Supplementary Information

Contents

A   A theoretical illustration of two competing hypotheses

Figure A.1 provides a simplified illustration of how the relationship between the ideological stance of politicians and the ideological stance of victims' perpetrators may shape patterns of responsiveness. In this simplified scenario, there are two types of victims: victims of perpetrators A, the Left shown in gray dots and dashed arrows; and victims of perpetrators B, the Right shown in black dots and solid arrows. Similarly, there are two types of municipalities: those governed by a left-leaning mayor (left side of the x-axis) and those governed by a right-leaning mayor (right side of the x-axis). Dots and arrows indicate the theoretical expectation of responsiveness with regards to victims of left-wing armed groups (dashed gray dots and arrows) and victims of right-leaning groups (solid black and arrows) as a function of the ideological leanings of the mayor.

Figure A.1: A theoretical illustration of two competing hypotheses

(a) Group bias   (b) Signaling

Note: Dots and arrows indicate the theoretical expectation of the ideological leaning of the mayor with regards to victims of left-wing armed groups (red dots and arrows) and victims of right-leaning groups (blue dots and arrows) as a function of the ideological leaning of the institution.

Figure 1A illustrates the dynamics of responsiveness that are expected if the in-group bias hypothesis explains the empirical data. If the in-group bias thesis has stronger explanatory power, responsiveness should be highest when left-leaning (or right-leaning) institutions respond to a victim of the rightist (or respectively leftist) political groups. In contrast to this, Figure 1B illustrates the dynamics of responsiveness that are expected if the signaling hypothesis explains the empirical data. If the signaling hypothesis has a stronger explanatory power, responsiveness should be highest when left-leaning (or right-leaning) institutions respond to a victim of leftist (or respectively, rightist) political groups.

B   Email Text: Spanish Version (Original)

Buenas Tardes Doctor(a) (nombre del alcalde), espero se encuentre bien.

Mi nombre es [María, Juan], [y soy víctima de [las FARC, el ELN, los paramilitares, el estado]]. Llevo viviendo un tiempo en (nombre del municipio) [en el que llegué como desplazado], [incluso ya estoy registrada en el municipio para poder votar en las próximas elecciones locales,] pero no he conseguido progresar ni económicamente ni profesionalmente. Es por eso que le escribo doctor(a). Porque me gustaría que usted me informara a cuáles programas de la alcaldía pudiera inscribirme para encontrar [empleo, vivienda de interés social].

Le agradezco que considere que no estoy vinculado con ninguna ideología o partido político, y que no hay ningún interés adicional más que el de mejorar mi situación.

Gracias señor(a) alcalde

C Email Text: Complexity and Length

We acknowledge that the combination of treatments might lead to changes in request complexity and length. While these differences are unlikely to affect the treatment regarding the types of perpetrators, they might affect our comparison between victims and non-victims. We have empirically evaluated these differences by comparing the text complexity scores of our simplest and our most complex prompts using a textual complexity software available at https://legible.es/.

Our most complex combination of treatments has a readability score of 52.12 and 113 words, and reads as follows:

Buenas Tardes Doctora, espero se encuentre bien. Mi nombre es María, y soy víctima de los paramilitares. Llevo viviendo un tiempo en el municipio en el que llegué como desplazada, incluso ya estoy registrada en el municipio para poder votar en las próximas elecciones locales, pero no he conseguido progresar ni económicamente ni profesionalmente. Es por eso que le escribo doctor. Porque me gustaría que usted me informara a cuáles programas de la alcaldía pudiera inscribirme para encontrar vivienda de interés social. Le agradezco que considere que no estoy vinculado con ninguna ideología o partido político, y que no hay ningún interés adicional más que el de mejorar mi situación. Gracias señor alcalde

By comparison, our simplest combination of treatments has a readability score of 54.52 and 102 words, and reads as follows:

Buenas Tardes Doctora, espero se encuentre bien. Mi nombre es María. Llevo viviendo un tiempo en el municipio, incluso ya estoy registrada en el municipio para poder votar en las próximas elecciones locales, pero no he conseguido progresar ni económicamente ni profesionalmente. Es por eso que le escribo doctor. Porque me gustaría que usted me informara a cuáles programas de la alcaldía pudiera inscribirme para encontrar vivienda de interés social. Le agradezco que considere que no estoy vinculado con ninguna ideología o partido político, y que no hay ningún interés adicional más que el de mejorar mi situación. Gracias señor alcalde

While we acknowledge that there is a difference in request length and complexity, a change in the email length of 12 words out of more than 100 words and a readability score of less than 3 points on a 100-point scale seems unlikely to have meaningful implications.

With this said, one of the treatments in the email text adds the clause "incluso ya estoy registrada en el municipio para poder votar en las próximas elecciones locales" [even I am already registered to vote in the next local elections], which is similarly lengthy and complex to our most complex treatment. Looking at the readability score, this clause implies a readability drop from our simplest combination from 54.52 to 52.82 and 15 additional words. Notwithstanding this, the treatment effect of this clause is always close to 0 and nonsignificant. Therefore, we conclude that there is little reason to be concerned that our results are an artifact of changes in textual complexity or email length.

D Additional Data

We collected additional data at the level of the municipality including data related to the conflict, socioeconomic variables, good governance indicators, and electoral measures from previous municipal elections.

We relied on information from the National Police (*Policía Nacional*), the Administrative Security Department (DAS), and from the think tank CEDE at *Universidad de los Andes*. This information classified attacks against the civil population, such as kidnappings and forced displacements, and by the type of perpetrator (FARC guerrilla, ELN guerrilla, paramilitary (AUC) group or other group). All events from 1993 to 2016 were recorded and summed up at the municipality level.

Attacks against civilians indicate the level of exposure to violence in the municipality during the conflict. It could be expected that higher exposure to violence could affect the level of responsiveness to victims, where municipalities with higher violence are more prone to attend to victims as the people in the local institution know the harshness of conflict. However, a municipality with higher exposure to violence could also have more victims within the municipality and response to them could be lower.

We also included cocaine crops in hectares and by number of lots in each municipality, as reported by the Integrated Illicit Crop Monitoring System (SIMCI). Cocaine crops are a good proxy for the presence level of illegal armed groups in the municipality and, as such, are positively correlated with the number of victims. A mayor in a municipality with more cocaine crops could have a different response to victims as the municipality could still be suffering from high levels of violence and a higher number of victims. Other socioeconomic variables from the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE) are considered as well: the total multidimensional poverty index, municipal Gini index, and total estimated population. All these variables are positively associated with the level of response to victims as those municipalities with the worst economic conditions may get more demands from citizens.

We also took into account the following indicators of good governance: the Open Government Index, the Index of Citizen Services and the Index of face-to-face Citizen Services published by the Office of the Procurator-General of the Nation (*Procuraduría General de la Nación*), the Fiscal Performance Indicator, and the municipality investment of attention to

vulnerable groups in thousands of Colombian pesos from the National Planning Department (DNP). Good governance variables imply that those local institutions have greater response rates than municipalities with the worst good governance indicators.

Finally, we computed the vote share of the largest party in the local municipality, and the ideology of the party of the mayor with the official information from the National Civil Registry (*Registraduría General del Estado Civil*). The variable of ideological position included three categories: left, center and right and was constructed based on the mayors' political party.

These additional datasets are used for three purposes: (1) to evaluate the balance of the treatments (see randomization checks in the online Appendix D); (2) to increase the precision of our estimate by adding these as control variables in our models; and, (3) to act as an indicator of the ideological leanings of the mayor, the key variable to evaluate heterogeneous effects.

