Online Appendix for "Learning to Dislike Your Opponents: Political Socialization in the Era of Polarization"

Matthew Tyler[1] and Shanto Iyengar[2]

[1]Democracy and Polarization Lab, Stanford University
[2]Political Science and Communication, Stanford University

March 1, 2022

Contents

A Data Appendix

A.1 Overview

Our "pre-polarization" data is limited to one state (Wisconsin) and derives from a three-wave statewide survey of Wisconsin families (Sears, Dennis, and Chaffee 2015). The University of Wisconsin Survey Research Laboratory fielded this survey via random digit dialing. The sample consisted of Wisconsin households with children between the ages of 10 and 17. For each preadult respondent completing the survey, the researchers also interviewed one of their parents (selected randomly).

At the outset of the study, the sample included 718 parent-offspring pairs, but with attrition, the sample fell to 366 pairs by late 1981. When compared to a high-quality national sample (the 1980 American National Election Study), the Wisconsin adult sample is slightly more educated and skews significantly in favor of women because of the inclusion of single-parent households (for more details on the sample and survey methodology, see Chaffee and Miyo 1983; Chaffee and Schleuder 1986). We mostly use data from wave 1 of the survey (January 1980), but draw on a couple of variables collected in wave 2 (October 1980).[1]

Our "post-polarization" dataset is a 2019 national online survey of children between the ages of 11 and 17 whose parents are members of the YouGov online panel. YouGov offered incentives to parents ($5 worth of YouGov points) to recruit a child. YouGov then offered child respondents an Amazon gift certificate worth $5. At the outset of the survey, we began obtaining the consent of parents on behalf of themselves and their children with the help of the following prompt:

> DESCRIPTION: You are invited to participate in a research study about the political attitudes of parents and their teenage children conducted by researchers at Stanford University. You will be asked some demographic questions and a few questions about your political preferences.
>
> If you consent to participate in this study, you will be asked to provide a phone number at which we can reach your child (aged 11-17), and you will be giving consent for them to participate in this study as well. The survey link will be sent to the child via text message at the phone number you provide.
>
> TIME INVOLVEMENT: Your participation will take approximately 10 minutes.
>
> RISKS AND BENEFITS: This is a minimal risk study. We cannot promise that you will receive any benefits from participating in this study.
>
> PAYMENTS: You will receive reimbursement of $5 from YouGov as payment for your participation.
>
> PARTICIPANT'S RIGHTS: If you have read this form and have decided to participate in this project, please understand your participation is voluntary and you have the right to withdraw your consent or discontinue participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. The

1. In particular, we use military and police trust measures collected in wave 2.

> alternative is not to participate. You have the right to refuse to answer particular questions. The results of this research study may be presented at scientific or professional meetings or published in scientific journals. Your individual privacy will be maintained in all published and written data resulting from the study.
>
> [Omitted contact information]
>
> Please print a copy of this page for your records.
>
> If you agree to participate in this research, please complete the following questionnaire.

Therefore, consent of the parents on behalf of themselves and their chidlren was obtained and documented by their continued participation in the study.

519 parent-offspring pairs completed the survey, who were then matched down to a sample of 500 to produce the final dataset.[2] In comparison with the 2016 ANES face-to-face sample, our adult YouGov sample skews in the direction of women (as in 1980) and slightly towards the younger and more educated but is not meaningfully different with regard to age or ethnicity (see Table A.1).

There are obvious design and mode differences between our pre- and post-polarization samples. Wisconsin respondents completed the survey by telephone interview, the national respondents by online self-completion. In-person interviews, and telephone interviews in particular (see Kreuter, Presser, and Tourangeau 2008; Holbrook, Green, and Krosnick 2003) are well known for eliciting "social desirability bias," by which respondents gravitate to normatively appropriate answers to survey questions. In the substantive context of this study, we might anticipate that the 1980 respondents will be more likely to provide "polite" and relatively moderate evaluations of their political opponents than 2019 respondents who completed the survey anonymously. Given the large scale of the differences we observe in out-party hostility between 1980 and 2019, we are skeptical that these differences are attributable entirely to the difference in survey mode.[3]

Our key indicator of partisanship is the respondent's party identification. The 2019 survey follows the format of the standard American National Election Studies question. Respondents first indicate whether they think of themselves "as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or something else" and those who respond with "independent" or "something else" answer a follow-up question: "Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?" The Wisconsin survey included a parallel question, "Do you think of yourself as a Republican or Democrat?" If the respondent said "No," then they were asked "Are you closer to the Republican party or to the Democratic Party?" In the

2. YouGov matched respondents to a sampling frame of parents (aged 29-64) and of children (aged 11-17) on gender, age, ethnicity, and education. YouGov constructed the frame by stratified sampling from the full 2016 American Community Survey 1-year sample with selection within strata by weighted sampling with replacements using the person weights on the public use file.

