

## Online Appendix for “Do Women Make More Protectionist Trade Policy?”

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### SI.1 TRADE POLICY DATA DESCRIPTION

The data set for the trade policy analyses is in the country-year-product category format, with product categories defined by categories in the Broad Economic Categories (BEC). The BEC distinguishes between 19 product categories and assigns, based on the System of National Accounts, end-use categories: household consumption products, intermediate inputs, and capital goods.<sup>21</sup> We consider capital goods as part of intermediate inputs, given that they are largely used as inputs for firms. Three product categories are indeterminate and therefore dropped from the data set, leaving 16 product categories for each country-year. Of these, 6 are consumption products. We create a dummy variable indicating all goods that are not consumption products.

Our outcome variable is the tariff rate, which is specific to each country-year and product category. It therefore varies across all three dimensions in our data set. Our main predictors are variables on women’s representation in legislatures and executives, which is constant within country-years but varies across countries and, within countries, across years. We evaluate the effect of changes in women’s representation and how this effect varies across product categories. For this, we use data on the product type, as described above, which varies across product categories but is constant across countries and across years. Figure [SI.1](#) displays the distribution of the outcome variable, tariff rates, and the variables for women’s representation in legislatures and executives, in our sample.

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<sup>21</sup>As we show below, we obtain similar results when using data in the Harmonised System format, at the level of six digits, which distinguishes among approximately 5,000 products.




FIGURE SI.1 Distribution of outcome variable, tariff rates, and predictors women’s seat shares in legislatures and women’s seat shares in cabinets. Variables already transformed using the log.

The sample includes up to 141 countries, from 1991 to 2019. We drop European Union members from the sample — instead including the European Union as a single entity — given that in the entire sample period trade policy was outside the political control of individual member states.

Our main specifications include two types of fixed effects. First, we include year fixed effects, which

control for global, year-specific changes in both representation and tariff rates. In particular, they control for global movements toward women’s representation and global declines in tariff rates across countries. Second, we include country fixed effects, which control for country-specific attributes that are associated with both tariff rates and women’s representation. For example, these fixed effects capture that countries with more egalitarian norms might have higher support for both (government intervention through) protectionist trade policies and higher shares of women in political office, as long as these country-specific attributes are constant over time. Note that the moderator, the dummy for the product type, is constant over time and years, and only varies across product categories, such that it is not affected by these fixed effects.

As a consequence of this fixed effects modeling strategy, our results exploit (i) *country-specific* changes in representation over time that (ii) *differ from global trends* in representation, and we assess how these changes in representation have (iii) differential effects across product categories. We can therefore rule out a large class of omitted variables as driving our results. Our results do not reflect a global move toward protectionism in recent years that coincided with gains in women’s representation, for example, because we control for global trends over time and because we examine a differential effect across product categories; nor do our results reflect any country-specific differences in both representation and trade policy, because we control for these through country fixed effects and because we examine a differential effect across product categories.

## SI.2 THE GENDER GAP IN ELITES’ TRADE PREFERENCES

We assume that the well-documented gender gap in preferences for trade protectionism in the mass public carries over into elites, specifically women in parties and government. We are agnostic about the roots of the gendered differences in trade preferences among elites: women politicians may themselves hold more protectionist preferences or may be seeking to represent the more protectionist preferences of women in the electorate. Our results should hold as long as the gender gap in the mass public translates to the elite level. We offer three supplementary analyses in support of this assumption.

First, we gather all roll call votes taken on free trade agreements in the U.S. House for the 108<sup>th</sup> – 112<sup>th</sup> Congresses (32 total votes). These data allow us to observe whether women and men in the House express differing levels of support for trade liberalization. We code each vote on each bill such that 1 indicates the protectionist position and 0 indicates the free trade position. We regress these votes on Congress members’ gender in bivariate regressions and expand the model to account for potential confounders, adding state and year fixed effects, and then several control variables capturing relevant district-level features (percentage of workforce employed in manufacturing and employed in services) and representatives’ characteristics (party, age, and experience in number of congressional terms). Our expectation is that the analyses will recover a positive estimate on the indicator for women representatives, suggesting that women are, on average, more protectionist in their voting on free trade agreements. The results are given in table [SI.1](#) below.