E   Ideologies of Political Parties

Table E.1 shows the 16 political parties that participated in the 2019 local elections and their respective ideology. The fourth column is an ideology index constructed from the Parliamentary Elites in Latin America Observatory (PELA) survey. This survey is answered by lower-house congressmen and includes several questions related to their ideology. The fifth column is an ideology index constructed from the Americas Barometer (LAPOP), a public opinion survey, according to respondents' party preferences. The third column provides an average of these ideology indices. However, we cannot construct these indexes to every party as many of them are parties with few seats in Congress that are not considered in these surveys, although these parties are also unlikely to have any mayoralty. The ideologies of the parties are well founded in part by these indexes but also based on the parties' history and our knowledge of Colombian politics. We review some of the connections of these parties with violent politics that also helps validating the ideological mapping with violent politics that we observe in Colombia.

The FARC party (latter renamed Comunes) is the political party formed after the demobilization of the FARC guerrilla. This is a extreme left-wing party but did not win any mayor election. Partido Colombia Humana- Unión Patriotica is a coalition of two parties: Colombia Humana, leaded by former M-19 guerrilla member, Gustavo Petro and presidential candidate in several elections, and Unión Patriótica, founded by the FARC and the Colombian Communist Party during the peace agreements in the eighties whose members latter suffered from assassinations and attacks by paramilitary groups. The Movimiento Altenativo Indigena y Social (MAIS) and Movimiento de Autoridades Indigenas de Colombia (AICO)

See online Appendix E for details on the classification of parties.

In Colombia, mayoral candidates are able to compete under a coalition of parties, however, they always most belong to one single party and that is the party we consider to represent their ideology. In some cases, some candidates can compete under the name of Significant Groups of citizens, another mechanism of political participation in which citizens who do not belong to any political party can participate in the elections supported by the collection of a certain minimum number of signatures. In total 30 mayors (2.7% of mayors) competed under this label and were classified according to their previous political party affiliation or otherwise consider as center candidates.

are two small indigenous left-wing parties that have very close ties with Colombia Humana. During the 2022 national elections both parties entered a new born coalition called Pacto Historico, a coalition of left parties which main party is Colombia Humana. Alianza Democratica Afrodescendiente (ADA) is a small Afro-Colombian left-wing party that in 2022 also joined Pacto Historico. Polo Democratico Alternativo party is also a left-wing party which also had many former guerrilla fighters including Antonio Navarro that latter moved to the Partido Alianza Verde party. This party also joined the Pacto Historico in 2022.

Table E.1: Party ideologies

Party	Ideology	Average (0-10)	PELA Ideology index (0-10)	LAPOP Ideology index (0-10)
PARTIDO FUERZA ALTERNATIVA REVOLUCIONARIA DEL COMUN FARC	Left	-	-	-
PARTIDO COLOMBIA HUMANA - UNION PATRIOTICA	Left	3.2	3.2	-
MOVIMIENTO ALTERNATIVO INDIGENA Y SOCIAL MAIS	Left	-	-	-
MOVIMIENTO AUTORIDADES INDIGENAS DE COLOMBIA AICO	Left	3.0	-	3.0
PARTIDO ALIANZA DEMOCRATICA AFRODESCENDIENTE ADA	Left	-	-	-
PARTIDO POLO DEMOCRATICO ALTERNATIVO	Left	4.4	4.2	4.6
PARTIDO ALIANZA VERDE	Left	4.65	4.8	4.5
PARTIDO ALIANZA SOCIAL INDEPENDIENTE ASI	Left	4.3	-	4.3
PARTIDO COLOMBIA RENACIENTE	Left	-	-	-
PARTIDO LIBERAL COLOMBIANO	Left	5.3	4.5	6.1
PARTIDO SOCIAL DE UNIDAD NACIONAL PARTIDO DE LA U	Center	5.7	5.3	6.1
PARTIDO CAMBIO RADICAL	Right	6.5	6.5	6.5
PARTIDO CONSERVADOR COLOMBIANO	Right	7.45	7.5	7.4
PARTIDO CENTRO DEMOCRATICO	Right	8.2	8.6	7.8
PARTIDO COLOMBIA JUSTA LIBRES	Right	-	-	-
PARTIDO MIRA	Right	7.7	-	7.7

The Alianza Verde party or Green Party is a center left party born from the AD-M19 party, a party of former M-19 guerrilla members, and Opcion Centro party. Today one of its co-presidents is Antonio Navarro, a former M-19 guerrilla member. Alianza Social Independiente (ASI) was born as an indigenous party but latter turned into a non-indigenous center left party supporting in many elections the presidential candidates of Alianza Verde. Colombia Renaciente is a small Afro-Colombian party that have been ideologically close to Alianza Verde. Partido Liberal is one of the two traditional parties in Colombia that was

formed as a classical liberal party and later turned into a social-democratic party. Some of their members were accused of relationships with the FARC guerrilla during the 2000s.

Partido de la U was formed by supporters of right-wing president Alvaro Uribe. However, after the new president Juan Manuel Santos, former ally of Alvaro Uribe, had political disagreements with Uribe, Partido de la U turned into a catch-all party with no clear political ideology. Cambio Radical was formed from a right-wing faction of the Liberal Party that has been very close to the right-wing presidential governments during the last twenty years. Partido Conservador is the second traditional party in Colombia that competed against the Liberal Party for many years, it is characterized by having a clear conservative ideology. The last two parties were the main political parties involved in the corruption scandal of illegal alliances with paramilitary groups during the 2000s. Partido Centro Democratico was born to replace Partido de la U as the party of supporters of Alvaro Uribe after he became opposition of Juan Manuel Santos and Partido de la U remained close to Santos. Today Centro Democratico is one of the main parties, together with Partido Conservador, of the right. Finally, Colombia Justa Libres and MIRA are two small conservative christian parties with no mayors.

F   Power Analysis

In this section we show the power analysis in order to check the minimum effect size we were powered to detect. We randomly assign each subject to treatment 1 (being an IDP victim), treatment 2 (being a non-IDP victim) and to control (non-victim). As we consider multiple treatments, we employ a Bonferroni correction, where the significance level is divided by the number of total comparisons made with the same data. With this power analysis we want to check the probability that at least one of the treatments turn up significant at the 0.05 level. The response variable was created using an inverse logit where victims of the conflict have 25% higher odd ratio than non-victims and IDP victims have a 35% higher odd ratio of response than non-victims. Figure F.1 shows that with a sample of more than 950 observations the experiment is about 80% likely to recover at least one significant result on the response variable. Our full sample is 1,098 municipalities.

We also report the probability of rejecting the null as sample size increases, taking the estimated effect size as the truth. We perform this post hoc power analysis to the request of an anonymous reviewer. To do this, we sample from the mayors' ideological variable in the data and randomly assign each subject to treatment (being a victim of a left-wing illegal armed group). We collapse the categories and created a dummy variable that captures the ideological mismatch between the mayor's ideology and the victims' perpetrator group. With the mismatch variable we performed the power analysis. As shown in figure F.2, with a sample of more than 700 observations the experiment is about 80% likely to recover a significant result for the mismatch variable on the response variable. The actual sample assigned to the victim condition is 739 municipalities.

Figure F.1: Power Analysis with three treatments

Figure F.2: Power Analysis - mismatch between mayor's ideological position and victims' perpetrator group

G   Randomization Checks

Tables 1, 2 and 3 in the PAP show a joint test of orthogonality to test for balance among treatment groups. Each table shows the results from a multinomial logit with the treatment group as a dependent variable and the covariates as independent variables. For each model we test the joint hypothesis b1=b2=b3=...=b17=0. Table 1 in the PAP compares the control group of non-victims with the treatment groups of victims from paramilitary groups or the state and victims from left-leaning guerrilla groups. Table 2 in the PAP compares non-victims with non-displaced victims and displaced victims. Table 3 in the PAP compares victims according to the type of perpetrator. Overall, we find that our randomization procedure is adequate with no significant imbalances in baseline covariates.

