

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

APPENDIX SM1

to be read in conjunction with
'Desperat wepons': scythes at Sedgemoor, at war and at the Tower of London' (Impey),
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JOHN TAYLOR'S ACCOUNT OF MONMOUTH'S REBELLION AND THE BATTLE OF SEDGEMOOR, 6 JULY 1685

edited by John Childs

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John Taylor, a mathematics teacher, enrolled as a gentleman volunteer in the newly-created Queen Consort's Regiment of Horse on 20 June 1685. Five days later, the unit left London to reinforce the Earl of Feversham's corps which was operating in Somerset against the Duke of Monmouth's insurrection. Between 1688 and 1689, Taylor recorded his martial experiences in pp 81–97 of 'Taylor's History of His Life and Travels' (National Library of Jamaica, Kingston, MS 105). This is transcribed below, extensively annotated. Although too late to experience action, Taylor spoke to combatants and visited the Sedgemoor battlefield on 6 or 7 July. This previously unnoticed narrative provides additional detail and some new perspectives on, inter alia, the internal organisation of the rival forces; the identification of Anton Buys; the social activities of royal infantry officers on the night of Sedgemoor; the impact of alcoholic intoxication upon the battle; the tactical roles, equipment, and articulation of Monmouth's scythemen; and the importance of Tangier veterans.

INTRODUCTION

James Scott, 1st Duke of Monmouth (1649–85), landed at Lyme Regis on 11 June 1685. Nine days later, John Taylor (b.1664) from Chale on the Isle of Wight, a private tutor in science and mathematics, enrolled as a gentleman volunteer in the Queen Consort's Regiment of Horse.¹ He appears not to have been seeking a regular commission and probably chose this change of profession either out of loyalty to the crown and/or a desire for excitement beyond that usually found in the schoolroom. If the latter, then Taylor was to be disappointed because his regiment did not participate in the Battle of Sedgemoor, 6 July, although he visited the battlefield and talked to combatants after the fighting had ended. The Queen's Horse then escorted Monmouth, Lord Grey, and Anton Buys to Staines, whence the prisoners were conveyed to the Tower of London by barge, before quartering at the regular cavalry étapes in Hounslow, Brentford, and Colnbrook. 'The wars being over' and wearying 'of this wild kind of life', Taylor resigned at the end of August. Three years later, between autumn 1688 and a date unknown in 1689, he wrote a three-part autobiography, principally covering his adventures in Jamaica and the West Indies, 1686–8, the first volume of which included sixteen pages (pp 81–97) describing his short tenure with the colours. Although this previously unpublished and unused account is not an exemplar of high literary style, it belongs to a very sparsely populated category of seventeenth-century documents, a campaign narrative penned by a member of the rank and file.²

Until the Queen's Horse reached the seat of war in Somerset, Taylor's information about Monmouth's progress and activities was culled from rumour, gossip, and unreliable newsletters but, thereafter, Taylor used his own eyes and ears. His recollection occasionally proved uncertain. He mis-remembered the title of his own unit as the Queen Dowager's Horse, which did not come into existence until 31 July, and generously over-promoted both Lieutenant Colonel William Legge and Captain Charles Nedby to full colonelcies: in mitigation, a mere gentleman volunteer would rarely have encountered such regimental luminaries. However, he correctly identified his troop subalterns – Lieutenant Sir Thomas Bludworth and Ensign Charles Strother – with whom he enjoyed more frequent contact.³ Despite these minor lapses, many of Taylor's observations can be corroborated, or, at least, rendered credible, by reference to other, longer-established sources. Taylor enhances knowledge of the rapid expansion of the royal army in June–July 1685; the march organisation of the Tower of London artillery train; the advance to Somerset of the Queen's Horse and its availability to Feversham as a cavalry reserve during the campaign's end-game; the identification of Anton Buys; the absence of most of Feversham's commissioned officers in Taunton on the night of Sedgemoor, 5–6 July; the effects of alcoholic intoxication upon the battle; the efficacy of the straightened and rehatted agricultural scythe as an infantry weapon; the tactical articulation of the scythemen within Monmouth's army; and the importance of Tangier veterans. *Inter alia*, these issues are discussed in the annotations.

1 Hereinafter referred to as the Queen's Horse.

2 David Buisseret has published the sections of the Taylor Manuscript relating to the West Indies (Buisseret 2010, 1–309).

3 The fourth troop officer, the quartermaster, is not mentioned probably because he usually operated ahead of the main body arranging provisions and billets along the march route. In mounted regiments, each troop had its own quartermaster whereas there was only one per infantry battalion. The post was held by warrant, except in the Life Guards and Royal Horse Guards where the commissioned quartermasters ranked as junior captains. Cheap to acquire and representing recognised stepping stones towards regular commissions, quartermaster's warrants were in high demand.

Taylor's troop quartermaster was Francis Nedby, probably a son of Captain Charles Nedby, who transferred in the same rank from the Queen's Horse to the Earl of Arran's Horse, 28 July 1685, and was advanced to a cornet's commission, 1 September 1689. He was promoted lieutenant in the same regiment, 6 May 1693, but was not listed in the army beyond 1697 (Dalton 1892–1904, II, 5, 8, 123; III, 23; Walton 1894, 412–13).

TRANSCRIPT

<81>⁴ An Account of the Rebellion in the County of Dorset, by James late Duke of Munmouth.

Now we come to give you an account of the Rebellion <82> in Dorsetshire which is as followeth.⁵

On the Eleventh of June being Thursday, James late Duke of Monmouth came with three small ships to Anchor, whence he landed at Lime,⁶ when he landed he had but Sixty men,⁷ all arayed in Scarlet,⁸ except three, which were in Purple, All arayed like the Duke of Monmouth, soe that none knew which of them was really the Dukes person.⁹ There was with them the Lord Gray,¹⁰ and Count van Horn,¹¹ they att their Landing were received wth all the Joy imaginable, of the Towns men of Lime, & Cuntry there about, soe that within fower daies, he had an Army of 200 Horse, and 1200 foot, at the Head of this Army he made a proclamation, lay claime to the right of y^e Crown, as being legittimate (pretended) Son of King Charles the Second, also he declared

4 The page numbers in the manuscript are indicated by **bold**, roman numerals within arrow-head brackets, ie <84>.

5 Although Monmouth initially came ashore in Dorsetshire and the first major action occurred at Bridport, 14 June 1685, Somerset was the seat of the subsequent campaign.

6 Lyme Regis, Dorsetshire.

7 Monmouth landed with eighty-two supporters, plus servants and attendants: ‘a romantick kind of invasion,’ according to Dr James Welwood, ‘scarce parallel’d in history.’ The Dutch crews of the expedition’s two cargo vessels did not participate in the subsequent land operations (*CSPD 1685*, 195; Welwood 1744, 129; Lingard 1874, 77–8).

8 The scarlet coat was becoming standard in the English, Scottish, and Irish standing armies but there were exceptions: the Lord Admiral’s Foot wore yellow; both the Royal Horse Guards and the Duke of Buckingham’s wartime infantry levy of 1672 were dressed in blue; and the Tangier garrison had undress grey coats and breeches. After 1689, there was a wider variety of colour with grey and blue being especially prevalent.

Monmouth, captain-general of the English army 1678–9, hoped that some of his former, military clients would desert King James II or, at least, help to undermine the army’s allegiance to the crown (Walton 1894, 363; Earle 1977, 33, 35, 78, 80; Clark 1984, 124–35; Wade 1980, 160).

9 Apart from Monmouth, it has not yet proved possible to identify the other men in purple coats.

10 Ford, 3rd Baron Grey of Warke (1655–1701), 1st Earl of Tankerville from 1695, was to command the cavalry regiment (Greaves 2009; Price 1956, 175).

11 ‘Count van Horn’ was Anthony/Antony/Antoine/Anton Buys/Buys/Buÿse/Buysse/Busse (b.c.1655), usually referred to as ‘the Brandenburger’ or ‘the German’, who landed with Monmouth. John Oldmixon described him as ‘a German count’ and this characterisation was subsequently repeated by White Kennett, Laurence Echard, and Andrew Browning. It is more likely that Buys was of Dutch-Flemish rather than German descent and probably belonged to a cadet branch of the family of Horn and Ouwerkerk (Overkirk). He was a captain in the army of the Elector of Brandenburg, stationed in the latter’s Rhineland provinces of Cleves, Mark, and Ravensburg. In April–May 1685, he was enticed into Monmouth’s service by Lord Grey, then resident in Cleves, although the influence of Captain Robert Bruce, Buys’s Scottish colleague who had served for fourteen years in the Brandenburg forces and was to become a captain in Monmouth’s Blue Regiment, was also important. Once committed, Buys agreed to act as the colonel of a bogus infantry regiment which, while supposedly recruiting in and around ’s-Hertogenbosch for the Brandenburg service, may have hoodwinked a few Dutch and German mercenaries into joining the expedition.

Buys did not hold a regimental commission in Monmouth’s army but appears to have functioned as a staff officer. He helped co-ordinate the operations that interrupted the junction of the Somerset and Devon militias around Axminster on 15 June and, according to Taylor, led the scythe demi-battalion at Sedgemoor. After the battle, he escaped with Monmouth, Grey, and Dr William Oliver (c 1658–1716). Following his capture near Ringwood, Hampshire, on 8 July 1685, Buys was committed to the Tower. Through the mediation of the Brandenburg resident in London, Johann von Besser (1654–1729), he entered into discussions with the government about receiving a pardon in return for a full confession and turning king’s evidence in the trials of fellow-rebels. The desired result achieved, during August Buys was sent to Edinburgh aboard the royal yacht *HMV Kitchen* (8 guns, Captain Anthony Crow R N) to swear against Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun (c 1653–1716) who was tried *in absentia* before the High Court of Justiciary, 4 January 1686. Robert Bruce, who had reached a similar accommodation, travelled with Buys and also gave testimony at Fletcher’s trial. When called to the stand, Buys was styled ‘lately a captain in the Duke of Brandenburg’s service, aged thirty years or thereby, (and) unmarried’, who ‘now can speak English’. He was deported later in 1686 (*CSPD 1685*, 260, 265, 293, 295, 297, 309; Price 1956, 169–70; Browning 1934, 385; Echard 1718, III, 757, 770; Oldmixon 1730, II, 701; Kennett 1706, III, 434, 437; Little 1956, 97, 110; Robertson 2008; Lauder 1840, 205, 213; Howell 1816–28, XI, 1027–8, 1052–5, 1066–7; Wade 1980, 165; Wigfield 1985, 28; Roberts 1844, I, 203–5).

he came to Maintaine the Lawes, and Libertys, and the Protestant Religion, as by Lawe establish. Also he layd to the charge of our Sovereign Jaimes the Second, these other things, Viz: first that thro' his Contrivance, the royall City of London in 1666 was fired by y^e Papists; Secondly that he was Actually concerned in the late Popish plot, and lastly that he was Guilty of the Death of King Charles the Second, by poisoning him all which he declared he would by Dint of Sword Maintaine, as long as breath remained in him;¹² his Standard was a red Flag, in which was portrayed an Angell with his wings extended, over whose head in a cloud was this Motto, Against Popery, this Angell had in's right hand a flameing Sword drawn, and in's left hand a Bible, under this Angell was portrayed at his feet, the Pope <83> grovelling on the Ground, and his triple Crown,¹³ and other Trumpery being favoured by him, at the dexter Rim of the Flagg, as it were proceeding out of the Angels mouth, was this Mooto portrayed, I will overturne, overturn, overturn, and it shall be noe more, untill he come, and I will will [*sic*]¹⁴ give it him, whose right it is [*marginalia: Ezek: cap 21: verse the 27*].¹⁵ When Monmouth stayed in Lime, the Mayors son discharged a pistoll at him, wth narrowly Mist him, this man was emediatly apprehended, and Hang up at the Market place, and shuch [*sic*] was the fury of those rebels, that 'tis said the Women att Lime cut him to peices as he hung, before he was half dead.¹⁶ Soe dayly shuch [*sic*] as were ill afected, in those western parts drew to him: as S^r Thomas Trencher,¹⁷ Tho: Dore the Mayor of Limington,¹⁸ &c. soe that his Army daily encreased to him, on y^e Seaventeenth of June he Marched out of Lime towards Bridgwater.¹⁹ And how 'tis strange to conceive, that within a certain Well, near Lime, for about a fourteen Nights before Mounmouth landed, was heard the sound of a drum, beating exceeding Loud both Night, and Day, all sorts of Poynts of Warr²⁰ very distinctly. Soe that no drummers in England, could have betered it: Multitudes of people resorting thither to hear it, when Munmouth landed at that Instant it loudly beat Allarum & soe continued

12 Monmouth's prolix and mendacious declaration was the work of Robert Ferguson, 'the Plotter' (d.1714), and delivered by Joseph Tiley/Tily/Tyly/Tyley of Bristol, a captain in the Red, or Duke's, Regiment of Foot. Both Ferguson and Tiley, who had earlier acted as a liaison between Monmouth's supporters in England and the Netherlands, had landed at Lyme on 11 June (D'Oyley 1938, 277; Wigfield 1985, 171; Wade 1980, 166; Ashcraft 1986, 362–3, 528).

13 The tiara, or triple crown, was worn by popes from the eighth century until 1963.

14 Editorial interventions in the transcript have been placed within square brackets.

15 Most accounts state that the colour of Monmouth's standard was deep sea-green with the legend, 'Fear Nothing but God', emblazoned in gold: it was planted in a field near Lyme Regis parish church (St Michael's) to identify the recruiting stand. Sea-green had been the personal colour of the arch-Leveller Colonel Thomas Rainsborough (1610–48) and was subsequently embraced by the wider Leveller movement and, later, the Exclusionists. Monmouth also brought four blue ensigns, manufactured in the Netherlands, adorned with the words, 'For God, Freedom and Religion' – 'Pro Religione et Libertate', according to George Roberts and Emerson – for use by the projected regiments. No authority supports Taylor's contention that the flag was either red or decorated so exuberantly.