Each model recovers the expected positive correlation, showing that women are more protectionist in roll call voting on free trade agreements in the US House during this period. This relationship is substantially attenuated by the inclusion of an indicator of partisanship (column 3), but still persists in the expected direction. A large portion of this attenuation is due to differences in partisan management of roll call discipline. Only one free trade agreement was considered in the 108<sup>th</sup> or 109<sup>th</sup> Sessions when the Democrats were in control. This means that nearly all roll calls were taken under Republican majorities. As such, there is almost no gender variation in voting behavior *within* Republican members—majorities, particularly weak majorities, as the Republicans were throughout most of this period—must insist on discipline from their members. But still, the overall correlation persists, driven primarily by variability in the voting behavior across gender within the Democratic party. Given that these effects are still detectable after legislative agenda gate-keeping and whipping by party leadership, we find this to be fairly compelling evidence that the gender gap in trade preferences among the mass public survives selection into political

**Table SI.1 Effect of gender on protectionism in free trade agreement roll call votes in the US House (108<sup>th</sup> – 112<sup>th</sup> Congresses).**

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Woman	0.130*** (0.020)	0.116*** (0.019)	0.028* (0.017)
Age			0.002*** (0.001)
Republican			-0.543*** (0.012)
Experience			0.002 (0.002)
District manufacturing production			0.695*** (0.204)
District service production			-0.441*** (0.147)
FEs		state, year	state, year
Observations	4,606	4,606	4,606
R <sup>2</sup>	0.009	0.134	0.404

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

office.

Second, we gather surveys of members of the European Parliament conducted in 2000, 2006, and 2010 by [Hix et al. \(2016\)](#). In these surveys, MEPs were asked whether they  $\{strongly\ disagree = 5; disagree = 4; neither = 3; agree = 2; strongly\ agree = 1\}$  with these statements: “The EU should promote global free trade at all costs;” “The EU should abide by all World Trade Organization rules and rulings;” and “All trade barriers between the EU and the USA should be abolished.” We aggregate these responses into a single (equal weights) index  $\in (0, 1)$  of expressed preferences for protectionism and regress these preferences on the MEPs’ gender. As above, we regress these preferences on the gender of the candidate in a bivariate model and then expand the model to account for potential confounders, adding year fixed effects, and then controlling for member party (there are 12 EP party groups) and their general left-right policy preferences.

**Table SI.2 Effect of gender on expressed protectionism in MEP surveys in 2000, 2006, 2010.**

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Woman	0.032 (0.020)	0.042** (0.020)	0.036** (0.018)
Left-right preferences			-0.030*** (0.006)
FEs		wave	wave, party group
Observations	518	518	510
R <sup>2</sup>	0.005	0.033	0.279

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

The results are given in Table [SI.2](#) and while the estimate in the bivariate model falls just short of traditional significance thresholds ( $p = 0.11$ ), the models with unit fixed effects and control variables yield efficient estimates of the expected correlation.

Third, we gather data from the Comparative Candidate Survey (Module 2), which includes survey responses from over 6,000 candidates across EU 12 countries.<sup>22</sup> In these modules, candidates competing in the national parliamentary election are asked about their policy preferences. Trade is not asked about directly, but there are two questions related to trade that we index in order to proxy for candidates’ trade preferences. The first asks candidates whether their country’s membership in the EU is a “good thing.” We note that the free movement of goods across national borders within the union is perhaps the most consequential aspect of EU membership. Candidates are allowed three responses: that membership is good, neither good nor bad, or bad. We code these responses such that  $\{bad = 1; neither = 0.5; good = 0\}$ . Higher values should thus positively correlate to protectionism. The second question asks whether candidates agree that governments should abstain from intervening in the economy. Tariffs are government interventions that shape production and consumption patterns by making imported goods more or less attractive. Allowed responses range from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” (5 point scale) and we recode the responses such that  $\{strongly\ disagree = 1; disagree = 0.75; neither = 0.5; agree = 0.25; strongly\ agree = 0\}$ . Higher values should thus positively correlate to protectionism.