We are aware that randomization checks might be detrimental in some instances and must be used with caution (Mutz and Pemantle 2012). Some scholars argue that making decisions based on failed randomization checks is ill-suited. For instance, researchers might decide whether or not to control for a covariate in regressions depending on whether or not the difference is significant in a randomization check (see Bruhn and McKenzie (2009)), or researchers might report fewer significant results than expected by chance as they might believe that reporting significant prerandomization differences could affect the credibility of their findings (see Schulz and Grimes (2002)). However, we should note that we do not make any estimation or reporting decision based on the results of these randomization checks. In fact, we report models with a full set of controls not because we need to correct for significant pre-treatment imbalances, which there were not, but to increase the precision of our estimates, as suggested in (Gerber and Green 2012; Imai et al. 2009).

H   Research ethics

A key concern of audit studies is that researchers do not internalize the costs produced to the public system, which could lead to over-use of such experiments that may pollute the subject pool (Fisher III and Herrick 2013; Leeper 2019). We have made efforts to quantify the cost of our intervention for the Colombian public system. In our qualitative post-experimental interviews with local officials and bureaucrats, we requested officials to estimate the number of electronic correspondence with local citizens and the amount of time invested in responding to them. Our interviewees gave us an average length of approximately 10 minutes. Using the monthly salary for the maximum rank of individual that could have responded to our requests – the mayor – we estimated the upper bound on potential costs of responding to our emails by multiplying the number of municipalities that responded to our requests (371) by 10 minutes by the upper limit in the monthly salary of our average municipality - 13,735,742 Colombian pesos (COP) according to the law. Multiplying the salary for 10 minutes – 13,300 COP – by the 371 municipalities that responded leads to the total estimated cost of the project: 4,934,300 COP, which is equivalent to about 1,317 USD. We believe that the societal benefits of better understanding politician responsiveness to conflict victims outsize surpass the monetary cost of our intervention.

In the qualitative interviews, verbal consent was sought after reading the following informative letter before the interviews:

(Version translated into English):

"Dear Mayor or public official of the Mayor's Office,

We are [Authors and institutions]. We are developing an academic work that seeks to study the attention to the vulnerable population and access to social services by the local government. For this reason, we are conducting a series of interviews with mayors and local officials to learn about welfare services, social programs, and programs being developed in the municipalities.

We are currently going across different regions of the country conducting these interviews and, therefore, we would like to know if you could provide us with a space to do a brief interview discussing the aforementioned topics. If you agree to do so, we would like to record the interview in order to have its literalness in the future. However, we will not do so if you prefer that this conversation not be recorded in whole or in part. In any case, this conversation has an exclusively academic objective, and the information provided will be strictly confidential. Any publication derived from this study will maintain the anonymity of the interviewees.

During our conversation, we will maintain the following COVID-19 safety protocol: social distance of 2 meters, mask, hygienic gel for your disposal and, if possible, the interview will be conducted in an open and ventilated space.

We greatly appreciate your attention,

Sincerely"

(Original in Spanish): "Estimado/a Alcalde/sa o funcionario público de la Alcaldía,

Somos [Authors and institutions]. Nos encontramos desarrollando una trabajo académica que busca estudiar la atención a la población vulnerable y el acceso a servicios sociales por parte del Estado. Por tal motivo nos encontramos haciendo una serie de entrevistas a alcaldes y funcionarios locales para que nos cuenten sobre los servicios de atención ciudadana, programas sociales y focalización de los programas que tienen en sus municipios. Actualmente estamos recorriendo distintas regiones del país haciendo estas entrevistas y por lo tanto quisiéramos saber si nos podrían brindar un espacio para hacerle una breve entrevista que trate los temas anteriormente señalados. Si accede a ello, nos gustaría grabar la entrevista a efectos de disponer de su literalidad en el futuro. Sin embargo, no lo haremos si usted prefiere que esta conversación no sea grabada en su parte o en su totalidad. En todo caso, esta conversación tiene un objetivo exclusivamente académica y la información proporcionada tendrá un carácter estrictamente confidencial. Cualquier publicación derivada de este estudio mantendrá la anonimidad de los entrevistados.

Durante nuestra conversación mantendremos las siguientes medidas de seguridad para prevenir la COVID-19: distancia social de 2 metros, mascarilla, gel higiénico para su disposición y, si fuera posible, realizar la entrevista en un espacio abierto y con ventilación. Agradecemos mucho su atención, Atentamente"

The protocols for the field experiment and the qualitative interviews were reviewed and approved by New York University - Abu Dhabi Institutional Review Board on the Protection of Human Subjects (HRPP-2019-90).

I Sample responses

I.1 Friendliness

The friendliness of a response was measured as the sum of four independent indicators: name use (0-1), warm greetings (0-1), offer to follow-up (0-1), and a 3-point qualitative indicator of friendliness (0-3).

The first three components (name use, warm greetings, offer to follow-up) are measured in a semi-automatic way. The following are four sampled responses that are illustrative of each of the values in the subcomponents.

Response sample #1:

Buenas Tardes, por medio de la presente doy respuesta a una solicitud presentada por usted en días anteriores, es indispensable que nos brinde información personal (cédula y teléfono) para poder verificar sus datos y guiarla para presentarse a un programa municipal o si se le facilita presentarse a la oficina de desarrollo social de la alcaldía municipal y verificar datos con todo gusto la atendemos. Cordialmente, **Name use** = 0; **Warm greetings** = 0; **Offer to follow-up** = 1

Response sample #2:

Buenos días señora María en calidad de gerente de fonvisoñocial me permito comunicarle que actualmente no hay convocatorias para acceder a programas de vivienda en el municipio aguachica, sin embargo, se está desarrollando un proyecto de vivienda denominado urbanización romansa pero a la fecha no se ha abierto la convocatoria. Le sugiero estar al pendiente de los medios de comunicación o comunicarse a los números de fonvisocial para obtener mayor información. Atentamente, [hidden for anonymity] Gerente Fonvisocial

Name use = 1; **Warm greetings** = 0; **Offer to follow-up** = 1

Response sample #3:

Buenas tardes,

Respetado Señor Gonzalez:

Reciba un cordial saludo por parte de la Administración Municipal [hidden for anonymity]. Me permito informarle que hemos recibido su consulta y asu vez solicitarle que allegue la hoja de vida a la Administración Municipal, para así revisar su perfil y de la misma manera la posible ocupación; seguidamente invitarlo a que se acerque al enlace Municipal de víctimas para validar y actualizar sus datos en la plataforma.

Cualquier inquietud, puede ser consultada en la siguiente línea telefónica: [hidden] Gracias por su atención, quedamos atentos a cualquier inquietud.

Firma Institucional Alcaldia Municipal de [hidden] [mayor's name hidden]] - ALCALDE

Name use = 1; **Warm greetings** = 1; **Offer to follow-up** = 1

Response sample 4:

Cordial saludo, Atendiendo la solicitud remitida vía correo electrónico el día 03 de diciembre de 2020 me permito informarle que la Administración Municipal de [municipality], a la fecha no se encuentra adelantando procesos de convocatorias para proyectos relacionados

con viviendas de interés social. De acuerdo a lo anterior, de presentarse proyectos o convocatorias relacionadas con su solicitud se estará informando oportunamente. Agradezco su atención. Atentamente, [hidden for anonymity] Seeretario de planeación e infraestructura

Name use = 0; **Warm greetings** = 0; **Offer to follow-up** = 0

The qualitative indicator of friendliness is a subjective assessment of the friendliness of the response and it was measured in a 3-point scale. We now provide a sample of responses that fall into each of the scores.

