


ONLINE Appendices

Figure 1: Communal Conflicts by Regime Type, 1989-2013




The UCDP Non-State conflict database records various types of non-state conflicts from 1989 through 2013, including conflicts organized along communal lines.¹ Matching the location of each communal conflict with the country's corresponding *Polity IV* score on the 'polity2' variable at the onset of violence, I show in *Figure 1* that communal clashes from 1989 through 2013 occurred disproportionately more in anocracies than in democracies.

Polity IV scores countries on a scale from -10 (for strongly autocratic) to 10 (for strongly democratic), and democracies are assigned a score of 6 and above. Of the 408 communal conflicts from 1989 through 2013, only 17.15% (70 cases) erupted in countries scored 6 and above on the *polity2* variable. 6.12% of the cases (25 cases) occurred autocracies, whereas 74.51% of the cases (304 cases) were in anocracies.

¹ Communal conflicts are coded as conflicts with organizational level 3 in the UCDP Non-State conflicts dataset, and are defined as conflicts between "groups that share a common identification along ethnic, clan, religious, national, or tribal lines. ... This level of organization captures aspects of what is commonly referred to as 'communal conflicts', in that conflict stands along lines of communal identity" (UCDP Non-State Conflict Codebook version 2.5-2014).

Figure 2: Distribution of Ethnic Riots in Indonesia (1990-2005)



Sources: UNSFIR data for riots from 1990-2003, and author's data for riots from 2004-2005.

Table 1: Count of riots by province, Indonesia (1990-2005)

province	count of riots
Bali	3
Bangka Belitung	0
Banten	2
Bengkulu	0
DI Jogjakarta	0
DKI Jakarta	8
Gorontalo	0
Irian Jaya	1
Irian Jaya Barat/Papua Barat	0
Jambi	0
Jawa Barat	26
Jawa Tengah	12
Jawa Timur	19
Kalimantan Barat	47
Kalimantan Selatan	0
Kalimantan Tengah	22
Kalimantan Timur	0
Kepulauan Riau	0
Lampung	1
Maluku	330
Maluku Utara	58
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam	0
Nusa Tenggara Barat	18
Nusa Tenggara Timur	11
Papua	3
Riau	16
Sulawesi Barat	2
Sulawesi Selatan	25
Sulawesi Tengah	67
Sulawesi Tenggara	0
Sulawesi Utara	0
Sumatra Barat	0
Sumatra Selatan	0
Sumatra Utara	1

Figure 3: Electoral Competition, 1990-2005²




Table 2: Golkar, PPP, and PDI electoral performance at the provinces under Soeharto's New Order regime

Parties	1971	1977	1982	1987	1992	1997
Golkar	68.11	66.59	72.65	78.99	75.95	81.82
PPP	22.62	23.06	21.93	13.11	12.17	14.14
PDI	9.28	9.72	5.44	7.91	11.91	4.02
# of provinces	25	27	27	27	27	27

Source: King (2003, 20-21).

² Data used in this graph are from the General Elections Committee reports of the 1987, 1992, 1999, and 2004 elections in all districts across Indonesia. By district, I am referring to the second-tiered administrative units of regencies, districts, and municipalities, not electoral districts.


Table 3: Summary Statistics

Variable	n	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Count of riots	5371	0.13	1.71	0	59
Riots-related death	5371	1.84	39.14	0	1384
Severity of violence	5371	0.06	0.39	0	5
Electoral competitiveness	5363	-41.73	29.45	-99.85	-0.07
Golkar voteshare	5363	0.56	0.27	0.05	1.00
% change of Golkar vote share from 1987 to 1997 elections	2164	-3.43	12.50	-78.97	24.26
Year after election	5371	0.26	0.44	0	1
Year before election	5371	0.25	0.43	0	1
Election year	5371	0.25	0.44	0	1
Proximity to election	5371	-1.05	0.74	-2	0
Non-golkar parties voteshare	5363	0.44	0.27	0.00	0.95
PDIP voteshare	5363	0.19	0.17	0	0.92
Muslim parties voteshare	5363	0.15	0.12	0	0.62
GDP per capita (logged)	5127	1.08	1.08	-2.63	6.47
Urban (yes/no)	5371	0.21	0.41	0	1
Area (logged)	5371	7.43	1.80	2.40	13.08
Separatist (yes/no)	5371	0.09	0.28	0	1
Java (yes/no)	5371	0.33	0.47	0	1
After-1998 (yes/no)	5371	0.51	0.50	0	1
Count of riots in prior year	4842	0.13	1.79	0	59
Population (logged)	5210	12.90	0.95	7.87	15.28
Security spending (adjusted for inflation)	3404	152.63	990.83	0	45927.60
Ratio of second largest religious group proportion to largest religious group proportion	3003	0.13	0.20	0	1.00
Second largest religious group proportion	3003	0.09	0.11	0	0.50
Distance of second largest religious group's proportion to 0.5	3003	0.41	0.11	0.00	0.5
Distance of third largest religious group's proportion to 0.5	2970	0.49	0.03	0.25	0.5
Electoral competitiveness*Distance of second largest religious group's proportion to 0.5	3002	-16.87	13.97	-49.57	0.00
Golkar voteshare*Distance of second largest religious group's proportion to 0.5	3002	0.22	0.14	0.00	0.50
Religious fractionalization	2951	0.17	0.17	0	0.93
Religious fractionalization squared	2951	0.06	0.09	0	0.87
Ethnic fractionalization	334	0.38	0.28	0.00	0.84
Turnover in favor of opposition	5371	0.05	0.22	0	1
Difference between vote margins in last and second to last election	4054	17.13	26.92	-59.00	93.87

Table 4: Variable Descriptions and Sources

Variable	Description	Source
Count of riots	Count of incidents of ethnic riots in a district-year	UNSFIR data; author's reading of Kompas and Tempo
Riots-related death	Number of deaths associated with each riot incident in district-year	UNSFIR data
Severity of violence	An index for severity of violence (0-5), where 0=no riots; 1=riots, but no casualties; 2=riots, 1-10 deaths; 3=riots, 11-100 deaths; 4=riots, 101-500 deaths; 5=riots, more than 500 deaths. This index follows convention and other measures of severity of violence as used in Brancatti (2006), Tadjoeddin (2013), and others	Own calculation based on UNSFIR data
Electoral competitiveness	Margin of voteshares between first and second-place winners in previous district legislative elections.	KPU
% change in Golkar voteshare from 1987 to 1997 elections	Per cent change in the voteshare Golkar accumulated in the district from the 1987 to the 1997 elections.	Own calculation based on KPU data
Ratio of second to largest religious group proportion	The ratio of proportion of second largest religious group over proportion of largest religious group in district	Own calculation, BPS dalam angka
Religious fractionalization	Religious fractionalization, using district population data based on religion	Own calculation, using BPS Dalam Angka data
Religious fractionalization squared	Squared of religious fractionalization, using district population data based on religion	Own calculation, using BPS Dalam Angka data
Proximity to election	Absolute number of years to/from nearest legislative election	Own calculation based on KPU data
Year after election	Dummy equals 1 if year is 1993, 1998, 2000, and 2005	Own calculation
Year before election	Dummy equals 1 if year is 1991, 1996, 1998, 2003.	Own calculation
Election year	Dummy equals 1 if year is 1992, 1997, 1999, and 2004	Own calculation
Golkar voteshare	Voteshare of Golkar in most recent legislative election	KPU
Non-Golkar parties voteshare	Voteshares of parties other than Golkar in most recent legislative election	Own calculation based on KPU data
PDI-P voteshare	Voteshare of PDI-P in most recent legislative election	KPU
Muslim party voteshare	Voteshare of Muslim parties (i.e., PPP, PBR, PBB, PKS)	KPU
Ethnic fractionalization	Ethnic fractionalization based on 2000 Census data on ethnic/tribal composition of district population	Own calculation, using 2000 Census data
Proportion of second largest religious group	Proportion of second largest religious group in district	Own calculation, based on BPS dalam angka data
Distance of group 2 to 0.5 proportion	Distance of the second largest religious group's proportion to 0.5	Own calculation, based on BPS dalam angka data
Distance of group 3 to 0.5 proportion	Distance of the third largest religious group's proportion to 0.5	Own calculation, based on BPS dalam angka data
Competitiveness*group2's distance to 0.5	An interaction term between vote margins and the distance of the second largest religious group's proportion to 0.5	Own calculation, based on BPS dalam angka data
Golkar voteshare*Group2's distance to 0.5	An interaction term between Golkar voteshare and the distance of the second largest religious group's proportion to 0.5	Own calculation, based on BPS dalam angka data
GDP per capita (logged)	Natural log of district GDP per capita	Own calculation, using BPS Dalam Angka data
Java	Dummy equals 1 if district is located in Java.	Own calculation
Separatist	Dummy equals 1 if district is in Papua and Aceh	Own calculation
After-1998	Dummy equals 1 if year is after 1998 (after Soeharto resigned)	Own calculation
Urban	Dummy equals 1 if district is urban	BPS Dalam Angka
Area (logged)	Natural log of district area	
Population density (logged)	Natural log of district population density	Own calculation, using BPS Dalam Angka data
Security spending	Amount allocated in district budget for security personnel and expenses (in million Rupiah, adjusted for inflation)	APBD
Delta vote margins	Difference in vote margins from second to last election to most recent elections	Own calculation, based on KPU reports
Turnover in favor of opposition	Dummy equals 1 if district unseated incumbent and elected candidates from a party other than Golkar in prior election	Own calculation, based on KPU reports
Count of riots in prior year	Count of ethnic riots in past year in a district	UNSFIR data; author's reading of Kompas and Tempo

