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# Descriptive Statistics

### Table A1. All Respondents

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  Variable |  Obs |  Mean |  Std. Dev. |  Min |  Max |
|  Milita participation | 4259 | .33 | .47 | 0 | 1 |
|  Ranger participation | 4207 | .16 | .37 | 0 | 1 |
|  Patriarchal | 3384 | 0 | .75 | -2.7 | 2.08 |
|  Waived | 4500 | .33 | .47 | 0 | 1 |
|  Lottery Served | 4500 | .33 | .47 | 0 | 1 |
|  NotBeatenHome | 4332 | 3.99 | 1 | 1 | 5 |
|  MalayMuslim | 4500 | .31 | .46 | 0 | 1 |
|  TalkBefore18 | 4249 | 2.23 | 1 | 1 | 5 |
|  HaveChildren | 4201 | .44 | .5 | 0 | 1 |
|  Education | 4416 | 2.05 | .54 | 0 | 4 |
|  Deep South | 4500 | .33 | .47 | 0 | 1 |
|  Sufficient Income | 4254 | .52 | .5 | 0 | 1 |
|  Age | 4490 | 28.41 | 3.61 | 21 | 39 |
|  AgeSq | 4490 | 820.18 | 207.51 | 441 | 1521 |
|  Married | 4283 | .5 | .5 | 0 | 1 |
|  MotherNotBeaten | 4176 | 4.56 | .82 | 1 | 5 |
|  ProtestBefore18 | 4194 | .03 | .18 | 0 | 1 |
|  Muslim | 4497 | .47 | .5 | 0 | 1 |
|  FatherServed | 4041 | .23 | .42 | 0 | 1 |
|  RespectServed | 4050 | 1.5 | .73 | 1 | 3 |
|  WomenPoliticalLeaders | 4269 | 2 | .92 | 1 | 5 |
|  WomenBusinessLeaders | 4275 | 2.54 | 1.03 | 1 | 5 |
|  UniversityWomen | 4323 | 2.94 | .57 | 1 | 5 |
|  FamilyDecisions | 4208 | 2.62 | .76 | 1 | 5 |
|  ViolenceFamilyTogether | 3624 | 2.21 | .69 | 1 | 3 |

### Table A2. Waived Participation in the Lottery

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  Variable |  Obs |  Mean |  Std. Dev. |  Min |  Max |
|  Milita participation | 1428 | .37 | .48 | 0 | 1 |
|  Ranger participation | 1406 | .22 | .41 | 0 | 1 |
|  Patriarchal | 1143 | 0 | .73 | -2.53 | 2.08 |
|  Waived | 1500 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
|  LotteryServed | 1500 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|  BeatenHome | 1443 | 4.04 | .99 | 1 | 5 |
|  MalayMuslim | 1500 | .32 | .46 | 0 | 1 |
|  TalkBefore18 | 1409 | 2.26 | .98 | 1 | 5 |
|  HaveChildren | 1401 | .43 | .5 | 0 | 1 |
|  Education | 1471 | 2.07 | .53 | 0 | 4 |
|  Deep South | 1500 | .33 | .47 | 0 | 1 |
|  Sufficient Income | 1408 | .54 | .5 | 0 | 1 |
|  Age | 1498 | 28.15 | 3.58 | 21 | 36 |
|  AgeSq | 1498 | 805.16 | 205.18 | 441 | 1296 |
|  Married | 1427 | .49 | .5 | 0 | 1 |
|  MotherNotBeaten | 1396 | 4.55 | .85 | 1 | 5 |
|  ProtestBefore18 | 1380 | .03 | .18 | 0 | 1 |
|  Muslim | 1498 | .47 | .5 | 0 | 1 |
|  FatherServed | 1362 | .28 | .45 | 0 | 1 |
|  RespectServed | 1363 | 1.58 | .77 | 1 | 3 |
|  WomenPoliticalLeaders | 1432 | 2 | .89 | 1 | 5 |
|  WomenBusinessLeaders | 1442 | 2.52 | .98 | 1 | 5 |
|  UniversityWomen | 1454 | 2.93 | .57 | 1 | 5 |
|  FamilyDecisions | 1410 | 2.61 | .75 | 1 | 5 |
|  ViolenceFamilyTogether | 1213 | 2.22 | .68 | 1 | 3 |
|  |

### Table A3. Participated in the Lottery and Had to Do Military Conscription Service

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  Variable |  Obs |  Mean |  Std. Dev. |  Min |  Max |
|  Milita participation | 1406 | .34 | .47 | 0 | 1 |
|  Ranger participation | 1388 | .16 | .37 | 0 | 1 |
|  Patriarchal | 1133 | .01 | .76 | -2.7 | 2.08 |
|  Waived | 1500 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|  LotteryServed | 1500 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
|  BeatenHome | 1448 | 4.01 | 1 | 1 | 5 |
|  MalayMuslim | 1500 | .31 | .46 | 0 | 1 |
|  TalkBefore18 | 1412 | 2.25 | 1 | 1 | 5 |
|  HaveChildren | 1396 | .47 | .5 | 0 | 1 |
|  Education | 1470 | 2 | .53 | 0 | 4 |
|  Deep South | 1500 | .33 | .47 | 0 | 1 |
|  Sufficient Income | 1415 | .5 | .5 | 0 | 1 |
|  Age | 1494 | 28.71 | 3.51 | 21 | 39 |
|  AgeSq | 1494 | 836.49 | 203.65 | 441 | 1521 |
|  Married | 1417 | .52 | .5 | 0 | 1 |
|  MotherNotBeaten | 1385 | 4.56 | .81 | 1 | 5 |
|  ProtestBefore18 | 1399 | .04 | .19 | 0 | 1 |
|  Muslim | 1500 | .48 | .5 | 0 | 1 |
|  FatherServed | 1335 | .22 | .41 | 0 | 1 |
|  RespectServed | 1351 | 1.57 | .76 | 1 | 3 |
|  WomenPoliticalLeaders | 1421 | 1.98 | .92 | 1 | 5 |
|  WomenBusinessLeaders | 1421 | 2.55 | 1.06 | 1 | 5 |
|  UniversityWomen | 1441 | 2.93 | .58 | 1 | 5 |
|  FamilyDecisions | 1405 | 2.6 | .77 | 1 | 5 |
|  ViolenceFamilyTogether | 1212 | 2.22 | .7 | 1 | 3 |
|  |

