Supporting Information (SI)

International Sports Events and Repression in Autocracies: Evidence from the 1978 FIFA World Cup

Adam Scharpf, Christian Gläßel, Pearce Edwards

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SI Contents

SI.1 Host regimes of international sports events

1) **Democratic and autocratic host regimes:** Figure SI.1.1 shows all host regimes of the most prominent international sports events since 1945. Black and grey spikes indicate autocratic and democratic host regimes, respectively. The classification of regime types is based on the variable *v2x_regime* of the Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) Project (Coppedge et al. 2021). Autocratic host regimes comprise closed and electoral autocracies, democratic host regimes consist of electoral and liberal democracies. Sports events are ordered according to the share of autocratic hosts from highest (top) to lowest (bottom). Included are tournaments for which contestants can qualify worldwide; in which individuals or teams compete for their nation; which take place in alternating host countries, and receive significant global media attention. Applying these criteria, we included the FIVB Volleyball World Championship (15 editions are men's championships only, 6 editions are both men's and women's championships in the same event), the FIBA Basketball World Cup (all editions are male-only), the World Table Tennis Championships (all editions are both men's and women's championships in the same event), the IHF World Handball Championship (all editions are male-only), the ICC Cricket World Cup (all editions are male-only), the FIFA World Cup (including all editions of both Men's and Women's World Cups), the IIHF Ice Hockey World Championships (all editions male-only), the (formerly IAAF) World Athletics Championships (all editions include both men's and women's championships in the same event), the Summer and the Winter Olympics (all editions include both men's and women's championships in the same event), and the Rugby World Cup (all editions male-only).

Figure SI.1.1. Host regimes of international sports event, 1945-2024



Note: Black spikes indicate autocratic host regimes, grey spikes indicate democratic host regimes.

SI.2 Case information

This section provides further information on the organization of the 1978 FIFA World Cup in Argentina.

1) **Official journalist hotels:** Figure 2.1 shows a sample page of an EAM brochure entitled "Los Hoteles Reservados Para El Periodismo." It was sent out to international journalists to inform them about all hotels with an allotment reserved for them. There is a short description of each hotel including its facilities, number of rooms, surroundings, and photos. We use this brochure to geolocate all hotels reserved for international journalists.

Figure SI.2.1. Information brochure about international journalist hotels

ALTA GRACIA

Sierras Hotel

Dir. en Bs. As., Maipú 510
2º P. C.
1006 Capital Federal
T.E. 392-4986

Tarifas:

Patios coloniales
single .... 30 francos suizos
doble .... 45 francos suizos
triple .... 55 francos suizos
Galerías exteriores
single .... 35 francos suizos
dobles .... 50 francos suizos
Dep. de Sala y dormitorio
1 pers. .... 37 francos suizos
2 pers. .... 60 francos suizos
3 pers. .... 75 francos suizos
4 pers. .... 90 francos suizos
Departamentos residenciales
(Living, 2 dorm. y 2 baños)
3 pers. .... 100 francos suizos
4 pers. .... 115 francos suizos
5 pers. .... 125 francos suizos
6 pers. .... 140 francos suizos

Adicional por cama 15 francos suizos
Media pensión 20 francos suizos

- 7 departamentos residenciales de living, dos dormitorios y dos baños con capacidad para 6 personas. 35 departamentos exteriores, de living, un dormitorio y 1 baño, con capacidad para 4 personas. 5 habitaciones exteriores con baño privado para dos personas. 11 habitaciones interiores sobre patio colonial español, con baño, para 2 personas. 8 habitaciones exteriores, con baño privado, para una persona. 8 habitaciones interiores sobre patio colonial español, con baño privado, para 1 persona. Teléfono en cada habitación. Restaurante a la carta. Comedor para niños. Salas de lectura, de estar, de conferencias y de juegos. Dos piletas de natación, una para adultos y otra para niños, solario. Parque de seis hectáreas. Cancha de golf de nueve hoyos. Lago artificial. Dos canchas de tennis. Juegos infantiles, baños sauna, playa de estacionamiento.

VILLA CARLOS PAZ

Residencial "El Ciervo de Oro"

Hipólito Yrigoyen 995
T.E. 211008

Tarifa: 60 francos suizos diarios por persona.

- 13 habitaciones, entre dobles, triples y suites, estas últimas con capacidad para 4 personas cada una.
- Todos los ambientes con heladera americana, música funcional y teléfono.
- Terraza, playa y piscina propia a orillas del lago.
- Salón de estar y iardín de invierno.
- Música funcional.
- Playa de estacionamiento.
- Bar y confitería.
- TV optativa.

Hostal del Sol

Avenida San Martín y Lope de Vega
T.E. 21074 y 22044
Casilla de Correo 258

Tarifa: Suite Junior, 65 francos suizos.
Suite mayor, 80 francos suizos.

- La suite junior consta de sala de estar, baño y habitación con dos camas simples o una de matrimonio.
La suite mayor, con la habitación de estar, dormitorio, vestidor y baño. El

SI.3 Summary and descriptive statistics

This section provides an overview of summary and descriptive statistics of our data sample. Table SI.3.1 shows summary statistics for all variables used in the main analyses, robustness checks, and mechanism tests at the department-day level. Table SI.3.2 summarizes the variables used to analyze repression during and after the 1978 FIFA World Cup.

Table SI.3.1. Summary statistics (Main analyses)

	Type	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Repression events	Count	58107	0.005	0.104	0.000	7.000
Repression events^a	Continous	58107	0.003	0.053	0.000	2.079
Repression events	Binary	58107	0.003	0.058	0.000	1.000
Host City	Binary	58383	0.010	0.100	0.000	1.000
Proximity to Hotel	Continous	58107	7.000	1.613	0.000	9.398
Proximity to Journalist Venue	Continous	58107	7.079	1.629	0.000	9.398
Time	Count	58383	0.590	0.338	0.010	1.170
Time^2	Count	58383	0.462	0.411	0.000	1.369
Time^3	Count	58383	0.407	0.460	0.000	1.602
Population Size^a	Continous	56628	9.701	1.336	6.057	14.905
Literacy Rate	Continous	56628	0.717	0.110	0.316	0.901
Peronist Vote Share	Continous	57447	58.752	11.539	28.500	94.300
Rebel Activity^a	Continous	58383	1.937	2.069	0.000	5.037
Past Repression^a	Continous	58383	0.908	1.434	0.000	7.557
Latitude	Continous	58383	-32.378	5.460	-54.749	-22.129
Protest$^a{}_{\text{Current month}}$	Continous	58383	0.010	0.102	0.000	2.079
Protest$^a{}_{\text{One month ago}}$	Continous	58383	0.009	0.100	0.000	2.079
Protest$^a{}_{\text{Two months ago}}$	Continous	58383	0.009	0.098	0.000	2.079
Military Zone 1	Binary	58383	0.246	0.431	0.000	1.000
Military Zone 2	Binary	58383	0.220	0.415	0.000	1.000
Military Zone 3	Binary	58383	0.379	0.485	0.000	1.000
Military Zone 4	Binary	58383	0.020	0.140	0.000	1.000
Military Zone 5	Binary	58383	0.134	0.341	0.000	1.000

Note: ^{a} Variable logarithmized.

Table SI.3.2. Summary statistics (Post-World Cup period)

	Type	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Repression events	Count	58321	0.004	0.096	0.000	9.000
Repression events^a	Continous	58321	0.002	0.047	0.000	2.303
Host City	Binary	58383	0.010	0.100	0.000	1.000
Post World Cup Period	Binary	58383	0.786	0.410	0.000	1.000
Time$_{\text{Post World Cup}}$	Count	58383	0.590	0.338	0.010	1.170
Time$^2{}_{\text{Post World Cup}}$	Count	58383	0.462	0.411	0.000	1.369
Time$^3{}_{\text{Post World Cup}}$	Count	58383	0.407	0.460	0.000	1.602
Population Size^a	Continous	56628	9.701	1.336	6.057	14.905
Literacy Rate	Continous	56628	0.717	0.110	0.316	0.901
Peronist Vote Share	Continous	57447	58.752	11.539	28.500	94.300
Rebel Activity^a	Continous	58383	1.937	2.069	0.000	5.037
Past Repression^a	Continous	58383	0.908	1.434	0.000	7.557
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Military Zone 3	Binary	58383	0.379	0.485	0.000	1.000
Military Zone 4	Binary	58383	0.020	0.140	0.000	1.000
Military Zone 5	Binary	58383	0.134	0.341	0.000	1.000

Note: ^{a} Variable logarithmized.

