

Online Appendix:

Evidence of Caste-Class Discrimination from a Conjoint Analysis of Law Enforcement Officers

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A: Data Collection

We collected data from July 24, 2017 to October 6, 2017 in five districts of Bagmati Pradesh of the Central Development Region in Nepal. Of the seven provinces in Nepal, we highlight our study site, shaded in light blue, in Figure A1 panel (a). Our study sample encompasses five of the thirteen districts within Bagmati as shown in Figure A1 panel (b). Four of the districts are in the Hill region (Bhaktapur, Dhading, Kavre, and Makwanpur) and the other is in the Tarai region (Chitwan).¹ We surveyed officers from all village development committees (VDCs) and municipalities within the districts, totalling 120 district police offices and local police stations, excluding seven police stations.² The size of the orange circles indicates how many local stations and district offices were surveyed, ranging from 1 to 11 stations, while the size of the blue circles indicates those that were excluded from the study in each VDC/municipality.

Our sample drew from all ranks of the police force: superintendents of police (SP), deputy superintendents of police (DSP), inspectors, sub inspectors, assistant sub inspectors, head constables, and constables. All SPs and DSPs were included in the target sample, which is approximately one officer per station. We also oversampled female police officers, who made up only 9% of the police force in our study sites at the time of data collection. In particular, we targeted 40% of all male officers and 75% of all female officers among the middle and lower police ranks within each police station to enable the examination of potential gender differences in officers' perceptions of offenders. This is not the case when we disaggregate the conjoint analysis by respondent gender. Further, in our subsequent supplemental analyses, we show that our substantive findings remain regardless of whether we include or exclude weights given our oversampling of female officers.

To collect responses from a representative sample of police officers within the five districts, we used a stratified random sampling method. Male and female police officers were randomly selected at the district and police station levels to ensure equal probability of selection. To design our sampling frame, we received lists from each district office and local station with their current counts of law enforcement officers by gender and rank. Our sampling frame included a total population of 2,421 officers. We aimed to collect a minimum of 1,000 surveys, and ultimately collected a total of 1,065 completed surveys.


Our field team carried out the random selection process in the following manner. The enumerator requested a list from the SP or DSP of the names of all officers and then, after disaggregating the names by sex, assigned each officer a number. The enumerator subsequently recorded each number on pieces of paper that were then put inside one container for men, and another for women. To collect a sample at random, the SP or DSP at each station drew the required number of pieces of paper from each container based on the targets of 40% and 75% of all male and female officers,

¹The geographic scope of our study was limited to these five districts, as we received authorization from Nepal's Inspector General of Police to conduct our survey in districts where they were piloting a police training on the subject of human trafficking, which he invited us to evaluate. As a result, our survey was not only measuring the preferences and demographic characteristics of police officers that we describe in this paper, but also designed to provide insights into the utility of this human trafficking program (results of which are the subject of other reports and papers we are producing). We were not authorized to visit police stations outside of the five districts we studied. We verified that the training did not have any substantive effect on our conjoint analysis by assessing whether our conjoint estimates differed according to whether or not the respondent had participated in the training (in that study, individuals assigned to the control group did not participate in the training). Reassuringly, our results are not affected by the training.


²These seven stations were excluded from the study due to accessibility challenges: they are located in remote areas where roads are inaccessible, particularly during the rainy season that coincided with data collection.

Figure A1: Nepal Study Site Maps

(a) Province Study Site



(b) Number of Police Stations within Five District Study Sites (N=120)



Source of administrative boundary data: [Humanitarian Data Exchange \(2019\)](#)

respectively. Once the draw was complete, the enumerator created a participant sheet. They also generated a backup list of an additional 10% of male and female officers from the remaining numbers. The backup list was used to identify a replacement officer in the case that a participant was not in the area or was in the area but had three failed attempts of contact. The response rate of our study was 97.17%. Non-response was minimal (only 31 officers) and driven by access and availability concerns rather than refusals to participate in the study. Thirty officers were not in the area due to transfers, being on holiday, personal issues, and other reasons.

Our team conducted the surveys with tablets using SurveyToGo software. The conjoint design displayed two profiles side-by-side and respondents completed the exercise twice. For each exercise, enumerators were instructed to show respondents the tablet screen displaying the two profiles side-by-side (the values of each attribute are provided in Nepali and English in Table A1). As respondents reviewed the profiles, enumerators asked the following questions:

- If you had to choose between them, which of these two individuals would you personally prefer to investigate? (In Nepali: यदी तपाईंले यी दुइको बिचमा छान्नुपरेमा, ब्यक्तिगत रुपमा तपाईं कसलाई प्रहरी अनुसन्धान गर्न चाहनुहुन्छ?)
- If you had to choose between them, which of these two individuals do you actually believe would be investigated by the police? (In Nepali: यदि तपाईंले यी दुईको बिचमा छान्नुपरेमा, तपाईंको बिचारमा प्रहरीले वास्तबमा कसलाई अनुसन्धान गर्छ जस्तो लाग्छ?)

Table A1: Conjoint Attributes for Offender Profile in Nepali and English

Attribute	Values
शिक्षा Education	अशिक्षित; शिक्षित illiterate; literate
आम्दानी Household Income	गरीब परिवार बाट; मध्य आय परिवार बाट; धनी परिवार बाट from a poor family; a from a middle-income family; from a wealthy family
जात / जातियता Caste/Ethnicity	दलित; ब्राह्मन; नेवार Dalit; Brahmin; Newar
लिङ्ग Gender	महिला; पुरुष female; male
उमेर Age	१४; १६; १८; २५; ४५ 14; 16; 18; 25; 45
अपराधको प्रकार Type of Crime	चोरी मा संलग्न; गौहत्या मा संलग्न; हत्या मा संलग्न; यौन कार्यका लागि आन्तरिक बेचबिखन मा संलग्न; यौन कार्यका लागि अन्तरराष्ट्रिय वा सिमापारी बेचबिखन मा संलग्न; रोजगारिका लागि आन्तरिक बेचबिखन मा संलग्न; रोजगारिका लागि अन्तरराष्ट्रिय वा सिमापारी बेचबिखन मा संलग्न engaged in theft; engaged in cow killing; engaged in murder; engaged in domestic sex trafficking; engaged in international/cross-border sex trafficking; engaged in domestic labor trafficking; engaged in international/cross-border labor trafficking

B: Demographic Characteristics of Sample

We present in Table A2 summary statistics of the demographic characteristics for our unweighted and weighted sample. Variables include police rank, monthly household income, years of employment, gender, age, caste/ethnic identity, religious identity, and educational attainment level. These are the variables we include as a robustness check for our conjoint analyses provided in Table A6 of Appendix F. We include weights here and in our robustness checks due to oversampling women officers. We calculated the weights by employing a raking procedure to reflect the actual share of police within each district who are women. Specifically, we took the expected number of female (male) respondents that would have been surveyed given the population of female (male) officers in a district and divided this value by the actual number of female (male) respondents surveyed.

