

## A Appendix

### A.1 Reservation policy and balance tests

In municipal elections in 2017 one half of all municipal constituencies were reserved for women through an as-if random process, which very briefly put, involves reserving every 2nd constituency from a serially ordered list of municipal constituencies. Delhi has had five elections with the reservation policy in 1997, 2002, 2007, 2012, and 2017. 33% constituencies or seats were reserved for women until 2007, which was later expanded to 50% from 2012 and onwards. However, no electoral or spatial data is available for the elections and municipal boundaries prior to 2007. Using the official census data and reservation policy document, I could verify the process was followed. Furthermore, qualitative evidence for the probity of the randomization process comes from the fact that the each of these elections saw the reservation of the seats of several senior male and female senior politicians, which made headlines each electoral cycle.<sup>17</sup> Sitting councilors and party activists who lost their wards to reservation in 2012 took the process to Delhi High court and this process was verified in court to be free and fair from any tampering, irregularities or political bias.<sup>18</sup> Below, balance tests bolster support for the internal validity of this design. Note that past reservation status in 2007 does not predict reservations in 2012.

**TABLE A1. Balance test using administrative data**

	Dependent variable: Reserved for women in 2012								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	BJP wins	INC wins	Margin	N	Female cand	Female voters	Female turnout	Winner votes	Reserved 2012
Reserved 2012	-0.077 (0.059)	0.059 (0.052)	0.230 (1.268)	-0.587 (0.505)	0.014 (0.054)	-0.054 (0.330)	0.451 (0.985)	0.778 (1.303)	
Reserved 2007									0.022 (0.064)
N	272	272	272	272	272	272	255	272	272
Ajd. R-sqr	0.002	0.001	-0.004	0.001	-0.003	-0.004	-0.003	-0.002	-0.003

*Notes:* The table displays robust OLS estimates of reservation status in 2012 (1 if reserved for women, 0 otherwise) regressed on lagged independent variables measured in 2007. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* <0.10

<sup>17</sup>See “*Delhi MCD polls: Many senior municipal councilors lose seats post delimitation of wards, rejig of seats reserved for SC, women*”, The Hindustan Times March 06 2017.

<sup>18</sup>See “*HC upholds reservation of municipal seats by EC*”, The Hindustan Times March 01 2012.

**TABLE A2. Balance using survey data**

Variable	Reserved 2017 (1)	Non-Reserved 2017 (2)	Difference (1) - (2)	P-values T-test
Education	0.837	0.815	-0.021 (0.031)	0.488
Married	0.709	0.75	0.042 (0.027)	0.124
Age	36.946	36.103	-0.843 (0.958)	0.379
Born Delhi	0.534	0.52	-0.014 (0.046)	0.766
Employed	0.404	0.443	0.039 (0.036)	0.28
Parent	0.665	0.705	0.04* (0.023)	0.086
SC/ST	0.324	0.336	0.012 (0.066)	0.857
OBC	0.19	0.229	0.039 (0.05)	0.432
Muslim	0.151	0.163	0.011 (0.056)	0.843
Home-owner	0.803	0.81	0.007 (0.023)	0.758
Family size	5.593	5.767	0.175 (0.151)	0.248
Consumption items	0.063	0.055	-0.008 (0.108)	0.941
Enumerator gender	0.441	0.464	0.023 (0.018)	0.207

*Notes:* N = 1449 respondents in 17 clusters. Respondents with missing responses on any of the variables are dropped. Standard errors are clustered at the constituency level. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* <0.10

## A.2 Citizen survey: Sampling wards and survey sites

I explain the sampling procedure for selecting municipal constituencies / wards, for selecting survey sites within them and for sampling respondents within these sites. Municipal wards form the primary site where the survey was conducted. To arrive at the list of wards to include in the survey, three parliamentary constituencies in Delhi were selected. These are North West, North East and South Delhi. These are amongst the largest constituencies (by population) and have been selected to get a broad geographic and neighborhood representation of Delhi. In this selected sample of 3 PCs there


are 30 AC's from which 9 relatively wealthy ACs were excluded. This was done to avoid having an over-representation of wealthy population and neighborhood, as only 1-3% citizens of Delhi live in such neighborhoods.

Municipal wards were selected via a three step process, which is as follows: (1) three national level constituencies of North West, North East and South Delhi were purposively selected to maximize geographic variation. (2) Each of these 3 three national constituencies contains, 30 state level constituencies. To avoid oversampling wealthy and high-income areas, the sample was restricted to 21 state-level constituencies. (3) municipal wards were randomly selected such that each ward is from a different state-level constituency, blocked on reservation status, such that 9 of the municipal constituency that were selected were reserved for women and the rest 8 wards were non-reserved wards as per 2017 reservation status. Within each ward, three neighborhoods (survey sites), which are a cluster of serially ordered polling stations, were randomly sampled from the most recent voter list of the 2017 municipal elections. I describe the details below.

Each AC in Delhi is further subdivided into an average of 4 municipal constituencies. The sample of 21 ACs has 95 municipal wards. Out of these 95 wards, 45 wards are general and 50 wards are reserved for women. From this sample of AC-Wards, I randomly select 17 AC-ward combination such that I first select 9 wards reserved for women and 8 for general. The next step was to select three survey sites or neighborhoods per ward to conduct the interview. Within each ward, three enumeration blocks or neighborhoods (survey sites), which are a cluster of serially ordered polling stations, were randomly sampled from the most recent voter list of the 2017 municipal elections.

To ensure that the enumeration blocks or neighborhoods selected were geographically dispersed, each ward was divided into blocks of 1500 households, and one block of 1500 HHs was randomly selected such that each household within the ward had an equal chance of being selected into the survey. That is, probability proportional to the size of the block as measured by the number of households in the block. On average, each ward was divided into 11 blocks and had approx. 18050 individual households as identified by unique house numbers. The next two blocks for two other teams were selected such that there was a gap of 3000 HHs between blocks to ensure geographical dispersion. For example, if a ward had ten blocks, and the first block was randomly selected. Then the fourth and

seventh blocks were selected. Figure A1 shows the three neighborhoods visited in one of the sampled wards, called *Holambi Khurd*.



Each day one ward was visited by the survey team in three sub-teams to conduct interviews in the three respective neighborhoods within the ward. The respective field supervisor of the sub-team assigned each enumerator one polling station and the entire list of polling stations was attempted serial wise by the team until the end of the working day. Polling stations that were far off from the dominant cluster were de-prioritized or not attempted for practical concerns.