Figure 4: Goodness of fit between models



Note: The AIC for negative binomial is 0, for Poisson is 41.3, for zero-inflated poisson is 50.6, for zero-inflated negative binomial is 52.6, for zero-inflated negative binomial 1 is 52.6. Negative binomial has the best fit. These models were run using *glmmadmb* package in R, with data with missing values. Papua and Aceh observations were dropped, and all NAs were omitted. The variables ‘year after election’ and ‘post-soeharto’ were excluded from the models because, after omitting missing values, there is no variation in the factors.

```
AICtab(fit_poisson, fit_nb, fit_zinb, fit_zipoisson, fit_zinb1)
```

```
# dAIC df
# fit_nb      0.0 12
# fit_poisson 41.3 11
# fit_zipoisson 50.6 12
# fit_zinb1   52.6 13
# fit_zinb    52.6 13
```

Table 5: Full results of Table 1 on main paper

	Dependent variable: count of riots				
	Full sample	Full sample	Full sample	Soeharto-era	Post-Soeharto era
	1	2	3	4	5
Electoral competitiveness	-0.01* (0.00)			-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01* (0.00)
Golkar voteshare		1.80*** (0.52)			
% change in Golkar voteshare from 1987 to 1997 elections			0.05** (0.02)		
Year after election	0.70*** (0.20)	0.78*** (0.20)	0.39 (0.26)	1.88*** (0.44)	0.49* (0.25)
Ratio of second to largest religious group	1.68** (0.59)	1.82** (0.58)	0.82 (0.70)	4.25** (1.52)	1.65** (0.64)
Count of riots in prior year	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.34 (0.92)	0.03** (0.01)
Security spending	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)
GDP per capita (logged)	0.08 (0.16)	0.11 (0.15)	0.11 (0.20)	-0.33 (0.30)	0.09 (0.18)
Population (logged)	0.87*** (0.20)	0.88*** (0.20)	0.99*** (0.25)	0.99** (0.37)	0.90*** (0.23)
Area (logged)	0.11 (0.13)	0.06 (0.13)	0.17 (0.15)	0.17 (0.28)	0.18 (0.14)
Urban (y/n)	0.8 (0.54)	0.74 (0.54)	1.19^ (0.66)	1.56 (1.22)	1.01^ (0.58)
Java (y/n)	-0.62 (0.41)	-0.48 (0.42)	-1.61** (0.52)	1.18 (0.76)	-1.10* (0.49)
After 1998 (y/n)	1.13*** (0.31)	1.36*** (0.31)	0.14 (0.38)		
Intercept	-16.03*** (2.73)	-16.43*** (2.70)	-16.47*** (3.29)	-18.97*** (5.22)	-15.53*** (3.11)
ln_r					
Intercept	0.56** (0.20)	0.59** (0.21)	0.42^ (0.23)	4.45 (15.24)	0.41^ (0.21)
ln_s					
Intercept	-0.47 (0.33)	-0.46 (0.33)	-0.43 (0.39)	3.08 (16.72)	-0.72^ (0.37)
Observations	1898	1898	1043	783	1115
Log Likelihood	-500.84	-498.06	-365.8	-108.46	-377.41
AIC	1029.68	1024.11	749.57	242.92	780.92

Note: Papua and Aceh districts were dropped in models presented above. Dependent variable is count of riots, and estimates were derived from negative binomial models. Columns 1 through 3 present results of all observations before and after democratic transition. Column 4 shows results of only Soeharto-era regression.

Column 5 presents results of post-Soeharto analysis. ^, *, **, and *** indicate $p < 0.10$, $p < 0.05$, $p < 0.01$, $p < 0.001$, respectively.

Table 6: Incidence Rate Ratios from Regressions Results presented in Table 1 in main paper

	dv: count of riots		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Electoral competitiveness	0.989* (-2.41)		
Year after election	2.012*** (3.50)	2.173*** (3.83)	1.482 (1.53)
Ratio of second to largest religious group	5.359** (2.85)	6.193** (3.17)	2.280 (1.18)
Count of riots in prior year	1.040*** (3.95)	1.046*** (4.50)	1.046*** (4.02)
Security spending	1.000 (-0.07)	1.000 (0.09)	1.000 (0.31)
GDP per capita (logged)	1.083 (0.50)	1.118 (0.72)	1.113 (0.53)
Population (logged)	2.397*** (4.29)	2.402*** (4.35)	2.700*** (3.99)
Area (logged)	1.118 (0.86)	1.062 (0.46)	1.182 (1.12)
Urban (y/n)	2.215 (1.46)	2.103 (1.37)	3.289 (1.80)
Java (y/n)	0.536 (-1.52)	0.617 (-1.16)	0.200** (-3.12)
After 1998 (y/n)	3.102*** (3.70)	3.892*** (4.42)	1.148 (0.36)
Golkar voteshare		6.058*** (3.47)	
% change in Golkar voteshare from 1987 to 1997 elections			1.053** (3.09)
Observations	1898	1898	1043

Note: Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** are for $p < 0.05$, $p < 0.01$, and $p < 0.001$, respectively.

Figure 5: Predicted riots





Figure 5 shows the predicted count of riots given varying levels in Golkar voteshare, urban, and Java measures.³

The predicted count of riots remains relatively low and stable for very low voteshare of Golkar, but increases drastically once Golkar voteshare surpasses fifty per cent. Urban districts outside of Java (blue dots) have the steepest incline in predicted count of riots given higher Golkar voteshare, followed by urban districts in Java (blue triangles), rural districts outside of Java (pink dots), and finally rural districts in Java (pink triangles). This finding is consistent with earlier works arguing that small towns outside of Java are more conflict-prone than others. Urban districts outside of Java are predicted to have more than thirty incidents as Golkar voteshare approaches one hundred per cent, while other districts have fewer than fifteen incidents at the same level of Golkar voteshare.

³ This estimation was done using data with missing values. Given the extent of missingness and my treatment to exclude observations with missing values, the remaining observations available for postestimation did not have variation in the “post-Soeharto” (whether or not an observation was after 1998) and “after election” (whether an observation was in a year after election) variables; both variables are equal to 1.

Figure 6: Party voteshares and count of riots



Note: This figure charts coefficients for party voteshares only. Other variable coefficients were suppressed to save space. In these models, Papua and Aceh districts were dropped. The dependent variable is count of riots.

