"How Democratic Alliances Solve the Power Parity Problem"

Appendix

Table 1: Incorporating Democracy of Challenger and Dyad

	Heteroskedastic Probit Model 1	Heteroskedastic Probit Model 2
Power Distribution	0.09	0.05
	(0.18)	(0.19)
Allies' Democracy Level	0.05**	0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.02)
*Power Distribution*Allies' Democracy Level*	-0.05*	-0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Alliance: Target & Challenger	0.02	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Joint Democracy	-	-0.18***
	-	(0.04)
Minimum Democracy in Dyad	-0.01***	-
	(0.01)	-
Challenger Democracy	-	0.01
	-	(0.01)
Major Power Dyad	0.44***	0.45***
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Contiguity	0.90***	0.93***
	(0.08)	(0.08)
Peace Years	-0.03***	-0.032***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
$PeaceYears^2$	0.01***	0.01***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
$PeaceYears^3$	-0.01***	-0.001***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-2.29***	-2.256***
	(0.08)	(0.08)
N	633,178	633,178

Dependent variable: $ln\sigma^2$

Power Distribution	-0.28***	-0.25**
	(0.10)	(0.10)
Allies' Democracy Level	-0.02**	-0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
*Power Distribution*Allies' Democracy Level*	0.03**	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)

* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$, two-tail test
Top values are beta coefficients
Standard errors in parentheses

Table 2: Including Average Democracy Level of Allies (Vice Minimum)

	Heteroskedastic Probit Model 1
Power Distribution	0.13
	(0.13)
*Allies' Democracy Level (**Average**)*	0.09***
	(0.03)
Power Distribution*Allies' Democracy Level	-0.08***
	(0.03)
Alliance: Target & Challenger	0.02
	(0.02)
Joint Democracy	-0.23***
	(0.04)
Major Power Dyad	0.43***
	(0.04)
Contiguity	0.90***
	(0.06)
Peace Years	-0.03***
	(0.01)
$PeaceYears^2$	0.01***
	(0.01)
$PeaceYears^3$	-0.01***
	(0.01)
Constant	-2.24***
	(0.07)
N	635,723

Dependent variable: $ln\sigma^2$

Power Distribution	-0.31***
	(0.07)
Allies' Democracy Level	-0.06***
	(0.02)
Power Distribution*Allies' Democracy Level	0.06***
	(0.02)

* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$, two-tail test
Top values are beta coefficients
Standard errors in parentheses

Table 3: Including Year-to-Year Change in Power Distribution

	Heteroskedastic Probit Model 1
Δ*Power Distribution*	-0.46***
	(0.16)
Power Distribution	0.16
	(0.18)
Allies' Democracy Level	0.05**
	(0.02)
Power Distribution*Allies' Democracy Level	-0.04*
	(0.02)
Alliance: Target & Challenger	0.02
	(0.02)
Joint Democracy	-0.16***
	(0.03)
Major Power Dyad	0.44***
	(0.04)
Contiguity	0.90***
	(0.08)
Peace Years	-0.03***
	(0.01)
PeaceYears^2	0.01***
	(0.01)
PeaceYears^3	-0.01***
	(0.01)
Constant	-2.26***
	(0.08)
N	622,532

Dependent variable: $ln\sigma^2$

Power Distribution	-0.28***
	(0.10)
Allies' Democracy Level	-0.02***
	(0.01)
Power Distribution*Allies' Democracy Level	0.02***
	(0.01)

* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$, two-tail test
Top values are beta coefficients
Standard errors in parentheses

Table 4: All Dyads (Includes Targets with No Alliance)

	Heteroskedastic Probit Model 1
Power Distribution	-0.98***
	(0.23)
Allies' Democracy Level	0.13***
	(0.02)
*Power Distribution*Allies' Democracy Level*	-0.12***
	(0.02)
Alliance: Target & Challenger	0.06**
	(0.03)
Joint Democracy	-0.26***
	(0.04)
Major Power Dyad	0.72***
	(0.04)
Contiguity	1.38***
	(0.07)
Peace Years	-0.05***
	(0.01)
$PeaceYears^2$	0.01***
	(0.01)
$PeaceYears^3$	-0.01***
	(0.01)
Constant	-2.49***
	(0.06)
N	1,104,186

Dependent variable: $ln\sigma^2$

Power Distribution	-0.30***
	(0.09)
Allies' Democracy Level	-0.02**
	(0.01)
*Power Distribution*Allies' Democracy Level*	0.02**
	(0.01)

* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$, two-tail test
Top values are beta coefficients
Standard errors in parentheses

The preceding analysis marks the first time that the effect of the *Power Distribution* is negative and significant in the non-heteroskedastic component of the model. To demonstrate that the substantive effects are comparable to those presented in the paper when including all dyads in the analysis, the change in predicted probabilities are presented below.

Figure 1: Change in Probability of Dispute Initiation - **All Dyads**