Enumerators were instructed to knock at every 3rd household on the street in the polling stations allotted by their field supervisors. Every person who agreed to be interviewed was eligible to be interviewed, if they were at least 18 years of age, had a mobile phone, were in Delhi over next 3 weeks and had lived in Delhi for at least 3 years. The team of 15 enumerators attempted a total of 4910 door knocks and interviewed 1664 respondents which gives a response rate of 34%. 18% door knocks were un-answered, and of the remaining 82% knocks that were answered - 60% were answered by females and 40% by male and 8.5% were answered by children. 48% of adults that answered the door agreed to be interviewed. The most common reason for refusal was that the respondent was busy (71%) followed

by not interested in answering surveys (21%).

### **A.2.1 Principles and guidance for human subjects research**

This section outline briefly how the data collection met the principles and guidance for human subjects research. The survey was part of the baseline survey of a field experiment. For this project, we trained the enumerators to explain the purpose of the research, the source, and nature of the funding, professional affiliation, and to share with respondents that the study was reviewed by academic ethic review boards. The study did not use any deception or involve any harm or trauma, did not interfere with any political or electoral processes, nor did it violate any other exception outlined in the general principles in human subject research. The data collection was not conducted close to or during any elections.


The survey enumerators were professionals who worked in a reputed survey firm. Additionally, we trained them to take oral consent from the participants in the local language before they began the interview. Research assistants accompanied enumerators throughout the survey and random subsamples of the interview were audited to ensure that the enumerators followed the guidelines. The interviews were roughly 25-40 minutes long and the participants were made aware of the time, effort, and risk involved in participating - which was low. Respondents were also informed that the data will be stored in compliance with the legal requirements of the academic board and the host countries, and that only anonymous data will be shared publicly. All respondents were adults (over 18 years of age) and understood that they could refuse participation and request to delete their data at a later stage should they choose to do so, and without giving any reason. Respondents were given printed consent material and contact sheets and compensated with INR 100 for participation in the interview, which comes close to the minimum hourly wage in Delhi, and therefore, is reasonable for the given context and the time burden. This remuneration was shared in special envelopes that had the printed logo and image of the academic university to reinforce that the research was conducted by academics and not by others such as, journalists or political parties.

### **A.3 Declining public support for gender egalitarianism in India**

The below figure plots the public gender egalitarianism index from Woo et al. (2022). India occupies a spot amongst the bottom 30 countries on the measure of public support for gender equality and this

support has also declined in India in the last three decades.


**FIGURE A2. Declining support for gender egalitarianism in India**



#### A.4 Descriptive representation and political participation: Mechanisms

Figure A3 sketches two sub-mechanisms that are discussed in the paper and shows that the effects of descriptive representation may not always move in the positive direction, especially in settings with weak or declining public support for gender egalitarianism.

**FIGURE A3. Descriptive representation to political participation**



#### A.5 Main results: Robustness checks

##### A.5.1 Covariate adjusted results

Table A13 and Table A4 replicates Table 2 and Table 3 in the manuscript. Both covariate adjusted results control for education measured as a dummy indicating 1 if the respondent has at least matric/10th class education level), age in years, employment which is measured as dummy indicating 1 if

the respondent has a job, marital status which is measured as dummy indicating 1 if the respondent has ever married, whether respondent is born in Delhi, number of children, caste / religion measured as whether respondent is Forward caste (baseline) ,SC/ST, OBC or Muslim, and dummy for house ownership. In all tables in the appendix, standard errors are clustered at the constituency level. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* <0.10

**TABLE A3. Women party activists are more likely to contact citizens in reserved seats**

	Contact by women activists		Contact by men activists		Contact by mixed group	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Reserved	0.101***	0.101***	-0.126***	-0.151***	0.033	0.017
2017	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.031)
Woman	0.005	0.005	0.003	0.005	0.101***	0.100***
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.034)
Interaction		-0.000		0.052*		0.035
		(0.031)		(0.028)		(0.047)
At least 10th class edu.		0.015		-0.127***		0.009
		(0.018)		(0.022)		(0.042)
Ever married	-0.022	-0.018	0.032	0.006	0.032	0.037
	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.032)	(0.036)
Age	-0.014	-0.017	-0.005	0.012	-0.135**	-0.141**
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.059)	(0.058)
Born in Delhi	0.001	0.001*	0.001	-0.000	0.004***	0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Employed	0.029	0.029	-0.035**	-0.033**	-0.042*	-0.042*
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Has child	0.004	0.012	0.033*	-0.016	0.060***	0.076***
	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.024)
OBC	0.014	0.012	-0.007	0.008	0.062	0.057
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.053)	(0.054)
SC/ST	-0.025**	-0.025**	-0.024	-0.023	0.057**	0.058**
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Muslim	-0.016	-0.016	-0.054**	-0.057**	0.123***	0.125***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Own House	-0.005	-0.005	-0.004	-0.004	-0.035	-0.035
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Constant	0.023	0.008	0.201***	0.313***	0.060	0.040
	(0.042)	(0.055)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.072)	(0.077)
Pvalues refer to	Reservation	Interaction	Reservation	Interaction	Reservation	Interaction
Wild bootstrap	0	0.993	0.001	0.112	0.304	0.493
RI p-values	0	0.724	0	0.063	0.27	0.531
N	1,466	1,466	1,466	1,466	1,466	1,466
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.023	0.022	0.033	0.046	0.040	0.040

**TABLE A4. Women are more likely to be contacted in reserved constituencies**

	The outcome is any partisan contact			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Reserved 2017	-0.003 (0.027)	0.013 (0.025)	-0.039* (0.021)	-0.028 (0.022)
Women respondent			-0.157*** (0.028)	-0.111*** (0.031)
Reserved 2017 * Women respondent			0.077** (0.037)	0.085* (0.044)
At least 10th class educated		0.044 (0.031)		0.025 (0.028)
Ever married		-0.158*** (0.060)		-0.147** (0.063)
Age		0.006*** (0.001)		0.006*** (0.001)
Born in Delhi		-0.052 (0.035)		-0.049 (0.034)
Employed		0.094*** (0.019)		0.064*** (0.022)
Has child		0.066 (0.046)		0.076* (0.045)
OBC		0.004 (0.033)		0.005 (0.033)
SC/ST		0.049 (0.034)		0.047 (0.033)
Muslim		-0.051 (0.036)		-0.050 (0.036)
Own House		0.098** (0.043)		0.099** (0.044)
Constant	0.597*** (0.022)	0.311*** (0.054)	0.673*** (0.017)	0.395*** (0.046)
Below p-values refer to	Reserved 2017	Reserved 2017	Interaction	Interaction
Wild bootstrap p-values	0.927	0.651	0.064	0.079
RI p-values	0.907	0.655	0.061	0.077
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	-0.001	0.047	0.014	0.051
N	1,601	1,466	1,601	1,466



## A.5.2 Tables for coefficient plots and matching estimations

This section provides the tabular results for Figure 2. Column 3 of each table from Table A5 to Table A10 provides the point estimate for the corresponding dot on the coefficient plot. Column 4 and 5 present two types of matching estimates, Mahalanobis matching and propensity score matching for each model.