Qualitative indicator of the friendliness Score = 1:

Buen día, le informo que en el Municipio de [municipality] a la fecha no se cuenta con ningún programa de vivienda, se debe de registrar en la página del Ministerio de Vivienda desde ahí se están radicando las solicitudes directamente sin intermediarios y sin costo alguno. Atentamente. [hidden to preserve anonymous response] Técnico Administrativo

Qualitative indicator of the friendliness Score = 2:

Municipio de [hidden for anonymity]. Comedidamente le informo que la Empresa de Fomento de Vivienda de [municipality] "FOMVIVIENDA", se encuentra ofertando la tercera etapa del Proyecto de Vivienda de Interés Social (VIS) Parque Residencial del Café, ubicado en la Carrera 19 Calle 2N contiguo al centro de Salud La Milagrosa, de la cual me permito adjuntar la información detallada del mentado proyecto, en la cual se especifica el área que comprende la unidad habitacional, los acabados, los subsidios que aplican, el precio y la forma de pago. Por otro lado, le comunico que las modalidades de Subsidio que pueda ofertar la Empresa de Fomento de

Vivienda de Armenia "FOMVIVIENDA" en cumplimiento de su objeto social, se pueden consultar en la página web www.fomvivienda.gov.co, así como eleras de la empresa, ya que son los sitios oficiales donde se publican las convocatorias de los Proyectos de Vivienda por parte del Municipio. Así mismo y para su conocimiento, le informo de modo general los requisitos que debe cumplir para aplicar a alguno de nuestros subsidios: • Tener un hogar conformado mínimo por dos personas y ser residentes en la ciudad. • Que ninguno de los miembros del hogar haya sido beneficiario de algún tipo de subsidio familiar de Vivienda por parte del Municipio o de la Empresa de Fomento de Vivienda de Armenia "FOMVIVIENDA", antes Fondo Municipal de Vivienda. • Acreditar y pertenecer a los estratos 1, 2, y 3, según la convocatoria. • Los demás que establezca la convocatoria de forma expresa, dependiendo el programa o modalidad de subsidio que se vaya a ofertar.

Nit: 800.246.890-7

FOMVIVIENDA

Empresa de Fomento de Vivienda de [municipality]

Qualitative indicator of the friendliness Score = 3:

Reciba un cordial saludo de la administración municipal en cabeza del señor alcalde [hidden for anonymity], en atención a su solicitud referente a la oferta laboral que actualmente hay para adquirir empleo, me permito informarle que actualmente y hasta el 20 de febrero estan abiertas la convocatoria para municipios PDET priorizados para el posconflicto, puede consultar en el siguiente link: [LINK]
De este modo puede participar para ocupar vacantes no solo en [hidden to preserve anonymity] sino en todos los municipios PDET. Esperamos haber atendido su inquietud, sin otro particular agradecemos su atención.
Cordialmente, [Contact name and municipality name hidden for anonymity]

I.2   Helpfulness

Helpfulness score 1:

Cordial saludo
Por favor enviar los datos completos del peticionario para proceder a radicar la solicitud. [name and municipality name hidden for anonymity]

Helpfulness score 2:

Señora: MARIA GONZALEZ. Cordial saludo. En atención a la solicitud realizada mediante al correo que antecede me permito manifestar que la administración municipal tiene contemplado reactivar la bolsa de empleo en la vigencia 2021 con el fin de brindar oportunidades a los pobladores de nuestro territorio desde la Secretaría de Agricultura, Desarrollo Económico, Turismo y Medio Ambiente, por tal motivo se le invita a estar pendiente de la página oficial de la Alcaldía Municipal para que en su momento inscriba su hoja de vida. Cordialmente, [name and position hidden for anonymity]

Helpfulness score 3:

Fecha Diciembre 2020. Aprobo: [name hidden for anonymity] Fecha Diciembre 2020. Los arriba firmantes, hemos revisado el documento y lo encontramos ajustado a las normas y disposiciones legales vigentes, por lo tanto bajo nuestra responsabilidad los presentamos para firma Centro Administrativo [municipality name hidden for anonymity]. PAGINA: 2 CÓDIGO: Versión: 02 [municipality name hidden for anonymity] PROCESO: COMUNICACIONES SECRETARIA DE GOBIERNO Y DESARROLLO COMUNITARIO. En cuanto a lo que hace referencia a su solicitud, le comunico que este ente administrativo no tiene inherencia en la selección de beneficiarios para los programa de vivienda de interés social presentados por el Gobierno Nacional, ya que la selección de los mismos, es realizada por el DNP (Departamento Nacional de Planeación), mediante un cruce de información actualizada que reposa en la base de datos del Sisben a nivel Nacional. Al igual ocurre con las demás entidades particulares. Esperamos haber dado respuesta clara y oportuna a su inquietud. Cordialmente, [name and position hidden for anonymity]

Helpfulness score 4:

Cordial Saludo, Por medio del presente oficio, me permito dar respuesta a oficio allegado a esta dependencia el día 03 de Diciembre del presente año; en el momento la Administración Municipal no cuenta con proyectos de vivienda 100% gratuita ya que no se cuentan con los recursos necesarios, sin embargo la administración municipal se encuentra adelantando un proyecto de vivienda de interés social (Urbanización Alta Vista) en Barcelona, que cuenta con 2 subsidios, el cual será realizado por la constructora LC Proyectos Y Construcciones S.A.S donde una parte del valor de la vivienda puede ser subsidia por el programa del Gobierno Nacional Mi Casa Ya, esto lo realiza el Gobierno Nacional para facilitar la adquisición de vivienda nueva urbana a hogares que no tienen vivienda y cuyos ingresos no superen los 4 smlmy. El programa contempla el subsidio parcial del valor total de la vivienda, el cual se aplica al momento de la aprobación del crédito hipotecario funciona por demanda, hasta que se agoten los cupos que tiene el Ministerio de Vivienda Ciudad y Territorio. Adicional al subsidio, se otorga al hogar el beneficio de cobertura a la tasa de interés, que es un porcentaje de la misma y lo asume el Gobierno Nacional, se ve representado en una menor cuota mensual del crédito hipotecario que el beneficiario paga a la entidad otorgante del mismo.
En la siguiente tabla se muestra el valor del subsidio de acuerdo a los ingresos de cada hogar, al igual que el valor de las viviendas que se encuentran en dicho rango para acceder al subsidio. municipality name hidden for anonymity - 2020 - 2023. VALORES DEL SUBSIDIO ANO 2020 Salario minimo: $ 877.803 INGRESOS EN (S.M.L.V.) Valor SFV en (S.M.L.V.) DESDE HASTA 2.00 (S 1.755,606) 30 SMLV $26.334.000 >2.00 ($ 1755.606) 4.00 (5 3.511.212) 20 SMLV $17.556,060 Hasta 70 SMMLV $61.446210 Valor vivienda de Interés Prioritario (VIP) Valor vivienda de Interés Social (Vis) Hasta 135 SMMLV $118.503405 SFV: Subsidio familiar de vivienda SMLMV: Salario mínimo legal mensual vigente. De igual forma, el municipio de [municipality name hidden for anonymity] cuenta con un subsidio para el proyecto AltaVista Ubicado en Barcelona, que corresponde a Cinco millones de pesos (5.000.000). También es de mencionar que para acceder a estos subsidios deben cumplir los siguientes requisitos: Ninguno de los miembros del grupo familiar posea vivienda, derechos o herencias en algún lugar del país. No haber sido beneficiarios por algún subsidio del Gobierno nacional ni por una caja de compensación, Inurbe, Banco Agrario, Forec, Focafé o Ley Quimbaya. Anexo a este oficio encontrara el folleto con información perteneciente al proyecto de vivienda antes mencionado, en caso de estar interesado se puede comunicar con la constructora y conocer a fondo las características de las viviendas. Atentamente, . Shito. VIWY. [name and municipality name hidden for anonymity]

J   Experimental results for internally displaced people

In this Appendix, we consider the differential responses to requests of help from citizens who are not only victims but also individuals who are internally displaced due to the conflict. Figure J.1 displays the differential responses between internally displaced victims and non-victims. Figure J.1A shows that the displacement victim treatment led to a significant increase in mayor offices' response rate. Requests for help increased response rate from 30.6% in the control group to 38.3% in the experimental condition where the help request comes from a putative internally displaced conflict victim (p = 0.03). This change of 7.7 percentage points is equivalent to a 25% increase in the response rate. In the Online Appendix H, OLS

regression estimates show that this effect is consistent when including control variables. With controls, the estimated intent-to-treat effect is an increase of 8.7 percentage points, which is equivalent to an increase of 28% in responses from putative displaced victims compared to non-victims.