3. Figure A.4 shows that in the ANES 2016 study there are statistically significant but substantively small mode differences in party evaluations. For instance, the average face-to-face Democratic respondent gave the Republican Party a thermometer score of 32, while that number only fell to 25 among Democrats who filled out the ANES online ($\Delta = 7.0$, or 0.32 standard deviations). If we compare that to the average decline in child out-party trust between 1980 and 2019 on our 5-point scale ($\Delta = -1.13$, or 1.2 standard deviations), we see that mode differences are unlikely to be large enough to undermine the interpretation of our results.

case of both the 1980 and 2019 surveys, we keep with conventional practice by combining leaners with partisans and exclude non-partisans (Druckman and Levendusky 2019). See the section below for exact wording and coding decisions.

A.2 Question Wordings and Coding Decisions

A.2.1 Party Identification (1980)

- Q28. Turning to a related topic... do you ever think of yourself as a Republican or a Democrat?

  1. Yes, Republican
  2. Yes, Democrat
  3. Yes, unspecified
  4. No

- (If Q28 = 3)

  Q28a. What political party — the Republican or the Democratic — do you favor?

  1. Republican
  2. Democrat
  3. Neither

- (If Q28 = 1,2 or Q28a = 1,2)

  Q28b. In your own mind, are you a very strong, fairly strong, or not a strong supporter of this party?

  1. Very strong
  2. Fairly strong
  3. Not strong
  4. Don't know

- (If Q28 = 4 or Q28a = 3)

  Q28c. Are you closer to the Republican party or to the Democratic party?

  1. Republican
  2. Democrat
  3. Neither
  4. Don't know

We classified 1980 respondents as Republicans if Q28, Q28a, or Q28c = 1 or Democrats if Q28, Q28a, or Q28c = 2 instead. The questions are checked in order, so we only check Q28a if Q28 is not 1 or 2, and so on. They are coded as strong partisans if Q28b = 1,2 or leaning partisan if Q28c = 1,2. They are non-partisans if Q28c = 3,4. We believe these decisions make party identification measured from the 1980 questions as close as possible to the 2019 measure based on the now-standard party ID battery.

A.2.2 Party Identification (2019)

- Q13. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or something else? (randomized order)

  1. Republican
  2. Democrat
  3. Independent
  4. Other

- (If Q13 = 1)

  Q15. Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?

  1. Strong Republican
  2. Not very strong Republican

- (If Q13 = 2)

  Q17. Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?

  1. Strong Democrat
  2. Not very strong Democrat

- (If Q13 = 3,4)

  Q19. Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party? (randomzied order)

  1. Closer to Democratic Party
  2. Closer to Republican Party
  3. Neither

Following the literature, we classify individuals with Q13 = 1 or Q19 = 2 as Republicans and those with Q13 = 2 or Q19 = 1 as Democrats. They are non-partisans if Q19 = 3. They are strong partisans if Q15 or Q17 = 1 and leaning partisans if Q19 = 1,2.

A.2.3 Trust Measures (1980)

Q33. Now I'll name some groups and organizations that are active in politics and government. For each one, please tell me **how often you think you can trust it or them to do what you feel is right. Can you almost always trust it to do what is right, can trust it most of the time, about half the time, not very often, or almost never?** First:

A Let's take the U.S. Congress. How often can you trust Congress to do what you think is right?

B The state government in Madison?

C **How about the Democratic party?**

D **The Republican party?**

E ...

We code the trust outcome as 5 = "almost always," 4 = "most of the time," 3 = "about half," 2 = "not very often," and 1 = "almost never."

A.2.4 Trust Measures (2019)

Q34. Now I'll name some groups and organizations that are active in politics and government. For each one, please tell me how often you think you can trust it or them to do what you feel is right.