While this is an imperfect proxy, it is one that we can evaluate empirically, as the MEP surveys

<sup>22</sup>Countries included are Albania, Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany (two waves), Greece, Hungary, Montenegro (two waves), Portugal, Spain, and Sweden.

also ask these questions in addition to the questions probing trade preferences directly that we modeled in the above analysis. In the MEP survey, the direct measure and the proxy measure are correlated at  $\beta = 0.214$ ;  $p < 0.001$ . Further, the measures behave similarly when modeled on gender. Table [SI.3](#) regresses the direct protectionism measure on the proxy (column 1), then compares the two by estimating the same fully specified model from the above analysis on both the direct measure (column 2) and the proxy (column 3). The analyses make us more confident in the quality of this measure.

**Table SI.3 Comparing direct protectionist sentiment to proxied protectionism in the MEP surveys.**

	y=Protectionism	y=Protectionism	y=Proxy
Proxy	0.214*** (0.050)		
Woman		0.036** (0.018)	0.026* (0.013)
Left-right preferences		-0.030*** (0.006)	-0.009** (0.004)
FEs		wave, party group	wave, party group
Observations	508	510	696
R <sup>2</sup>	0.035	0.279	0.285
<i>Note:</i>		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Recorded responses to the two questions that compose the proxy in the CCS data are averaged to create our proxy for protectionist preferences. We regress these preferences on the gender of the candidate in a bivariate model and then expand the model to account for potential confounders, adding country-year fixed effects, and then controlling for candidate age and party (there are 124 observed election-parties total). The expectation is a positive estimate on the indicator for women candidates. The results are given in table [SI.4](#) below.

Each model recovers the expected correlation between gender and the protectionism proxy—women candidates are more protectionist than their male counterparts, even after accounting for party. Taken together with the analyses above, we are thus comfortable assuming that the well-documented gender gap in preferences for trade protectionism in the mass public carries over into elites, specifically women in parties and government.

### SI.3 MANIFESTO ANALYSES

Below we estimate models that account for the non-trade preferences of the parties included in our election manifestos analyses. To this end, we calculate parties' espoused preferences for general economic policy (central planning, redistribution, labor policy, etc.) and social policy (traditional morality, law and order, etc.) from the same manifesto codings we use to derive our measure of trade policy preferences. Following [Lowe et al. \(2011\)](#), we take the logged ratio of right to left-leaning statements using the following issue codings:

**Table SI.4 Effect of gender on (proxied) preferences for protectionism in CCS Module 2.**

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Woman	0.039*** (0.007)	0.018*** (0.006)	0.008* (0.005)
Age			-0.000 (0.000)
FEs		country-year	party-year
Observations	5,942	5,942	5,942
R <sup>2</sup>	0.006	0.131	0.541
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

**Table SI.5 Policy dimensions for economic and social preferences**

	Economic	Social
Left	403, 404, 412, 413, 504, 506, 701	103, 105, 106, 107
Right	401, 402, 414, 505	104, 201, 203, 305, 601, 603, 606, 606

These economic and social policy preferences are then included in supplementary models in Table SI.6 below. The models show that our central results remain in the predicted direction and statistically significant, although they are somewhat attenuated by the inclusion of estimates of economic and social policy stands. This is almost certainly due to collider bias: as women’s presence in parties predicts those parties’ trade preferences *and* their preferences for economic and social policy (as shown by Greene and O’Brien 2016), inclusion of economic and social policy preferences *should* attenuate the central result.

**Table SI.6 Women’s representation within parties and protectionism in party platforms. Accounting for general economic and social preferences.**

	National Elections			European Election			Sweden	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Women’s share of party seats	0.629*** (0.212)	0.397* (0.217)	0.417* (0.220)					
Women’s share of party list				1.568** (0.754)	1.378* (0.756)	1.389* (0.760)		
Gender parity quota							0.312* (0.166)	0.301* (0.168)
Economic preferences		-0.152*** (0.032)	-0.142*** (0.036)		-0.152** (0.064)	-0.167** (0.070)		-0.048 (0.044)
Social preferences		0.026 (0.035)	0.028 (0.035)		0.023 (0.133)	0.018 (0.134)		0.045 (0.040)
Niche parties	0.226** (0.091)	0.235*** (0.089)	0.243*** (0.090)	0.714*** (0.185)	0.625*** (0.192)	0.685*** (0.221)		
Socialist and other left parties			0.077 (0.125)			-0.224 (0.402)		
Fixed effects	Election	Election	Election	Country	Country	Country	Party, year	Party, year
Observations	425	425	425	102	102	102	137	137
R <sup>2</sup>	0.297	0.341	0.342	0.511	0.546	0.548	0.430	0.441