It is remotely possible that Taylor's information refers to one of the banners presented to Monmouth by the twenty-seven 'maids of Taunton' on 19 June during his formal entrance into the town. Mary Mead, the senior maid, bore a golden flag, fringed with lace and carrying the letters 'J(acobus) R(ex)', anticipating by one day Monmouth's decision to declare himself king (German and Rees 2012, 58–61; D'Oyley 1938, 277, 284–5; Little 1956, 95–6, 114–15; Roberts 1844, I, 230, 255; Keay 2017, 343–5; Chandler 1985, 25, 120, 124; Macaulay 1914, III, 564; Dummer 1895, 46; Scott 1868, I, 500; Price 1956, 179; Emerson 1951, 41; *HMC, Bath MSS*, II, 170–2; Lingard 1874, 78).

16 The royalist Gregory Alford (1620–97), captain of the Lyme Regis militia from 1661, was mayor of Lyme in 1663 and 1685. On his wife, Mary Burridge of Lyme (d.1673), he sired three children: Gregory (1645–93), Joan (1646–66), and William (b.1650). Although the date of William's death has not yet been established, he was certainly alive in 1685 because his third and last child, Sarah (1688–1743), was born three years later. Thus, neither of Alford's sons died in 1685 and no other record suggests that either man, or anyone else, took a pot shot at Monmouth during his sojourn in Lyme (*Alfords of Lyme Regis*, 81–91; Little 1956, 66–9).

17 Sir John Trenchard (1649–95) took no part in the rebellion having absconded to the Netherlands a few days before the landing at Lyme Regis (Clifton 2009; Wigfield 1985, 173).

18 Thomas Dore (c 1658–1705), mayor of Lymington, Hampshire, 1683–5. A firm Whig, Dore had been suspected of complicity in the Rye House Plot, 1683. During the rebellion, Dore was reported 'hovering' in the New Forest at the head of about eighty men ready to join Monmouth but his unit was dispersed by the Sussex militia. After a period in hiding, either in England or abroad, he was pardoned, 2 August 1686. MP for Lymington, 1690–1705 (*CSPD 1685*, 213; *HP*, <<http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/dore-thomas-1658-1705>> (18 December 2018).

19 Monmouth reached Axminster, 15 June; Taunton, 18 June; and Bridgwater, 21 June.

20 'Poynts of Warr' were military signals and instructions, relayed by drum in the infantry and trumpet among the cavalry.

for about one hower, and then ceasing, it was never heard afterwards. tho' dilligently observed.²¹ Thus we have Mounmouth, and his Rout,²² Marching towards Bridgwatter; for he brought with them Arms &c, for about 5000 Horse, & 10000 foot men, which he brought ashore at Lime, & then (like William the Conqueror) sunk his three ships;²³ <84> resolving Either to Obtaine the Imperiall Diadem, or also to lose his life, and never thinck of returning. His Majesty being advertised of the Rebels doings in the West, with all Expedition Sent his Army thitherward, Under the Command of the Duke of Albemarle,²⁴ which Commanded the Hors, and the Lord

21 For additional premonitions see, Heywood 1811, App 4, 30.

22 Troops.

23 The expedition's equipment was transported in a ketch of about 100 tons and a 'flyboat' (fluit) of around 200 tons – 'a pink and a dogger', according to Edward Dummer – one of which, that carrying the gunpowder, was commanded by Captain James Hayes (d.1685), afterward a captain in the Red Regiment. During the final stages of preparation, the English 'summer guard' was reported to be patrolling the English Channel, necessitating the hire of a warship. Time was very short and all that could be found was a 32-gun Dutch privateer frigate of 240 tons, the *Helderenberg* (Captain Cornelius Abraham van Brakell). She was already loaded with armaments for Bilbao but Brakell was persuaded to divert from his intended course to protect Monmouth's two ships until a landing in the south-west of England had been secured. His price was extortionate, raising the total cost of the expedition to above £5,500. The flotilla, which carried Monmouth; Anton Buys, Count van Horn; an experienced, but unnamed, Dutch gunner; eighty English and Scottish supporters; some Dutch and German mercenaries; servants and attendants; plus a modest arsenal, sailed from the Texel on 30 May and reached Lyme on 11 June. The two tenders remained there until discovered and captured on 20 June by HMS *Saudadoes* (6th rate, 16 guns, Captain Richard Trevanion R N (1627–1714), a future Jacobite). Although the bulk of their cargoes had already been landed, the cavalry armour, horse furniture, and forty barrels of gunpowder remained on board and were thereby forfeit.

The *Helderenberg*, easily identified by the carving on her stern depicting the sun either rising from the sea or sinking into it, left Lyme Regis on 14 June. On board was Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun (c 1653-1716), a leading member of the ducal entourage, banished by Monmouth for murdering the expedition's treasurer and paymaster, Thomas Dare, on the previous day. To disguise the perceived calamity of Fletcher's premature departure, false information was spread that the *Helderenberg* was owned by the duke and bound for Bristol, where both it and Fletcher would rejoin the expedition. Joseph Tiley added verisimilitude by kidnapping a local sailor, John Kerridge, supposedly to pilot the ship around Land's End. In fact, the *Helderenberg* resumed its planned voyage to northern Spain but, first, it had to put into St Ives to replenish provisions, where it was still at anchor on 27 June. By this date, Captain Brakell had already landed some prisoners taken earlier at Lyme and forcibly purchased four barrels of beef from the *Caesar*, a small, Irish coaster, which was sheltering in St Ives *en route* to Dunkirk. Infuriated by Brakell's bullying and threatening behaviour, the *Caesar's* master, John Buck, informed the mayor of St Ives who immediately notified the county lieutenancy. The *Helderenberg* was ordered to be detained, the local customs officers executing this instruction on 29–30 June by removing and confiscating her rudder. The ensuing search was perfunctory – Fletcher was not discovered – and, after listening to the truthful and plausible explanation that she was loaded with weapons for Iberia, the frigate was released.

For some, as yet, unexplained reason, instead of making for Bilbao the *Helderenberg* proceeded to Santander where it was promptly impounded, Brakell and Kerridge seized, and Fletcher arrested, although he escaped on the following day. Brakell and Kerridge were extradited to England on board the ketch, *Mary* (Captain John Price), and committed to the Marshalsea prison while the *Helderenberg* was returned to the Netherlands. Following a petition explaining that he was an entirely innocent party, Kerridge was freed on 9 August 1686. To help repair the fractured relations between England and the United Provinces, in July 1686 the *Helderenberg* was gifted to James II: on board were 'three cases of herrings', one for the king, one for Lord Treasurer Laurence Hyde, 1st Earl of Rochester (1642–1711), and one for the Charles, 2nd Earl of Middleton (c 1649–1719), secretary of state for the north. In acknowledgment of these friendly gestures, James pardoned Brakell. The *Helderenberg* was then commissioned into the Royal Navy as a 5th rate before conversion to a hospital ship to service Lord Dartmouth's fleet in October–November 1688. It sank near the Isle of Wight, 18 November 1688, after colliding with HMS *Bonaventure* (4th rate, 52 guns) (Childs 2014, 68–71; Roberts 1844, I, 202, 272–4; Robertson 2008; D'Oyley 1938, 274; Chandler 1985, 125; Emerson 1951, 48; *CSPD* 1685, 243; *CSPD* 1686–7, 155, 160, 177, 187, 201, 204, 230, 233, 338; *CTB* 1685–9, 836; *LJ*, XIV, 39; Luttrell 1857, I, 349; *LG*, no. 2045; Wade 1980, 160–2; Dummer 1895, 46; Wigfield 1985, 98).

24 Christopher Monck, 2nd Duke of Albemarle (1653–88), captain of the 1st Troop of the Life Guard, 29 November 1679–1 August 1685, was also lord lieutenant of Devon and commander of the Devonshire militia. During Monmouth's Rebellion, he functioned solely as a militia officer, holding no field command over regular troops (Clifton 2008; Dalton 1892–1904, I, 265; II, 1).

of Feversham²⁵ the foot, or Infantry;²⁶ and on the Eighteenth of June and Artillery and Bagage, March from the Tower, thro' the City, a very Great Traine for when the front was at Highpark

25 Lieutenant General Louis de Duras, 2nd Earl of Feversham (1641–1709), a nephew of Marshal Turenne (1611–75), was appointed commander-in-chief of the field corps. A French Huguenot, he owed his appointment to membership of James II's inner circle and the shortage of suitable British candidates. Despite the opinion of William III of Orange (1650–1702) that Feversham, although brave and honest, lacked the experience necessary to conduct large-scale field operations, he proved competent and efficient. Subsequently, he was much-criticised for over-caution but Feversham understood that he commanded the king's only and heavily-outnumbered army, the defeat of which would have proved catastrophic for the regime (Handley 2016; Rambaut 2007, 47–58; Japikse 1927, I, 25).

26 Taylor, resident in London at this time (Buisseret 2010, xvi), has conflated two separate events. James II was very well informed about Monmouth's intentions – more than a fortnight before the invasion, the English ambassador at The Hague, Bevil Skelton (1641–96), knew that the expedition would come ashore at Lyme Regis – enabling the principal secretary of state for the south, Robert Spencer, 2nd Earl of Sunderland (1641–1702), to issue a series of alerts, starting on 10 May, to Ireland and the English county lieutenancies about 'some ill designs on foot'. Aware of the impending crisis and possibly in receipt of some private information, on 7 June the Duke of Albemarle, commander of the Devonshire militia, ordered his forces to muster at Exeter on 11 June, thus anticipating Sunderland's official instruction of 13 June to embody the various southern and western shire militias. On being informed by the mayor of Lyme Regis of Monmouth's arrival, Albemarle sent an express to Sunderland asking for regular troops to be dispatched. Because the Restoration militia was a police and security force, adept at harassing dissenters but neither equipped nor trained to fight pitched battles, the request was routine. Sunderland replied on 13 June that four troops of horse, two of dragoons, and five companies of foot would arrive in Salisbury by Monday 15 June 'and Colonel Kirke with them'. Albemarle then force-marched c.4,000 Devon militia thirty-three miles to Axminster, with the aim of isolating Monmouth in Lyme Regis. Arriving late on 14 June, Albemarle intended to combine with two regiments of the Somerset militia – Colonels Sir Francis Luttrell (1659–90) and Sir Edward Phelipps (1638–99) – while 1,200 Dorsetshire militia under Colonel Thomas Strangways (1643–1714) assembled at Bridport to threaten the rebels' eastern flank. On discovering this fast-closing trap, Monmouth successfully cleared his flank by sending a detachment under Lord Grey and Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Venner (d.1712) to attack Strangways at Bridport on 14 June. Monmouth's main force then hurriedly debouched from Lyme Regis early on 15 June and reached Axminster in time to interrupt the intended junction of the Devon and Somerset militias, obliging them to retire in divergent directions.

Pursuant to Sunderland's instruction, on 13 June William Blathwayt (1649–1717), the secretary at war, ordered two troops of the Royal Dragoons (Lieutenant Colonel Edward Hyde, Viscount Cornbury (1661–1723), and Captain John Coy), to ride to Salisbury from their quarters in Chichester. Meanwhile, Brigadier John Churchill (1650–1722) exited London that same evening at the head of four troops from the Royal Horse Guards (Captains Sir John Parsons, 2nd Bt of Langley, Buckinghamshire (c.1656–1704); Sir Charles Wyndham (1638–1706); Walter Littleton (d.1688); and Edwin Sandys); two from his own regiment, the Royal Dragoons (Churchill's own troop, led by Captain Lieutenant Thomas Hussey, and Captain Charles Nedby's, commanded by Lieutenant John Williams following Nedby's transfer to the Queen's Horse on 6 June); and a half-battalion (5 companies) of the Queen Dowager's infantry regiment, then conveniently billeted in Kensington and Chelsea, led by its colonel, Percy Kirke (c.1647–91). Commanded by Churchill, the mounted troops formed the advance party and duly rendezvoused with Cornbury and Coy at Salisbury on 14 June. Churchill and these eight troops then covered 120 miles in four days, through Blandford Forum and Dorchester, reaching Bridport on 17 June. Thence, Churchill was under orders to observe the rebels and disrupt their progress through Axminster towards Taunton and Bridgwater, always liaising closely with Albemarle. Kirke's infantry was left to make its best speed. Leaving Staines on 14 June, it reached Salisbury on 17 June, eventually joining Churchill at Chard on the evening of Sunday 21 June. To support Churchill, a small train of light, field artillery was instructed to leave Portsmouth on 16 June.

On reaching the theatre, Churchill reported that the Devonshire and Somerset militias had failed to prevent Monmouth from breaking out of Lyme Regis towards Axminster and Taunton. James quickly decided that a more substantial corps from the English standing army was required. On 19 June, Sunderland informed Churchill that three battalions of foot guards, 150 Life Guards, two troops from the Royal Horse Guards, and two troops from the Royal Dragoons would march to Bath 'as soon as possible'. However, the dispatch of these troops to the West Country and the reinforcement of key points in the kingdom consumed most of the English standing army, a situation exacerbated by the fact that Prince George of Denmark's infantry regiment, commanded by Colonel Sir Charles Littleton (1628–1716), was in poor condition and unfit for active service. The six regiments of the Anglo-Dutch Infantry Brigade, a corps on long-term loan to the army of the United Provinces, comprised the principal, trained, reserve: the three Scottish battalions were recalled on 22 May and the three English battalions on 17 June. The former were initially intended to suppress Argyll's Rebellion but this had collapsed by the time of embarkation, so they were diverted, landing at Gravesend on 30 June. On 5 July, they began their march to the west but had only reached Bagshot, Surrey, when news arrived of the victory at Sedgemoor; they returned to London and sailed for the Dutch Republic on 27 July. The three English units did not come ashore until 8 July and returned to the Netherlands on 24 July. Despite dismissing the rebels as a 'rude and unarmed multitude', an 'abundance of caution' overcame the government and, on 26 June, the Lords Justices of Ireland were instructed to send 1,000 infantry from the Irish army to Chester. The order was cancelled on 8 July before any movement had occurred.