### Table A4. Participated in the Lottery but Did Not Have to Do Military Conscription Service

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  Variable |  Obs |  Mean |  Std. Dev. |  Min |  Max |
|  Milita participation | 1425 | .27 | .45 | 0 | 1 |
|  Ranger participation | 1413 | .1 | .3 | 0 | 1 |
|  Patriarchal | 1108 | -.01 | .76 | -2.47 | 2.08 |
|  Waived | 1500 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|  LotteryServed | 1500 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|  BeatenHome | 1441 | 3.92 | 1.01 | 1 | 5 |
|  MalayMuslim | 1500 | .31 | .46 | 0 | 1 |
|  TalkBefore18 | 1428 | 2.18 | 1 | 1 | 5 |
|  HaveChildren | 1404 | .42 | .49 | 0 | 1 |
|  Education | 1475 | 2.06 | .57 | 0 | 4 |
|  Deep South | 1500 | .33 | .47 | 0 | 1 |
|  Sufficient Income | 1431 | .5 | .5 | 0 | 1 |
|  Age | 1498 | 28.38 | 3.7 | 21 | 39 |
|  AgeSq | 1498 | 818.93 | 212.52 | 441 | 1521 |
|  Married | 1439 | .48 | .5 | 0 | 1 |
|  MotherNotBeaten | 1395 | 4.58 | .78 | 1 | 5 |
|  ProtestBefore18 | 1415 | .03 | .17 | 0 | 1 |
|  Muslim | 1499 | .47 | .5 | 0 | 1 |
|  FatherServed | 1344 | .2 | .4 | 0 | 1 |
|  RespectServed | 1336 | 1.35 | .65 | 1 | 3 |
|  WomenPoliticalLeaders | 1416 | 2.01 | .94 | 1 | 5 |
|  WomenBusinessLeaders | 1412 | 2.53 | 1.06 | 1 | 5 |
|  UniversityWomen | 1428 | 2.95 | .56 | 1 | 5 |
|  FamilyDecisions | 1393 | 2.64 | .77 | 1 | 5 |
|  ViolenceFamilyTogether | 1199 | 2.2 | .69 | 1 | 3 |
|  |

# STUDY 1

### Table A5. Analysis of *Patriarchal Values*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Item** | **Range** | **Factor Loading** | **Scoring Coefficients** |
| In general, who do you think can be a better political leader? | Men can be much betterMen can be slightly betterSame for men and womenWomen can be slightly betterWomen can be much better | 0.55 | 0.30 |
| In general, who do you think can be a better business leader? | Men can be much betterMen can be slightly betterSame for men and womenWomen can be slightly betterWomen can be much better | 0.60 | 0.35 |
| Is university education more important for men or for women?  | More important for menSlightly more important for menEqually important for men and womenSlightly more important for womenMore important for women | 0.32 | 0.15 |
| Who should be the decision maker about important issues in the family? | Always the husbandMostly the husbandMutual decision made by husband and wife togetherMostly the wifeAlways the wife | 0.47 | 0.23 |
| What level of violence should women tolerate in order for the family to hold together? | All types of violenceSome violenceNo violence at all | 0.28 | 0.13 |

### Figure A1. Histogram of Patriarchal Values



There is a wide spectrum of views reflected in the variable *Patriarchal values*, which ranges from -2.70 to 2.08 with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 0.75. Figure 1 is a histogram showing that here is little reason to worry about ceiling or floor effects in our analyses using this variable.

### Table A6. Main Models: Logistic Regression Results for Two Dependent Variables

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 |  | Model 2 |
|  | Community Militia |  | Rangers |
| Patriarchal | 0.520\*\*\* |  | 0.487\*\*\* |
|  | (0.11) |  | (0.12) |
| Waived | 0.318\* |  | 0.438\*\* |
|  | (0.12) |  | (0.16) |
| NotBeatenHome | -0.310\*\* |  | -0.231\* |
|  | (0.10) |  | (0.11) |
| MalayMuslim | -0.025 |  | -0.868\*\*\* |
|  | (0.24) |  | (0.24) |
| TalkBefore18 | 0.209\* |  | 0.382\*\*\* |
|  | (0.09) |  | (0.11) |
| HaveChildren | 0.334 |  | 0.434\* |
|  | (0.17) |  | (0.18) |
| Education | 0.029 |  | 0.330\* |
|  | (0.13) |  | (0.15) |
| constant | 0.433 |  | -1.387\* |
|  | (0.64) |  | (0.68) |
| N | 926 |  | 921 |
| R-sqr | 0.05 |  | 0.08 |

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

These are the regressions presented in Figure 2 in the main text. Standard errors are clustered on village

### Figure A2. Effect of Patriarchal Values on Participating in Community Militias



#### Figure A2 graphs average predicted probabilities of participating in the community militias over the range of Patriarchal values based on Model 1 in Table A6 above.

### Figure A3. Effect of Patriarchal Values on Participating in the Rangers



#### Figure A3 graphs average predicted probabilities of participating in the Rangers over the range of Patriarchal values based on Model 2 in Table A6 above.