- Q35. Let's take the Democratic Party. How often can you trust it to do what is right?

  5. Almost always
  4. Most of the time
  3. About half of the time
  2. Not very often
  1. Almost never

- Q37. Let's take the Republican Party. How often can you trust it to do what is right?

  5. Almost always
  4. Most of the time
  3. About half of the time
  2. Not very often
  1. Almost never

As with 1980, we code the trust outcome so that 5 is most trusting and 1 is least trusting.

A.2.5 Feeling Thermometers (2019)

Q23. We'd like to get your feelings toward some groups who are in the news these days. We'll show the name of a group and we'd like you to rate that group using something we call the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much for that group. You would rate the person at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the group.

Figure A.1: Feeling thermometer guide shown to respondents as Q25.

Q28. On a scale of 0-100, with 0 being coldest and 100 being warmest, how would you rate:

- The Democratic Party
- The Republican Party

Table A.1: Average gender, education, and race in the parents sample compared to the 2016 ANES (face-to-face).

	ANES (N=1180)		Parents (N=500)			
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Diff. in Means	Std. Error
Age	49.86	18.18	45.61	6.88	-4.25	0.62
Female	0.52	0.50	0.65	0.48	0.13	0.03
No HS	0.09	0.29	0.03	0.17	-0.06	0.01
High school graduate	0.22	0.41	0.25	0.43	0.03	0.02
Some college	0.17	0.38	0.20	0.40	0.02	0.02
2-year	0.16	0.36	0.12	0.32	-0.04	0.02
4-year	0.23	0.42	0.26	0.44	0.03	0.02
Post-grad	0.13	0.34	0.15	0.36	0.02	0.02
White	0.68	0.47	0.69	0.46	0.01	0.02
Black	0.10	0.30	0.11	0.31	0.01	0.02
Hispanic	0.14	0.35	0.12	0.32	-0.03	0.02
Asian	0.03	0.16	0.05	0.22	0.03	0.01
Native American	0.01	0.09	0.01	0.08	0.00	0.00
Other	0.04	0.21	0.03	0.17	-0.02	0.01



Figure A.2: Image of Q28 feeling thermometer sliders.

study	Parent's PID	Child's PID	Count
1980	D	D	61
1980	D	N	11
1980	D	R	28
1980	D		20
1980	N	D	18
1980	N	N	17
1980	N	R	20
1980	N		12
1980	R	D	27
1980	R	N	18
1980	R	R	79
1980	R		8
2019	D	D	168
2019	D	N	23
2019	D	R	12
2019	N	D	29
2019	N	N	66
2019	N	R	19
2019	R	D	12
2019	R	N	26
2019	R	R	145

Table A.2: Child and Parent PID by Study

A.3 Summary Statistics



Figure A.3: Partisan identification across time and across age groups.

A.4 Possible Mode Differences



Figure A.4: Political party feeling thermometers by respondent party and survey mode in the 2016 ANES. Note that no such comparison is available for the 2020 ANES due to precautions for COVID-19.

B Supplemental Figures for Main Results



Figure B.1: Trust in the Democratic party across time and age groups.



Figure B.2: Trust in the Republican party across time and age groups.



Figure B.3: In-party vs. out-party trust as a function of time and household party ID agreement.

C Regression Estimates for Main Results

	Any Partisan ID	Strong Partisan
	Model 1	Model 2
(Intercept)	0.73***	0.27***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
2019 Study	0.04	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Parent	0.06	0.09**
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Parent X 2019 Study	−0.06	−0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Num. obs.	1638	1638
N Clusters	819	819

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

Table C.1: Empirical model results for the relationship between partisan identification (any identification for Model 1 and strong identification for Model 2) and whether the respondent is an adolescent (child) vs. adult or comes from the 1980 vs. 2019 sample. Standard errors are clustered by household (parent + child).