	Dependent variable is political knowledge index									
	Reserved constituencies					Non-reserved constituencies				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Any contact	0.092*** (0.023)	0.088*** (0.025)	0.119*** (0.026)	0.101*** (0.030)	0.125*** (0.027)	0.047** (0.022)	0.039 (0.024)	0.020 (0.026)	0.007 (0.028)	0.024 (0.027)
At least 10th class educated		0.066** (0.031)	0.080*** (0.030)	0.098*** (0.034)	0.089*** (0.032)		0.095*** (0.030)	0.106*** (0.031)	0.116*** (0.032)	0.118*** (0.032)
Ever married		-0.016 (0.068)	-0.018 (0.066)	-0.006 (0.072)	-0.014 (0.069)		0.072 (0.068)	0.077 (0.069)	0.115 (0.075)	0.087 (0.070)
Age		0.002* (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.003** (0.002)	0.003* (0.001)		0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Born in Delhi		0.052* (0.027)	0.053** (0.027)	0.063** (0.030)	0.061** (0.028)		-0.027 (0.028)	-0.039 (0.028)	-0.045 (0.030)	-0.048 (0.030)
Employed		0.048 (0.037)	0.052 (0.036)	0.031 (0.042)	0.047 (0.037)		0.017 (0.031)	0.019 (0.032)	0.001 (0.033)	0.009 (0.033)
Has child		0.034 (0.066)	0.027 (0.063)	0.024 (0.069)	0.028 (0.066)		-0.119* (0.065)	-0.128* (0.066)	-0.155** (0.071)	-0.128* (0.067)
OBC		0.016 (0.033)	-0.003 (0.031)	0.018 (0.036)	0.011 (0.032)		0.043 (0.030)	0.053* (0.031)	0.034 (0.034)	0.051 (0.033)
SC/ST		-0.037 (0.033)	-0.026 (0.034)	-0.023 (0.038)	-0.031 (0.036)		-0.034 (0.030)	-0.020 (0.034)	-0.002 (0.036)	-0.011 (0.036)
Muslim		0.015 (0.036)	0.058 (0.036)	0.086** (0.040)	0.069* (0.038)		-0.057 (0.036)	-0.052 (0.037)	-0.028 (0.040)	-0.040 (0.040)
Own House		0.009 (0.039)	0.011 (0.042)	-0.000 (0.049)	0.013 (0.044)		-0.018 (0.037)	-0.044 (0.040)	-0.032 (0.041)	-0.041 (0.041)
Constant	0.098*** (0.017)	-0.077 (0.065)	0.080 (0.088)	0.018 (0.095)	0.030 (0.091)	0.082*** (0.016)	-0.003 (0.062)	-0.017 (0.090)	-0.023 (0.097)	-0.022 (0.098)
Estimation	Base	Controls	Controls+FE	Mahalanobis	Full PSM	Base	Controls	Controls+FE	Mahalanobis	Full PSM
N	412	377	377	314	354	361	329	329	286	302
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.034	0.056	0.202	0.206	0.216	0.010	0.046	0.082	0.082	0.079

**TABLE A6. Women respondents: Dependent variable is voted in 2017 elections**

	Dependent variable is voted in 2017 elections									
	Reserved constituencies					Non-reserved constituencies				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Any contact	0.158*** (0.048)	0.122*** (0.043)	0.134*** (0.046)	0.103* (0.055)	0.119** (0.048)	0.193*** (0.049)	0.120** (0.049)	0.079 (0.051)	0.060 (0.057)	0.077 (0.054)
At least 10th class educated		0.158*** (0.053)	0.109** (0.055)	0.124** (0.063)	0.091 (0.058)		-0.026 (0.059)	-0.032 (0.061)	0.010 (0.066)	0.000 (0.064)
Ever married		-0.014 (0.116)	-0.052 (0.118)	-0.126 (0.133)	-0.062 (0.124)		0.181 (0.134)	0.202 (0.137)	0.111 (0.153)	0.166 (0.139)
Age		0.020*** (0.002)	0.019*** (0.002)	0.020*** (0.003)	0.019*** (0.003)		0.011*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)
Born in Delhi		0.025 (0.047)	0.030 (0.049)	0.030 (0.056)	0.038 (0.051)		-0.004 (0.055)	-0.012 (0.056)	0.004 (0.061)	-0.005 (0.059)
Employed		0.147** (0.064)	0.154** (0.065)	0.138* (0.077)	0.156** (0.066)		0.023 (0.061)	0.009 (0.063)	-0.011 (0.068)	-0.000 (0.066)
Has child		0.178 (0.112)	0.222* (0.115)	0.289** (0.127)	0.240** (0.119)		0.014 (0.128)	0.035 (0.131)	0.126 (0.145)	0.048 (0.132)
OBC		0.118** (0.056)	0.122** (0.056)	0.132** (0.065)	0.131** (0.058)		0.128** (0.061)	0.134** (0.063)	0.151** (0.070)	0.157** (0.066)
SC/ST		0.017 (0.056)	0.045 (0.062)	0.066 (0.070)	0.059 (0.065)		0.054 (0.059)	0.034 (0.067)	0.006 (0.073)	0.032 (0.071)
Muslim		0.018 (0.062)	0.031 (0.065)	0.065 (0.073)	0.037 (0.068)		-0.002 (0.072)	0.013 (0.075)	-0.018 (0.082)	-0.015 (0.079)
Own House		-0.042 (0.066)	-0.079 (0.076)	-0.061 (0.089)	-0.062 (0.079)		0.165** (0.074)	0.204** (0.080)	0.182** (0.084)	0.198** (0.082)
Constant	0.544*** (0.035)	-0.481*** (0.111)	-0.500*** (0.159)	-0.546*** (0.174)	-0.497*** (0.164)	0.562*** (0.036)	-0.079 (0.124)	0.059 (0.180)	-0.024 (0.198)	-0.028 (0.194)
Estimation	Base	Controls	Controls+FE	Mahalanobis	Full PSM	Base	Controls	Controls+FE	Mahalanobis	Full PSM
N	407	373	373	314	354	353	323	323	286	302
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.024	0.301	0.333	0.312	0.322	0.039	0.207	0.225	0.209	0.206