Table A2: Summary Statistics

Variables	<i>N</i> Officers	Unweighted Sample		Weighted Sample		Min	Max
		Mean	St Dev	Mean	St Dev		
Superintendent	1065	0.005	0.068	0.005	0.068	0	1
Deputy Superintendent	1065	0.008	0.086	0.008	0.090	0	1
Inspector	1065	0.017	0.129	0.018	0.133	0	1
Sub Inspector	1065	0.061	0.240	0.061	0.240	0	1
Assistant Sub Inspector	1065	0.124	0.330	0.129	0.335	0	1
Head Constable	1065	0.223	0.416	0.228	0.420	0	1
Constable	1065	0.563	0.496	0.551	0.498	0	1
Monthly household income (in NRS)	1058	36344	28991	35378	27926	10000	400000
Years of employment	1065	12.057	6.345	12.208	6.385	1	45
Female	1065	0.158	0.365	0.087	0.282	0	1
Age	1063	32.761	6.394	32.950	6.408	21	53
Hill Chhetri	1064	0.276	0.447	0.270	0.444	0	1
Hill Brahmin	1064	0.129	0.335	0.127	0.333	0	1
Tarai/Madhese Brahmin/Chhetri	1064	0.025	0.157	0.028	0.164	0	1
Hill Dalit	1064	0.037	0.188	0.036	0.187	0	1
Tarai/Madhese Dalit	1064	0.016	0.125	0.017	0.130	0	1
Newar	1064	0.060	0.238	0.058	0.234	0	1
Madhese Other Castes	1064	0.127	0.333	0.137	0.344	0	1
Mountain/Hill Janajati	1064	0.210	0.407	0.208	0.406	0	1
Tarai Janajati	1064	0.062	0.241	0.059	0.236	0	1
Other Caste/Ethnic Groups	1064	0.058	0.234	0.060	0.238	0	1
Hindu	1065	0.926	0.262	0.927	0.261	0	1
Buddhist	1065	0.060	0.238	0.060	0.237	0	1
Islam	1065	0.006	0.075	0.006	0.078	0	1
Kirant	1065	0.001	0.031	0.001	0.032	0	1
Christian	1065	0.008	0.086	0.007	0.081	0	1
Bachelor level and above	1065	0.106	0.308	0.109	0.312	0	1
Class 12/Intermediate Level	1065	0.248	0.432	0.243	0.429	0	1
School Leaving Certificate	1065	0.282	0.450	0.277	0.448	0	1
Class 2-10	1065	0.363	0.481	0.370	0.483	0	1
Illiterate, no schooling	1065	0.001	0.031	0.001	0.023	0	1

C: Literature Review

Table A3 provides a list of studies that examine police bias against race- and caste-class subjugated communities.³ For simplicity, we refer to this as caste-class subjugated communities (CCSCs) in this section. The studies are sorted in reverse alphabetical order by the “Evidence of Police Bias Against CCSCs” column, then sorted alphabetically by the “Study” column. To create a comprehensive list of extant research, we conducted a literature search on sources including Google Scholar, JSTOR, Cambridge Core, Wiley Online Library, SAGE Journals, and ProQuest databases. Database searches included both general searches and targeted searches to include journals such as *American Journal of Political Science*, *The American Journal of Sociology*, *American Political Science Review*, *American Sociological Review*, *British Journal of Political Science*, *Comparative Political Studies*, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology*, *Journal of Democracy*, *The Journal of Politics*, *Law & Society Review*, *Perspectives on Politics*, *Political Behavior*, *Political Research Quarterly*, *PS, Political Science & Politics*, *Social Forces*, *Social Justice*, and *Social Research*. We limited the search to articles published between 2000 and 2020 and included the following search terms: “police,” “policing,” “law enforcement,” “racial bias,” “racial discrimination,” “class bias,” “caste discrimination” and other general and specific forms of discrimination. This literature has continued to grow since we conducted our search (e.g., [Goncalves and Mello 2021](#)). We also reviewed *Annual Review* articles and other literature reviews to collect additional sources that may have been missed. Our search extended across disciplines including political science, economics, social psychology, sociology, anthropology, law, and criminology.

We sought to include studies that addressed whether bias exists in policing efforts. We excluded research that sought to address under what conditions—e.g., types of cognitive biases interacting with various situational factors—police display discriminatory attitudes and/or behavior. Our search focused on empirical studies that seek to address the research question employing statistical and causal inference methodologies. Although there is a rich tradition of qualitative and ethnographic work on this topic, it falls beyond the scope of our review. Our search included meta-analyses of extant research, but excluded review pieces. Our review does not seek to address any methodological shortcomings of the articles as much work across disciplines has already been dedicated to this pursuit. Additionally, we included studies employing quantitative analyses of civilian encounters with police but excluded studies examining citizens’ perceptions of police bias based solely on their attitudes. We also acknowledge the growing scholarship in comparative politics that examines community-police relations, perceptions of bias, and descriptive representation in countries such as Israel (e.g., [Nanes 2020](#)), Liberia (e.g., [Karim 2020](#)), Pakistan (e.g., [Malik and Lyon 2021](#)), Uganda (e.g., [Curtice 2022](#)), and others.⁴ These recent studies help to address the dearth of police scholarship in political science noted by [Crabtree \(2018\)](#), particularly in the Global South.

