environment	0.76	0.17	0.07
Race: Immigration	0.34	0.58	0.08
Party: Immigration	0.82	0.16	0.03

1.2 Social Group Knowledge among Low Political Knowledge Subjects

To understand how knowledge of where parties and groups stand on issues is distributed in the electorate, we next break down respondent knowledge of party and social group policy views by more general political knowledge.¹ Group knowledge is especially high among low knowledge respondents when compared to knowledge of party positions. This is especially pronounced in the 1970s, although it persists across years.

Table 4: **Knowledge of Party and Social Group Policy Views among those with Low Political Knowledge**

	(1) Below Avg: Pct Know Race	(2) Below Avg: Pct Know Party
Avg. 1972	.52	.30
Avg. 1976	.43	.21
Avg. 1997	.52	.47
Avg. 2021	.72	.59

Each cell represents the average knowledge of party versus group positions across years. Only implicitly or explicit racial questions included.


¹In each year, interviewers for the American National Election Study are asked to rank respondents on a scale from 1 to 5 to measure their general knowledge levels. For the 2021 YouGov sample, we measure general knowledge by responses to questions about basic political facts (e.g, how long is a Senator's term).

2 Issue Attitudes

2.1 Alternative Explanations

The pattern of attitudes presented in the mechanisms section is consistent with our theory. However, as discussed in the sections on stability and constraint, other factors may explain our results. For ease of comparison (and as we do in the sections on stability and constraint), we pool together all issues for each year and calculate the precision-weighted average difference in slopes across all issues between respondents who associate groups with a policy and those who do not. The first row of Figure 1 presents the results of Figure 4 from the main text, collapsed into precision-weighted averages by year. The remaining rows of Figure 1 test alternative explanations for this relationship beyond the effect of social group knowledge (as done in previous sections).

Figure 1: **Alternative Explanations for difference in Issue Attitudes, Group Affect and Social Group Policy Views**



This figure explores alternative explanations for Fig. 4 in the main text; line 1 shows the average by year of all points in the right-hand panel of Fig. 4. Each point represents the difference in the relationship between group attitudes and issue attitudes between respondents who know and do not know group policy views, averaged across issues. Positive coefficients mean the relationship between group attitudes and issue attitudes is stronger for respondents who can accurately place the social groups than for those who cannot. For full results as regression tables, see section 9 of the secondary appendix.


As in the sections on stability and constraint, other forms of knowledge cannot account for the role of social group knowledge. The relationship between knowledge of social group positions and impact of group attitudes on issue attitudes is similar in all comparisons: people who do and do not know where the parties stand on issues (lines 2-3), people who do and do not know which parties

groups align with (lines 4-5), and people at all levels of political knowledge² (lines 6-8), with the exception of the lowest knowledge category in 2021³.

2.2 Placebo Knowledge

Another alternative explanation for the relationship between group knowledge and group attitudes' effects on issue positions is that voters who know that know the racial groups' positions on policy X are just generally more knowledgeable about politics; this could create a stronger relationship between group and policy attitudes in general. To test this alternative explanation, we replicate the analysis where we regress attitudes on policy X on knowledge of racial groups' positions on a policy times the respondents' racial attitude—but instead of knowledge about issue X, we instead use *other than X*. The effect is much smaller for misaligned policies, suggesting that knowledge about racial group positions on specific policies drives the effect.

Figure 2: **Placebo Knowledge**



For results as regression tables, see section 9 of the secondary appendix.

2.3 Projection


We take our results as evidence that voters learn which groups support and oppose group-related from their political context. However, Brady and Sniderman (1985) provide an important alternative explanation for this knowledge: a process of projection. The projection account sees voters' own issue attitudes as the source of their perceptions of the attitudes of social groups.⁴ Brady and Sniderman argue that people attribute attitudes that are similar to their own to groups they like and attitudes dissimilar to their own to groups they dislike. For example, a white person who dislikes black people attributes positions to black people that are very unlike the white person's own positions.

²For the 2021 YouGov sample, as before, this was determined by factual questions about government/politics.

³The Additional Tests: Issue Attitudes section of the secondary appendix repeats this model with individual fixed effects, and the results are robust to this specification.

⁴That is, the opposite of our account.