Figure J.1: Differential Responses to Requests of Help by Victim Displacement Status

Note: Differences are reported in percentage points (pp) or standard deviations (SD) and p-value are based on two-sided t-tests.

The results are similar when using our indicators of response quality. Figure J.1B shows that the condition of an internally displaced conflict victim significantly increased the response from an average of 0.77 in the non-victim condition to 1.33 in the displaced victim treatment ($p < 0.001$), a change that is equivalent to 0.31 standard deviations in the friendliness score. Similarly, Figure J.1C shows that responses to requests from displaced conflict victims are also more helpful than similar requests of help from non-victims. More specifically, the average helpfulness response score to requests from non-victims is 0.47 compared to a 0.65 among displaced victims ($p = 0.01$). This difference implies an increase of 0.18 standard deviations in the helpfulness outcome. In the Online Appendix H, we show that these treatment effects are robust, controlling for an extensive set of pre-treatment covariates and adding department fixed effects.

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K Main effects (OLS Models)

K.1 Response rates

Table K.1: Estimated effects of conflict victim or displacement status on receiving a response

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	*Dependent variable:* Response to the request					
Conflict victim	0.05*	0.05*	0.06**			
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)			
IDP status				0.08**	0.08**	0.08**
				(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Female treatment		0.01	0.01		0.07*	0.06*
		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Vote registration treatment		−0.02	−0.04		−0.03	−0.04
		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Employment request treatment		−0.07**	−0.08***		−0.05	−0.05
		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Attacks against civilians by Unidentified groups			0.0001			0.0001
			(0.0003)			(0.0004)
Attacks against civilians by ELN			0.003			0.003
			(0.003)			(0.004)
Attacks against civilians by FARC			−0.002			−0.003
			(0.002)			(0.003)
Attacks against civilians by AUC			0.002			0.01
			(0.01)			(0.01)
Cocaine crops			−0.0000			0.0000
			(0.0001)			(0.0001)
Gini coefficient (inequality)			−1.53*			−1.78*
			(0.83)			(1.05)
Poverty Index (NBI)			−0.002			−0.001
			(0.001)			(0.002)
Population per million inhabitants			0.41			0.53
			(0.28)			(0.38)
Municipal revenues			0.001			0.001
			(0.002)			(0.003)
Index of Open Government			0.01***			0.01***
			(0.003)			(0.004)
Citizens' Assistance Office			−0.001			−0.001
			(0.001)			(0.001)
Index of Fiscal Performance			−0.003			−0.002
			(0.01)			(0.01)
Investment to vulnerable groups			−0.00			−0.00
			(0.0000)			(0.0000)
Competitiveness (% votes for the largest party)			0.15			0.21
			(0.14)			(0.18)
Centrist mayor			0.01			−0.02
			(0.04)			(0.05)
Right-leaning mayor			0.01			0.02
			(0.03)			(0.04)
Constant	0.31***	0.03	0.67	0.31***	−0.06	0.59
	(0.03)	(0.32)	(0.51)	(0.03)	(0.33)	(0.64)
Departamento FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,098	1,098	1,040	735	735	702

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

K.2 Friendliness score

Table K.2: Estimated effects of conflict victim or displacement status on response friendliness

| | *Dependent variable:* Friendly Response Score (0/6) | | | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Conflict victim	0.45***	0.46***	0.47***			
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)			
IDP Status				0.56***	0.57***	0.56***
				(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Female treatment		0.09	0.07		0.24*	0.23*
		(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.13)	(0.13)
Vote registration treatment		−0.04	−0.10		−0.12	−0.15
		(0.10)	(0.11)		(0.13)	(0.13)
Employment request treatment		−0.11	−0.12		−0.03	0.003
		(0.10)	(0.11)		(0.13)	(0.13)
Attacks against civilians by Unidentified groups			−0.0003			0.0001
			(0.001)			(0.001)
Attacks against civilians by ELN			−0.0002			−0.01
			(0.01)			(0.01)
Attacks against civilians by FARC			−0.01			−0.02
			(0.01)			(0.01)
Attacks against civilians by AUC			−0.002			0.02
			(0.03)			(0.03)
Cocaine crops			−0.0001			0.0000
			(0.0002)			(0.0002)
Gini coefficient (inequality)			−4.92			−6.40
			(3.15)			(3.91)
Poverty Index (NBI)			−0.01			−0.01
			(0.005)			(0.01)
Population per million inhabitants			1.15			1.23
			(1.06)			(1.41)
Municipal revenues			0.01			0.01
			(0.01)			(0.01)
Index of Open Government			0.02**			0.03**
			(0.01)			(0.01)
Citizens' Assistance Office			−0.0002			−0.003
			(0.004)			(0.005)
Index of Fiscal Performance			−0.02			−0.02
			(0.02)			(0.02)
Investment to vulnerable groups			0.00			−0.0000
			(0.0000)			(0.0000)
Competitiveness (% votes for the largest party)			0.79			1.09*
			(0.54)			(0.66)
Centrist mayor			−0.01			−0.08
			(0.15)			(0.18)
Rightist mayor			0.09			0.14
			(0.13)			(0.15)
Constant	0.77***	−0.20	2.70	0.77***	−0.49	2.86
	(0.09)	(1.22)	(1.93)	(0.09)	(1.21)	(2.39)
Departamento FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,098	1,098	1,098	735	735	702

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

K.3   Helpfulness score

Table K.3: Estimated effects of conflict victim or displacement status on response helpfulness

	Dependent variable: Helpful Response Score (0/3)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Conflict victim	0.10*	0.11*	0.11*			
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)			
IDP status				0.18**	0.18**	0.17**
				(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Female treatment		0.05	0.04		0.11	0.12
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Vote registration treatment		−0.02	−0.05		−0.07	−0.10
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Employment request treatment		−0.13**	−0.13**		−0.08	−0.05
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Attacks against civilians by Unidentified groups			−0.001**			−0.002**
			(0.001)			(0.001)
Attacks against civilians by ELN			0.004			0.004
			(0.01)			(0.01)
Attacks against civilians by FARC			−0.004			−0.01
			(0.004)			(0.01)
Attacks against civilians by AUC			−0.003			0.005
			(0.01)			(0.02)
Cocaine crops			−0.0000			0.0000
			(0.0001)			(0.0001)
Gini coefficient (inequality)			−2.99*			−3.10
			(1.66)			(2.15)
Poverty Index (NBI)			−0.004			−0.01
			(0.003)			(0.003)
Population per million inhabitants			2.13***			2.73***
			(0.56)			(0.77)
Municipal revenues			0.01			0.001
			(0.005)			(0.01)
Index of Open Government			0.01*			0.02**
			(0.01)			(0.01)
Citizens' Assistance Office			−0.001			−0.001
			(0.002)			(0.003)
Index of Fiscal Performance			−0.01			−0.01
			(0.01)			(0.01)
Investment to vulnerable groups			−0.0000			−0.0000
			(0.0000)			(0.0000)
Competitiveness (% votes for the largest party)			0.26			0.22
			(0.28)			(0.36)
Centrist mayor			0.03			−0.02
			(0.08)			(0.10)
Right-leaning mayor			0.06			0.12
			(0.07)			(0.08)
Constant	0.47***	0.02	1.64	0.47***	−0.12	1.33
	(0.05)	(0.65)	(1.02)	(0.05)	(0.68)	(1.31)
Departamento FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,098	1,098	1,040	735	735	702