Table A3: Evidence Review of Police Bias against Caste-Class Subjugated Communities (CCSCs)

[See `taba3_evidence_review.xlsx` at <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ESR7YG>]

³Table A3 can be found at <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ESR7YG>.

⁴See also the EGAP Metaketa Initiative IV on Community Policing: <https://egap.org/our-work-0/the-metaketa-initiative/round4-community-policing/>

D: Caste-Class Subjugation and Discrimination in Policing Efforts


Minimal research has investigated policing efforts in South Asia, especially as it relates to discrimination (e.g., Malik and Lyon (2021) on citizen perceptions of bias in Pakistan). Most extant research has been carried out in India. A pioneer of this research, David Bayley laid the groundwork for examining the police in a comparative perspective (Bayley 1971), and specifically the role of caste in police behavior along with public opinion toward police in India (Bayley 1969). Narula (2008, 290) offers a historical account of police discrimination and brutality against Dalits in India. She claims that India’s National Human Rights Commission “has characterized the law enforcement machinery as the greatest violator of Dalits’ human rights” which has resulted in disproportionate searches, detainment rates, and acts of torture by police against Dalits.

Some academic and media accounts speak to caste discrimination by police in Nepal. For instance, in examining Dalit inequality, Bishwakarma (2019, 146) contends that Nepali police are unlikely to be a “tool for justice,” because the police often refuse to classify crimes as cases of caste discrimination or to even register the cases at all. He descriptively recounts that “[o]rdinary Dalit, who are often illiterate and poor, rarely press caste discrimination cases, are forced to compromise and withdraw cases and may themselves be penalised even if they are victims” (147). These forms of discrimination—police refusals to register cases and coerced victim-perpetrator reconciliation—are also supported by media accounts (e.g., Pun 2020). Pun (2020) further reports that many police and civilians are still unaware of Nepal’s Caste-Based Discrimination and Untouchability Offence and Punishment Act despite its enactment in 2011.

Nepal has made efforts for inclusivity specifically by implementing a recruitment quota within the Police Force. According to the Police Rules, 2071, 45% of competitive posts are reserved for competition among women and certain ethnic and caste groups. Specifically, of the 45% of competitive posts, 20% are reserved for women, 32% for Adivasis/Janajatis, 28% for Madhesis, 15% for Dalits, and 5% for candidates of other groups considered “Backward Areas.”⁵ As reflected in our sample, however, these efforts do not automatically translate to increased representation or to the promotion of marginalized groups to higher positions of power. Others have examined the dominance of high castes in a variety of different professions in Nepal (Adhikari 2015; Gurung et al. 2014; Hachhethu and Gellner 2010; Lawoti 2005; Maharjan 1999; Sijapati 2012). Yet, to our knowledge, a police study of our scope and scale is rare.

Caste and ethnic groups in Nepal have been categorized into hierarchical groupings based on the varna system discussed in the main text and used in our conjoint design. Nepal’s data collection and categorization on caste and ethnicity have drastically evolved over time. For example, the 1991 census recorded 60 ethnic/caste groups, whereas the 2011 census recorded 125 groups (Central Bureau of Statistics 2014). With that said, from a hierarchy standpoint, the many castes are still organized under the four varnas. We explore further cultural, linguistic, and regional distinctions, described here, and follow the classification described by the Cen-

Figure A2: Hierarchy of Nepal Police Force



Note: Proportion of respondents in sample displayed in parentheses.

⁵The bylaw defines “Backward Areas” as Achham, Kalikot, Jajarkot, Jumla, Dolpa, Bajhang, Bajura, Mugu, and Humla districts. See: <http://www.lawcommission.gov.np/archives/34306>.

tral Bureau of Statistics (2014, 117) for our supplemental analyses in Appendix F. They explain that this classification is constructed on a cultural basis. Specifically, the first three social groups—Hill Brahmin, Hill Chhetri, and Tarai/Madhesi Brahmin/Chhetri—are all high caste, yet there are differences between the three such as origins of residency and language.⁶ Other Madhesi castes are similar to Tarai/Madhesi Brahmins/Chhetris in terms of origins of residency and language, but are mid-ranked in the caste hierarchy. Hill Dalits and Tarai/Madhesi Dalits are similarly low caste groups but also differ in terms of origins of residency and language. Newars, Mountain/Hill Janajatis, and Tarai Janajatis belong to Adibasi Janajatis, meaning indigenous groups, and thus are culturally and linguistically distinct from Hindu caste principles. As discussed previously, Newars are an exceptional group given their socioeconomic dominance, whereas Mountain/Hill and Tarai Janajatis differ in terms of origins of residency. Muslims and other groups differ by religion and culture. In Table A4, we present our operationalization of the social groupings for the caste and ethnic groups identified in the 2011 census. Not all groups, however, were present in our sample of police officers. We use this classification to construct a **Caste** variable to represent the “social groups” for each caste and ethnic group.

Table A4: Categorization of Caste/Ethnic Groups

Social Groups	Caste/Ethnic Groups	<i>N</i> Officers
Hill Brahmin	(Hill Brahmin)	137
Hill Chhetri	(Chhetri, Thakuri)	294
Tarai/Madhesi Brahmin/Chhetri	(Tarai Brahmin, Rajput)	27
Madhesi Other Castes	(Hajam/Thakur, Haluwai, Kalwar, Koiri, Kumhar, Kurmi, Lohar, Nuniya, Sonar, Sudhi, Teli, Yadav)	135
Hill Dalit	(Badi, Kami, Damain/Dholi, Sarki)	39
Tarai/Madhesi Dalit	(Chamar/Harijan/Ram, Dusadh/Paswan/Pasi, Tatma)	17
Newar	(Newar)	64
Mountain/Hill Janajati	(Adibasi/Janajati, Bote, Chepang/Praja, Danuwar, Darai, Gharti/Bhujel, Gurung, Kumal, Limbu, Magar, Majhi, Pahari, Rai, Tamang)	223
Tarai Janajati	(Tharu)	66
Muslim & Other Groups		62

Notes: One officer responded “don’t know” to the caste/ethnic identity question. The unit of subgroup analysis is at the profile level, so there are four observations for every respondent.