**TABLE A7. Women respondents: Dependent variable is non-electoral participation index**

	Dependent variable is non-electoral participation index									
	Reserved constituencies					Non-reserved constituencies				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Any contact	0.050*** (0.015)	0.045*** (0.016)	0.059*** (0.018)	0.062*** (0.019)	0.067*** (0.018)	0.072*** (0.016)	0.065*** (0.017)	0.058*** (0.018)	0.058*** (0.020)	0.063*** (0.019)
At least 10th class educated		0.049** (0.020)	0.056*** (0.021)	0.032 (0.022)	0.052** (0.022)		0.045** (0.021)	0.045** (0.022)	0.042* (0.022)	0.048** (0.023)
Ever married		-0.023 (0.043)	-0.014 (0.045)	-0.010 (0.047)	-0.008 (0.047)		-0.087* (0.047)	-0.093* (0.049)	-0.116** (0.052)	-0.097* (0.049)
Age		0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)		0.002* (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)
Born in Delhi		0.003 (0.017)	0.002 (0.018)	0.013 (0.020)	0.012 (0.019)		-0.018 (0.019)	-0.018 (0.020)	-0.031 (0.021)	-0.037* (0.021)
Employed		0.111*** (0.024)	0.103*** (0.025)	0.103*** (0.027)	0.098*** (0.025)		0.011 (0.021)	-0.003 (0.022)	-0.030 (0.023)	-0.013 (0.023)
Has child		0.024 (0.042)	0.009 (0.043)	0.010 (0.045)	0.007 (0.045)		0.035 (0.045)	0.024 (0.047)	0.035 (0.050)	0.023 (0.047)
OBC		-0.005 (0.021)	-0.018 (0.021)	-0.007 (0.023)	-0.018 (0.022)		0.011 (0.021)	0.005 (0.022)	0.000 (0.024)	0.005 (0.023)
SC/ST		-0.002 (0.021)	-0.008 (0.024)	-0.034 (0.025)	-0.018 (0.025)		0.014 (0.021)	0.041* (0.024)	0.035 (0.025)	0.046* (0.025)
Muslim		0.000 (0.023)	0.010 (0.025)	-0.004 (0.026)	0.016 (0.026)		0.012 (0.025)	0.018 (0.026)	0.021 (0.028)	0.023 (0.028)
Own House		-0.003 (0.025)	-0.006 (0.028)	-0.033 (0.032)	-0.018 (0.030)		0.018 (0.026)	0.006 (0.028)	0.001 (0.029)	0.012 (0.029)
Constant	0.065*** (0.011)	-0.067 (0.041)	-0.004 (0.060)	0.031 (0.062)	-0.006 (0.062)	0.066*** (0.011)	0.015 (0.043)	0.001 (0.064)	0.025 (0.068)	0.004 (0.069)
Estimation	Base	Controls	Controls+FE	Mahalanobis	Full PSM	Base	Controls	Controls+FE	Mahalanobis	Full PSM
N	412	377	377	314	354	361	329	329	286	302
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.024	0.099	0.112	0.089	0.117	0.054	0.057	0.063	0.099	0.083

**TABLE A8. Men respondents: Dependent variable is political knowledge index**

	Dependent variable is political knowledge index									
	Reserved constituencies					Non-reserved constituencies				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Any contact	0.201*** (0.028)	0.173*** (0.031)	0.158*** (0.031)	0.147*** (0.040)	0.161*** (0.032)	0.145*** (0.032)	0.140*** (0.034)	0.120*** (0.034)	0.138*** (0.049)	0.124*** (0.035)
At least 10th class educated		0.062 (0.046)	0.054 (0.046)	0.119* (0.063)	0.059 (0.049)		0.051 (0.064)	0.060 (0.066)	0.008 (0.079)	0.030 (0.068)
Ever married		0.041 (0.071)	0.090 (0.069)	0.112 (0.086)	0.084 (0.072)		-0.086 (0.080)	-0.087 (0.081)	-0.087 (0.095)	-0.050 (0.089)
Age		0.002* (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.003** (0.002)	0.003** (0.001)		-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)
Born in Delhi		0.031 (0.034)	0.057* (0.033)	0.102** (0.042)	0.056 (0.035)		0.006 (0.038)	-0.013 (0.039)	0.083* (0.048)	0.007 (0.040)
Employed		0.028 (0.035)	0.030 (0.034)	0.064 (0.044)	0.029 (0.036)		-0.018 (0.037)	-0.024 (0.036)	-0.059 (0.045)	-0.038 (0.037)
Has child		-0.001 (0.069)	-0.042 (0.066)	-0.043 (0.081)	-0.041 (0.069)		0.125 (0.076)	0.143* (0.075)	0.131 (0.085)	0.097 (0.082)
OBC		0.070* (0.039)	0.062 (0.040)	0.044 (0.049)	0.056 (0.042)		0.114*** (0.042)	0.106** (0.042)	0.118** (0.052)	0.100** (0.043)
SC/ST		-0.081** (0.039)	-0.065 (0.040)	-0.080 (0.049)	-0.069* (0.041)		-0.015 (0.039)	0.007 (0.040)	0.079* (0.048)	0.005 (0.040)
Muslim		-0.075* (0.040)	-0.022 (0.040)	-0.070 (0.052)	-0.025 (0.042)		0.017 (0.044)	0.028 (0.044)	0.027 (0.056)	0.023 (0.045)
Own House		0.028 (0.047)	0.007 (0.047)	-0.044 (0.062)	0.003 (0.048)		0.087* (0.049)	0.064 (0.053)	0.050 (0.066)	0.057 (0.053)
Constant	0.214*** (0.023)	0.022 (0.074)	0.057 (0.106)	-0.048 (0.127)	0.068 (0.110)	0.284*** (0.026)	0.168* (0.095)	0.326** (0.126)	0.159 (0.146)	0.305** (0.131)
Estimation	Base	Controls	Controls+FE	Mahalanobis	Full PSM	Base	Controls	Controls+FE	Mahalanobis	Full PSM
N	434	399	399	262	382	394	361	361	218	345
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.101	0.122	0.235	0.187	0.221	0.049	0.057	0.133	0.201	0.122