SI.4 Empirical strategy and additional robustness checks

Formally, we estimate negative binomial regression models with robust as well as clustered standard errors:

$$\begin{aligned} y_{i,t} = \alpha &+ \beta_1 HostCity_i * Time_t + \beta_2 HostCity_i * Time_t^2 \\ &+ \beta_3 HostCity_i + \beta_4 Time_t + \beta_5 Time_t^2 \\ &+ \gamma \mathbf{X}_i + \epsilon_{i,t}, \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where y is number of repression events in department i at day t. α is the intercept, the coefficients β_1 and β_2 capture repression dynamics in host and non-host cities. γ_t is a vector of coefficients for the time-invariant control variables. Unobserved determinants of repression events are captured by the error term $\epsilon_{i,t}$.

We undertake ten checks to assess the robustness of our main empirical results.

1) **Using linear regression (OLS):** This robustness test checks whether the main results depend on the choice of regression method. We re-run our main statistical analysis using linear regression models and the logarithmized version of the dependent variable. Table SI.4.1 shows that the coefficient of the interaction term between *Host City* and *Time* is positive and statistically significant across specifications, lending additional support to Hypothesis 1. Likewise, the coefficient of the interaction term between *Host City* and $Time^2$ is negative and statistically significant across all model specifications, which offers further support to Hypothesis 2. Together, our findings remain consistent across different regression methods and specifications.

2) **Using clustered standard errors:** This test accounts for the fact that observations might be temporally correlated within departments and spatially correlated across departments. To account for temporal correlation, Table SI.4.2 presents results of our main analyses with standard errors clustered on departments (and partidos in Buenos Aires province). Figure SI.4.1 shows corresponding substantive effects. To account for spatial correlation, Table SI.4.3 presents results with standard errors clustered on provinces in which departments are nested. In both tables, Models 1–3 are negative binomial regressions and Models 4–6 linear OLS regressions. Results demonstrate that our findings remain unchanged. In line with Hypothesis 1, the coefficients of the interactions between *Host City* and *Time* are positive and statistically significant. In line with Hypothesis 2, the coefficients of the interactions between *Host City* and $Time^2$ are negative and statistically significant. In sum, our findings are robust to the use of clustered standard errors and are unlikely to suffer from temporal or spatial correlation.

3) **Using cubic polynomials:** This test checks whether our finding of an inverted U-shaped pattern of repression is driven by an overly restrictive functional form. To allow for more flexibility on the temporal dimension, we re-run our analysis with cubic polynomials of time ($Time$, $Time^2$, and $Time^3$). Table SI.4.4 shows results of six regression models with interactions between the time polynomials and the variable *Host City*. Models 1–3 are based on negative binomial regressions, while Models 4–6 employ linear OLS regressions. Since the coefficients cannot be directly interpreted, particularly for the negative binomial models, we calculate substantive effects (Berry, DeMeritt and Esarey 2010). Figure SI.4.2 visualizes the spatio-temporal pattern of repression before and during the World Cup. Control variables are held at observed values. The figure again supports our original finding that—within host

cities—repression spiked shortly before the World Cup, and swiftly dropped with the opening match on June 1, 1978. In contrast, within non-host cities, the level of repression was at a constantly low level. The substantive effects based on OLS regressions (omitted due to space limitations but available upon request) fully replicate the results from the negative binomial models. Together, this corroborates the original modeling strategy and our theoretical expectation of an inverted U-shape in repression.

4) **Using a binary outcome variable of repression:** In this test, we check whether our results are robust to potential reporting biases in our dependent variable. We dichotomize our count dependent variable of repression by re-coding all positive count values to 1, and 0 otherwise. We then fit logistic regressions (Models 1–3) and linear probability models (Models 4–6). Results in Table SI.4.5 show that our findings remain unchanged when using a binary variable of repression. In line with Hypothesis 1, the coefficients of the interactions between *Host City* and $Time$ are positive and statistically significant. In line with Hypothesis 2, the coefficients of the interaction between *Host City* and $Time^2$ are negative and statistically significant. Together, this shows that our findings are robust to potential reporting biases in repression events.

5) **Using matched samples:** This test checks the robustness of our results with matched samples that pair similar departments with and without host cities. We first use a manual matching procedure and then turn to coarsened exact matching (CEM) (Blackwell et al. 2009; Iacus, King and Porro 2012). Overall, this provides us with three matched samples. The manual matching procedure uses the range of *Population size* (min–max) of all departments with host cities to select those departments without host cities into the control group. The sample thus excludes small, sparsely populated departments. The second matched sample is based on the CEM algorithm. We rely on manually determined bins for *Population size* to ensure the inclusion of all host cities. The third matched sample is also based on the CEM algorithm but uses automated binning for *Population size*. The resulting sample excludes the host city of Buenos Aires. Balance statistics for the raw and matched data samples are omitted due to space limitations but available upon request. Using all three matched samples, we re-run our main analysis with negative binomial regressions and linear OLS regressions. Results in Table SI.4.6 and Table SI.4.7 show that our findings remain substantively unchanged. Only in the OLS regressions that employ the CEM sample without Buenos Aires, coefficients drop below conventional levels of statistical significance, while the coefficient signs remain in the expected direction. Our results are therefore robust to various sample compositions and unlikely to be driven by covariate imbalances or model dependencies.

6) **Dropping one host city at a time:** In this check, we test whether our results are robust to potential outliers. To this end, we re-run our main analysis five times. In each run, we drop one host city and all its observations from the sample. Results therefore have to hold up against a significant drop in observations of the treatment group. We run this procedure for both negative binomial regressions and linear OLS regressions. Table SI.4.8 shows that our results remain robust independent of which host city is dropped from the sample. In sum, our results are not driven by an individual host city.

7) **Extending the length of the analysis window:** In this check, we assess whether our results are robust to the length of the window of analysis. We extend the original

pre-tournament window from three to five months. The resulting sample includes data on all departments from January 1 to June 25, 1978. To fully account for the dynamic in repression patterns in the extended window, we re-run our main analysis with cubic polynomials of time ($Time$, $Time^2$, and $Time^3$) interacted with the variable *Host City*. The coefficients of our explanatory variables shown in Table SI.4.9 remain unchanged (visualized substantive effects are omitted due to space limitations but available upon request), which demonstrates that our results are not driven by the length of our analysis window.

8) **Using different fixed effects:** In this test, we further probe the robustness of our results using different sets of fixed effects. In the main analysis we employ military zone fixed effects to capture the sub-national features of Argentina's repressive system. In this test, we employ fixed effects to account for structural differences between 1) provinces and 2) military subzones. We re-run our analysis using linear OLS regressions to ensure model convergence and unbiased beta coefficients. Table SI.4.10 shows that our results remain unchanged to the inclusion of both types of fixed effect. In sum, our findings are robust to the control of sub-national factors.

9) **Modeling selection of host venues:** In this test, we replicate the main findings while accounting for the selection of departments that eventually hosted matches of the FIFA World Cup. The EAM decided in mid-December 1974 which cities would host the matches, with construction work starting in mid-1975. We fit linear and probit regression models with Heckman sample selection, using the logarithmized version as well as the dichotomized version of repression. As shown in Table SI.4.11, we specify three different models. Model 1 only includes variables measured before 1974 (*Population Size*, *Literacy Rate*, and *Peronist Vote Share*). Model 2 includes additional control variables that capture the violent history of each department (*Rebel Activity* and *Past Repression*). Model 3 includes pre-1974 variables and an instrument: *Latitude* gives the exogenous distance of each department from the equator therefore accounting for local climatic conditions. Note that the World Cup took place during Winter in South America.

