Appendix:
The Changing Standard of Accountability and the Positive Relationship between Human Rights Treaty Ratification and Compliance

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Contents

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Introduction to the Appendix

The supplementary material presented in this document provides additional details about the latent variable model developed in the article "Human Rights Treaty Compliance and the Changing Standard of Accountability". The main article makes reference to the materials contained here. The code and data files necessary to implement the models in JAGS and R are publicly available at the Harvard Dataverse Network https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/CJFariss, which can be linked to through http://cfariss.com/.

A Dynamic Latent Variable Model Parameters from Logit Link Functions

Table 1: Model Parameters that Link the Latent Treaty Variable θ to the Observed Binary Treaty Variables[1]

Treaty Name	α_j $(std.dev.)$	β_j $(std.dev.)$
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide	-0.250 (0.092)	1.426 (0.071)
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination	-0.220 (0.115)	1.771 (0.091)
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	-10.678 (1.135)	16.465 (1.437)
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Optional Protocol	-4.107 (0.237)	3.170 (0.185)
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	-6.926 (0.676)	10.062 (0.684)
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid	-0.663 (0.046)	0.491 (0.034)
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women	-4.797 (0.204)	2.356 (0.137)
Convention Against Torture	-0.278 (0.096)	1.322 (0.076)
Convention Against Torture Article 21 (no reservation)	-2.792 (0.195)	2.548 (0.152)
Convention Against Torture Article 22 (no reservation)	-6.794 (0.310)	3.231 (0.200)
Convention on the Rights of the Child	-7.646 (0.371)	3.653 (0.231)
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Optional Protocol 2	1.130 (0.077)	0.800 (0.060)
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families	-5.142 (0.229)	2.231 (0.142)
International Criminal Court	-3.380 (0.133)	0.717 (0.068)
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women Optional Protocol	-2.017 (0.124)	1.039 (0.075)
Convention on the Rights of the Child Optional Protocol 1	-3.526 (0.187)	1.594 (0.111)
Convention on the Rights of the Child Optional Protocol 2	-1.719 (0.124)	0.968 (0.075)
Convention Against Torture Optional Protocol	-1.183 (0.101)	0.623 (0.058)
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities	-3.682 (0.239)	0.984 (0.104)
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Optional Protocol	-2.233 (0.170)	0.549 (0.077)
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance	-3.391 (0.247)	0.786 (0.102)
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Optional Protocol	-4.242 (0.339)	0.620 (0.132)
Convention on the Rights of the Child Optional Protocol 3	-6.363 (0.759)	0.545 (0.225)

Note 1: The α_j parameter from the logistic regression that links θ to the observed binary treaty variables, once transformed using the inverse logit function, represents the baseline probability of country-year ratification of treaty j. The β_j parameter represents the strength of the relationship between the θ and the observed binary treaty variable j. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treaty and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights treaty have the strongest relationship with the latent treaty variable, which suggests that the ratification of these core treaties are the most important for embedding a country within the international human rights regime.



Figure 1: Visualization of the parameters displayed in the Table 1. Each graph represents the probability that a country-year unit has ratified a human rights treaty j across values of the latent variable estimate θ using the logistic regression parameter estimates α_j and β_j for each of the observed binary treaty variable j. As displayed in Table 1, the strength of the relationship between the estimated treaty embeddeness variable and the observed binary treaty variables varies across these indicators. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treaty and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights treaty have the strongest relationship (largest slope) with the latent treaty variable, which suggests that the ratification of these core treaties are the most important for embedding a country within the international human rights regime.

B Treaty Embeddedness Comparison Plots

Figure 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, Figure 7, and Figure 8 display the rank order of countries by posterior mean in the year 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010 respectively. Countries shift to the right along the latent variable across decades. For example, the most embedded countries in 1980 are only as embedded as the middle ranked countries in the year 2000.

B.1 1950



Figure 2: Rank order of countries by posterior mean in the year 1950.

B.2 1960



Figure 3: Rank order of countries by posterior mean in the year 1960.

B.3 1970



Figure 4: Rank order of countries by posterior mean in the year 1970.

B.4 1980



Figure 5: Rank order of countries by posterior mean in the year 1980. The most embedded countries in this year are only as embedded as the middle ranked countries in 2000.

B.5 1990



Figure 6: Rank order of countries by posterior mean in the year 1990.

B.6 2000



Figure 7: Rank order of countries by posterior mean in the year 2000.

B.7 2010



Figure 8: Rank order of countries by posterior mean in the year 2010.

C Human Rights Data Sources

Table 2 and Table 3 contain information about the documentary sources used to generate each of the variables that enter the human rights latent variable models that generate the data used in this paper. For more information on these sources see the original citations and also Fariss (2014).

C.1 Standards-Based Repression Data Sources

Table 2: Standards-Based Repression Data Sources

Dataset Name and Variable Description	**Dataset Citation** and Primary Source Information
CIRI Physical Integrity Data, 1981-2010 - political imprisonment (ordered scale, 0-2) - torture (ordered scale, 0-2) - extrajudicial killing (ordered scale, 0-2) - disappearance (ordered scale, 0-2)	Cingranelli and Richards (1999, 2012); **?** Amnesty International Reports[1] and State Department Reports[2] *Information in Amnesty reports takes precedence over information in State Department reports*
Hathaway Torture Data, 1985-1999 - torture (ordered scale, 1-5)	Hathaway (2002) State Department Reports[1]
Ill-Treatment and Torture (ITT), 1995-2005 - torture (ordered scale, 0-5)	Conrad and Moore (2011), Conrad, Haglund and Moore (2013), Amnesty International (2006) Annual Reports[1], press releases[1], and Urgent Action Alerts[1]
PTS Political Terror Scale, 1976-2010 - Ammesty International scale (ordered scale, 1-5) - State Department scale (ordered scale, 1-5)	Gibney, Cornett and Wood (2012), Gibney and Dalton (1996) Amnesty International Reports[1] State Department Reports[1]