### Table A7. Community Militia Models with Additional Controls, Part 1

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 | Model 7 |
| Patriarchal | 0.523\*\*\* | 0.526\*\*\* | 0.528\*\*\* | 0.522\*\*\* | 0.522\*\*\* |
|  | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) |
| Waived | 0.350\*\* | 0.314\* | 0.310\* | 0.310\* | 0.273\* |
|  | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.13) |
| NotBeatenHome | -0.299\*\* | -0.316\*\* | -0.315\*\* | -0.340\*\*\* | -0.356\*\* |
|  | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.13) |
| MalayMuslim | -0.017 | -0.030 | -0.035 | -0.021 | -0.024 |
|  | (0.25) | (0.24) | (0.25) | (0.25) | (0.25) |
| TalkBefore18 | 0.189\* | 0.217\* | 0.213\* | 0.193\* | 0.197\* |
|  | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| HaveChildren | 0.340\* | 0.210 | 0.202 | 0.100 | 0.305 |
|  | (0.17) | (0.21) | (0.21) | (0.27) | (0.18) |
| Education | 0.021 | 0.025 | 0.020 | -0.027 | 0.046 |
|  | (0.14) | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.14) | (0.13) |
| SuffInc | -0.271 |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.20) |  |  |  |  |
| Age |  | 0.034 | 0.293 |  |  |
|  |  | (0.03) | (0.30) |  |  |
| AgeSq |  |  | -0.004 |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.01) |  |  |
| Married |  |  |  | 0.315 |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.30) |  |
| MotherBeaten |  |  |  |  | 0.119 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.15) |
| constant | 0.535 | -0.461 | -4.142 | 0.647 | 0.111 |
|  | (0.63) | (0.86) | (4.32) | (0.65) | (0.79) |
| N | 905 | 925 | 925 | 906 | 892 |
| R-sqr | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 |

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Models 3-7 add additional control variables, one at a time, to Model 1. None of the additional control variables is significant. *Patriarchal Values* remains highly significant with strong effects in the expected direction also when adding these controls. Standard errors are clustered on village in all models.

### Table A8. Community Militia Models with Additional Controls, Part 2

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 8 | Model 9 | Model 10 | Model 11 |
| Patriarchal | 0.514\*\*\* | 0.538\*\*\* | 0.506\*\*\* | 0.520\*\*\* |
|  | (0.11) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.11) |
| Waived | 0.395\*\* | 0.335\* | 0.399\*\* | 0.317\* |
|  | (0.14) | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.12) |
| NotBeatenHome | -0.314\*\* | -0.269\*\* | -0.294\*\* | -0.310\*\* |
|  | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| MalayMuslim | -0.031 | -0.012 | -0.040 |  |
|  | (0.24) | (0.25) | (0.25) |  |
| TalkBefore18 | 0.206\* | 0.169 | 0.200\* | 0.210\* |
|  | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.09) |
| HaveChildren | 0.323 | 0.264 | 0.308 | 0.335 |
|  | (0.18) | (0.18) | (0.18) | (0.17) |
| Education | 0.033 | 0.099 | -0.004 | 0.029 |
|  | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.13) |
| LotteryServed | 0.157 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.17) |  |  |  |
| FServed |  | -0.325 |  |  |
|  |  | (0.17) |  |  |
| ProtestB18 |  |  | 0.817 |  |
|  |  |  | (0.58) |  |
| MalThaiMuslim |  |  |  | -0.011 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.25) |
| constant | 0.385 | 0.285 | 0.435 | 0.418 |
|  | (0.64) | (0.66) | (0.65) | (0.64) |
| N | 926 | 839 | 871 | 926 |
| R-sqr | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 |

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Models 8-10 add additional control variables, one at a time, to Model 1. None of the additional control variables is significant. *Patriarchal Values* remains highly significant with strong effects in the expected direction also when adding these controls. Model 11 uses an indicator of Muslim religion instead of the indicator of Malay Muslim identity. Standard errors are clustered on village in all models.

### Table A9. Ranger Models with Additional Controls, Part 1

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 12 | Model 13 | Model 14 | Model 15 | Model 16 |
| Patriarchal | 0.501\*\*\* | 0.483\*\*\* | 0.487\*\*\* | 0.476\*\*\* | 0.530\*\*\* |
|  | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.13) |
| Waived | 0.436\*\* | 0.439\*\* | 0.436\*\* | 0.429\*\* | 0.398\* |
|  | (0.16) | (0.16) | (0.17) | (0.17) | (0.17) |
| NotBeatenHome | -0.192 | -0.227\* | -0.226\* | -0.248\* | -0.159 |
|  | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.12) |
| MalayMuslim | -0.898\*\*\* | -0.864\*\*\* | -0.869\*\*\* | -0.876\*\*\* | -0.776\*\* |
|  | (0.23) | (0.24) | (0.24) | (0.24) | (0.26) |
| TalkBefore18 | 0.384\*\*\* | 0.376\*\*\* | 0.373\*\*\* | 0.369\*\*\* | 0.329\*\* |
|  | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.11) | (0.11) |
| HaveChildren | 0.449\* | 0.513\* | 0.504\* | 0.298 | 0.385\* |
|  | (0.19) | (0.23) | (0.23) | (0.28) | (0.19) |
| Education | 0.294 | 0.331\* | 0.328\* | 0.281 | 0.359\* |
|  | (0.15) | (0.15) | (0.15) | (0.15) | (0.15) |
| SuffInc | -0.077 |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.23) |  |  |  |  |
| Age |  | -0.022 | 0.181 |  |  |
|  |  | (0.03) | (0.43) |  |  |
| AgeSq |  |  | -0.003 |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.01) |  |  |
| Married |  |  |  | 0.192 |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.34) |  |
| MotherBeaten |  |  |  |  | -0.130 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.15) |
| constant | -1.466\* | -0.807 | -3.700 | -1.220 | -1.096 |
|  | (0.67) | (0.96) | (6.34) | (0.67) | (0.81) |
| N | 899 | 920 | 920 | 900 | 886 |
| R-sqr | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.07 |

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Models 12-16 add additional control variables, one at a time, to Model 2. None of the additional control variables is significant. *Patriarchal Values* remains highly significant with strong effects in the expected direction also when adding these controls. Standard errors are clustered on village in all models.