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

K.4 Response timing in days

Table K.4: Estimated effects of conflict victim or displacement status on response timing (in days) using a Cox proportional hazards model

	Dependent variable: Response timing in days					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Conflict victim	0.19*	0.23**	0.28**			
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)			
IDP status				0.26**	0.30**	0.33**
				(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Female treatment		0.04	0.07		0.23*	0.27**
		(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.13)	(0.13)
Vote registration treatment		−0.06	−0.11		−0.11	−0.11
		(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.13)	(0.14)
Employment request treatment		−0.28***	−0.35***		−0.19	−0.22
		(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.13)	(0.14)
Attacks against civilians by Unidentified groups			0.001			0.001
			(0.001)			(0.001)
Attacks against civilians by ELN			0.01			0.02
			(0.01)			(0.02)
Attacks against civilians by FARC			−0.01			−0.02
			(0.01)			(0.01)
Attacks against civilians by AUC			0.01			0.03
			(0.03)			(0.03)
Cocaine crops			−0.0000			0.0001
			(0.0002)			(0.0002)
Gini coefficient (inequality)			−4.05			−4.88
			(3.21)			(3.96)
Poverty Index (NBI)			−0.01			−0.002
			(0.01)			(0.01)
Population per million inhabitants			1.19			1.32
			(0.86)			(1.06)
Municipal revenues			0.01			0.01
			(0.01)			(0.01)
Index of Open Government			0.03***			0.04***
			(0.01)			(0.01)
Citizens' Assistance Office			−0.003			−0.01
			(0.004)			(0.005)
Index of Fiscal Performance			−0.02			−0.02
			(0.02)			(0.03)
Investment to vulnerable groups			−0.00			−0.00
			(0.0000)			(0.0000)
Competitiveness (% votes for the largest party)			0.48			0.75
			(0.54)			(0.67)
Centrist mayor			0.02			−0.11
			(0.16)			(0.20)
Right-leaning mayor			0.05			0.06
			(0.13)			(0.15)
Departamento FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,098	1,098	1,098	735	735	702

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

K.5 Length of the response

Table K.5: Estimated effects of conflict victim or displacement status on response length

	Dependent variable: log(Response length in words)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Conflict victim	0.27*	0.28**	0.30**			
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)			
IDP status				0.41**	0.43***	0.42***
				(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Female treatment		0.09	0.07		0.30*	0.29*
		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.16)	(0.16)
Vote registration treatment		−0.07	−0.15		−0.13	−0.17
		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.16)	(0.16)
Employment request treatment		−0.32***	−0.37***		−0.23	−0.20
		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.16)	(0.16)
Attacks against civilians by unidentified groups			−0.0002			−0.001
			(0.001)			(0.002)
Attacks against civilians by ELN			0.01			0.01
			(0.01)			(0.02)
Attacks against civilians by FARC			−0.01			−0.02
			(0.01)			(0.01)
Attacks against civilians by AUC			−0.004			0.01
			(0.03)			(0.03)
Cocaine crops			−0.0000			0.0001
			(0.0002)			(0.0003)
Gini coefficient (inequality)			−8.08**			−9.08*
			(3.71)			(4.70)
Poverty Index (NBI)			−0.01			−0.01
			(0.01)			(0.01)
Population per million inhabitants			3.08**			3.96**
			(1.25)			(1.69)
Municipal revenues			0.01			0.004
			(0.01)			(0.01)
Index of Open Government			0.04***			0.04***
			(0.01)			(0.02)
Citizens' Assistance Office			−0.004			−0.01
			(0.004)			(0.01)
Index of Fiscal Performance			−0.02			−0.01
			(0.02)			(0.03)
Investment to vulnerable groups			−0.00			−0.0000
			(0.0000)			(0.0000)
Competitiveness (% votes for the largest party)			0.79			1.01
			(0.64)			(0.79)
Centrist mayor			0.11			−0.08
			(0.18)			(0.22)
Right-leaning mayor			0.10			0.13
			(0.15)			(0.18)
Constant	1.31***	0.09	3.95*	1.31***	−0.29	3.59
	(0.11)	(1.46)	(2.28)	(0.11)	(1.49)	(2.87)
Departamento FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,098	1,098	1,098	735	735	702

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

L Interaction Models (OLS Models)

L.1 Response rates

Table L.1: Estimated effects of the ideological leaning of mayors on responses to requests for help by the identity of victims' violent perpetrator

	Dependent variable: Response to the request					
	(1)		(2)		(3)	
Victim of left-wing groups	0.19***	(0.06)	0.17***	(0.06)	0.15**	(0.06)
Centrist mayor	0.11	(0.07)	0.09	(0.07)	0.10	(0.07)
Right-leaning mayor	0.15***	(0.06)	0.14***	(0.05)	0.16***	(0.06)
Victim of left-wing groups × Centrist mayor	−0.13	(0.10)	−0.08	(0.10)	−0.08	(0.10)
Victim of left-wing groups × Right-leaning mayor	−0.27***	(0.08)	−0.27***	(0.08)	−0.25***	(0.08)
Female treatment			−0.02	(0.03)	−0.02	(0.04)
Vote registration treatment			−0.03	(0.03)	−0.04	(0.03)
Employment request treatment			−0.11***	(0.03)	−0.11***	(0.03)
Attacks against civilians by Unidentified groups					−0.0000	(0.001)
Attacks against civilians by ELN					0.001	(0.004)
Attacks against civilians by FARC					−0.003	(0.003)
Attacks against civilians by AUC					0.002	(0.01)
Cocaine crops					−0.0000	(0.0001)
Gini coefficient (inequality)					−1.64	(1.02)
Poverty Index (NBI)					−0.001	(0.002)
Population per million inhabitants					0.44	(0.39)
Municipal revenues					0.002	(0.003)
Index of Open Government					0.01***	(0.003)
Citizens' Assistance Office					−0.0004	(0.001)
Index of Fiscal Performance					−0.01	(0.01)
Investment to vulnerable groups					0.00	(0.0000)
Competitiveness (% votes for the largest party)					0.03	(0.17)
Constant	0.24***	(0.04)	0.12	(0.45)	0.87	(0.62)
Departamento FE	No		Yes		Yes	
Observations	739		739		698	

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

L.2 Friendliness score

Table L.2: Estimated effects of the ideological leaning of mayors on response friendliness to requests for help by the identity of victims' violent perpetrator

	Dependent variable: Friendly Response Score (0/6)					
	(1)		(2)		(3)	
Victim of left-wing groups	0.65***	(0.23)	0.57**	(0.23)	0.51**	(0.24)
Centrist mayor	0.30	(0.28)	0.22	(0.27)	0.25	(0.28)
Right-leaning mayor	0.58***	(0.22)	0.52**	(0.22)	0.58**	(0.23)
Victim of left-wing groups × Centrist mayor	−0.36	(0.40)	−0.19	(0.39)	−0.24	(0.40)
Victim of left-wing groups × Right-leaning mayor	−0.89***	(0.31)	−0.85***	(0.30)	−0.82***	(0.32)
Female treatment			−0.03	(0.14)	−0.03	(0.14)
Vote registration treatment			−0.02	(0.14)	−0.05	(0.14)
Employment request treatment			−0.20	(0.14)	−0.20	(0.14)
Attacks against civilians by Unidentified groups					−0.003	(0.003)
Attacks against civilians by ELN					−0.0003	(0.02)
Attacks against civilians by FARC					−0.01	(0.01)
Attacks against civilians by AUC					0.01	(0.03)
Cocaine crops					−0.0001	(0.0002)
Gini coefficient (inequality)					−3.41	(4.18)
Poverty Index (NBI)					−0.01	(0.01)
Population per million inhabitants					1.45	(1.58)
Municipal revenues					0.01	(0.01)
Index of Open Government					0.03**	(0.01)
Citizens' Assistance Office					−0.001	(0.005)
Index of Fiscal Performance					−0.02	(0.03)
Investment to vulnerable groups					0.0000	(0.0000)
Competitiveness (% votes for the largest party)					0.37	(0.71)
Constant	0.81***	(0.17)	0.23	(1.84)	2.35	(2.55)
Departamento FE	No		Yes		Yes	
Observations	739		739		698	

