"The Micro-Foundation of Party Competition and Issue Ownership: the Reciprocal Effects of Citizens' Issue Priorities and Party Attachments"

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Supplementary analyses

We report five sets of supplementary analyses on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, which are designed to evaluate the robustness of the conclusions we report in the original paper.

We report the coefficient estimates on the individual-level covariates we included in the specifications given by equations 1-6 in the paper, to account for factors that affected respondents' partisanship and issue concerns when they first entered the panel (see Neundorf et al. 2011). The robustness checks we report below are as follows: 1) analyses where we used higher cut-off points for the minimum number of observations per respondent required for inclusion in our analyses; 2) analyses that account for errors in our measurements of survey respondents' partisanship; 3) analyses that specify different time lags for the effects of partisanship on issue saliency (and vice versa); 4) analyses designed to evaluate whether our conclusions varied depending on which parties were currently part of the national governing coalition; and, 5) analyses of different Coalition Periods. Our estimates suggest that our conclusions are robust to each of these extensions: we find that our coefficient estimates do not change substantially when we increase the cut-off point for the minimum number of observations per respondent, when we specify party identification as a latent construct, or when we specify different time lags in our models. We also estimate that the degree of reciprocal-effect did not significantly change with different Coalition Period, with a slight exception for the issue of the national economy; and, that mass-elite linkages varied only modestly depending on which parties were in government.

Increasing the cut-off point for the minimum number of observations per respondent

In the analyses we report in the paper the selected respondents comprised the 19,777 individuals with at least three observations on the party support and issue saliency variables, the minimum number of responses required to estimate our models. Table S1 reports analyses where we increased the cut-off point to a minimum of five observations per respondent (N=12,977), while Table S2 reports analyses on only those respondents who completed all 26 waves of the panel

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study (N=1,746). Both sets of analyses continue to support the reciprocal effects hypothesis, in that we estimate significant effects of respondents' lagged issue concerns on their party support and of their lagged party support on their current issue concerns. Our parameter estimates also continue to support the reciprocal-effect hypotheses.

[TABLES S1-S2 ABOUT HERE]

Treating partisanship as a latent variable

Donald Green and his collaborators (Green and Palmquist 1994; Green et al. 2002) argue that measurements of partisanship based on single survey questions are subject to considerable measurement error, which can lead analysts to greatly under-estimate the degree of partisan stability in the electorate. In order to evaluate whether the conclusions we report in our paper extend to models that account for this type of measurement error, we replicated our models while specifying partisanship as a latent variable. (See Neundorf et al. 2011 for a formal description of the latent markov model that was estimated here.) For computational reasons we restricted our sample to those respondents that participated in all 26 waves of the panel study.[2] Table S3 presents parameter estimates for the effects of respondents' lagged issue concerns on their current partisanship, with partisanship specified as a latent variable. The coefficient estimates continue to support the reciprocal-effect hypothesis.

[TABLE S3 ABOUT HERE]

Varying the time lags specified in the models

Using panel data to estimate the lagged effect of one variable on another raises the question of how much time has to pass to observe the expected effect. Typically researchers working with panel data use the previous wave to capture lagged effects, which is the specification we employed in the analyses we reported in the main text of the paper. In the case of our panel, which features yearly waves, this entailed specifying one-year lagged effects. However since our panel consists of many more waves (26 in all) than the panels normally analyzed in political science, we decided to investigate the effects of varying the lag times specified in our models: specifically we estimated separate models that varied the specified length of the lagged effects from 1 to 5 years. In order to compare the different models, we constrained the analyses to the time span 1989-2009, which allows us to use a time point that has valid responses on all lagged variables, so that the model estimates are comparable for different lagged specifications.

Table S4.1 reports our estimates on issue-based partisan updating for alternative specifications of the time lags, while Table S4.2 reports reciprocal estimates on partisan-based issue updating, again for alternative time lags. These estimates demonstrate that our substantive conclusions are robust to alternative specifications about time lags: for all specified lags we estimate

[2] As we showed in Table S2 above, our parameter estimates are similar regardless of whether we estimate our models on all respondents who took part in at least three panel waves, as opposed to restricting our analyses to respondents who completed all 26 panel waves.

reciprocal causal effects, i.e., that the survey respondents' issue concerns influenced their subsequent partisanship and that respondents' partisanship influenced their subsequent issue concerns.