### Table A10. Ranger Models with Additional Controls, Part 2

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 17 | Model 18 | Model 19 | Model 20 |
| Patriarchal | 0.491\*\*\* | 0.560\*\*\* | 0.538\*\*\* | 0.489\*\*\* |
|  | (0.12) | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.12) |
| Waived | 0.380 | 0.386\* | 0.392\* | 0.431\*\* |
|  | (0.20) | (0.17) | (0.17) | (0.17) |
| NotBeatenHome | -0.228\* | -0.180 | -0.222\* | -0.228\* |
|  | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) |
| MalayMuslim | -0.864\*\*\* | -0.781\*\* | -0.928\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.24) | (0.25) | (0.24) |  |
| TalkBefore18 | 0.384\*\*\* | 0.366\*\*\* | 0.377\*\*\* | 0.385\*\*\* |
|  | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) |
| HaveChildren | 0.443\* | 0.383\* | 0.450\* | 0.444\* |
|  | (0.18) | (0.19) | (0.19) | (0.18) |
| Education | 0.327\* | 0.411\*\* | 0.295 | 0.325\* |
|  | (0.15) | (0.15) | (0.16) | (0.15) |
| LotteryServed | -0.117 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.17) |  |  |  |
| FServed |  | -0.304 |  |  |
|  |  | (0.22) |  |  |
| ProtestB18 |  |  | 0.851 |  |
|  |  |  | (0.49) |  |
| MalThaiMuslim |  |  |  | -0.915\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.24) |
| constant | -1.353\* | -1.758\* | -1.340 | -1.358\* |
|  | (0.69) | (0.69) | (0.69) | (0.68) |
| N | 921 | 832 | 867 | 921 |
| R-sqr | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.08 |

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Models 17-19 add additional control variables, one at a time, to Model 2. None of the additional control variables is significant. *Patriarchal Values* remains highly significant with strong effects in the expected direction also when adding these controls. Model 20 uses an indicator of Muslim religion instead of the indicator of Malay Muslim identity. This alternative indicator of identity is significant, just like the indicator used in Model 2, but the result for *Patriarchal Values* remain almost unchanged. Standard errors are clustered on village in all models.

### Table A11. Community Militia Pruned Models

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 21 | Model 22 | Model 23 | Model 24 | Model 25 | Model 26 |
| Patriarchal | 0.516\*\*\* | 0.537\*\*\* | 0.520\*\*\* | 0.433\*\*\* | 0.455\*\*\* | 0.514\*\*\* |
|  | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) |
| Waived |  | 0.291\* | 0.317\* | 0.383\*\* | 0.326\*\* | 0.319\* |
|  |  | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) |
| NotBeatenHome | -0.307\*\* |  | -0.310\*\* | -0.319\*\* | -0.409\*\*\* | -0.310\*\* |
|  | (0.10) |  | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| MalayMuslim | -0.005 | -0.031 |  | -0.067 | -0.156 | -0.028 |
|  | (0.25) | (0.25) |  | (0.24) | (0.24) | (0.24) |
| TalkBefore18 | 0.212\* | 0.229\* | 0.210\* |  | 0.251\*\* | 0.211\* |
|  | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.10) |  | (0.09) | (0.09) |
| HaveChildren | 0.348\* | 0.345\* | 0.335 | 0.322\* |  | 0.330 |
|  | (0.17) | (0.17) | (0.17) | (0.16) |  | (0.17) |
| Education | 0.024 | 0.020 | 0.029 | 0.009 | -0.000 |  |
|  | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.14) | (0.14) |  |
| constant | 0.498 | -0.941\* | 0.408 | 1.081 | 1.154 | 0.488 |
|  | (0.63) | (0.44) | (0.58) | (0.64) | (0.65) | (0.56) |
| N | 926 | 949 | 926 | 964 | 1005 | 928 |
| R-sqr | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.05 |

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Models 21-26 in Table A11 drop each of the control variables included in Model 1, one at a time. *Patriarchal Values* remains highly significant with strong effects in the expected direction also in the pruned models. Standard errors are clustered on village in all models.

### Table A12. Rangers Pruned Models

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 27 | Model 28 | Model 29 | Model 30 | Model 31 | Model 32 |
| Patriarchal | 0.481\*\*\* | 0.450\*\*\* | 0.482\*\*\* | 0.348\*\* | 0.414\*\*\* | 0.464\*\*\* |
|  | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.12) |
| Waived |  | 0.425\*\* | 0.400\* | 0.505\*\* | 0.447\*\* | 0.438\*\* |
|  |  | (0.16) | (0.16) | (0.16) | (0.16) | (0.16) |
| NotBeatenHome | -0.229\* |  | -0.220\* | -0.262\* | -0.309\*\* | -0.228\* |
|  | (0.11) |  | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) |
| MalayMuslim | -0.835\*\*\* | -0.847\*\*\* |  | -0.942\*\*\* | -0.985\*\*\* | -0.886\*\*\* |
|  | (0.24) | (0.24) |  | (0.24) | (0.24) | (0.23) |
| TalkBefore18 | 0.384\*\*\* | 0.399\*\*\* | 0.413\*\*\* |  | 0.374\*\*\* | 0.387\*\*\* |
|  | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.11) |  | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| HaveChildren | 0.454\* | 0.460\* | 0.462\* | 0.416\* |  | 0.409\* |
|  | (0.18) | (0.18) | (0.18) | (0.17) |  | (0.18) |
| Education | 0.324\* | 0.293\* | 0.345\* | 0.366\* | 0.333\* |  |
|  | (0.15) | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.15) | (0.14) |  |
| constant | -1.281 | -2.365\*\*\* | -2.276\*\*\* | -0.243 | -0.660 | -0.722 |
|  | (0.68) | (0.54) | (0.62) | (0.64) | (0.65) | (0.59) |
| N | 921 | 944 | 921 | 957 | 999 | 923 |
| R-sqr | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.08 |

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Models 27-32 in Table A12 drop each of the control variables included in Model 2, one at a time. *Patriarchal Values* remains highly significant with strong effects in the expected direction also in the pruned models. Standard errors are clustered on village in all models.