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

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L.3 Helpfulness score

Table L.3: Estimated effects of the ideological leaning of mayors on response helpfulness score to requests for help by the identity of victims' violent perpetrator

	Dependent variable: Helpful Response Score (0/3)					
	(1)		(2)		(3)	
Victim of left-wing groups	0.26**	(0.12)	0.21*	(0.12)	0.17	(0.12)
Centrist mayor	0.18	(0.14)	0.14	(0.14)	0.11	(0.14)
Right-leaning mayor	0.27**	(0.11)	0.25**	(0.11)	0.26**	(0.11)
Victim of left-wing groups × Centrist mayor	−0.13	(0.20)	−0.02	(0.20)	−0.02	(0.20)
Victim of left-wing groups × Right-leaning mayor	−0.42***	(0.16)	−0.41***	(0.15)	−0.36**	(0.16)
Female treatment			−0.02	(0.07)	−0.01	(0.07)
Vote registration treatment			−0.02	(0.07)	−0.03	(0.07)
Employment request treatment			−0.19***	(0.07)	−0.18***	(0.07)
Attacks against civilians by Unidentified groups					−0.002*	(0.001)
Attacks against civilians by ELN					0.004	(0.01)
Attacks against civilians by FARC					−0.002	(0.01)
Attacks against civilians by AUC					−0.01	(0.02)
Cocaine crops					−0.0001	(0.0001)
Gini coefficient (inequality)					−3.42	(2.09)
Poverty Index (NBI)					−0.002	(0.003)
Population per million inhabitants					2.06***	(0.79)
Municipal revenues					0.01*	(0.01)
Index of Open Government					0.01	(0.01)
Citizens' Assistance Office					−0.002	(0.002)
Index of Fiscal Performance					−0.02	(0.01)
Investment to vulnerable groups					−0.00	(0.0000)
Competitiveness (% votes for the largest party)					−0.09	(0.36)
Constant	0.40***	(0.08)	0.21	(0.93)	2.41*	(1.28)
Departamento FE	No		Yes		Yes	
Observations	739		739		698	

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

L.4 Response timing in days

Table L.4: Estimated effects of the ideological leaning of mayors on response timing in days by the identity of victims' violent perpetrator using a Cox proportional hazards model

	Dependent variable: Response timing in days					
	(1)		(2)		(3)	
Victim of left-wing groups	0.71***	(0.22)	0.63***	(0.22)	0.57**	(0.23)
Centrist mayor	0.35	(0.27)	0.19	(0.28)	0.30	(0.29)
Right-leaning mayor	0.59***	(0.21)	0.53**	(0.22)	0.63***	(0.23)
Victim of left-wing groups × Centrist mayor	−0.47	(0.36)	−0.16	(0.37)	−0.21	(0.38)
Victim of left-wing groups × Right-leaning mayor	−1.03***	(0.29)	−1.05***	(0.29)	−0.97***	(0.30)
Female treatment			−0.07	(0.13)	−0.03	(0.13)
Vote registration treatment			−0.06	(0.13)	−0.06	(0.13)
Employment request treatment			−0.39***	(0.13)	−0.43***	(0.13)
Attacks against civilians by Unidentified groups					0.0005	(0.003)
Attacks against civilians by ELN					0.01	(0.01)
Attacks against civilians by FARC					−0.01	(0.01)
Attacks against civilians by AUC					0.01	(0.03)
Cocaine crops					−0.0002	(0.0004)
Gini coefficient (inequality)					−4.33	(3.95)
Poverty Index (NBI)					−0.003	(0.01)
Population per million inhabitants					0.65	(1.32)
Municipal revenues					0.01	(0.01)
Index of Open Government					0.03**	(0.01)
Citizens' Assistance Office					−0.002	(0.005)
Index of Fiscal Performance					−0.04	(0.03)
Investment to vulnerable groups					0.0000	(0.0000)
Competitiveness (% votes for the largest party)					0.04	(0.64)
Departamento FE	No		Yes		Yes	
Observations	739		739		698	

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

L.5   Length of the response

Table L.5: Estimated effects of the ideological leaning of mayors on the length of the response by the identity of victims' violent perpetrator

	Dependent variable: log(Length of the response)					
	(1)		(2)		(3)	
Victim of left-wing groups	0.80***	(0.27)	0.71***	(0.26)	0.59**	(0.26)
Centrist mayor	0.51	(0.32)	0.43	(0.31)	0.47	(0.31)
Right-leaning mayor	0.74***	(0.25)	0.67***	(0.25)	0.73***	(0.25)
Victim of left-wing groups × Centrist mayor	−0.43	(0.46)	−0.17	(0.44)	−0.20	(0.44)
Victim of left-wing groups × Right-leaning mayor	−1.12***	(0.36)	−1.11***	(0.34)	−0.99***	(0.35)
Female treatment			−0.07	(0.16)	−0.08	(0.16)
Vote registration treatment			−0.12	(0.16)	−0.15	(0.16)
Employment request treatment			−0.48***	(0.15)	−0.50***	(0.16)
Attacks against civilians by Unidentified groups					−0.002	(0.003)
Attacks against civilians by ELN					0.01	(0.02)
Attacks against civilians by FARC					−0.02	(0.01)
Attacks against civilians by AUC					−0.003	(0.04)
Cocaine crops					−0.0001	(0.0003)
Gini coefficient (inequality)					−8.54*	(4.63)
Poverty Index (NBI)					−0.01	(0.01)
Population per million inhabitants					3.21*	(1.75)
Municipal revenues					0.02	(0.01)
Index of Open Government					0.04**	(0.02)
Citizens' Assistance Office					−0.005	(0.01)
Index of Fiscal Performance					−0.04	(0.03)
Investment to vulnerable groups					0.0000	(0.0000)
Competitiveness (% votes for the largest party)					0.15	(0.79)
Constant	1.04***	(0.19)	0.55	(2.07)	5.12*	(2.82)
Departamento FE	No		Yes		Yes	
Observations	739		739		698	

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

M   Interaction models using the ideological mismatch dummy

Table M.1: The Interaction Effects of Mayor's Ideology and the Identity of the Perpetrator on Responsiveness, Friendliness, and Helpfulness of the Response

	Response rate			Friendly Response Score			Helpful Response Score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Perpetrator and Mayor's Ideological Mismatch	−0.12***	−0.13***	−0.12***	−0.37**	−0.37***	−0.35**	−0.20***	−0.20***	−0.17**
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Departamento FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
All manipulations?	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
All controls?	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	739	739	698	739	739	698	739	739	698

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Complete model results are available in the APSR Dataverse at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/EORLRJ.

N   Friendliness results (objective vs. subjective)

N.1   Friendliness objective indicators

Table N.1: Re-estimation of the main effects on friendliness response score using objective indicators only

	Dependent variable: Friendliness, objective indicators only (0-3)								
	H1: Victim vs. not			H2: IDP vs. not			H3: Ideological mismatch		
Conflict victim	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***						
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)						
IDP status				0.25***	0.26***	0.25***			
				(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)			
Victim of left-wing groups							0.32***	0.29**	0.28**
							(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Centrist mayor			−0.01			−0.05	0.14	0.11	0.13
			(0.08)			(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Right-leaning mayor			0.03			0.03	0.26**	0.22**	0.27**
			(0.07)			(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Victim of left-wing groups × Centrist mayor							−0.19	−0.10	−0.14
							(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)
Victim of left-wing groups × Right-leaning mayor							−0.43***	−0.43***	−0.43***
							(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Departamento FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
All manipulations?	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
All controls?	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	1,098	1,098	1,040	735	735	702	739	739	698

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.   Complete model results are available in the APSR Dataverse at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/EORLRJ.