In the meantime, Blathwayt set about assembling the second increment of the field corps from among available units: seven companies of the 1st battalion of the 1st Foot Guards, commanded by Colonel Henry Fitzroy, 1st Duke of Grafton (1663–90), and six companies from the 2nd battalion under Major William Eaton (d.1688); six companies of the 2nd Foot Guards led by Lieutenant Colonel Edward Sackville (c.1640–1714); 150 Life Guardsmen headed by Lieutenant Colonel Theophilus Oglethorpe (1650–1702); sixty Life Guard Horse Grenadiers, twenty from each troop, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Edward Villiers (1620–89) of the 1st Troop of the Life Guards, supported by Captains John Parker (c.1651–c.1719),

Corner, the Rear was then at the Tower Gate, and were in their March thro' the City from 8 in the Morning, till 6 at Night[.]²⁷ The Kings Army consisted of 5000 Hors, and foot, besides the King raised what Hors and foot he could, with all Expedition;²⁸ and the County troops were also Comanded down into the West, to Joyne with his Majestys forces; as the Northampton Militia Troops under the Comand of the Earle of Petterborough,²⁹ the Devonshire Troops under the Comand of his Grace Christopher Duke of Albemarle, the Hampshire Militia Troops by Collonⁱⁱ

Thomas Gay, Richard Potter, Robert Dixon, Anthony Heyford, and John Vaughan; and three troops of the Royal Horse Guards (Major Sir Francis Compton (c 1629–1716); Captain Henry Cornwall (c 1654–1717); and Captain Charles Adderley). The eighth troop of the Royal Horse Guards (Captain Sir Thomas Slingsby, 2nd Bt of Scriven (1636–88)), was on detached duty at Egham escorting a pay convoy and took no part in the campaign. This force left London on 20 June. *En route*, Major Compton's troop of the Royal Horse Guards was ordered to Marlborough, where it arrived on 26 June, to provide an additional escort for the main artillery train. Feversham was commissioned lieutenant general on 19 June and appointed to command all the royal forces in the west, both standing and militia. To his long-lasting chagrin, Churchill, who had been semi-promised the overall leadership on 15 June, was thus relegated to second-in-command. Feversham travelled ahead with the 150 Life Guards and sixty horse grenadiers leaving Grafton in charge of the foot and the Royal Horse Guards. The security of London and Westminster was entrusted to the impeccably royalist Lieutenant Colonel John Strode (d.1686) commanding the City of London trained bands, amounting to c.10,000 men, and the remaining eleven companies of the 1st Foot Guards (CSPD 1685, 149-97, 207, 209–11, 225, 228, 250, 257; Ashcraft 1986, 456–7; Little 1956, 99–101, 109–10; *Axminster Ecclesiastica*, 94–5; Childs 2014, 72–3; White-Spunner 2006, 87; Davis 1895, 17–22; Western 1965, 54; Scott 2015, 128–9, 208–28; Oldmixon 1730, III, 73).

For descriptions of the uniforms of the standing army and militia, see Sandford 1687, 46–56; Scott 2008, *passim*; Scott 2015, 158–73.

27 On the evening of 21 June, a train of artillery departed from the Ordnance Office's premises in the Tower of London. It comprised sixteen brass guns (two twelve-pounders, four eight-pounders, four six-pounders, four five-pounders, and two four-pounders), sufficient ammunition to provide each with forty cannon balls and fifteen case shot, plus enough tents for 3,000 men, a bridging train, engineering stores, powder and shot for the infantry, and spare weapons. The train was under the command of Sir Phineas Pett (1646–90) and guarded by five companies from the Royal Scots (1st Foot) led by Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Douglas (1643–1729). The column was divided into three divisions, which left the Tower separately according to a schedule of staggered departures, hence Taylor's observation of the length of time taken to pass through the City's narrow and congested streets. However, he says that the train trundled out of London on 18 June whereas Narcissus Luttrell recorded this event on 22 June, so neither may have been an eye-witness. Pett's column reached Marlborough on 26 June, where the escort was reinforced by Major Sir Francis Compton's troop of the Royal Horse Guards, linking-up with Feversham's main body while it was journeying from Westbury to Frome on 30 June.

A second train of eight, light guns was drawn from the Ordnance depot in Portsmouth (four, iron three-pounders plus four, brass falcons, or one-pounders). Henry Sheres (c 1641–1710) commanded, assisted by Quartermaster Edward Dummer (c1651–1713), Fireworker James English, and Bombardier Daniel Moody. It departed on 16 June, protected by five companies from the infantry battalion of Colonel Charles Trelawny (1653–1731), led by Lieutenant Colonel Charles Churchill (1656–1714), John Churchill's younger brother. It travelled via Dorchester and Sherborne, combining with the main army at Westbury on 29 June. Following the junction of both trains with the army, overall command passed to Sheres. At Sedgemoor, Feversham would be served by twenty-four cannon while the two escorting half-battalions provided the field corps with an additional ten infantry companies. Dummer says that the train also carried 'mortar pieces'. There does not appear to have been an allocation of gunners so it must be assumed that the cannon were served by infantrymen, most probably grenadiers (CSPD 1685, 201; Luttrell 1857, I, 348; Childs 2014, 73; Tomlinson 1979, 134–5; Little 1956, 118; Duncan 1879, I, 48–50; Dummer 1895, 46–8; Walton 1894, 733).

28 On James II's accession, 6 February 1685, the English standing army possessed an establishment strength of 8,865 men, of whom 7,472 were available for service in mobile, marching regiments and 1,393 restricted to semi-permanent garrison duty. In response to Argyll's rebellion and otherwise uncertain times, the Queen's Horse was created on 6 June. After Monmouth had landed, James also raised eight cavalry regiments; three of dragoons, one of which was placed upon the Irish establishment; and eight infantry battalions. By 31 December 1685, James had more than doubled the size of the English army to 19,778 soldiers (Childs 1980, 1–2; Dalton 1892–1904, II, 1–64; Hardwicke 1778, II, 309).

29 Henry Mordaunt, 2nd Earl of Peterborough (1623–97), was appointed lord lieutenant of Northamptonshire in 1666 and colonel of a newly-raised regiment of horse in the English standing army, 20 June 1685 (Dalton 1892–1904, II, 6; Stater 2004).

W^m Fleming Esquire,³⁰ and the Sussex Troops commanded by the Lord Lumby:³¹ these with others were united to the Army and the Auxiliaries of the City, now listed into Companies, & preparing to March:³² all passages thro' out-England were layed,³³ & the Country in Arms, and strong Guardes dayly kept at each Twon [*sic*], place of Note. Thus we have the rebels marching towards bridgwater, & (daylie increasing), and his Majesties Army Marching Against them, with all Expedition the Gentrys and County forces dayly resorting to him, also y^e Kings Fleet was drawing towards Lime, & scouring the Channell.³⁴ <85> Now come we againe to spake of this John Taylor, whom on the begining of this Instant June, we left him hard at the Studie of Cymistry, but now we find him in the Feild of Mars. For on the twentyeth of June, he having furnished himselfe with a Good Hors, Arms &c: and arayed himself in a good Scarlet Coat, and things sutable to his quality, he rod as a Cadete,³⁵ in one of the New raised, Troops of Quen Dowagers Reidgment,³⁶ in that Troop under the Command of Collonel Charles Nedby,³⁷ and S^r Thomas Bloodworth

30 Edward Fleming (c 1653–1700) of North Stoneham, near Southampton, Hampshire, was the first son of Edward Fleming of North Stoneham. Fleming was a JP for Hampshire, c.1680–April 1688; deputy lieutenant and colonel in the county militia, 1682–April 1688; verderer of the New Forest, 1686; freeman of Lymington, 1686; sheriff of Hampshire, 1688–9; commissioner for assessment, 1689–90; and MP for Southampton, 25 November 1689, but unseated on petition, 31 December. In 1695, John, 1st Baron Cutts (1661–1707), described Fleming as ‘a gentleman very zealously affected to his Majesty, the monarchy, and the church’ (*HP*, <<http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/fleming-edward-1653-1700>> ; Childs 1990, 389, 409; *CJ*, X, 321; *CSPD* 1685, 144).

31 Richard, 1st Baron Lumley (1650–1721), 1st Earl of Scarborough from 1690, had been commissioned to raise an independent troop of horse, 18 June 1685. This troop was subsequently incorporated into the Queen Dowager’s Regiment of Horse, 31 July 1685, of which Lumley was appointed colonel (Childs 2007; Dalton 1892–1904, II, 9, 14, 15, 89).

32 The City of London militia, numbering c.10,000 men, remained in the capital. The militias of Somerset, Devonshire, and Wiltshire bore the brunt of the early stages of the campaign before relegation to a support-role under Feversham’s theatre command. Nevertheless, there was considerable operational co-operation between amateurs and professionals. On Kingsdown near Box, 26 June, Colonel Percy Kirke and Lieutenant Colonel Edward Sackville exercised a brigade comprising three regiments of the Wiltshire militia, three battalions of foot guards, and three troops of regular cavalry (Childs 2014, 73; Scott 2015, 52–4; Oldmixon 1730, III, 73; *SCA*, DC/SM/2).

On the militia during Monmouth’s Rebellion, see Western 1965; McClain 2003; Scott 2015; Wheeler 1910.

33 Watched; monitored.

34 This is a massive exaggeration. Three light cruisers of the summer guard, including HMS *Saudadoes*, were patrolling the English Channel but the fleet was effectively decommissioned (Ehrman 1953, 203).

35 Taylor was not *au fait* with military terminology. Had he joined the regiment with the objective of seeking a commission, then he would indeed have qualified as a cadet. However, as it seems that he only intended to serve for the duration of the rebellion and was, almost certainly, unremunerated, then he was a ‘gentleman volunteer’. He rode in the ranks, enjoying a status between that of a common trooper and a non-commissioned officer – equivalent to a ‘gentleman of the troop’ – but was obliged to provide his own horse, purchase full regimentals, and submit to military discipline (Walton 1894, 410–11).

36 Taylor could not remember the name of the unit in which he had served. He was entered on the rolls of Captain Charles Nedby’s troop, levied from 6 June, in the Queen’s Horse commanded by Colonel Sir John Lanier (c 1634–92). Raised in and around London between 6 and 13 June 1685, thus anticipating Monmouth’s landing by five days, this unit comprised ten troops, each of forty men plus three officers and a quartermaster: as a gentleman volunteer, Taylor was supernumerary. The Queen’s Horse was the senior and best-trained of the new regiments formed during the summer and the only reinforcement to reach Feversham’s army. Its creation was occasioned by the insurrection of Archibald Campbell, 9th Earl of Argyll (1629–85), in Scotland (6 May–18 June) and the receipt of reliable intelligence about Monmouth’s aggressive intentions. However, James had already decided to enlarge the English army, beginning with the mounted arm which was more mobile and operationally flexible than infantry: the twin crises thus served to provide a conveniently credible justification for the initiation of this policy.

The Queen Dowager’s Horse (Colonel Lord Lumley, 240 troopers, besides officers), the unit Taylor thought he had joined, came into being on 31 July through the regimentation of six of the sixty-three independent cavalry troops hurriedly recruited between 15 June and 3 July 1685. Six other mounted regiments were similarly formed between 25 and 31 July. An eighth, the Earl of Peterborough’s Horse, raised between 20 June and 24 July, was slightly more senior. Three of its six troops had been completed before the end of June (Major John Chitham, Captain John Egerton (d.1686), and Captain Lieutenant Hugh O’Connor) and were deemed proficient enough to join a second batch of reinforcements, comprising 400 infantry replacements and four companies from the Royal Scots, dispatched by Sunderland to Feversham on 29 June in response to the royal army’s embarrassment at Norton St Philip, 27 June. This force had advanced along the Thames Valley to the Maidenhead-Reading area when news of the victory at Sedgemoor caused it to be halted (*CSPD* 1685, 184, 232, 234–5, 250, 252, 377; Dalton 1892–1904, II, 5–9, 14–18; Walton 1894, 42–3; Browning 1934, 381–2).

37 Charles Nedby, a client of Monmouth, was created lieutenant of Captain Charles Macarty’s troop in Monmouth’s Regiment of Horse in French service, 31 January 1676, a commission held until the British Brigade in France was recalled to England in 1678; captain in Monmouth’s Horse on the English establishment, 10 February 1678; disbanded in 1679; captain in the cavalry regiment of Charles, Lord Gerard of Brandon (1618–94), 1st Earl of Macclesfield from 1679, during the covenant emergency in Scotland, 1679; captain of an independent troop of horse in Tangier, 1680–3; captain in the Royal

Lieutenant,³⁸ and M^r Charles Strother Coronnet³⁹ of the said Troop. Now this Troop on the 25th of June, had orders (with the rest of the Regiment, which were filled up with some Gentlemen of the Kings Guards)⁴⁰ to march to Salsburey, with all Expedition and in the Afternoon they March from High parck⁴¹ (haveing there bin viewed by his Majesty) under the command of Collonⁿ William Legg, only brother to the Lord of Dartmouth,⁴² thus we have this truly Accomplisht youth, whose hart was as filled with unfeined Loyalty to his Prince, and truely to maintaine the

Dragoons, 1683–5; captain in the Queen’s Horse (Colonel Sir John Lanier), 6 June 1685. Because of his decidedly Whiggish disposition, Monmouth thought Nedby a likely agent provocateur to operate within the English standing army prior to and during his invasion of England. However, Nedby decided that his former patron had little chance of success and remained loyal to James II. He was rewarded by promotion to lieutenant colonel of the cavalry regiment of James Hamilton (1658–1712), Earl of Arran and 4th Duke of Hamilton from 1698, 28 July 1685. Nedby had died or otherwise left the army before 28 February 1687 and his lieutenant colonelcy was awarded to John Parker (c. 1651–c. 1719), lieutenant colonel of the Earl of Arran’s Horse (*CTB* 1681–5, 1472; *CSPD* 1675–6, 537; *CSPD* 1679–80, 557, 583–4; Childs 1987, 65; Trench 1969, 180; Atkinson 1934, 24–5, 29–30, 38, 40–1, 49; Dalton 1892–1904, II, 43, 92, 97, 123).