	Out-Party Trust			In-Party Trust		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Adolescent	0.39***	0.38***	0.38***	0.35***	0.35***	0.35***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
2019	−0.85***	−0.83***	−0.83***	0.17**	0.20**	0.16*
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Adolescent x 2019	−0.28**	−0.28**	−0.28**	−0.27**	−0.28**	−0.28**
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Parent's Age		−0.01*	−0.01*		−0.01*	−0.01
		(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)
Parent's Pol. Interest (Some)		−0.02	−0.02		0.11	0.13
		(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.12)	(0.12)
Parent's Pol. Interest (A lot)		−0.09	−0.09		0.27*	0.30*
		(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.12)	(0.11)
Parent is White			0.00			−0.14
			(0.08)			(0.08)
Partisans Only	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	1227	1225	1225	1237	1235	1235
N Clusters	719	718	718	719	718	718

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table C.2: Empirical model results for the relationship between out/in-party trust and whether the respondent is an adolescent (child) vs. adult or comes from the 1980 vs. 2019 sample. 2019 is a binary variable that indicates the respondent is from the 2019 sample. Parent's age is measured in years. Political interest is measured with the question "Do you pay a lot of attention, some, or very little attention to what the President is doing?" The baseline category is "very little." Due to unavailability of self-reported ethnicity, we impute ethnicity as White for the entire 1980 Wisconsin sample (only relevant for Models 3 and 6). We do this because the population of Wisconsin in 1980 was approximately 95 percent White per US Census records (IPUMS 2021). Given that the Wisconsin 1980 sample is slightly biased towards higher socioeconomic status relative to its population (Sears and Valentino 1997), we expect the misclassification error to be smaller even than 5 percent. If this imputation does result in misclassification, the discrepancy between 95% and 100% is so small that we should not expect the bias to significantly alter our conclusions about the adolescent-adult gap in polarization (see Aigner 1973). If the reader is still uncomfortable with this imputation decision, Models 2 and 5 in the same table include all the demographic controls except race. We merely include Models 3 and 6 in the case that the reader is particularly concerned about ethnoracial differences in the 1980 and 2019 sample (given the homogeneity of Wisconsin in 1980). For visual clarity, we have omitted the intercept term for each model. Standard errors are clustered at the household level.



Figure C.1: Marginal effect plot of time ('2019' variable) in Table C.2 for the child and parent subgroups.



Figure C.2: Marginal effect plot of Adolescent variable in Table C.2 for the 1980 and 2019 studies.

	Child's Diff.
1980	−0.14*
	(0.07)
2019	0.11*
	(0.06)
1980 x Parent's Diff.	0.23**
	(0.08)
2019 x Parent's Diff.	0.74***
	(0.03)
Num. obs.	758

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

Table C.3: Empirical model results for Figure 6, which regresses child's trust difference on parent's trust difference in each period. "Diff." here refers to the difference between Democratic party trust and Republican party trust (-4 to 4). There is no baseline category; each study has its own slope and intercept to make comparisons easier. The estimates show that parent attitudes became much better at predicting child attitudes between 1980 and 2019. The standard errors are robust (HC2).

D Partisan Evaluations of Non-partisan Institutions

Against the baseline of the highly polarized evaluations of the political parties, Figure D.1 shows that evaluations of non-partisan institutions (the military and police) — while not constant over time — have not polarized to the same extent.[4] In 1980, average child evaluations of the military and police hover in the same general vicinity just below 4.0 on the 5-point scale with little differentiation across parties or across institution. By 2019, Republicans are on average more positive towards both institutions than are Democrats, but evaluations of the police and military are nowhere near as polarized as for the parties themselves. This is true for both children and adults.

4. Note that the outcome measure in 2019 is no longer on the 5-point scale as the other evaluation outcomes and is instead on a 4-point scale as indicated in the right panel of Figure D.1. In 2019, the trust outcome is 1 = "Not at all trustworthy," 2 = "Somewhat trustworthy," 3 = "Generally trustworthy," and 4 = "Completely trustworthy." Since we are making relative comparisons this should not seriously impact our ability to draw conclusions about partisan differences from the data.



Figure D.1: Trust in the military and police over time. Note that in 2019 (right panel) the trust scale is on a 4-point scale as opposed to the usual 5-point scale (left panel).

We note that there is greater politicization of the police relative to the military over time. Trust in the police drops to a greater degree than trust in the military. Indeed, trust in the military has gone up over time across both parties while trust in the police has fallen among Democrats.[5] This was true even in 2019, which was well before the polarizing 2020 summer George Floyd protests.

E Spillover to Social Distance

The affective polarization literature suggests that partisan cues now intrude into a variety of non-political attitudes and behaviors. One widely cited finding concerns the increased aversion of partisans to entering into close relations with members of the opposing party (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). Our 2019 survey includes indicators of social distance, allowing us to replicate this spillover effect.