   Results from the first stage show that a large population, a low number of rebel attacks, and a history of high government repression increased the chances of a department being selected to host matches. Conversely, higher Peronist vote shares and literacy rates decreased a department's chances for being selected. In addition, the coefficient estimates for *Latitude* show that departments in Argentina's warm north were more likely to be chosen for hosting World Cup matches. Results from the second stage of the models again support our original findings. The positive and statistically significant coefficient estimates for $Time$ indicate that repression spiked right before the World Cup in host-city departments and then dropped at the start of the World Cup, as indicated by the negative and statistically significant estimates for $Time^2$. Together, the results show that our results hold after accounting for the selection of host cities.

10) **Aggregating data to the department-week level:** With this test, we check whether our findings are robust when re-running our analyses at the department-week level. We aggregate the variables to the department-week and estimate both negative binomial regressions and linear OLS regressions. Results in Table SI.4.12 and Table SI.4.13 show that the main coefficient estimates remain robust across all specifications. In line with Hypothesis 1, the coefficient of the interaction term between *Host City* and

$Time$ is positive and statistically significant; in line with Hypothesis 2, the coefficient of the interaction term between *Host City* and $Time^2$ is negative and statistically significant. In sum, our results remain unchanged when aggregating the data to the department-week level.

11) **Controlling for dissident resistance activities:** With this test we assess whether our results are confounded by opposition behavior. We have argued that, before the World Cup, the regime used preemptive repression in host cities to prevent subsequent anti-regime protests. Yet, the spike in repression might have also been the state's reaction to a potential relocation of dissidents and opposition activity from non-host cities to host cities in the months before the tournament. The latter scenario has two observable implications. First, if dissidents had strategically relocated from non-host cities to host cities, we should observe a decrease in opposition activity in non-host cities and an increase in resistance in host cities as the World Cup is coming closer. Second, if the regime's repression had been reactive rather than preemptive, our main results should also no longer hold once we control for dissident activities in host and non-host cities.

    To test whether our results are driven by a potential relocation of dissidents and opposition activity, we hand-code and geolocate resistance events based on a list of 266 monthly union and worker protests between 1976 and 1981 compiled by Falcón (1982). The list constitutes the only source that offers comprehensive information on peaceful resistance activities during the last Argentine dictatorship (McGuire 1996). Decentralized demonstrations by workers at the local level were often initiated by Peronist or Communist activists, and presented the most common form of peaceful resistance to the regime. Accordingly, the junta regarded unions and organized workers as the breeding ground for Argentina's subversion problem (Pion-Berlin and Lopez 1991, 75; Heinz 1999, 668).

    Figure SI.4.3 visualizes the number of protest events in host and non-host cities between 1976 and 1981. The relative trend shown in Panel (b) does not support the first observable implication that dissidents relocated resistance activities from non-host to host cities. If anything, the data suggest the opposite: With the World Cup approaching, the number of protests in non-host cities increases compared to host cities. That is, dissident activities do not seem to have moved from non-host cities to host cities in the months before the tournament.

    Next, we assess whether occurrences of protest confound our statistical results. Using our hand-coded data, we code the variable *Protest*, which captures the monthly number of protest events in each department. To account for temporal dynamics and potentially delayed government responses in our main analyses, we control for the number of protests in the current, last, and second-last month. Results in Table SI.4.14 show that our main results are not affected by the inclusion of $Protest_{current\ month}$, $Protest_{One\ month\ ago}$, or $Protest_{Two\ months\ ago}$ as control variables. The coefficients of our main independent variables and their interactions are robust and statistically significant. In sum, the tests lend additional support to our theoretical argument that the regime's repression adjustments were preemptive rather than reactive.

Table SI.4.1. Linear regressions (OLS) for repression in departments with and without host cities

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Host City * Time	0.401**	0.401**	0.401**
	(0.144)	(0.143)	(0.142)
Host City * Time^2	−0.323**	−0.323**	−0.323**
	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.109)
Host City	0.020	−0.004	−0.004
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Time	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Time^2	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.003***	−0.004*	−0.004†
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Controls	✗	✓	✓
Zone FE	✗	✗	✓
F Statistic	13.90***	17.56***	12.96***
R^2	0.05	0.06	0.06
Observations	58107	56394	56394

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.4.2. Regression results with standard errors clustered on departments (and partidos)

	Negative Binomial			OLS		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Host City * Time	7.138***	7.556***	8.301***	0.401*	0.401*	0.401*
	(1.694)	(2.083)	(2.482)	(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.177)
Host City * Time^2	−5.880***	−6.165***	−6.844**	−0.323*	−0.323*	−0.323*
	(1.523)	(1.754)	(2.134)	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.134)
Host City	2.610**	−1.511*	−1.434*	0.020	−0.004	−0.004
	(0.882)	(0.762)	(0.648)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Time	−1.816	−1.935	−1.928	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003
	(1.374)	(1.589)	(1.590)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Time^2	1.326	1.377	1.373	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(1.100)	(1.219)	(1.215)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	−5.344***	−15.077**	−13.412**	0.003**	−0.004	−0.004
	(0.427)	(5.320)	(4.979)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Ln(Alpha)	3.617*	1.971*	1.803*			
	(1.506)	(0.860)	(0.839)			
Controls	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓
Zone FE	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓
Wald χ^2	988.81***	508.18***	663.09***			
Pseudo R^2	0.08	0.31	0.32			
F Statistic				9.56***	8.67***	7.96***
R^2				0.05	0.06	0.06
Observations	58107	56394	56394	58107	56394	56394
Number of clusters	497	482	482	497	482	482

Note: Values are coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.4.3. Regression results with standard errors clustered on provinces

	Negative Binomial			OLS		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Host City * Time	7.138***	7.556***	8.301***	0.401*	0.401*	0.401*
	(1.317)	(1.818)	(2.296)	(0.181)	(0.181)	(0.181)
Host City * Time^2	−5.880***	−6.165***	−6.844***	−0.323*	−0.323*	−0.323*
	(1.166)	(1.447)	(1.975)	(0.136)	(0.137)	(0.137)
Host City	2.610**	−1.511†	−1.434*	0.020	−0.004	−0.004
	(0.908)	(0.810)	(0.575)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.020)
Time	−1.816†	−1.935	−1.928	−0.003†	−0.003†	−0.003†
	(1.009)	(1.408)	(1.354)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Time^2	1.326†	1.377	1.373	0.002†	0.002†	0.002†
	(0.706)	(0.983)	(0.946)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	−5.344***	−15.077*	−13.412*	0.003†	−0.004	−0.004
	(0.486)	(6.829)	(6.073)	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Ln(Alpha)	3.617*	1.971*	1.803†			
	(1.790)	(0.939)	(0.951)			
Controls	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓
Zone FE	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓
Pseudo R^2	0.08	0.31	0.32			
R^2				0.05	0.06	0.06
Observations	58107	56394	56394	58107	56394	56394
Number of clusters	24	24	24	24	24	24

Note: Values are coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.4.4. Regression results for cubic polynomials of time