[TABLES A4.1-A4.2 ABOUT HERE]

Analyses of different coalition periods

Germany featured three national governing coalitions during the 1984-2009 period of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP): a CDU-FDP coalition between 1984 and 1998, with the CDU's Helmut Kohl serving as Chancellor; an SPD-Green coalition between 1998 and 2005, with the SPD's Gerhard Schroeder serving as Chancellor; and, a "grand coalition" of the CDU and the SPD between 2005 and 2009, with the CDU's Angela Merkel serving as Chancellor. The latter coalition was brought about because the far left party *Die Linke* held the balance of power in the Bundestag (the lower parliamentary chamber) following the 2005 parliamentary elections, so that neither the left-wing proto-coalition of the SPD and the Greens nor the right-wing proto-coalition of the CDU and the FDP commanded a parliamentary majority.[3]

In order to assess whether the reciprocal effects of citizens' issue concerns and their party support were mediated by the composition of the national governing coalition, we re-estimated the parameters of the specifications given by equations 1-6 in the original paper, on the GSOEP data subdivided for three different periods: 1984-1998, the period of the CDU-FDP governing coalition; 1999-2005, the period of the SPD-Green coalition; and 2006-2009, the period of the "grand coalition" of the CDU and the SPD.[4] Table S5.1 reports the estimates of issue-based partisan updating effects for these three different periods, while Table AS.2 reports the reciprocal estimates of issue cueing effects for these periods; for comparison purposes the tables also report the coefficient estimates across the entire 1984-2009 period. The estimates for each coalition period continue to support the reciprocal effects hypothesis.

Finally, we note that our parameter estimates suggest that governing parties suffer when the electorate is concerned about the national economy (Fiorina 1981; Lewis-Beck 1988), although the effects we identify are modest. Specifically, we estimate that while citizens' economic concerns enhanced their support for the SPD during the 1984-1998 period when the SPD was in opposition, economic concerns depressed support for the SPD between 1999-2009 when the SPD was in government (although the magnitudes of these coefficient estimates are small). Similarly, we estimate that citizens' economic concerns modestly enhanced their support for the CDU during the 1998-2005 period when the CDU was in opposition, but that economic concerns modestly depressed support for the CDU between 1984-1998 and again between 2005-2009 when the CDU was in government, although these estimated effects are modest.

[3] Although the sharply left-wing *Die Linke* would seem to be a natural coalition partner for the SPD and the Greens, personal animosity between the SPD leader Gerhard Schroeder, and *Die Linke*'s leader Oskar Lafontaine, proved to be an insurmountable obstacle to the formation of this left-wing coalition.

[4] As the GSOEP surveys are administered in the spring, but the elections in 1998 and 2005 that changed the government took place in the fall, we count the election year as part of the sitting government.

[TABLES S5.1-S5.2 ABOUT HERE]

Coefficient estimates on the individual-level covariates included in the specifications

In equations 1-6 in the paper we included individual-level covariates to account for factors that affected respondents' partisanship and issue concerns when they first entered the panel (see Neundorf et al. 2011). Table S6.1 reports the coefficient estimates on the effects of these variables on party support. To highlight a few results, support for the Greens decreases with age and with church attendance but increases with education and political interest. This supports the claim that Green partisans are substantially younger, less religious, better educated, and more interested in politics than are independents; and that education is associated with stronger support for the FDP but weaker support for the SPD and the CDU. Table S6.2 reports the coefficient estimates on issue concerns, which imply that younger, more educated and politically-interested respondents tended to prioritize the environment, while education and church attendance were associated with decreased attention to the economy.