5. To the extent averages on a 5-point and a 4-point scale can be compared.



Figure E.1: The proportion of respondents in each party by adult/adolescent (left) and adolescent age group (right) who change their willingness to socialize with a colleague after learning they are a member of the out-party. Higher values indicate the respondent is *less likely* to socialize with a hypothetical colleague once their out-party ID is revealed; i.e., around half of Democrats and approximately 30% of Republicans use party as a social cue based on an index constructed from three socialization measures. Table E.1 in the Appendix shows that the three measures used in the index are nearly identical in terms of average partisan and adolescent/adult behavior.

To measure social distance, we gave adolescents in our sample the following prompt: "A new kid joins your class. During lunch, they tell you that they (support/oppose) president Trump." We used "support" for Democratic respondents and "oppose" for Republican respondents. We then asked the respondent three questions about potential social interactions with this new classmate: (1) "Would you be more or less likely to hang out with this person at lunch tomorrow?", (2) "...to go his or her house for a party?", and (3) "...to follow this person on Instagram?" Parents were asked a similar battery of questions with appropriate substitutions (e.g., a "a new employee joins your workplace"). We then recorded which respondents said they would be "less likely" to interact with this new arrival who holds different political views.

Figure E.1 plots the proportion of respondents in each party who use partisanship (measured via Trump support) as a social cue across the three different questions. Pooling across the three measures (since responses across the three items rarely varied), we see that, with a high degree precision, there are no differences between adolescent and adult responses.[6] These results show that adolescents and adults consider partisanship as a social cue at similar rates. Finally, as shown in the right panel of Figure E.1, we do not have the precision to flexibly estimate a developmental trend between ages 11 and 17. When we estimate a single coefficient on age, there is some suggestive evidence that Republican adolescents become less interested in social interactions with Democrats as they get older (Table E.2.)

6. We separately estimate this difference, and the difference between Democrats and Republicans, for each of the three items in Table E.1 in the Appendix.

	Eat Lunch with	Party with	Follow on Social Media
(Intercept)	0.48***	0.51***	0.46***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Republican	−0.19***	−0.21***	−0.17***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Adolescent	−0.01	−0.02	−0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Republican x Adolescent	0.05	0.04	0.04
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Num. obs.	723	720	723

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

Table E.1: Outcome variables are whether the respondent said they would be *less likely* to socialize with a member of the opposite party. Sample restricted to partisan respondents (Democrats and Adults are the reference categories). For instance, 48% of Democrat adults said they would be less likely to eat lunch with a Republican colleague after learning their party ID vs. 28% of Republican adults for a Democrat colleague. Adolescent and adult partisans are similar. Standard errors are robust (HC2).

	Eat Lunch with	Party with	Follow on Social Media
Democrat at 11	0.44***	0.47***	0.47***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Republican at 11	0.16*	0.22**	0.23**
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Democrat x (Age - 11)	0.01	0.01	−0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Republican x (Age - 11)	0.04*	0.03	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num. obs.	337	336	337

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

Table E.2: Outcome variables are whether the respondent said they would be *less likely* to socialize with a member of the opposite party. Sample restricted to partisan adolescents. To aid interpretation, there is no baseline category: "Democrat at 11" and "Republican at 11" coefficients give the average outcome for that subset. "(Age - 11)" is 0 when the respondent is age 11, 1 when the respondent is 12, etc. Standard errors are robust (HC2).

F Political Discussions and Polarization

	Trust DEM	FT DEM	FT Clinton	Trust REP	FT REP	FT Trump
Dem.	0.61***	0.70***	0.61***	−0.63***	−0.72***	−0.73***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Rep.	−0.73***	−0.87***	−0.74***	0.75***	0.86***	0.85***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Dem. x Talks Politics	0.17***	0.10**	0.14**	0.02	−0.08	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Rep. x Talks Politics	0.04	0.07	−0.04	0.16**	0.11*	0.19***
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Num. obs.	384	367	378	384	369	379

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table F.1: For adolescents, party and candidate evaluations regressed on party ID and "How much do you usually talk with other people about national politics?" (originally a 1-4 point scale). Trust refers to the main trust outcome measure used throughout and FT denotes feeling thermometer. To aid interpretability, the outcomes and Talk Politics have all been standardized to have zero mean and unit standard deviation (among partisan adolescents). There is no baseline category; each party has its own slope and intercept to make comparisons easier. The results suggest talking about politics with others is only a significant predictor of in-party evaluations. Standard errors are robust (HC2).

