

Appendix A: Interview Methods

I conducted a total of forty-one interviews for this paper from May to September 2018. Interviews lasted between one and two hours, and all interviews were audio recorded. All interview subjects granted me permission to use their names. However, given the current nature of political retributions in Brazil, I chose for ethical reasons to keep most of my interviews anonymous, describing instead the ministries or agencies where they had worked and their general responsibilities.

I adopted a strict approach to counting my interviews by counting each interview subject only once. However, individual interview subjects often fell into multiple informant categories (such as those who had worked in several different ministries, or those who had worked for some time in a government bureaucracy and for some time in the field office of a United Nations agency)—reflective of the increasingly blurred boundaries of the state. Often, my interview subjects offered information about multiple government programs and United Nations agencies, based on the different career positions they had held over time.

Sampling Frame

Following the widely accepted best practice for process-tracing projects, I used a purposive sampling strategy that combined positional and reputational criteria to select my interview informants (Tansey 2007, 770-771). Initially, I adopted a positional approach by dividing interview subjects into four categories based on where they worked, with particular attention to divergence in their incentives to comply with accountability rules and to promote bureaucratic outsourcing. I interviewed bureaucrats in government ministries, who were motivated to escape accountability rules and, therefore, to promote bureaucratic outsourcing. I interviewed United Nations officials in Brazil, who were key facilitators of bureaucratic outsourcing. But I also interviewed the government auditors whose job it was to enforce accountability rules, and who preferred to eliminate bureaucratic outsourcing. Finally, I interviewed the top officials who controlled Brazil's international cooperation agreements, who also sought to eliminate the practice of bureaucratic outsourcing. (See Table 1.)

I then incorporated a reputational approach to interview sampling by adding respondents who were deemed by their own peers and by academics to be particularly influential, and to have deep knowledge about the process of bureaucratic outsourcing. To give a few illustrative examples without compromising anonymity, I included high-ranking current and former government bureaucrats who had birds-eye views of bureaucratic outsourcing. I included a top former World Bank official, based in Washington, D.C., who had managed loans to Brazil. I also included a top United Nations official, based at their agency's global headquarters, who had evaluated their Brazil operations and who had later directed their Brazil field office.

Universally, despite their varying positions and incentives, my interview subjects all described the same causes and consequences of bureaucratic outsourcing. They described in fine-grained detail how Brazil's accountability rules and regulations posed strong barriers to building efficient and effective social-sector programs. Informants across all four categories also offered similar narratives about how bureaucratic outsourcing contributed to the construction of capable new government programs—even the very auditors who were cracking down on the practice. Although my interview subjects differed in their opinions about the long-term advantages and

disadvantages of bureaucratic outsourcing, they agreed on the causal processes I identify in the article. For further detail on my interview subjects, see Appendix B.

Table 1: Summary of Interview Sampling Frame

Informant Category	# of Informants	Potential biases	Reliability check
Bureaucrats in Govt. Ministries	17	These bureaucrats were motivated to escape accountability rules, either to pursue their agency's goals or, potentially, for other reasons not related to capacity-building. They had strong incentives to pursue bureaucratic outsourcing as a method of escaping accountability rules.	To increase the reliability of my information from this group of interview subjects, I included both current and former bureaucrats, as well as top officials at Brazil's national school of public administration (ENAP), the country's well-reputed civil-service training institute.
United Nations and World Bank Officials	15	Officials in these organizations had helped bureaucrats escape government accountability rules by administering technical cooperation agreements. They were motivated to continue the practice of bureaucratic outsourcing in part because it promoted their goal of helping Brazil build institutional capacity, but also potentially because it was a principal justification for their Brazil field offices.	To increase the reliability of this interview data, I included non-Brazilian officials who had worked in other countries in addition to Brazil, as well as former top officials who no longer worked in these agencies. Within this group, I included an external United Nations auditor who was specifically sent to Brazil to investigate the practice of bureaucratic outsourcing.
Government Auditors	5 (100%)	This group of five officials was charged with enforcing accountability rules and cracking down on officials who sought to escape them through bureaucratic outsourcing.	We can assume the information they gave me about how outsourcing helped to build bureaucratic capacity is fairly reliable, because it went against their interests. Moreover, these officials constitute 100% of the auditors in charge of investigating national executive agencies, and they all gave me the same story.
Govt. Regulators of International Cooperation Agreements	2 (100%)	These are the two top-ranking government officials in charge of regulating international cooperation agreements in Brazil. Like the auditors, they sought to end the practice of using international organizations to	Based on their positions and reputation, we can be fairly confident in the accuracy of the information they provided. These two interview subjects sought to end bureaucratic outsourcing, yet they described to me instead how the practice supported