**TABLE A9. Men respondents: Dependent variable is voted in 2017 elections**

	Dependent variable is voted in 2017 elections									
	Reserved constituencies					Non-reserved constituencies				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Any contact	0.256*** (0.045)	0.153*** (0.042)	0.147*** (0.043)	0.162*** (0.056)	0.141*** (0.044)	0.271*** (0.046)	0.176*** (0.044)	0.175*** (0.047)	0.125* (0.071)	0.176*** (0.047)
At least 10th class educated		0.081 (0.063)	0.026 (0.065)	0.053 (0.088)	0.015 (0.069)		0.072 (0.084)	0.097 (0.090)	0.049 (0.115)	0.105 (0.091)
Ever married		0.158 (0.097)	0.167* (0.096)	0.323*** (0.121)	0.192* (0.099)		-0.046 (0.103)	-0.084 (0.109)	0.049 (0.138)	-0.069 (0.120)
Age		0.011*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)		0.008*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.003)	0.008*** (0.002)
Born in Delhi		0.124*** (0.046)	0.105** (0.047)	0.172*** (0.059)	0.096** (0.048)		0.058 (0.049)	0.065 (0.054)	0.065 (0.070)	0.053 (0.054)
Employed		0.206*** (0.048)	0.235*** (0.048)	0.261*** (0.061)	0.230*** (0.050)		0.159*** (0.047)	0.164*** (0.049)	0.181*** (0.065)	0.177*** (0.050)
Has child		-0.044 (0.094)	-0.058 (0.093)	-0.224** (0.113)	-0.080 (0.095)		0.184* (0.098)	0.222* (0.102)	0.166 (0.124)	0.199* (0.110)
OBC		0.144*** (0.054)	0.191*** (0.056)	0.218*** (0.068)	0.203*** (0.058)		0.132** (0.055)	0.140** (0.058)	0.259*** (0.076)	0.130** (0.058)
SC/ST		0.015 (0.053)	0.013 (0.056)	-0.021 (0.068)	0.010 (0.058)		-0.072 (0.050)	-0.073 (0.054)	-0.093 (0.069)	-0.070 (0.054)
Muslim		-0.089 (0.055)	-0.066 (0.056)	-0.116 (0.072)	-0.055 (0.058)		-0.092 (0.057)	-0.056 (0.060)	-0.072 (0.082)	-0.040 (0.061)
Own House		0.103 (0.064)	0.077 (0.066)	0.108 (0.086)	0.078 (0.067)		0.054 (0.063)	0.045 (0.071)	0.093 (0.096)	0.050 (0.072)
Constant	0.522*** (0.036)	-0.310*** (0.101)	-0.460*** (0.149)	-0.657*** (0.177)	-0.438*** (0.153)	0.548*** (0.038)	-0.026 (0.124)	0.000 (0.172)	-0.090 (0.212)	-0.024 (0.176)
Estimation	Base	Controls	Controls+FE	Mahalanobis	Full PSM	Base	Controls	Controls+FE	Mahalanobis	Full PSM
N	432	398	398	262	382	390	358	358	218	345
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.068	0.290	0.345	0.413	0.329	0.079	0.261	0.246	0.309	0.246

**TABLE A10. Men respondents: Dependent variable is non-electoral participation index**

	Dependent variable is non-electoral participation index									
	Reserved constituencies					Non-reserved constituencies				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Any contact	0.083*** (0.021)	0.065*** (0.023)	0.062** (0.025)	0.081** (0.033)	0.062** (0.025)	0.137*** (0.025)	0.141*** (0.027)	0.127*** (0.029)	0.074* (0.038)	0.128*** (0.030)
At least 10th class educated		0.070** (0.035)	0.059 (0.037)	0.053 (0.052)	0.053 (0.040)		0.071 (0.051)	0.054 (0.055)	0.074 (0.061)	0.040 (0.058)
Ever married		-0.006 (0.053)	0.002 (0.055)	-0.023 (0.071)	0.009 (0.057)		-0.048 (0.064)	-0.030 (0.068)	-0.100 (0.073)	-0.038 (0.077)
Age		0.002** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)		-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.001)
Born in Delhi		0.059** (0.025)	0.066** (0.027)	0.090** (0.035)	0.060** (0.028)		-0.049 (0.030)	-0.049 (0.033)	-0.009 (0.037)	-0.051 (0.034)
Employed		0.025 (0.026)	0.041 (0.028)	0.041 (0.036)	0.040 (0.029)		-0.008 (0.029)	-0.015 (0.030)	0.045 (0.035)	-0.014 (0.032)
Has child		-0.014 (0.052)	-0.030 (0.053)	0.003 (0.067)	-0.026 (0.055)		0.046 (0.060)	0.044 (0.063)	0.071 (0.066)	0.048 (0.070)
OBC		0.053* (0.030)	0.064** (0.032)	0.051 (0.040)	0.080** (0.033)		0.100*** (0.034)	0.107*** (0.036)	0.030 (0.040)	0.108*** (0.037)
SC/ST		0.018 (0.029)	0.027 (0.032)	0.025 (0.040)	0.031 (0.033)		0.011 (0.031)	0.019 (0.033)	0.093** (0.037)	0.016 (0.035)
Muslim		0.048 (0.030)	0.071** (0.032)	0.031 (0.043)	0.071** (0.033)		0.019 (0.035)	0.015 (0.037)	0.063 (0.043)	0.111 (0.039)
Own House		0.043 (0.035)	0.054 (0.038)	0.003 (0.051)	0.052 (0.039)		0.069* (0.039)	0.066 (0.044)	0.118** (0.051)	0.072 (0.046)
Constant	0.140*** (0.017)	-0.089 (0.056)	-0.073 (0.085)	-0.091 (0.105)	-0.080 (0.088)	0.133*** (0.021)	0.067 (0.076)	0.028 (0.106)	-0.107 (0.113)	0.019 (0.112)
N	434	399	399	262	382	394	361	361	218	345
Estimation	Base	Controls	Controls+FE	Mahalanobis	Full PSM	Base	Controls	Controls+FE	Mahalanobis	Full PSM
N	434	399	399	262	382	394	361	361	218	345
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.032	0.073	0.076	0.055	0.079	0.067	0.082	0.059	0.076	0.054