Table 7: Party voteshare and violence full results

	dv: count of riots			
	1	2	3	4
Golkar voteshare	1.80*** (0.52)			
PDIP voteshare		-1.94** (0.68)		
Islamic party voteshare (PPP, PKS, PBR, PBB)			0.98 (1.10)	
Voteshare of non-Golkar parties				-1.80*** (0.52)
Year after election	0.78*** (0.20)	0.71*** (0.20)	0.68*** (0.20)	0.78*** (0.20)
Ratio of second to largest religious group	1.82** (0.58)	1.72** (0.57)	1.32* (0.57)	1.82** (0.58)
Count of riots in prior year	0.04*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
<i>Controls</i>				
Security spending	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)
GDP per capita (logged)	0.11 (0.15)	0.11 (0.16)	0.07 (0.16)	0.11 (0.15)
Population (logged)	0.88*** (0.20)	0.82*** (0.20)	0.81*** (0.20)	0.88*** (0.20)
Area (logged)	0.06 (0.13)	0.06 (0.13)	0.1 (0.13)	0.06 (0.13)
Urban (y/n)	0.74 (0.54)	0.72 (0.54)	0.71 (0.55)	0.74 (0.54)
Java (y/n)	-0.48 (0.42)	-0.74 [^] (0.40)	-0.83* (0.41)	-0.48 (0.42)
After 1998 (y/n)	1.36*** (0.31)	1.15*** (0.29)	0.76** (0.28)	1.36*** (0.31)
Intercept	-16.43*** (2.70)	-14.09*** (2.60)	-14.47*** (2.63)	-14.63*** (2.65)
ln_r				
Intercept	0.59** (0.21)	0.59** (0.21)	0.55** (0.20)	0.59** (0.21)
ln_s				
Intercept	-0.46 (0.33)	-0.4 (0.34)	-0.45 (0.34)	-0.46 (0.33)
Observations	1898	1898	1898	1898
Log Likelihood	-498.06	-499.58	-503.28	-498.06
AIC	1024.11	1027.15	1034.56	1024.11

Note: Papua and Aceh districts were dropped. The dependent variable is count of riots. All regressions use a negative binomial model. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ^, *, **, and *** indicate p<0.10, p<0.05, p<0.01, p<0.001, respectively.

Table 8: Party voteshares and violence with fixed effects

	dv: count of riots			
	1	2	3	4
Golkar voteshare	1.58* (0.61)			
Year after election	0.85*** (0.21)	0.79*** (0.21)	0.79*** (0.21)	0.85*** (0.21)
Ratio of second to largest religious group	-0.22 (0.92)	-0.41 (0.90)	-0.66 (0.91)	-0.22 (0.92)
Count of riots in prior year	0.02^ (0.01)	0.02^ (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02^ (0.01)
Security spending	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)
GDP per capita (logged)	0.16 (0.28)	0.08 (0.27)	0.06 (0.27)	0.16 (0.28)
Population (logged)	0.16 (0.37)	0.05 (0.36)	0.08 (0.36)	0.16 (0.37)
Area (logged)	-0.2 (0.23)	-0.14 (0.22)	-0.1 (0.22)	-0.2 (0.23)
Urban (y/n)	0.43 (1.06)	0.7 (1.03)	0.69 (1.03)	0.43 (1.06)
After 1998 (y/n)	1.25*** (0.35)	1.11** (0.35)	0.81* (0.32)	1.25*** (0.35)
PDIP voteshare		-1.48^ (0.76)		
Islamic party voteshare (PPP, PKS, PBR, PBB)			0.88 (1.50)	
Voteshare of non-Golkar parties				-1.58* (0.61)
Intercept	-3.9 (5.47)	-1.61 (5.39)	-2.49 (5.34)	-2.32 (5.45)
Observations	488	488	488	488
Log Likelihood	-233.56	-234.82	-236.48	-233.56
AIC	489.12	491.65	494.95	489.12

Note: Papua and Aceh districts were dropped. The dependent variable is count of riots. All regressions use a negative binomial model. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ^, *, **, and *** indicate p<0.10, p<0.05, p<0.01, p<0.001, respectively.

Table 9: Party voteshares and violence, IRR

Note: Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** are for $p < 0.05$, $p < 0.01$, and $p < 0.001$, respectively.

	dv: count of riots			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Golkar voteshare	6.058*** (3.47)			
Year after election	2.173*** (3.83)	2.039*** (3.57)	1.973*** (3.39)	2.173*** (3.83)
Ratio of second to largest religious group	6.193** (3.17)	5.571** (3.03)	3.740* (2.31)	6.193** (3.17)
Count of riots in prior year	1.046*** (4.50)	1.047*** (4.53)	1.039*** (3.82)	1.046*** (4.50)
Security spending	1.000 (0.09)	1.000 (-0.04)	1.000 (0.06)	1.000 (0.09)
GDP per capita (logged)	1.118 (0.72)	1.113 (0.69)	1.072 (0.42)	1.118 (0.72)
Population (logged)	2.402*** (4.35)	2.272*** (4.16)	2.255*** (4.05)	2.402*** (4.35)
Area (logged)	1.062 (0.46)	1.065 (0.48)	1.106 (0.77)	1.062 (0.46)
Urban (y/n)	2.103 (1.37)	2.060 (1.33)	2.032 (1.29)	2.103 (1.37)
Java (y/n)	0.617 (-1.16)	0.476 (-1.85)	0.434* (-2.06)	0.617 (-1.16)
After 1998 (y/n)	3.892*** (4.42)	3.146*** (3.91)	2.148** (2.76)	3.892*** (4.42)
PDIP voteshare		0.143** (-2.86)		
Islamic party voteshare			2.675 (0.89)	
Voteshare of non-Golkar parties				0.165*** (-3.47)
Observations	1898	1898	1898	1898

Table 10: Table 1 results with fixed effects

	dv: count of riots			dv: riots-related death	
	1	2	3	4	5
Electoral competitiveness	-0.01 [^] (0.01)			-0.15* (0.07)	
Golkar voteshare		1.58* (0.61)			21.40** (7.92)
% change in Golkar voteshare from 1987 to 1997 elections			0.11 [^] (0.06)		
Year after election	0.81*** (0.21)	0.85*** (0.21)	0.65* (0.27)	-0.14 (3.08)	0.26 (3.09)
Ratio of second to largest religious group	-0.28 (0.92)	-0.22 (0.92)	-0.23 (1.09)	-7.99 (19.82)	-8.54 (19.77)
Count of riots in prior year	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 [^] (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.51 (0.53)	0.56 (0.53)
Security spending	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)
<i>Controls</i>					
GDP per capita (logged)	0.1 (0.27)	0.16 (0.28)	0.04 (0.38)	-6.64* (3.09)	-6.26* (3.09)
Population (logged)	0.16 (0.36)	0.16 (0.37)	0.4 (0.53)	-7.4 (6.24)	-6.91 (6.23)
Area (logged)	-0.2 (0.23)	-0.2 (0.23)	-0.02 (0.25)	2.97 (5.33)	3.07 (5.31)
Urban (y/n)	0.27 (1.07)	0.43 (1.06)	1.35 (1.31)		
After 1998 (y/n)	1.06** (0.34)	1.25*** (0.35)	0.47 (0.39)	18.10*** (4.36)	20.88*** (4.63)
Java (y/n)			0.83 (3.00)		
Intercept	-3.22 (5.40)	-3.9 (5.47)	-7.03 (7.33)	68.88 (85.98)	54.1 (85.97)
Observations	488	488	260	1898	1898
Log Likelihood	-234.82	-233.56	-161.67	-9943.37	-9941.41
AIC	491.64	489.12	347.33	19906.74	19902.81

Note: All regressions above included district fixed effects. Papua and Aceh districts were dropped. The dependent variable in columns 1 through 3 is count of riots, whereas the dependent variable in columns 4-5 is riots-related death. Regressions in columns 1-3 used a negative binomial model, while regressions in columns 4-5 use OLS. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. [^], *, **, and *** indicate p<0.10, p<0.05, p<0.01, p<0.001, respectively.