G Media and Polarization



Figure G.1: Media use rates among adolescent partisans. Original question is "Where do you get your news? (check all that apply)" Social media dominates with network and local TV news also being frequent responses.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
(Intercept)	1.59***	1.69***	1.61***	1.49***	1.64***	1.61***	1.73***	1.57***
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Local TV News	0.19							0.15
	(0.14)							(0.14)
Network News (ABC/NBC/CBS news)		−0.03						−0.29
		(0.14)						(0.15)
Other TV News (CNN/PBS)			0.28					0.11
			(0.16)					(0.16)
Liberal/Conservative-Leaning TV (MSNBC/Fox News)				0.78***				0.77***
				(0.14)				(0.15)
Liberal/Conservative-Leaning Sites (Vox/Breitbart)					0.34			0.01
					(0.20)			(0.18)
Newspapers (New York Times, Washington Post, LA Times)						0.42*		0.24
						(0.17)		(0.17)
Social Media							−0.10	−0.15
							(0.14)	(0.13)
Num. obs.	385	385	385	385	385	385	385	385

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

Table G.1: For partisan adolescents, in-party minus out-party trust difference regressed on "Where do you get your news? (check all that apply)". The median respondent chose 2 options (IQR: 1-3). Standard errors are robust (HC2).

H Adolescent Evaluations of Politicians



Figure H.1: Average child feeling thermometer of Republican Party, Democratic Party, Trump, and Clinton by child's party. The plot shows that out-party evaluations of both Trump and Clinton are significantly lower than the parties they represent. See Table H.1.

	Model 1
(Intercept)	23.03***
	(1.13)
Clinton or Trump	−10.01***
	(1.57)
Republican	−0.13
	(1.69)
Republican * (Clinton or Trump)	2.47
	(2.34)
Num. obs.	1506

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table H.1: Difference-in-differences results for Figure H.1. The difference in Trump evaluations vs. Republican party evaluations is slightly (2.5 out of 100, s.e. 2.3) larger in magnitude than the difference in Clinton evaluations vs. Democratic party evaluations. However, the difference is neither substantively large nor statistically significant. Note that "Num. obs." is counting each individual twice (once each for the candidate and party evaluations). Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.

I Additional Feeling Thermometer Results



Figure I.1: Average feeling thermometer for Democrat and Republican children and parents for various people and groups.

J Additional Trust Results



Figure J.1: Average trust scores for Democrat and Republican children for various groups. Trust scores are standardized with respect to both parents and children within each study (even for variables that overlap studies). Standardization is necessary because the trust variable does not retain a fixed scale even within studies.

References

Aigner, Dennis J. 1973. "Regression with a binary independent variable subject to errors of observation." *Journal of Econometrics* 1 (1): 49–59.

Chaffee, Steven H, and Yuko Miyo. 1983. "Selective exposure and the reinforcement hypothesis: An intergenerational panel study of the 1980 presidential campaign." *Communication Research* 10 (1): 3–36.

Chaffee, Steven H, and Joan Schleuder. 1986. "Measurement and effects of attention to media news." *Human Communication Research* 13 (1): 76–107.

Druckman, James N, and Matthew S Levendusky. 2019. "What do we measure when we measure affective polarization?" *Public Opinion Quarterly* 83 (1): 114–122.

IPUMS. 2021. *IPUMS Abacus.* https://usa.abacus.ipums.org/session?session=1~191089~2595~~1148725~t~percent. Accessed: 2021-04-14.

Iyengar, Shanto, Gaurav Sood, and Yphtach Lelkes. 2012. "Affect, not ideology: a social identity perspective on polarization." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 76 (3): 405–431.

Sears, David O, Jack Dennis, and Stephen Chaffee. 2015. *Wisconsin Political Socialization Study, 1980 (M129).* V. V1. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/T2VX6K.

Sears, David O, and Nicholas A Valentino. 1997. "Politics matters: Political events as catalysts for preadult socialization." *American Political Science Review* 91 (1): 45–65.