1. Primary Source; 2. Secondary Source

C.2 Event-Based Repression Data Sources

Table 3: Event-Based Repression Data Sources

Dataset Name and Variable Description	**Dataset Citation** and Primary Source Information
Harff and Gurr Dataset, 1946-1988 - massive repressive events (1 if country-year experienced event 0 otherwise)	Harff and Gurr (1988) historical sources (see article references)[1]
Political Instability Task Force (PITF), 1956-2010 - genocide and politicide (1 if country-year experienced event 0 otherwise)	Harff (2003), Marshall, Gurr and Harff (2009) historical sources (see article references)[1] State Department Reports[2] Amnesty International Reports[2]
Rummel Dataset, 1949-1987 - genocide and democide (1 if country-year experienced event 0 otherwise) (3 death count estimates: best, low, high)	Rummel (1994, 1995), Wayman and Tago (2010) New York Times[1], New International Yearbook[2], Facts on File[2], Britannica Book of the Year[2], Deadline Data on World Affairs[2], Kessing's Contemporary Archives[2]
UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset, 1989-2010 - government killing (event count estimate) (1 if country-year experienced event 0 otherwise) (3 death count estimates: best, low, high)	Eck and Hultman (2007), Sundberg (2009) Reuters News[1], BBC World Monitoring[1] Agence France Presse[1], Xinhua News Agency[1], Dow Jones International News[1], UN Reports[2], Amnesty International Reports[2], Human Rights Watch Reports[2], local level NGO reports (not listed)[2]
World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators WHPSI, 1948-1982 - political executions (event count estimate) (1 if country-year experienced event 0 otherwise)	Taylor and Jodice (1983) New York Times[1], Middle East Journal[2], Asian Recorder[2], Archiv der Genenwart[2] African Diary[2], Current Digest of Soviet Press[2]

1. Primary Source; 2. Secondary Source



Figure 9: Temporal coverage and data type of repression data sources. The supplementary appendix for more information. Grey lines are event-based variables. Black lines are standards-based variables derived from the content of annual human rights reports. This figure is taken from (Fariss, 2014).



Figure 10: Temporal coverage and proportion of country-year observations that experience one of the 5 event-based types of repression that enter the latent human rights models. While these types of events are increasingly uncommon, they still occur in each year of the data. It is important to note that it is not only the frequency of the event-based indicators that Fariss (2014) uses in the latent variable model but the relative frequency of these values compared to all the other values of the different indicators. For example, there are still many 4s and 5s from the PTS scores today compared to earlier periods. As Fariss (2014) notes regarding the difference between the estimate obtained from the two latent variable models: "In sum, for the constant standard model to be more consistent with reality and for this same pattern [of changes to the latent variable estimates] to obtain [over time], Amnesty International and the US State Department would need to produce human rights reports consistently from year to year *and* the producers of the event-based data (introduced below) would need to use a less and less stringent definition of repression in the assessment of repressive events over time. This is unlikely because the events-based variables ... are consistently updated as new information about the specific events becomes available. In addition to periodic updating, the producers of these events-based variables are focused on the extreme end of the repression spectrum (e.g., genocide, politicide, mass-repression). Both of these features suggest that the event-based data are a valid representation of the historical record to date. The event-based data therefore act as a consistent baseline by which to compare the levels of the standards-based variables, which are produced in a specific historical context and never updated." (Fariss, 2014, 298). This figure is also presented in the supplementary appendix from (Fariss, 2014), which is available here: http://cfariss.com/documents/Fariss2014APSR_SupplementaryAppendix.pdf.

D Plot of Yearly Human Rights Scores



Figure 11: Yearly mean and credible intervals for latent physical integrity estimates from two models. The difference in the two sets of estimates suggests that an increasing standard of accountability explains why the average level of repression has remained unchanged over time when the changing standard is not taken into account. By allowing this standard to vary with time, a new picture emerges of improving physical integrity practices over time, which begins after initially deteriorating from the beginning of the period until the late 1970s. This figure is taken from (Fariss, 2014).

E Country Example Plots

Selected country-year posterior estimates and credible intervals (1949-2010). Coverage extends back to 1949 because of the incorporation of multiple indicators of physical integrity rights violations. More information is available about state behavior in the post 1975 period so the estimates are generally more precise from this period onwards. However, the level of precision (inverse variance) is quantified which makes possible probabilistic comparisons across the entire period. The model does a better job of discriminating among abusive states than with states that exhibit moderate to low abuse during the earlier period. Some of these figures are also presented in the supplementary appendix from (Fariss, 2014), which is available here:

http://cfariss.com/documents/Fariss2014APSR_SupplementaryAppendix.pdf.



Figure 12: Selected country-year posterior estimates and credible intervals (1949-2010). Coverage extends back to 1949 because of the incorporation of multiple indicators of physical integrity rights violations. More information is available about state behavior in the post 1975 period so the estimates are generally more precise from this period onwards. However, the level of precision (inverse variance) is quantified which makes possible probabilistic comparisons across the entire period. The model does a better job of discriminating among abusive states than with states that exhibit moderate to low abuse during the earlier period. The grey estimates represent those taken from the constant standard model. The blue estimates represent those taken from the dynamic standard model. The dynamic standard model explicitly accounts for changes in the standard of accountability over time. The difference between the two series increases as a function of time.



Figure 13: Selected country-year posterior estimates and credible intervals (1949-2010). The grey estimates represent those taken from the constant standard model. The blue estimates represent those taken from the dynamic standard model. The dynamic standard model explicitly accounts for changes in the standard of accountability over time. The difference between the two series increases as a function of time. In both of these cases, the models suggest that the 1980s and 2000s are about the same in terms of human rights respect in the constant standard model whereas the 2000s is a on average better than the 1980s for these two countries.



Figure 14: Selected country-year posterior estimates and credible intervals (1949-2010). The grey estimates represent those taken from the constant standard model. The blue estimates represent those taken from the dynamic standard model. The dynamic standard model explicitly accounts for changes in the standard of accountability over time. The difference between the two series increases as a function of time.



Figure 15: Selected country-year posterior estimates and credible intervals (1949-2010). The grey estimates represent those taken from the constant standard model. The blue estimates represent those taken from the dynamic standard model. The dynamic standard model explicitly accounts for changes in the standard of accountability over time. The difference between the two series increases as a function of time.



Figure 16: Selected country-year posterior estimates and credible intervals (1949-2010). The grey estimates represent those taken from the constant standard model. The blue estimates represent those taken from the dynamic standard model. The dynamic standard model explicitly accounts for changes in the standard of accountability over time. The difference between the two series increases as a function of time.

F Additional Information About the Results

Here I display tables of regression results for the main models presented visually in the manuscript. To reiterate the results from the main manuscript: even though the individual coefficients change depending on the model specification, the differences are consistent, which is a substantively important finding that eliminates concern that the use of a particular control variable is driving the results. And again, the results always contradict the negative findings from existing research. The coefficient for the each of the various treaty variables flip signs in every model permutation presented across the figures.