Table 11: Full results of Soeharto-era and Post-Soeharto observations

	dv: count of riots				dv: riots-related death		
	Soeharto era		Post-Soeharto		Soeharto era		Post-Soeharto
	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Electoral competitiveness	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01* (0.00)					
Golkar voteshare			3.86^ (2.32)	1.46** (0.56)	-0.17 (0.35)	16.34^ (8.66)	
Year after election	1.88*** (0.44)	0.49* (0.25)	1.72*** (0.45)	0.55* (0.25)	0.52*** (0.12)	1.53 (3.98)	
Ratio of second to largest religious group	4.25** (1.52)	1.65** (0.64)	4.41** (1.53)	1.73** (0.63)	0.96** (0.34)	15.55 (16.75)	
Count of riots in prior year	0.34 (0.92)	0.03** (0.01)	0.35 (0.91)	0.04** (0.01)	-0.1 (0.26)	-1.43* (0.59)	
Security spending	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	
GDP per capita (logged)	-0.33 (0.30)	0.09 (0.18)	-0.32 (0.30)	0.13 (0.18)	-0.32*** (0.07)	-2.9 (3.29)	
Population (logged)	0.99** (0.37)	0.90*** (0.23)	1.03** (0.37)	0.88*** (0.23)	0.02 (0.06)	3.91 (4.78)	
Area (logged)	0.17 (0.28)	0.18 (0.14)	0.18 (0.28)	0.11 (0.14)	0.03 (0.05)	9.51** (3.60)	
Urban (y/n)	1.56 (1.22)	1.01^ (0.58)	1.72 (1.24)	0.94 (0.59)	0.15 (0.20)	30.57* (15.14)	
Java (y/n)	1.18 (0.76)	-1.10* (0.49)	1.31^ (0.75)	-1.03* (0.49)	0.05 (0.13)	2.5 (11.41)	
Intercept	-18.97*** (5.22)	-15.53*** (3.11)	-21.61*** (5.86)	-15.20*** (3.05)	-0.28 (0.83)	-125.83* (63.47)	
ln_r							
Intercept	4.45 (15.24)	0.41^ (0.21)	5.12 (29.88)	0.43* (0.21)			
ln_s							
Intercept	3.08 (16.72)	-0.72^ (0.37)	3.79 (31.27)	-0.71^ (0.37)			
Observations	783	1115	783	1115	783	1115	
Log Likelihood	-108.46	-377.41	-107.9	-376.87			
AIC	242.92	780.82	241.79	779.74			

Note: Papua and Aceh districts were dropped. Regression results presented in columns 1 through 4 are based on negative binomial regressions on count of riots with panel-corrected standard errors. Columns 5 and 6 present results from OLS regressions on riots-related death. ^, *, **, and *** indicate $p < 0.10$, $p < 0.05$, $p < 0.01$, $p < 0.001$, respectively.

Table 12: Full results of Soeharto-era and Post-Soeharto era observations with fixed effects

	dv: count of riots				dv: riots-related death	
	Soeharto era 1	Post-Soeharto 2	Soeharto era 3	Post-Soeharto 4	Soeharto era 5	Post-Soeharto 6
Electoral competitiveness	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.01 [^] (0.01)				
Year after election	2.48*** (0.68)	0.78** (0.29)	2.07** (0.70)	0.84** (0.29)	1.34*** (0.17)	3.03 (4.28)
Ratio of second to largest religious group	0.57 (5.62)	-0.22 (1.07)	0.79 (5.50)	-0.11 (1.07)	2.23 [^] (1.17)	-27.37 (23.81)
Count of riots in prior year	-1.85 [^] (0.97)	0.01 (0.01)	-2.05* (1.04)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.57* (0.29)	-2.22*** (0.65)
Security spending	0 (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0.00 [^] (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)
GDP per capita (logged)	0.41 (0.71)	0.24 (0.41)	0.32 (0.70)	0.29 (0.42)	-1.48*** (0.19)	1.79 (4.21)
Population (logged)	-1.64 (2.26)	0.08 (0.48)	-1.11 (2.30)	0.05 (0.50)	-1.29*** (0.26)	13.16 (9.81)
Area (logged)	-0.53 (2.02)	-0.09 (0.24)	-0.61 (2.22)	-0.11 (0.24)	-0.33 (1.04)	11.20 [^] (6.11)
Urban (y/n)	1.43 (5.92)	0.53 (1.20)	2.25 (6.45)	0.96 (1.17)		
Golkar voteshare			18.64 (13.81)	1.42* (0.70)	-2.36 (1.59)	13.83 (9.44)
o.Urban (y/n)					0 (.)	0 (.)
Intercept	20.97 (34.17)	-2.1 (6.90)	5.01 (37.08)	-2.05 (7.16)	21.68* (8.64)	-254.58 [^] (130.56)
Observations	101	225	101	225	783	1115
Log Likelihood	-27.1	-146.33	-26.75	-146.08	-1041.22	-5758.16
AIC	74.21	312.67	73.51	312.15	2100.44	11534.31

Note: Papua and Aceh districts were dropped. Regression results presented in columns 1 through 4 are based on negative binomial regressions on count of riots with panel-corrected standard errors. Columns 5 and 6 present results from OLS regressions on riots-related death. [^], *, **, and *** indicate p<0.10, p<0.05, p<0.01, p<0.001, respectively

Table 13: Full results of Table 2 in main paper

	dv: count of riots					
	Full sample	Uncompetitive districts only	Uncompetitive post-conflict districts after 1998	Full sample	Uncompetitive districts only	Uncompetitive post-conflict districts after 1998
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Turnover in favor of opposition	-1.16** (0.38)	-1.61* (0.67)	-0.09 (1.17)			
Delta vote margins				-0.01** (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.10*** (0.02)
Year after election	1.19*** (0.25)	1.23*** (0.30)	0.31 (0.80)	0.65*** (0.20)	0.78** (0.26)	0.28 (0.49)
Ratio of second to largest religious group	1.41* (0.57)	2.10* (0.86)	0.43 (1.39)	1.54** (0.58)	2.13* (0.85)	1.91 (1.90)
Count of riots in prior year	0.04*** (0.01)	0.05** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
Security spending	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)		0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	
GDP per capita (logged)	0.03 (0.16)	-0.21 (0.22)	0.48 (0.72)	0.03 (0.16)	-0.21 (0.22)	-1.19 (0.78)
Population (logged)	0.84*** (0.20)	1.09*** (0.27)	1.54 (0.94)	0.74*** (0.21)	1.08*** (0.27)	-1.35 (0.92)
Area (logged)	0.09 (0.13)	0.07 (0.16)	0.24 (0.54)	0.15 (0.13)	0.1 (0.16)	-0.71 (0.69)
After 1998 (y/n)	0.99*** (0.28)	1.60*** (0.33)		1.16*** (0.31)	1.55*** (0.35)	
Urban (y/n)	0.75 (0.54)	0.81 (0.70)	0.98 (1.98)	0.69 (0.55)	0.86 (0.73)	-2.71 (2.80)
Java (y/n)	-0.62 (0.40)	-0.35 (0.49)		-0.87* (0.41)	-0.59 (0.49)	
Intercept	-14.85*** (2.63)	-18.40*** (3.44)	-23.01^ (12.82)	-13.69*** (2.71)	-18.04*** (3.53)	28.08^ (14.68)
ln_r						
Intercept	0.56** (0.20)	0.53* (0.26)	-0.29 (0.41)	0.58** (0.21)	0.51* (0.26)	1.29 (2.10)
ln_s						
Intercept	-0.39 (0.34)	0.02 (0.51)	-0.73 (0.95)	-0.43 (0.34)	-0.2 (0.48)	-1.26** (0.47)
Observations	1898	1028	58	1833	1020	51
Log Likelihood	-498.68	-285.23	-85.42	-487.86	-288.64	-76.86
AIC	1025.36	598.46	192.83	1003.71	605.29	175.72

Notes: Papua and Aceh observations were dropped. Standard errors are in parentheses. ^, *, **, and *** indicate $p < 0.10$, $p < 0.05$, $p < 0.01$, $p < 0.001$, respectively.