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## SI.4 FIXED EFFECTS SPECIFICATIONS

Our main models examining the effects of women’s political representation on tariffs at the level of Broad Economic Categories (BEC) for 141 countries over time include country- and year-fixed effects. In Table SI.7, we present three additional sets of fixed effects specifications. First, we include fixed effects for the higher-order categories in BEC (e.g., “food and beverages”), which we label BEC groups in the table. These allow us to distinguish, for example, between consumption products and intermediate inputs within the category of “food and beverages.” Second, we include fixed effects for each BEC product category (and as a consequence, the intermediate input dummy drops out). Third, we include country-year fixed effects. Here, most variables drop out, because they are invariant at the country-year level, but the model remains suitable to evaluate the conditional hypothesis. That the results remain even in these demanding fixed effects specifications further reassures us that they are not merely a (spurious) correlation.



**Table SI.7 Alternative fixed effects specifications for models examining effect of women’s representation and protectionism in trade policy**

	BEC group FE		BEC category FE		Country-year FE	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Dependent variable: log tariff rate</i>						
Log seat share women	.14*** (.040)		.14*** (.040)		.	(.)
x intermediate inputs	-.15*** (.025)		-.15*** (.025)		-.15*** (.026)	
Log cabinet share women		.072** (.029)		.072** (.029)		(.)
x intermediate inputs		-.11*** (.029)		-.11*** (.029)		-.11*** (.029)
Intermediate inputs	-.63*** (.064)	-.57*** (.071)	.	.	-1.23*** (.065)	-1.15*** (.077)
Polity score	-.083 (.117)	-.11 (.108)	-.083 (.117)	-.11 (.108)	.	(.)
Log GDP	-.033 (.201)	-.043 (.178)	-.030 (.201)	-.040 (.178)	.	(.)
GDP per capita	-.22 (.175)	-.18 (.187)	-.22 (.175)	-.18 (.187)	.	(.)
Unemployment rate	-.59 (1.862)	-1.21 (1.807)	-.59 (1.862)	-1.21 (1.808)	.	(.)
Constant	4.40 (4.918)	4.52 (4.330)	4.21 (4.926)	4.34 (4.341)	2.22*** (.024)	2.24*** (.025)
Number Obs.	36,338	36,335	36,338	36,335	36,338	36,335
R2	.572	.569	.592	.587	.570	.577
BEC Group FE	✓	✓				
BEC Category FE			✓	✓		
Country-Year FE					✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓		
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓		

Linear regression models with robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

## SI.5 DEMAND FOR PROTECTIONISM

Some readers may posit that our results reflect a protectionist turn in the electorate. Anticipating that women behave in a more protectionist way, an increasingly protectionist electorate votes women into political office. This, in turn, causes trade barriers to rise. This effect is compatible with our argument and, in fact, subsumes it: in this explanation, women still make more protectionist policy. The explanation simply adds a step in which voters recognize and act upon the correlation between the gender of office-holders and their trade policy choices.

That being said, we can rule out that our results are wholly reflecting a protectionist turn in the

electorate. In Table [SI.8](#), we show that the results change little when limiting the sample to years after 2001, when China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (the “China shock”) led to a protectionist turn across countries (models 1 and 2); and when controlling for past annual changes in imports (models 3 and 4), using data from COMTRADE.

Additionally, in Table [SI.9](#), we show a series of results suggesting that women are not more likely to gain political representation in countries that plausibly experience a protectionist turn in the electorate. As before, we present results for legislatures in odd columns, results for executives in even columns. First, in models 1 and 2, we show that in countries that experienced the largest decline in trade barriers in response to China’s entry into the World Trade Organization, we observe no corresponding change in the representation of women. For this, we use the average bilateral tariff rate for imports from China, and for each country calculate the difference in the tariff rate in the four years before and the four years after China’s entry into the World Trade Organization; we similarly calculate the change in women’s representation for the same time period. This model has one observation for each country, and therefore includes no country fixed effects. Note that the change in the tariff rate toward China is largely exogenous to each country’s policy choices in the years after 2001: the change comes about because of China’s entry into the World Trade Organization, taking a country’s policy choices toward China until 2001 as given.