38 Sir Thomas Bludworth (1660–94) was the third but first surviving son of Sir Thomas Bludworth (1620–82) of London and Leatherhead, the lord mayor of London, 1665–6. Knighted in 1682, Thomas Bludworth was standard bearer of the Gentlemen Pensioners, 1684–9. He was commissioned lieutenant in Charles Nedby’s troop of the Queen’s Horse, 6 June 1685, and promoted captain in the Earl of Plymouth’s Horse (Sir John Fenwick’s from 1 November 1687), 1 May 1686. Bludworth remained loyal to James II in 1688–9 and was deprived of his offices. His younger sister, Anne Jones née Bludworth (1657–1703), married Lord Chief Justice George, 1st Baron Jeffreys of Wem (1645–89), in 1679 (Dalton 1892–1904, II, 5, 111, 122; *HP*, <<http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/bludworth-sir-thomas-1600-94>>).

39 Charles Strother was commissioned cornet in the Queen’s Horse (Colonel Sir John Lanier), 6 June 1685, and promoted captain in the Royal Dragoons, 1 January 1687. He appears to have resigned from the army at the Glorious Revolution. His family had long been established in Northumberland, around Kirknewton, Alnwick, and Berwick-upon-Tweed. As a consequence of their loyalty to Charles I during the English Civil Wars, several Strothers were obliged to adopt the martial profession: Charles’s grandfather, William, had been commissioned colonel during the Second Civil War, 1648, and continued as a senior officer in the Restoration Army, while his father, also William, and brothers William and Lancelot, held commissions in the forces post–1660 (Newman 1981, 363; *CSPD* 1686–7, 332; Strother 1891, *passim*; Dalton 1892–1904, I, 14, 80, 134, 149, 153, 214, 244, 258, 262; II, 5, 94, 126).

40 Nine new infantry battalions were levied between 19 and 23 June but they were not ready to participate in the campaign. However, one of the nine additional cavalry regiments and elements of a second did take part: the Queen’s Horse, raised 6–13 June, and three troops of the Earl of Peterborough’s Horse, levied 20 June–24 July from among the sixty-three independent cavalry troops commissioned 15 June–3 July. For three reasons, the Queen’s Horse was far more advanced in training and readiness than any of the other eight, new, mounted regiments. First, its formation predated that of Peterborough’s by a fortnight and the other seven by between six and seven weeks. Secondly, it mostly employed highly experienced officers. Thirdly, according to Taylor, the ranks were completed by drafting troopers from the Life Guards (the transfer of soldiers from one unit to another, both permanent and *pro tem*, was a regular practice in the Restoration standing army). These draftees were probably concentrated in the regiment’s five or six senior troops, those commissioned 6–8 June. One hundred and fifty out of the three troops of the Life Guards (600 men), plus sixty from the three troops of horse grenadiers attached to the Life Guards (240 men), had accompanied Feversham to Somerset, leaving 450 Life Guards and 180 horse grenadiers in London. Thus, it is possible that the whole of the Queen’s Horse (400 men) was drafted from among these household troops but highly unlikely because such a weighty transfer would have left just fifty Life Guards and 180 horse grenadiers in Westminster, scarcely enough to protect the royal person during a period of raised tension and insecurity. The very short time that the regiment was granted to organise itself for the campaign further supports Taylor’s contention that the Queen’s Horse was ‘filled up with’ the Life Guards (ie drafts of regulars supplied the shortage of volunteers). The organisation of a new cavalry regiment was normally ‘a long and laborious process’ yet the Queen’s Horse, or at least its five or six senior troops, was ordered to take the field on 25 June, less than three weeks after its formation: such an ambitious schedule could only have been achieved by utilising professional officers, experienced troopers, and trained mounts.

Charles Dalton is in error when stating that the Queen’s Horse served at Sedgemoor: it quartered in or near Taunton on 5–7 July, leaving for Winchester on 8 July (Chandler 1976, 47; Dalton 1892–1904, II, 5–36).

41 Hyde Park.

42 William Legge (c. 1650–98) was the second son of the royalist colonel, William Legge (c. 1608–70), and younger brother of George Legge, 1st Baron Dartmouth (c. 1647–91). Contrary to Taylor’s fawning and deferential description, William Legge was a rakish and wild young man who was arraigned for murder in 1666. He was first commissioned a duration-only lieutenant in the Lord High Admiral’s Maritime Infantry Regiment, 1666–7; lieutenant in the Barbados battalion of Colonel Sir Tobias Bridge (d. 1674), 1667; cornet in the Royal Horse Guards, 1674; captain of the King’s Troop in the Royal Horse Guards, 1676; lieutenant colonel of the Queen’s Horse, 6 June 1685; and governor of Kinsale, 1686–91. Legge resigned his commission in the Queen’s Horse, December 1688. He also held several court offices: page of honour, 1668–76; supernumerary groom of the bedchamber, 1676–85; envoy to Brussels and Kassel, 1680; and superintendent of the royal parks, 1685–90. He died in Dublin on some date between 28 February and 28 June 1698.

As lieutenant colonel of the Queen’s Horse, Legge commanded the regiment in the field allowing Colonel Sir John Lanier, appointed brigadier on 20 June 1685, to concentrate on staff and general responsibilities (Dalton 1892–1904, I, 64, 75, 176, 190, 192; II, 5, 46, 92; Jeaffreson 1888, III, 381; *HP*, <<http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/legge-william-ii-1650-1697>>).

Undaunted Courage of his Predecessors, whose valour was never hid, but extend in their princes Service, on all Occasions: therefor that Coll he might maintain the Honour of his Predicessors, and discharge himself as every Loyall Gentleman ought, he thus betooke himself to his Majestys Service, with all the Resolution and bravery imaginable. Thus we have him, and the Ridgement continuing their March towards Salsbury with all expedition, and againe stop to tell you how that, On the 27th of June⁴³ Mounmouth with his Army, which was <86> Now got to Bath, and Wells, entered the town of Bath, went into the Church, pulled down the Organs, and committed much rudeness, there they puld down the Lead from the Church which they puld down to make Bullets of.⁴⁴ Here munmouth held his Rendevouse 'tis said his Army is now encreased to 7000 Men,⁴⁵ badly Armed;⁴⁶ On the 28th some of Monmouth forces met with some of the Kings, in a Lane which Munmouth had lind the hedges with his Men;⁴⁷ here the Kings Horse under Collonel Ogelthorp⁴⁸ had a Sharp dispute, in the Conflict were Slaine On both Sides about 170 Men, and

43 Taylor's chronology is misleading. Monmouth left Keynsham in the very early hours of 26 June and marched south-east along the left bank of the River Avon. On approaching Bath, he sent a trumpeter to demand its surrender. Although the town was garrisoned by only 500 militia, the summons was rejected and the herald shot. Monmouth pressed on to Norton St Philip, five miles south of Bath, where he rested for the remainder of 26 June intending to move to Frome on 27 June. While decamping on the morning of 27 June, he was attacked by Feversham's advance guard. Following success in this substantial skirmish, Monmouth reached Frome on 28 June, intending to march for London (*CSPD 1685*, 236–7; Foxcroft 1911, 1–24; Little 1956, 145–54; Wade 1980, 167–8; Coad 1849, 4–5; Dummer 1895, 47–8).

44 While resting at Frome, 28–29 June, Monmouth learned from his scouts that Feversham intended to shift from Bradford-on-Avon to Westbury on 29 June whence he would flank the road to London via Warminster, a movement supported from Trowbridge by the Red, Blue, and Yellow regiments of the Wiltshire militia. The continuation of his planned march on London via Warminster now depended upon defeating the royal army in an open, pitched battle and Monmouth knew that, despite the success at Norton St Philip on 27 June, such a task was beyond the capabilities of his hastily-raised and ill-trained forces. He decided to turn back into Somerset thus surrendering both the small tactical advantage recently gained and the operational initiative. He hoped to link-up with an army of 'clubmen' supposedly assembling on the Somerset Levels under Thomas Plaice, a Quaker and serge maker from Edington. The rebels entered Shepton Mallet on 30 June and reached Wells on 1 July where the cathedral – not Bath Abbey – was partially desecrated: horses were stabled in the nave, lead stripped from the roof to mould bullets, and the organ damaged (*HMC, Dean and Chapter of Wells MSS*, II, 458; Little 1956, 159–62; Dummer 1895, 48; Childs 2014, 84; Wigfield 1985, 134–5; Waylen 1859, 317).

45 The number of soldiers in Monmouth's army is unknown. Although the initial recruits from in and around Lyme Regis were properly listed, the number of volunteers at Taunton overwhelmed the system and, thereafter, paper records were not maintained. In addition, few contemporaries were proficient at reckoning the size of a body of troops through observation. From the landing at Lyme late in the afternoon of Thursday 11 June until the evening of 12 June, about 800 men were raised. When the expedition left Lyme on 15 July, it probably contained about 2,300 soldiers (2,000 foot and 300 horse), increasing to around 4,000 by the time it had reached Taunton, 18–19 June. On departing Taunton, 21 June, Monmouth commanded over 6,000 men and this number may have risen to nearer 7,000 on arrival at Keynsham on 25 June. Thereafter, despite the success at Norton St Philip on 27 June, the failure to capture Bristol and the unexpectedly speedy concentration of Feversham's army along the line of the Avon from Bristol to Bath led to demoralisation and increasing levels of desertion: 2,000 departed between the skirmish at Norton St Philip and the two-day halt at Frome, 28–29 June. Nevertheless, at Sedgemoor, although Monmouth's strength had been reduced to about 2,900 infantry and 600 cavalry, he outnumbered Feversham by over two to one (*Axminster Ecclesiastica*, 97–8; Burnet 1857, 412; Wade 1980, 162).

46 Monmouth had brought from the Netherlands 1,460 suits of cavalry armour; 100 muskets and bandoliers of cartridges; 500 pikes; 500 swords; 250 barrels of gunpowder; four light field guns; plus assorted carbines and pistols. Monmouth could afford no more and was only too happy to believe the report by the spy Robert Cragg that potential supporters in the west of England were already 'well armed'. The cavalry equipment and forty barrels of powder were lost when the two tenders were captured off Lyme on 20 June by HMS *Saudadoes*: consequently, Grey's horsemen were poorly accoutred. Although a few muskets and pikes were gathered from the Devon and Somerset militia, which retired in orderly fashion before Monmouth's advance from Lyme to Taunton via Axminster, Chard and Ilchester, at this early stage of the campaign Monmouth did not have enough weapons to arm all his men making improvisation essential (Wade 1980, 159; Ashcraft 1986, 449–51; *CTB 1685–9*, 718; *CSPD 1685*, 413).

47 The skirmish at Norton St Philip occurred on 27 June. It seems that Taylor has conflated the actions at Keynsham, 25 June, where Oglethorpe was involved, and Norton St Philip, where he was not. Those who served in the ranks, especially a newcomer like Taylor, knew very little of what was going on, a situation that has not changed.

48 Theophilus Oglethorpe (1650–1702), was a son of Sutton Oglethorpe (1612–85) of Oglethorpe Hall, Bramham, Yorkshire. In 1681 he married Eleanor (Ellen) Wall (1662–1732), a Roman Catholic from Rathkennan, County Tipperary, maid to Louise de K rouaille, Duchess of Portsmouth (1649–1734), then head laundress to Charles II. Although Oglethorpe remained a Protestant, two of his four daughters, Anne (1683–1756) and Eleanor 1684–1775), were sent to St Germain-en-Laye in 1696 to be educated as Roman Catholics where they were joined in 1713 by their younger sister, Frances (Fanny) Charlotte. The third surviving son was Francis Edward Oglethorpe (1696–1785).

Oglethorpe, decidedly rakish and ill-disciplined when young, was a client of Lord Feversham and one of the 'swordsmen' much favoured by James II. He had joined the French army at the age of eighteen in 1668; captain in Sir Henry Jones's/Duke

18 of Monmouth's Men taken prisoners, which were immediatly hanged.⁴⁹ Now the Kings forces hold their Rendevouse at Salsbury,⁵⁰ and on the 29th the Army being Compleat marches from Salsbury,⁵¹ directing themselves after Munmouth which is drawing his forces towards Salt Sedgmore,⁵² and his, and the Kings Forces; had by their Scouts dayly skirmishes, for Munmouth watched all the Oppertunities to lie in ambuscado, to intrap the Kings forces; also every night his outriderds, caused an allarum in the Kings army.⁵³ On the last of June Katherin Queen Dowagers Reidgment of Hors, came into Salsbury; where they remained untill the second of July, at which time they had orders from the Lord Feversham, to march with all Expedition, & Joyne wth the Army.⁵⁴ Now the Duke of Albemarle with his forces hold their Rendevous, in and about the City of Exchester * [*sic*].⁵⁵ Thus in the Afternoon on the Second of July, our Reidgment Marched out of Salsbury, continuing our March towards the <87> Kings Army, soe that on the fifth about noon, we Arived to them, having marched the most part of the last night, and therefore being weary, we were Quartered at Taunton, to refresh Our Selves;⁵⁶ for You Must Understand that

of Monmouth's regiment of light horse in the French service, 1672–5; captain in the Royal English infantry regiment in France, 1675–8; major of Feversham's dragoon regiment in England, 1678; lieutenant of the 3rd Troop of the Life Guards (Feversham's), 1678; major, 1679; lieutenant colonel, 1680; knighted, 7 July 1685, for conveying news of the victory at Sedgemoor to James II in Whitehall; colonel of the Holland infantry battalion, 23 October 1685; brigadier general, 1688; resigned his commissions at the Glorious Revolution, 1688. He dabbled in Jacobite politics and went to France in 1692 but returned to England in 1696 and swore the oaths to the new regime. Oglethorpe was elected MP for Morpeth, 1685, and Haslemere, 1698 and 1701. He died in London, 10 April 1702. During the campaign, Oglethorpe commanded Feversham's scouts and reconnaissance troops but was not involved in the action at Norton St Philip (Childs 2004; Ettinger 1936, 3–23; Little 1956, 188; *HP*, <<http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/oglethorpe-theophilus-1650-1701>>).