One additional note of interest: I also use a method to incorporate uncertainty in the regression models and summarized visually in the figures. Specifically, Schnakenberg and Fariss (2014) describe a technique, which is designed to incorporate measurement uncertainty into any model that includes a latent variable on the right hand side of a regression equation. The procedure is to create m datasets, which can be as low as 5 or 10 (Mislevy, 1991). The datasets are constructed using different draws from the posterior distribution of the latent variable and then combined using the Rubin (1987) formulas, where the point estimate for each parameter is the mean from the m estimates, and the standard error is $\sqrt{\frac{1}{m}\sum_k^m s_k^2 + \left(1+\frac{1}{m}\right)\sigma_\beta^2}$ where s_k^2 is the standard error from dataset k, and σ_β^2 is the variance in the regression coefficients between datasets. In words, the standard error is the average standard error from each model, plus the variance in the regression coefficients times a correction factor for $m < \infty$. This is the same procedure used for multiple imputation in the political science community (King et al., 2001). For an applied example and further discussion see Crabtree and Fariss (2015).

Table 4: Summary of Visual Displays of Regression Results for Nine Treaty Variables

	Human Rights Treaty Variable Description
Table 5	Latent Human Rights Treaty Variable
Table 6	Count of Selected Human Rights Treaties (CAT, CCPR, CESCR, CERD, CEDAW, CRC)
Table 7	Count of All Human Rights Treaties (see Table 1 in main manuscript)
Table 8	Proportion of All Human Rights Treaties Available for Ratification in Year t (see Table 1 in main manuscript)
Table 9	Convention Against Torture (CAT)
Table 10	Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
Table 11	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR)
Table 12	International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR)
Table 13	International Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
Table 14	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD)

Note: This list corresponds with a similar table in the main manuscript, which refers to figures that visually display the the treaty coefficients from the models displayed below. Each table displays linear regression coefficients for one of two dependent variables regressed on the selected treaty variable and controls. Each treaty variable is included in each of 8 model specifications described in the main manuscript. The difference between the treaty coefficients is similar across model specifications for all treaty variables. To reiterate the results from the main manuscript: even though the individual coefficients change depending on the model specification, the differences are consistent, which is a substantively important finding that eliminates concern that the use of a particular control variable is driving the results. And again, the results always contradict the negative findings from existing research. The coefficient for the each of the various treaty variables flip signs in every model permutation presented across the figures.

Table 5: Linear Regression of Two Latent Human Rights Variables on Latent Treaty Variable

	Model 1a^{Dynamic}		**Model 2a**^{Dynamic}		**Model 3a**^{Dynamic}		**Model 4a**^{Dynamic}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	0.007	1.125	0.013	1.986	-0.366	-8.090	-0.064	-1.198
	(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.045)		(0.053)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.930	185.952	0.913	171.654	0.895	158.713	0.870	140.351
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	0.015	3.703	0.002	0.520	0.002	0.489	0.007	1.582
	(0.004)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.004)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$			0.008	8.189	0.006	6.554	0.008	8.897
			(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)					0.046	8.451	0.054	9.913
					(0.005)		(0.005)	
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)							-0.041	-10.482
							(0.004)	
	Model 5a^{Dynamic}		**Model 6a**^{Dynamic}		**Model 7a**^{Dynamic}		**Model 8a**^{Dynamic}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.202	-3.906	-0.429	-9.381	0.225	6.291	0.331	8.908
	(0.052)		(0.046)		(0.036)		(0.037)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.889	145.591	0.906	158.760	0.921	171.574	0.894	156.881
	(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.005)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	0.019	4.543	0.012	2.947	0.020	4.788	0.006	1.401
	(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$							0.010	10.527
							(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)	0.061	11.153	0.053	9.638				
	(0.005)		(0.006)					
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)	-0.033	-8.208			-0.024	-6.172	-0.036	-8.753
	(0.004)				(0.004)		(0.004)	

	Model 1a^{Constant}		**Model 2a**^{Constant}		**Model 3a**^{Constant}		**Model 4a**^{Constant}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.014	-2.167	-0.010	-1.505	-0.384	-8.509	-0.098	-1.816
	(0.006)		(0.007)		(0.045)		(0.054)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.930	192.366	0.916	176.537	0.899	163.687	0.877	144.995
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	0.001	0.199	-0.013	-2.815	-0.015	-3.428	-0.014	-3.101
	(0.004)		(0.005)		(0.004)		(0.004)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$			0.007	7.380	0.005	5.671	0.007	7.572
			(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)					0.045	8.393	0.053	9.699
					(0.005)		(0.005)	
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)							-0.039	-9.743
							(0.004)	
	Model 5a^{Constant}		**Model 6a**^{Constant}		**Model 7a**^{Constant}		**Model 8a**^{Constant}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.222	-4.240	-0.442	-9.707	0.199	5.473	0.287	7.719
	(0.052)		(0.046)		(0.036)		(0.037)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.890	153.920	0.907	166.373	0.920	174.518	0.899	161.919
	(0.006)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	-0.002	-0.396	-0.005	-1.334	0.005	1.127	-0.011	-2.613
	(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$							0.009	9.196
							(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)	0.060	11.024	0.052	9.458				
	(0.005)		(0.005)					
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)	-0.032	-8.038			-0.024	-5.941	-0.033	-8.108
	(0.004)				(0.004)		(0.004)	

Table 6: Linear Regression of Two Latent Human Rights Variables on Count (Selected) Treaty Variable

	Model 1b *Dynamic*		**Model 2b** *Dynamic*		**Model 3b** *Dynamic*		**Model 4b** *Dynamic*	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.012	-1.179	0.009	0.845	-0.375	-7.988	-0.075	-1.405
	(0.010)		(0.011)		(0.047)		(0.054)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.932	187.237	0.914	173.820	0.896	159.610	0.870	139.956
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	0.010	3.744	0.002	0.626	0.003	0.926	0.005	1.869
	(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$			0.008	8.040	0.006	6.243	0.008	8.499
			(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)					0.046	8.403	0.055	10.088
					(0.006)		(0.005)	
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)							-0.042	-10.211
							(0.004)	
	Model 5b *Dynamic*		**Model 6b** *Dynamic*		**Model 7b** *Dynamic*		**Model 8b** *Dynamic*	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.231	-4.496	-0.451	-9.806	0.200	5.559	0.320	8.570
	(0.051)		(0.046)		(0.036)		(0.037)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.889	149.907	0.906	162.099	0.922	175.910	0.895	160.481
	(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.005)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	0.013	5.045	0.009	3.494	0.013	5.019	0.004	1.404
	(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$							0.010	10.183
							(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)	0.062	11.372	0.053	9.697				
	(0.005)		(0.006)					
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)	-0.034	-8.396			-0.025	-6.144	-0.035	-8.679
	(0.004)				(0.004)		(0.004)	