The Nepal Police is organized in a hierarchical structure as illustrated in Figure A2. Gazetted officers include the rank of inspector and above. The appointment, promotion, and discipline of gazetted officers are made by the Government of Nepal, whereas these processes for non-gazetted or subordinate ranks are made internally by the higher ranked officers. As noted in the main text and shown in Table A5, Brahmin, Chhetri, and Newar officers in our sample are overrepresented in each position and especially within high-ranking positions. Dalits, on the other hand, are significantly underrepresented, if at all, in each rank.

⁶The terms “Hill,” “Tarai,” and “Mountain” refer to the three conventional ecological zones in Nepal.

Table A5: Ethnic Composition of Police Ranks

	Superintendents		Inspectors		Constables		Total	
	%	col%	%	col%	%	col%	%	(<i>N</i>)
Brahmin & Chhetri	0.94	76.92	11.65	57.67	30.45	38.76	43.05	(458)
Newar	0.19	15.38	1.50	7.44	4.32	5.50	6.02	(64)
Dalit	0.00	0.00	0.38	1.86	4.89	6.22	5.26	(56)
Janajati (excl. Newar)	0.09	7.69	4.23	20.93	22.84	29.07	27.16	(289)
Madhesi	0.00	0.00	1.88	9.30	10.81	13.76	12.69	(135)
Muslim & other groups	0.00	0.00	0.56	2.79	5.26	6.70	5.83	(62)
Total	1.22	100.00	20.21	100.00	78.57	100.00	100.00	(1064)
<i>N</i>		13		215		836		1064

Notes: The “%” columns display the percent of officers from the corresponding caste/ethnic group and police rank for the entire sample. The “col %” columns are the column percentages or the percent of each caste/ethnic group within that ranking position.

E: Research Ethics

We took a number of steps to carry out this study in an ethical manner that exercises due diligence to protect the participants in our study. We organize this discussion in accordance with the American Political Science Association’s 2020 *Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research*, and address each of the 12 principles individually.⁷ This study was approved by the institutional review board at Vanderbilt University (IRB 161358) in order to meet US regulations concerning human subject research. We also sought and obtained approval for the study from Nepal’s Ministry of Home Affairs, which oversees the Police Force, along with Nepal’s Inspector General of Police.

- **Principle 1: “Political science researchers should respect autonomy, consider the well-being of participants and other people affected by their research, and be open about the ethical issues they face and the decisions they make when conducting their research.”**

First, research participants were under no obligation to participate in this research. When introducing the study to them, we provided them with a clear consent form that included a description of the study and contact information to the IRB review board, the protocol directors, and a local research manager if participants have any questions, concerns, or complaints. The consent language is included in the study’s replication file. We recognize that, despite this consent form, lower-ranked police officers may feel pressure from higher-ranked officers to participate in our study. We discuss this issue in Principle 4.

Second, we carried out in-depth training with all of our enumerators. This allowed them to be intimately familiar with all aspects of the study before they conducted any interviews. We also equipped the enumerators with documentation indicating that they were authorized to conduct these interviews to minimize pushback from community members. They were in no way coerced to work on the project. At any time, they could step away.

Third, while this was a survey of the police, it inquired about police enforcement behavior in relation to the general population. There is no reason to believe that the conjoint we administered would in some way shape the actual behaviors of law enforcement officers. We simply asked the police to describe the choices they would actually make, and describe the choices they think their

⁷Source: <https://connect.apsanet.org/hsr/principles-and-guidance/>.

institution makes more generally in hypothetical situations. We in no way primed them with the aim of influencing their response. Furthermore, because the conjoint does not single out one characteristic or one profile of a hypothetical offender, it is unlikely an officer would engage in backlash against a certain population as a result of taking the survey.

This reflection on the autonomy and well-being of the three groups of people affected by our research (research participants, enumerators, and the general population) raises a more general question pertaining to how ethical considerations influenced our methodological choices in this study. Overall, the substantive question driving this study was about who has access to justice. More specifically, we aimed to understand police officer bias. There are a variety of different methodological approaches to gathering empirical data on this question, including qualitative approaches (interviewing police officers and the general population, or ethnographic observation of these two groups); field experiments (aimed at collecting data on actual behaviors); and surveys (including conjoint experiments). We chose to examine this question through a conjoint experiment that allowed us to achieve representativeness and causality without negatively affecting police behavior. While a field experiment would have similarly satisfied these two goals, it also presented more ethical issues: we would have needed to contend with the possibility of negatively influencing how police officers make enforcement decisions. The conjoint experiment is not designed in such a way as to influence actual behavior.

- **Principle 2: “Political science researchers have an individual responsibility to consider the ethics of their research related activities and cannot outsource ethical reflection to review boards, other institutional bodies, or regulatory agencies.”**

As a first step, we sought out and received research approval from multiple sources, including: (1) Vanderbilt University’s institutional review board (IRB 161358); (2) Nepal’s Ministry of Home Affairs and their Inspector General of Police; and (3) the US Department of Labor (which both approved and funded this study). In recognition of the fact that such institutional approval does not guarantee a commitment to ethical research, we carried out a number of additional steps to consider the ethics of our research. Before designing and disseminating the survey, the principal investigators and the local research team conducted field work to assess risks and better understand the contextual underpinnings of law enforcement within Nepal. We carried out interviews and focus groups with former and current police officers, including meetings with the detective training school at the Nepal Police Academy, a women’s issues police cell, and the human trafficking unit at the Central Investigation Bureau. We also met with civil society organizations that either have a working relationship or expertise on law enforcement in Nepal. These organizations include Asia Foundation, Center for Legal Research and Resource Development, Change Nepal, Centre for Security and Justice Studies, Institute of Human Rights and Communication Nepal, Legal Aid and Consultancy Center, Planète Enfants, the Policy and Legal Research Center at Kathmandu School of Law, Saathi, National Judicial Academy, and Search for Common Ground. We discussed our proposed research design and survey instrument with members of these organizations to identify any potential impacts our study could have on respondents and the communities they reside in. The input we received from these interactions helped us develop a culturally-sensitive and ethically-appropriate study.