Figure 3: **Histograms of racial group placement differences among conservatives.**



The x-axis represents the difference between the placement of black and white people on each issue, with positive numbers indicating black people placed further to the left than white people. We subset the data to 1) people who feel more positively to whites than blacks and 2) people who indicate they are more conservative on each policy item.

Brady and Sniderman provide compelling evidence that projection plays some role in perception of social groups' attitudes. However, the projection account leaves important patterns unexplained. Most importantly, projection cannot account for observed differences in knowledge of a group's positions across different issues (as, for example, in Figure 1).

To illustrate this, consider a group of respondents who a) feel warmer towards white people than black people, b) are conservative on environmental issues, and c) are conservative on the issue of aid to minorities. How might these people judge the positions of white and black people on these issues? A projection account would predict that on both environment and aid to minorities, they should overwhelmingly attribute more liberal attitudes to black people than white people. In our account, the predictions for the two issues are different: the issue of aid to minorities is linked to racial groups, while the issue of environment is not. Therefore, we expect many respondents to know black people are more liberal than whites on aid to minorities, but we expect fewer respondents to do the same on the issue of environment.

Figure 3 shows the positions attributed to black and white people on environment (on the left) and aid to minorities (on the right) among the subset of respondents to our 2021 NORC survey who feel warmer towards white people than black people and are conservative on both issues. On the issue of aid to minorities, the pattern both we and the projection account predict is borne out: 85% of respondents know that black people are more liberal than whites. However, on the issue of environment, only 38% place blacks to the left of whites and another 38% of respondents place the racial groups at the same position — a choice that makes little sense if respondents are projecting their attitudes onto the racial groups.

Instead, this pattern fits with our hypothesis that respondents associate government aid to minorities with racial groups to a greater extent than they do environmental policy. While we do not doubt that projection plays some role in perceptions of groups' positions, especially when a person does not know the group's position, the evidence presented in this section suggests that people make meaningful distinctions between issues on the basis of their social group ties.

3 Temporal Stability: Additional Results

The tables in this section present additional tests of the temporal stability analyses in the main text.

3.1 Multivariate Regression, Controls

To address the concern that demographic differences between respondents who do and do not know where the racial groups stand could account for differences in stability, the models in this table add controls for respondent characteristics. The results are robust.

Table 5: **Stability with Demographic Controls**

	(1) 1970s	(2) 1997	(3) 2021
% Place Race Correct	-3.09*** (0.62)	-3.94** (1.35)	-2.70* (1.24)
South	-0.09 (0.51)	-0.65 (1.04)	1.09 (0.83)
BA+	-1.56** (0.58)	-1.26 (1.03)	-2.01* (0.83)
Party ID	-0.37*** (0.11)	-0.43 (0.23)	-0.15 (0.18)
White	0.34 (2.60)	0.77 (3.49)	0.02 (0.94)
Black	5.36* (2.70)	5.39 (3.95)	0.99 (1.47)
Constant	18.34*** (2.64)	15.81*** (3.67)	11.38*** (1.51)
<i>N</i>	1466	308	343

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

3.2 Control for General Political Knowledge

To address the concern that differences in general political knowledge could explain the effects of differences in racial group placement knowledge, the models in the table below add a control for general political knowledge. While general political knowledge is associated with greater stability, the coefficients on racial group placement knowledge remain significant.

Table 6: **Stability Controlling for General Knowledge**

	(1) 1970s	(2) 1997	(3) 2021
% Place Race Correct	-3.59*** (0.76)	-3.92** (1.22)	-2.48* (1.23)
General Political Knowledge	-1.52* (0.63)	-4.86*** (1.24)	-2.34* (1.07)
Constant	18.54*** (0.54)	17.55*** (1.09)	12.13*** (1.22)
<i>N</i>	1550	308	347

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Temporal Stability controlling for ANES interviewer rated knowledge, 1972-1976 and 1992-1996, only.

3.3 Positive vs. Negative Feelings towards Blacks

This section tests whether positive or negative attitudes towards a racial group produce a stronger link between group placement knowledge and stability. Columns 1-3 repeat the main results on respondents with warmer-than-neutral attitudes towards black people, while columns 4-6 uses respondents with colder-than-neutral attitudes. The results are more consistently significant for negative affect, and the coefficients are larger in the later period. (The coefficient for positive affect is larger in the 1970s, though the sample size here is small.)