	Model 1c *Constant*		**Model 2c** *Constant*		**Model 3c** *Constant*		**Model 4c** *Constant*	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.006	-0.552	0.020	0.163	-0.355	-7.696	-0.065	-1.219
	(0.011)		(0.010)		(0.046)		(0.053)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.930	186.974	0.912	176.661	0.895	163.100	0.872	145.250
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	-0.003	-1.101	-0.013	-4.749	-0.014	-5.089	-0.015	-5.245
	(0.001)		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$			0.008	8.087	0.006	6.434	0.008	8.451
			(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)					0.046	8.415	0.054	9.906
					(0.005)		(0.005)	
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)							-0.040	-9.991
							(0.004)	
	Model 5c *Constant*		**Model 6c** *Constant*		**Model 7c** *Constant*		**Model 8c** *Constant*	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.226	-4.343	-0.437	-9.558	0.197	5.382	0.322	8.390
	(0.052)		(0.046)		(0.037)		(0.038)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.889	153.353	0.905	164.776	0.921	173.354	0.895	161.074
	(0.006)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	-0.005	-1.955	-0.007	-2.716	-0.001	-0.355	-0.013	-4.645
	(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.003)		(0.003)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$							0.010	9.962
							(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)	0.061	11.131	0.053	9.656				
	(0.006)		(0.006)					
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)	-0.032	-7.925			-0.023	-5.717	-0.034	-8.254
	(0.004)				(0.004)		(0.004)	

Table 7: Linear Regression of Two Latent Human Rights Variables on Count (All) Treaty Variable

	Model 1c^{Dynamic}		**Model 2c**^{Dynamic}		**Model 3c**^{Dynamic}		**Model 4c**^{Dynamic}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.016	-1.659	0.004	0.353	-0.372	-8.138	-0.070	-1.319
	(0.010)		(0.010)		(0.046)		(0.053)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.929	179.964	0.913	173.999	0.896	156.341	0.870	139.756
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	0.006	4.668	0.002	1.396	0.002	1.146	0.003	2.420
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$			0.007	7.629	0.006	6.172	0.008	8.373
			(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)					0.046	8.419	0.054	9.903
					(0.005)		(0.005)	
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)							-0.042	-10.551
							(0.004)	
	Model 5c^{Dynamic}		**Model 6c**^{Dynamic}		**Model 7c**^{Dynamic}		**Model 8c**^{Dynamic}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.210	-4.061	-0.439	-9.725	0.211	5.887	0.323	8.574
	(0.052)		(0.045)		(0.036)		(0.038)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.887	150.434	0.905	162.190	0.918	168.321	0.894	156.512
	(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.005)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	0.007	5.503	0.005	3.744	0.008	6.042	0.004	2.481
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$							0.009	9.634
							(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)	0.061	11.126	0.052	9.541				
	(0.005)		(0.005)					
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)	-0.035	-8.659			-0.026	-6.511	-0.036	-8.827
	(0.004)				(0.004)		(0.004)	

	Model 1a^{Constant}		**Model 2a**^{Constant}		**Model 3a**^{Constant}		**Model 4a**^{Constant}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.014	-1.477	0.009	0.854	-0.375	-8.155	-0.089	-1.684
	(0.009)		(0.010)		(0.046)		(0.053)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.930	189.856	0.915	175.025	0.896	162.342	0.874	146.029
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	0.000	0.034	-0.005	-3.495	-0.006	-4.570	-0.006	-4.424
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$			0.007	7.470	0.006	6.151	0.008	8.004
			(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)					0.047	8.550	0.055	10.166
					(0.006)		(0.005)	
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)							-0.039	-9.696
							(0.004)	
	Model 5c^{Constant}		**Model 6c**^{Constant}		**Model 7c**^{Constant}		**Model 8c**^{Constant}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.228	-4.369	-0.441	-9.934	0.195	5.296	0.305	8.092
	(0.052)		(0.044)		(0.037)		(0.038)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.890	155.987	0.906	171.300	0.920	171.513	0.897	160.622
	(0.006)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	-0.002	-1.192	-0.003	-2.177	0.001	1.021	-0.005	-3.278
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$							0.009	9.506
							(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)	0.061	11.261	0.053	9.812				
	(0.005)		(0.005)					
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)	-0.032	-7.974			-0.024	-5.828	-0.033	-8.148
	(0.004)				(0.004)		(0.004)	

Table 8: Linear Regression of Two Latent Human Rights Variables on Proportion Treaty Variable

	Model 1d^{Dynamic}		**Model 2d**^{Dynamic}		**Model 3d**^{Dynamic}		**Model 4d**^{Dynamic}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.014	-1.226	0.011	0.964	-0.365	-7.993	-0.067	-1.264
	(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.046)		(0.053)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.931	183.980	0.914	172.590	0.896	160.721	0.870	137.507
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	0.077	3.263	0.008	0.299	-0.003	-0.113	0.028	1.134
	(0.023)		(0.025)		(0.025)		(0.025)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$			0.008	8.381	0.006	6.857	0.009	9.105
			(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)					0.046	8.498	0.054	9.752
					(0.005)		(0.006)	
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)							-0.042	-10.189
							(0.004)	
	Model 5d^{Dynamic}		**Model 6d**^{Dynamic}		**Model 7d**^{Dynamic}		**Model 8d**^{Dynamic}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.223	-4.325	-0.439	-9.632	0.199	5.595	0.322	8.715
	(0.052)		(0.046)		(0.036)		(0.037)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.890	150.191	0.907	163.657	0.921	172.700	0.894	153.724
	(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.005)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	0.090	3.789	0.051	2.163	0.109	4.549	0.035	1.387
	(0.024)		(0.024)		(0.024)		(0.025)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$							0.010	10.390
							(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)	0.061	10.956	0.053	9.645				
	(0.006)		(0.005)					
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)	-0.033	-8.158			-0.025	-6.223	-0.036	-8.809
	(0.004)				(0.004)		(0.004)	