	Negative Binomial			OLS		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Host City * Time	−0.156	0.538	1.818	−0.682*	−0.682*	−0.682*
	(5.386)	(4.893)	(5.121)	(0.347)	(0.344)	(0.340)
Host City * Time^2	9.100	8.439	6.591	1.962**	1.962**	1.962**
	(11.704)	(10.912)	(11.490)	(0.728)	(0.723)	(0.716)
Host City * Time^3	−8.541	−8.484	−7.799	−1.291**	−1.291**	−1.291**
	(7.151)	(6.639)	(6.981)	(0.414)	(0.411)	(0.408)
Host City	3.373***	−0.718	−0.702	0.129**	0.105*	0.105*
	(0.662)	(0.648)	(0.638)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Time	−6.787*	−6.693*	−6.797*	−0.013*	−0.013*	−0.013*
	(3.065)	(2.902)	(2.888)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Time^2	12.220†	11.839†	12.074*	0.023*	0.024†	0.024†
	(6.413)	(6.102)	(6.049)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Time^3	−6.270†	−6.037†	−6.173†	−0.012†	−0.012†	−0.012†
	(3.677)	(3.542)	(3.502)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Constant	−4.910***	−14.691***	−13.015***	0.004***	−0.003	−0.003
	(0.357)	(3.518)	(3.455)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Ln(Alpha)	3.554***	1.904***	1.738***			
	(0.438)	(0.332)	(0.328)			
Controls	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓
Zone FE	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓
Wald χ^2	624.03***	583.40***	758.71***			
Pseudo R^2	0.09	0.31	0.32			
F Statistic				10.48***	14.79***	11.44***
R^2				0.05	0.06	0.07
Observations	58107	56394	56394	58107	56394	56394

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.4.5. Regression results for binary variable of repression

	Logit			OLS		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Host City * Time	4.140*	4.869*	5.378*	0.318*	0.319*	0.319*
	(2.081)	(2.119)	(2.267)	(0.158)	(0.156)	(0.155)
Host City * Time^2	−3.214*	−3.798*	−4.217*	−0.262*	−0.262*	−0.262*
	(1.600)	(1.647)	(1.774)	(0.121)	(0.120)	(0.119)
Host City	3.138***	−1.627**	−1.327†	0.051	0.022	0.022
	(0.576)	(0.628)	(0.690)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Time	−0.873	−0.993	−0.992	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002
	(1.068)	(1.088)	(1.086)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Time^2	0.535	0.618	0.618	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.864)	(0.882)	(0.880)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	−5.851***	−17.248***	−15.402***	0.003***	−0.005*	−0.005†
	(0.267)	(3.181)	(3.161)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Controls	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓
Zone FE	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓
Wald χ^2	712.19***	637.21***	791.30***			
Pseudo R^2	0.15	0.40	0.41			
F Statistic				15.66***	19.78***	14.45***
R^2				0.04	0.06	0.06
Observations	58107	56394	56394	58107	56394	56394

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.4.6. Negative binomial regressions for matched samples

	Manual matching			Coarsened exact matching			Coarsened exact matching (w/o Buenos Aires)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Host City * Time	6.528**	6.808***	7.417***	6.965**	7.332***	7.598***	8.684*	8.275*	8.625*
	(2.114)	(1.995)	(2.017)	(2.174)	(2.038)	(2.031)	(3.947)	(3.805)	(3.703)
Host City * Time^2	−5.365**	−5.682***	−6.221***	−5.540**	−5.903***	−6.127***	−7.917**	−7.304*	−7.629**
	(1.711)	(1.596)	(1.635)	(1.751)	(1.629)	(1.636)	(3.071)	(2.910)	(2.852)
Host City	0.194	−1.680*	−1.137†	−0.533	−1.715*	−1.146†	−1.876	−0.272	1.639
	(0.556)	(0.657)	(0.635)	(0.574)	(0.701)	(0.679)	(1.160)	(1.368)	(2.831)
Time	−1.248	−1.128	−1.124	−1.683	−1.656	−1.673	−0.088	0.387	0.177
	(1.286)	(1.244)	(1.242)	(1.360)	(1.331)	(1.354)	(1.975)	(1.933)	(1.905)
Time^2	0.975	0.868	0.866	1.184	1.118	1.133	0.276	−0.218	0.002
	(1.055)	(1.029)	(1.017)	(1.126)	(1.092)	(1.104)	(1.584)	(1.537)	(1.517)
Constant	−2.978***	−20.619***	−15.441**	−2.268***	−27.818***	−9.914	−2.747***	−9.456	−32.842
	(0.328)	(5.257)	(5.784)	(0.341)	(6.743)	(9.533)	(0.526)	(16.066)	(46.718)
Ln(Alpha)	2.344***	1.417***	1.331***	2.048***	1.215***	1.149***	2.491***	2.081***	1.994***
	(0.194)	(0.283)	(0.267)	(0.184)	(0.294)	(0.276)	(0.229)	(0.240)	(0.232)
Controls	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓
Zone FE	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓
Wald χ^2	93.99***	230.33***	434.15***	43.98***	166.30***	15731.51***	10.40†	27.27**	10687.30***
Pseudo R^2	0.04	0.14	0.16	0.03	0.11	0.13	0.01	0.06	0.08
Observations	4095	4095	4095	2223	2223	2223	1404	1404	1404

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.4.7. Linear regressions (OLS) for matched samples

	Manual matching			Coarsened exact matching			Coarsened exact matching (w/o Buenos Aires)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Host City * Time	0.424**	0.424**	0.424**	0.465**	0.465**	0.465***	0.189	0.189	0.189
	(0.148)	(0.135)	(0.131)	(0.157)	(0.142)	(0.138)	(0.116)	(0.115)	(0.115)
Host City * Time^2	−0.341**	−0.341**	−0.341***	−0.368**	−0.368***	−0.368***	−0.166†	−0.166†	−0.166†
	(0.113)	(0.105)	(0.102)	(0.120)	(0.111)	(0.109)	(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.090)
Host City	−0.006	−0.100**	−0.077*	−0.035	−0.159***	−0.129***	−0.041	−0.033	−0.034
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.038)
Time	−0.026	−0.026	−0.026	−0.067	−0.067	−0.067	0.014	0.014	0.014
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.083)
Time^2	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.047	0.047	0.047	−0.008	−0.008	−0.008
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Constant	0.029***	−0.937***	−0.978***	0.058***	−1.841***	−0.605†	0.036†	0.297	0.363
	(0.008)	(0.141)	(0.172)	(0.017)	(0.330)	(0.335)	(0.022)	(0.481)	(0.579)
Controls	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓
Zone FE	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓
F Statistic	8.55***	12.90***	10.48***	5.53***	10.24***	11.90***	3.24**	5.21***	4.64***
R^2	0.03	0.10	0.12	0.02	0.12	0.14	0.00	0.02	0.03
Observations	4095	4095	4095	2223	2223	2223	1404	1404	1404

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.4.8. Outlier test with dropping one host city at a time

	Negative Binomial					OLS				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Host City * Time	12.778**	8.513***	7.473***	8.107***	7.822***	0.206**	0.467**	0.440*	0.428*	0.466**
	(4.038)	(1.989)	(2.025)	(2.072)	(1.989)	(0.079)	(0.169)	(0.173)	(0.172)	(0.174)
Host City * Time^2	−10.793***	−6.682***	−6.096***	−6.753***	−6.594***	−0.176**	−0.364**	−0.351**	−0.346**	−0.380**
	(2.953)	(1.594)	(1.616)	(1.654)	(1.614)	(0.062)	(0.129)	(0.132)	(0.131)	(0.134)
Host City	−2.365†	−1.754**	−1.380*	−1.095†	−1.329*	−0.024	−0.009	0.006	0.007	0.006
	(1.225)	(0.626)	(0.629)	(0.623)	(0.612)	(0.018)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Time	−1.995	−1.926	−1.937	−1.921	−1.932	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003
	(1.265)	(1.210)	(1.213)	(1.208)	(1.216)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Time^2	1.421	1.372	1.380	1.365	1.373	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.999)	(0.955)	(0.956)	(0.954)	(0.958)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	−12.919***	−13.716***	−12.855***	−13.796***	−13.229***	−0.004	−0.003	−0.008***	−0.003	−0.002
	(3.122)	(3.657)	(3.449)	(3.501)	(3.474)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Ln(Alpha)	2.817***	1.723***	1.789***	1.817***	1.772***					
	(0.282)	(0.329)	(0.311)	(0.304)	(0.306)					
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Zone FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Wald χ^2	541.66***	759.23***	640.83***	686.60***	679.38***					
Pseudo R^2	0.25	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32					
F Statistic						9.11***	12.60***	12.82***	12.58***	12.92***
R^2						0.02	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
Observations	56277	56277	56277	56277	56277	56277	56277	56277	56277	56277
Excluded Host City	Buenos Aires	Mar del Plata	Rosario	Cordoba	Mendoza	Buenos Aires	Mar del Plata	Rosario	Cordoba	Mendoza