49 No precise casualty returns were compiled following the action at Norton St Philip. Feversham's report to James II, via the Earl of Sunderland, stated that eight or nine private soldiers were dead and about thirty wounded but there were no officer casualties. Another letter from Feversham acknowledged 'some' dead in the grenadier company of the 1st Foot Guards, commanded by Captain Francis Hawley (c 1653–92), while the anonymous 'Lord Feversham's March', almost certainly prepared by a member of his staff, indicated that twenty men and some horses had been 'lost in this dayes action'. Feversham probably had between fifty and 100 casualties: about twenty killed; perhaps forty or fifty wounded; and several taken prisoner. Monmouth's army, thought Feversham, lost 'a great many men ... and that one Colonel (Edward) Matthews had been killed.' Monmouth's force suffered between twenty and twenty-five casualties and Colonel Matthews remained very much alive (*CSPD 1685*, 236–7; *HMC, Stopford-Sackville MSS*, 11; Childs 2014, 82; Little 1956, 152–4; Dummer 1895, 47–8).

50 Feversham's army assembled at Bath, not Salisbury. The cavalry of Churchill's advance party had reached Salisbury on Sunday 14 June where it joined Cornbury's and Coy's troops from the Royal Dragoons. Most of Feversham's main body concentrated at Bath on the evening of 26 June. The Portsmouth train of artillery arrived in the royal camp at Westbury on 29 June. The train from the Tower of London linked-up with Feversham on 30 June while he was *en route* from Westbury to Frome (Childs 2014, 70, 84).

51 Feversham's army was marching from Bradford-on-Avon to Westbury on 29 June.

52 King's Sedgemoor, Somerset.

53 Both sides relied upon mounted reconnaissance patrols to locate their opponents resulting in several encounters prior to the action at Norton St Philip on 27 June, most notably at Ashill, 19 June; near Langport, 21 June; close to Glastonbury, 22 June; and in Keynsham, 25 June. Difficulty in finding an enemy and remaining in touch thereafter was characteristic of contemporary warfare: Oglethorpe's troopers twice stumbled upon Monmouth's main force by luck rather than judgement and it proved remarkably easy for Monmouth's army to 'disappear' from Bridgwater on the night of 5–6 July, despite Oglethorpe's troopers being close-by. Inaccurate and unreliable maps and gazetteers; very small armies; shortage of cavalry; wide areas of low population density; the uncultivated nature of much of the landscape; and the physical height of hedges and crops, all contributed. It is also difficult for a modern reader to imagine the intensity of night-time darkness during the seventeenth century, particularly in rural areas. Although Monmouth gained a good deal of information from the broadly-sympathetic local population, he was largely ignorant of developments beyond the campaign theatre. Only in the aftermath of the skirmish at Keynsham did Monmouth realise that he was facing Feversham's full corps rather than Churchill's advance detachment. The opposing forces maintained improved, but not unbroken, contact following Norton St Philip (Childs 1991, 84, 305; Childs 2014, 77–8).

54 The Queen's Horse was the only recently-raised unit that was operationally capable of joining the field army. It was to be followed, a little later, by the three senior troops of Peterborough's Horse, 400 infantry recruits, and four companies of the Royal Scots (Childs 2014, 72; *CSPD 1685*, 252).

55 Exeter, where the Devon militia mustered on 11 June.

56 No other known source mentions this junction between the royal army and the Queen's Horse. On that day, 5 July, Feversham was marching from Somerton to the chosen camp site behind the Bussex Rhine on Weston Moor, north of Westonzoiland. The link-up probably occurred around 11:00 between the villages of Aller and Othery. Because the Queen's Horse was weary following its series of forced marches and Feversham did not envisage an immediate, major action – Monmouth was then occupying Bridgwater, the south side of which he appeared to be fortifying in order to withstand a siege

Munmouths forces, lay about three miles more west,⁵⁷ and the Kings forces⁵⁸ for the most part lay about Taunton only Collonell Trylawny, & Coll: Kircks, & Duglass's Reidgment lay incampt on Sedgmore;⁵⁹ and we and all other of his Majestys forces, kept Strong Guards, & Stricht Watches,⁶⁰

– the regiment was probably ordered to turn left at the Othery junction on to the Bristol-Exeter road and billet overnight in Taunton, about twelve miles distant. Even though Taunton was supposedly 'secure' in the hands of the Devon militia, Wade reported that 'great numbers' of Monmouth's men journeyed from Bridgwater to Taunton on 4 July to visit families and friends, returning, 'for the most part', on the morning of Sunday 5 July. The Queen's Horse must have reached Taunton during the afternoon, not long after the last rebels had departed (Bowen 1720, 149–50; Wade 1980, 169; Dummer 1895, 48; Scott 2015, 199, 201).

57 Monmouth's forces entered Bridgwater on 3 July, remaining until the late evening of 5 July when they commenced the night march towards Sedgemoor. Influenced by reports that the rebels were digging earthworks on the south side of the town, Feversham assumed that they were preparing to undergo a short siege to create a sufficiently convincing diversion to cover either Monmouth's intended escape via the Bristol Channel, possibly into Wales, or the march of the whole army towards Bristol. Accordingly, on 4 July Feversham ordered the officers of the artillery train to bring forward the mortars and a supply of shells which had been left in Bath on 27 June (Dummer 1895, 47–8).

58 The militia.

59 The site of Feversham's infantry camp on Weston Moor along the south bank of the Bussex Rhine to the north of Westonzoyland was 'very well chosen ... for such a small body of men, and very secure'. The Royal Scots (five companies under Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Douglas), the army's oldest foot regiment, occupied the place of honour on the right of the line, while the five companies of the Queen Dowager's battalion (Colonel Percy Kirke), held the left of the line, the second most prestigious station. The remaining units extended to the left of the Royal Scots in order of seniority: seven companies from the 1st battalion of the 1st Foot Guards, led by the Duke of Grafton; six companies from the 2nd battalion of the 1st Foot Guards under Major William Eaton; six companies from the 2nd Foot Guards commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Edward Sackville; and five companies from the battalion of Colonel Charles Trelawny led by Lieutenant Colonel Charles Churchill. This regimental alignment did not obey the rules of precedence and cannot be convincingly explained. The guns, minus the mortars which were *en route* from Bath, covered the Bridgwater-Westonzoyland road from an artillery park situated between the left of Kirke's half-battalion and the bridge that carried the carriageway across the Bussex Rhine: the horse teams and drivers were lodged separately in Westonzoyland. Three regiments of the Wiltshire militia infantry (*c.* 1,300 men), commanded by Thomas Herbert, 8th Earl of Pembroke (1656–1733), lacked tents and had to be billeted in the villages of Middlezoy and Othery, one and two miles distant respectively (Childs 2014, 86–7; Chandler 1985, 50–3, 180; Wheeler 1910, 162–3; Dalrymple 1790, II, 24–5; Dummer 1895, 48–9; Waylen 1859, 317–18; Scott 2015, 81; Hardwicke 1778, II, 306; Tincey 2005, 102).

60 Although Feversham did not expect a full-scale battle on Weston Moor, he seriously entertained the possibility that the rebels might mount a limited, spoiling attack either to cover Monmouth's escape via the Bristol Channel into Wales or the march of the whole army towards Bristol. Feversham's task was complicated because, although his heavily-outnumbered regulars were supposed to be a match for any number of rebels, the reverse at Norton St Philip was a reminder of the dangers of over-confidence and he was responsible for the king's sole army. Pondering how best to deploy a weak force in the face of a superior, and possibly aggressive, enemy, Feversham rode on to Sedgemoor during the evening of 5 July to supervise the positioning of one-eighth of his soldiers as sentries and pickets. Captain John Coy took one troop of the Royal Dragoons south to Burrow Bridge on the River Parrett to watch the Bristol-Taunton-Exeter road. A 'grand guard' of forty horsemen from the 2nd Troop of Life Guards, commanded by its quartermaster, Captain William Upcott, was placed to the east of Penzoy Farm to observe the Bridgwater-Westonzoyland road and protect the artillery park. Upcott was instructed to dispatch regular patrols as far as the Taunton intersection. To Upcott's right, a party of fifty musketeers was stationed in a sheepfold called Pitzoy Pound to watch a 'middle but narrow way' from Bridgwater on to the moor. These musketeers were also to support Upcott who was directed to retire upon them should he come under pressure.

Two troops from the Royal Horse Guards and one from the Royal Dragoons (fifty men each) under Major Sir Francis Compton were posted to the right of the royal camp 'against a way that goes from Chedzoy towards Bridgwater', almost certainly the modern Chedzoy Lane. In Compton's left rear, the immediate front of the camp was screened by an 'advance party' and a line of sentries and small patrols comprising 100 infantrymen from the duty battalion, the Royal Scots – half its strength – to 'keep guard, and lie upon their arms all night'. Some of these may well have taken station on the north bank of the Bussex Rhine, having first secured their retreat. The remaining two troops of the Royal Horse Guards, the Life Guards (110 troopers plus sixty Life Guard Horse Grenadiers), and Royal Dragoons (three troops) billeted in Westonzoyland where they slept in their clothes with mounts saddled and bridled.

These dispositions were essentially static. The only mobile patrol was provided by Theophilus Oglethorpe who continued his now-established role of scoutmaster-general. Anticipating that the rebels might exit Bridgwater and make for Bristol, Feversham told him to take three troops of the Royal Horse Guards (*c.* 120 men) to scout through Bradney towards the causeway that carried the Bath Road over the fens. If he found nothing, he was to move north to watch the Bristol Road. In addition, he was also to keep a close eye on the situation in and around Bridgwater. Should he fail to find the enemy, he was to climb Position or Knowle Hill (*c.* 230ft), on the edge of the Poldens above the T-junction where the Bath Road from Bridgwater forked to either Bristol or Wells: from this vantage point, on a clear night, Oglethorpe might also have been able to detect movement on the Bristol Road. Feversham told Oglethorpe to wait on the hill until any rebels came into view and then shadow their march, always ensuring that headquarters were fully informed.

Feversham stayed in the field throughout the evening, riding as far north as Chedzoy whence he sent a messenger to Oglethorpe on Knowle Hill to enquire whether he had seen or heard anything; the reply was negative. Reasonably satisfied, though uneasy, he returned to Westonzoyland and, at 00:45 on 6 July, entered army headquarters in Weston Court, where his

for feare of Surprizes for Munmouth was a brave Soldier (tho' a Rebell) and watched all advantages[.] Thus we have given you a perfect Account of the proceeding of Both Armys, hitherto, we now come to give you an impartial Account, of the fatall Batel, which put a period to this detestable Rebellion.

On Moonday the sixth of July 1685, whilst the Silent Earth was covered with her Sable Vaile, these forces of Rebellion contrived to Surprize, and cutt of his Sacred Maj^{ty} forces, then encampt on Sedgmore, thincking thereby fore to defeat all his Majesties Army, holding there rendesvous in and about Taunton⁶¹ &c. for about two a Clock in the Morning, Munmouth ranged both his horse, and foot forces, and put them in order;⁶² Himself; and Count Horn, commanded the Infantry; Count Horn commanded the Sithmen particular, and the Left Wing; Munmouth commanded his maine Batatalia of Foot, and the Lord Greay, commanded the <88> Body of the Calvary. Now Munmouth had in his Army 300 Sithers, armd with Sithes, pistols sticking in at their Girdles, and brod sords, in wast belts,⁶³ he had about 4000 foot armd with Piks, &

camp bed had been set up in the parlour. Contrary to later stories that he slumbered until disturbed by news of the rebel attack, Feversham would rest for less than thirty minutes (Childs 2014, 88; Little 1956, 175; Chandler 1985, 50–2; White-Spunner 2006, 86; Kennett 1719, III, 437; Dummer 1895, 48).

61 Monmouth's army was in Bridgwater, not Taunton.

62 Monmouth's under-trained and inexperienced soldiers could only hope for success against the king's regulars in certain conditions. At Norton St Philip they had benefited from the natural cover provided by hedgerows; at Sedgemoor they would have the advantage of a stratagem. Encouraged by local intelligence sources which indicated that the royal camp at Westonzoiland might be vulnerable to surprise attack and aware that significant reinforcements were marching towards Feversham, Monmouth decided to act offensively. Between 22:00 and 23:00 on Sunday 5 July, Monmouth set out from Castle Field, Bridgwater, along the causeway that carried the Bath Road across the levels. Monmouth commanded the main body of c.2,900 foot organised into five regiments: the Red, or Duke's, under Lieutenant Colonel Nathaniel Wade (1646–1718) (c 800 men); the Blue (Taunton) led by Lieutenant Colonel Richard Bovett (d.1685) (c 600 men); the Green, Lieutenant Colonel Abraham Holmes (d.1685) (c 600 men); the Yellow commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Edward Matthews (1640–97) (c 500 men); the White, Lieutenant Colonel John Foulkes (d.1693) (c 400 men); and the Lyme Regis independent company (c 80 men). In the rear of the infantry, Grey led c 600 cavalry followed by three field guns and a train of between forty-two and forty-seven waggons plus the remaining field gun, which was defective. Monmouth did not appoint any full colonels, this rank being reserved for members of the aristocracy and upper gentry who might rally to his cause (Childs 2014, 87; Wade 1980, 152; Reresby 1936, 383–4; DC/SM/2/4).

63 During the rebels' stay in Taunton, 18–21 June, the number of volunteers had outstripped the supply of weapons. On 20 June, Monmouth instructed the constables and tithingmen in adjacent parishes to seize all available scythes and scythe blades, which were then straightened and rehafted by local blacksmiths. Almost certainly modelled on the new-fangled grenadier companies which were rapidly becoming *de rigueur* in professional infantry battalions, between 20 and 22 June a company of 200 scythemen was attached to each of Monmouth's five regiments: Taylor is the only known source to imply that Monmouth made an imaginative virtue out of necessity by turning scythemen into ersatz-grenadiers. Captain James Hayes (d.1685) commanded the scythe company in the Red Regiment and Captain William Thompson that of the Blue Regiment, both reliable officers and members of the original expedition from the Dutch Republic. The initial establishment of scythemen in Monmouth's army was thus c.1,000 but it is unclear for how long this strength was maintained. When the rebel host rested in Bridgwater, 21–22 June, John Oldmixon (1673–1742), writing forty-five years later, remembered seeing about 500 but he was then a boy of twelve who had probably never seen more than a few tens of people gathered in one place. Another eye-witness, Andrew Paschall (c 1631–96), rector of Chedzoy and prebendary of Wells, initially recorded 4,000 armed and 1,000 unarmed men but did not mention scythemen. Both 'King James II's Account' and Paschall's second narrative stated that, despite the high rate of desertion consequent upon the skirmish at Norton St Philip on 27 June, Monmouth marched 1,000 scythemen on to Sedgemoor, 5–6 July. John Taylor's statement that only 300 scythiers were present on 5–6 July therefore seems comparatively low but probably refers just to the specially-formed scythe demi-battalion, the remaining 700 remaining with their regiments but it is impossible to be certain.