### Table A13. Community Militia Model with Significant Variables Only

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Model 33  |
| Patriarchal | 0.533\*\*\* |
|  | (0.11) |
| Waived | 0.289\* |
|  | (0.12) |
| TalkBefore18 | 0.232\* |
|  | (0.09) |
| HaveChildren | 0.345\* |
|  | (0.17) |
| constant | -0.936\*\* |
|  | (0.32) |
| N | 951 |
| R-sqr | 0.04 |

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

As can be seen in Table A6, all independent variables in Model 2 are statistically significant at the .05 level or better, and in that sense, they belong in the model. Using the same criterion for retaining variables, a pruned alternative to Model 1 would retain three controls in addition to patriarchal values, namely Waived, NotBeatenHome, and TalkBefore18 – see model 33 above.

### Table A14. Bivariate Regressions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 34(Community militia) | Model 35(Rangers) |
| Patriarchal | 0.359\*\*\* | 0.188 |
|  | (0.11) | (0.12) |
| constant | 0.010 | -0.928\*\*\* |
|  | (0.11) | (0.12) |
| N | 1091 | 1082 |
| R-sqr | 0.01 | 0.00 |

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

In bivariate regressions, the index for patriarchal values is highly significant for the first of the dependent variables, namely participation in the community militias, but does not attain statistical significance for the second dependent variable, ranger participation – see models 34 and 35 above.

### Table A15. Minimal Ranger Models with Significant Variables Only

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 36(Rangers) | Model 37(Rangers) |
| Patriarchal | 0.468\*\*\* | 0.423\*\*\* |
|  | (0.11) | (0.11) |
| TalkBefore18 | 0.290\*\* |  |
|  | (0.09) |  |
| HaveChildren |  | 0.363\* |
|  |  | (0.16) |
| constant | -0.746\*\* | -0.249 |
|  | (0.26) | (0.15) |
| N | 1031 | 996 |
| R-sqr | 0.03 | 0.02 |

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Given that we above identified several control variables that belong in the models, these bivariate regressions are thus clearly misspecified in terms of omitted variable bias. We therefore maintain that Models 1 and 2 are good baseline models for Study 1. Nevertheless, it can be interesting to investigate what minimum set of control variables needs to be added in order for patriarchal values to become significant in relation to ranger participation. It turns out that it is sufficient to add either TalkBefore18 or HaveChildren – see models 36 and 37 above.

### Table A16. Correlations

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Rangerbin | Patriarchal | TalkBefore18 | HaveChildren |
| Rangerbin | 1.0000 |  |  |  |
| Patriarchal | 0.0854 | 1.0000 |  |  |
| TalkBefore18 | 0.1581 | -0.2181 | 1.0000 |  |
| HaveChildren | 0.0842 | -0.0712 | -0.0284 | 1.0000 |

It would seem that in the bivariate regressions above the index for patriarchal values picked up also some of the effect of these relevant but omitted control variables. The index for patriarchal values has a weak negative correlation with both TalkBefore18 and HaveChildren, while each of these controls has a weak positive correlation with participation in the rangers – see Table A16 above.

Hence, in the bivariate regressions the positive association between patriarchal values and ranger participation is partially masked by the influence of these omitted variables. For example, a person with high patriarchal values is somewhat less likely to have children, at the same time as fathers are somewhat more likely to be rangers, and a bivariate model will incorrectly lump the influence of having no children together with the effect of patriarchal values. Given how these variables are interrelated it thus makes sense that the effect of patriarchal values on ranger participation stands out more clearly when either TalkBefore18 or HaveChildren (or both) are added to the model. This provides a reasonable explanation for why patriarchal values failed to attain statistical significance in the bivariate model 35. In sum, our examination of pruned and bivariate models reassures us that Models 1 and 2 are good baseline models for Study 1.

## Robustness Checks for Missing Data in Study 1

There are relatively few observations with missing values on one (or both) of the two dependent variables in Study 1, 5-7%. There is no systematic difference between the Deep South of Thailand, where the armed conflict rages, and the rest of the South in this regard. The percentage missing values on the dependent variable *Community Militia participation* is 5-6%.

### Figure A3. Tabulation of Community Militia Missing vs Deep South

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| MilitiaMissing | Deep South |
| 0 | 1 | Total |
| 0 | 2850 | 1409 | 4259 |
|  | 95.00 | 93.93 | 94.64 |
| 1 | 150 | 91 | 241 |
|  | 5.00 | 6.07 | 5.36 |
| Total | 3000 | 1500 | 4500 |
|  | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| Pearson Chi2 = 2.24 Prob = 0.1341 |

First row has *frequencies* and second row has *column percentages*

### Figure A4. Tabulation of Ranger Missing vs Deep South

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| RangerMissing | Deep South |
| 0 | 1 | Total |
| 0 | 2804 | 1403 | 4207 |
|  | 93.47 | 93.53 | 93.49 |
| 1 | 196 | 97 | 293 |
|  | 6.53 | 6.47 | 6.51 |
| Total | 3000 | 1500 | 4500 |
|  | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| Pearson Chi2 = 0.01 Prob = 0.9319 |

First row has *frequencies* and second row has *column percentages*

The percentage missing values on the dependent variable *Ranger participation* is 6-7%.

### Figure A5. Tabulation of Patriarchal Missing vs Deep South

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Patriarchal missing | Deep South |
| 0 | 1 | Total |
| 0 | 2254 | 1130 | 3384 |
|  | 75.13 | 75.33 | 75.20 |
| 1 | 746 | 370 | 1116 |
|  | 24.87 | 24.67 | 24.80 |
| Total | 3000 | 1500 | 4500 |
|  | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| Pearson Chi2 = 0.021 Prob = 0.8836 |

First row has *frequencies* and second row has *column percentages*

The variable of main explanatory interest in Study 1, *Patriarchal values*, is missing for 25% of the observations (1116 out of 4500). There is no systematic difference between the Deep South of Thailand and the rest of the South in this regard. This is a relatively large percentage of missing values and therefore we take a closer look at the missingness and perform alternative tests, including a pair of tests using multiple imputation to replace the missing values.

