

# Group Gender Composition and Perceptions of Legitimacy

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# A Survey Description

## A.1 Sampling Procedure

To test the hypotheses above, we implemented a series of phone survey experiments between November - December 2021 in Tunisia and Morocco and January - March 2022 in Jordan. The surveys were implemented by Elka Consulting, One-to-One for Research and Polling, and NAMA in Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan, respectively. Local survey providers hired and trained enumerators; our research team members prepared training materials, checked recordings for quality, participated virtually in the training, maintained constant contact with team leaders, and monitored the incoming data daily.

We implemented gender quotas in our surveys so that there would be an even number of male and female enumerator-led interviews across genders. In Jordan, however, our local survey provider could not find enough competent male enumerators to implement the survey. We thus had to allow a higher number of female enumerators in Jordan, an issue which is discussed in further detail below.

## A.2 Pre-Treatment Measures

After consent, participants were asked their gender and citizenship. They were then asked about their positions regarding domestic violence penalties. These questions were followed by two batteries of questions in random order on benevolent and hostile sexism adapted for the most part from (Glick et al. 2004) as well as gender norms in the society. Finally, we asked respondents about their views of the government, the importance of democracy, and their religiosity.

Do you think that the penalties for domestic violence should be raised? (Yes, No)

(For those in Jordan only) Do you think that the penalties for littering should be raised? (Yes, No)

Different people hold different opinions regarding roles of men and women. I am going to read out some statements. For each one, can you tell me if you agree or disagree with it? (Agree, Disagree)

- Women should be cherished and protected by men.
- Women, compared to men, tend to have a superior moral sensibility.
- Women are too easily offended.
- A wife should not be significantly more successful in her career than her husband.

In different communities men and women also behave in different ways. Is it acceptable for women in your circle of friends and family: (Yes, No)

- To gather with men in the same space at weddings
- To publicly disagree with a man's opinion
- To travel out of town alone

How satisfied are you with the current government's performance overall? (Completely dissatisfied, Dissatisfied, Satisfied, Completely satisfied)

How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? (Not at all important, Not important, Important, Very important)

In general, would you describe yourself as very religious, religious, not religious, not at all religious?

### **A.3 Pretest to Determine Issue Area**

During our piloting phase, we asked 257 respondents across our cases which of three different types of gendered issues was most salient in their society at the time of the survey: 1) increasing penalties for domestic violence; 2) giving mothers the same rights as fathers over decision regarding their children's education, travel, and general welfare; and 3) ensuring women earn the same pay as men for performing equal jobs. Among these three topics, majorities considered domestic violence to be the most important issue to address in their society currently.

Below, we provide the text of our experimental stimuli which was read by a local. (For respondents in Jordan, randomization of topic also occurred where the words "domestic violence" were replaced with "littering in public spaces" in the text below.)

#### **Vignette (Radio Broadcast)**

In today's news, a committee of [**8 male / 4 male and 4 female**] legislators from varying parties and areas of the country [**supported/rejected**] a proposal to increase penalties for domestic violence.

Over the past month, the [**all-male/gender-balanced**] parliamentary committee thoroughly reviewed a law to increase the penalties for domestic violence. The committee of [**8 male / 4 male and 4 female**] legislators met weekly to hear opinions from citizens, experts, and bureaucrats, to learn about the issue, and to examine the potential costs and benefits of increasing the penalties.

Earlier today, one of our journalists visited the committee's meeting and recorded their debates. Here is a brief excerpt:

(Recording of committee deliberation plays, randomize order of statement 1 and 2 and for the gender-balanced committees randomize if male or female comes first (both are male voices for the all-male committees))

[Statement 1]: We thank our team for their work researching policy options relating to penalties for domestic violence. Clearly our team did important work that demonstrates the importance of the questions we are debating and the consequences of our decisions.

[Statement 2]: I am grateful for the important discussions in our committee, which has gone a long way to develop policies which will address our community's needs.

[Back to Radio discussion]

At the end of this meeting, our reporter learned that the committee, composed of **[8 men / 4 men and 4 women]** has decided to **[support/reject]** the proposed law on penalties for domestic violence. The committee stated that prevention of domestic violence is an important cause **[and they are glad they determined appropriate measures to support this cause/ but, in the end, the committee decided that the current penalties are enough and so, they will remain unchanged]**. All committee members had equal say in deciding this matter.

#### **A.4 Quality Checks**

After the recording played, we checked if the respondent could hear it clearly. We had enumerators play it again if they could not, up to three times. If the respondent could not hear the recording after the third time, we terminated the interview.

- Could you hear the recording clearly or do you want me to play it again? (I could hear it fine, I need you to replay the recording please, Respondent could not hear the recording for the third time)

#### **A.5 Post-Treatment Measures**

After listening to the brief radio expert, study participants were asked a series of manipulation questions. Then they responded to several questions related to outcome measures: Evaluation of the committee's decision (in general and in terms of female interests), trust in the committee, perceived fairness of the decision making process, and the expectation regarding public attitudes towards the committee's decision.

##### *Manipulation Checks*

In the radio story that you heard, was the entire committee men, women, or was it half-half?