In attack, Monmouth's scythiers were intended to act as shock troops, in defence, they protected the artillery and less well-armed infantry against cavalry: Monmouth's field gun deployment at Norton St Philip was guarded by a company of scythes. Taylor's description of the scythemen's extensive and exceptional level of equipment further indicates that they were regarded as élite troops: Taylor's rather fanciful drawing of a scythier is reproduced by David Buisseret.

According to Taylor, the 300-strong scythe detachment, commanded by Anton Buys, Count van Horn, headed the infantry at Sedgemoor. Presumably, it was composed of picked men from the five, regimental scythe companies in imitation of a professional grenadier battalion. It must have been rapidly organised during the late afternoon and evening of Sunday 5 July following the decision to launch the surprise attack on the royal camp, so the men would not have been able to train together. Armed with a weapon which enjoyed a fearsome reputation in hand-to-hand fighting, the scythe demi-battalion was to follow closely behind Grey's cavalry and charge into the royalist camp once surprise had been achieved: throughout the devising and execution of the early stages of the attack, Monmouth seems to have been unaware of the existence of the Bussex Rhine, or, at least, thought it a lesser obstacle than proved to be the case. Taylor's depiction of this deployment is supported by Andrew Paschall's first narrative, which states that Monmouth brought his infantry on to the moor in 'three

Musquets, compleat. And about 3000 foot more, some with Halberds, Prongs, bills, & what else they could gett. He hadd 400 hors completely Armd, with Sword, Carbins, and pistols (the which for the most part were duple barreld) and he had besides about 300 hors more, which some had Arms, & others none, these were place [*sic*] in the reare of the Horse, all which were commanded by the Lord Greay, and had Orders to begin the onseet;⁶⁴ Secondly the Batalia of Sitheears, under the Comand of Count Horn, assisted with 1500 Musquetiers,⁶⁵ now to Second them; and lastly Munmouth with the Maine body of the Infantry, was to cary on the Main Bataile, which was ranged in Order having four Sakers haled [hauled?] before them.⁶⁶ Thus Mounmouths being ranged into this Order, about two a'clock in the Morning began their march, with all the Silence Imaganiable:⁶⁷ fetching a while about to the Eastward, for you must understand that monmouth laid encampt in the front of the Kings Army, about two Miles to y^e West ward; therefor he continued his March, wheleing to the East ward, and sort to fall on the reare of the Kings Army, intending to Surprise the Vauntguard;⁶⁸ for he had som which had informed him of the watchword, which that night was James the Second:⁶⁹ thus we have Munmouth silently marching to Surprize his Majt^{ies} forces on Sedgmore, and come to give you an Account of his Majesties Army.

bodies, two greater, one lesser (which lesser body might be intended to follow Lord Grey's Horse, if they had gone over the Plungeon into Westonzoyland).' The scheme was abandoned when two-thirds of Grey's horsemen, on discovering the presence of the Bussex Rhine and feeling the weight of royalist musketry, lost discipline and veered away to the north-west. Accordingly, 'this lesser body after a time joined itself with one of the greater bodies when, as [whereas] before, they were commanded to run over the ditch, now they are commanded not to do so upon pain of death.' Further validation is provided by the first of three sketch-maps accompanying Edward Dummer's 'Journal', showing Monmouth's infantry column, divided into Paschall's 'two greater' bodies, marching on to Sedgemoor with a small, separate, unit in the van, which might have been the scythe demi-battalion. There is, however, contrary evidence. 'King James II's Account' says that Monmouth arranged his army into two columns, the horse on the left and the infantry to the right. Nathaniel Wade, who commanded 'the vanguard of the foot with the Duke's Regiment', does not mention being preceded by a scythe demi-battalion. He maintains that the plan called for the horse to advance first 'and push into the King's camp and mixing with the King's foote endeavour to keep them from coming together; that the cannon should follow the horse, and the foote the cannon, and draw all up in one line and so finish what the horse had began before the King's horse or canon could get in order.'

Taylor's version of Monmouth's scythe deployment at Sedgemoor cannot, therefore, be given unqualified endorsement. Despite some corroboration for the existence of regimental scythe companies and a scratch demi-battalion of scythe shock troops at Sedgemoor, the situation remains unclear. The scythe demi-battalion probably existed but was untested in action. Each of the five infantry regiments certainly included a 200-man scythe company but supernumerary scythiers also served in the standard infantry companies – Wade records that Captain Richard Slape's company of the Red Regiment consisted of 'sithes and musqueteers' (Oldmixon 1730, II, 703; Chandler 1985, 58–9, 109–10, 112–13; Little 1956, 125, 181; Scott 2015, 204; Wheeler 1910, 160; Wigfield 1985, 80; Wade 1980, 166, 168, 169–70; Paschall 1811, App 4, xli–xlv; Dummer 1895, 48–9; Hardwicke 1778, II, 307–8; Buisseret 2010, xii; Wolseley 1894, I, 310–11).

64 At Sedgemoor, Monmouth commanded c.2,900 infantry and c.600 cavalry (Childs 2014, 87).

65 This is probably an exaggeration. Monmouth's foot may have deployed as many as 1,500 muskets, or other firearms, but the actual total was likely to have been closer to 1,000. Feversham, one-third of whose infantry was armed with the pike, fielded between 1,000 and 1,100 musketeers (Childs 1991, 75–6).

66 Monmouth advanced along the causeway that carried the Bath Road over the fens. Half-a-mile short of the village of Knowle, the column wheeled right into Bradney Lane, then left along Marsh Lane where it halted to reorganise. The cavalry passed through the infantry to take the van, closely followed by three of the four field guns. The waggon train, plus the one defective cannon, marched back on to the Bath Road before turning north towards Bristol at the fork beneath Knowle Hill (Childs 2014, 89; Bowen 1720, 149; Wade 1980, 170; Chandler 1985, 53–7).

67 Monmouth's march from Castle Field, Bridgwater, began between 22:00 and 23:00 on Sunday 5 July. Despite drinking cider during the afternoon, the troops maintained surprisingly good march discipline (Paschall 1811, App 4, xliii; Wade 1980, 170; Chandler 1985, 58).

68 Because the Bussex Rhine was considered an impossible obstacle to mounted troops, although 'passable' for infantry, Monmouth instructed Grey's cavalry to cross via the Upper Plungeon before charging into the right flank and right rear of Feversham's encampment. The foot, presumably led by van Horn's 300 scythemen, would then follow to assault the disordered royalists. In the final phase of the action, the army would regroup before advancing on Westonzoyland to tackle Feversham's horse and dragoons (Childs 2014, 89; Wade 1980, 169–70).

69 The password that night was 'Albemarle'. There were spies in both camps (Chandler 1985, 63; Davis 1895, 34; Scott 1868, I, 497; Hardwicke 1778, II, 309).

Now his Majesties Forces knew nothing of these Sutile [*sic*], treach<89>ery: lay safly encampt on Sedgmore, where was about 120 Hors under the Command of Collonell Oglethorpe,⁷⁰ about 600 Foot under the Command of Collonell Trylaunie, 900 under the Command of Collonell Duglass, and about 760 under the Comand of Collonell Kirck, in all 2260 Men;⁷¹ with 120 Horse,⁷² these foot were all well disciplined – Old Souldiers, and those which when Tangier was demolisht;⁷³ were brought from there, these lay incampt formidable, with about thirty peices of Ordnance, & Attendance;⁷⁴ laying by them, haveing Strong Guards and Strickt Watches; and

70 Late in the evening of 5 July, Theophilus Oglethorpe left Westonzoyland at the head of his patrol of three troops from the Royal Horse Guards (c 120 men). Their objective was to watch for any enemy movement around Bridgwater, either along the northerly Bristol Road or the more easterly Bath Road. Should he see nothing, Oglethorpe was to establish an observation post on Knowle Hill, situated above the T-junction where the Bath Road divided, south to Wells and north to Bristol. If he detected any movement, he was to inform royal headquarters in Westonzoyland and maintain contact with the enemy. Oglethorpe's patrol, the only mobile royalist force operating beyond the immediate vicinity of Weston Moor, seems to have set off towards the village of Chedzoy before striking the Bath Road. Next, the troopers continued north to the Bristol Road. Having seen nothing of the enemy, and neglecting orders to watch Bridgwater closely, they returned to the Bath Road and proceeded along the causeway reaching the summit of Knowle Hill at about midnight. Between 22:00 and 23:00, Monmouth's soldiers set off from Castle Field, Bridgwater, and marched along the Bath Road causeway until turning right down Bradney Lane and left on to Marsh Lane where they halted to reorganise before the trek across the fens. During this pause, the hoofbeats of Oglethorpe's patrol as it rode along the causeway towards Knowle Hill were clearly heard. Despite Monmouth's column marching along the Bath Road and Oglethorpe's patrol crossing the same road twice, they remained unaware of each other's presence. Following the reordering of Monmouth's column on Marsh Lane, the waggon train returned to the causeway before taking the Bristol fork at the T-junction below Knowle Hill. Oglethorpe, atop Knowle Hill since well before midnight, failed to detect the passage of the waggons even though the defective cannon had developed a squeaky wheel. Oglethorpe waited for close to an hour, growing increasingly anxious that the enemy had slipped past unnoticed in the mist rising from the fens. Feversham's courier then rode in to enquire about the situation. Armed with Oglethorpe's report, he promptly returned to Weston Court, which he reached at c.01:15. Sir Hugh Middleton (c 1658–1702), a staff officer, promptly ushered him into Feversham's presence: having seen no rebels, Oglethorpe intended to take his men back along the causeway towards Bridgwater. Should he still not discover anything, he would return to the royal camp via the Bridgwater-Westonzoyland road. As the dispatch rider talked to Feversham, Oglethorpe was already leading his men down from Knowle Hill on to the causeway. Oglethorpe has been much criticised, principally by Sir Garnet Wolseley, for his inability to discover Monmouth's night march. In mitigation, although he was clearly remiss in not sending regular patrols towards and into Bridgwater, in the mist and darkness Oglethorpe missed the rebels by the finest of margins.

Although the paper strength of Oglethorpe's command was 150 men (50 per troop), the actual number was probably closer to 120. During the Nine Years' War, 1688–97, William Blathwayt calculated that, after allowing for campaign friction and the numerous regimental 'dead pays', the average field strength of a British infantry battalion was 600 men and a cavalry squadron 130 (Childs 2014, 89; Chandler 1985, 52–8; BL, Add MSS 9,724, fol 169; Bowen 1720, 78–9; Wolseley 1894, I, 322–5).

71 Despite omitting the three battalions of foot guards, Taylor substantially overestimates the strength of the royalist infantry. However, he seriously underestimates the number of cavalry and dragoons.

Contrary to the impression created by Dr Scott's table – apart from the Royal Scots, realistically listed at 204 men against an official strength of 300 – the actual numbers of royal infantry at Sedgemoor were almost certainly appreciably lower than those represented in the annual establishments. The ten companies from Percy Kirke's and Charles Trelawny's half-battalions should have amounted to 500 rank and file but the actual figure was probably between 350 and 400. There were thirteen companies from the 1st Foot Guards, giving a paper strength of 780 soldiers but a realistic figure closer to 600–650, plus six companies from the 2nd Foot Guards amounting to 360 men on paper but nearer to 250–300 on the ground. Thus Feversham's infantry should have totalled 1,940 men but, at the most, only between 1,500 and 1,650 men were present on Weston Moor and the actual number may well have been lower. Throughout the campaign, Feversham knew that he was heavily outnumbered and designed his operations accordingly (Davis 1895, 6–7; Scott 2015, 190).

72 Feversham's establishment cavalry strength was 720 but there were probably only between 500 and 600 in the field. Forty Life Guards were guarding the artillery park and the Bridgwater road and two troops of the Royal Horse Guards (100 men), 110 Life Guardsmen, sixty Life Guard Horse Grenadiers, and three troops of the Royal Dragoons (120 men) were quartered in Westonzoyland. When Oglethorpe returned to the camp via the Bridgwater-Westonzoyland road, having gathered in Upcott's forty Life Guards *en route*, about 160 additional cavalymen joined the royal line. In the wake of their brush with Grey's cavalry, Compton's three troops retired to a position covering the approach to the Upper Plungeon across the Bussex Rhine (Childs 2014, 90–3).

73 Kirke's and Trelawny's battalions were the old 1st and 2nd Tangier Regiments, while the five companies from the Royal Scots had all fought in Tangier between 1680 and 1684. Several men from the 1st and 2nd Foot Guards had probably also served in the King's Battalion in Tangier over the same period but it is impossible to be certain because this had been a composite unit comprising drafts from among the regular guards companies. Inexperienced troops may not have reacted so calmly and proficiently when suddenly attacked at night (Childs 2014, 94–5, 198).