### Figure A6. Tabulation of Community Militia Participation vs

### Patriarchal Missing

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Militia participation | Patriarchal missing |
|   | 0 | 1 | Total |
| 0 | 539 | 175 | 714 |
|  | 49.40 | 55.03 | 50.67 |
| 1 | 552 | 143 | 695 |
|  | 50.60 | 44.97 | 49.33 |
| Total | 1091 | 318 | 1409 |
|  | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| Pearson Chi2 = 3.12 Prob = 0.0774 |

First row has *frequencies* and second row has *column percentages*

We begin by noting that the indicator for missing Patriarchal values is not significantly associated with Militia participation, which is reassuring. As in the rest of Study 1, when analysing participation in the community militias and rangers we use the observations from the Deep South conflict zone (n=1500).

### Figure A7. Tabulation of Ranger Participation vs Patriarchal Missing

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Ranger participation | Patriarchal missing |
|   | 0 | 1 | Total |
| 0 | 773 | 233 | 1006 |
|  | 71.44 | 72.59 | 71.70 |
| 1 | 309 | 88 | 397 |
|  | 28.56 | 27.41 | 28.30 |
| Total | 1082 | 321 | 1403 |
|  | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| Pearson Chi2 = 0.16 Prob = 0.6895 |

First row has *frequencies* and second row has *column percentages*

Likewise, the indicator for missing Patriarchal values is not significantly associated with Ranger participation.

### Table A17. Models with First Alternative Index of Patriarchal Values

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 38 | Model 39 |
|  | Community Militia | Rangers |
| Patriarchal alt | 0.427\*\*\* | 0.451\*\*\* |
|  | (0.10) | (0.12) |
| Waived | 0.317\*\* | 0.408\*\* |
|  | (0.12) | (0.15) |
| BeatenHome | -0.297\*\*\* | -0.235\* |
|  | (0.09) | (0.10) |
| MalayMuslim | -0.015 | -0.684\*\* |
|  | (0.24) | (0.24) |
| TalkBefore18 | 0.249\*\* | 0.414\*\*\* |
|  | (0.09) | (0.10) |
| HaveChildren | 0.375\* | 0.536\*\* |
|  | (0.16) | (0.17) |
| Education | 0.047 | 0.403\*\* |
|  | (0.12) | (0.14) |
| constant | 0.188 | -1.837\*\* |
|  | (0.59) | (0.62) |
| N | 1064 | 1060 |
| R-sqr | 0.04 | 0.08 |

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Before moving on to the multiple imputation we tested a simplified version of the variable representing patriarchal values. We noted that out of the five survey items used to construct Patriarchal values (Table A5), the missingness was greatest for the question “What level of violence should women tolerate in order for the family to hold together” (see Online Appendix, Codebook, survey questions). We created an alternative index using the same method but without this question and thus using only four survey items. Using this alternative index for patriarchal values, which has fewer missing observations, the results are very similar to the main models (cf. Table A6., Model 1 and Model 2).

### Table A18. Variables Used for Multiple Imputation

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable** | **Missing** | **Total** | **Percent Missing** |
| Rangerbin (dependent variable in Study 1) | 293 | 4,500 | 6.51 |
| VGAbin (dependent variable in Study 1) | 241 | 4,500 | 5.36 |
| Patriarchal (dependent variable in Study 2) | 1,116 | 4,500 | 24.80 |
| Waived | 0 | 4,500 | 0.00 |
| BeatenHome | 168 | 4,500 | 3.73 |
| MalMuslim | 0 | 4,500 | 0.00 |
| TalkBefore18 | 251 | 4,500 | 5.58 |
| HaveChildren | 299 | 4,500 | 6.64 |
| Edu | 84 | 4,500 | 1.87 |
| Age | 10 | 4,500 | 0.22 |
| Married | 217 | 4,500 | 4.82 |

Although the number of observations increases substantially with this alternative version of the main explanatory variable in Study 1, a quite large number of observations are still lost due to missing variable values. We therefore turn to multiple imputation. For the multiple imputation we used the variables in the table above.

We used the Stata command “mi impute chained” to multiply impute the data by chained equations so that different imputed variables can use separate conditional distributions, which is necessary when certain variables must only take on specific values (e.g., binary outcome variables like Rangerbin). We thereby used logistic imputation for Rangerbin, VGAbin, MalMuslim, HaveChildren, and Married; ordinal logit for BeatenHome, TalkBefore18, and Edu; and linear regression for Patriarchal and Age. We imputed 30 datasets, setting an arbitrary seed of 53421, so that exactly the same imputation can be replicated. The imputed data were analysed using the Stata command “mi estimate”. The results with multiple imputation are very similar to the main models (cf. Table A6., Model 1 and Model 2).

### Table A19. Baseline Models with Multiple Imputation of Missing Data

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 40 | Model 41 |
|  | Village Militia | Rangers |
| Patriarchal | 0.449\*\*\* | 0.267\* |
|  | (0.10) | (0.11) |
| Waived | 0.320\*\* | 0.385\*\* |
|  | (0.11) | (0.14) |
| BeatenHome | -0.282\*\*\* | -0.279\*\*\* |
|  | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| MalayMuslim | -0.053 | -0.799\*\*\* |
|  | (0.22) | (0.21) |
| TalkBefore18 | 0.333\*\*\* | 0.409\*\*\* |
|  | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| HaveChildren | 0.265\* | 0.366\*\* |
|  | (0.12) | (0.13) |
| Education | 0.005 | 0.318\* |
|  | (0.11) | (0.13) |
| Constant | 0.090 | -1.175\* |
|  | (0.51) | (0.55) |
| N | 1500 | 1500 |

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

To sum up, missingness with regard to Patriarchal values is not systematically related to our dependent variables in Study 1, and our alternative tests, including the pair of tests using multiple imputation to replace missing values, give very similar results as the baseline models. Hence, we conclude that our robustness checks suggest that missingness is unlikely to be a major threat to the validity of the results of Study 1.