Table 14: IRR of results in Table 2 in main paper

Note: Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** are for $p < 0.05$, $p < 0.01$, and $p < 0.001$, respectively

	dv: count of riots					
	Full sample	Uncompetitive districts	Uncompetitive, postconflict districts after 1998	Full sample	Uncompetitive districts	Uncompetitive, postconflict districts after 1998
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Turnover in favor of opposition	-0.90*	-1.40^	-0.55			
	(0.42)	(0.82)	(1.46)			
Year after election	1.14***	1.02**	0.48	0.75***	0.69*	-1.07
	(0.26)	(0.33)	(0.95)	(0.21)	(0.29)	(1.21)
Ratio of second to largest religious group	-0.66	-1.39	-1.83	-0.08	0.8	2.84
	(0.91)	(1.71)	(2.89)	(0.91)	(1.62)	(4.10)
Count of riots in prior year	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02^	0.01	0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Security spending	0	0		0	0	
	(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)	
GDP per capita (logged)	-0.04	0.15	2.29	0.09	0.42	-3.30^
	(0.27)	(0.46)	(1.58)	(0.27)	(0.46)	(1.78)
Population (logged)	0.09	0.14	3.36	0.18	0.52	-4.11*
	(0.35)	(0.72)	(2.65)	(0.37)	(0.72)	(2.05)
Area (logged)	-0.08	-0.14	0.77	-0.18	-0.19	0.27
	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.96)	(0.23)	(0.29)	(1.32)
After 1998 (y/n)	1.02**	1.16**		0.97**	1.01*	
	(0.33)	(0.41)		(0.35)	(0.42)	
Urban (y/n)	0.82	0.66		0.02	0.43	
	(0.99)	(1.25)		(1.09)	(1.33)	
Delta vote margins				-0.01^	0	-0.07***
				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Intercept	-2.81	-2.8	-49.89	-2.99	-7.47	59.57^
	(5.18)	(9.70)	(39.10)	(5.53)	(9.82)	(31.28)
Observations	488	247	21	485	246	19
Log Likelihood	-234.28	-123.24	-30.74	-233.45	-124.66	-24.61
AIC	490.55	268.48	77.47	488.91	271.33	65.21

Table 15: Full results of Table 2 in main paper with fixed effects

	dv: count of riots					
	Full sample	Uncompetitive districts	Uncompetitive, postconflict districts after 1998	Full sample	Uncompetitive districts	Uncompetitive, postconflict districts after 1998
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Turnover in favor of opposition	-0.90*	-1.40 [^]	-0.55			
	(0.42)	(0.82)	(1.46)			
Year after election	1.14***	1.02**	0.48	0.75***	0.69*	-1.07
	(0.26)	(0.33)	(0.95)	(0.21)	(0.29)	(1.21)
Ratio of second to largest religious group	-0.66	-1.39	-1.83	-0.08	-0.8	-2.84
	(0.91)	(1.71)	(2.89)	(0.91)	(1.62)	(4.10)
Count of riots in prior year	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02 [^]	0.01	0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Security spending	0	0		0	0	
	(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)	
GDP per capita (logged)	-0.04	0.15	2.29	0.09	0.42	-3.30 [^]
	(0.27)	(0.46)	(1.58)	(0.27)	(0.46)	(1.78)
Population (logged)	0.09	0.14	3.36	0.18	0.52	-4.11*
	(0.35)	(0.72)	(2.65)	(0.37)	(0.72)	(2.05)
Area (logged)	-0.08	-0.14	0.77	-0.18	-0.19	0.27
	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.96)	(0.23)	(0.29)	(1.32)
After 1998 (y/n)	1.02**	1.16**		0.97**	1.01*	
	(0.33)	(0.41)		(0.35)	(0.42)	
Urban (y/n)	0.82	0.66		0.02	0.43	
	(0.99)	(1.25)		(1.09)	(1.33)	
Delta vote margins				-0.01 [^]	0	-0.07***
				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Intercept	-2.81	-2.8	-49.89	-2.99	-7.47	59.57 [^]
	(5.18)	(9.70)	(39.10)	(5.53)	(9.82)	(31.28)
Observations	488	247	21	485	246	19
Log Likelihood	-234.28	-123.24	-30.74	-233.45	-124.66	-24.61
AIC	490.55	268.48	77.47	488.91	271.33	65.21

Note: Papua and Aceh observations were dropped. Standard errors are in parentheses. [^], *, **, and *** indicate p<0.10, p<0.05, p<0.01, p<0.001, respectively.

Table 16: Alternative measures of proximity to election

	dv: count of riots											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Electoral competitiveness	-0.01*			-0.01*			-0.01*			-0.01*		
	(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)		
Golkar voteshare		1.68**			2.02***			1.45**			1.80***	
		(0.57)			(0.61)			(0.50)			(0.52)	
% change in Golkar voteshare from 1987 to 1997 elections			0.05**			0.05**			0.05**			0.05**
			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)
Year of election				-0.2	-0.46^		-0.11					
				(0.25)	(0.28)		(0.28)					
Year before election							-0.11	-0.06	-1.48**			
							(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.52)			
Year after election										0.70***	0.78***	0.39
										(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.26)
Proximity to election	-0.03	-0.12	-0.2									
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.17)									
Ratio of second to largest religious group	1.33*	1.40*	0.4	1.34*	1.46*	0.52	1.36*	1.42*	0.76	1.68**	1.82**	0.82
	(0.60)	(0.59)	(0.71)	(0.60)	(0.58)	(0.69)	(0.60)	(0.58)	(0.67)	(0.59)	(0.58)	(0.70)
Count of riots in prior year	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.05***	0.04***	0.05***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Security spending	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
<i>Controls</i>												
GDP per capita (logged)	0.09	0.13	0.08	0.09	0.14	0.07	0.1	0.12	0.16	0.08	0.11	0.11
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.20)
Population (logged)	0.84***	0.84***	0.94***	0.85***	0.86***	0.96***	0.84***	0.84***	0.92***	0.87***	0.88***	0.99***
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.25)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.25)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.25)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.25)
Area (logged)	0.14	0.09	0.21	0.14	0.08	0.2	0.13	0.09	0.18	0.11	0.06	0.17
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.15)
Urban (y/n)	0.88	0.83	1.40*	0.88	0.83	1.34*	0.86	0.81	1.26^	0.8	0.74	1.19^
	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.67)	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.66)	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.66)	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.66)
Java (y/n)	-0.63	-0.52	-1.58**	-0.62	-0.46	-1.56**	-0.64	-0.56	-1.55**	-0.62	-0.48	-1.61**
	(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.52)	(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.51)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.52)	(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.52)
After 1998 (y/n)	1.12***	1.35***	-0.12	1.17***	1.50***	-0.1	1.07***	1.23***	-1.45*	1.13***	1.36***	0.14
	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.60)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.38)
Intercept	-15.60***	-15.98***	-15.93***	-15.71***	-16.26***	-15.82***	-15.41***	-15.59***	-13.65***	-16.03***	-16.43***	-16.47***
	(2.73)	(2.71)	(3.28)	(2.73)	(2.72)	(3.26)	(2.72)	(2.69)	(3.33)	(2.73)	(2.70)	(3.29)
ln_r												
Intercept	0.55**	0.56**	0.40^	0.54**	0.56**	0.41^	0.55**	0.56**	0.44^	0.56**	0.59**	0.42^
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.23)
ln_s												
Intercept	-0.45	-0.46	-0.45	-0.46	-0.45	-0.41	-0.46	-0.45	-0.52	-0.47	-0.46	-0.43
	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.39)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.39)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.37)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.39)
Observations	1898	1898	1043	1898	1898	1043	1898	1898	1043	1898	1898	1043
Log Likelihood	-506.46	-504.46	-366.22	-506.15	-503.34	-366.85	-506.38	-504.77	-360.81	-500.84	-498.06	-365.8
AIC	1040.92	1036.93	760.43	1040.30	1034.68	761.70	1040.76	1037.55	749.62	1029.68	1024.11	759.60

Note: Results presented in columns 1-12 are negative binomial regressions on count of riots. Papua and Aceh observations were dropped. Standard errors are in parentheses. ^, *, **, and *** indicate $p < 0.10$, $p < 0.05$, $p < 0.01$, $p < 0.001$, respectively.