	Model 1d^{Constant}		**Model 2d**^{Constant}		**Model 3d**^{Constant}		**Model 4d**^{Constant}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.018	-1.632	0.005	0.432	-0.367	-7.826	-0.091	-1.683
	(0.011)		(0.012)		(0.047)		(0.054)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.930	185.665	0.917	179.171	0.900	161.366	0.878	145.241
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	0.010	0.459	-0.058	-2.290	-0.076	-3.024	-0.057	-2.309
	(0.023)		(0.025)		(0.025)		(0.025)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$			0.007	7.310	0.005	5.541	0.007	7.192
			(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)					0.046	8.208	0.053	9.541
					(0.006)		(0.006)	
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)							-0.038	-9.584
							(0.004)	
	Model 5d^{Constant}		**Model 6d**^{Constant}		**Model 7d**^{Constant}		**Model 8d**^{Constant}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.218	-4.224	-0.435	-9.518	0.194	5.438	0.295	7.910
	(0.052)		(0.046)		(0.036)		(0.037)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.890	150.291	0.907	169.963	0.920	170.571	0.900	161.180
	(0.006)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	0.000	0.014	-0.028	-1.226	0.036	1.529	-0.040	-1.614
	(0.023)		(0.023)		(0.023)		(0.025)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$							0.008	8.983
							(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)	0.060	10.890	0.052	9.413				
	(0.005)		(0.006)					
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)	-0.033	-8.164			-0.025	-6.154	-0.033	-8.144
	(0.004)				(0.004)		(0.004)	

Table 9: Linear Regression of Two Latent Human Rights Variables on CAT Treaty Variable

	Model 1e^{Dynamic}		**Model 2e**^{Dynamic}		**Model 3e**^{Dynamic}		**Model 4e**^{Dynamic}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	0.000	0.029	0.009	1.239	-0.367	-8.089	-0.060	-1.111
	(0.007)		(0.008)		(0.045)		(0.054)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.931	182.974	0.913	176.584	0.896	161.063	0.870	141.133
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	0.050	4.086	0.015	1.113	0.008	0.575	0.025	1.939
	(0.012)		(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.013)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$			0.008	8.257	0.006	6.684	0.008	9.020
			(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)					0.046	8.402	0.054	9.740
					(0.005)		(0.006)	
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)							-0.042	-10.156
							(0.004)	
	Model 5e^{Dynamic}		**Model 6e**^{Dynamic}		**Model 7e**^{Dynamic}		**Model 8e**^{Dynamic}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.200	-3.807	-0.426	-9.339	0.224	6.127	0.328	8.803
	(0.052)		(0.046)		(0.036)		(0.037)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.890	151.506	0.907	166.772	0.921	174.474	0.894	158.749
	(0.006)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	0.056	4.541	0.035	2.882	0.068	5.320	0.031	2.340
	(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.013)		(0.013)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$							0.010	10.181
							(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)	0.060	10.980	0.052	9.432				
	(0.006)		(0.006)					
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)	-0.033	-8.207			-0.025	-6.232	-0.036	-8.691
	(0.004)				(0.004)		(0.004)	

	Model 1e^{Constant}		**Model 2e**^{Constant}		**Model 3e**^{Constant}		**Model 4e**^{Constant}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.013	-1.785	-0.004	-0.498	-0.394	-8.560	-0.110	-2.055
	(0.007)		(0.007)		(0.046)		(0.054)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.930	183.470	0.915	177.063	0.896	160.686	0.874	143.087
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	-0.002	-0.149	-0.044	-3.337	-0.060	-4.624	-0.057	-4.486
	(0.012)		(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.013)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$			0.007	7.618	0.005	5.987	0.007	8.008
			(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)					0.048	8.595	0.055	10.048
					(0.006)		(0.005)	
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)							-0.039	-9.554
							(0.004)	
	Model 5e^{Constant}		**Model 6e**^{Constant}		**Model 7e**^{Constant}		**Model 8e**^{Constant}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.235	-4.471	-0.452	-9.867	0.195	5.383	0.290	7.785
	(0.053)		(0.046)		(0.036)		(0.037)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.889	150.259	0.905	165.412	0.921	174.532	0.898	157.496
	(0.006)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	-0.020	-1.635	-0.031	-2.631	0.010	0.821	-0.038	-2.936
	(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.013)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$							0.009	9.397
							(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)	0.062	11.069	0.054	9.726				
	(0.006)		(0.006)					
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)	-0.032	-7.991			-0.024	-5.845	-0.033	-8.014
	(0.004)				(0.004)		(0.004)	

Table 10: Linear Regression of Two Latent Human Rights Variables on CEDAW Treaty Variable

	Model 1f^{Dynamic}		**Model 2f**^{Dynamic}		**Model 3f**^{Dynamic}		**Model 4f**^{Dynamic}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	0.006	0.602	0.017	1.782	-0.297	-5.498	-0.056	-0.893
	(0.010)		(0.010)		(0.054)		(0.063)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.949	175.766	0.934	160.525	0.921	147.187	0.901	135.320
	(0.005)		(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.007)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	0.027	2.121	0.002	0.190	0.010	0.756	0.014	1.100
	(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.013)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$			0.006	6.371	0.005	4.651	0.007	6.433
			(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)					0.038	5.960	0.043	6.829
					(0.006)		(0.006)	
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)							-0.032	-7.423
							(0.004)	

	Model 5f^{Dynamic}		**Model 6f**^{Dynamic}		**Model 7f**^{Dynamic}		**Model 8f**^{Dynamic}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.210	-3.591	-0.371	-7.212	0.165	4.386	0.270	6.851
	(0.058)		(0.051)		(0.038)		(0.039)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.916	142.950	0.928	153.220	0.943	165.220	0.918	145.069
	(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	0.038	3.013	0.029	2.273	0.033	2.634	0.005	0.365
	(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.013)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$							0.008	8.112
							(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)	0.052	8.498	0.045	7.450				
	(0.006)		(0.006)					
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)	-0.025	-5.976			-0.018	-4.353	-0.028	-6.603
	(0.004)				(0.004)		(0.004)	