## A.6 Additional results: By gender of the party activist

Dependent Variable	Reserved constituencies			Non-reserved constituencies		
	Political Knowledge index	Voting in local election	Non-electoral participation index	Political Knowledge index	Voting in local election	Non-electoral participation index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Woman activist contact (ref male activist)	-0.039 (0.057)	0.044 (0.103)	-0.072* (0.039)	0.060 (0.059)	-0.054 (0.118)	0.007 (0.042)
Mixed group contact	-0.092* (0.052)	-0.020 (0.094)	-0.107*** (0.035)	-0.038 (0.042)	0.075 (0.084)	0.025 (0.029)
No contact	-0.186*** (0.052)	-0.133 (0.094)	-0.143*** (0.035)	-0.037 (0.038)	-0.042 (0.077)	-0.047* (0.027)
At least 10th class educated	0.082*** (0.031)	0.105* (0.056)	0.055*** (0.021)	0.110*** (0.031)	-0.035 (0.062)	0.049** (0.022)
Ever married	-0.018 (0.066)	-0.046 (0.119)	-0.015 (0.045)	0.069 (0.069)	0.206 (0.138)	-0.094* (0.049)
Age	0.002 (0.001)	0.019*** (0.002)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.002** (0.001)
Born in Delhi	0.052* (0.028)	0.030 (0.050)	0.009 (0.019)	-0.043 (0.028)	-0.005 (0.057)	-0.019 (0.020)
Employed	0.060* (0.036)	0.155** (0.066)	0.106*** (0.025)	0.014 (0.032)	0.012 (0.064)	-0.005 (0.022)
Has child	0.032 (0.064)	0.223* (0.116)	0.015 (0.043)	-0.123* (0.066)	0.029 (0.132)	0.025 (0.047)
OBC	0.005 (0.032)	0.128** (0.057)	-0.013 (0.021)	0.046 (0.032)	0.141** (0.064)	0.003 (0.022)
SC/ST	-0.026 (0.035)	0.043 (0.063)	-0.013 (0.024)	-0.012 (0.034)	0.017 (0.069)	0.040* (0.024)
Muslim	0.063* (0.037)	0.039 (0.066)	0.007 (0.025)	-0.047 (0.038)	-0.001 (0.077)	0.018 (0.027)
Own House	0.018 (0.043)	-0.076 (0.078)	-0.023 (0.029)	-0.038 (0.041)	0.183** (0.083)	-0.003 (0.029)
Constant	0.249** (0.097)	-0.358** (0.175)	0.123* (0.066)	0.034 (0.092)	0.093 (0.186)	0.063 (0.065)
Constituency Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	371	368	371	325	319	325
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.208	0.328	0.131	0.092	0.217	0.072

**TABLE A12. Results for men respondents**

Dependent Variable	Reserved constituencies			Non-reserved constituencies		
	Political Knowledge index	Voting in local election	Non-electoral participation index	Political Knowledge index	Voting in local election	Non-electoral participation index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Woman activist contact (ref male activist)	0.019 (0.053)	0.043 (0.074)	0.013 (0.043)	0.051 (0.076)	0.164 (0.102)	0.011 (0.064)
Mixed group contact	-0.022 (0.047)	-0.080 (0.065)	-0.008 (0.038)	0.034 (0.041)	0.064 (0.056)	0.021 (0.035)
No contact	-0.170*** (0.047)	-0.185*** (0.066)	-0.065* (0.038)	-0.104** (0.041)	-0.141** (0.056)	-0.117*** (0.035)
At least 10th class educated	0.058 (0.047)	0.036 (0.066)	0.059 (0.038)	0.036 (0.067)	0.110 (0.091)	0.046 (0.057)
Ever married	0.078 (0.069)	0.152 (0.096)	-0.001 (0.056)	-0.065 (0.083)	-0.037 (0.112)	-0.039 (0.070)
Age	0.003** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.002* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.001)
Born in Delhi	0.058* (0.034)	0.107** (0.048)	0.062** (0.028)	-0.005 (0.039)	0.058 (0.053)	-0.049 (0.034)
Employed	0.032 (0.035)	0.250*** (0.049)	0.038 (0.028)	-0.034 (0.037)	0.168*** (0.050)	-0.020 (0.031)
Has child	-0.037 (0.067)	-0.059 (0.093)	-0.027 (0.054)	0.130* (0.077)	0.184* (0.104)	0.056 (0.066)
OBC	0.061 (0.041)	0.194*** (0.057)	0.071** (0.033)	0.104** (0.043)	0.125** (0.058)	0.102*** (0.036)
SC/ST	-0.069* (0.041)	0.004 (0.057)	0.021 (0.033)	-0.000 (0.040)	-0.072 (0.054)	0.013 (0.034)
Muslim	-0.028 (0.041)	-0.058 (0.057)	0.068** (0.033)	0.010 (0.045)	-0.055 (0.061)	0.011 (0.038)
Own House	-0.000 (0.048)	0.075 (0.067)	0.048 (0.039)	0.062 (0.053)	0.056 (0.071)	0.069 (0.045)
Constant	0.230** (0.110)	-0.295* (0.154)	-0.004 (0.089)	0.451*** (0.130)	0.133 (0.176)	0.159 (0.110)
Constituency Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	391	390	391	355	352	355
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.237	0.344	0.071	0.136	0.256	0.054

### A.6.1 Measurement concerns

Like all self-reported survey measures, the party activist measure may suffer from measurement bias. However, several reasons allay these concerns. These concerns were addressed at the survey design stage. The survey was designed as a generic survey asking about all political levels: state, central, and municipal; it is not a survey about gender or party activists. Consequently, this question does not stand out or provoke social desirability. The survey was conducted much after elections and citizens have no incentive to lie or to be dishonest. Furthermore, political participation questions were asked as part of first round of demographics early in the survey 10-15 minutes ahead of partisan contact questions, and knowledge questions were asked as a large battery of questions. This survey design makes it less likely that prior responses are salient to respondents when answering questions about partisan contact.

With regard to potential for a gendered bias in recall, there may be measurement errors, but assuming that men's or women's propensity to remember is not affected by the treatment, there is little scope for bias. This assumption is reasonable as most citizens do not know their representative, do not know gender reservations exist, and few know the reservation status of their constituency. Furthermore, restricting the analysis to the sub-sample of respondents who do not know their representative—therefore unaffected by this bias—does not change the results. Table A13 replicates Table 2 and Table A14 presents co-variate adjusted results in this subsample.