N.2   Friendliness subjective indicators

Table N.2: Re-estimation of the main effects on friendliness response score using the subjective assessment only

	Dependent variable: Friendliness, subjective assessment only (0-3)								
	H1: Victim vs. not			H2: IDP vs. not			H3: Ideological mismatch		
Conflict victim	0.24***	0.25***	0.25***						
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)						
IDP status				0.31***	0.31***	0.31***			
				(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)			
Victim of left-wing groups							0.32***	0.27**	0.23*
							(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Centrist mayor			0.004			−0.03	0.16	0.11	0.12
			(0.08)			(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Right-leaning mayor			0.06			0.11	0.33***	0.29***	0.30***
			(0.06)			(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Victim of left-wing groups × Centrist mayor							−0.17	−0.09	−0.11
							(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)
Victim of left-wing groups × Right-leaning mayor							−0.45***	−0.42***	−0.39**
							(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Departamento FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
All manipulations?	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
All controls?	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	1,098	1,098	1,040	735	735	702	739	739	698

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.   Complete model results are available in the APSR Dataverse at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/EORLRJ.

O Type of violence type and mayor's ideology

O.1 Correlation table

Table O.1: Correlation between mayor's ideological leaning and observed level of violence in the municipality

		Violence by type of perpetrator			
		Unknown	FARC	ELN	AUC
Mayor's ideological leaning	Left	0.09	0.07	0.06	0.05
	Center	-0.01	-0.02	0.00	0.03
	Right	-0.09	-0.05	-0.05	-0.08

O.2 Main finding with a restricted sample

Table O.2 shows the main finding after restricting the sample to those areas where with an above-the-median level of right- and left-wing violence.

Table O.2: Main effects after restricting the sample to areas with both leftist and rightist violence

	Dependent variable:
	Response
Victim of left-wing groups	0.213*
	(0.113)
Centrist mayor	0.167
	(0.131)
Right-leaning mayor	0.157
	(0.108)
Victim of left-wing groups × Center	−0.161
	(0.200)
Victim of left-wing groups × Right-leaning mayor	−0.328**
	(0.165)
Constant	0.167**
	(0.075)
Observations	154

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

P Signal-based responsiveness between politicians and non-politicians

Table P.1: The interaction effects of mayor's ideology and the identity of the perpetrator when considering responses from politicians and non-politicans separately

| | *Dependent variables:* | | | | | |
| | Response from a politician | | | Response from a non-politician | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Victim of left-wing groups	0.14**	0.14**	0.11**	0.05	0.04	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Centrist mayor	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.05
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Right-leaning mayor	0.15***	0.14***	0.16***	0.01	−0.002	−0.0001
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Victim of left-wing groups × Centrist mayor	−0.04	−0.0002	0.01	−0.10*	−0.08	−0.09*
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Victim of left-wing groups × Right-leaning mayor	−0.19***	−0.21***	−0.17**	−0.08*	−0.06	−0.07*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Departamento FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
All manipulations?	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
All controls?	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	739	739	698	739	739	698

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Complete model results are available in the APSR Dataverse at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/EORLRJ.

Q Pre-specified analysis and deviations from the PAP

In our pre-analysis plan, we registered three main hypotheses. The first two hypotheses refer to the two main effects that are reported in the paper:

1. Elected officials are more (less) likely to be responsive to citizens who have been victims of the civil conflict

2. Elected officials are more (less) likely to be responsive to displaced citizens who have been victims of the civil conflict

In empirical terms, these hypotheses were implicitly laid out as:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 * Victim_i + \epsilon_i; \tag{1}$$

where Y_i is the outcome of interest, $Victim_i$ refers to the dummy indicating an email request from a putative conflict victim, X_i refers to the other attributes in the email, and Z_i to a full list of control variables.

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 * IDP_i + \delta X_i + \delta Z_i + \epsilon_i, \tag{2}$$

where Y_i is the outcome of interest, IDP_i refers to the dummy indicating an email request from a putative internally displaced conflict victim, X_i refers to the other attributes in the email, and Z_i to a full list of control variables.

The third hypothesis was the heterogeneous treatment effects reported and analyzed in the paper where we established that we would analyze the interaction effect between the ideological leaning of the mayor and the ideology of the perpetrator of violence to the victim. In empirical terms, this hypothesis was implicitly laid out as:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 * Victimleft_i + \beta_2 * Mayorleft_i + \beta_3 * Victimleft_i * Mayorleft_i + \delta X_i + \mu Z_i + \epsilon_i, \tag{3}$$

where Y_i is the outcome of interest, $Victimleft_i$ refers to the dummy indicating an email request from a putative victim from leftwing violence, X_i refers to the other attributes in the email, and Z_i to a full list of control variables.

We have followed all pre-registered model specifications with no deviations on our empirical strategies.

With this said, the third hypothesis in our pre-registration expected that the coefficient of the interaction in Equation 3 would take a negative sign ($\beta_3 < 0$), implying that rightwing (leftwing) politicians would be more likely to respond to victims of leftwing (rightwing) violence.

This expectation followed most of the audit literature suggesting that politicians tend to respond to ingroup members, which, in our context, would mean victims they "own" (those from their own "side"). By contrast, our results revealed a signaling behavior by which politicians responded to conflict victims of the other presumed ideological side, so ($\beta_3 > 0$). Our theorizing of the signaling-based responsiveness took place after the experiment and, thus, came from learning from the results. This inductive theorizing took place before the qualitative interviews. The findings from the interviews served the reinforce the plausibility and meaningfulness of the signal-based responsiveness.

As reflected in our pre-registration document, all other attributes in the experiment (gender, voter registration, policy issue) were present to ensure variation in the content of the email, yet we did not pre-specify any expectation on them. In fact, we explicitly stated in the pre-analysis plan our intention to "analyze the names' gender, voter registration and the request types together, collapsing the study to 12 conditions". To clarify, there were no more hypotheses for this project on our pre-analysis plan.

We also pre-specified our list of controls to be included in the analysis: attacks ELN, attacks FARC, Attacks AUC, attacks others/unknown, kidnapping, number if displaced individuals, cocaine crops, Gini index, poverty NBI, population, municipality income, Open Government index, Index of Citizen Services, Fiscal performance indicator, investment in attention to vulnerable groups, mayor's ideology, and victory margin. This is the full list that we include in the models with "All controls" in the main manuscript.

While the independent variables, the model specification, and the set of control variables were all pre-specified, we did not pre-specify any outcome variables in the PAP. To be clear,

we have not changed the outcome variables form the pre-analysis to the main manuscript but we did not include any outcome measure. However, we have followed Mia (Costa 2017, 2021) and included a full set of outcome measures from the most objective measures (response, response time, length of the response) to the most subjective measures (helpfulness, friendliness).

An important deviation from the PAP is the qualitative interviews. However, we believe it represents additional information to interpret our main findings. Additionally, the re-analysis conducted after restricting the sample to those areas with an above-the-median level of right- and left-wing violence shown in the online Appendix O.2 was not pre-registered, yet it may add credence to the robustness of our findings. Finally, the robustness check associated with the signal-based responsiveness by using only responses signed by politicians or non-politicians, which is shown in the online appendix P, was not pre-specified in our PAP.

R   Pre-registration document

"The Political Representation of Conflict Victims: Pre-Analysis Plan" was pre-registered on March 26, 2020, and can be found at the following link: `https://osf.io/38te7`.

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