[TABLES S6.1-S6.2 ABOUT HERE]

Predicted Stability of Respondents' Partisanship and Issue Concerns, as a Function of their Cross-Lagged Effects

Analogue to Figures 3-4 that plot the predicted probabilities of partisan and issue concern mobilization, Figure S1 and S2 illustrate the stability of partisanship and issue concern as a function of cross-lagged effects. Figure S1 displays computations on issue-based partisan updating effects on the stability of partisanship. The figure displays the likelihoods that respondents who supported a given party at the previous panel wave would support the same party at the current panel, stratified by lagged concerns over the economy (Figure S1.A), the environment (Figure S1.B), crime (Figure S1.C) and immigration (Figure S1.D). For example, Figure S1.B shows that among respondents who reported lagged support for the Greens, those with lagged environmental concerns had a computed 0.72 probability of supporting the Greens at the current panel wave (based on the coefficient estimates in Table A.2A) while Green supporters who did not report lagged environmental concerns had a computed 0.56 probability of supporting the Greens again – i.e., the partisan stability of Green supporters increased by 0.16 (from 0.56 to 0.72) if they also expressed lagged environmental concerns, with all other factors held constant. And Figures 2A-2D, which display parallel computations on effects of lagged concerns relating to the economy, crime, and immigration, respectively, also illustrate more modest effects with respect to the mainstream parties, in that lagged environmental concerns depressed the probabilities that CDU and FDP supporters would remain loyal to their parties at the current panel by roughly 0.05, and increased the probability that SPD supporters would remain loyal to their party by approximately 0.03.

Figures S2 display computations on partisan updating effects. Figure S2.A shows that among respondents who identified with one of the two mainstream parties or the FDP in the previous panel wave, about a proportion of 0.55 remained concerned about the economy. Green supporters on the other hand are less likely to remain concerned about the economy (p=0.47). Green supporters however had a computed 0.81 probability of prioritizing the environment at the cur-

rent panel (based on the coefficient estimates in Table A1.B), while respondents who were nonpartisans at the previous panel (and who prioritized the environment at that panel) had only a 0.63 probability of prioritizing the environment at the current panel – i.e., lagged Green support increased the likelihood that respondents' environmental concerns would persist into the current panel by 0.18 (from 0.63 to 0.81), compared to lagged nonpartisanship (with all other factors constant).

[FIGURES S1 + S2 ABOUT HERE]

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Table S1: Analyses of respondents with valid answers across at least 5 panel waves (N=12,977)

Table S1.1: Multinomial logistic regression on partisanship:
Estimates of issue-based partisan updating effects

	SPD-Model		CDU-Model		FDP-Model		Green-Model	
	coef.	*s.e.*	*coef.*	*s.e.*	*coef.*	*s.e.*	*coef.*	*s.e.*
Transition probabilities (y_t):								
Issue Saliency (X_{t-1}):								
National economy	0.028	0.023	0.003	0.024	-0.072	0.054	-0.337**	0.042
Environment	0.187**	0.022	-0.199**	0.024	-0.204**	0.055	0.805**	0.040
Initial state probabilities (y_0): Not reported								
Number of obs.	12,977							

Significance levels: * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$.
Data: GSOEP (1984-2009); Base category: no or other party identification; Control variables on initial state: education; occupation status, gender, age, church attendance, political interest.

Table S1.2: Logistic regression on issue saliency:
Estimates of partisan-based issue cueing effects

	National Economy		Environment	
	coef.	*s.e.*	*coef.*	*s.e.*
Transition probabilities (y_t):				
Partisanship (X_{t-1}):				
SPD	0.034	0.018	0.176**	0.018
CDU	0.014	0.018	-0.206**	0.019
FDP	-0.113*	0.045	-0.227**	0.048
Green	-0.432**	0.034	0.801**	0.032
Initial state probabilities (y_0): Not reported				
Number of obs.	12,977			

Significance levels: * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$.
Data: GSOEP (1984-2009); Base category: not concerned with issue; Control variables on initial state: education; occupation status, gender, age, church attendance, political interest.

Table S2: Analyses of respondents who participated in all 26 panel waves (N=1,746)

Table S2.1: Multinomial logistic regression on partisanship:
Estimates of issue-based partisan updating effects

	SPD-MODEL		CDU-MODEL		FDP-MODEL		GREEN-MODEL	
	coef.	*s.e.*	*coef.*	*s.e.*	*coef.*	*s.e.*	*coef.*	*s.e.*
Transition probabilities (y_t)								
Issue Saliency (X_{t-1}):								
National economy	0.084	0.045	-0.188	0.116	-0.079	0.050	-0.743**	0.098
Environment	0.195**	0.044	-0.189**	0.109	-0.173**	0.048	1.002**	0.090
Initial state probabilities (y_0): Not reported								
Number of obs.	1,746							

Significance levels: †p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01.
Data: GSOEP (1984-2009); Base category: no or other party identification; Control variables: education; occupation status, gender, age, church attendance, political interest.