	Contact by women activists		Contact by men activists		Contact by mixed group	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Reserved	0.070***	0.055***	-0.097***	-0.136***	0.019	0.032
2017	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.040)	(0.021)
Woman		-0.007		-0.110***		0.016
respondent		(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.014)
Interaction		0.026		0.065**		-0.024
		(0.030)		(0.030)		(0.030)
Constant	0.059***	0.064***	0.174***	0.237***	0.289***	0.280***
	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.016)	(0.031)	(0.016)
P-values for	Reservation	Interaction	Reservation	Interaction	Reservation	Interaction
Wild bootstrap	0	0.459	0.002	0.132	0.672	0.649
RI p-values	0	0.466	0.003	0.107	0.657	0.661
N	1,217	1,217	1,217	1,217	1,217	1,217
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.013	0.012	0.021	0.034	-0.000	-0.002

**TABLE A14. Women party activists are more likely to contact citizens in reserved seats**

	Contact by women activists		Contact by men activists		Contact by mixed group	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Reserved	0.083***	0.070***	-0.100***	-0.128***	0.019
2017	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Woman		0.007		-0.121***		0.052
		(0.016)		(0.033)		(0.046)
At least 10th	-0.015	-0.011	0.015	-0.010	0.023	0.037
class educated	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.036)
Ever married	-0.015	-0.019	-0.013	-0.002	-0.126*	-0.134**
	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.067)	(0.067)
Age	0.001	0.001	-0.000	-0.001	0.005***	0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Born in Delhi	0.025	0.025	-0.038**	-0.034*	-0.043*	-0.044*
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Employed	-0.001	0.011	0.046**	-0.004	0.015	0.046
	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.030)
Has child	0.025	0.022	0.024	0.043	0.037	0.027
	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.056)	(0.056)
OBC	-0.038**	-0.037**	-0.021	-0.021	0.085***	0.086***
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.030)
SC/ST	-0.023	-0.021	-0.050**	-0.052***	0.166***	0.168***
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Muslim	-0.012	-0.012	-0.018	-0.016	-0.011	-0.012
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Own House	0.011	0.009	0.004	0.009	0.097***	0.094***
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Interaction		0.024		0.042		0.009
		(0.030)		(0.044)		(0.054)
Constant	0.037	0.022	0.200***	0.315***	0.043	-0.014
	(0.049)	(0.054)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.080)	(0.083)
Pvalues refer to	Reserved	Interaction	Reserved	Interaction	Reserved	Interaction
Wild bootstrap	0.001	0.517	0.004	0.39	0.628	0.88
RI p-values	0	0.533	0.003	0.325	0.653	0.865
N	1,094	1,094	1,094	1,094	1,094	1,094
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.013	0.012	0.022	0.034	0.047	0.047



## A.7 Additional results: Reduced-form effects of descriptive representation

<b>TABLE A15. Amongst women respondents</b>			
	Knowledge index	Voted in local elections	Non-electoral participation index
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Reserved	0.035	-0.033	-0.014
2017	(0.023)	(0.039)	(0.010)
Constant	0.111***	0.660***	0.103***
	(0.012)	(0.025)	(0.007)
Wild bootstrap	0.171	0.441	0.211
RI p-values	0.176	0.444	0.199
N	789	789	789
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.004	-0.000	0.001

<b>TABLE A16. Amongst men respondents</b>			
	Knowledge index	Voted in local elections	Non-electoral participation index
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Reserved	-0.037	-0.042	-0.029
2017	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.021)
Constant	0.375***	0.720***	0.219***
	(0.024)	(0.042)	(0.016)
Wild bootstrap	0.338	0.233	0.028
RI p-values	0.390	0.233	0.031
N	851	851	851
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.003	0.001	0.003

## A.8 Hierarchy of grassroots party activists

The poster shown below was taken from a man and woman party activist during fieldwork. The man (Manish Bhasin) and woman party activist (Kanta Gautam) are counterparts who both belong in the Aam Aadmi Party. The woman is a “Ward Adhyaksh” (municipal constituency president) in the women’s wing and the man is a “Sangathan Mantri” (Municipal constituency-level organization minister). The top half of both posters show senior party leaders and state legislators. The bottom half of both posters shows their grassroots party activists. The woman activists poster shows eight of her top grassroots activists in small images. The man activists poster shows five of his top activists. Data based on formal party lists only records position holding activists (such as Kanta and Manish), but does not capture the entire hierarchy of grassroots activists (such as 13 activists in the bottom of each image), missing those who do not yet hold a position in the party. The citizen survey data

captures interaction with the party activists present across the entire hierarchy. The party activists survey focuses entirely on those activists who hold formal positions in the party.

**FIGURE A4. Hierarchy of grassroots party activists**




Notes: The images were collected during fieldwork.

## A.9 Delhi local politician and party activist survey


Structured interviews were conducted with incumbent municipal politicians in Delhi during 2019-2020. To contact politicians, a list of phone numbers of all politicians was obtained via party offices and all incumbents were contacted to participate in the survey. Each person received at least 6-7 attempts to interview and this yielded a response rate of 33%: 92 out of 272 incumbents were interviewed. The coefficient plot below shows that the survey is representative of the overall population of incumbents from major parties. However, independents and those affiliated with small parties were less likely to respond, however, only a mere 2.9% of incumbents are from small parties or are independent candidates.

For the observations and evidence on party activists presented in Section 5.3, I rely on two sources of data. I rely on fieldwork conducted in ground campaigns in municipal elections during 2012-2017 and state elections during 2013-2020, where the number of women and men formal and informal party activists and the resources they had could be directly observed. I also use qualitative and demographic data collected as part of an in-person structured survey interview conducted with 1243 formal party activists during 2021-2022 for improving generalizability. The survey asked party activists about how

**FIGURE A5. Delhi politician survey is balanced on key observables**

Notes: The figure plots the regression estimates from the Table A17.

they access politics, their beliefs and opinions on politics and policy, and their views on candidate selection and violence against women in politics. All activists are formal party activists who occupy municipal-level party positions. 43 percent of the party activists that were interviewed were women. The party-wise breakup is as follows: AAP - 696 activists (president and vice-president positions), 45 percent are women activists; BJP - 381 activists (president position), 50 percent are women activists; the INC - party 166 activists (president position), 21 percent are women activists. We successfully interviewed 1243 activists (28 activists in pilot) out of 1642 formally active activists, yielding a response rate of 75 percent. A total of 1215 activists completed the main survey. The figure below shows the breakup visually of those who completed the main survey.

**FIGURE A6. Distribution of men and women activists across parties**

As seen in Figure A7, majority of party activists credit being recruited by someone into the party.