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.4.9. Regression results for extended analysis window (January 1, 1978 - June 25, 1978)

	Negative Binomial			OLS		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Host City * Time	-3.457^{*}	-3.749	$-4.197^{\dagger}$	-0.377^{*}	-0.377^{*}	-0.377^{*}
	(1.733)	(2.349)	(2.520)	(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.173)
Host City * Time^2	6.695^{**}	7.125^{*}	7.867^{*}	0.596^{*}	0.596^{*}	0.596^{*}
	(2.191)	(3.050)	(3.306)	(0.272)	(0.272)	(0.272)
Host City * Time^3	-2.970^{***}	-3.112^{**}	-3.428^{**}	-0.239^{*}	-0.239^{*}	-0.239^{*}
	(0.840)	(1.124)	(1.225)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.108)
Host City	4.355^{***}	0.331	0.526	$0.154^{\dagger}$	0.130	$0.130^{\dagger}$
	(0.688)	(0.657)	(0.559)	(0.086)	(0.081)	(0.078)
Time	0.668	0.944	0.876	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(1.502)	(1.883)	(1.845)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Time^2	-1.273	-1.716	-1.636	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(1.834)	(2.324)	(2.278)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Time^3	0.510	0.670	0.644	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.674)	(0.833)	(0.816)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	-5.742^{***}	-12.970^{***}	-11.072^{***}	0.002^{**}	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.407)	(3.615)	(3.364)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Ln(Alpha)	3.764^{*}	2.154^{*}	2.008^{*}			
	(1.493)	(0.846)	(0.837)			
Controls	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓
Zone FE	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓
Wald χ^2	1472.61^{***}	892.81^{***}	1039.08^{***}			
Pseudo R^2	0.08	0.29	0.30			
F Statistic				55.84^{***}	26.29^{***}	52.56^{***}
R^2				0.04	0.06	0.06
Observations	87371	84832	84832	87371	84832	84832
Number of clusters	497	482	482	497	482	482

Note: Values are coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.4.10. Linear regressions (OLS) with different fixed effects specifications

	Province Fixed Effects		Subzone Fixed Effects	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Host City * Time	0.401^{**}	0.401^{**}	0.401^{**}	0.401^{**}
	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.124)	(0.123)
Host City * Time^2	-0.323^{***}	-0.323^{***}	-0.323^{***}	-0.323^{***}
	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.098)
Host City	$-0.055^{\dagger}$	-0.070^{*}	$-0.053^{\dagger}$	-0.068^{*}
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Time	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Time^2	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.007^{***}	-0.004	0.014^{***}	-0.005
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Controls	✗	✓	✗	✓
FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
F Statistic	7.46^{***}	6.58^{***}	9.56^{***}	7.80^{***}
R^2	0.13	0.14	0.13	0.14
Observations	58107	56394	58107	56394

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.4.11. Regressions with Heckman sample selection for departments with host cities

	Ln(Repression)			Pr(Repression)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Within Argentina: Departments with host cities						
Population Size	1.759***	3.625***	1.778***	1.923***	3.856***	1.941***
	(0.063)	(0.345)	(0.063)	(0.058)	(0.231)	(0.054)
Literacy Rate	−4.587***	−4.113***	−3.953***	−5.897***	−4.153***	−4.970***
	(0.606)	(0.704)	(0.676)	(0.539)	(0.701)	(0.679)
Peronist Vote Share	−0.192***	−0.375***	−0.192***	−0.192***	−0.396***	−0.191***
	(0.004)	(0.031)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.022)	(0.004)
Rebel Activity		−1.044***			−1.115***	
		(0.106)			(0.070)	
Past Repression		0.263***			0.253***	
		(0.049)			(0.048)	
Latitude			0.036**			0.047**
			(0.013)			(0.017)
Constant	−9.952***	−22.389***	−9.499***	−10.876***	−23.945***	−10.293***
	(0.447)	(2.572)	(0.469)	(0.396)	(1.838)	(0.414)
Within Host Cities: Repression trend						
Time	0.358**	0.385**	0.358**	2.061**	1.772*	2.042**
	(0.114)	(0.136)	(0.115)	(0.760)	(0.853)	(0.780)
Time^2	−0.293**	−0.312**	−0.293**	−1.698**	−1.495*	−1.690**
	(0.089)	(0.105)	(0.090)	(0.580)	(0.658)	(0.596)
Constant	0.260***	0.104*	0.257***	−0.838***	−1.260***	−0.878***
	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.238)	(0.244)	(0.240)
Correlation Parameter						
atanh ρ	−0.920***	−0.457**	−0.908***	−1.025***	−0.593***	−0.962***
	(0.130)	(0.157)	(0.137)	(0.138)	(0.141)	(0.126)
Wald χ^2	10.85**	8.92*	10.74**	8.85*	5.48†	8.35*
Number of observations	128421	128421	128421	128421	128421	128421
Selected observations	585	585	585	585	585	585

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.4.12. Negative binomial regression results with week-level data

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Host City * $\text{Time}_{\text{Week}}$	5.265*	5.952**	6.793***	5.265***	5.952***	6.793***
	(2.181)	(1.950)	(1.900)	(1.143)	(1.653)	(1.990)
Host City * $\text{Time}^2_{\text{Week}}$	−2.852*	−3.156***	−3.624***	−2.852***	−3.156***	−3.624***
	(1.137)	(0.950)	(0.923)	(0.634)	(0.824)	(1.006)
Host City	2.354*	−1.824*	−2.000*	2.354*	−1.824*	−2.000*
	(0.919)	(0.847)	(0.812)	(0.958)	(0.909)	(0.861)
$\text{Time}_{\text{Week}}$	−0.062	−0.287	−0.314	−0.062	−0.287	−0.314
	(1.030)	(1.159)	(1.197)	(0.921)	(1.155)	(1.196)
$\text{Time}^2_{\text{Week}}$	−0.104	−0.011	0.002	−0.104	−0.011	0.002
	(0.513)	(0.547)	(0.558)	(0.475)	(0.547)	(0.560)
Constant	−3.750***	−13.272**	−11.359*	−3.750***	−13.272**	−11.359*
	(0.465)	(4.277)	(4.504)	(0.458)	(4.464)	(4.543)
Ln(Alpha)	3.680***	1.287**	1.114*	3.680***	1.287*	1.114†
	(0.261)	(0.414)	(0.479)	(0.483)	(0.522)	(0.595)
Controls	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓
Zone FE	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓
Wald χ^2	291.99***	456.87***	554.49***	1490.57***	410.21***	446.46***
Pseudo R^2	0.06	0.32	0.34	0.06	0.32	0.34
Observations	8982	8676	8676	8982	8676	8676
Clustered Standard Errors	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓

Note: Values are coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.4.13. Linear regression results with week-level data

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Host City * $\text{Time}_{\text{Week}}$	1.437^{*}	1.438^{*}	1.438^{**}	1.437^{**}	1.438^{**}	1.438^{**}
	(0.575)	(0.560)	(0.545)	(0.465)	(0.465)	(0.466)
Host City * $\text{Time}^2_{\text{Week}}$	-0.788^{**}	-0.789^{**}	-0.789^{**}	-0.788^{**}	-0.789^{**}	-0.789^{**}
	(0.275)	(0.267)	(0.260)	(0.257)	(0.257)	(0.257)
Host City	0.027	−0.100	−0.100	0.027	−0.100	−0.100
	(0.225)	(0.219)	(0.212)	(0.120)	(0.108)	(0.096)
$\text{Time}_{\text{Week}}$	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.002
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
$\text{Time}^2_{\text{Week}}$	−0.003	−0.002	−0.002	−0.003	−0.002	−0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	0.011^{**}	-0.030^{*}	-0.031^{*}	0.011^{**}	−0.030	−0.031
	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.004)	(0.026)	(0.032)
Controls	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓
Zone FE	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓
F Statistic	8.60^{***}	13.36^{***}	10.29^{***}	12.34^{***}	7.17^{***}	6.25^{***}
R^2	0.14	0.19	0.21	0.14	0.19	0.21
Observations	8982	8676	8676	8982	8676	8676
Clustered Standard Errors	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓

Note: Values are coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.4.14. Regression results with controls for protest

	Negative Binomial						OLS					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Host City * Time	7.346^{***}	5.772^{**}	8.777^{***}	8.641^{***}	6.982^{**}	8.561^{***}	0.359^{**}	$0.252^{\dagger}$	0.482^{***}	0.360^{**}	0.252^{*}	0.481^{***}
	(2.016)	(2.090)	(2.133)	(1.995)	(2.187)	(2.176)	(0.135)	(0.129)	(0.136)	(0.135)	(0.128)	(0.135)
Host City * Time^2	-5.942^{***}	-5.124^{**}	-7.213^{***}	-7.212^{***}	-6.046^{***}	-7.070^{***}	-0.269^{**}	-0.222^{*}	-0.401^{***}	-0.270^{**}	-0.223^{*}	-0.400^{***}
	(1.609)	(1.657)	(1.680)	(1.615)	(1.725)	(1.731)	(0.102)	(0.100)	(0.105)	(0.102)	(0.099)	(0.104)
Host City	-1.493^{*}	−0.983	-1.817^{**}	-1.430^{*}	$-1.129^{\dagger}$	-1.511^{*}	−0.013	0.023	−0.028	−0.015	0.020	−0.030
	(0.622)	(0.633)	(0.638)	(0.607)	(0.643)	(0.641)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Time	−2.017	-2.563^{*}	−1.717	−1.797	$-2.346^{\dagger}$	−1.884	-0.006^{*}	-0.008^{***}	−0.001	-0.005^{*}	-0.008^{***}	−0.001
	(1.235)	(1.203)	(1.217)	(1.246)	(1.226)	(1.205)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Time^2	1.458	$1.768^{\dagger}$	1.111	1.246	$1.629^{\dagger}$	1.319	0.005^{*}	0.005^{**}	−0.001	0.005^{*}	0.005^{**}	−0.001
	(0.984)	(0.961)	(0.970)	(0.992)	(0.968)	(0.952)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
$\text{Protest}_{\text{Current month}}$	0.161			−0.257			0.072^{***}			0.070^{***}		
	(0.222)			(0.272)			(0.013)			(0.013)		
$\text{Protest}_{\text{One month ago}}$		0.780^{***}			0.535^{*}			0.111^{***}			0.111^{***}	
		(0.206)			(0.246)			(0.017)			(0.017)	
$\text{Protest}_{\text{Two months ago}}$			0.401^{*}			0.085			0.080^{***}			0.079^{***}
			(0.196)			(0.232)			(0.013)			(0.013)
Constant	-14.875^{***}	-13.922^{***}	-14.684^{***}	-13.726^{***}	-12.659^{***}	-13.324^{***}	−0.002	0.000	−0.002	−0.000	0.002	−0.001
	(3.562)	(3.429)	(3.525)	(3.629)	(3.492)	(3.546)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Ln(Alpha)	1.964^{***}	1.842^{***}	1.939^{***}	1.786^{***}	1.766^{***}	1.803^{***}						
	(0.311)	(0.313)	(0.310)	(0.316)	(0.307)	(0.306)						
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Zone FE	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Wald χ^2	588.50^{***}	708.57^{***}	613.15^{***}	748.84^{***}	842.66^{***}	748.67^{***}						
Pseudo R^2	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.32	0.32	0.32						
F Statistic							16.37^{***}	16.92^{***}	16.48^{***}	12.26^{***}	12.62^{***}	12.37^{***}
R^2							0.08	0.10	0.08	0.08	0.10	0.08
Observations	56394	56394	56394	56394	56394	56394	56394	56394	56394	56394	56394	56394

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Figure SI.4.1. Substantive effects using clustered standard errors



Note: Graph shows predicted numbers of daily repression events in departments with host cities (left panel) and in other departments (right panel). Calculations are based on interaction effects of Models 3 and 6 in Table 1, with control variables held at observed values. Shading around lines give 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors, vertical black lines give 95% confidence intervals using clustered standard errors.

Figure SI.4.2. Substantive effects using cubic polynomials in negative binomial regression



Note: Graph shows predicted numbers of daily repression events in departments with host cities (solid line) and in other departments (dashed line). Calculations are based on Model 3, Table 4.4, with control variables held at observed values. Dark shadings give 95% CIs.

Figure SI.4.3. Protest occurrence, March 1976 - March 1981

(a) Occurrence of protest events

(b) Difference in protest events



Note: Left panel shows the absolute numbers of monthly protest events in host cities (light gray) and non-host cities (dark gray). Right panel shows the difference between monthly protest events in host and non-host cities ($Protests_{\text{Host cities}} - Protests_{\text{Other cities}}$), where positive values indicate a surplus of protest events in host cities, while negative values indicate a surplus of protest events in other cities. Dashed vertical lines in both panels highlight the month of the World Cup (June 1978).

SI.5 Zooming in on the junta's scrutiny-publicity dilemma

This section offers visualizations and tests for key parts of our theoretical mechanism.

1) **The scrutiny-publicity dilemma and repression types:** In the main text, we argue that the junta's scrutiny-publicity dilemma should have influenced the use of different types of repression as a function of their covertness and their deterrence potential. As described in the main text, we expect that the junta increased disappearances but reduced killings with the World Cup approaching. We test this by disaggregating the dependent variable into the number of disappearances and the number of killings. We run negative binomial regressions and linear OLS regressions on the (logarithmized) count of each dependent variable. Table SI.5.5 shows the regression results used to produce Figure 7 in the main text. Coefficient estimates show that disappearances significantly spiked right before the beginning of the World Cup in May (Model 1 and 2), whereas killings steadily decreased, most notably in the month before and during the tournament (Model 3 and 4). The results suggest that the regime strategically adjusted repression types to the tournament schedule.

2) **The spatial presence of international journalists and repression:** In the main text, we argue that the presence of foreign journalists should have incentivized the regime to especially adjust repression in close proximity to journalist hotels. To test this expectation, we collect original archival data on the locations of venues that housed journalists during the World Cup. Using this information we construct two variables: The variable *Proximity to Hotel* measures the proximity (in kilometers) from the centroid of each department to the nearest journalist hotel; and the variable *Proximity*

to Journalist Venue measures the proximity (in kilometers) from the centroid of each department to the nearest venue that housed international journalists. The latter includes any of the following: 1) the nearest journalist hotel, 2) the nearest team hotel of a democratic competing country (some journalists stayed in the same hotel as their national football teams), or 3) the nearest press center of the 1978 FIFA World Cup. For the ease of interpretation we construct both variables in a way that higher values give higher proximity. We interact each variable with $Time$, $Time^2$, and $Time^3$. We run negative binomial regressions and linear OLS regressions for all sets of variables.

Table SI.5.2 presents regression results for the variable *Proximity to Nearest Hotel*; Table SI.5.3 shows the results using the variable *Proximity to Journalist Venue*. Due to non-linearity the coefficients and their statistical significance in the negative binomial regressions cannot be directly interpreted (Berry, DeMeritt and Esarey 2010). The coefficient estimates for the OLS models (Models 4–6 respectively) indicate that the closer a department was located to a journalist venue the more repression spiked before the World Cup and declined during the tournament. Figure SI.5.1 shows the substantive effects of the negative binomial regression in a contour plot. Looking at the effects from "bird's eye perspective", the figure shows that repression spiked shortly before the World Cup in areas closely located to the Cup venues. In areas that were far away from the tournament venues repression remained at a constantly low level throughout. Together, the results support our argument that the junta adjusted repression in accordance with spatial presence of international journalists.