		escape government accountability rules.	capacity-building—a description that does not support or justify their goal of ending the practice. (They offered other justifications for ending the practice.) Moreover, they have deep knowledge about bureaucratic outsourcing. They have controlled international cooperation policy for multiple decades. Many informants, across categories, recommended I speak with them.
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Appendix B: Detailed Description of Interview Subjects

Bureaucrats in Government Ministries

I interviewed seventeen current and former bureaucrats across five national government ministries: The Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Human Rights, and the Ministry of Social Development. All five ministries contained a significant number of social-sector programs, yet there were also important differences among them. In particular, two ministries (the Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry of Health) were old and institutionalized, whereas the other three ministries were newer, created during or after re-democratization. I illustrate the strategy of bureaucratic outsourcing with examples from programs in two ministries (the Bolsa Família program in the Ministry of Social Development, and the National AIDS program in the Ministry of Health) because they are widely studied pockets of effectiveness. However, in my fieldwork I collected further interview evidence of bureaucratic outsourcing, driven by the same motivations, from my interviews with bureaucrats who worked with programs in the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of the Environment, and the Ministry of Human Rights as well.

The bureaucrats I interviewed held a variety of mid-to-high-level positions: some were political appointees, some were career civil servants, and others had been contracted as consultants. Two were program directors. All of the bureaucrats I interviewed agreed on the main challenges of navigating the tension between complying with accountability rules and achieving their agency's objectives. Many informants, across ministries, gave me detailed illustrative examples of the administrative burdens that Brazil's accountability rules had imposed on them, as well as of how these burdens sometimes prevented them from hiring experts and spending their budgets. The detailed examples my informants gave me, across ministries, were strikingly similar. The interview quotes I use in the paper are illustrative examples of these common narratives.

Notably, the bureaucrats I interviewed diverged in their opinions about whether international cooperation was a preferred long-term solution to the challenges of complying with accountability rules. Several of my interview subjects emphasized the very vulnerabilities of the bureaucratic-outsourcing approach that I highlight in this paper. These bureaucrats did, however, agree on the short-term benefits of international cooperation for agency performance. They also all provided similar explanations of the driving logic that led policymakers in new social-sector programs to pursue bureaucratic outsourcing: to build capacity by escaping the red tape produced by accountability requirements.

Representatives of International Organizations

I interviewed fifteen current and former officials in the Brazilian field offices of four United Nations affiliated agencies, as well as with three officials from the World Bank. All of these international organizations had helped bureaucrats escape government accountability rules through technical cooperation agreements. Through these interviews, I gained detailed information about the logic of bureaucratic outsourcing, about the process of bureaucratic outsourcing, and about the new challenges to bureaucratic outsourcing that had emerged since Brazil's auditing and regulatory agencies had begun cracking down on the practice.

I focused my interviews in this category with officials from the United Nations Economic, Social, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), because they had the largest number of technical cooperation agreements in Brazil. I interviewed officials from the World Bank because they participated indirectly in technical cooperation through their loan agreements.

Based on the information I gained from my interviews with government bureaucrats, I later chose to broaden my comparative perspective by including interviews with officials from two additional United Nations organizations that were engaged in bureaucratic outsourcing: the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the Latin American Social Sciences Faculty (FLACSO). To highlight the extent of FAO involvement in Brazil, two former Brazilian bureaucrats who had engaged in bureaucratic outsourcing were, at the time of my interview, top FAO officials at their global headquarters. FLACSO's involvement in bureaucratic outsourcing was surprising because, across Latin America, FLACSO is a United-Nations affiliated research institute. In Brazil, however, FLACSO had forged technical cooperation agreements to help administer several government programs—reflective of my broader argument that governments are outsourcing bureaucrats to a variety of nonstate actors, including university research centers.