Table 7: Positive vs. Negative Feelings towards Blacks (Whites Only)

	Positive Feelings to Blacks			Negative Feelings to Blacks		
	(1) 1970	(2) 1997	(3) 2021	(4) 1970	(5) 1997	(6) 2021
% Place Race Correct	-14.10** (4.53)	-4.38 (5.11)	-2.50 (2.24)	-3.80*** (0.80)	-5.26* (2.38)	-5.67* (2.56)
Constant	26.79*** (3.57)	13.01** (3.81)	9.82*** (1.83)	17.47*** (0.60)	16.00*** (1.80)	14.27*** (2.22)
<i>N</i>	41	22	102	791	81	83

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Broken down by whether respondent has more positive feelings towards blacks than whites (columns 1-3) and people who have more positive feelings towards whites than blacks (columns 4-6).

4 Constraint: Additional Results

This section presents additional results related to the analyses of constraint in the main text. The three tables repeat the three analyses of stability in the previous section, instead looking at the outcome of constraint.

4.1 Multivariate Regression, Controls

Table 8: Results with Controls

	(1) 1970s	(2) 1997	(3) 2021
% Place Race Correct	-7.99*** (0.70)	-4.56** (1.64)	-2.22 (1.36)
White	2.47 (1.69)	-9.12 (5.47)	-1.19 (1.07)
Black	1.72 (1.86)	-4.89 (5.91)	1.57 (1.62)
South	-0.22 (0.60)	-1.73 (1.23)	0.75 (0.93)
BA+	-3.85*** (0.71)	-3.32* (1.29)	-3.90*** (0.92)
Party ID	-0.35** (0.13)	-0.49 (0.27)	0.55** (0.20)
Constant	30.98*** (1.77)	32.06*** (5.61)	20.45*** (1.55)
<i>N</i>	3922	474	956

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Pooled responses with controls.

4.2 Control for General Knowledge

Table 9: Results Controlling for Interview Knowledge

	(1) 1970s	(2) 1997	(3) 2021
% Place Race Correct	-8.07*** (0.71)	-4.60** (1.64)	-2.67 (1.91)
Gen Political Knwldg	-2.22*** (0.67)	-4.83** (1.54)	-5.06** (1.63)
Constant	32.68*** (0.55)	23.02*** (1.38)	24.05*** (1.85)
<i>N</i>	3924	474	451

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Pooled responses controlling for general knowledge.

4.3 Positive vs. Negative Feelings towards Blacks

Table 10: Positive vs. Negative Feelings towards Blacks (Whites Only)

	Positive Feelings to Blacks			Negative Feelings to Blacks		
	(1) 1970	(2) 1997	(3) 2021	(4) 1970	(5) 1997	(6) 2021
% Place Race Correct	2.28 (3.15)	4.60 (5.80)	-2.41 (2.93)	-10.49*** (0.98)	-7.16* (3.44)	-13.68*** (3.55)
Constant	24.06*** (2.32)	11.86* (4.37)	19.24*** (2.18)	33.54*** (0.72)	24.36*** (2.62)	29.66*** (2.64)
<i>N</i>	175	30	193	1958	117	175

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Broken down by whether respondent has more positive feelings towards blacks than whites (columns 1-3) and people who have more positive feelings towards whites than blacks (columns 4-6).

4.4 Experimental Evidence

This section reports the results of an experiment included on the 2021 NORC Amerispeak survey. The experiment attempted to induce a linkage between racial groups and environmental issues by presenting respondents with an informative paragraph about environmental racism. (Respondents in a placebo control group viewed an image and prompt highlighting the severity of environmental issues, and respondents in a control condition read about an unrelated issue). We expected that respondents in the treatment condition would more closely associate racial groups and the environment, and this linkage would lead them to exhibit greater constraint between environmental issues and racial issues.

However, our treatment failed to produce a linkage between racial groups and environmental issues. As a manipulation check, we measured respondents’ perceptions of racial groups’ positions on racial issues; as in other analyses, we measured linkage based on whether respondents placed black people’s opinion to the left of white people’s on a seven-point scale. Though a pilot experiment conducted using a sample recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk suggested the treatment did increase knowledge of this linkage, the treatment on the NORC/Amerispeak sample did not.