## Robustness to Coding Decisions Study 1

Below we report a robustness test using another alternative version of the index for patriarchal values. In this version the answer options reflecting attitudes that can be viewed as favouring women are treated the same as the egalitarian option. For example, in the question “In general, who do you think can be a better political leader?” the answer options “Women can be slightly better” and “Women can be much better” are recoded and given the same value as the answer option “Same for men and women”. In our original version of the patriarchal values index answers favouring women result in a lower level of patriarchal values, but in this alternative version answers favouring women influence the level of patriarchal values in the same way as egalitarian values. Since not many respondents chose the answer options favouring women this alternative index is quite similar to the original version (Pearson correlation .95).

Using the second alternative index for patriarchal values the results are again very similar to the main models (cf. Tale A6., Model 1 and Model 2).

### Table A20. Models with Second Alternative Index of Patriarchal Values

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 42 | Model 43 |
|  | b/se | b/se |
| PatriarchalC | 0.543\*\*\* | 0.543\*\*\* |
|  | (0.12) | (0.14) |
| Waived | 0.332\*\* | 0.449\*\* |
|  | (0.13) | (0.16) |
| BeatenHome | -0.303\*\* | -0.220\* |
|  | (0.10) | (0.11) |
| MalayMuslim | -0.020 | -0.864\*\*\* |
|  | (0.25) | (0.24) |
| TalkBefore18 | 0.234\*\* | 0.410\*\*\* |
|  | (0.09) | (0.10) |
| HaveChildren | 0.331 | 0.440\* |
|  | (0.17) | (0.18) |
| Education | 0.025 | 0.330\* |
|  | (0.13) | (0.15) |
| Constant | 0.326 | -1.539\* |
|  | (0.63) | (0.67) |
| N | 926 | 921 |
| R-sqr | 0.05 | 0.09 |

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

### Table A21. Main Models with Four-Step Dependent Variable

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 44 | Model 45 |
|  | Community Militias | Rangers |
| Patriarchal | 0.439\*\*\* | 0.467\*\*\* |
|  | (0.10) | (0.12) |
| Waived | 0.288\* | 0.405\* |
|  | (0.11) | (0.16) |
| NotBeatenHome | -0.349\*\*\* | -0.270\* |
|  | (0.10) | (0.12) |
| MalayMuslim | -0.036 | -0.805\*\*\* |
|  | (0.23) | (0.23) |
| TalkBefore18 | 0.248\*\* | 0.353\*\* |
|  | (0.08) | (0.11) |
| HaveChildren | 0.400\* | 0.374\* |
|  | (0.17) | (0.19) |
| Education | 0.030 | 0.358\* |
|  | (0.13) | (0.15) |
| / |  |  |
| cut1 | -0.483 | 1.217 |
|  | (0.64) | (0.70) |
| cut2 | 0.903 | 3.051\*\*\* |
|  | (0.65) | (0.77) |
| cut3 | 2.965\*\*\* | 5.291\*\*\* |
|  | (0.67) | (0.82) |
| N | 926 | 921 |
| R-sqr | 0.04 | 0.06 |

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Standard errors are clustered on village in both models. The two models present the results of an alternative coding of the dependent variable to the one that forms the basis of Figure 2 in the main text. Model 44 analyses participation in the Community Militias, and the results are very similar to Model 1 (presented in Table A6). Model 45 analyses participation in the Rangers, and the results are very similar to Model 2 (presented in Table A6). The coding in the above table corresponds to the original survey questions about participation in the Community Militias and Rangers, which had four alternative answers representing different levels of participation (in addition to alternatives for the answers “Don’t know” and “Rather not say”), namely “Never”/”Rarely [at least once a year]”/”Sometimes [at least once a month]”/”Often [at least once a week]”. Very few respondents answered “Often” (only 3% of all respondents for the community militias, and 1% for the Rangers). When discussing this with local experts, we were advised that the qualitatively most meaningful variation is that between those who answer that they never participate and those who answer that they participate at all (“Rarely” or more often). Hence we used this dichotomous variation for the analyses presented above. In the table above we use ordinal logit to analyze the participation variables in four ordinal steps, with the same set of explanatory variables as in Models 1 and 2.

# STUDY 2

### Table A22. Controlling for Age and How Often the Respondent Was Beaten Growing Up

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Range** | **Mean Served****(Treatment)** | **MeanDid Not Serve****(Control)** | **P-value test** | ***n*** |
| **Patriarchal Values** | Only age >23 |
| -2.70 – 2.08 | 0.0021 | -0.013 | 0.65 | 2050 |
| Beaten at Home: Very Often (1) |
| -1.05 – 2.08 | 1.04 | 0.62 | 0.40 | 10 |
| Beaten at Home: Often (2) |
| -2.70 – 2.08 | -0.09 | -0.06 | 0.85 | 104 |
| Beaten at Home: Sometimes (3) |
| -2.64 – 2.08 | 0.028 | 0.076 | 0.37 | 732 |
| Beaten at Home: Seldom (4) |
| -2.14 – 1.90 | -0.22 | -0.25 | 0.62 | 416 |
| Beaten at Home: Never (5) |
| -2.36 – 2.08 | 0.10 | 0.026 | 0.14 | 939 |

In Table A22 the variable *Patriarchal Values* is compared for the control group and treatment group while controlling for *Age* and *Beaten at Home*. First only respondents older than 23 years are included. Next the comparison is repeated for each level of *Beaten at Home*. There is no significant difference between the control and treatment.