3) **The spatial presence of international journalists and repression (GAM):** In addition to the negative binomial and OLS regressions, we run generalized additive models. These models are well suited to estimate and visualize the conditional effects of two continuous variables (Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu 2019). Table SI.5.4 presents results from Gaussian generalized additive models using the logarithmized number of repression events as the dependent variable. The models predict the number of daily repressive events in each department as a function of both the temporal proximity to the World Cup and the spatial proximity to the nearest journalist hotel. To this end, all models use tensor product smooths of the space-time dimension (Wood 2006). While Models 1–3 in Table SI.5.4 are based on the tensor product between *Time* and *Proximity to Journalist Hotel*, Models 4–6 use *Proximity to Journalist Venue* instead of *Proximity to Journalist Hotel*. Since the coefficients of tensor products cannot be directly interpreted, we visualize results in three-dimensional surface plots.

   Model 3 in Table SI.5.4 serves as the basis for Figure 8 in the main text. In line with our expectation, Figure 8 depicts a clear spatio-temporal trend in repression. The regime especially adjusted its level of violence in close proximity to hotels that accommodated international journalists. The corresponding figure for Model 6 in Table 5.4, which employs the variable *Proximity to Journalist Venue*, shows the identical spatio-temporal trends of repression and is available upon request. In sum, the results of the generalized additive models lend further support to our suggested mechanism, underlining the importance of the spatial presence of international media.

4) **The temporal absence of international media attention and repression:** By further disaggregating the temporal dimension of repression, we assess whether the junta adjusted repression to the daily working schedule of journalists. To this end, we calculate the share of repression events that were carried out during the journalists' core working hours and the share of repression events outside of these hours.

Figure SI.5.2 visualizes the match schedule and the journalist working hours that underlie the results presented in Figure 9, which indicates that the junta even adjusted the daytime of repression in order to hide violence from the international press.

Table SI.5.1. Regression results for types of repression (time indicators)

	Disappearances		Killings	
	(1) NegBin	(2) OLS	(3) NegBin	(4) OLS
April	−0.069	−0.030	−0.586	−0.103
	(0.206)	(0.151)	(0.739)	(0.105)
May	0.582**	0.374*	−1.872†	−0.183*
	(0.203)	(0.167)	(1.079)	(0.088)
June	−0.223	−0.180	−1.657*	−0.163†
	(0.296)	(0.162)	(0.808)	(0.089)
Constant	0.693***	0.936***	−0.869*	0.218**
	(0.148)	(0.109)	(0.434)	(0.081)
Ln(Alpha)	−1.121**		1.796***	
	(0.358)		(0.457)	
Wald χ^2	15.19**		5.97	
Pseudo R^2	0.03		0.04	
F Statistic		3.60*		1.63
R^2		0.10		0.05
Observations	117	117	117	117

Note: March is reference month. Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.5.2. Regression results for proximity to nearest journalist hotel

	Negative Binomial			OLS		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Proximity to Hotel * Time	4.102	1.549	1.544	−0.013*	−0.013*	−0.013*
	(5.610)	(2.327)	(2.242)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Proximity to Hotel * $Time^2$	2.249	0.758	0.631	0.031**	0.031**	0.031**
	(13.174)	(5.085)	(4.875)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Proximity to Hotel * $Time^3$	−4.634	−1.672	−1.570	−0.019**	−0.019**	−0.019**
	(7.777)	(2.904)	(2.787)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Proximity to Hotel	0.852†	−0.064	−0.027	0.003***	0.002*	0.002*
	(0.465)	(0.221)	(0.248)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Time	−42.100	−19.820	−19.673	0.069*	0.070*	0.070*
	(49.806)	(20.300)	(19.473)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.034)
$Time^2$	−7.588	5.973	6.951	−0.173*	−0.175**	−0.175**
	(117.562)	(44.660)	(42.650)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.067)
$Time^3$	33.917	7.565	6.709	0.107**	0.108**	0.108**
	(69.492)	(25.586)	(24.462)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Constant	−11.308**	−10.885**	−10.160**	−0.017***	−0.005	−0.005
	(4.044)	(3.846)	(3.939)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Ln(Alpha)	3.246***	1.940***	1.787***			
	(0.248)	(0.296)	(0.313)			
Controls	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓
Zone FE	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓
Wald χ^2	60.44***	512.86***	713.33***			
Pseudo R^2	0.17	0.32	0.33			
F Statistic				21.99***	14.09***	11.08***
R^2				0.01	0.03	0.04
Observations	58107	56394	56394	58107	56394	56394

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.5.3. Regression results for proximity to nearest journalist venue (journalist hotel, team hotel, or press venue)

	Negative Binomial			OLS		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Proximity to Journalist Venue * Time	4.100	1.692	1.682	−0.012*	−0.012*	−0.012*
	(5.362)	(2.261)	(2.195)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Proximity to Journalist Venue * $Time^2$	0.498	−0.119	−0.195	0.029**	0.030**	0.030**
	(12.957)	(5.070)	(4.890)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Proximity to Journalist Venue * $Time^3$	−2.871	−0.878	−0.822	−0.018**	−0.018**	−0.018**
	(7.862)	(2.981)	(2.874)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Proximity to Journalist Venue	0.794†	−0.082	−0.052	0.003***	0.002*	0.002*
	(0.432)	(0.214)	(0.242)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Time	−42.373	−21.159	−20.968	0.066†	0.067*	0.067*
	(47.847)	(19.749)	(19.095)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
$Time^2$	8.262	13.652	14.191	−0.163*	−0.166*	−0.166*
	(116.198)	(44.435)	(42.690)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.066)
$Time^3$	18.136	0.640	0.191	0.100**	0.102**	0.102**
	(70.589)	(26.134)	(25.109)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Constant	−10.902**	−10.882**	−10.149*	−0.016***	−0.005	−0.004
	(3.785)	(3.821)	(3.948)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Ln(Alpha)	3.457***	1.951***	1.803***			
	(0.218)	(0.298)	(0.314)			
Controls	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓
Zone FE	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓
Wald χ^2	56.81***	519.44***	730.25***			
Pseudo R^2	0.16	0.32	0.33			
F Statistic				21.97***	14.09***	11.09***
R^2				0.00	0.03	0.04
Observations	58107	56394	56394	58107	56394	56394

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.5.4. Generalized additive regression results for proximity to nearest journalist hotel or nearest journalist venue

	Proximity to nearest hotel			Proximity to nearest journalist venue		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
EDF: te(Proximity to Journalist Hotel, Time)	22.877***	22.876***	22.880***			
	(23.625)	(23.629)	(23.629)			
EDF: te(Proximity to Journalist Venue, Time)				22.192***	22.207***	22.211***
				(23.187)	(23.206)	(23.208)
Population Size		0.001***	0.003***		0.001***	0.003***
		(0.000)	(0.000)		(0.000)	(0.000)
Literacy Rate		−0.009**	−0.026***		−0.010**	−0.026***
		(0.003)	(0.004)		(0.003)	(0.004)
Peronist Vote Share		−0.000***	−0.000***		−0.000***	−0.000***
		(0.000)	(0.000)		(0.000)	(0.000)
Past Repression		0.005***	0.004***		0.005***	0.005***
		(0.000)	(0.000)		(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.003***	0.004	0.006	0.003***	0.003	0.005
	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Zone Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
AIC	−178577.52	−172470.28	−172763.40	−178216.79	−172289.82	−172591.52
BIC	−178354.37	−172203.18	−172460.51	−177999.78	−172028.71	−172294.61
Log Likelihood	89313.63	86265.02	86415.58	89132.59	86174.12	86328.97
Deviance	157.28	154.91	154.09	158.27	155.42	154.56
Deviance explained	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.04
Dispersion	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
R^2	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.04
GCV score	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Number of observations	58107	56394	56394	58107	56394	56394
Number of smooth terms	1	1	1	1	1	1

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Figure SI.5.1. Repression as a function of proximity to journalist hotels and time to World Cup (negative binomial regression).