Table 11: Manipulation Check: Perception of Racial Groups & Environment

	(1)	(2)
	MTURK	NORC
Treat	0.29***	0.08
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	0.26***	0.23***
	(0.03)	(0.02)
<i>N</i>	511	564
<i>R</i> ²	0.085	0.007

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Treat is a 0-1 variable that framed environmental issues in racial terms. Dependent variable is measure of people how “know” that blacks are more favorable to environmental reform than whites. Column 1 shows that Mturk workers in the treatment condition were 30% more likely to know this. However, in column 2, it appears the treatment fails the manipulation check in our NORC sample — treated respondents were no more likely to perceive environment as more racialized.

Although our treatment did not produce the expected linkage between racial groups and environmental issues, so we would not expect to see downstream effects on constraint, we report the effects of the treatment on constraint below for the sake of transparency.

Table 12: Constraint

	MTURK 2020		NORC 2021	
	(1) Env/Jobs	(2) Env/Imm	(3) Env/Aidblack	(4) Env/Imm
Treat	-0.0178 (0.0172)	-0.0212 (0.0220)	0.0131 (0.0177)	-0.0475 (0.0292)
Constant	0.1582*** (0.0106)	0.2105*** (0.0137)	0.1328*** (0.0097)	0.2439*** (0.0162)
<i>N</i>	369	258	350	186
<i>R</i> ²	0.003	0.004	0.002	0.014

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Treat is a 0-1 variable that framed environmental issues in racial terms. Dependent variable are constraint among pairs of issues (as measured by standard deviation between issue pairs). In the MTurk sample, we see that being in the treatment corresponds with modest increases in constraint (that is decrease in standard deviation) between environmental attitudes and the other issue (subset to people who know the racial groups on the secondary issue).

5 Social Sorting & Affective Polarization: Additional Results

This section presents additional results related to the analyses in the main text on social sorting and affective polarization. First, Table 5.1 divides respondents based on their answers to a question measuring the subjective importance of partisanship to their identity. The effect of party placement on stability and constraint is substantially stronger for respondents who see their partisanship as important to their identity.

5.1 Partisan Identity (2021 YouGov)

Table 13: Constraint & Stability by Partisan Identity

	Partisan Identity Import		Partisan Identity Not Import	
	(1) Constraint	(2) Stability	(3) Constraint	(4) Stability
% Place Race Correct	4.04 (3.17)	3.14 (2.31)	-2.20 (2.40)	-0.13 (1.59)
% Place Party Correct	-20.06*** (3.24)	-23.94*** (2.31)	-7.39** (2.48)	-5.70** (1.96)
Constant	33.27*** (3.08)	28.63*** (2.27)	25.47*** (2.49)	13.41*** (1.88)
<i>N</i>	198	162	232	181

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Columns 1 and 2 are those respondents who say their partisan identity is important to them. Columns 3 and 4 are those respondents who do not indicate their partisan identity is not important to them.

5.2 Issue Sorting

The table below presents results separately for respondents who agree and disagree with what they perceive to be their national party's position on an issue. For each issue with available data, we analyze people who perceive themselves to be in-line with the national party and share the position of the party (e.g., a racially liberal Democrat), and compare them with respondents who perceive themselves to be misaligned with their national party (e.g., a racially conservative Democrat). We measure perceived alignment as someone who identifies as a Democrat, and perceives their own issue position to be more closely aligned with Democrats than Republicans, as measured by their party-placement. We label those that place their own attitudes closer to the out-party as disagreeing with the party. We limit the 1997 sample to only ideological self-placement and government services spending because these are the only issues for which party placement was available in the first wave.

Table 14: Average Constraint & Stability by Agree or Disagree with Party on Issue


	CONSTRAINT						STABILITY					
	1970		1997		2021		1970		1997		2021	
	Agree (1)	Disagree (2)	Agree (3)	Disagree (4)	Agree (5)	Disagree (6)	Agree (7)	Disagree (8)	Agree (9)	Disagree (10)	Agree (11)	Disagree (12)
% Place Group Correct	-4.24 (0.43)	-6.93 (0.70)	-2.01 (0.89)	1.06 (1.58)	-1.47 (0.56)	2.60 (1.88)	-0.35 (0.70)	-5.02 (1.00)	-3.08 (2.11)	-4.34 (1.76)	0.30 (0.94)	-1.42 (3.62)
% Place Party Correct	-12.31 (0.44)	7.05 (0.70)	-7.90 (0.95)	7.34 (1.55)	-9.43 (0.73)	5.07 (1.82)	-2.90 (0.77)	0.26 (0.90)	-5.83 (3.50)	-3.18 (2.52)	-10.98 (1.55)	-0.08 (4.75)
Avg. Observations	583	289	248	104	319	67	283	169	43	44	240	25

Regression coefficients are weighted averages and standard errors are in parentheses.