Table S2.2: Logistic regression on issue saliency:
Estimates of partisan-based issue cueing effects

	NATIONAL ECONOMY		ENVIRONMENT	
	coef.	*s.e.*	*coef.*	*s.e.*
Transition probabilities (y_t):				
Partisanship (X_{t-1}):				
SPD	0.086*	0.034	0.235**	0.034
CDU	-0.100**	0.037	-0.158**	0.037
FDP	-0.239**	0.091	-0.274**	0.089
Green	-0.720**	0.076	0.870**	0.069
Initial state probabilities (y_0): Not reported				
Number of obs.	1,746			

Significance levels: * p<.05, ** p<.01.
Data: GSOEP (1984-2009); Base category: not concerned with issue; Control variables on initial state: education; occupation status, gender, age, church attendance, political interest.

Table S3: Accounting for measurement error of partisanship

Multinomial logistic regression on latent partisanship:
Estimates of issue-based partisan updating effects

	SPD-MODEL		CDU-MODEL		FDP-MODEL		GREEN-MODEL	
	coef.	*s.e.*	*coef.*	*s.e.*	*coef.*	*s.e.*	*coef.*	*s.e.*
Transition probabilities (y_t)								
Issue Saliency (X_{t-1}):								
National economy	0.062	0.100	-0.198	0.114	0.393	0.214	-0.637**	0.200
Environment	0.140	0.097	-0.397**	0.104	-0.309	0.192	1.215**	0.194
Number of obs.	1,746 (answered all 26 waves)							

Significance levels: †p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01.
Data: GSOEP (1984-2009); Base category: no or other party identification; Control variables: education; occupation status, gender, age, church attendance, political interest.

Table S4. Estimates for Different Lagged Effects (1989-2009, N = 15,718)

Table S4.1: Multinomial logistic regression on partisanship:
Estimates of issue-based partisan updating effects

	SPD-MODEL		CDU-MODEL		FDP-MODEL		GREEN-MODEL	
	coef.	*s.e.*	*coef.*	*s.e.*	*coef.*	*s.e.*	*coef.*	*s.e.*
National Economy (X_{t-N}):								
Lag1	-0.043	0.023	-0.023	0.025	-0.156 **	0.061	-0.462 **	0.048
Lag2	0.031	0.023	-0.006	0.025	-0.047	0.060	-0.482 **	0.048
Lag3	0.004	0.023	-0.019	0.025	-0.001	0.058	-0.450 **	0.048
Lag4	-0.016	0.023	0.020	0.025	-0.011	0.059	-0.452 **	0.049
Lag5	0.031	0.024	-0.040	0.025	-0.017	0.059	-0.434 **	0.049
Environment (X_{t-N}):								
Lag1	0.069 **	0.023	-0.189 **	0.025	-0.181 **	0.060	0.658 **	0.045
Lag2	0.096 **	0.023	-0.145 **	0.025	-0.187 **	0.060	0.719 **	0.045
Lag3	0.106 **	0.023	-0.166 **	0.025	-0.152 *	0.060	0.771 **	0.046
Lag4	0.131 **	0.023	-0.177 **	0.024	-0.183 **	0.060	0.767 **	0.046
Lag5	0.086 **	0.023	-0.204 **	0.024	-0.144 *	0.059	0.721 **	0.046

Significance levels: * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$.
Data: GSOEP (1989-2009); Base category: no or other party identification; Control variables on initial state: education; occupation status, gender, age, church attendance, political interest.

Table S4.2: Logistic regression on issue saliency:
Estimates of partisan-based issue cueing effects