- **Principle 3: “These principles describe the standards of conduct and reflexive openness that are expected of political science researchers. In some cases, researchers may have good reasons to deviate from these principles (for example, when the principles conflict with each other). In such cases, researchers should acknowledge and justify deviations in scholarly publications and presentations of their work.”**

To the best of our knowledge, we can attest that we have not deviated from any of the principles outlined here.

- **Principle 4: “When designing and conducting research, political scientists should be aware of power differentials between researcher and researched, and the ways in which such power differentials can affect the voluntariness of consent and the evaluation of risk and benefit.”**

Possibilities of power differentials between us, the foreign researchers, and the researched, police officers, were not prominent from the perspective of the researched. Specifically, the research leads never interacted directly with study respondents—that was impossible given police hierarchies in Nepal. The study required that we secure permission from the police, and then have Nepali researchers carry out all aspects of data collection. Moreover, given the position of authority of the researched, it is unlikely that the researchers affected the voluntariness of consent. While this principle focuses on the potential power dynamic between the researcher and the researched, it is more likely that there was a power differential between the researched (police officers) and the visible researchers (Nepali surveyors).

The main power differential of concern for us, therefore, was not between the researcher and researched, but rather between the police leadership (who approved our study) and lower-ranking police officers (who participated in the study). Our near 100% response rate was likely due to receiving approval from the Inspector General of Police. We acknowledge that by obtaining approval from the authorities (high ranked police officials) and sharing that approval with study participants (lower ranked police officers), our study respondents may have felt pressure to participate. This step could not have been avoided, however, as the only way to conduct a police survey in Nepal is to secure permission from the highest levels of the police bureaucracy. The agency is hierarchical, and if we had attempted to carry out the study without permission from the highest levels, the study would not have been feasible. Potential participants would have viewed us with great distrust and suspicion, which would have severely affected our response rates.

Given this concern, we conducted a careful assessment of the risks of participating in a study endorsed by police authorities. Our conversations with retired police officers and civil society organizations (CSOs) who have experience working with the police suggested that, while official approval was necessary, it did not mean that respondents would feel obliged to participate. Instead, they would feel that they had been given permission to do so. Our high response rate is, we believe, in large part tied to the fact that police officers knew they were allowed to participate, and doing so was a welcome change from the usual responsibilities they carry out over the course of any given day. Moreover, the retired officers and CSOs confirmed that none of the content of the survey instrument could be viewed as compromising a given respondent’s safety. With that said, we took steps to ensure the interviews were conducted in private places so that lower-ranked officers did not feel pressure from their supervisors in how they answered certain questions.

- **Principle 5: “Political science researchers should generally seek informed consent from individuals who are directly engaged by the research process, especially if research involves more than minimal risk of harm or if it is plausible to expect that engaged individuals would withhold consent if consent were sought.”**

Although our study involved minimal risk of harm to participants, we sought informed consent from all participants and only surveyed those who provided their consent. Using tablets to conduct the survey, enumerators read to potential participants the consent language excluding contact information, and then provided each participant a handout of the consent form with contact

information for their own record. Enumerators explained that officers could opt out of the survey at any time and refuse to answer any question. We also included information on how we would maintain confidentiality of their data. Each enumerator also audio-recorded themselves reading the consent form to participants and receipt of consent from each participant, which allowed the research team to ensure proper protocols for gaining consent were consistently followed.

- **Principle 6: “Political science researchers should carefully consider any use of deception and the ways in which deception can conflict with participant autonomy.”**

We did not use any deception in our study.

- **Principle 7: “Political science researchers should consider the harms associated with their research.”**

Our study involved minimal risk to the participants. None of our questions were deemed as particularly sensitive. Officer pay was not affected by refusal to participate or by how they answered any of the survey questions. Respondents were all interviewed in a private place where no one would overhear their responses. We also did not report our results in a disaggregated way in which participants would potentially be identifiable, and therefore potentially face professional or social backlash. Furthermore, the enumerators were trained to build rapport with the officers so that respondents would feel comfortable when interviewed.

The research leads were also sensitive to potential risks that the enumerators might face. To ensure enumerators were never in harm’s way, the research leads were in frequent communication with the local enumerators to ensure their safety was maintained and concerns addressed. None of the study sites were considered conflict zones. In order to protect our enumerators, we also excluded several rural stations that were difficult to access due to poor road conditions during the rainy season.

- **Principle 8: “Political science researchers should anticipate and protect individual participants from trauma stemming from participation in research.”**

Officers are likely to experience traumatic events such as violent or deadly encounters with offenders. We did not ask probing questions about officers’ personal history with these types of experiences. We also held interviews and focus groups with officers prior to implementing our survey to drop or revise sensitive questions. In addition, we piloted the survey to ensure all question wording was culturally appropriate.

- **Principle 9: “Political science researchers should generally keep the identities of research participants confidential; when circumstances require, researchers should adopt the higher standard of ensuring anonymity.”**

No personally identifying information was collected during the data collection process. However, our sampling procedure required us to gather names of the police officers from police rosters of each station. We have expunged the officers’ names from the data files used for analysis and all files are stored under password-protected accounts. As part of the informed consent process, we described these efforts to maintain confidentiality of the participants.

- **Principle 10: “Political science researchers conducting studies on political processes should consider the broader social impacts of the research process as well as the**

impact on the experience of individuals directly engaged by the research. In general, political science researchers should not compromise the integrity of political processes for research purposes without the consent of individuals that are directly engaged by the research process.”

The broader social impact of our study—its main societal benefit—is the insight it provides into access to justice, what types of victims are more likely to receive police assistance, and what type of criminal perpetrators are more likely to be targeted by the police. This benefit is unlikely to come at the expense of harm to survey participants or society more generally. For instance, although we conducted the survey during the police officer’s workday, our enumerators always deferred to an officer’s work responsibilities. Respondents only participated during down time at work, and were never in a position in which they needed to prioritize the survey over their professional responsibilities. In order to ensure that we would not encroach upon respondents’ professional duties, enumerators spent several days at each research site so that they would have ample time to accommodate respondents’ schedules. In addition, participation in the study is unlikely to lead to negative outcomes for the individuals in the general population who interact with the police: the conjoint study did not prime participants to enforce in any particular way. Further, because we worked with the proper authorities to receive approval, it is extremely unlikely that officers would harm or target our enumerators. For these reasons, when considering the benefits and risks of the study, we felt that risks of harm stemming from the study were low and the potential contribution to increase understanding of biased policing and the policy implications to improve access to justice for marginalized groups were substantially important enough to move forward with the study.