What issue was the committee discussing? (Women's shelters, Domestic violence, Littering, Equality in pay for work, Don't know/Refuse to answer)

What was the committee's decision regarding the penalties/budget proposal? (Support, Reject, Don't Know/Refuse to Answer)

##### *Outcomes*

Now I am going to ask you some questions about how you feel about the committee. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree...

- The committee made the right decision for all citizens?
- The committee made the right decision for women?
- The committee made the right decision for men?
- The committee can be trusted to make future decisions that are right for all citizens?

- Still thinking about the radio story you just heard, how fair was the decision making process? (Very unfair, Somewhat unfair, Somewhat fair, Very fair)

- How likely is the general public to accept the committee's decision to (support/reject) raising penalties for (domestic violence/littering)? (Not at all likely, Not likely, Likely, Very likely, Don't Know/Refuse to Answer)

#### *Additional Checks*

-Could you imagine a real legislative committee in (country name) considering raising penalties for (domestic violence/littering)? (Yes, No)

- What do you think this survey is about? (Law making/legislative processes, Differences between men and women, Environmental politics, Women's rights, Government service provision/spending, Other, Don't Know/Refuse to Answer)

## **A.6 Ethics**

We obtained ethical clearance for this study from the Institutional Review Board at the University of Wisconsin, Madison (no. 2020-1159-CP001). We also included a consent form before beginning the survey to ensure the respondent understood what they were agreeing to and their rights regarding the storage and use of their data. Finally, we confirmed that the respondent was above the age of 18 before continuing with the survey. The text read as follows:

Hello, my name is (enumerator name). I am calling you from (organization) to participate in a survey of about 20 minutes or less. Participation is voluntary and there is no penalty for refusing to participate. We are implementing this survey as part of a broad research project on governance in the Middle East and North Africa. First, just to confirm, how old are you?

By agreeing to take this survey, you are giving us the right to transfer the information you provide to our research partners at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden and the University of Wisconsin-Madison. All the answers you are providing will be fully anonymous. We will not ask your name, and no identifying information will be collected. The data will be analyzed in Sweden and the United States, and when the results of this research are published, we will report general results which cannot be used to identify individual participants. We will never use a participant's name or personal information, so please feel free to tell us what you think. We would like your opinion with the knowledge that there are no right or wrong answers to these questions and that you may ask for clarification or stop the survey at any time. You are also free to skip questions you consider personal or invasive without penalty. If you would like to receive an overview of the final results of the study, if you have any questions about the study or your rights as a participant, or you wish to withdraw your consent at a later time, please contact us via email: marwa.shalaby@wisc.edu. If you are not satisfied with the response of the research team, have more questions, or want to talk with someone about your rights as a research participant, you should contact the Education and Social/Behavioral Science IRB Office at (+1) 608-265-4312.

Are you willing to participate in the survey please? (Agree to participate/Do not agree to participate)

## B Descriptive Statistics

We present descriptive statistics in Table A1. This table reports the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of key variables in our data. The table reports aggregate statistics for respondents from all countries, a total of 6,304 respondents (including Jordanian respondents assigned to a vignette about recycling rather than domestic violence).

We further plot the distribution of our key outcomes by country in Figures A1-A3. Our first outcome is an index measuring the extent to which a respondent believes that the committee described in the vignette made the right decision. To create this index, we combine three questions, answered on four-point Likert scales, asking respondents whether the committee made the right decision for i) all citizens, ii) men, and iii) women. As reported in Figure A1, the  $\alpha$  Cronbach for these items is 0.804, suggesting that they are highly correlated and suitable to be included in an additive index, as we specified in our pre-analysis plan.

Our second index measures respondents' general attitudes towards the committee mentioned in the vignette. This index is comprised of two questions, answered on four-point Likert scales that ask respondents whether (1) the committee can be trusted and (2) the decision making process was fair. As reported in Figure A2, the  $\alpha$  Cronbach for this pre-registered index is slightly lower ( $\alpha = 0.668$ ), likely as a result of the fact that the index includes only two measures. However, given that these measures are associated, and our theoretical pre-registered motivation was to index these measures together, we use this index as one of our key outcomes in the analyses. In Section C, we report additional analyses, demonstrating that our results are similar when considering the index and its components. In Figure A3 we report our third outcome. This outcome is a single item measure, eliciting survey respondents' belief that the general public will accept the decision made by the committee described in the experimental vignette. Finally, in Figure A4 we demonstrate that a majority of survey respondents in all countries perceive the scenarios reported in our vignette's as rather realistic.

We report balance tests in Tables A2-A3. As expected, respondents assigned to different conditions of our gender balance and committee decision treatments are indistinguishable in terms of their demographics variables and pre-treatment attitudes relating to sexism and perceptions of gender norms in their locality.

## C Additional Analyses

In this section, we report table format results for our main findings reported in Figures 2-5. We further report results from additional pre-registered hypotheses and exploratory analyses.

### C.1 Hypothesis 1

In Table A4, we report the main result presented in Figure 2, by which both our gender balance and decision treatments increased respondents' perceptions that the committee made the right decision. Following our pre-registration, in Tables A5-A6, we report additional models, focusing on two components of our index, belief that the committee made the right decision for i) women, and ii) men. Although we did not pre-register this analysis, we further consider the effect of our treatment on the final component of our index—belief that the committee made the right decision for all

citizens— in Table A7. Taken together, we interpret the results in Tables A5-A7 to suggest that our main result reported in the paper (Figure 2), and in Table A4, is driven by citizens’ beliefs that gender balance committees make suitable decisions mainly for women and all citizens.

## **C.2 Hypothesis 2**

In this Section, we report Table format results for Hypothesis 2, considering the effects of our treatment on respondents’ attitudes towards the committee. First, in Table A8, we report results plotted in Figure 3 of the main text. After doing so, we further consider the effects of our treatment on the individual components of our main index: i) the respondent’s belief that the committee can be trusted to make the right decision, and ii) the respondent’s belief that the committee’s decision making process was fair. An examination of Tables A8-A10 emphasizes that results of models considering our index and individual survey items yield a similar substantive interpretation.

## **C.3 Hypothesis 3**

In Table A11, we further report in table format results of our test for Hypothesis 3 regarding the effects of our treatments on respondents’ belief that the general public will accept the committee’s decision. These results are identical to the results we visualize in Figure 4 of the main text.

## **C.4 Hypothesis 4 – Moderating Effect of Decision on Gender Balance**

In this section, we report in table format the results of Figure C.4 in the main text, in which we examine whether the committee decision treatment, and specifically the committee’s decision in favor of women, moderates the effects of our gender balance treatment on our key outcomes from hypotheses 1-3. To do so, we regress a given outcome over our two treatments, and their interaction. Our main parameter of interest is the interaction  $\text{Balance} * \text{Pro}$ , representing the moderating effect of pro-women decision treatment on the gender balance treatment. We report table format results of this analysis in Table A12, and find no evidence that pro-women decisions moderate the effects of gender balance.

## **C.5 Hypothesis 5a – Moderating Effect of Sexism**

In our pre-analysis plan, we further registered analyses in which we consider whether individual level attributes, and specifically respondents’ level of sexism, might moderate the effect of our gender balance treatment. We test this expectation in Figures A5 by interacting a sexism index comprised of four measures of hostile and benevolent sexism. In Figures A5-A7, we show that the overall measure of sexism and dis-aggregated measures of hostile or benevolent sexism do not consistently moderate the gender balance ATE, on our three key outcomes. We further show in Figure A8 that when employing a binary measure of sexism, taking a value of 1 for respondents with above average levels of overall sexism ( $\mu > 0.629$ ) results remain substantively similar — our measure of sexism does not moderate the effects of the gender balance treatment.

## C.6 Hypothesis 5b – Moderating Effect of Gender Norms

In this section, we consider another pre-registered hypothesis regarding gender norms. Specifically, we test whether respondents who perceive the gender norms of the community as more conservative, react differently to treatment. To do so, we create an index measuring individual-level perceptions of gender norms, based on three survey items asking people whether in their community it is acceptable for women to: i) disagree publicly with men, ii) travel alone, and iii) gather in public spaces with men. We interact our gender norm index with our key gender-balance treatment, in order to test how perceptions of gender norms moderate the average treatment effects of gender balance on our key outcomes from H1-H3. As reported in Figure A9, we do not find evidence that gender norms moderate our main gender-balance treatment.

## C.7 Moderating Effect of Respondent Gender on ATEs

In this section, we further consider the moderating effect of gender on our main gender-balance treatment. To do so, we interact an indicator taking the value of 1, if a subject identifies as male (0 otherwise), with our gender balance treatment, as well as our pro-women decision. As reported in Figure A10, we find no evidence that gender moderates the effects of the gender balance treatment. However, in Figure A18 we show that gender moderates the effects of the pro-women decision. Specifically, it appears that for our key outcomes the treatment effects of the pro-women decision are larger for women, when compared to men as further shown in Figure A19.

## C.8 Moderating Effect of Issue Area on Main ATEs

Our main analyses consider the effects of the committee’s composition and decision, and focus on a committee that is discussing a gender salient topic: penalties for domestic violence. However, one may wonder whether similar effects would be identified when considering a committee discussing a topic unrelated to gender. As we describe in Section A.3, to address this question, in our Jordan experiment we further randomized the issue area discussed by the committee. Specifically, we assigned subjects to learn about a committee discussing fines for domestic violence or littering. This design allows us to test whether the effects of gender balance and committee decisions vary across issue areas.

In Table A13, we focus on our Jordanian sample (where we randomized issue area in addition to our main treatments) and consider our key outcomes from H1-3. We do not find evidence that the effects of gender balance are moderated by the issue area discussed by the committee (see small and imprecise point estimates for  $\text{Balance} \times \text{DV Issue}$ ). However, we do find some moderation with regards to our decision treatment, by which penalties for domestic violence are viewed as less favorable than penalties for littering, and committee’s making pro-women decisions are viewed as less favorable than committees making decisions to reduce littering (see columns 2 and 4 for the  $\text{Decision} \times \text{DV Issue}$  estimate).

## C.9 Moderating Effect of Attitudes towards Regime on Main ATEs

In Figure A20 we consider whether respondents with varying levels of regime support react differently to our gender-balance treatment. To do so, we interact a 4-point measure of regime sat-



isfaction with our key gender balance treatment. The results reported in Figure A20 provide little support for the notion that attitudes towards the regime moderate our main gender-balance treatment effects.

## C.10 An Overview of Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

In Sections C.4-C.8, we consider a range of pre-registered and non-pre-registered heterogeneous treatment effects. Specifically, we focus on the extent to which theoretically motivated moderators, including: respondents' level of sexism, perceptions of norms relating to gender, attitudes toward government, and gender moderate the effects of our main pre-registered treatment – committee gender balance. Although it is very plausible that these variables which we consider as moderators correlate with support for gendered policies, and although we demonstrate in Figure A22 that many of these moderators correlate with pre-treatment measures of support for increasing penalties on perpetrators of domestic violence, we do not find strong evidence that these variables moderate our main treatment effects. Interestingly, in additional non-pre-registered analyses, we find strong patterns of variation in gendered responses to the pro-women decision treatment. Indeed, Figures A18-A19 suggest that while the effects of pro-women decisions on our key outcomes are positive for both women and men, these effects are substantively larger for women. We interpret this finding to suggest that in the realm of gendered policy, women are likely more responsive to the substance of committee decisions, when compared with men. However, we emphasize that our results imply that both men and women still appear to prefer pro-women decisions.

## D Robustness Checks

### D.1 Attrition

In our surveys we provided respondents with the option to report a “do not know” answer, or to refuse to answer any question. As a result, we have minor missingness issues in our key outcomes of interest. In Table A14 we consider whether our treatments increase the probability of not responding to our main outcomes, examining the pooled and country specific samples. In most models reported in Table A14, we do not precisely estimate treatment effects on non-response to outcomes. However, in some models we do find a statistically significant relationship between our treatment and non-response to outcomes.

To address concerns regarding attrition, we estimate additional models with inverse probability weights. In practice, we create weights that use pre-treatment covariates and treatments to account for attrition in our key outcomes. We report weighted and non-weighted models for our main result in Figure A11. The additional analyses suggest that accounting for attrition with inverse probability weights does not substantively change our estimates.

### D.2 Treatment Recall

In this section, we analyze responses to our main treatment manipulation checks. In Figure A12, we demonstrate that almost 83% of our full sample correctly recalled whether the legislative com-

mittee was comprised of 8 men or of 4 men and 4 women. Compliance with treatment was highest in Jordan and lowest in Tunisia, but overall quite high.

In Figure A13 we demonstrate that correct treatment recall was lower for our decision treatment. Indeed, in the overall sample, 65% of subjects across all countries correctly recalled the committee's decision, and this lower percentage is largely driven by the Tunisian sample.

It is important to note that failure to correctly recall treatment amongst respondents would likely introduce downwards bias, leading us to identify conservative point estimates. Regardless, to address this issue, in Table A15 we descriptively examine potential correlates of manipulation check failure for both our treatments. To do so, we regress a variable taking a value of 1 if a respondent correctly recalled their treatment (0 otherwise) over our treatment indicators and several demographics. We show that gender and education are predictors of failure to pass manipulation checks and that respondents assigned to gender-balanced committees and pro-women decisions were more likely to recall their treatment status.

Though not causally identified, in Figure A15 we report our main models, employing respondents' response to the manipulation check instead of actual treatment status as independent variables. The results reported in Figure A14 suggest that using perceived gender balance and committee decisions instead of respondents actual treatment status yields similar results. Moreover, we show that lower compliance with the decision treatment is unlikely the reason for our null result in H4 (moderating effect of decision on the gender balance effect). As reported in Figure A15, in line with the results reported in Figure 5 where pro-women decisions do not moderate the average treatment effect of gender balance, perceived pro-women decisions do not appear to moderate the original effects of gender balance. These additional analyses emphasize that failure in manipulation checks, and more generally incomplete compliance with treatment, likely pose a downward bias on our main estimates reported in the paper.

### **D.3 Enumerator Effects**

Since our survey was implemented via phone, one might worry that the identity of enumerators might shape respondents' answers and reaction to our experimental treatments. To address this concern, we set up our implementation to ensure that overall, our enumerators interviewed even proportions of respondents of the same/opposite sex. Unfortunately, however, in Jordan NAMA was unable to find a sufficient number of qualified male enumerators, resulting in an interviewer that was largely female. To reduce concerns regarding the consequences of enumerator gender for our main results, we report additional models controlling for enumerator identity. Specifically, we created a variable taking a value of 1 if an enumerator's gender identity is similar to a respondent's gender identity (0 otherwise). In Figure A16 we report our main results further controlling for this enumerator-respondent congruence measure. In Figure A17 we also run additional analyses where we control for the respondent's gender, enumerator's gender, and the interaction of the two indicators. Across the difference specifications reported in Figures A16-A17, our results remain consistent with the main results reported in the paper.

### **D.4 Pre-Treatment Attitudes on Domestic Violence**

In Figure A21 we report our main analyses, controlling for respondents pre-treatment self-reported support for increasing penalties for domestic violence. Since the treatment was randomly assigned,

this measure unlikely confounds our main estimates. As expected, controlling for this measure does not substantively change our main findings.

## D.5 Ordered Logit Specification

In our main specification reported in the paper, we run OLS regressions to estimate treatment effects on our main survey measures. In Table A16, we demonstrate that our results are robust to other model specifications. Specifically, we show that that we get similar substantive results when estimating ordered logit models.

**Table A1:** Descriptive Statistics – Overall

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Male	6,104	0.502	0.500	0	1
Female	6,104	0.498	0.500	0	1
Age	6,102	42.556	14.249	18	90
Moroccan	6,104	0.240	0.427	0	1
Jordanian	6,104	0.525	0.499	0	1
Tunisian	6,104	0.235	0.424	0	1
Education	6,093	1.485	1.272	0	4
Income	6,048	1.895	0.999	0	3
Married	6,104	0.703	0.457	0	1
Sexism Index	6,104	0.624	0.204	0.000	1.000
Norms Index	6,104	0.468	0.370	0.000	1.000

**Table A2:** Covariate Balance (Gender Treatment)

	adj.diff	z
x_male	0.00	0.15
x_female	-0.00	-0.15
x_age	0.04	0.12
Education	-0.01	-0.20
Income	-0.02	-0.69
Married	-0.01	-0.65
m_sexism_ix	-0.00	-0.13
m_norms_ix	-0.02	-1.61

graphicx

**Table A3: Covariate Balance (Decision Treatment)**

	adj.diff	z
x_male	-0.01	-0.44
x_female	0.01	0.44
x_age	-0.09	-0.24
Education	0.00	0.08
Income	-0.03	-1.19
Married	-0.01	-0.57
m_sexism_ix	0.00	0.23
m_norms_ix	0.00	0.01

**Table A4: ATE on Decision Evaluation (H1)**

	Committee Made Right Decision			
	Pooled	Jordan	Tunisia	Morocco
Gender Balance	0.08** (0.03)	0.11* (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)
Decision	0.66*** (0.03)	0.76*** (0.05)	0.60*** (0.05)	0.63*** (0.06)
Age	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Vocational Diploma	-0.13* (0.06)	-0.08 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.14)	-0.24* (0.10)
BA	-0.20*** (0.04)	-0.17* (0.07)	-0.24** (0.08)	-0.21** (0.08)
MA/PHD	-0.27*** (0.07)	-0.15 (0.14)	-0.40*** (0.11)	-0.27* (0.11)
NA Edu	-0.40*** (0.12)			-0.41* (0.20)
Male	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.17*** (0.05)	-0.03 (0.06)	0.03 (0.05)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.13	0.16	0.11	0.11
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.13	0.15	0.10	0.10
Num. obs.	3881	1460	1230	1191
RMSE	0.94	0.92	0.95	0.95

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$

**Table A5: ATE on Decision Evaluation for Women (H1a)**

	Committee Made Right Decision for Women			
	Pooled	Jordan	Tunisia	Morocco
Gender Balance	0.07* (0.03)	0.14** (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)
Decision	0.66*** (0.03)	0.79*** (0.05)	0.61*** (0.05)	0.60*** (0.05)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Vocational Diploma	-0.13* (0.05)	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.10 (0.14)	-0.24** (0.09)
BA	-0.23*** (0.04)	-0.22** (0.07)	-0.21** (0.07)	-0.29*** (0.08)
MA/PHD	-0.30*** (0.06)	-0.22 (0.13)	-0.36*** (0.10)	-0.33*** (0.11)
NA Edu	0.02 (0.13)			0.07 (0.13)
Male	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.18*** (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.14	0.17	0.10	0.11
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.13	0.17	0.10	0.10
Num. obs.	4173	1509	1328	1336
RMSE	0.93	0.91	0.95	0.95

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$

**Table A6: ATE on Decision Evaluation for Men (H1b)**

	Committee Made Right Decision for Men			
	Pooled	Jordan	Tunisia	Morocco
Gender Balance	0.02 (0.03)	0.07 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.06)
Decision	0.34*** (0.03)	0.43*** (0.05)	0.34*** (0.05)	0.25*** (0.06)
Age	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)
Vocational Diploma	-0.06 (0.06)	0.01 (0.09)	0.04 (0.15)	-0.18 (0.09)
BA	-0.11* (0.04)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.17* (0.08)	-0.10 (0.08)
MA/PHD	-0.14* (0.07)	0.08 (0.14)	-0.34** (0.11)	-0.12 (0.12)
NA Edu	-0.45 (0.30)			-0.53 (0.37)
Male	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.13* (0.05)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.11 (0.06)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.02
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.02
Num. obs.	4069	1496	1300	1273
RMSE	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.99

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$

**Table A7: ATE on Decision Evaluation for All Citizens**

	Committee Made Right Decision for All Citizens			
	Pooled	Jordan	Tunisia	Morocco
Gender Balance	0.06*	0.07	0.06	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Decision	0.60***	0.71***	0.53***	0.58***
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age	-0.00	-0.00*	-0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Vocational Diploma	-0.15**	-0.15	0.14	-0.26**
	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.09)
BA	-0.20***	-0.17*	-0.25**	-0.22**
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
MA/PHD	-0.31***	-0.24	-0.34**	-0.36***
	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.11)
NA Edu	-0.37***		-0.51***	-0.33
	(0.11)		(0.07)	(0.20)
Male	-0.05	-0.14**	-0.03	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.11	0.14	0.09	0.10
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.11	0.13	0.08	0.09
Num. obs.	4202	1549	1327	1326
RMSE	0.94	0.93	0.96	0.95

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$

**Table A8: ATE on Evaluation of Committee (H2)**

	Evaluation of Committee (Index)			
	Pooled	Jordan	Tunisia	Morocco
Gender Balance	0.14***	0.15**	0.16**	0.12*
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Decision	0.56***	0.72***	0.48***	0.50***
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Age	0.00	-0.00*	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Vocational Diploma	-0.35***	-0.35***	-0.18	-0.39***
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.09)
BA	-0.40***	-0.27***	-0.49***	-0.47***
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
MA/PHD	-0.58***	-0.37**	-0.76***	-0.61***
	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.11)
NA Edu	-0.90*		-0.26***	-1.44***
	(0.36)		(0.07)	(0.34)
Male	-0.05	-0.16***	-0.01	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.13	0.16	0.11	0.12
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.13	0.15	0.11	0.11
Num. obs.	3818	1412	1233	1173
RMSE	0.93	0.92	0.95	0.94

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$

**Table A9: ATE on Trust in Committee (H2a)**

	Trust in Committee			
	Pooled	Jordan	Tunisia	Morocco
Gender Balance	0.09** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	0.12* (0.06)
Decision	0.37*** (0.03)	0.50*** (0.05)	0.31*** (0.05)	0.50*** (0.06)
Age	0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Vocational Diploma	-0.39*** (0.05)	-0.36*** (0.09)	-0.26 (0.13)	-0.39*** (0.09)
BA	-0.41*** (0.04)	-0.28*** (0.07)	-0.57*** (0.08)	-0.47*** (0.08)
MA/PHD	-0.58*** (0.06)	-0.32* (0.13)	-0.77*** (0.10)	-0.61*** (0.11)
NA Edu	-0.76* (0.35)		0.22*** (0.07)	-1.44*** (0.34)
Male	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.24*** (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.00 (0.06)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.12
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.10	0.09	0.08	0.11
Num. obs.	4088	1467	1321	1173
RMSE	0.95	0.95	0.96	0.94

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ **Table A10: ATE on Perceptions of Committee Fairness (H2b)**

	Committee is Fair			
	Pooled	Jordan	Tunisia	Morocco
Gender Balance	0.14*** (0.03)	0.10* (0.05)	0.18*** (0.05)	0.16** (0.05)
Decision	0.59*** (0.03)	0.74*** (0.05)	0.51*** (0.05)	0.48*** (0.05)
Age	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Vocational Diploma	-0.20*** (0.05)	-0.25** (0.08)	0.03 (0.15)	-0.23* (0.10)
BA	-0.28*** (0.04)	-0.20** (0.07)	-0.27*** (0.08)	-0.37*** (0.08)
MA/PHD	-0.43*** (0.06)	-0.29* (0.13)	-0.55*** (0.10)	-0.44*** (0.11)
NA Edu	-0.71** (0.26)		-0.66*** (0.07)	-0.86* (0.37)
Male	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.00 (0.06)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.11	0.15	0.10	0.09
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.11	0.15	0.09	0.08
Num. obs.	4112	1543	1301	1268
RMSE	0.94	0.92	0.95	0.96

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$

**Table A11: ATE on Perceptions of Public Accepting Decision (H3)**

	Will Public Accept Decision			
	Pooled	Jordan	Tunisia	Morocco
Gender Balance	0.02 (0.03)	0.08 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)
Decision	0.42*** (0.03)	0.51*** (0.05)	0.45*** (0.05)	0.28*** (0.05)
Age	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Vocational Diploma	-0.08 (0.06)	0.01 (0.08)	0.03 (0.18)	-0.30*** (0.09)
BA	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.08)	0.11 (0.08)	-0.28*** (0.08)
MA/PHD	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.13)	-0.11 (0.10)	-0.13 (0.11)
NA Edu	-0.61 (0.44)		0.62*** (0.07)	-1.06 (0.55)
Male	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.14** (0.05)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.08	0.07	0.06	0.04
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.07	0.07	0.05	0.03
Num. obs.	4322	1595	1355	1372
RMSE	0.96	0.97	0.98	0.98

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$

**Table A12: Moderating Effect of Decision on Gender Balance (H4)**

	Committee Made Right Decision				Attitudes towards Committee				Public Accept Decision			
	Pooled	Jordan	Tunisia	Morocco	Pooled	Jordan	Tunisia	Morocco	Pooled	Jordan	Tunisia	Morocco
Gender Balance	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.1)	0.1 (0.1)	0.0 (0.1)	0.1 (0.0)	0.1 (0.1)	0.1 (0.1)	0.0 (0.1)	-0.0 (0.0)	0.1 (0.1)	-0.0 (0.1)	-0.1 (0.1)
Decision	0.6*** (0.0)	0.7*** (0.1)	0.6*** (0.1)	0.6*** (0.1)	0.5*** (0.0)	0.7*** (0.1)	0.5*** (0.1)	0.4*** (0.1)	0.4*** (0.0)	0.5*** (0.1)	0.4*** (0.1)	0.2** (0.1)
Age	-0.0* (0.0)	-0.0* (0.0)	-0.0 (0.0)	-0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	-0.0* (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	-0.0* (0.0)	-0.0 (0.0)	-0.0 (0.0)	-0.0 (0.0)
Vocational Diploma	-0.1* (0.1)	-0.1 (0.1)	-0.0 (0.1)	-0.2* (0.1)	-0.3*** (0.1)	-0.3*** (0.1)	-0.2 (0.1)	-0.4*** (0.1)	-0.1 (0.1)	0.0 (0.1)	0.0 (0.1)	-0.3*** (0.1)
BA	-0.2*** (0.0)	-0.2* (0.1)	-0.2** (0.1)	-0.2** (0.1)	-0.4*** (0.0)	-0.3*** (0.1)	-0.5*** (0.1)	-0.5*** (0.1)	-0.1 (0.0)	-0.1 (0.1)	0.1 (0.1)	-0.3*** (0.1)
MA/PHD	-0.3*** (0.1)	-0.2 (0.1)	-0.4*** (0.1)	-0.3* (0.1)	-0.6*** (0.1)	-0.4** (0.1)	-0.8*** (0.1)	-0.6*** (0.1)	-0.1 (0.1)	-0.1 (0.1)	-0.1 (0.1)	-0.1 (0.1)
NA Edu	-0.4** (0.1)	-0.4** (0.1)	-0.4** (0.1)	-0.4* (0.2)	-0.9* (0.4)	-0.9* (0.4)	-0.3*** (0.1)	-1.5*** (0.3)	-0.6 (0.4)		0.6*** (0.1)	-1.1 (0.5)
Male	-0.1* (0.0)	-0.2*** (0.0)	-0.0 (0.1)	0.0 (0.1)	-0.0 (0.0)	-0.2*** (0.0)	-0.0 (0.1)	0.0 (0.1)	-0.1** (0.0)	-0.1 (0.0)	-0.0 (0.1)	-0.1** (0.1)
Balance*Decision	0.1 (0.1)	0.2 (0.1)	0.0 (0.1)	0.0 (0.1)	0.1 (0.1)	0.1 (0.1)	0.0 (0.1)	0.2 (0.1)	0.0 (0.1)	-0.0 (0.1)	0.1 (0.1)	0.2 (0.1)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0
Num. obs.	3881	1460	1230	1191	3818	1412	1233	1173	4322	1595	1355	1372
RMSE	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$



**Table A13: Moderating Effect of Issue Area on Main Treatments (Jordan)**

	Right Decision		Attitudes towards Committee		Public Accept Decision	
	Jordan	Jordan	Jordan	Jordan	Jordan	Jordan
Gender Balance	0.09 (0.05)	0.10** (0.04)	0.12* (0.05)	0.14*** (0.04)	0.04 (0.06)	0.06 (0.04)
Decision (Support Proposal)	0.91*** (0.04)	1.04*** (0.05)	0.82*** (0.04)	0.92*** (0.05)	0.55*** (0.04)	0.54*** (0.06)
Domestic Violence Issue	-0.07 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	-0.16** (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.06)
Balance*DV Issue	0.01 (0.07)		0.04 (0.07)		0.05 (0.08)	
Decision*DV Issue		-0.26*** (0.07)		-0.19** (0.07)		0.02 (0.08)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.19	0.20	0.19	0.19	0.07	0.07
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.19	0.20	0.18	0.19	0.06	0.06
Num. obs.	2803	2803	2744	2744	3093	3093
RMSE	0.95	0.95	0.94	0.94	1.06	1.06

All models control for age, education, and gender.

**Table A14: Attrition By Country – Treatment Effects on Non-Response**

	Overall Attrition				Right Decision				Attitudes				Public Accept			
	Pool	JRD	TNS	MRC	Pool	JRD	TNS	MRC	Pool	JRD	TNS	MRC	Pool	JRD	TNS	MRC
Gender Balance	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Decision	-0.00 (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.03* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)
Age	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Vocational Diploma	0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.04)	0.04 (0.07)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.13* (0.06)	-0.01 (0.02)
BA	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.07 (0.03)	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)
MA/PHD	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.09* (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.04* (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)
NA Edu	0.53*** (0.12)	0.79*** (0.03)	0.75*** (0.03)	0.47*** (0.14)	0.51*** (0.15)	0.86*** (0.03)	0.84*** (0.03)	0.43* (0.17)	0.52*** (0.14)	0.85*** (0.03)	-0.14*** (0.02)	0.56*** (0.15)	0.34* (0.16)	0.96*** (0.01)	-0.04** (0.02)	0.31 (0.17)
Male	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02
Num. obs.	4552	1654	1436	1462	4552	1654	1436	1462	4552	1654	1436	1462	4552	1654	1436	1462
RMSE	0.43	0.40	0.42	0.45	0.35	0.32	0.35	0.38	0.36	0.35	0.35	0.39	0.22	0.18	0.23	0.24

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$

**Table A15: Correlates of Correct Response**

	Recall Gender Balance?				Recall Decision			
	Pooled	Jordan	Tunisia	Morocco	Pooled	Jordan	Tunisia	Morocco
Gender Balance	0.17*** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)	0.33*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)
Decision (Pro)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.04* (0.01)	0.05* (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.23*** (0.01)	0.30*** (0.02)	0.06* (0.03)	0.30*** (0.02)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
High School	0.06*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.08** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.08* (0.03)
Vocational Diploma	0.08*** (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	0.09 (0.06)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.06 (0.04)	0.23** (0.07)	0.16*** (0.04)
BA	0.08*** (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)	0.05 (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.21*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.33*** (0.04)	0.17*** (0.03)
MA	0.10*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.04 (0.04)	0.14*** (0.04)	0.22*** (0.03)	0.21*** (0.04)	0.38*** (0.05)	0.11** (0.04)
NA Edu	-0.12 (0.14)	-0.85*** (0.02)	0.19*** (0.02)	-0.03 (0.14)	-0.17 (0.15)	-0.82*** (0.03)	-0.29*** (0.03)	-0.12 (0.18)
Male	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.05* (0.02)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.09	0.03	0.16	0.06	0.13	0.13	0.08	0.13
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.09	0.02	0.15	0.05	0.13	0.13	0.07	0.13
Num. obs.	4552	1654	1436	1462	4552	1654	1436	1462
RMSE	0.36	0.29	0.40	0.37	0.44	0.41	0.48	0.43


The outcome variable in these regression takes a value of 1 if respondent correctly answers manipulation check.

**Table A16: Main Results: Ordered Logit**


	Right Decision	Attitudes towrds Committee	Public Accept
Gender Balance	0.15* (0.06)	0.26*** (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)
Decision	1.29*** (0.06)	1.09*** (0.06)	0.85*** (0.06)
Age	-0.00* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)
Vocational Diploma	-0.23* (0.11)	-0.66*** (0.11)	-0.20 (0.11)
BA	-0.38*** (0.08)	-0.77*** (0.09)	-0.18* (0.09)
MA/PHD	-0.49*** (0.12)	-1.13*** (0.12)	-0.23 (0.12)
NA Edu	-0.81 (0.87)	-1.78 (0.92)	-1.09 (0.79)
Male	-0.13* (0.06)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.15** (0.06)
AIC	14822.43	12717.16	9804.57
BIC	14947.71	12823.36	9893.77
Log Likelihood	-7391.22	-6341.58	-4888.29
Deviance	14782.43	12683.16	9776.57
Num. obs.	3881	3818	4322

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$


**Figure A1: Distribution of Right Decision Index by Country.**




**Figure A2: Distribution of Attitudes towards Committee Index by Country.**




**Figure A3: Distribution of Beliefs that the Public will Accept the Committee's Decision**




**Figure A4: Distribution of Respondent Perceptions Regarding the Possibility that the Scenario Described in their Experimental Vignette is Realistic.**




**Figure A5: Moderating Effect of Overall Sexism Index on Gender Balance.**




**Figure A6: Moderating Effect of Hostile Sexism on Gender Balance.**



**Figure A7: Moderating Effect of Benevolent Sexism on Gender Balance.**




**Figure A8: Moderating Effect of Sexism on Gender Balance Using a Binary Indicator.**




*Note:* This plot reports the interaction of our gender balance treatment with a binary indicator taking a value of 1 for respondents with above average ( $\mu = .629$ ) levels of sexism on the general sexism index.


**Figure A9: Moderating Effect of Perceptions of Gender Norms on Gender Balance.**



**Figure A10: Moderating Effect of Gender on Gender Balance Treatment.**




**Figure A11: Inverse Probability Models.**




*Note:* This figure presents weighted models accounting for the mild attrition in our main outcomes of interest. We benchmark weighted models with original models reported in the main text.

**Figure A12: Distribution of Correct Gender Balance Treatment Recall by Country.**







**Figure A13: Distribution of Correct Decision Treatment Recall by Country.**




**Figure A14: Correlation of Perceived Gender Balance and Committee Decision (i.e. Manipulation Check Answers) with Key Outcomes.**




**Figure A15: Moderating Effect of Perceived Committee Support on Gender Balance Treatment.**




**Figure A16: Main Results Controlling for Enumerator-Respondent Gender Congruence.**



**Figure A17: Main Results Controlling for Enumerator Gender, Respondent Gender, and the Interaction of both Indicators.**




**Figure A18: Moderating Effect of Respondents' Gender on the Pro-Women Decision Treatment.**




*Note:* This Figure demonstrates that respondents' male identity has a negative moderating effect on treatment.

**Figure A19: Effects of Gender Balance and Decision Treatment by Gender.**




*Note:* This Figure reports the main experimental effects on sub-samples of female and male respondents for our pooled and country specific samples.

**Figure A20: Regime Satisfaction does not Consistently Moderate the Effects of Gender Balance.**



*Note:* This Figure reports the moderating effects of respondents' pre-treatment regime satisfaction on our primary gender balance treatment.

**Figure A21: Main Results Controlling for Respondents' Pre-Treatment Attitudes Regarding Increasing Penalties for Domestic Violence.**



**Figure A22: Correlation of Key Moderators with Pre-Treatment Support for Increasing Penalties on Domestic Violence Perpetrators.**