	National Economy		Environment	
	coef.	*s.e.*	*coef.*	*s.e.*
SPD Partisanship (X_{t-N}):				
Lag1	0.025	0.018	0.117 **	0.018
Lag2	0.035 *	0.018	0.152 **	0.018
Lag3	0.049 **	0.017	0.111 **	0.018
Lag4	0.042 *	0.017	0.117 **	0.018
Lag5	0.078 **	0.017	0.139 **	0.018
CDU Partisanship (X_{t-N}):				
Lag1	-0.048 **	0.018	-0.173 **	0.019
Lag2	-0.057 **	0.018	-0.174 **	0.019
Lag3	-0.033	0.018	-0.202 **	0.019
Lag4	-0.046 **	0.018	-0.177 **	0.019
Lag5	-0.029	0.018	-0.191 **	0.019
FDP Partisanship (X_{t-N}):				
Lag1	-0.119 *	0.049	-0.184 **	0.051
Lag2	-0.170 **	0.049	-0.186 **	0.051
Lag3	-0.197 **	0.049	-0.205 **	0.051
Lag4	-0.139 **	0.050	-0.212 **	0.051
Lag5	-0.094	0.050	-0.247 **	0.052
Green Partisanship (X_{t-N}):				
Lag1	-0.399 **	0.037	0.671 **	0.035
Lag2	-0.409 **	0.037	0.749 **	0.035
Lag3	-0.348 **	0.037	0.638 **	0.035
Lag4	-0.331 **	0.037	0.635 **	0.034
Lag5	-0.343 **	0.036	0.652 **	0.034

Significance levels: * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$.
Data: GSOEP (1984-2009); Base category: no or other party identification; Control variables on initial state: education; occupation status, gender, age, church attendance, political interest.

Table S5. Estimates for Different Coalition Periods

Table S5.1: Multinomial logistic regression on partisanship:
Estimates of issue-based partisan updating effects

	SPD-MODEL		CDU-MODEL		FDP-MODEL		GREEN-MODEL	
	coef.	*s.e.*	*coef.*	*s.e.*	*coef.*	*s.e.*	*coef.*	*s.e.*
Overall period: 1984-2009								
Nat. Economy	0.000	0.017	0.027	0.018	-0.083 *	0.043	-0.404 **	0.034
Environment	0.068 **	0.017	-0.223 **	0.018	-0.154 **	0.041	0.643 **	0.032
CDU/FDP Coalition: 1984-1998								
Nat. Economy	0.117 **	0.025	-0.014	0.028	-0.222 **	0.071	-0.205 **	0.051
Environment	0.107 **	0.023	-0.222 **	0.024	-0.066	0.060	0.853 **	0.052
Red/Green Coalition: 1999-2005								
Nat. Economy	-0.139 **	0.032	0.126 **	0.032	0.165 *	0.076	-0.602 **	0.062
Environment	0.034	0.032	-0.232 **	0.035	-0.227 **	0.083	0.543 **	0.055
Grand Coalition: 2006-2009								
Nat. Economy	-0.065	0.050	-0.095	0.050	-0.128	0.099	-0.526 **	0.094
Environment	0.026	0.049	-0.199 **	0.052	-0.295 **	0.102	0.548 **	0.079

Significance levels: * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$.
Data: GSOEP (1984-2009); Base category: no or other party identification; Control variables on initial state: education; occupation status, gender, age, church attendance, political interest.

Table S5.2: Logistic regression on issue saliency:
Estimates of partisan-based issue cueing effects

	National Economy		Environment	
	coef.	*s.e.*	*coef.*	*s.e.*
Overall period: 1984-2009				
SPD	0.095 **	0.013	0.195 **	0.013
CDU	0.034 **	0.013	-0.193 **	0.014
FDP	-0.071 *	0.034	-0.117 **	0.035
The Greens	-0.357 **	0.026	0.959 **	0.025
CDU/FDP Coalition: 1984-1998				
SPD	0.283 **	0.019	0.266 **	0.019
CDU	-0.067 **	0.021	-0.177 **	0.019
FDP	-0.111	0.058	-0.015	0.051
The Greens	-0.302 *	0.041	1.279 **	0.046
SPD/Green Coalition: 1999-2005				
SPD	-0.077 **	0.023	0.094 **	0.024
CDU	0.230 **	0.022	-0.246 **	0.025
FDP	0.020	0.057	-0.281 **	0.068
The Greens	-0.494 **	0.043	0.827 **	0.039
Grand Coalition: 2006-2009				
SPD	-0.091 *	0.038	0.186 **	0.038
CDU	-0.093 **	0.035	-0.123 **	0.037
FDP	-0.188 *	0.078	-0.090	0.081
The Greens	-0.510 **	0.070	0.803 **	0.060

Significance levels: * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$.
Data: GSOEP (1984-2009); Base category: no or other party identification; Control variables on initial state: education; occupation status, gender, age, church attendance, political interest.