- **Principle 11: “Political science researchers should be aware of relevant laws and regulations governing their research related activities.”**

The research leads have a great deal of experience conducting research in Nepal. Additionally, beyond receiving approval from Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB 161358), we went through the proper channels of authority to receive permission from Nepal’s government and police agency to ensure the research design adhered to all laws and regulations along with local customs.


- **Principle 12: “The responsibility to promote ethical research goes beyond the individual researcher or research team.”**

To ensure our study was conducted ethically, the research team carried out a rigorous ten-day training with our field team and enumerators prior to launching the survey. We also held random audits with enumerators throughout the process to verify that they had followed our guidelines. We also worked diligently with each district to ensure research protocols were transparent, clearly defining researcher expectations and providing training to the local field team interfacing with study participants where necessary. Furthermore, the lead researchers trained the entire research team, including graduate students and post-doctoral students, in the importance of ethical research and how to make this an integral part of all elements of designing and carrying out empirical research. As such, we believe that we are contributing to fostering a community of political science scholars who are increasingly mindful of the centrality of ethical questions when carrying out research.

F: Supplemental Analyses and Robustness Tests

In this section, we discuss our supplemental analyses and robustness tests in greater detail. Figure A3 shows the average marginal component effects for all attributes displayed in the conjoint design. We did not report coefficients for type of crime in the main text for purposes of presentation clarity. Officers' responses to this attribute act as a validity check. We observe that police officers' prioritization of case investigation corresponds with the egregiousness of the given crimes: theft was the least likely to be prioritized, followed by cow killing (considered a crime in Nepal as cows are culturally sacred), while perpetrators of murder were most preferred for investigation. This pattern indicates that officers correctly identify which cases should be prioritized based on the seriousness of the crime and suggests that our conjoint design is a valid measure of officers' assessments. Additionally, by controlling for type of criminal activities, we are able to more robustly identify police biases and preferences based on demographic characteristics.

Figure A3: Conjoint Analysis for All Attributes



Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level for the unweighted sample. The bars indicate 95% confidence intervals and the points without bars denote the reference category. Estimates of panels (a) and (b) correspond to coefficients in columns (1) and (5) of Table A6, respectively.

We also estimate the AMCEs for both outcome measures with the inclusion of controls and sampling weights as presented in Table A6. Our sampling weights are based on gender (we provide an explanation of weight calculations in Appendix B). Our control variables include individual-level covariates of police rank (constable as reference category (RC)), log of monthly household income, years of employment, gender (male as RC), age, caste/ethnic identity (Hill Chhetri as RC), religious identity (Hindu as RC), and educational attainment level (Bachelor and above as RC) (see Table A2 in Appendix B for the breakdown of these controls). In models (4) and (8), we include both weights and controls in the analyses. Our findings for both outcome variables are robust to the inclusion of these controls and sample weights across each model.⁸ An extended version of Table A6 that lists coefficients for all control variables can be found in <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ESR7YG>.

We interact offenders' caste and income attributes, while averaging across all other features. Table A7 is a tabular format of Figure 2 in the main text and provides predicted values of the interaction between caste and income attributes along with standard errors and confidence intervals for both outcome variables. The plots in panels (a) and (b) in Figure 2 and the estimates in Table A7 show the probabilities of offenders being selected by officers for investigation as a personal preference and as an assessment of institutional preferences, respectively. We calculate these probabilities using the marginal means estimate option within the R package `cregg` (Leeper 2020).

To address potential multiple comparisons problems, we adjust our naive p-values with two methods. We control the false discovery rate (FDR) with the Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) method and the sharpened two-stage approach proposed by Benjamini et al. (2006). We follow the procedures described in Anderson (2008) and use Anderson's Stata code to generate the "q-values," which are listed in Table A8. Our results remain significant when controlling FDR at $q = .10$ with the BH method and at $q = .05$ with the BKY method. For the former method, `Newar` becomes marginally significant ($p = 0.071$) for the `personally preferred` outcome measure, and `Brahmin` becomes marginally significant ($p = 0.070$) for the outcome `institutionally preferred`. Our findings remain robust to these multiple inference adjustments.

To improve the treatment component of our design's external validity (Egami and Hartman 2020), we follow the methodology proposed by de la Cuesta et al. (2022). Because the AMCE, by design, uses a uniform distribution that gives equal weights to each profile attribute, some profiles and the task itself may become too substantively unrealistic, compromising the external validity of the treatments. The population AMCEs (pAMCEs) account for the relative distribution of profiles within the target population. Figure A4 shows that our conjoint design employed a uniform distribution for each profile without any restrictions. With their R package `factorEx`, we estimate the pAMCEs using the post hoc model-based design proposed by de la Cuesta, Egami and Imai. To determine the marginal distributions of our target population, we use data from Nepal's Central Bureau of Statistics⁹ and the CIA World Factbook.¹⁰ For education, caste, and gender attributes, we collect marginal distributions from the Central Bureau representative of the five districts in our study site. We use the CIA World Factbook national data to construct the marginal distributions for income and age attributes. Because no systematic administrative data on crimes are maintained in Nepal, we cannot collect the marginal distributions for the types of crime attribute. We therefore leave that attribute's distributions as uniform. The marginal distributions used in our pAMCE estimation are given in Figure A9.

In estimating the pAMCE for both outcome measures, we find the results remain substantively

⁸Figures 1 and A3 are based on models (1) and (5) in Table A6.