Second, we show that in countries that experienced larger annual increases in imports in response to China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, we observe no significant change in the representation of women (models 3 and 4). We use data from COMTRADE to calculate changes in bilateral imports, and limit the sample to years after 2001.

Third, we account for protectionist preferences in the electorate directly, showing that in countries where a larger share of the population views increasing trade negatively (as reported via the regularly conducted Pew Global Attitudes Surveys), women are not more likely to hold political office (models 5 and 6). For this, we gather the Pew Global Attitudes Surveys from 2007 through 2014 and calculate the share of respondents who view growing trade and business ties with other countries as ‘somewhat bad’ or ‘very bad’ (we obtain very similar results when instead using the average of the responses on the reported four-point scale). These data are available for 44 of the countries in our sample, frequently for several time periods, covering a total of over 200,000 survey participants.

All models include our standard control variables and, in the second and third set of results, country- and year fixed effects as well. We find statistically significant effects in none of the models, and the substantive size of the effect is negligible as well. The unconditional correlations, including in models without any fixed effects, are substantively similar; we also obtain similar results, indicating no association between protectionist pressures in the electorate and women’s representation, when using first-differences for the outcome. In sum, a demand-driven explanation is compatible with the process we suggested, but does not appear to be the sole driver of the patterns we identified.

**Table SI.8 Protectionist demands and trade policy**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Dependent variable: log tariff rate</i>				
Log seat share women	.13*** (.040)		.099** (.041)	
x intermediate inputs	-.15*** (.027)		-.16*** (.028)	
Log cabinet share women		.070** (.035)		.091*** (.029)
x intermediate inputs		-.12*** (.035)		-.12*** (.035)
Intermediate inputs	-1.24*** (.064)	-1.19*** (.084)	-1.26*** (.068)	-1.20*** (.085)
Polity score	-.11 (.090)	-.15 (.090)	-.11 (.086)	-.12 (.091)
Log GDP	-.12 (.214)	-.14 (.181)	-.054 (.333)	-.029 (.289)
GDP per capita	-.12 (.142)	-.080 (.151)	-.045 (.178)	.041 (.175)
Unemployment rate	-1.43 (2.475)	-2.02 (2.532)	-.58 (1.937)	-1.20 (1.998)
Lagged change in imports			.0002 (.001)	.0006 (.001)
Constant	5.91 (5.377)	6.22 (4.556)	4.33 (8.215)	3.67 (7.032)
Number Obs.	28,982	28,675	27,417	27,036
R2	.481	.481	.494	.504
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear regression models with robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table SI.9 Protectionist demands and women’s representation**

	(1) seats	(2) cabinets	(3) seats	(4) cabinets	(5) seats	(6) cabinets
Change in tariff toward China	-.013 (.022)	.004 (.023)				
Change in imports from China			.0006 (.002)	.0006 (.002)		
Pew globalization attitudes					.41 (.539)	-.25 (1.529)
Polity score	-.31** (.152)	.21* (.118)	-.16 (.193)	.048 (.239)	-.15 (.355)	-1.23 (1.403)
Unemployment rate	.66 (.874)	-.34 (1.195)	.96 (1.162)	-.41 (1.889)	-3.36 (3.232)	5.45 (10.182)
Log GDP	-.014 (.029)	.028 (.054)	.29 (.245)	.83*** (.171)	.042 (.380)	.61 (.453)
GDP per capita	.035 (.034)	-.016 (.065)	-.45** (.173)	.079 (.234)	-.59 (.444)	1.51 (1.285)
Constant	.71 (.670)	-.32 (1.278)	-9.20 (5.964)	-22.7*** (4.143)	-2.30 (9.885)	-19.8* (11.726)
Number Obs.	96	100	1,611	1,603	142	144
R2	.096	.030	.815	.658	.930	.662
Year FE			✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE			✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear regression models with robust standard errors, clustered by country (except models 1 and 2), in parentheses.  
\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