74 Because a major night action was not anticipated, Feversham's guns, minus the mortars which were on the road from Bath, were parked *en bloc* towards the extreme left flank and the horses and teamsters lodged separately in Westonzoyland. Normally, three-pounder infantry guns, served by the grenadier companies, would have been positioned in the intervals

because they suspected noe such surprize the most of the Commition Officers, were gone to Taunton and there about to refresh themselves.⁷⁵ Soe that, this night, there was only Two Captains, One Lieutenant, and five Ensigns in the Campe. For they thought themselves secure, by their own Guards, & the Guards of the other forces of Hors and foot; laying in, and about Taunton.⁷⁶ Thus we have given you a true Account of both Armys, we now come to give y^o an Account of the begining, and Success of the Bataile. Before that Phebus had dispersed his raies, and Guilded the Earth with his Golden beams, couldly did the Trumpet of Warr, in both Armys blow their shrill blast; provoackeing slugards, to fight. For betwixt three, and foure, in the Morning, Munmouths Horse aproach the Kings Vaunt Guards, which bidding them Stand, and demanding the word, they said James the Second, soe the Vauntguards let them pass quietly but Collonel Oglethorp being next at hand, hearing a Noise of hors marching, (for 'twas exceeding dark) with the Guards, rod forth, whoe commig up with the Lord Grey, demaned <90> whoe they were, and the watch word; they Answered friend, to King James the Second, he bid them again Stand, and demanded whither they were friend to King James the Second, late duke of York: they sayed noe: but for King James, late Duke of Mounmouth; upon which Collonel Ogelthorp discharged his pistols at them, and soe galloped a main to his Hors upon this the Outguards fired, and the Kings Army on Sedgmore, and his forces were allarmed,⁷⁷ and the Expert Tangire Soldiers, with out the Command of Officers soon ranged them Selves into Order of Bataile, with the greatest bravery imaginable, also the forces of Munmouth proceeded and his

between battalions but this was considered unnecessary because the army camped in a heightened state of readiness rather than full battle formation. About two hours into the action, Bishop Peter Mews (1619–1706), recently translated from Bath and Wells to Winchester, was attending the army, mainly because he enjoyed soldiering but also to care for his previous flock and protect certain property interests. He volunteered his six coach horses to tow a pair of cannon from the artillery park into position between the 1st battalion of the 1st Foot Guards and the Royal Scots. The subsequent deployment of nine more guns substantially relieved the pressure on both battalions (Childs 1991, 86–7; Childs 2014, 87; Little 1956, 182; Dummer 1895, 49; Webb 1995, 95–6; Walton 1894, 733).

⁷⁵ In 1718, thirty-three years after the event, White Kennett received information from a retired officer of the Royal Horse Guards who recalled that, on the night of 5–6 July, the royalist cavalry officers were in bed in Westonzoyland while their infantry comrades lay drunk in the camp. Indeed, spies had reported a good deal of cider-induced revelry among Feversham's foot soldiers on the afternoon of 5 July, a fact that may have influenced Monmouth's decision to launch a surprise attack. In addition, Edward Dummer comments upon the 'supiness (*sic*) and a preposterous confidence of our selves with an undervaluing of the rebels' and the fact that Feversham's encampment was not fully battle-ready. However, the rapid and disciplined response to the rebels' night assault does not suggest that the royalist infantry was suffering from the after-effects of mass debauchery. Taylor, who was billeted in Taunton on the night of 5–6 July, was presumably speaking from personal observation when stating that most of the royalist foot officers were not in the camp but carousing in the town. If this was the case, then Sedgemoor was a truly 'soldiers' battle'. James II's regular infantry was clearly well-drilled and trained and led by a corps of highly efficient non-commissioned officers.

When in the presence of an enemy, armies usually camped in fighting order so that, on an alarm, the men could fall out of their bivouacs directly into battle formation. On Weston Moor, the infantry tents had been pitched in a line, fifty yards deep, sufficiently withdrawn from the edge of the Bussex Rhine to allow space for emergency deployment. Standard procedure required that marker posts and/or tapes were laid out to indicate each company's action station but, because the royal army camped in a state of battle readiness rather than battle order, only the half-battalion of the Royal Scots, the duty battalion, was required to take this step. When the emergency arose, the remaining five battalions successfully aligned themselves on the more organised deployment of the Royal Scots.

Taunton was evidently very busy because, according to Wade, on Saturday 4 July 'great numbers' had left Monmouth's camp in Bridgwater to visit friends and family in the town, 'the most part' returning on Sunday 5 July (Childs 2014, 86, 90; Kennett 1706, III, 437; Arthur 1909, I, 196; Wade 1980, 169; Dummer 1895, 48–9; *LG*, no. 2049; Wolseley 1894, I, 320–1).

⁷⁶ It has often been assumed, rather naïvely, that the king's commissioned officers were normally present with their commands but this was rarely the case in either peace or war and the army was largely run by long-service sergeants and corporals. Absenteeism was a major and persistent problem throughout the three British standing armies. The senior infantry officer, the Duke of Grafton, reputedly spent the night of 5–6 July under canvas among the 1st battalion of the 1st Foot Guards. Captain Charles Barclay and at least four other officers were on duty with the Royal Scots. Feversham lodged at Weston Court in Westonzoyland while Percy Kirke had commandeered the vicarage but it is not known whether he was in residence throughout the evening or boozing and hunting for women in Taunton. It is interesting to note that the manuscript and printed reports of the battle do not mention the names of individual Royalist infantry officers, with the honourable exception of Barclay, at any stage of the battle, whereas several cavalry officers – John Churchill, Compton, Sandys, Oglethorpe, Upcott, Cornbury – are identified. Even if the absentees had reacted immediately on hearing gunfire from Weston Moor, or were already making their unsteady way back from Taunton, they would not have been able to reach their posts in sufficient time to affect the outcome (Childs 1980, 37–9; Childs 2014, 88, 90–1; Fitzroy 1922, 36–8).

⁷⁷ The alarm was raised in the royal camp at c.01:00, 6 July.

horse metting with Collonell Ogelthorps, stood the first Charge; for they came horse head, almost to head, Now Oglethorps Men being Expert Soldiers fired on them, upon which Munnouths horse being unused to such service, were put into disorder, Some threw their Riders, and all the rest in a confused manner, thronged together; soe that in less than half ane houre, Gray with his Horse quited the feilde, Cowardly without firing but five pistols: leaving behind him about 100 of his Men Slain, and desperatly wounded, and about 27 taken prisoners.⁷⁸ Now Count Horn, and his Sitheears approachte, who stoutly maintained their ground against Ogelthorps hors (cutting off many for those Sithes was a desperat weapon) untill Mounmouths Main Batallia drew up, which as Stoutly (as our men did) continued the Bataile, and those brave Tangier Soldiers as nobly received them;⁷⁹ And now the Cannons on boath sides <91> begin loudly to roar out their mortall peals, Upon this Noise all the out forces about Taunton &c were Allarmed, and as fast as hast would give leave, put themselves into a warlick posture, soe that by foure (while 'twas yet dark) they begann to March towards Sedgmore, both hors, and foot. In the Mean time Munnouth's Infantry stoutly fought on having him at their head, and the Kings forces as bravely resisted, soe that many both officers and souldiers fell on both sides; for you must understand that there was a Trench, or Bogmire, betwixt both armys, soe that thro the Darknesse of the Night they could not find a passe to come at each other; which hindered a great deale of blood from being Spilt, for the rebels fought desperatly: and (had it not bin for that Trench) had undoubtedly routed the Kings forces.⁸⁰ When Munnouth understood how Cowardly the Lord Grey had quited to feild, and finding himselfe bereaved of his hors and thereby much weakened, he privately with some of his trusty servants, and friend quited the feild:⁸¹ and being befriended by

78 This is a thoroughly muddled and misleading account of the clash early in the battle between Grey's cavalry and Sir Francis Compton's three troops forming Feversham's right-flank advanced guard. Taylor has confused, along with much else, Theophilus Oglethorpe, who was returning from Knowle Hill, with Francis Compton; when Oglethorpe eventually joined the battle, he did so on the royalist left flank via the Bridgwater-Westonzoyland-Middlezoy road. Having raised the alarm, Compton followed orders and retired to cover the passage of the Upper Plungeon. *En route*, his three troops brushed against Grey's cavalry and Compton was wounded in the chest: Captain Edwin Sandys (Royal Horse Guards) took over. Sandys's men reached the Upper Plungeon ahead of the rebels and defended it stoutly against an attack by 200 horsemen commanded by an ex-member of the New Model Army, Captain John Jones (Childs 2014, 89–90; Chandler 1985, 60–4; Bowen 1720, 149).

79 Monmouth's infantry regiments advanced in the order Red, Yellow, Green, White, and Blue. The two leading regiments began to form line of battle some thirty to forty yards north of the Bussex Rhine but failed to extend fully towards the Bridgwater-Westonzoyland-Middlezoy road and crowded together opposite the Royal Scots and the right wing of the 1st battalion of the 1st Foot Guards leaving insufficient space for the Green, White and Blue battalions to come into action. This failure was partly due to inexperience – raw troops tend to 'bunch-up' when under pressure – and partly because Grey's broken cavalry barged through Wade's men as they were deploying spreading disorientation and demoralisation. A firefight then followed between the Red and Yellow Regiments, supported by the three field guns, and the Royal Scots and the right wing of the 1st battalion of the 1st Foot Guards. Most of the royalist casualties were caused by Monmouth's cannon: his infantry possessed relatively few muskets and their fire was desultory, poorly directed, and at excessive range. The three remaining rebel foot regiments were not engaged until called upon to defend themselves during Feversham's final attack. Andrew Paschall says that, following the failure of Grey's cavalry to cross the Upper Plungeon, Horn's scythe detachment, thus deprived of its special mission, was absorbed into the main body of infantry. No source mentions royalist cavalry being engaged by rebel scythemen at this early stage in the battle. It is most likely that Taylor has confused this phase of operations with the royalist counter-offensive that concluded the action (Chandler 1985, 109–10).

80 The 'old' Bussex Rhine, which conveyed water from the Black Ditch to the River Parrett, was about six feet deep, twenty feet wide, and steep-sided. Despite the recent heavy rains, in July 1685 it was variously described as either dry 'but in some places miery' or containing a 'little pool of water'. While compiling his account of Monmouth's Rebellion, the historian George Roberts was informed by an eighty-year-old labourer that although the 'old' Bussex Rhine never contained more than two feet of water, deep and soft mud rendered it almost bottomless. Prior to 1844, the 'old' rhine had been widened and deepened – a mid-nineteenth-century photograph shows this 'new' cut in spate – but it was completely filled-in later in the century. Whether dry, wet, or damp, the old rhine was impassable to formed cavalry but negotiable for infantry, although dressings would have been forfeit during a necessarily slow transit. On the left and right of the royalist camp, which occupied the space created by the northward curve of the rhine around Westonzoyland, were two fords, or plungeons – the Lower Plungeon to the west and the Upper Plungeon to the east – where the banks had been cut away and the gradient reduced to enable the passage of livestock (Dummer 1895, 48; Roberts 1844, II, 56; Wigfield 1980, 69).

81 Perceiving that the day was lost, Monmouth discarded his armour, received a purse of 100 guineas from his faithful steward, William Williams, and, in company with Lord Grey, Count van Horn, and Dr William Oliver (c 1658–1716), rode towards Chedzoy and the Polden Hills. The most obvious route to safety was via ship from the coast of the Bristol Channel – Oliver escaped thus via Weston-super-Mare while Nathaniel Wade nearly succeeded through Ilfracombe – but Monmouth,

the Sable Night, each shifted for him Self as well as he could. Nevertheless his infantry not knowing thereof continued firing desperately, soe that 'tis beleived they charged at least ten, or twelve times, but when it began to be light, and the forces about Taunton were Joyned with the Kings forces,⁸² then fighting on Sedgmore, and the Rebels understood of the Lord Gray's, with the Hors quitting the feild; and how that Munmouth was also gon, they in the most confused maner betoock themselves to flight, each shifting for himself as well as he could <92> soe that nothing but Scaterd Arms, and dead carcasses lay every where, scattered on the Ground: and the Kings horse pursuing them, many were slaine, and taken prisoners, thus in this bataille on the Kings side, were slaine, noe less than 700 men, and On Monmouth Side were found Slaine 3469 Men, and about 260 were that day taken prisoners,⁸³ thus we have given you an impartiall Account of the fatall batell of Sedgmore in Somersetshire.

Now the Rebels being thus defeated, and Munmouth, and the Lord Gray, & Count Horn &c. being fled, divers Troops were sent round in all part in search for him, and to Apprehend him; and others; and the rest of his Maj^s forces remained searching too and fro', in and about Taunton; to Apprehend the Rebels many of which being taken were hanged on the Signepost at Taunton, Lime, Bridgwater, Bath, & soe that within about three day were apprehended of the Rebels, about 1500 men, and about 200 of them were imediately hanged, for the terror of others: the rest were comited to the County Goals of Dorchester, Salisbury, &c were filed therewith.⁸⁴ And On the Eight of Jully, Munmouth, & Count Horn, were taken neare Ringwood, in Hampshire: by the Sussex Millitia troops, under the command of the Lord Lumbley, being hid in a Pease-feild; thus, some of the Troopers haveing taken Count Horn, as he lay hidd in a hedg neare the Road; demanded of him where munmouth was, he not understanding English: made show he know not; but one of them presented a Pistoll to his brow, saying that If he did not imediately confess wher Mounmouth was, he would Pistoll him: Upon which he pointed to the pease feild, soe the Troopers rid<93>ing too and froe [in] the pease feild found Mounmouth ling [sic] in a furrow a mong the peas; which being apprehended, was imediately conveyed to Ringwood; and a strong Guard conveyd to attend him; and Count Horn. Also the same day the Lord Gray was apprehended neare Salisbury, and on the Morrow brought by a Strong Guard to Ringwood also a prisoner. Thus we have given you a true Account of the Overthrow of this Rebellion, and the Apprehending of the Duke of Munmouth, the Lord Grey, Count Horn &c:

Horn, and Grey turned south-east towards the English Channel hoping to find either assistance and shelter from Grey's tenants on his Uppark estate, West Sussex, or safety in the New Forest and passage to France via Lymington (Keay 2017, 364; Wade 1980, 170; Price 1956, 191–2).

82 The Queen's Horse did not participate in the night-time dash from Taunton to Sedgemoor: Taylor's narrative indicates clearly that the regiment reached Taunton on 5 July and remained there before leaving for Winchester on 8 July. Those hurrying back were the absentee officers, mainly from the infantry. Leaving Taunton at 04:00, the officers would not have arrived on Weston Moor before 05:30 or 06:00, too late to participate in the battle although, as Taylor suggests, they might have assisted in the exploitation of victory.