Note: Contour plot shows predicted number of daily repression events as function of spatial proximity to journalist hotels and temporal proximity to 1978 World Cup. Calculations are based on Model 1, Table SI.5.2. Darker color indicate higher predicted counts.

Figure SI.5.2. Match schedule and journalist working hours during the 1978 FIFA World Cup



Note: Plot shows the daily schedule of the 1978 World Cup. Y-axis presents calendar days; x-axis indicates the times of the day; black horizontal bars visualize start and end times of individual games; the gray rectangle indicates the core working hours defined by the start and end times of individual games plus pre- and post-match coverage (vertical dashed lines), and the days of the opening match and the final (horizontal dotted lines).

SI.6 Additional implications

This section offers tests on the a localized rebound in repression immediately after the end of an international sport event. We have argued that the presence of international journalists tied the hands of the military government during the World Cup and thus might have allowed the opposition to regroup. This implies that the junta might have had an incentive to initiate a second wave of repression in host venues right after the World Cup had ended. To test this, we compare the number of daily repressive events before, during, and after the World Cup. We undertake two tests.

1) **Repressive rebound after the World Cup (bi-weekly indicators):** First, we analyze daily repression events in the 30 weeks around the World Cup (March - September 1978). We create biweekly indicator variables and interact them with the variable *Host city* to allow a functional form that can capture multiple repression spikes. We expect that, after the tournament, repression significantly increased in host cities but not in others. Coefficient estimates in Table SI.6.1 show that daily repression spiked in host cities directly before the World Cup ($Week_{-6}$ and $Week_{-4}$) and directly after the final ($Week_{+2}$ and $Week_{+4}$). Figure 10 in the main text is based on Model 3. Together, the results corroborate the original finding of a strategic increase in repression before the tournament and lends support to the argument that—after the international journalists had left the country—the Argentine dictatorship sought to break any resistance networks that might have flourished during the World Cup.

2) **Repressive rebound after the World Cup (quadratic and cubic polynomials):** Second, to corroborate our results of a repression rebound after the World Cup, we re-run the analysis using the continuous time variable $Time_{Post\ World\ Cup}$ as well as its quadratic and polynomial term. We then interact the time variables for the post-World Cup period with the variable *Host City*. This test set-up imitates our analysis of the pre-tournament period. Regression results of negative binomial and linear OLS regression models fully support our original finding (results table and visualized substantive effects are omitted due to space limitations but available upon request). Repression spiked right after the final match had been played. This supports our finding that, after the international journalists had left Argentina, the junta initiated a second wave of repression to break any resistance networks that might have developed under the protection of the world press during the World Cup.

Table SI.6.1. Linear regressions (OLS) with biweekly time interactions in full analysis window (March - September 1978)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Host City * $Week_{-12}$	0.036	0.036	0.036
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.041)
Host City * $Week_{-10}$	0.028	0.028	0.028
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Host City * $Week_{-8}$	0.039	0.039	0.039
	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Host City * $Week_{-6}$	0.152^{*}	0.152^{*}	0.152^{*}
	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Host City * $Week_{-4}$	0.134^{*}	0.134^{*}	0.134^{*}
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)
Host City * $Week_{-2}$	$0.082^{\dagger}$	$0.082^{\dagger}$	$0.082^{\dagger}$
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Host City * $Week_{0}$	−0.045	−0.045	−0.045
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Host City * $Week_{+2}$	0.137^{*}	0.137^{*}	0.137^{*}
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Host City * $Week_{+4}$	0.118^{*}	0.118^{*}	0.118^{*}
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.057)
Host City * $Week_{+6}$	$0.099^{\dagger}$	$0.099^{\dagger}$	$0.099^{\dagger}$
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Host City * $Week_{+8}$	0.044	0.045	0.045
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.046)
Host City * $Week_{+10}$	0.023	0.023	0.023
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.043)
Host City * $Week_{+12}$	−0.014	−0.014	−0.014
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Host City * $Week_{+14}$	0.015	0.015	0.015
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Host City	$0.053^{\dagger}$	0.033	0.033
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
$Week_{-12}$	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$Week_{-10}$	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$Week_{-8}$	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$Week_{-6}$	-0.001^{*}	-0.001^{*}	-0.001^{*}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$Week_{-4}$	$0.002^{\dagger}$	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$Week_{-2}$	$-0.001^{\dagger}$	$-0.001^{\dagger}$	$-0.001^{\dagger}$
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$Week_{0}$	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$Week_{+2}$	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$Week_{+4}$	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$Week_{+6}$	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$Week_{+8}$	-0.001^{*}	-0.002^{**}	-0.002^{**}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$Week_{+10}$	-0.001^{*}	-0.002^{*}	-0.002^{*}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$Week_{+12}$	-0.002^{**}	-0.002^{**}	-0.002^{**}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$Week_{+14}$	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	0.002^{***}	−0.002	−0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
F Statistic	5.44^{***}	8.05^{***}	7.33^{***}
R^2	0.06	0.07	0.08
Observations	101523	98328	98328
Control Variables	No	Yes	Yes
Zone Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
$Week_{-14}$ is reference category.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

SI.7 External validity

This section offers additional evidence on the external validity the proposed logic of repression adjustment around international sport events.

1) **Anecdotal evidence from Hitler's Germany and Mobutu's Zaire:** The arrangements for Hitler's 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin resemble the repressive adjustments of the Argentine junta. The Nazis wanted to impress their international guests during the Games and improve their image abroad. For the time of the Olympics, the government temporarily suspended several illiberal regulations. Among other things, it commanded that "homosexuals should not be arrested for a broad range of behaviors between men that were ordinarily considered a crime" (Bachrach 2000, 87). In contrast, two weeks before the opening ceremony, the regime ordered the police president to arrest all members of the Roma community living in Greater Berlin. The police round-up before the Games indicates that the totalitarian Nazi regime wanted to cleanse the streets of potential troublemakers and avoid any protests by discriminated communities.

   Similarly, Zaire's long-time dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko, used the legendary heavyweight boxing match between George Foreman and Muhammad Ali in 1974 to boost his prestige. Going to great lengths to host 'The Rumble in the Jungle,' Mobutu skillfully exploited Ali's great popularity across Africa. The fight had an attendance of 60,000 ecstatic live spectators at Kinshasa's stadium and a record-breaking television audience of one billion viewers worldwide. In the lead-up to the fight, the regime allegedly abducted 300 suspects, brought them to the stadium, killed 50 of them, and then released the rest so that they could warn others (Mailer 1975, 112). By making "the stadium the center of frightening rumors" Mobutu deterred any disturbances (Malaquais 2010, 236).

2) **Descriptive evidence from the CAF Africa Cup of Nations across time:** This test probes whether informational changes or changes in the media scrutiny of autocracies influence repression adjustments around international sports events. To this end, we zoom in on one major sport event, the Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON), which is frequently hosted by autocratic regimes and receives large media coverage by Western journalist. Most importantly, the AFCON takes place at the beginning of the year. This allows us to identify spikes in preemptive violence with yearly data. Figure SI.7.1 visualizes repression dynamics in the run-up to the Africa Cup. In line with our theoretical argument, the graph shows a visible spike in repression prior to the Cup across time. As can be seen, the stark increase in state violence in the year before the Cup not only occurs during the Cold War (1945-1990), but also before contemporary Cups in a globalized media environment (1991-2020). Together, this lends additional support to our proposed logic of preemptive repression around international sport events.

Figure SI.7.1. Changes in repression before and during the Africa Cup



Note: Graph shows average repression scores based on Fariss, Kenwick and Reuning (2020). Original measure was inverted to ease interpretation.

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