⁹<http://nationaldata.gov.np/>

¹⁰<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/np.html>

Table A6: AMCEs with Controls and Sampling Weights

	<i>Personally Preferred</i>				<i>Institutionally Preferred</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Newar ^a	-0.037*	-0.037*	-0.036+	-0.035+	-0.017	-0.016	-0.020	-0.018
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Brahmin	-0.020	-0.021	-0.017	-0.017	-0.041*	-0.043*	-0.040*	-0.041*
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
from a wealthy family ^b	-0.047**	-0.047*	-0.048**	-0.049**	-0.018	-0.014	-0.017	-0.013
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)
from a middle-class family	-0.041*	-0.041*	-0.042*	-0.042*	-0.028	-0.025	-0.026	-0.024
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)
literate ^c	-0.042**	-0.042**	-0.043**	-0.044**	0.003	0.000	0.002	-0.001
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
male ^d	-0.046**	-0.047**	-0.044**	-0.045**	-0.028+	-0.026+	-0.025+	-0.023
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
45 years old ^e	-0.026	-0.017	-0.025	-0.016	-0.006	0.001	-0.004	0.003
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)
25 years old	0.029	0.033	0.031	0.034	0.002	0.008	0.001	0.007
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)
18 years old	0.004	0.012	0.003	0.010	-0.006	-0.005	-0.009	-0.008
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
16 years old	0.028	0.033	0.029	0.034	-0.006	-0.004	-0.005	-0.003
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.024)
theft ^f	-0.385**	-0.384**	-0.387**	-0.386**	-0.375**	-0.376**	-0.376**	-0.378**
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
cow killing	-0.325**	-0.318**	-0.323**	-0.316**	-0.330**	-0.326**	-0.335**	-0.332**
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
domestic labor trafficking	-0.167**	-0.175**	-0.164**	-0.172**	-0.144**	-0.145**	-0.142**	-0.143**
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
international labor trafficking	-0.103**	-0.102**	-0.102**	-0.101**	-0.120**	-0.120**	-0.120**	-0.119**
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)
domestic sex trafficking	-0.160**	-0.161**	-0.154**	-0.156**	-0.125**	-0.134**	-0.120**	-0.129**
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
international sex trafficking	-0.016	-0.016	-0.013	-0.013	0.015	0.016	0.017	0.018
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Observations	4208	4208	4168	4168	4208	4208	4168	4168
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Weights	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the respondent level. Reference categories are ^aDalit, ^bfrom a poor family, ^cilliterate, ^dfemale, ^e14 years old, and ^fmurder, respectively. Columns present AMCEs with the inclusion and exclusion of controls (see Table A2 for the full list of covariates considered) and weights for each of our dependent variables. Columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) include controls; and columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) include weights in the models. A complete list of coefficients for all control variables can be found in Table A6 (Extended) in the APSR Dataverse at <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ESR7YG>. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table A7: Predicted Values of Interaction between Caste and Income

	<i>Personally Preferred</i>				<i>Institutionally Preferred</i>			
	Estimate	SE	CI Lower	CI Upper	Estimate	SE	CI Lower	CI Upper
Poor Dalit	0.577	0.021	0.536	0.618	0.538	0.022	0.495	0.580
Middle Dalit	0.510	0.022	0.467	0.553	0.525	0.022	0.482	0.568
Wealthy Dalit	0.481	0.022	0.438	0.525	0.510	0.022	0.466	0.553
Poor Brahmin	0.506	0.022	0.464	0.549	0.489	0.022	0.447	0.532
Middle Brahmin	0.501	0.022	0.457	0.545	0.453	0.023	0.409	0.497
Wealthy Brahmin	0.490	0.021	0.448	0.532	0.490	0.021	0.448	0.531
Poor Newar	0.517	0.022	0.473	0.561	0.535	0.022	0.491	0.578
Middle Newar	0.438	0.022	0.394	0.482	0.466	0.022	0.422	0.510
Wealthy Newar	0.479	0.021	0.437	0.521	0.496	0.021	0.455	0.537


Notes: The probabilities are estimated based on the interaction between income and caste features while averaging across all other features.

similar. In panel (a) of Figure A5, it remains that officers personally prefer to investigate Dalit over Newar offenders ($p = 0.031$), offenders from a poor family over offenders from a wealthy family ($p = 0.027$), and, marginally, offenders from a middle-income family ($p = 0.082$). Gender and education, however, are no longer statistically significant predictors. In panel (b), officers believe that the institution prefers to investigate Dalit offenders over Brahmin ones, though this effect is marginally significant ($p = 0.073$).

Next, we conduct robustness checks to test whether respondents experienced a learning effect between task iterations and whether they were influenced by the layout of the profile displays. In Figure A6, we only find statistically meaningful differences between the first and second pairing tasks for some values of the crime types and age attributes. Our primary attributes of interest were not statistically different between the two pairing tasks in either outcome measure. In testing the left/right profile display as displayed in Figure A7, we find that our findings substantively remain the same. More formally, we conduct omnibus F-tests of the nested models for each outcome variable and none are statistically significant. Specifically, when testing the significance of the interaction between the task iteration and the conjoint features, the p -values are 0.202 and 0.440 for personal and institutional investigatory preferences, respectively. When testing the interaction between the left/right displays and the features, the p -values are 0.439 and 0.506 for the personal and institutional outcomes.

Finally, we conducted two heterogeneity tests to examine treatment effects by police ranks and caste/ethnic groups. For the former, we compare constable rankings, which are the lowest ranked positions in the police hierarchy, with all inspector positions and above (see Appendix D discussion and Figure A2 on police ranks). To test descriptive differences in preferences by rank, we estimate the marginal means rather than AMCEs (Leeper et al. 2020, 210). Because conditional AMCEs depend on what reference category is chosen, interpreting the differences between subgroups can be problematic if their preferences diverge in the reference category. Figure A8 shows the subgroup differences between high- and low-rank officers for their personal investigatory preferences (panel (a)) and their assessment of institutional preferences (panel (b)). We might expect that because officers' level of decision-making power increases as they move up in rank, their preferences and assessments of the institution may also vary by rank. Yet, we find few differences. This could be for several reasons: the status of lower-ranked officers may depend on higher-ranked officers to advance professionally or officers across ranks may adopt the organizational culture of the police agency through professionalization. In estimating the conditional marginal means

Figure A4: Profile Display Frequencies



Notes: Frequencies of each attribute value confirm a uniform distribution without any constraints.