Table 17: Alternative measures of ethnic composition/balance

	dv: count of riots											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Electoral competitiveness	-0.01* (0.00)		-0.01* (0.00)		-0.01* (0.00)		-0.01* (0.00)		-0.01 (0.01)		0 (0.01)	
Golkar voteshare		1.75*** (0.51)		1.75*** (0.51)		1.85*** (0.52)		1.47** (0.51)		2.2 (1.48)		3.76** (1.16)
Year after election	0.70*** (0.20)	0.78*** (0.20)	0.70*** (0.20)	0.78*** (0.20)	0.70*** (0.20)	0.78*** (0.20)	0.70*** (0.20)	0.66** (0.20)	0.69*** (0.20)	0.77*** (0.20)		
Religious fractionalization	2.83*** (0.81)	3.01*** (0.81)	2.78 (2.31)	3.31 (2.31)								
Religious fractionalization squared			0.07 (3.45)	-0.49 (3.43)								
Proportion of second largest religious group					3.34** (1.15)	3.77*** (1.14)						
Distance of Group 2 to 0.5 Proportion							-3.34** (1.15)		-3.11* (1.49)	-3.37^ (1.96)		
Distance of Group 3 to 0.5 proportion								-2.08 (3.92)				
Competitiveness*Group2's distance to 0.5 proportion									0.01 (0.03)			
Golkar voteshare*Group 2's distance to 0.5										-0.85 (3.39)		
Ethnic fractionalization											1.12 (1.18)	1.48 (1.12)
Count of riots in prior year	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.11*** (0.01)	0.13*** (0.01)
Security spending	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0.00^ (0.00)
<i>Controls</i>												
GDP per capita (logged)	0.03 (0.16)	0.06 (0.16)	0.03 (0.16)	0.06 (0.16)	0.08 (0.16)	0.11 (0.15)	0.08 (0.16)	0.06 (0.16)	0.07 (0.16)	0.11 (0.15)	-0.66* (0.32)	-0.35 (0.31)
Population (logged)	0.84*** (0.20)	0.85*** (0.20)	0.84*** (0.20)	0.85*** (0.20)	0.88*** (0.20)	0.89*** (0.20)	0.88*** (0.20)	0.76*** (0.20)	0.88*** (0.20)	0.89*** (0.20)	1.21*** (0.33)	1.55*** (0.35)
Area (logged)	0.05 (0.13)	0 (0.14)	0.06 (0.14)	0 (0.14)	0 (0.13)	0.09 (0.13)	0.03 (0.13)	0.09 (0.13)	0.17 (0.13)	0.08 (0.13)	0.02 (0.14)	0.23 (0.21)
Urban (y/n)	0.49 (0.57)	0.41 (0.57)	0.5 (0.59)	0.38 (0.60)	0.66 (0.56)	0.58 (0.56)	0.66 (0.56)	1.18* (0.53)	0.64 (0.57)	0.57 (0.56)	1.09 (0.97)	0.71 (0.91)
Java (y/n)	-0.44 (0.41)	-0.3 (0.42)	-0.44 (0.42)	-0.29 (0.42)	-0.61 (0.41)	-0.46 (0.41)	-0.61 (0.41)	-0.56 (0.43)	-0.62 (0.41)	-0.47 (0.41)	-1.60^ (0.83)	-1.15 (0.86)
After 1998 (y/n)	1.19*** (0.31)	1.40*** (0.31)	1.19*** (0.31)	1.41*** (0.31)	1.16*** (0.31)	1.41*** (0.31)	1.16*** (0.31)	1.27*** (0.31)	1.18*** (0.31)	1.43*** (0.31)		
Intercept	-15.49*** (2.64)	-15.83*** (2.62)	-15.49*** (2.64)	-15.84*** (2.62)	-16.06*** (2.72)	-16.55*** (2.69)	-14.39*** (2.66)	-14.03*** (3.31)	-14.46*** (2.67)	-14.80*** (2.68)	-19.50*** (4.78)	-25.54*** (5.17)
ln_r Intercept	0.61** (0.21)	0.64** (0.21)	0.61** (0.21)	0.64** (0.21)	0.57** (0.21)	0.60** (0.21)	0.57** (0.21)	0.56** (0.20)	0.58** (0.21)	0.61** (0.21)	15.55 (295.87)	17.25 (811.35)
ln_s Intercept	-0.38 (0.34)	-0.38 (0.33)	-0.38 (0.34)	-0.37 (0.33)	-0.44 (0.33)	-0.42 (0.33)	-0.44 (0.33)	-0.65* (0.31)	-0.43 (0.34)	-0.41 (0.33)	15.49 (295.87)	17.1 (811.35)
Observations	1876	1876	1876	1876	1898	1898	1898	1895	1898	1898	275	275
Log Likelihood	-498	-495.25	-498	-495.24	-500.62	-497.54	-500.6	-502.3	-500.59	-497.51	-97.71	-92.63
AIC	1024	1018.5	1026	1020.48	1029.23	1023.09	1029.2	1032.5	1031.18	1025.02	219.42	209.26

Note: Results presented in columns 1-10 are negative binomial regressions on count of riots. Papua and Aceh observations were dropped. Standard errors are in parentheses. ^, *, **, and *** indicate p<0.10, p<0.05, p<0.01, p<0.001, respectively.

Table 18: Amelia-imputed results of Table 2 columns 1-3 regressions on count of riots

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	Estimate	SE	z	Estimate	SE	z	Estimate	SE	z
(Intercept)	-18.38	2.54	-7.24	-20.02	2.56	-7.81	-17.68	2.55	-6.932
Electoral competitiveness	-0.01	0.00	-3.17						
Golkar voteshare				2.90	0.49	5.88			
% change of Golkar voteshare from 1987 to 1997 election							0.00	0.01	0.181
Year after election	0.59	0.20	3.02	0.70	0.19	3.64	0.49	0.19	2.514
Ratio of second to largest religious group	1.26	0.56	2.25	1.18	0.55	2.15	1.12	0.57	1.958
Count of riots in prior year	0.08	0.03	3.06	0.09	0.02	3.85	0.08	0.03	2.680
Security spending	0.00	0.00	0.72	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.707
GDP per capita (logged)	0.28	0.15	1.86	0.37	0.15	2.48	0.21	0.15	1.382
Population (logged)	0.65	0.19	3.37	0.69	0.19	3.57	0.67	0.20	3.422
Area (logged)	0.42	0.15	2.73	0.37	0.15	2.42	0.42	0.16	2.710
Urban	1.45	0.60	2.43	1.36	0.60	2.28	1.39	0.60	2.295
Java	0.14	0.47	0.31	0.37	0.47	0.80	-0.12	0.47	-0.248
After 1998	1.24	0.27	4.55	1.67	0.27	6.09	0.97	0.26	3.693

Note: Aceh and Papua observations were dropped. All regressions are on negative binomial model with standard errors corrected for panel data. Missing values were imputed using Amelia II. Dependent variable is count of riots.