	Model 1f^{Constant}		**Model 2f**^{Constant}		**Model 3f**^{Constant}		**Model 4f**^{Constant}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.012	-1.266	0.000	-0.026	-0.291	-5.459	-0.064	-1.019
	(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.053)		(0.063)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.946	177.501	0.932	167.322	0.921	149.647	0.903	138.920
	(0.005)		(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.007)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	-0.009	-0.746	-0.037	-2.843	-0.034	-2.554	-0.036	-2.777
	(0.012)		(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.013)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$			0.006	6.045	0.004	4.146	0.006	5.878
			(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)					0.035	5.565	0.040	6.246
					(0.006)		(0.006)	
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)							-0.030	-6.920
							(0.004)	

	Model 5f^{Constant}		**Model 6f**^{Constant}		**Model 7f**^{Constant}		**Model 8f**^{Constant}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.208	-3.623	-0.363	-7.153	0.142	3.723	0.239	6.102
	(0.057)		(0.051)		(0.038)		(0.039)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.915	148.134	0.927	158.412	0.939	168.036	0.918	149.374
	(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	-0.010	-0.874	-0.015	-1.218	-0.006	-0.487	-0.039	-3.031
	(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.013)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$							0.007	7.597
							(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)	0.049	7.992	0.043	7.064				
	(0.006)		(0.006)					
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)	-0.023	-5.751			-0.017	-4.140	-0.027	-6.311
	(0.004)				(0.004)		(0.004)	

Table 11: Linear Regression of Two Latent Human Rights Variables on CCPR Treaty Variable

	Model 1g^{Dynamic}		**Model 2g**^{Dynamic}		**Model 3g**^{Dynamic}		**Model 4g**^{Dynamic}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	0.000	-0.037	0.017	1.869	-0.363	-7.865	-0.066	-1.235
	(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.046)		(0.054)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.933	188.756	0.914	172.262	0.895	156.274	0.871	144.031
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	0.031	2.639	-0.006	-0.505	-0.005	-0.430	0.004	0.343
	(0.012)		(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.013)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$			0.008	8.574	0.007	6.917	0.009	9.453
			(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)					0.046	8.432	0.054	9.872
					(0.005)		(0.005)	
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)							-0.041	-10.333
							(0.004)	

	Model 5g^{Dynamic}		**Model 6g**^{Dynamic}		**Model 7g**^{Dynamic}		**Model 8g**^{Dynamic}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.230	-4.421	-0.437	-9.567	0.202	5.566	0.328	8.874
	(0.052)		(0.046)		(0.036)		(0.037)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.892	154.219	0.908	165.638	0.924	178.317	0.895	158.873
	(0.006)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	0.040	3.379	0.024	2.066	0.043	3.638	0.001	0.104
	(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.012)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$							0.010	10.739
							(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)	0.062	11.202	0.053	9.757				
	(0.006)		(0.005)					
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)	-0.032	-7.896			-0.023	-5.775	-0.035	-8.638
	(0.004)				(0.004)		(0.004)	

	Model 1g^{Constant}		**Model 2g**^{Constant}		**Model 3g**^{Constant}		**Model 4g**^{Constant}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.008	-0.870	0.009	1.040	-0.364	-7.802	-0.077	-1.440
	(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.047)		(0.054)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.930	185.888	0.914	175.202	0.897	160.963	0.874	146.718
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	-0.011	-0.918	-0.051	-4.031	-0.056	-4.377	-0.054	-4.357
	(0.012)		(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.012)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$			0.007	7.855	0.006	5.941	0.007	8.092
			(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)					0.045	8.209	0.053	9.626
					(0.006)		(0.005)	
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)							-0.039	-9.820
							(0.004)	

	Model 5g^{Constant}		**Model 6g**^{Constant}		**Model 7g**^{Constant}		**Model 8g**^{Constant}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.222	-4.393	-0.437	-9.716	0.196	5.349	0.307	8.151
	(0.050)		(0.045)		(0.037)		(0.038)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.890	152.825	0.906	167.731	0.921	172.906	0.897	162.079
	(0.006)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	-0.018	-1.551	-0.027	-2.345	-0.002	-0.180	-0.049	-3.809
	(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.013)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$							0.009	9.564
							(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)	0.061	11.362	0.053	9.702				
	(0.005)		(0.005)					
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)	-0.032	-8.056			-0.023	-5.741	-0.033	-8.209
	(0.004)				(0.004)		(0.004)	

Table 12: Linear Regression of Two Latent Human Rights Variables on CESCR Treaty Variable

	Model 1h^{Dynamic}		**Model 2h**^{Dynamic}		**Model 3h**^{Dynamic}		**Model 4h**^{Dynamic}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.002	-0.173	0.016	1.217	-0.364	-5.552	-0.066	-0.852
	(0.012)		(0.013)		(0.066)		(0.077)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.932	133.250	0.914	121.629	0.896	113.077	0.871	97.753
	(0.007)		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.009)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	0.035	2.101	-0.004	-0.203	-0.002	-0.107	0.002	0.124
	(0.017)		(0.018)		(0.018)		(0.018)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$			0.008	5.982	0.006	4.757	0.009	6.440
			(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)					0.046	5.911	0.054	6.987
					(0.008)		(0.008)	
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)							-0.041	-7.121
							(0.006)	
	Model 5h^{Dynamic}		**Model 6h**^{Dynamic}		**Model 7h**^{Dynamic}		**Model 8h**^{Dynamic}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.232	-3.120	-0.438	-6.900	0.197	3.925	0.327	6.106
	(0.074)		(0.063)		(0.050)		(0.054)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.892	106.623	0.907	117.277	0.924	125.892	0.895	109.501
	(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.007)		(0.008)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	0.040	2.414	0.028	1.748	0.044	2.620	0.000	-0.005
	(0.017)		(0.016)		(0.017)		(0.018)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$							0.010	7.397
							(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)	0.062	8.000	0.053	7.000				
	(0.008)		(0.008)					
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)	-0.031	-5.568			-0.023	-4.063	-0.035	-6.053
	(0.006)				(0.006)		(0.006)	