6 Constraint and Stability: Non-Race Social Groups

The figures in this section reproduce results from the main text using social groups other than race. Figure 4 shows levels of constraint among respondents who do and do not know class groups' positions on class-related issues. Data is only available on class groups for 1976.


Figure 4: Constraint by Knowledge of Class-based Social Groups



Note: Data on class-based social groups only available in 1976. **Left Panel:** Lower values equal more constraint. Social groups here are knowledge of where “businessmen” and “poor people” stand on each of the issues in question. **Right Panel:** Robustness checks (see main manuscript for details.) For full results as regression tables, see section 9 of the secondary appendix.

Figure 5 shows levels of stability among respondents who do and don't know the positions of class groups and cultural groups for relevant issues. Again, the years of results presented vary based on data availability.

Figure 5: Stability by Knowledge of Class-based/Culture-based Social Groups



Note: Data on non-race social groups only available in years shown on graph. Question on women equal roles uses gender based knowledge in 1976 (men/women stand on issue) and culture wars based knowledge in 1997 (Christian Fundamentalists/LGBT stand on issue). **Left Panel:** Lower values equal more stability. Social groups here are knowledge of where “businessmen” and “poor people” stand on each of the economic issues in question; where “men” and “women” stand on women equality in 1976; and where Christian Fundamentalists/LGBT people stand for the question on Women Equality in 1997. **Right Panel:** Robustness checks (see main manuscript for details.) For full results as regression tables, see section 9 of the secondary appendix.

Finally, the tables below show the relationship between group placement knowledge and stability and constraint separately for respondents who are and are not aligned with their parties’ positions on these groups. As in the main text, the effects of social group knowledge are stronger for people unaligned with their party.

Table 15: Constraint: Party versus Class Knowledge (1976 ANES)

	(1) Sorted	(2) Not Sorted
% Place Class Correct	-8.41* (3.62)	-11.19** (4.14)
% Place Party Correct	-7.36** (2.47)	-6.67* (3.01)
Constant	38.56*** (2.87)	39.80*** (3.22)
<i>N</i>	462	232

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table replicates analysis of social sorting in Table 3 of the main manuscript but with class-based social groups and affect. Column 1 are respondents that are socially sorted; that is those respondents that feel warmer affect (measured using group feeling thermometers) to the class based group that aligns with their party (e.g., Democrat that feels warmer to poor people than businessmen). Column 2 are respondents that are not socially sorted; that is those respondents that feel warmer to the out-party group (e.g., Democrat that feels warmer to businessmen than to poor people).

Table 16: Stability: Party versus Class Knowledge (1970s ANES Panel)

	(1) Sorted	(2) Not Sorted
% Place Class Correct	-2.11 (3.35)	-5.70 (4.04)
% Place Party Correct	-2.45 (2.20)	-5.52* (2.75)
Constant	21.85*** (2.67)	26.62*** (3.26)
<i>N</i>	313	177

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table replicates analysis of social sorting in Table 3 of the main manuscript but with class-based social groups and affect. Column 1 are respondents that are socially sorted; that is those respondents that feel warmer affect (measured using group feeling thermometers) to the class based group that aligns with their party (e.g., Democrat that feels warmer to poor people than businessmen). Column 2 are respondents that are not socially sorted; that is those respondents that feel warmer to the out-party group (e.g., Democrat that feels warmer to businessmen than to poor people).

Table 17: Stability: Party versus Culture War Groups Knowledge (1990s ANES Panel)

	(1) Sorted	(2) Not Sorted
Know Culture Grps	1.67 (2.99)	-2.84 (3.85)
Know Party	-2.28 (2.76)	0.42 (3.58)
Constant	11.02*** (2.49)	17.07*** (3.58)
<i>N</i>	120	75

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Replicates social sorting (see section 4 of main manuscript) with the question of gender equality in the 1997 sample. Uses affect towards fundamentalist Christians and LGBT people and knowledge of where those groups stand on question of gender equality.

7 Survey Descriptive Statistics

This section presents descriptive statistics for the surveys we conducted. The paper’s analysis used weighted data, when available, but unweighted demographics are also presented below.