It is more likely that Taylor is here referring to the deployment of the Wiltshire militia. Between 24:00 on 5 July and 01:00 on 6 July, when the alarm was sounded (Dummer says the drums beat the alarm at 02:00 and this may well be more accurate), the three infantry battalions of the Wiltshire militia under the Earl of Pembroke, billeted in Middlezoy and Othery, had advanced through Westonzoyland on to Weston Moor to form a second line, three ranks deep, directly behind the royal camp. Here they stood throughout the battle and subsequent pursuit, acting as a support for the regular regiments should the rebels rally or stage a counter-attack.

Taylor's detailed comments on the injuries caused by scythes indicate that he visited the battlefield on 6 or 7 July and spoke with participants, both rebel and royalist (Wheeler 1910, 162–3; Scott 2015, 232–3).

83 Monmouth's army lost between 200 and 400 killed in the battle – Richard Alford, the churchwarden of St Mary's, Westonzoyland, recorded 'about 300' – and many more during the pursuit and subsequent man-hunts. The parson and churchwardens of Westonzoyland ultimately listed 1,384 interments within the parish bounds. In addition, at least 500 prisoners were taken during combat and the ensuing police actions in Somerset, Dorset, and Wiltshire. Feversham estimated his own casualties at fifty dead and 200 wounded: the latter figure has since been revised to 233. Most had occurred in the Royal Scots, which lost thirty killed and seventy-seven wounded, a casualty rate of fifty-two per cent, assuming there were only 204 men present (Chandler 1985, 70–1; Childs 2014, 93–4; Little 1956, 186; Wheeler 1910, 162; Arni 2006, 42; Wigfield 1980, 72–4; Locke 1782, 21–2; Wyndham 1859, 319; SCA DC/SM/2/4).

84 For modern accounts of the post-Sedgemoor subjugation of Dorset and Somerset see, Childs 2014, 94–122; Timmons 2003, 286–91.

Now to return to our discourse Again where we left this John Taylor a Cadete; in Queen Dowagers ridgment of Horse, att Taunton, you must understand that after the defeat of the Duke of Munmouth, that Ridgment had orders from the Lord Feversham, to March with all Expedition to Winchester, and there remain till further Orders. Soe on the Eight of July they began their march, and on the Eleventh they arrivd at Winchester, at which time Mounmouth was brought thither with a Strong guard, both of Horse and foot, there beinge there now of the Kings forces about 1500 Horse, and 3500 foot, besides a great many of the County Millitia, soe that now our Ridgment had orders to march to London, with him as part of his Guards.

Soe on the 12th, Mounmouth marcht with his Guards, (with other prisoners) from Winchester, and in the Evening arrived to Farnham,⁸⁵ where all the forces lodged that night, and he was kept there that Night with an exceeding strong guard.

On the 13th, The Guards with Mounmouth, and Other prisoners, seet forward from Farnham, and by Night arived at Stanes,⁸⁶ where there was a Strong Guard Sett over him, and he their continued <94> that Night. On the fourteenth, betime in the Morning the Duke of Mounmouth, the Lord Grey, and Count van Horn being secured were putt into a barge, and with a Strong Guard of foot with Blunderbusses, Musquets &c. in other boats, was from there Conveyed to Whithall, whereafter he was admitted to the Speuch [*sic*] of the King, (none but the Lord Keeper being present, soe that none knows publickly what passed betwen them) after about two houres sleep, he was conveyed from thence to the Tower, where he remained till the sixteenth of July, at which time aClock [*sic*] in the morning, he was beheaded on a scaffold on Tower hill, and his corps was from thence conveyed back to the Tower, where in the Chappell he laies entered; But as for the Lord Grey he had his pardon, and also Count van Horn was at the Request of this duke of Mounmouth by his serene Majesty. Thus we have given you an Account of the proceeding of Both Armys from time, to time, till such times as the Rebels were defeated neare Bridgwatter in Somersetshire, and the Duke Apprehended, and beheaded for high treason. Now the Kings forces draw all Up towards London, being ordered to quarter within ten Miles all round the City, in y^e Countys of Kent, Surrey, Middlesex, &c. and Quen Dowagers Redgmt had Orders to Quarter in and About Hounslow, Brandford,⁸⁷ and Collebrock.⁸⁸ Soe we have this John Taylor at his quarters at M^r Goad's, at the Sing of the Ostrich, at Colebrook⁸⁹ in Buckinghamshire: July the eighteenth 1685, where he remaind well and in perfect health.

Thus this Rebellion was by the Great Jehovah over throwne and brought to nothing, and here 'twill not be unnecessary to give you a <95> description of the Strang, and Unheard of Wepon, which Mounmouth had in his Army, those Sithes, which were thus: these Sithes were about fower foot Long, and fower inches brod, and one Inch thick at the back, and were place into Strong Stafs about ten feet long, of good supple Ash, about 1½ Inch Diameter, in the Lowerward they were bound with a ferul [*ferule*] and had a sharp spike, about 9 inches long, in all respects as you see in the figure of these Sithemen here hee had 300 men, which were the Tallest and Lustiest men they could prick out, they were ranged in the front of the Infantry, and Comanded by Count Horn; these Sithes maintaind their Ground Stoutly to the last, against the Kings horse,⁹⁰ for indeed these Sithes was a desperat Wepon, loping off at one Stroak, either head, or Arm, and I

85 Farnham, Surrey.

86 Staines, Middlesex.

87 Brentford.

88 Colnbrook was then in Buckinghamshire. Since 1974, it has been in Berkshire.

89 Colnbrook was a regular cavalry station.

90 Taylor's description of the scythemen as the 'tallest and lustiest' offers additional evidence of their élite status and deployment after the manner of grenadiers: a battalion's grenadier company was composed of the strongest, tallest, fittest men and enjoyed a superior level of equipment. Regularly, usually during sieges, grenadier companies from several foot regiments were formed into *ad hoc* battalions to lead particularly hazardous operations.

'They were ranged in front of the infantry' refers to the scythemen's role in protecting the front of Monmouth's line when it came under sustained attack from royalist horse and foot during the last phase of the battle. Although Taylor seems to suggest that the scythe demi-battalion was still a discrete force at this stage of the battle, it is more likely that it had been absorbed back into the main body of the infantry.

saw⁹¹ a man layinge among the dead, whose back was clove down, by one struck of [*marginalia: now that their orders was to cutt of the bridle arm, thereby the disable the riders, and defend themselves, the which they to the last stoutely did*]⁹⁶ these Sithes, and a horse whose head at one strock, was almost separated from his body.⁹² These Sithes with abundance more of Mounmouth's other Arms were brought Up to London, and laid up in the Armory of the Tower of London.⁹³

Now after the defeat of the Rebels, as many of them as could made their Escape to Holland, and other parts, and for all the Strickt Searches, and Watches, which were keep in all parts of England, yet Nevertheless many of them made their Escape, as Mounmouths Chaplain D: Fergusson,⁹⁴ Doer the Mayor of Limington,⁹⁵ with many others, went to Holland, But abundance of the Rebels were Apprehend in their Luerking places as D^r Hick⁹⁶ and another Presbyterian Minister were taken hid in the Lady Lisles house, neare Salsbury; and she for succoring them was committed A prissoner to Winchester* [*marginalia: This Lady Lisle began to acct the second part of her husbands treason, for he was one of the wicked Judges, of King Charles the first, & suffered among the Recilsides as for his crime he justly deserved*];⁹⁷ and they committed with many others to the Gales [*sic*] of Dorchester, Salsbury &c soe that those County Goals were all fild soe that other houses in those Citys were made Goals of; for there were noe less than 1500 of the Rebels Apprehend and Committed to close prison in those parts.

Now when the Lord chiefe Justice Jefferys, with the rest of his breatheren the Judges,⁹⁸ went the Western Circuit, about 680 of those rebels were condemd to die, in those western parts, Dr Hick^s [*marginalia: This Dr Hicks lived at Portsmouth, was a very learned man, altho' a Rebll*], and six others at Salsbury were hanged, drawn, and Quartered, and 178 others hanged there, At Dorchester where three hang, drawn &c: and 235 hanged, and soe at Bridgwater, and all other parts, there were abundance Executed. At Winchester the Lady Lisle was for high treason, (in succoring those Rebels) condemned to be burnt, but her Son W^m Lisle Esquir, gott at his request to the Majestie that she might be beheaded, and Accordingly she suffered [*marginalia: The Lady Lisle beheaded at Winchester, she was 79 years old, and died obstanaty wth out a word*], how 30 Rebels were executed, all which; like those at Salsbury, Dor<97>chester &c: did obstanaty, without any seeing signe of remorse, But for the others which were found Guilty, and suffered not, were transported for ten years Servitude, into America, soe that about 750 were transported

91 Taylor, probably in company with many other officers who had also missed the action, evidently visited the battlefield on 6 or 7 July (Childs 2014, 93–4).

92 John Oldmixon (1673–1742), who was brought up in Bridgwater, also referred to the 'terror of the weapon' (Oldmixon 1730, II, 703).

93 Only two scythes from Sedgemoor remain in the collection of the Royal Armouries.

94 Robert Ferguson, 'the Plotter' (d.1714).

95 Thomas Dore (c 1658–1705).

96 Dr John Hickeys (1633–85), a nonconformist minister who had been ejected from his living of Stoke Damarel, Plymouth, in 1660. Before joining Monmouth at Shepton Mallet, 23 June, Hickeys had ministered to a Presbyterian congregation in Portsmouth (Greaves 2014; *Axminster Ecclesiastica*, 49; Zook 1999, 29–30; Wigfield 1985, 83).

97 Lady Alice Lisle, née Beconsawe (c 1614–85). In 1636 she became the second wife of John Lisle (c 1609–64), a regicide, who was raised to Cromwell's peerage in 1657. Following her husband's murder in Lausanne, Switzerland, in 1664, Lady Alice, as she was subsequently known, returned to England and lived peacefully at Moyle's Court on the western edge of the New Forest. On 25 July 1685, John Dunne, a nonconformist baker from Warminster who seems to have operated an escape network for rebels on-the-run after Sedgemoor, came to Moyle's Court bearing a note from Dr John Hickeys asking for shelter for himself and Richard Nelthorpe (d.1685). They dined with Alice Lisle and spent the night in an outhouse but their presence was discovered to Colonel Thomas Penruddock (c 1648–c.95), a deputy lieutenant of Wiltshire and commander of the Wiltshire militia horse. Hickeys and Nelthorpe were arrested on 26 July and Alice Lisle was taken into custody charged with harbouring rebels. She was tried at Winchester on 27 July, the first case heard by Judge Lord George Jeffreys's special commission. Through incessant bullying and intimidation of witnesses, Jeffreys secured a conviction. Alice Lisle was beheaded on the Market Square, Winchester, 2 September 1685. Her small estate, inherited from her father, was given to the Earl of Feversham (Galgano 2016; Greaves 2009; Clifton 1984, 233).

98 Accompanying Lord Chief Justice George, 1st Baron Jeffreys of Wem (1645–89), on the special commission were Sir William Montague (d.1706), Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer; Sir Robert Wright (c 1634–89), Recorder of Cambridge; Sir Francis Wythens (c 1635–1704), Justice of the King's Bench; and Sir Cresswell Levinz (1627–1701), Justice of the Common Pleas. Sir Henry Pollexfen (c 1632–91) was the principal crown prosecutor.

to New England, Virginia, Barbados, Jamaica, and other of his Majestys Colloneys in that new found western clime.⁹⁹

Also in the City of London, many were executed as being Conspirators, and Agents in this Rebellion, as S^r William Cornish K^t,¹⁰⁰ one of the Sheriffes of the City of London, was hangd, drawn, and Quartered, for high treason, and about 46 more for being concernd in this Rebellion, were hangd at Tibourn. Thus wee have given you an Account, of the care his Majesties Officers and Ministers of State, took to Suppress, and root out those sons of cursed Rebellion; and destroy the land, all their contrivances.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbreviations

Add MSS	Additional Manuscript
<i>Axminster Ecclesiastica</i>	<i>The Axminster Ecclesiastica, 1660–1698</i> , K W H Howard (ed), Gospel Tidings Publication, Leicester, 1976
<i>BL</i>	British Library, London
<i>CJ</i>	<i>Journals of the House of Commons</i> , 35 vols, HMSO, London, 1802–30
<i>CSPD</i>	<i>Calendar of State Papers Domestic, James II</i> , 3 vols, J K Timings (ed), HMSO, London, 1960–72
<i>CTB</i>	<i>Calendar of Treasury Books</i> , 32 vols, W A Shaw and F H Slingsby (eds), HMSO, London, 1904–62
<i>HMC</i>	Reports of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts
<i>HMC Bath MSS</i>	<i>Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Marquis of Bath</i> , 3 vols, HMSO, London, 1904–8
<i>HMC, Dean and Chapter of Wells MSS</i>	<i>Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Dean and Chapter of Wells</i> , 2 vols, HMSO, London, 1914

⁹⁹ In total, 1,381 rebels were tried. Of these, about 250 were executed; 100 died in prison or had certificates of pardon allowed; between 850 and 890 were transported to the West Indian colonies; while the remainder were given lesser sentences. Four-hundred-and-eight detainees were released without trial (Childs 2014, 100; Clifton 1984, 231–43; Wigfield 1985, viii–ix; Locke 1782, 11–20).

¹⁰⁰ Henry Cornish (d.1685), merchant, alderman of the City of London, and sheriff, 1680–1. He was not a knight (De Krey 2004).

- HMC, Stopford Sackville MSS* *Report on the Manuscripts of Mrs Stopford-Sackville*, 2 vols, HMSO, London, 1904
- HP* *The History of Parliament: online edition*, History of Parliament Trust, London, www.historyofparliamentonline.org
- LG* *The London Gazette, 1685: online edition*, Thomas Newcomb, London, [http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:London Gazette Index/16/1685](http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:London_Gazette_Index/16/1685)>
- LJ* *Journals of the House of Lords*, 64 vols, HMSO, London, 1767–1832
- ODNB* *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography: online edition*, H C G Matthew and Brian Harrison (eds), Oxford University Press, Oxford, <http://www.oxforddnb.com>
- SCA* Salisbury Cathedral Archives

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