	Model 1h^{Constant}		**Model 2h**^{Constant}		**Model 3h**^{Constant}		**Model 4h**^{Constant}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.010	-0.823	0.006	0.485	-0.364	-5.525	-0.072	-0.931
	(0.012)		(0.013)		(0.066)		(0.078)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.930	134.425	0.914	124.630	0.898	113.931	0.874	100.494
	(0.007)		(0.007)		(0.008)		(0.009)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	-0.006	-0.400	-0.046	-2.557	-0.050	-2.772	-0.053	-2.921
	(0.016)		(0.018)		(0.018)		(0.018)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$			0.007	5.450	0.005	4.176	0.008	5.521
			(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)					0.045	5.781	0.053	6.813
					(0.008)		(0.008)	
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)							-0.040	-6.691
							(0.006)	
	Model 5h^{Constant}		**Model 6h**^{Constant}		**Model 7h**^{Constant}		**Model 8h**^{Constant}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.220	-2.975	-0.437	-6.951	0.196	3.848	0.312	5.849
	(0.074)		(0.063)		(0.051)		(0.053)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.890	105.083	0.906	116.929	0.921	122.585	0.897	111.226
	(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.008)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	-0.015	-0.904	-0.021	-1.295	0.000	0.021	-0.049	-2.681
	(0.016)		(0.017)		(0.016)		(0.018)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$							0.009	6.991
							(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)	0.061	7.753	0.052	6.941				
	(0.008)		(0.008)					
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)	-0.032	-5.656			-0.023	-4.173	-0.034	-5.886
	(0.006)				(0.006)		(0.006)	

Table 13: Linear Regression of Two Latent Human Rights Variables on CRC Treaty Variable

	Model 1i^{Dynamic}		**Model 2i**^{Dynamic}		**Model 3i**^{Dynamic}		**Model 4i**^{Dynamic}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.004	-0.465	0.005	0.662	-0.384	-8.026	-0.082	-1.537
	(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.048)		(0.053)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.932	186.971	0.914	177.202	0.895	156.655	0.870	142.356
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	0.047	3.939	0.020	1.686	0.028	2.275	0.036	2.991
	(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.012)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$			0.007	8.305	0.006	6.352	0.008	8.773
			(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)					0.047	8.351	0.055	10.296
					(0.006)		(0.005)	
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)							-0.042	-10.403
							(0.004)	

	Model 5i^{Dynamic}		**Model 6i**^{Dynamic}		**Model 7i**^{Dynamic}		**Model 8i**^{Dynamic}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.246	-4.678	-0.456	-10.002	0.198	5.499	0.321	8.530
	(0.053)		(0.046)		(0.036)		(0.038)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.889	151.800	0.906	164.337	0.924	176.591	0.895	155.198
	(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.005)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	0.062	5.392	0.049	4.238	0.055	4.657	0.026	2.122
	(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.012)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$							0.010	10.622
							(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)	0.064	11.648	0.055	10.073				
	(0.005)		(0.005)					
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)	-0.032	-8.107			-0.023	-5.762	-0.035	-8.660
	(0.004)				(0.004)		(0.004)	

	Model 1i^{Constant}		**Model 2i**^{Constant}		**Model 3i**^{Constant}		**Model 4i**^{Constant}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.007	-0.898	0.004	0.489	-0.368	-7.994	-0.067	-1.251
	(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.046)		(0.054)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.929	185.021	0.913	173.989	0.896	160.712	0.871	140.912
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	-0.015	-1.327	-0.050	-4.164	-0.053	-4.402	-0.062	-5.229
	(0.011)		(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.012)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$			0.007	7.955	0.005	5.743	0.008	8.324
			(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)					0.045	8.193	0.053	9.655
					(0.005)		(0.005)	
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)							-0.041	-10.034
							(0.004)	

	Model 5i^{Constant}		**Model 6i**^{Constant}		**Model 7i**^{Constant}		**Model 8i**^{Constant}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.221	-4.350	-0.437	-9.703	0.199	5.380	0.318	8.515
	(0.051)		(0.045)		(0.037)		(0.037)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.888	150.081	0.905	165.101	0.920	175.160	0.894	161.439
	(0.006)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	-0.026	-2.400	-0.028	-2.536	-0.011	-0.948	-0.057	-4.735
	(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.012)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$							0.009	9.999
							(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)	0.061	11.437	0.052	9.722				
	(0.005)		(0.005)					
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)	-0.032	-8.136			-0.023	-5.741	-0.035	-8.646
	(0.004)				(0.004)		(0.004)	

Table 14: Linear Regression of Two Latent Human Rights Variables on CERD Treaty Variable

	Model 1j^{Dynamic}		**Model 2j**^{Dynamic}		**Model 3j**^{Dynamic}		**Model 4j**^{Dynamic}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	0.003	0.256	0.014	1.310	-0.367	-7.674	-0.074	-1.346
	(0.010)		(0.010)		(0.048)		(0.055)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.934	192.035	0.914	173.280	0.896	157.822	0.870	143.498
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	0.020	1.600	0.001	0.064	0.004	0.302	0.017	1.370
	(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.012)		(0.012)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$			0.008	8.864	0.006	7.078	0.009	9.783
			(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)					0.046	8.192	0.054	9.916
					(0.006)		(0.005)	
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)							-0.041	-10.137
							(0.004)	
	Model 5j^{Dynamic}		**Model 6j**^{Dynamic}		**Model 7j**^{Dynamic}		**Model 8j**^{Dynamic}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.241	-4.518	-0.442	-9.475	0.194	5.318	0.324	8.651
	(0.053)		(0.047)		(0.036)		(0.037)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.892	154.826	0.908	165.040	0.926	178.801	0.895	159.273
	(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.005)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	0.033	2.661	0.019	1.509	0.029	2.290	0.012	0.962
	(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.013)		(0.012)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$							0.010	11.178
							(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)	0.063	11.366	0.054	9.806				
	(0.006)		(0.006)					
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)	-0.031	-7.943			-0.022	-5.410	-0.035	-8.637
	(0.004)				(0.004)		(0.004)	

	Model 1j^{Constant}		**Model 2j**^{Constant}		**Model 3j**^{Constant}		**Model 4j**^{Constant}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.006	-0.611	0.003	0.247	-0.364	-7.809	-0.086	-1.597
	(0.010)		(0.010)		(0.047)		(0.054)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.930	190.684	0.917	176.465	0.900	161.119	0.878	148.182
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	-0.012	-0.935	-0.031	-2.453	-0.032	-2.535	-0.026	-2.057
	(0.012)		(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.012)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$			0.006	7.315	0.004	5.183	0.006	7.258
			(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)					0.044	8.115	0.052	9.616
					(0.005)		(0.005)	
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)							-0.039	-9.473
							(0.004)	
	Model 5j^{Constant}		**Model 6j**^{Constant}		**Model 7j**^{Constant}		**Model 8j**^{Constant}	
Variable	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z	β (s.e.)	Z
Intercept	-0.217	-4.137	-0.428	-9.296	0.196	5.312	0.297	7.990
	(0.053)		(0.046)		(0.037)		(0.037)	
Latent Human Rights$_{t-1}$	0.890	151.215	0.907	167.020	0.921	173.972	0.900	161.934
	(0.006)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)	
Latent Treaty$_{t-1}$	-0.010	-0.788	-0.020	-1.638	-0.003	-0.277	-0.026	-2.049
	(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.013)	
Polity2$_{t-1}$							0.008	9.179
							(0.001)	
ln(gdppc$_{t-1}$)	0.060	10.967	0.051	9.527				
	(0.005)		(0.005)					
ln(Population$_{t-1}$)	-0.032	-8.023			-0.023	-5.666	-0.033	-8.176
	(0.004)				(0.004)		(0.004)	