Table A9: Marginal Distributions

	Proportion
Caste/Ethnicity	
Newar	0.138
Brahmin	0.198
Dalit	0.069
Household Income	
from a wealthy family	0.200
from a middle-income family	0.548
from a poor family	0.252
Education	
literate	0.717
illiterate	0.259
Gender	
male	0.485
female	0.515
Age	
45 years old	0.150
25 years old	0.150
18 years old	0.240
16 years old	0.240
14 years old	0.220
Type of Crime	
theft	0.138
cow killing	0.141
domestic labor trafficking	0.138
international labor trafficking	0.149
domestic sex trafficking	0.141
international sex trafficking	0.138
murder	0.142

Notes: Marginal distributions for education, caste, and gender attributes are determined from data from the Central Bureau representative of the five districts in our study site. Marginal distributions for income and age attributes are constructed from data from the CIA World Factbook national data. Type of crime is left as a uniform distribution due to lack of systematic administrative data.

Table A8: Multiple Inference Adjustments

Level	<i>Personally Preferred</i>			<i>Institutionally Preferred</i>		
	Naive <i>p</i> -value	FDR <i>q</i> -value	Sharpened FDR <i>q</i> -value	Naive <i>p</i> -value	FDR <i>q</i> -value	Sharpened FDR <i>q</i> -value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Newar	0.04	0.07	0.04	0.36	0.57	0.40
Brahmin	0.27	0.31	0.13	0.03	0.07	0.05
from a wealthy family	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.32	0.57	0.40
from a middle-income family	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.12	0.25	0.16
literate	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.84	0.90	0.81
male	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.14	0.10
45 years old	0.27	0.31	0.13	0.80	0.90	0.81
25 years old	0.21	0.30	0.13	0.95	0.95	0.90
18 years old	0.86	0.86	0.43	0.79	0.90	0.81
16 years old	0.23	0.30	0.13	0.79	0.90	0.81
theft	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
cow killing	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
domestic labor trafficking	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
international labor trafficking	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
domestic sex trafficking	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
international sex trafficking	0.56	0.60	0.29	0.60	0.87	0.78


Notes: Naive *p*-values for our personally preferred and institutionally preferred outcome variables are presented in columns (1) and (4), respectively. Adjusted FDR “*q*-values” using the BH method are presented in columns (2) and (5). Adjusted “*q*-values” using the BH method and controlling FDR at $q = .10$ are presented in columns (2) and (5). Adjusted “*q*-values” using the sharpened two-stage BKY method and controlling FDR at $q = .05$ are presented in columns (3) and (6).

for both outcomes, we find that none of the subgroup differences for the ascriptive attributes are statistically significant. Lower ranking officers are marginally more likely than higher ranking officers to personally prefer investigating illiterate offenders ($p = 0.072$) and marginally less likely to personally prefer investigating literate offenders ($p = 0.089$). Subgroup differences are statistically significant for some types of crimes.

Results of our subgroup analysis of officers’ caste/ethnic identity by estimating the marginal means are shown in Figure A9 for our first and second outcomes, respectively. As described in Appendix D and shown in Table A4, we operationalize caste/ethnic identity by following the classification described by Central Bureau of Statistics (2014). Because we use a forced-choice conjoint design, 50% of all profiles are chosen and 50% are not. As a result, the grand mean is by definition 0.5 and indicated with vertical lines in each facet. Although we are underpowered among some caste groups, the findings suggest some caste preferences.¹¹ For example, Hill Chhetri officers are more likely to personally prefer investigating offenders who are Dalit or from a poor family, and marginally more likely to believe the police will investigate Dalit offenders. Hill Brahmin officers are marginally less likely to prefer investigating wealthy offenders and believe the institution will

¹¹We report the marginal means for our four main caste groups of interest.

Figure A5: Population AMCEs of Offender Attributes on Police Investigatory Preferences




Notes: Point estimates represent population AMCEs. The bars indicate 95% confidence intervals and the points without bars denote the reference category. Figure estimates correspond to coefficients in Table A10 found in the APSR Dataverse at <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ESR7YG>.

also deprioritize investigating wealthy offenders. They are also significantly less likely to believe the police will investigate Brahmin offenders. Hill Dalit officers are significantly more likely to prefer investigating offenders from poor families and believe the police are more likely to investigate them. We cannot fully determine why Hill Dalits would target low-income offenders. One possible explanation, however, is that Hill Dalit officers do not have the social status to pursue investigations against wealthy individuals, who may then use resources to push back against Dalit officers. Another possible explanation is that Dalit officers undergo processes of professionalization that pressure them to conform and pledge loyalty to the institution which then leads to their increased discrimination against minority groups.¹²

¹²See, for example, Blair et al. (2022), who find that police investigation teams in Liberia are more likely to discriminate against ethnic minority offenders when officers of the same ethnic minority are present on the team. This is due to a loyalty conflict in which they offer allegiance to the institution rather than their


Figure A6: Average Marginal Component Effect for First and Second Pairing Tasks



Notes: Estimates illustrate order effects between the first and second pairing tasks for each of our dependent variables. Figure estimates correspond to coefficients in Table A11 found in the APSR Dataverse at <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ESR7YG>.


ethnic group.

Figure A7: Average Marginal Component Effect for Left/Right Profile Display



Notes: Estimates illustrate display effects between left-side and right-side profiles for each of our dependent variables. Figure estimates correspond to coefficients in Table A12 found in the APSR Dataverse at <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ESR7YG>.


Figure A8: Subgroup Analysis by Police Rank




Notes: Panels illustrate the differences between low- and high-rank officers. Point estimates on the left of the vertical line at 0.0 indicate high-rank officers' preferences and estimates on the right represent low-rank officers' preferences. Figure estimates correspond to coefficients in Table A13 found in the APSR Dataverse at <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ESR7YG>.

Figure A9: Subgroup Analysis by Respondent Caste

(a) Personal Investigatory Preferences



(b) Assessment of Institutional Investigatory Preferences



Notes: Panels illustrate officers' subgroup preferences of four main caste groups of interest: Hill Brahmin, Hill Chhetri, Newar, and Hill Dalit. Estimates for all caste groups can be found in Tables A14 and A15 in the APSR Dataverse at <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ESR7YG>.

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