## SI.6 EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS

Men and women participate in the labor market at different rates and in different industries and occupations. They are therefore affected differently by tariff rates on individual products, and we might as a consequence expect a link between representation and tariff rates across products. We thus seek to rule out that our results capture differential rates of labor market participation between men and women and across industries and occupations. More generally, we note that while prior work has examined the consequences of trade liberalization for men and women (see, e.g., [Autor, Dorn and Hanson 2019](#)), we are not aware of any work that posits a relationship between gendered employment patterns across industries or occupations and tariff rates. We believe this to be an important topic for future research.

To rule out the possibility that gendered employment patterns explain our findings, we compare the employment share of women in different industries to whether these industries produce consumption products or intermediate inputs. We create two measures of the role of women employees in an industry: (i) the share of women employees among an industry’s total employees (as a measure of the reliance of each industry on women employees) and (ii) the share of an industry in employing a country’s total number of women employees (as an indicator of the importance of an industry in employing women).

We draw on two data sources. Country-specific data at the two-digit level in the ISIC format are available from the International Labor Organisation (ILO). The advantage is that the data are country-specific: they are available for 106 countries in our sample. But the data are relatively aggregated, which introduces a

considerable amount of uncertainty when linking it to the variable on consumption products and intermediate inputs. To complement these data, we thus rely on employment data from the U.S., which are available at a lower level of aggregation, four-digit NAICS codes, through the Quarterly Workforce Indicators, QWI, from 2010-2015 (Do et al., 2016, for example, also use U.S. data to capture female-labor intensive goods worldwide). We link information from both data sets to the BEC format, using available concordances between ISIC/NAICS, the Harmonised System, and BEC. We note that these are still very coarse matches, due to the aggregated format of the BEC categories.

Table [SI.10](#) displays the difference in means between consumption products and intermediate inputs, together with the  $p$ -value, for (i) the share of women employee’s among an industry’s total employees in the top panel and (ii) the share of an industry in employing a country’s total number of women employees in the bottom panel, for the variables derived from the ILO data and from the QWI data. In the second column, we also control for product category fixed effects, using fixed effects for the higher-order categories in the BEC (e.g., “food and beverages”).<sup>23</sup>

We overall find little evidence that the share of women employees is significantly different for consumption products and intermediate inputs. Only in one of the eight models, when using U.S. employment data on the share of women employee’s among an industry’s total employees and when not including the product category fixed effects, do we find a statistically significant difference. When including product group fixed effects, the difference becomes substantively negligible in this model as well. We thus find only limited evidence to suggest that gendered employment patterns explain the results reported in the paper, and leave it to future research to examine the link between representation, gendered employment patterns, and trade policy more fully.

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<sup>23</sup>Including, for example, country fixed effects for the sample with ILO data leaves the results virtually unchanged, because the product category variable is not correlated with country fixed effects.

**Table SI.10 Employment patterns**

	Unconditional	BEC group FE
Women share in industry employment		
ILO data	.083 (.056)	.036 (.027)
U.S. data	.089*** (.027)	.017 (.012)
Industry share in women employment		
ILO data	-.003 (.030)	.012 (.020)
U.S. data	.020 (.018)	.016 (.032)

Difference in means in gendered employment between consumption products and intermediates, unconditional (left column) and conditional on BEC group fixed effects (right column), together with standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by BEC product category. Cross-country data from the International Labor Organisation, U.S. Data from Quarterly Workforce Indicators, matched to BEC data.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

## SI.7 ADDITIONAL MODELS

Table [SI.11](#) makes several modifications to the base model predicting tariffs at the level of Broad Economic Categories (BEC) for 141 countries from 1991-2019 with country and year fixed effects, for representation in the legislature (odd columns) and the executive (even columns). We restrict the sample to countries that were democracies for at least part of the sample period; we include the percent of the urban population, given that the beneficiaries of trade liberalization tend to be located in urban centers and that urbanization is likely correlated with women's representation; and, we include variables for economic crises (defined as a reduction in GDP of at least 3 percent) and for exchange rate crisis (defined as a country-specific two-standard deviation change from the mean in the exchange rate). The substantive results remain the same in all of these models.