**TABLE A17. Dependent variable is politician is interviewed**

Female	0.025 (0.059)
BJP	-0.049 (0.083)
BSP	-0.024 (0.303)
INC	-0.018 (0.120)
IND	-0.342*** (0.101)
INLD	-0.568*** (0.124)
SP	-0.530*** (0.129)
Highly educated=1	0.001 (0.061)
SC Reserved=1	0.102 (0.085)
Standardized vote-share	0.015 (0.048)
Standardized margin of victory	0.061 (0.049)
EAST	0.127 (0.114)
NEW DELHI	-0.037 (0.116)
NORTH EAST	0.036 (0.107)
NORTH WEST	0.178 (0.111)
SOUTH DELHI	-0.040 (0.107)
WEST DELHI	0.229* (0.112)
Observations	272


Figure A8 shows that women are overwhelmingly more likely to credit a woman recruiter than men activists. Note that women still credit men for recruiting them into the party. While it is not unusual that men still play a larger role in recruiting women into formal party positions, fieldwork suggests there are additional reasons for women crediting men for their recruitment. When men recruit women activists, they often rely on the support or nomination from other women in the party. However, women

may end of crediting men as they have more authority over the appointment.

**FIGURE A7. Majority party activists are recruited into the party**





**FIGURE A8. Women party activists are more likely to credit women recruiter**



The question on role model effects was only included later in the BJP and the INC survey, mainly because fieldwork suggested that hardly any activists talk about role model effects when discussing their recruitment into the party. However, to provide quantitative support, this question was included in the surveys that were conducted later. The question is leading and asks whether the activists were inspired by someone to enter politics. Explicitly asking political activists if they were inspired by someone to enter politics can lead them to respond with a name. Despite the leading nature of the question, the data shows that only 11 percent, that is, 60 out of 550 party activists – 45 men and 17 women - mentioned experiencing some role-model effects. The figure shows the break up by gender within the BJP and the INC. Notably, no activist mentioned a local level leader. Instead majority activists mentioned national level men leaders.

There may also be concerns that women activists are mere tokens for men. However, the data shows that both men and women activists are equally likely to have family members who are active in politics or have previously contested elections. These figures allay concerns that women are only acting on men's behalf.

**FIGURE A9. No evidence for role model effects****FIGURE A10. Women and men activists are equally likely to have politically active family**

## A.10 Qualitative evidence from ground campaigns

Below, the photographs (author's own) and quotes below refer to another series of campaigns that were followed in the run up to state elections in Delhi in February 2020. Following state election campaigns improves external validity and in particular confirms that the gendered dynamics in local elections are also observed in non-quota elections. The images refer to the quotes in the main text.

Party workers present at these campaigns were also asked about how they were recruited into the party. Take, for example, how a male candidate's nephews that were on-boarded by the candidate himself and further expand the recruitment of male party activists:

“Two of his nephews also help in the campaign in terms of handling simultaneous pad yatras where the candidate cannot go himself because the area is so big. These young men get some of their [male] friends and acquaintances to help them out and along with other people who work in the candidate's office, they organize door-to-door campaigns.”

In contrast, women party activist note that they were asked by other women party activist in the

**FIGURE A11. Images from ground campaigns**

Notes: The photographs were taken during fieldwork.

female candidate's office to help with the campaign:

“Eventually, these people who were close to her in the office, who were higher up in the hierarchy [other women party activist] asked us to compile the problems of the constituency so that a record could be maintained. That is how for most of us how our journey began with [candidate]. Today, we accompany her to all her campaigns, she consults us before finalizing any route for the pad yatra (walking campaigns) and door to doors, and relies on us for community outreach.”

The media coverage of the elections also highlights gendered differences in the ground campaigns.<sup>19</sup> For example, women tend to conduct campaigns in different spaces than men, such as temples and religious spaces, as they find these to be more effective places for women to campaign in.

“ “Places of worship are a good way to connect as we get to meet a lot of people simultaneously. It helps kick start a conversation and if the priest tells the worshippers to

<sup>19</sup>See, *Vikaas in their wards, triple talaq: What BJP's Muslim picks for Delhi civic polls are fighting for*, Scroll.in Apr 21 2017. Also see Getty collection of images for a larger compilation of candidates' door to door campaigns.

support us then it goes a long way. I also feel people tend to relate to a woman more than a man at such sites,” said Veena who holds a Sangeet Prabhakar degree from Allahabad.”<sup>20</sup>

Women have a high intensity of outreach and also their campaigns tend to emphasize party leaders and policy issues. For example,

“Explaining how she is campaigning, Gupta said, “My target is to cover around 400 houses each day. I start meeting people from 5 am. I also four teams who are separately meeting voters and they are managing about 2,000 homes daily. My focus remains on spreading Kejriwalji’s message on cleaning corruption in the MCD and showing how Delhi can be made a clean city.”<sup>20</sup>

In addition to outreach during elections, party activists engage residents between elections to encourage participation in party events, marches, and demonstrations. During a recent round of fieldwork, I watched a woman party activist run a street campaign to collect women’s signatures opposing a new alcohol regulation proposed by the state ruling party, as well as conduct neighborhood deliberative forums to propose policy amendments. On the day of independence, all party activists prepared a number of social activities to bring together existing women members in their neighbourhood and to recruit new ones.

Fieldwork shows that women activists are perceived as more trustworthy, echoing ethnographic research (Bedi 2016). They spend more time informing voters about policy and party platforms. They are also more likely to talk to women voters about women’s issues and specifically inform them about party policies that affect women voters. However, women tend to campaign for shorter periods of time because they frequently have to return home to complete household chores, and a lack of infrastructure such as toilets makes it difficult to campaign for long periods. Men, on the other hand, can devote more uninterrupted time conducting campaigns. Women also find it more difficult to enter male-dominated areas because they are afraid of sexual violence and harassment.

### **A.11 Evidence from rural politician survey in Bihar**

This section presents data from two politician surveys which were conducted in rural Bihar, one of the poorest Indian state, during 2020-2021 and interviewed two types of *gram panchayat* politicians

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<sup>20</sup>See, *MCD election: Women candidates say they are no pushovers*, The Hindustan Times, Nov 22, 2018.




**FIGURE A12. Women party activists mobilizing citizens in Delhi**

Women party activists mobilizing women citizens and collecting petitions against a new liquor policy in Delhi (March 2022)



Notes: The image is taken from the public Facebook profile of the woman party activist during her interview.

**FIGURE A13. Gender gap in grassroots activist presence in Bihar's ground campaigns**

Notes: The graph plots evidence from the Bihar survey for mukhiya incumbents (N=753) and sarpanch candidates (N=1153) from the 2016 Bihar Gram Panchayat elections for same three categories of politicians as in Figure 3.

who contested 2016 elections. First are incumbent mukhiyas who are responsible for public service delivery. Second are winners and runners of close-elections (up to 5% margin of victory) for the peer position of sarpanch, who are responsible for law enforcement. Both surveys included the same measure of campaign composition as in the Delhi politician survey. Figure A13 shows that men and women politicians report remarkably similar gender gap in campaign composition as in Delhi.