## Missing Data in Study 2

Next, we turn to an analysis of missingness in Study 2. The number of missing values on the indicator of Patriarchal values is not significantly different in the treatment group (Enlisted by lottery) and the control group (Not Enlisted by Lottery). Hence, we conclude that missingness is unlikely to be a threat to the results of Study 2.

### Figure A8. Tabulation of Patriarchal Missing vs Enlisted

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Patriarchal missing | Status of Military Service |
|   | Enlisted by Lottery | Not Enlisted by Lottery | Total |
| 0 | 1133 | 1108 | 2241 |
|  | 75.53 | 73.87 | 74.70 |
| 1 | 367 | 392 | 759 |
|  | 24.47 | 26.13 | 25.30 |
| Total | 1500 | 1500 | 3000 |
|  | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| Pearson Chi2 = 1.10 Prob = 0.2938 |

First row has *frequencies* and second row has *column percentages*

### Table A23. Alternative Treatment Variables

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Range** | **Mean****Served****(Treatment)** | **Mean****Did Not Serve****(Control)** | **P-value test** | ***n*** |
| **Patriarchal Values** | Treatment Limited to Conscripts Exposed to Violence During Military Service |
| -2.70 – 2.08 | -0.011 | 0.055 | 0.11 | 1603 |
| Treatment Limited to Conscripts Who Served in the Army |
| -2.47 – 2.08 | -0.011 | 0.042 | 0.13 | 1879 |
| Treatment Limited to Conscripts Who Served in the Navy |
| -2.70 – 2.08 | -0.011 | -0.027 | 0.75 | 1416 |

In Table A23 the variable *Patriarchal Values* is compared for the control group and treatment group when the definition of the treatment is varied. There is no significant difference between the control and treatment.

### Table A24. Effect on Components of Patriarchal Values and On Respect for Those Who Served

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Range | MeanServed | MeanDid Not Serve | P-value test | *n* |
| *Political Leaders* | 1–5 | 1.98 | 2.014 | 0.36 | 2837 |
| *Business Leaders* | 1–5 | 2.55 | 2.53 | 0.61 | 2833 |
| *University Boys* | 1–5 | 2.93 | 2.95 | 0.28 | 2869 |
| *Family Decisions* | 1–5 | 2.60 | 2.64 | 0.30 | 2798 |
| *Violence Family* | 1–3 | 2.22 | 2.20 | 0.41 | 2411 |
| *Respect Served* | 1–3 | 1.57 | 1.35 | 0.00 | 2687 |

Table A24 tests for differences between treatment and control in each of the five components of *Patriarchal Values* (cf. Table A5 above). There is no significant difference between the control and treatment. Then the treatment and control groups are compared with regard to a variable that measures whether the respondent agrees that a man who has served in the military should be more respected than a man who has not served. There is a significant effect in the direction that those who served are more likely to answer that a man who has served in the military should be more respected than a man who has not served.

## Robustness to Coding Decisions Study 2

In Table A25 we test for the effect of the treatment on the two alternative indices of patriarchal values described above (pp 26, and 29), and we find no significant difference between treatment and control.

### Table A25. Tests with Alternative Indices of Patriarchal Values

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Range** | **Mean****Served** | **Mean****Did Not Serve** | **P-value test** | ***n*** |
| **Patriarchal Values** | First Alternative Index of Patriarchal Values |
| -2.59 – 1.93 | 0.010 | -0.009 | 0.50 | 2595 |
| Second Alternative Index of Patriarchal Values |
| -.98 – 2.26 | 0.008 | 0.000 | 0.80 | 2241 |

# Figure A9. Overview of the Military System in Thailand



Figure A9 depicts the military system in Thailand as a kind of decision-tree. Although it is quite complex, it is a simplification that approximates the system. Several aspects are particularly relevant for our study.

The three ovals labelled “Lottery to service”, “Lottery to Reserve”, and “Served no lottery” show the three categories of men that we have sampled, namely [1] men who participated in the conscription lottery and had to do Military Conscription Service; [2] men who participated in the lottery and were not selected for Military Conscription Service; and [3] men who had waived participation in the lottery and did Military Conscription Service.

In Study 1, we pool residents from the Deep South from these three categories and analyse which of these men are active in the paramilitaries, i.e., the community militias or the rangers. Since there are 500 men residing in the Deep South in each category, the maximum *n* in Study 1 is 1500 (i.e., 500 + 500 + 500).

In Study 2, we compare the 1500 men indicated by the label “Lottery to service” (treatment) to the 1500 men indicated by the label “Lottery to Reserve” (control), and test whether they differ with regard to patriarchal values. The number from each category is 1500 because we include all respondents in our survey from each category and not just those residing in the Deep South. In other words, in Study 2 all respondents reside in the South of Thailand, but only a third of the respondents reside in the Deep South.

There are several categories of men in Thailand who do not belong to any of the three categories that we sample, and hence are not part of our study. In particular, approximately one fourth of the men in each cohort enter the Territorial Defence Student Training when in secondary school. If they complete that program they do not have to do Military Conscription Service but are given reserve status. Furthermore, senior monks, transgender individuals, and those with physical or mental disabilities are permanently exempted from military obligations. This is a negligible share of each cohort.

The voluntary decision to join one of the government paramilitary organizations does not substitute for one’s conscription obligation. The overwhelming majority of those active in the paramilitaries have already fulfilled their conscription obligations, many of them by participating in the conscription lottery and not having to do Military Conscription Service because they drew a black ticket. At the same time, many of the members of the paramilitaries have done Military Conscription Service. Individuals are eligible to join paramilitary organizations before and after regular military service.

The different paramilitaries have different qualification requirements. For example, to apply to be a ranger one must not have been exempted from Military Conscription Service due to physical or mental reasons. It is possible, however, to apply to be a ranger if one drew a black ticket in the conscription lottery, meaning that prior military experience is not a requirement to join the rangers. For the other paramilitaries, military conscription status does not matter.