Table 18: NORC-Amerispeak Mar/April 2021 (Weighted)

	Statistic	Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max
1	BA	565.00	0.36	0.48	0.00	1.00
2	White	565.00	0.65	0.48	0.00	1.00
3	Black	565.00	0.12	0.32	0.00	1.00
4	Hispanic	565.00	0.15	0.35	0.00	1.00
5	Asian Pac Island	565.00	0.04	0.21	0.00	1.00
6	Male	565.00	0.49	0.50	0.00	1.00
7	Age	565.00	48.06	17.70	18.00	91.00
8	Party	557.00	3.83	2.19	1.00	7.00
9	Party FT	561.00	-0.08	0.50	-1.00	1.00
10	Race FT	560.00	-0.02	0.22	-1.00	1.00
11	Aid Blacks	509.00	0.41	0.31	0.00	1.00
12	Immigration	486.00	0.55	0.32	0.00	1.00
13	Environment	516.00	0.26	0.28	0.00	1.00

Table 19: NORC-Amerispeak Mar/April 2021 (Unweighted)

	Statistic	Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max
1	BA	565.00	0.36	0.48	0.00	1.00
2	White	565.00	0.66	0.47	0.00	1.00
3	Black	565.00	0.11	0.32	0.00	1.00
4	Hispanic	565.00	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00
5	Asian Pac Island	565.00	0.02	0.16	0.00	1.00
6	Male	565.00	0.49	0.50	0.00	1.00
7	Age	565.00	49.14	17.35	18.00	91.00
8	Party	557.00	3.72	2.17	1.00	7.00
9	Party FT	561.00	-0.09	0.52	-1.00	1.00
10	Race FT	560.00	-0.03	0.22	-1.00	1.00
11	Aidblack	509.00	0.39	0.30	0.00	1.00
12	Immigration	486.00	0.53	0.33	0.00	1.00
13	Environment	516.00	0.25	0.28	0.00	1.00

Table 20: YouGov Mar/April 2021 (Weighted)

	Statistic	Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max
1	BA	451.00	0.32	0.47	0.00	1.00
2	White	451.00	0.68	0.47	0.00	1.00
3	Black	451.00	0.11	0.32	0.00	1.00
4	Hispanic	451.00	0.14	0.34	0.00	1.00
5	Asian Pac Island	451.00	0.02	0.15	0.00	1.00
6	Male	451.00	0.49	0.50	0.00	1.00
7	Age	451.00	50.05	17.78	19.00	92.00
8	Party	447.00	3.80	2.34	1.00	7.00
9	Party FT	443.00	-0.01	0.61	-1.00	1.00
10	Race FT	447.00	-0.03	0.27	-1.00	0.99
11	Aid Blacks	451.00	0.46	0.37	0.00	1.00
12	Defund Police	451.00	0.59	0.30	0.00	1.00
13	Gov't Jobs	451.00	0.51	0.34	0.00	1.00
14	Gov't Ins	451.00	0.46	0.39	0.00	1.00

Table 21: YouGov Mar/April 2021 (Unweighted)

	Statistic	Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max
1	BA	451.00	0.33	0.47	0.00	1.00
2	White	451.00	0.69	0.46	0.00	1.00
3	Black	451.00	0.11	0.31	0.00	1.00
4	Hispanic	451.00	0.10	0.29	0.00	1.00
5	Asian Pac Island	451.00	0.03	0.16	0.00	1.00
6	Male	451.00	0.47	0.50	0.00	1.00
7	Age	451.00	50.77	17.20	19.00	92.00
8	Party	447.00	3.40	2.23	1.00	7.00
9	Party FT	443.00	-0.11	0.57	-1.00	1.00
10	Race FT	447.00	-0.05	0.27	-1.00	0.99
11	Aid Minorities	451.00	0.42	0.35	0.00	1.00
12	Defund Police	451.00	0.55	0.30	0.00	1.00
13	Gov't Jobs	451.00	0.48	0.34	0.00	1.00
14	Gov't Ins	451.00	0.40	0.38	0.00	1.00

7.1 Ethics Statement

Research was approved by the IRB. Payment was consistent with what is typical for online surveys. The survey pool was eligible to any one over 18 years living in the United States and marginalized groups were not included beyond the extent they are part of the general population. The research did not differentially benefit or harm particular groups.