Bureaucrats in Charge of Regulating International Cooperation

I interviewed the two top Brazilian government officials in charge of regulating international cooperation or, in other words, 100% of the officials in the Brazilian Agency for Cooperation (abbreviated as ABC). These officials had overseen international cooperation agreements for over two decades, and they were strongly against the practice of bureaucratic outsourcing. During the time of my fieldwork, they were tightening the reins on such practices through new regulations.

However, these same officials had not always been opposed to bureaucratic outsourcing. My two interview subjects agreed that such uses of international organizations had been essential to help new social-sector programs build bureaucratic capacity. During the early years of building new social-sector programs, they had in fact supported the practice. Specifically, ABC had provided government office space for the UNDP to use by creating a “unit” within their office dedicated to administering all of Brazil's technical cooperation projects with the UNDP. This unit was called the Administrative Unit for Projects (abbreviated in Portuguese as UAP-ABC), and it was staffed by UNDP officials. While this unit was located inside the ABC office and paid for by government money, it instead followed UNDP rules. This meant, in practice, that the operational arm of the UNDP in Brazil—the division that administered their technical cooperation projects—was located inside donated Brazilian government offices. (By contrast, the programmatic arm of the UNDP in Brazil was located in a separate UNDP office building.)

While ABC officials had once facilitated bureaucratic outsourcing, at the time of our interviews they opposed the practice of bureaucratic outsourcing. This opposition was based on their broader perspective about national development: that Brazil was a middle-income country, and that the Brazilian state was strong enough that it should ultimately be able to administer its own bureaucracies. Their former involvement in promoting bureaucratic outsourcing, juxtaposed against their current opposition to outsourcing, offers a strong indication that the practice was once relatively widespread among federal social-sector programs in Brazil.

Bureaucrats in Auditing Agencies

Finally, I spoke with five auditors from the federal comptroller's office (abbreviated in Portuguese as the CGU). These officials were trained accountants, and together they formed 100% of the group responsible for enforcing accountability rules and cracking down on agencies that sought to escape them. Like the officials in charge of international cooperation, these informants sought to end the practice of using international cooperation to avoid government accountability rules.

At the same time, these very auditors articulated the same causes and effects of bureaucratic outsourcing as the other categories of informants. They agreed that accountability rules hindered the ability of bureaucrats to achieve agency goals. These very auditors also agreed that, for the most part, government agencies had built capacity through bureaucratic outsourcing. Their fundamental disagreement rested instead on how the problem should best be solved. The opinion they articulated was that if government rules are broken, the solution is to fix government rules rather than to avoid the rules. These informants emphasized that their job was to enforce the rules, not to fix the rules.

Appendix C: Access to Systematic Government Data on Capacity and Performance

Qualitative interviews and United Nations audits, together, suggest that bureaucratic outsourcing helped new programs to build capacity. However, quantitative government data such as performance evaluations and budget execution reports are unavailable for three reasons. First, this practice took place in Brazil not at the level of government ministries but, rather, at the at the lower level of government programs: driven by agency directors, not by government ministers. Most government ministries had not collected any aggregate data on their own outsourced agencies. I found only one exception in my research. At the time I was conducting interviews, in 2018, the Ministry of the Environment had just begun to collect data on its own technical cooperation projects, through a newly created Department of International Resources. This department was the fruit of a long-term attempt by the ministry to map their international cooperation projects, because “there were a lot of projects within the ministry and, yet, not even the highest level of leadership of the ministry—not even the ministers—were able to keep track of their projects.”ⁱ

Second, policymakers in Brazil essentially removed national government programs from the books when they outsourced programs to international organizations. The budgets of these programs, once transferred into United Nations accounts, were no longer tracked by government agencies. The Brazilian bureaucrats who led these programs were officially hired not as civil servants but as “United Nations consultants.” Thus, neither the budgets nor the personnel of outsourced social-sector programs appear in quantitative databases of government bureaucracy.