**Table SI.11 Additional models examining women’s representation and protectionism in trade policy**

	Democracies		Urban population		Crises	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Dependent variable: log tariff rate</i>						
Log seat share women	.18** (.088)		.14*** (.040)		.14*** (.040)	
x intermediate inputs	-.20*** (.054)		-.15*** (.025)		-.15*** (.025)	
Log cabinet share women		.057* (.030)		.073** (.030)		.073** (.029)
x intermediate inputs		-.098*** (.033)		-.11*** (.029)		-.11*** (.029)
Intermediate inputs	-1.39*** (.112)	-1.21*** (.090)	-1.23*** (.063)	-1.15*** (.075)	-1.23*** (.064)	-1.16*** (.076)
Polity score	-.17 (.146)	-.19 (.132)	-.082 (.118)	-.11 (.110)	-.085 (.115)	-.12 (.106)
Log GDP	-.27 (.472)	-.78*** (.254)	-.052 (.231)	-.073 (.198)	-.031 (.210)	-.059 (.183)
GDP per capita	-.46** (.217)	-.60*** (.207)	-.21 (.181)	-.16 (.195)	-.23 (.180)	-.18 (.189)
Unemployment rate	-1.09 (2.603)	-1.24 (2.384)	-.64 (1.902)	-1.29 (1.829)	-.45 (1.883)	-1.06 (1.823)
Urban population			.0036 (.020)	.0080 (.020)		
Economic crisis					-.10 (.114)	-.091 (.112)
x-rate crisis					.043 (.128)	.032 (.134)
Constant	10.2 (11.669)	22.5*** (6.357)	4.54 (5.213)	4.72 (4.468)	4.23 (5.124)	4.76 (4.438)
Number Obs.	23,114	23,242	36,338	36,335	35,474	35,935
R2	.388	.388	.490	.492	.493	.493
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear regression models with robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table [SI.12](#) displays the results when replicating the main models predicting tariffs at the level of Broad Economic Categories (BEC) with untransformed seat shares and cabinet shares. The results remain very similar, with positive effects for consumption goods and an offsetting interaction for intermediate inputs. Only in column 3 is the term on seat shares in the legislature no longer significant at the 5% level.

**Table SI.12 Women's representation (untransformed variables) and protectionism in trade policy**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Dependent variable: log tariff rate</i>						
Seat share women	1.13** (.436)		.84* (.485)		1.49*** (.527)	
x intermediate inputs	-1.30*** (.322)		-1.19*** (.331)		-1.39*** (.366)	
Cabinet share women		.64** (.311)		.71** (.297)		.75** (.350)
x intermediate inputs		-1.21*** (.296)		-1.02*** (.288)		-1.26*** (.321)
Intermediate inputs	-0.70*** (.069)	-0.73*** (.057)	-0.74*** (.072)	-0.80*** (.059)	-0.69*** (.075)	-0.73*** (.062)
Polity score	-0.088 (.117)	-0.11 (.109)	-0.23* (.128)	-0.25* (.127)	-0.12 (.121)	-0.14 (.116)
Log GDP	-0.028 (.201)	-0.053 (.180)	-0.090 (.258)	-0.12 (.253)	-0.090 (.261)	-0.19 (.245)
GDP per capita	-0.23 (.175)	-0.18 (.188)	-0.24 (.209)	-0.18 (.221)	-0.48** (.210)	-0.44** (.221)
Unemployment rate	-0.58 (1.857)	-1.24 (1.814)	-1.33 (1.915)	-1.76 (1.842)	-0.84 (2.072)	-1.42 (1.949)
Right-wing party			.25** (.116)	.27** (.111)		
Center party			.40* (.218)	.43** (.215)		
Left-wing party			.17 (.112)	.18* (.105)		
Plurality rule			-0.17 (.174)	-0.17 (.171)		
Presidential system			-0.012 (.132)	.10 (.162)		
Secondary school enrollment					-0.005 (.005)	-0.003 (.005)
Women, Business, and Law Index					-0.011 (.007)	-0.009 (.007)
Women labor force participation					-0.030** (.013)	-0.030** (.012)
Constant	3.68 (4.907)	4.38 (4.376)	5.20 (6.237)	5.95 (6.140)	7.77 (6.577)	10.0 (6.152)
Number Obs.	36,338	36,335	32,246	31,973	25,195	25,579
R2	.490	.493	.498	.503	.434	.434
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear regression models with robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .



In Table SI.13, we present results for models that interact all predictor variables (except for the fixed effects, in which case we would have split sample models), for seat shares in columns 1 and 2 and for cabinet shares in columns 3 and 4. To facilitate interpretation, we present the effect sizes split into two columns. Odd columns present the effect sizes for consumption products, even columns for intermediate inputs (the interaction terms themselves are omitted). We obtain similar results as before for seat shares in the legislature, but not for women in the cabinet. Here, the pattern of the coefficients remains, but the coefficient on cabinet shares loses statistical significance for consumption products.

**Table SI.13 Fully interacted models of women’s representation and protectionism in trade policy**

	Seat shares		Cabinet shares	
	(1) Consumption	(2) Intermediates	(3) Consumption	(4) Intermediates
Log seat share women	.11*** (.039)	-.002 (.038)		
Log cabinet share women			.039 (.028)	-.015 (.028)
Intermediate inputs	-1.09*** (.383)		-.83* (.421)	
Polity score	.043 (.123)	-.16 (.119)	.039 (.119)	-.20* (.109)
Log GDP	-.042 (.201)	-.034 (.200)	-.049 (.179)	-.047 (.178)
GDP per capita	-.19 (.173)	-.23 (.177)	-.15 (.185)	-.19 (.189)
Unemployment rate	.48 (1.908)	-1.24 (1.862)	-.18 (1.849)	-1.84 (1.809)
Constant	4.28 (4.932)	3.19 (4.908)	4.31 (4.339)	3.48 (4.338)
Number Obs.	36,338		36,335	
R2	.493		.495	
Year FE	✓		✓	
Country FE	✓		✓	

Linear regression models with robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses. Each set of columns represents one model, with all predictor variables (except fixed effects) interacted with product category.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

## SI.8 DIFFERENT MEASURES OF PROTECTIONISM

Table SI.14 presents results for three alternative dependent variables: when using most-favored nation tariff rates (columns 1-2); when using logged import values (columns 3-4) as a measure of de facto protection; and when using tariff rates at the Harmonised System six-digit level (columns 5-6). As before, we replicate our base model with country and year fixed effects. With one exception—when looking at aggregate imports and legislative seat shares, in column 3—the results are consistent with the prior findings.

**Table SI.14 Different Measures of Protectionism**

	MFN Tariffs		Imports		HS 6-digit	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Log seat share women	.12*** (.032)		-.004 (.033)		.19** (.076)	
x intermediate inputs	-.13*** (.023)		.007 (.040)		-.29*** (.072)	
Log cabinet share women		.083*** (.029)		.092*** (.029)		.22*** (.060)
x intermediate inputs		-.094*** (.027)		-.11*** (.036)		-.29*** (.066)
Intermediate inputs	-1.20*** (.059)	-1.12*** (.069)	.38*** (.101)	.12 (.094)	-2.19*** (.186)	-2.25*** (.191)
Polity score	-.061 (.114)	-.086 (.107)	.11 (.070)	.16** (.073)	-.23 (.217)	-.25 (.204)
Log GDP	-.015 (.181)	-.0100 (.164)	.90*** (.112)	.74*** (.159)	-.57 (.366)	-.44 (.337)
GDP per capita	-.21 (.166)	-.20 (.171)	-.17*** (.051)	-.17*** (.051)	-.0094 (.249)	.054 (.249)
Unemployment rate	-.73 (1.796)	-1.04 (1.721)	-.86 (.704)	-.69 (.686)	.73 (2.869)	-.13 (2.719)
Constant	3.78 (4.433)	3.61 (3.976)	-10.8*** (2.722)	-6.64* (3.844)	17.2* (9.056)	14.2* (8.279)
Number Obs.	36,592	36,496	35,725	35,947	9,166,556	9,142,842
R2	.533	.536	.618	.598	.349	.357
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear regression models with robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .