Online appendix for

"Autocratic Policy and the Accumulation of Social Capital: The Moscow Housing Renovation Program."

Ekaterina Borisova, Regina Smyth, and Alexei Zakharov

APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTION OF SURVEY QUESTIONS

Generic social capital index components

1. Do you think that, in general, you can count on the help of your neighbors? 1-Definitely yes; 2-Probably yes; 3-Probably no; 4-Definitely not.

2. How did you interact with your neighbors over the last year? Took the keys to the apartment to monitor it / gave the keys to your apartment. 1-Mentioned; 0-Not mentioned

3. How did you interact with your neighbors over the last year? You helped or neighbors helped you to solve some problem. 1-Mentioned; 0-Not mentioned

4. How did you interact with your neighbors over the last year? Helped with a child. 1-Mentioned; 0-Not mentioned

5. How did you interact with your neighbors over the last year? Lent food, medicine, and household items. 1-Mentioned; 0-Not mentioned

House-specific social capital index components

1. Which of the following have you (or those living with you in this apartment) done over the past year? Participated in community work days, and home improvement activities in the surrounding area. 1-Mentioned; 0-Not mentioned

2. Which of the following have you (or those living with you in this apartment) done over the past year? Participated in the repair, and cleaning of the entrance hall. 1-Mentioned; 0-Not mentioned

3. Which of the following have you (or those living with you in this apartment) done over the past year? Collected cash contributions for the general needs of the residents of the building/entrance hall. 1-Mentioned; 0-Not mentioned

4. Which of the following have you (or those living with you in this apartment) done over the past year? Participated in the monitoring of order (for example, as part of voluntary people's squads). 1-Mentioned; 0-Not mentioned

[Policy-specific/Pension specific] Interactions index components

Please tell me, what did you do of the following regarding [the Renovation Program/raising of the retirement age]?

1. Signed a petition. 1-Mentioned; 0-Not mentioned

2. Participated in a peaceful demonstration. 1-Mentioned; 0-Not mentioned

3. Discussed this issue on the social networks on the Internet. 1-Mentioned; 0-Not mentioned

4. Voted in the election for a candidate whose position on this issue coincides with your own. 1-Mentioned; 0-Not mentioned

5. Discussed this issue with neighbors, friends, and colleagues. 1-Mentioned; 0-Not mentioned

6. Participated in a meeting with a deputy of any level or a representative of a political party. 1-Mentioned; 0-Not mentioned

7. Participated in a meeting of an initiative group of citizens. 1-Mentioned; 0-Not mentioned

8. Did not do anything. 1-Mentioned; 0-Not mentioned

Political participation

1. **2018 Mayoral vote.** On September 9, the mayoral election was held in Moscow. Please tell me, did you vote in this election, and if so, for which candidate? 1 if For Mikhail Balakin/For Mikhail Degtyarev/For Ilya Sviridov/For Sergei Sobyanin/Other/Difficult to answer; 0 if I did not know that there were elections/I did not vote/I was going to vote, but could not

2. **Discussion of politics.** How often during the past year have you discussed politics in conversations with your relatives, friends, coworkers? 1 - Almost every day; 0.66 - Several times a week; 0.33 - Several times a month; 0 - Less often or never

Controls: Individual level from the survey

1. **Age.** How old are you?

2. **Higher education.** What is the highest level of education you have achieved? 0 if Primary

or junior high school/Higher Secondary school/Vocational school/Secondary professional education/Incomplete higher education (at least 2 years); 1 if Higher education (university diploma, bachelor, master or specialist degree)

3. **Income.** To which of the following groups do you belong? 0-We do not have enough money even to buy food; 0.2-We have enough money for food, but not enough to buy clothes; 0.4-We have enough money for food and clothing, but buying more expensive items such as a TV or a refrigerator can be a problem; 0.6-We can buy some expensive items such as a refrigerator or a TV, but we cannot afford to buy a car; 0.8-We can buy a car, but we can't say that we are not financially; 1-We can afford anything we need

4. **Years lived.** Since what year do you live in your house? *The value of the variable is equal to 2018 minus the answer*

5. **Retiree.** What is your occupation? If you work in different places, then mark the main place of work. 1 if Pensioner; 0 if Independent entrepreneur/Government employee/Manager in the public sector/Manager in the private sector/Public sector specialist or employee/Specialist, Employee in the private sector or non-public sector/Worker (including foreman)/Pupil, student/Self-employed/Housewife/Unemployed, temporarily not employed

6. **State employee.** What is your occupation? If you work in different places, then mark the main place of work. 1 if Government employee/Manager in the public sector/Public sector specialist or employee; 0 otherwise

7. **Privatized apartment.** The apartment that you live in is 1 if Privatized by my family members or me; 0 if it was purchased by my family members or me/I am renting an apartment or room/I live under a social contract of employment/ Other

8. **Rooms.** How many rooms in your apartment without the kitchen, hallway, and utility rooms? If there was a remodeling in your apartment, please indicate the initial number of rooms.

9. **Residents per room.** How many people live with you in your apartment, not counting yourself? *Plus one, divided by the number of rooms.*

10. **Wood frames.** What are the window frames made of in your apartment? 1 if Wood; 0 if Plastic, the frames were changed before I began to live in this apartment/ Plastic, the frames

were changed after I began to live in this apartment/ Another material, the frames were changed before I began to live in this apartment/ Another material, the frames were changed after I began to live in this apartment

APPENDIX B: BUILDING LEVEL COVARIATES

1. **State managed building.** Dummy variable equal to 1 if the building is state-managed. *Source: reformazhkh.ru*

2. **Privatized land.** Dummy variable equal to 1 if the land under the apartment building is privatized by the homeowners. *Source: rosreestr.gov.ru*

3. **Unassigned land.** Dummy variable equal to 1 if homeowners don't have property rights for the land under the apartment building. *Source: rosreestr.gov.ru*

4. **Year built**. The year an apartment building was built. *Source: reformazhkh.ru*

5. **Number of apartments**. The overall number of flats in a building. *Source: reformazhkh.ru*

6. **Overall condition**. Overall condition of the building *Source: reformazhkh.ru*

7. **Car owners**. Share of car owners in the apartment building. *Source: http://atlas.mos.ru/*

8. **Retirees.** Share of retirees. *Source: http://atlas.mos.ru/*

9. **Children.** Share of children. *Source: http://atlas.mos.ru/*

10. **Work in health care.** Share of working in health care. *Source: http://atlas.mos.ru/*

11. **Work in education.** Share of working in education. *Source: http://atlas.mos.ru/*

12. **Work in culture.** Share of working in culture. *Source: http://atlas.mos.ru/*

13. **Work in utilities.** Share of working in the housing and utility sector. *Source: http://atlas.mos.ru/*

14. **Work in transport.** Share of working in transport. *Source: http://atlas.mos.ru/*

15. **Price per m sq.** Price for the square meter in 2016. *Source: cian.ru*

16. **Vote in favor**. Share of voted for building inclusion into the Renovation program (from all tenants of the building who took part in voting). *Source: http://mos.ru/*

17. **Turnout.** Share of tenants eligible to vote who participated. *Source: http://mos.ru/*

APPENDIX C: FOCUS GROUP DATA

To supplement our survey data we gathered information from the focus groups, carried out by Levada Center at the end of January 2019. The Levada facilitators recruited 80 unpaid respondents to participate in eight focus groups. Participants were recruited from various districts of Moscow and lived in both brick and panel houses. Groups were organized based on age and general predisposition toward the program. Participants in six focus groups were recruited in houses included in the Renovation Program. Participants in the other two focus groups were recruited from the houses that were not included in the program.

APPENDIX D: ETHICS STATEMENT

The survey company Levada Center complies with the highest international ethical and data protection standards. In particular respondents gave their voluntary consent to participate and were advised that they could end the interview at any time. Our survey and focus groups targeted respondents of various age, gender and socio-economic characteristics. No vulnerable groups were affected. There were no additional risks related to participation. Anonymity and confidentiality of the participants were guaranteed to the best of our ability. All data was anonymized by the Levada Center before being transferred to the research team.

The street survey and focus groups are part of the project "Housing Policy, Political Participation, and Regime Support: Moscow 2018" that received IRB approval at Indiana University Bloomington (No 1808794401, October 22, 2018).

APPENDIX E: ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS

Controlling for overall building quality

Here we examine whether our results could be biased due to the possible nonrandom nature of the selection of buildings into the program. In particular, buildings of worse overall condition may be more likely to be selected, and the overall condition of the building could plausibly be correlated with both the level of social norms, potentially confounding the result. Existing works exploring the selection of buildings for the renovation program do not find that worse building condition is significantly associated with selection (Marques and Zakharov 2022, Table B3).

Nonetheless, we examine whether the results are robust with respect to controlling for a measure of overall building condition that is available for 104 buildings out of 123 in our sample. The included and excluded buildings were balanced with respect to that measure (Table 1). To further address possible endogeneity concerns, in Tables OA1, OA2, OA3, OA4, and OA5 we reestimated the models reported in Tables 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 while including our measure of building condition as a control (as the measure of overall building quality was not known for all buildings, we lose approximately 180 observations, so this control wasn't used in the original estimation).

However, the overall results are largely unchanged; the effect of program inclusion on generic social capital becomes both stronger and more significant; the mediating effect of program-specific interactions continues to be significant at 95% level and robust ($\rho = .144$); the effect of treatment on house-specific social capital is now marginally significant at $p = 0.11$; as previously, the effect of program inclusion on generic and house-level social capital is heterogeneous in building size, program inclusion has an effect on pension reform and voting, with the effect on pension reform being heterogeneous in building size.

Restricted index of policy-specific interactions

We next look at a narrower index of policy-specific interactions that included the activities that were more likely to create social ties: Signing a petition, discussion in social networks, discussion with neighbors, meeting an elected deputy, and participating in an initiative group[7]. The composition of that

index is reported in Table OA6. In Tables OA7 and OA8 we re-estimated those results that involved interactions specific to the housing policy (reported in Columns 3 and 5 of Table 9, Table 10, Column 1 of Table 12, Columns 2 and 5 of Table 13, and Table 14).

We find that Hypothesis 2 is supported — the effect of program inclusion on generic and house-specific social capital is mediated by the interactions specific to the housing policy, with the average causal mediation effect being significant at 95% level for both measures, and being robust with respect to potential confounders ($\rho = 0.182$ and $\rho = 0.129$, respectively). Hypothesis 5a (that the renovation policy program affected subsequent political engagement through program-specific interactions) is likewise supported, with similar significance levels and robustness parameters as with the broader index.

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[7]For example, initial contacts between neighbors are often made during campaigns to gather signatures (for example, in support of a candidacy for a local municipal council, or under some complaint to the housing authority); these may or may not lead to greater social contacts later on. Meetings with deputies and can also be events where neighbors gather, meet, and establish contacts.

TABLE OA1. The effect of program inclusion on policy-specific interactions and social capital, controlling for overall building condition (0-excellent, 100-poor)

	Policy	Generic		House	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
May 2017 list	0.590***	0.155**	0.0612	0.0896	0.00607
	(0.0636)	(0.0663)	(0.0687)	(0.0549)	(0.0565)
Policy-specific interactions			0.162***		0.139***
			(0.0376)		(0.0466)
Male	-0.169***	-0.0970	-0.0735	-0.0315	-0.0161
	(0.0582)	(0.0648)	(0.0652)	(0.0528)	(0.0529)
Age	0.00392	-0.00430	-0.00536	0.00348	0.00289
	(0.00257)	(0.00359)	(0.00362)	(0.00311)	(0.00312)
Higher education	0.131**	-0.111	-0.126*	0.105	0.0910
	(0.0560)	(0.0692)	(0.0680)	(0.0652)	(0.0661)
Income	0.259	0.316	0.238	0.247	0.194
	(0.175)	(0.200)	(0.203)	(0.161)	(0.164)
Years lived	0.00841***	0.00773***	0.00647**	0.00558**	0.00441*
	(0.00230)	(0.00272)	(0.00269)	(0.00240)	(0.00231)
Retired	0.00151	0.148	0.170	-0.122	-0.130
	(0.100)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.124)	(0.124)
State employee	-0.0245	-0.0334	-0.0300	-0.0132	-0.00914
	(0.0745)	(0.0758)	(0.0741)	(0.0835)	(0.0830)
Privatized apartment	-0.0707	0.0252	0.0229	0.136**	0.145**
	(0.0624)	(0.0554)	(0.0551)	(0.0651)	(0.0636)
Number of rooms	0.0978*	0.0168	0.000203	0.000881	-0.0199
	(0.0515)	(0.0504)	(0.0507)	(0.0512)	(0.0525)
Residents per room	0.0255	0.00670	0.000448	-0.0261	-0.0274
	(0.0415)	(0.0464)	(0.0458)	(0.0504)	(0.0514)
Wood window frames	-0.0654	-0.0438	-0.0353	0.00646	0.00886
	(0.0575)	(0.0836)	(0.0846)	(0.0611)	(0.0612)
State managed building	-0.380***	-0.115	-0.0745	0.000557	0.0614
	(0.141)	(0.146)	(0.144)	(0.0620)	(0.0651)
Privatized land	0.233	-0.380*	-0.396**	0.595**	0.648**
	(0.388)	(0.193)	(0.192)	(0.277)	(0.253)
Unassigned land	0.134	0.243**	0.158	0.340***	0.371***
	(0.201)	(0.0980)	(0.111)	(0.127)	(0.128)
Overall building condition	-0.0188***	-0.0101	-0.00839	0.00869*	0.0113**
	(0.00585)	(0.00817)	(0.00845)	(0.00496)	(0.00483)
Building group FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	1141	1107	1095	1155	1141
Adjusted R^2	0.267	0.0838	0.103	0.118	0.134

Note: OLS regressions. SEs are clustered at building level. Column 1 DV is index of policy-specific interactions. Column 2 and 3 DV is index of generic social capital. Columns 4 and 5 DV is the house-specific social capital index. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

TABLE OA2. The effect of house size on social capital accumulation, controlling for overall building condition (0-excellent, 100-poor)

	Policy	Generic	House
	(1)	(2)	(3)
May 2017 list	0.995***	0.765***	0.392***
	(0.205)	(0.175)	(0.137)
May 2017 × Apartments	-0.00486**	-0.00703***	-0.00311**
	(0.00220)	(0.00198)	(0.00137)
No of apartments	0.00494***	0.00418**	-0.00257*
	(0.00164)	(0.00169)	(0.00142)
Male	-0.177***	-0.103	-0.0247
	(0.0587)	(0.0643)	(0.0524)
Age	0.00401	-0.00466	0.00310
	(0.00254)	(0.00357)	(0.00310)
Higher education	0.123**	-0.122*	0.104
	(0.0561)	(0.0701)	(0.0654)
Income	0.273	0.328	0.242
	(0.173)	(0.200)	(0.160)
Years lived	0.00820***	0.00770***	0.00575**
	(0.00227)	(0.00273)	(0.00243)
Retired	-0.00803	0.146	-0.116
	(0.0998)	(0.111)	(0.123)
State employee	-0.0200	-0.0340	-0.0299
	(0.0747)	(0.0764)	(0.0834)
Privatized apartment	-0.0450	0.0491	0.128*
	(0.0638)	(0.0582)	(0.0664)
Number of rooms	0.0937*	0.0108	-0.00219
	(0.0513)	(0.0493)	(0.0508)
Residents per room	0.0226	0.00742	-0.0229
	(0.0417)	(0.0468)	(0.0502)
Wood window frames	-0.0510	-0.0339	0.00137
	(0.0565)	(0.0860)	(0.0625)
State managed building	-0.236	0.0325	-0.0114
	(0.160)	(0.0825)	(0.0834)
Privatized land	0.211	-0.353*	0.695***
	(0.388)	(0.197)	(0.256)
Unassigned land	0.252	0.336***	0.277*
	(0.193)	(0.113)	(0.153)
Overall building condition	-0.0142**	-0.00648	0.00590
	(0.00644)	(0.00724)	(0.00483)
Building group FE	YES	YES	YES
N	1141	1107	1155
Adjusted R^2	0.271	0.0907	0.126

Note: OLS regressions. SEs are clustered at building level. Column 1 DV is the index of policy-specific interactions. Column 2 DV is the index of generic social capital. Column 3 DV is the house-specific social capital index. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

TABLE OA3. The effect of program inclusion on policy-specific interactions, generic social capital, and vote in 2018 Mayoral elections, controlling for overall building condition

	Vote 2018			Discuss politics		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
May 2017 list	0.0773***	0.0483*	0.170**	0.0317	-0.0135	0.0915
	(0.0216)	(0.0253)	(0.0730)	(0.0194)	(0.0209)	(0.0600)
Policy-specific interactions		0.0477***			0.0738***	
		(0.0177)			(0.0124)	
May 2017 × Apartments			-0.00106			-0.000854
			(0.000873)			(0.000620)
No of apartments			0.000492			0.00237***
			(0.000969)			(0.000536)
Male	-0.0313	-0.0245	-0.0317	0.0464*	0.0600**	0.0419*
	(0.0318)	(0.0322)	(0.0317)	(0.0246)	(0.0242)	(0.0245)
Age	0.00510***	0.00481***	0.00507***	0.00230**	0.00215**	0.00243**
	(0.00157)	(0.00156)	(0.00157)	(0.00107)	(0.00106)	(0.00107)
Higher education	0.0559*	0.0502	0.0544*	-0.00515	-0.0127	-0.00797
	(0.0323)	(0.0322)	(0.0323)	(0.0229)	(0.0226)	(0.0230)
Income	0.0293	0.00163	0.0307	0.102	0.0719	0.107
	(0.0829)	(0.0851)	(0.0828)	(0.0680)	(0.0684)	(0.0678)
Years lived	0.000851	0.000356	0.000846	0.000222	-0.000496	0.000128
	(0.00117)	(0.00117)	(0.00117)	(0.00102)	(0.00102)	(0.00100)
Retired	0.0409	0.0384	0.0400	0.0989**	0.0988***	0.0944**
	(0.0637)	(0.0643)	(0.0637)	(0.0390)	(0.0375)	(0.0390)
State employee	0.0451	0.0451	0.0440	0.0116	0.0166	0.0169
	(0.0320)	(0.0329)	(0.0324)	(0.0244)	(0.0236)	(0.0248)
Privatized apartment	0.0363	0.0369	0.0392	-0.00221	0.00299	0.00818
	(0.0350)	(0.0357)	(0.0355)	(0.0252)	(0.0255)	(0.0251)
Number of rooms	0.0357	0.0329	0.0350	0.00614	0.000613	0.00585
	(0.0253)	(0.0255)	(0.0255)	(0.0182)	(0.0178)	(0.0181)
Residents per room	0.0396	0.0391	0.0397	0.00593	0.00810	0.00474
	(0.0287)	(0.0287)	(0.0287)	(0.0172)	(0.0175)	(0.0173)
Wood window frames	-0.0133	-0.00489	-0.0117	-0.00248	0.00593	0.00309
	(0.0335)	(0.0345)	(0.0335)	(0.0222)	(0.0217)	(0.0220)
State managed building	0.312***	0.334***	0.333***	-0.0119	0.0209	0.0427
	(0.111)	(0.114)	(0.107)	(0.0749)	(0.0757)	(0.0318)
Privatized land	-0.0259	-0.0453	-0.0196	0.221***	0.215***	0.186**
	(0.0674)	(0.0796)	(0.0703)	(0.0717)	(0.0641)	(0.0746)
Unassigned land	0.0645	0.0579	0.0750	0.115**	0.102	0.170***
	(0.0518)	(0.0629)	(0.0549)	(0.0510)	(0.0620)	(0.0506)
Overall building condition	0.00155	0.00274	0.00195	-0.000918	0.000545	0.00137
	(0.00356)	(0.00366)	(0.00327)	(0.00189)	(0.00190)	(0.00131)
Building group FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	1155	1141	1155	1138	1124	1138
Adjusted R^2	0.0848	0.0888	0.0840	0.142	0.174	0.151

Note: OLS regressions. SEs are clustered at the building level. Column 1-3 DV is whether the individual voted in 2018 Mayoral elections. Column 4-6 DV is how often one discusses politics (0-1). * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

TABLE OA4. The effect of program inclusion on policy-specific interactions, vote in 2018 Mayoral elections, and discussion of politics: 95% confidence intervals and sensitivity analysis, controlling for overall building condition.

	Generic	Vote 2018
	(1)	(2)
ACME	0.105 (0.068 0.145)	0.024 (0.006 0.044)
Direct effect	0.011 (-0.117 0.117)	0.065 (-0.000 0.130)
Total effect	0.116 (-0.006 0.222)	0.065 (0.028 0.152)
ρ at which ACME=0	0.143	0.077

TABLE OA5. Interactions related to pension reform, controlling for overall building condition (0-excellent, 100-poor)

	(1)	(2)
May 2017 list	0.0305	0.577***
	(0.0536)	(0.205)
May 2017 × Apartments		-0.00633***
		(0.00220)
No of apartments		0.00393*
		(0.00223)
Male	-0.130**	-0.135**
	(0.0634)	(0.0642)
Age	0.00911***	0.00903***
	(0.00327)	(0.00325)
Higher education	-0.00775	-0.0169
	(0.0663)	(0.0667)
Income	0.253	0.263
	(0.209)	(0.207)
Years lived	0.00260	0.00251
	(0.00312)	(0.00306)
Retired	-0.430***	-0.438***
	(0.110)	(0.110)
State employee	0.00602	0.00313
	(0.0879)	(0.0897)
Privatized apartment	-0.104	-0.0818
	(0.0745)	(0.0759)
Number of rooms	0.0353	0.0300
	(0.0551)	(0.0545)
Residents per room	0.0348	0.0334
	(0.0525)	(0.0532)
Wood window frames	0.0569	0.0687
	(0.0736)	(0.0751)
State managed building	0.115	0.255
	(0.0878)	(0.159)
Privatized land	0.479	0.497*
	(0.326)	(0.290)
Unassigned land	0.369	0.455*
	(0.228)	(0.249)
Overall building condition	-0.00313	0.000272
	(0.00491)	(0.00514)
Building group FE	YES	YES
N	1146	1146
Adjusted R^2	0.123	0.128

Note: OLS regressions. SEs are clustered at the building level. DV is the index of interactions specific to pension reform. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

TABLE OA6. Components of the restricted policy-specific interactions index

	(1)
Signed a petition	0.399
Discussed in social networks	0.282
Discussed with neighbors	0.499
Met an elected deputy	0.490
Participated in an initiative group	0.522

Note: Values show factor loadings for the first principal component. Eigenvector for the first principal component is 2.346; 0.293 of variance is explained.

TABLE OA7. The effect of program inclusion on policy-specific interactions (restricted index), social capital, vote in 2018 Mayoral elections, and discussion of politics

	Policy		Generic	House	Vote 2018	Discuss pol
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
May 2017 list	0.435***	0.778***	0.0131	0.0288	0.0854***	-0.00213
	(0.0607)	(0.173)	(0.0660)	(0.0454)	(0.0265)	(0.0167)
May 2017 × Apartments		-0.00392**				
		(0.00183)				
Policy-specific interactions (2)			0.206***	0.146***	0.0354**	0.0646***
			(0.0384)	(0.0440)	(0.0167)	(0.0108)
Male	-0.127**	-0.130**	-0.0832	-0.0308	-0.0228	0.0548**
	(0.0571)	(0.0572)	(0.0590)	(0.0481)	(0.0292)	(0.0215)
Age	0.00270	0.00255	-0.00287	0.00293	0.00435***	0.00296***
	(0.00234)	(0.00233)	(0.00334)	(0.00281)	(0.00138)	(0.000980)
Higher education	0.0668	0.0598	-0.134**	0.0737	0.0383	-0.0166
	(0.0583)	(0.0586)	(0.0633)	(0.0634)	(0.0299)	(0.0210)
Income	0.0902	0.0834	0.314*	0.180	-0.0143	0.0947
	(0.179)	(0.177)	(0.186)	(0.163)	(0.0828)	(0.0627)
Years lived	0.00611***	0.00612***	0.00579**	0.00508**	0.000769	-0.00104
	(0.00232)	(0.00228)	(0.00257)	(0.00227)	(0.00108)	(0.000947)
Retired	0.0649	0.0592	0.118	-0.131	0.0444	0.0628*
	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.112)	(0.116)	(0.0592)	(0.0350)
State employee	-0.0260	-0.0242	-0.0358	-0.0247	0.0740**	0.0216
	(0.0647)	(0.0648)	(0.0686)	(0.0738)	(0.0319)	(0.0223)
Privatized apartment	-0.0158	-0.00393	0.0316	0.152***	0.0268	0.00818
	(0.0585)	(0.0582)	(0.0511)	(0.0566)	(0.0332)	(0.0241)
Number of rooms	0.0642	0.0598	0.0167	0.0114	0.0466**	0.0155
	(0.0492)	(0.0491)	(0.0497)	(0.0530)	(0.0230)	(0.0165)
Residents per room	-0.00149	-0.00194	0.00521	0.00880	0.0415	0.0192
	(0.0403)	(0.0400)	(0.0439)	(0.0472)	(0.0261)	(0.0164)
Wood window frames	-0.0977*	-0.0990*	-0.00503	0.0392	-0.00938	0.0107
	(0.0546)	(0.0550)	(0.0754)	(0.0570)	(0.0315)	(0.0205)
State managed building	-0.319*	-0.332*	-0.0418	-0.0606	0.142*	-0.0192
	(0.177)	(0.176)	(0.0837)	(0.0731)	(0.0838)	(0.0431)
Privatized land	0.357	0.324	-0.426**	0.558**	-0.0881	0.162***
	(0.309)	(0.306)	(0.184)	(0.237)	(0.0738)	(0.0613)
Unassigned land	0.266*	0.295**	0.132	0.258***	0.0217	0.0460
	(0.143)	(0.142)	(0.0881)	(0.0964)	(0.0564)	(0.0538)
Building group FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	1324	1324	1270	1324	1324	1301
Adjusted R^2	0.238	0.241	0.123	0.134	0.0853	0.147

Note: OLS regressions. SEs are clustered at the building level. Columns 1-2 DV is the index of policy-specific interactions. Column 3 DV is the index of generic social capital. Column 4 DV is the house-specific social capital index. Column 5 DV is whether the individual voted in 2018 Mayoral elections. Column 6 DV is how often one discusses politics (0-1).* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

TABLE OA8. The effect of program inclusion on policy-specific interactions (restricted index), social capital, vote in 2018 Mayoral elections, and discussion of politics: 95% confidence intervals and sensitivity analysis.

	Generic	House-specific	Vote 2018	Discuss politics
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ACME	0.089 (0.058 0.125)	0.060 (0.033 0.092)	0.014 (0.001 0.028)	0.028 (0.018 0.040)
Direct effect	0.014 (-0.090 0.129)	0.021 (-0.081 0.133)	0.086 (0.033 0.143)	-0.002 (-0.037 0.036)
Total effect	0.104 (-0.003 0.212)	0.082 (-0.020 0.188)	0.099 (0.047 0.154)	0.026 (-0.010 0.062)
ρ at which ACME=0	0.182	0.129	0.059	0.172

APPENDIX REFERENCES

Marques, Israel II and Alexei Zakharov. 2022. "Redistributive policy and redistribution preferences: The effects of Moscow redevelopment program." *Unpublished manuscript* .

URL: *https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract${}_i$d* = 4186325