Third, quantitative data on outsourced bureaucracies was beyond the reach even of government auditors. Brazil’s federal government auditors were not even legally able to obtain lists of employees from these United Nations agencies. When I asked the CGU auditors who were in charge of monitoring and enforcing Brazil’s accountability rules how I could obtain such data, the general response was “that’s difficult.”ⁱⁱ As one explained, “The administration of technical cooperation projects is done inside the systems of international organizations. So we [in the] CGU don’t have... (pause) we aren’t able to get at... (pause) we don’t have the ability to see those databases.”ⁱⁱⁱ Another CGU informant elaborated, “The international cooperation office (ABC) is fighting to improve this, but it isn’t yet... (pauses to think). Since the project administration is done by the international organizations, they have to choose to declare that information to ABC. If the organization doesn’t declare [information on hiring and procurement], there’s no way to map it.”^{iv}

Appendix D: Adherence to Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research

This article adheres to all principles and guidelines for human-subjects research. Prior to conducting fieldwork in 2018, I submitted my research plan to the institutional review board (IRB) at Marquette University. My research was determined exempt from human-subjects review.

There are at least two reasons my research was declared to be exempt. First, all my interviews were conducted with national public officials and international officials who are all powerful actors according to the APSA Council human-subjects definition. Second, I was transparent about the goals of my research in my interviews.

Consent

I obtained verbal consent for all of my interviews by explaining my position, my goals for the research project, and my intentions for using the information they provided. I documented consent in my written notes, as well as in my audio recordings.

Confidentiality

With one exception, all of my interview subjects granted me permission to use their names. However, I chose to anonymize the names of all informants who are currently working as public servants in Brazil and to withhold any mention of their specific positions or detailed work history. I made this decision based on my ethical obligation to minimize the risk of harm to my interview subjects.

Risk of Harm

My concern about the risk of harm to my informants stems from a change in political context that occurred after I conducted my interviews. A populist-authoritarian politician, Jair Bolsonaro, was elected as president of Brazil. Once in office, Bolsonaro began to pursue an agenda to dismantle bureaucracies that promoted social justice and human rights. While none of the public servants who spoke to me described any activities that were controversial at the time, or even hidden from the public, I became concerned about personally linking any of my informants to activities that could be characterized as part of the “deep state”—a term re-popularized by populist-authoritarian leaders across the world as a strategy for attacking the legitimacy of civil servants.

I therefore considered the possibility that, by using names, I would place one or more my informants at risk of an attack on their professional reputation. I also considered the potential for placing someone’s job at risk. I should note, however, that I did not have any specific reason to believe I was placing their professional reputations at risk. I also did not have a specific reason to believe that any risk to their professional reputation would lead to any greater risk for the health or well-being of my informants.

My decision to withhold the names and precise positions of my informants potentially weakens the credibility of my evidence. My informants are highly regarded among national policy and academic circles in Brazil. They also have intimate knowledge about the inner workings of various national programs that were created to promote social-justice, environmental justice, and human rights in Brazil. In my methods appendix, I make it clear that my informants all had strong

reputations in their fields. I also described their most direct work connection to the programs I describe in the article, making it clear that they were all directly involved in “bureaucratic outsourcing.” However, I could perhaps have provided stronger evidence of their credibility had I included their names and detailed work histories.

Despite the potential sacrifice for the strength of my evidence, I chose to anonymize my informants who are still working as public servants in Brazil. While the risk to my informants still appears to be minimal (even if increased by the change in political context), I concluded that I am obligated to keep most of my informants anonymous in order to follow the principle of minimizing harm. I made this decision despite having obtained consent to use their names.

ⁱ Anonymous interview with a bureaucrat in the Ministry of the Environment who was hired to create a system for tracking technical cooperation projects, August 8, 2018

ⁱⁱ Anonymous interview CGU official 1, August 7, 2018

ⁱⁱⁱ Anonymous interview with CGU official 2, August 7, 2018

^{iv} Anonymous interview with CGU official 3, August 7, 2018