G Graphical Comparisons of the Latent Human Rights Variable and the Constituent Human Rights Indicators

The following set of figures display the distribution of country-year units across values of the latent human rights variable for each value of the thirteen categorical human rights indicators included in the latent variable described in Fariss (2014). Statistical analyses of the relationship between the latent variable and the indicators are described in detail in the Supplementary Appendix that accompanies the article by Fariss (2014). These graphical displays provide visual evidence that corroborates the statistical analyses: the latent human rights variable and the individual categorical human rights variables are strongly related to one another. That is, the latent human rights variable — an estimate based on the constellation of all thirteen human rights indicators — is able to differentiate between the values of each of these individual variables. To reiterate a point made in the main article, latent variable models, with their focus on the theoretical relationship between data and model parameters, offer a principled way to bring together different pieces of information even if that information is biased in some way. These figures offer a visual method of inspecting the relationship between the values of the latent variable and the values of the categorical indicators included in the latent human rights model developed by Fariss (2014).



Figure 17: Distribution of country-year units across values of the latent human rights variable from Fariss (2014), for each value from the categorical human rights indicator. A 1 indicates that the described event occurred in the country-year and 0 indicates that it did not. More information about the operationalization of the human rights variables are above. This figure offers a visual method of inspecting the relationship between the values of the latent variable and the values of the categorical indicator, which is included in the latent human rights model developed by Fariss (2014).



Figure 18: Distribution of country-year units across values of the latent human rights variable from Fariss (2014), for each value from the categorical human rights indicator. A 1 indicates that the described event occurred in the country-year and 0 indicates that it did not. More information about the operationalization of the human rights variables are above. This figure offers a visual method of inspecting the relationship between the values of the latent variable and the values of the categorical indicator, which is included in the latent human rights model developed by Fariss (2014).



Figure 19: Distribution of country-year units across values of the latent human rights variable from Fariss (2014), for each value from the categorical human rights indicator. A 1 indicates that the described event occurred in the country-year and 0 indicates that it did not. More information about the operationalization of the human rights variables are above. This figure offers a visual method of inspecting the relationship between the values of the latent variable and the values of the categorical indicator, which is included in the latent human rights model developed by Fariss (2014).



Figure 20: Distribution of country-year units across values of the latent human rights variable from Fariss (2014), for each value from the categorical human rights indicator. A 1 indicates that the described event occurred in the country-year and 0 indicates that it did not. More information about the operationalization of the human rights variables are above. This figure offers a visual method of inspecting the relationship between the values of the latent variable and the values of the categorical indicator, which is included in the latent human rights model developed by Fariss (2014).



Figure 21: Distribution of country-year units across values of the latent human rights variable from Fariss (2014), for each value from the categorical human rights indicator. A 1 indicates that the described event occurred in the country-year and 0 indicates that it did not. More information about the operationalization of the human rights variables are above. This figure offers a visual method of inspecting the relationship between the values of the latent variable and the values of the categorical indicator, which is included in the latent human rights model developed by Fariss (2014).



Figure 22: Distribution of country-year units across values of the latent human rights variable from Fariss (2014), for each value from the categorical human rights indicator. More information about the operationalization of the human rights variables are above. This figure offers a visual method of inspecting the relationship between the values of the latent variable and the values of the categorical indicator, which is included in the latent human rights model developed by Fariss (2014).



Figure 23: Distribution of country-year units across values of the latent human rights variable from Fariss (2014), for each value from the categorical human rights indicator. More information about the operationalization of the human rights variables are above. This figure offers a visual method of inspecting the relationship between the values of the latent variable and the values of the categorical indicator, which is included in the latent human rights model developed by Fariss (2014).



Figure 24: Distribution of country-year units across values of the latent human rights variable from Fariss (2014), for each value from the categorical human rights indicator. More information about the operationalization of the human rights variables are above. This figure offers a visual method of inspecting the relationship between the values of the latent variable and the values of the categorical indicator, which is included in the latent human rights model developed by Fariss (2014).



Figure 25: Distribution of country-year units across values of the latent human rights variable from Fariss (2014), for each value from the categorical human rights indicator. More information about the operationalization of the human rights variables are above. This figure offers a visual method of inspecting the relationship between the values of the latent variable and the values of the categorical indicator, which is included in the latent human rights model developed by Fariss (2014).



Figure 26: Distribution of country-year units across values of the latent human rights variable from Fariss (2014), for each value from the categorical human rights indicator. More information about the operationalization of the human rights variables are above. This figure offers a visual method of inspecting the relationship between the values of the latent variable and the values of the categorical indicator, which is included in the latent human rights model developed by Fariss (2014).



Figure 27: Distribution of country-year units across values of the latent human rights variable from Fariss (2014), for each value from the categorical human rights indicator. More information about the operationalization of the human rights variables are above. This figure offers a visual method of inspecting the relationship between the values of the latent variable and the values of the categorical indicator, which is included in the latent human rights model developed by Fariss (2014).



Figure 28: Distribution of country-year units across values of the latent human rights variable from Fariss (2014), for each value from the categorical human rights indicator. More information about the operationalization of the human rights variables are above. This figure offers a visual method of inspecting the relationship between the values of the latent variable and the values of the categorical indicator, which is included in the latent human rights model developed by Fariss (2014).



Figure 29: Distribution of country-year units across values of the latent human rights variable from Fariss (2014), for each value from the categorical human rights indicator. More information about the operationalization of the human rights variables are above. This figure offers a visual method of inspecting the relationship between the values of the latent variable and the values of the categorical indicator, which is included in the latent human rights model developed by Fariss (2014).

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