**Appendix A**

*The following is the text of the survey instrument we used to gather data on the social connections between MEPs’ legislative assistants.*

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this short survey. This questionnaire will take about 15 minutes to complete.
Purpose: The purpose of the study is to investigate the communication networks of parliamentary assistants. We are interested in learning how you communicate and interact with other parliamentary assistants.
Your personal information: In the survey that follows we ask you to reveal what you may feel is personal information and we understand if you feel some hesitation to do so. To help ease your hesitation it is important that you know the following:

* Any information you provide us will remain strictly confidential. We will not share your data or information with anyone.
* Results of this study are to be used strictly for academic research. Any publications resulting from this project will only describe general trends. Nobody will be identified by name, and it will be impossible to attribute any quotations or findings to you. If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to contact me using the information below.

*Right to Withdraw:* You understand that you can withdraw from this research study at any time. You can ask to be removed from this study if you feel the confidentiality of the information you provide is not sufficiently guaranteed.

*Instructions and Definitions:* Below, we ask you to name the parliamentary assistants with whom you have had recent contact. By parliamentary assistants we mean assistants employed in the offices of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who help MEPs with their parliamentary work.
\*It is okay to repeat names in the questions.

1a. Who are the parliamentary assistants with whom you had LUNCH in the past two weeks?

1b. For which MEP does each of the assistants you named to the left work?

1c. How often would you say you have contact with each of the assistants you named to the left? (daily, 2-3 times a week, once a week, 2-3 times a month, once a month or less)

2a. Who are the parliamentary assistants with whom you have spoken on the PHONE in the past two weeks?

2b. For which MEP does each of the assistants you named to the left work?

2c. How often would you say you have contact with each of the assistants you named to the left? (daily, 2-3 times a week, once a week, 2-3 times a month, once a month or less)

3a. Who are the parliamentary assistants with whom you spoke at an event or RECEPTION after work hours in the past two weeks?

3b. For which MEP does each of the assistants you named to the left work?

3c. How often would you say you have contact with each of the assistants you named to the left? (daily, 2-3 times a week, once a week, 2-3 times a month, once a month or less)

4a. Who are the parliamentary assistants with whom you have E-MAILED in the past two weeks?

4b. For which MEP does each of the assistants you named to the left work?

4c. How often would you say you have contact with each of the assistants you named to the left? (daily, 2-3 times a week, once a week, 2-3 times a month, once a month or less)

5a. Who are the parliamentary assistants with whom you met casually for a cup of coffee or informal chat in the past two weeks?

5b. For which MEP does each of the assistants you named to the left work?

5c. How often would you say you have contact with each of the assistant you named to the left? (daily, 2-3 times a week, once a week, 2-3 times a month, once a month or less)

6a. Who are the parliamentary assistants with whom you spoke at a MEETING in the past two weeks?

6b. For which MEP does each of the assistants you named to the left work?

6c. How often would you say you have contact with each of the assistants you named to the left? (daily, 2-3 times a week, once a week, 2-3 times a month, once a month or less)

7. How long have you worked for your current boss (MEP)?

8. For which MEP do you work?

9. How long have you worked for the EP?

What is your gender?

This concludes the survey. Thank you for participating. We appreciate your valuable time. When you click ‘done’ below your responses will be sent to the researcher and your web browser will be directed to the EP homepage.

If you'd like to provide comments for the researcher you may do so here:

**Appendix B**

It is possible to articulate our theoretical expectations more formally via a Bayesian learning model, where legislators update their prior preferences based on new information they receive from other sources.[[1]](#endnote-1) To capture the essence of what such a model might look like, imagine that legislator A, without knowledge of how any colleagues will vote, places some prior probability on the appropriate ordering of options being considered. Let  A’s prior probability that *X* would be preferable to *Y*, according to A’s own utility function. Presumably, based on past experience, legislators have a sense of how likely other legislators are to share their preferences, conditional on whether they are in one’s own party, voting bloc, or other grouping. Letting the probability that B will prefer *X* to *Y*, given that A prefers *X*, this quantity is expected to grow as the ideological distance between A and B shrinks. Suppose A uses the simple heuristic that if B belongs to A’s group (party, voting bloc, etc.) and if not, the fixed probability of agreeing with a group member and a non-group member, respectively. (For multiple recognized clusters of legislators, this latter probability may be replaced with a small set of observed probabilities, one for each cluster.) If consider what will happen as A updates his or her prior probability in light of knowledge of how B plans to vote. A’s own posterior probability of preferring *X* to *Y*, upon discovering that B prefers *X* to *Y*, is calculated as



It can easily be shown that for any prior the posterior as long as A and B are members of the same voting cluster but if not That is, if a legislator is inclined to favor a bill on its merits, this inclination will become even greater once the individual discovers that a group member supports it, but will in fact decline should he or she discover that an opponent supports it. On the other hand, for any this a priori distaste for the proposal will become more pronounced in light of information that someone outside the group *favours* it, or less so if a fellow group member supports it. Thus, so long as legislators agree with allies more often than not, and disagree with opponents more often than not, confidence in one’s opinion of a bill should increase if it matches the opinion of an ally and decrease if at odds, while confidence in one’s opinion should decrease if it matches that of a political enemy and increase if at odds. Actual contact with a fellow legislator not in one’s voting bloc makes it more likely that this person will serve as a source of cues, meaning that such contact will likely correspond to even less frequent vote agreement than would be expected simply by virtue of membership in opposing clusters.

1. J.S. Jordan, ‘Bayesian Learning in Normal Form Games’, *Games and Economic Behavior*, 3 (1991), 60-81; John H. Nachbar, ‘Bayesian learning in repeated games of incomplete information’, *Social Choice and Welfare*, 18 (2001), 303-326. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)