Table 19: Regression results of only provinces & years covered by UNSFIR data

	dv: count of riots			dv: riots-related death			dv: severity of violence		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Electoral competitiveness	-0.01 (0.00)			-0.17 [^] (0.09)			-0.01 (0.01)		
Golkar voteshare		1.38* (0.60)			22.03* (11.15)			1.11 [^] (0.66)	
% change in Golkar voteshare from 1987 to 1997 elections			0.02 (0.02)			-0.28 (0.46)			0.01 (0.02)
Year after election	0.75*** (0.20)	0.80*** (0.21)	0.46 [^] (0.26)	-1.8 (4.75)	-0.65 (4.77)	-3.35 (7.88)	0.81*** (0.24)	0.85*** (0.24)	0.42 (0.32)
Ratio of second to largest religious group	1.16 [^] (0.64)	1.32* (0.63)	0.37 (0.80)	28.95 [^] (15.23)	29.80 [^] (15.27)	41.26 (30.92)	1.65* (0.70)	1.75* (0.70)	0.61 (0.83)
Count of riots in prior year	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)	1.73** (0.55)	1.78** (0.55)	0.5 (0.91)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)
Security spending	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)
<i>Controls</i>									
GDP per capita (logged)	0.22 (0.18)	0.26 (0.18)	0.17 (0.23)	-2.5 (3.05)	-2.51 (3.04)	-8.38 (6.06)	0.29 (0.18)	0.32 [^] (0.18)	0.27 (0.22)
Population (logged)	1.01*** (0.22)	0.98*** (0.22)	1.15*** (0.27)	2.06 (3.24)	1.77 (3.23)	1.93 (7.61)	1.09*** (0.21)	1.08*** (0.20)	1.15*** (0.25)
Area (logged)	0.14 (0.14)	0.13 (0.14)	0.26 (0.17)	5.53* (2.64)	5.25* (2.63)	12.05* (5.77)	0.13 (0.14)	0.13 (0.14)	0.26 (0.17)
Urban (y/n)	0.98 [^] (0.58)	1.03 [^] (0.58)	1.64* (0.77)	20.33 [^] (10.38)	19.11 [^] (10.33)	43.46 [^] (22.60)	0.94 [^] (0.57)	0.97 [^] (0.57)	1.48* (0.72)
Java (y/n)	-1.71*** (0.43)	-1.44** (0.46)	-2.25*** (0.52)	3.39 (7.03)	5.09 (7.28)	-0.61 (15.09)	-1.98*** (0.41)	-1.78*** (0.43)	-2.32*** (0.49)
After 1998 (y/n)	0.93** (0.32)	1.13*** (0.33)	0.2 (0.40)	14.20** (5.32)	16.71** (5.86)	18.07 (12.38)	0.62 [^] (0.33)	0.79* (0.34)	-0.28 (0.43)
Intercept	-17.58*** (2.89)	-17.88*** (2.85)	-19.25*** (3.56)	-84.13* (39.49)	-85.99* (39.48)	-119.12 (89.82)			
ln_r									
Intercept	0.84** (0.26)	0.83** (0.25)	0.59* (0.28)						
ln_s									
Intercept	0.59 (0.43)	0.51 (0.43)	0.38 (0.51)						
cut1									
Intercept							18.70*** (2.76)	19.12*** (2.72)	19.14*** (3.35)
cut2									
Intercept							19.56*** (2.77)	19.99*** (2.73)	20.06*** (3.36)
cut3									
Intercept							20.92*** (2.79)	21.35*** (2.75)	21.15*** (3.37)
cut4									
Intercept							21.64*** (2.80)	22.08*** (2.76)	21.94*** (3.39)
cut5									
Intercept							22.46*** (2.82)	22.90*** (2.78)	22.78*** (3.41)
Observations	1118	1118	608	1118	1118	608	1118	1118	608
Log Likelihood	-413.3	-411.7	-298.62				-376.63	-375.73	-261.03
AIC	854.50	851.39	625.25				785.27	783.45	554.06

Note: Only the 14 provinces covered by the UNSFIR data were included in these regressions: Riau, Jakarta, Central Java, West Java, East Java, Banten, Central Kalimantan, West Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, East Nusa Tenggara, West Nusa Tenggara, Maluku, and North Maluku, and only observations prior to 2004 are included. Results presented in columns 1 through 3 are based on negative binomial regressions, with count of riots as the dependent variable. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Results on columns 4 through 6 are based on OLS regression with corrections for panel data, with riots-related death as the

dependent variable. Results on columns 7 through 9 are based on ordered logit regressions, with severity of violence as the dependent variable. ^, *, **, and *** indicate $p < 0.10$, $p < 0.05$, $p < 0.01$, $p < 0.001$, respectively.

Table 20: Results when Outliers are Dropped

	dv: count of riots					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
	Full Sample	No outliers	Full Sample	No outliers	Full Sample	No outliers
Electoral competitiveness	-0.01*	-0.01				
	(0.00)	(0.00)				
Golkar voteshare			1.80***	1.29*		
			(0.52)	(0.54)		
% change in Golkar voteshare from 1987 to 1997 elections					0.05**	0.05**
					(0.02)	(0.02)
Year after election	0.70***	0.70**	0.78***	0.76***	0.39	0.41
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.26)	(0.28)
Ratio of second to largest religious group	1.68**	1.95**	1.82**	2.02**	0.82	0.93
	(0.59)	(0.69)	(0.58)	(0.67)	(0.70)	(0.88)
Count of riots in prior year	0.04***	0	0.04***	0.01	0.04***	0.05
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.05)
Security spending	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
GDP per capita (logged)	0.08	0.11	0.11	0.13	0.11	0.14
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Population (logged)	0.87***	0.88***	0.88***	0.89***	0.99***	0.96***
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Area (logged)	0.11	0.08	0.06	0.05	0.17	0.15
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Urban (y/n)	0.8	0.67	0.74	0.6	1.19^	1.10^
	(0.54)	(0.56)	(0.54)	(0.56)	(0.66)	(0.67)
Java (y/n)	-0.62	-0.75^	-0.48	-0.64	-1.61**	-1.59**
	(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.52)	(0.51)
After 1998 (y/n)	1.13***	0.94**	1.36***	1.13***	0.14	0.03
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.38)	(0.38)
Intercept	-16.03***	-15.01***	-16.43***	-15.50***	-16.47***	-15.45***
	(2.73)	(2.81)	(2.70)	(2.81)	(3.29)	(3.35)
ln_r						
Intercept	0.56**	1.01***	0.59**	1.02***	0.42^	0.92**
	(0.20)	(0.26)	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.23)	(0.29)
ln_s						
Intercept	-0.47	-0.58^	-0.46	-0.56^	-0.43	-0.37
	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.39)	(0.42)
Observations	1898	1889	1898	1889	1043	1034
Log Likelihood	-500.84	-435.8	-498.06	-434.13	-365.8	-303.68
AIC	1029.68	899.60	1024.11	896.27	759.60	635.36

Note: ^, *, **, and *** indicate $p < 0.10$, $p < 0.05$, $p < 0.01$, $p < 0.001$, respectively.

Figure 7: Graph of Residuals




Table 21: Party vote shares in Poso elections

District	Election year	Muslim parties	Golkar	PDIP	Non-Golkar
Poso	1987	0.05	0.94	0.01	0.06
Poso	1992	0.06	0.87	0.07	0.13
Poso	1997	0.07	0.88	0.05	0.12
Poso	1999	0.15	0.67	0.19	0.33
Poso	2004	0.14	0.21	0.06	0.79

Note: Elections from 1987 through 1997 included three parties: Golkar, PDI-P, and PPP. Consequently, Muslim parties for those years were basically limited to one party's vote share: PPP's. In 1999, Muslim parties' voteshare included PPP, PBB, PKS. In 2004, Muslim parties' voteshare included PPP, PBB, PKS, PBR.

Table 22: Alternative dependent variables

	dv: count of riots			dv: riots-related death			dv: severity of violence		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Electoral competitiveness	-0.01* (0.00)			-0.15* (0.07)			-0.01* (0.00)		
Golkar voteshare		1.80*** (0.52)			12.61* (6.09)			1.61** (0.52)	
% change in Golkar voteshare from 1987 to 1997 elections			0.05** (0.02)			-0.01 (0.26)			0.05*** (0.01)
Year after election	0.70*** (0.20)	0.78*** (0.20)	0.39 (0.26)	-0.14 (3.08)	-0.08 (2.79)	-2.78 (4.85)	0.69** (0.22)	0.76*** (0.23)	0.29 (0.29)
Ratio of second to largest religious group	1.68** (0.59)	1.82** (0.58)	0.82 (0.70)	-7.99 (19.82)	21.74** (7.84)	36.00* (15.90)	2.48*** (0.55)	2.47*** (0.54)	1.33* (0.66)
Count of riots in prior year	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.51 (0.53)	2.02*** (0.42)	1.26^ (0.67)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)
Security spending	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)
<i>Controls</i>									
GDP per capita (logged)	0.08 (0.16)	0.11 (0.15)	0.11 (0.20)	-6.64* (3.09)	-2.29 (1.58)	-5.94^ (3.18)	-0.02 (0.14)	0 (0.14)	0.02 (0.18)
Population (logged)	0.87*** (0.20)	0.88*** (0.20)	0.99*** (0.25)	-7.4 (6.24)	1.35 (1.72)	0.38 (4.09)	0.83*** (0.17)	0.86*** (0.17)	0.91*** (0.21)
Area (logged)	0.11 (0.13)	0.06 (0.13)	0.17 (0.15)	2.97 (5.33)	2.41^ (1.28)	6.08* (2.68)	0.14 (0.12)	0.09 (0.12)	0.17 (0.14)
Urban (y/n)	0.8 (0.54)	0.74 (0.54)	1.19^ (0.66)		8.33 (5.24)	18.85^ (11.24)	0.92^ (0.48)	0.84^ (0.49)	1.08^ (0.58)
Java (y/n)	-0.62 (0.41)	-0.48 (0.42)	-1.61** (0.52)		2.06 (3.57)	1.04 (8.23)	-0.51 (0.34)	-0.47 (0.34)	-1.45*** (0.43)
After 1998 (y/n)	1.13*** (0.31)	1.36*** (0.31)	0.14 (0.38)	18.10*** (4.36)	10.48** (3.45)	8.07 (7.21)	1.00** (0.31)	1.21*** (0.31)	-0.23 (0.40)
o.Urban (y/n)				0 ()					
o.Java (y/n)				0 ()					
Intercept	-16.03*** (2.73)	-16.43*** (2.70)	-16.47*** (3.29)	68.88 (85.98)	-48.22* (22.07)	-49.87 (49.81)			
ln_r									
Intercept	0.56** (0.20)	0.59** (0.21)	0.42^ (0.23)						
ln_s									
Intercept	-0.47 (0.33)	-0.46 (0.33)	-0.43 (0.39)						
cut1									
Intercept							16.54*** (2.26)	17.17*** (2.27)	15.77*** (2.75)
cut2									
Intercept							17.42*** (2.27)	18.06*** (2.27)	16.69*** (2.76)
cut3									
Intercept							18.69*** (2.28)	19.33*** (2.29)	17.70*** (2.77)
cut4									
Intercept							19.51*** (2.30)	20.15*** (2.31)	18.57*** (2.79)
cut5									
Intercept							20.33*** (2.33)	20.98*** (2.33)	19.42*** (2.82)
Observations	1898	1898	1043	1898	1898	1043	1898	1898	1043
Log Likelihood	-500.84	-498.06	-365.8	-9943.37			-475.45	-473.22	-334.67
AIC	1029.68	1024.11	759.60	19906.74			982.90	978.44	701.34

Note: Papua and Aceh districts were dropped. Results presented in columns 1 through 3 are based on negative binomial regressions, with count of riots as the dependent variable. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Results on columns 4 through 6 are based on OLS regression with corrections for panel data, with riots-related death as the dependent variable. Results on columns 7 through 9 are based on ordered logit regressions, with severity of violence as the dependent variable. ^, *, **, and *** indicate $p < 0.10$, $p < 0.05$, $p < 0.01$, $p < 0.001$, respectively.

Data Collection Protocol for Riots data from *KOMPAS* and *TEMPO*

Data Collection Protocol for *Kompas* violence data

Source

To collect additional data on ethnocommunal violence in Indonesia, I read *Kompas*, a national-level newspaper based in Jakarta, Indonesia. The bulk of this data collection work was done in the archives of the National Library in Jakarta in Summer 2004. The remaining portion of the data was collected during a visit to the Asia Library at Cornell University, where I read through the pages of *Kompas* microforms. These visits and data collection were made possible through the generous support of the UCLA Graduate Mentorship Program.

Time period

The time period covered by this data is from 1999 to 2005. I deliberately limited my data collection to this period for two reasons: 1) to extend the UNSFIR coverage from 1990 to 2003, to include 2004 and 2005; and 2) to have some years of overlap between the *Kompas* and UNSFIR data to examine how the two correlate with each other.

Sampling procedure

I read the newspapers every eleven days from 1999 to 2005. With this method, I do not waste time reading every *Kompas* paper ever published during my period of interest, and simultaneously avoid possible bias from selecting days that are more conducive to conflict. Admittedly, eleven days is a long period that events occurring on Day 1 may have become old news on Day 11 that the Day 11 paper would not report it. Regardless, I assume that the conflicts that I am interested in are of national political interest (and hence they would be reported in the national newspaper) and that due to its political implications it would at least be mentioned in the papers even eleven days after the event occurred. If for whatever reason the paper is not published on the day that it is supposed to be read, I read the paper from one day before or after the scheduled date as a substitute. To avoid potential bias, I substitute public holidays with the day before and after alternately.⁴

Data Entry

Following the definitional scope and case selections outlined in this paper, I record incidents reported in the paper as having been triggered by an offense along ethnic lines, or more broadly, incidents fought by communities defined by ethnic identities.

In entering the data into my dataset, I recorded the event's location (e.g., province, district, sub-district, and village name) and date. This information is later recoded into both a count variable (i.e., count of clashes that occurred in a district-year) and a binary variable (i.e., whether communal clashes occurred in a given district-year. 1s are for when clashes did occur, and 0s if otherwise).

⁴ It is possible that religious conflicts tend to occur on, before, or after religious holidays. Consequently, if I consistently read papers published one day after a religious holiday, for example, I may track more violence. Alternating between one day before and one day after a holiday would normalize this effect.

Data Collection Protocol for *Tempo* violence data

Source

To supplement *Kompas* data which may have suffered from censorship and underreporting, I rely on news reports of a national weekly magazine, *Tempo*. Archives of this magazine were accessible at the *Tempo* office in Jakarta, Indonesia.

Time period

For the purpose of this research, I read through every edition published from 2002 through 2005, with approximately 50 editions per year and approximately 200 editions for the entire four years. I read every report published under the sections of “Laporan Utama” (cover story), “Hukum” (law), “Kriminalitas” (crime), “Lingkungan” (environment), “Nasional” (national reports), and “Peristiwa” (events) sections, and skimmed the rest (e.g., religion, education, interviews).

Following closely the data collection protocol of the UN team (Varshney et al 2008), I recorded incidents of collective violence which fall under the following categories: ethnocommunal clashes between groups, collective violence against the state (or members of state apparatus), collective violence driven by economic concerns/demands, and other miscellaneous forms of collective violence. Examples of clashes that fall under ethnocommunal category include clashes between ethnic groups, clashes between religious groups, and sectarian violence between members of a religious community.⁵

Given the definitional scope of this project, I do not include separatist clashes and demonstrations under the “state” collective action category. The “state” category refers to mass demonstrations against state policies, group attacks on state properties, and clashes between civilians and police/military officers motivated by reasons other than separatist demands.

The “economic-related” category refers to clashes, protests, and demonstrations motivated by struggle over land use, laborers relations with their employers and companies, use of natural resources, and others.

Incidents that fall under the “Miscellaneous” category range from killings of alleged witch doctors in Java, clashes between party supporters during election campaigns, brawls between villagers, terrorist bombings and attacks, killings of petty criminals commonly known as street or popular justice, clashes and shootings between status agencies (military and police officers), and others.

Data Entry

⁵ In some cases, magazine reports only mention the mode of attack (e.g., bombing, sniper shooting, group brawl, and others) without specifying the identities of both the victims and the perpetrators. Typically, if there is no mention that the attack was done against a specific group defined by their ethnicity, or that the attack was initially triggered by an offense along ethnic line, I would code this unspecified attack as “Other” or “Miscellaneous”. However, if these unspecified attacks occurred in locales where previously there have been ethnocommunal clashes such as in Poso (Sulawesi Tengah) or Ambon (Maluku), these attacks would be coded in the dataset as ethnic riots.

In my reading of both Kompas and Tempo, I follow these specific procedures for data entry:⁶

Source Date: Enter the date in which the violence is reported in the following format: month/day/year.

Village(s): Enter when given. If the violence occurs in multiple villages, enter all the villages as reported, separated by commas. For example: village A, village B, village C, etc.

Town(s): Enter when given. If the violence occurs across several towns, enter all towns as reported, separated by commas. For example: town A, town B, town C, etc.

Sub-district(s): Enter when given. If the violence occurs in multiple villages and/or towns that are part of different sub-districts, list the sub-districts following the same sequence as the list of villages/towns. For example, if village A (part of sub-district X) and village B (part of sub-district Y) are listed as “village A, village B” in the *Village* column, then the *Sub-district* column should read: sub-district X, sub-district Y. Thus, readers would know the sub-district to which each village belongs.

District(s): Enter when given. If violence occurs across multiple districts, list the district following the same sequence as the list of villages/towns/sub-districts

Province(s): Enter name of province. If violence occurs across multiple provinces, list all of them.

Year: Enter year of observation.

Conflict: Write “1” if conflict was reported to have been triggered by an offense along ethnic lines, involve multiple people on both the perpetrator and victim sides, and that the groups involved were separated along ethnic lines.

⁶ This data entry procedure is adapted from the Ashutosh Varshney (2002) and Steven Wilkinson (2004) research project on Hindu-Muslim riots in India, with modifications to suit the Indonesian context.