Table S6. Control Variables on Initial State Probabilities of Party Support

Table S6.1: Multinomial logistic regression on partisanship:
Estimates of issue-based partisan updating effects

	SPD-Model		CDU-Model		FDP-Model		Green-Model	
	coef.	*s.e.*	*coef.*	*s.e.*	*coef.*	*s.e.*	*coef.*	*s.e.*
Transition probabilities (y_t): See Figure 2 in the paper								
Initial state probabilities (y_0):								
Education								
Intermediate	-0.565**	0.082	-0.027	0.080	0.608**	0.231	0.281	0.204
Secondary	-1.045**	0.128	-0.360	0.120	0.543†	0.314	0.614**	0.221
Degree	-0.745**	0.128	-0.296	0.122	1.004**	0.284	1.365**	0.220
Occupation								
Upper service	0.022	0.166	0.324*	0.156	-0.020	0.349	-0.504*	0.253
Lower service	0.180	0.120	-0.120	0.126	-0.538	0.341	-0.030	0.191
Higher white collar	0.083	0.114	0.077	0.116	-0.546	0.365	-0.238	0.219
Self-employed	-0.892**	0.210	0.651**	0.151	-0.280	0.430	-0.377	0.329
Skilled worker	0.033	0.127	-0.175	0.138	-1.191*	0.560	-0.729*	0.311
Unskilled worker	0.035	0.127	-0.061	0.135	-1.600*	0.742	-0.144	0.280
Pensioner	-0.261*	0.114	-0.391**	0.113	-1.205**	0.302	-0.515	0.340
Age	0.015**	0.003	0.026**	0.003	0.050**	0.007	-0.047**	0.007
Female	0.105	0.072	-0.043	0.072	-0.085	0.208	0.497**	0.146
Church attendance	-0.391**	0.042	0.360	0.036	-0.191†	0.115	-0.711**	0.107
Pol. Interest	0.869**	0.056	0.720	0.057	0.864**	0.150	1.266**	0.116
Intercept	-1.970**	0.196	-3.677	0.199	-6.584**	0.573	-2.950**	0.419

Significance levels: * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$.
Data: GSOEP (1984-2009); Base category: no or other party identification; Reference categories: education (low); occupation status (no occupation); Wald test of significance of categorical variables education and occupation.

Table S6.2: Logistic regression on issue saliency:
Estimates of partisan-based issue cueing effects

	National Economy		Environment	
	coef.	*s.e.*	*coef.*	*s.e.*
Transition probabilities (y_t): See Figure 2 in the paper				
Initial state probabilities (y_0):				
Education				
Intermediate	-0.271**	0.068	0.236**	0.065
Secondary	-0.314**	0.100	0.564**	0.101
Degree	-0.378**	0.101	0.581**	0.102
Occupation				
Upper service	-0.462**	0.135	-0.125	0.130
Lower service	-0.107	0.100	0.234*	0.101
Higher white collar	0.040	0.094	0.120	0.093
Self-employed	0.300*	0.130	0.131	0.133
Skilled worker	-0.166	0.110	0.015	0.107
Unskilled worker	0.033	0.109	-0.072	0.106
Pensioner	-0.117	0.095	-0.014	0.092
Age	-0.002	0.002	-0.013**	0.002
Female	-0.053	0.060	0.268**	0.059
Church attendance	-0.087**	0.032	-0.087*	0.031
Pol. Interest	0.341**	0.045	0.588**	0.046
Intercept	-0.984**	0.160	-0.714**	0.157

Significance levels: * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$.
Data: GSOEP (1984-2009); Base category: not concerned with issue; Reference categories: education (low); occupation status (no occupation). Wald test of significance of categorical variables education and occupation.

Figure S1: Predicted Stability of Respondents' Party Support as a Function of their Lagged Issue Concerns

Partisan stability as a function of….

lagged <u>economic concerns</u> (S1.A)



lagged <u>environmental concerns</u> (S1.B)



lagged <u>crime concerns</u> (S1.C)



lagged <u>immigration concerns</u> (S1.D)



Notes: Figure S2 displays the computed likelihoods that German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) respondents who supported a given party at the previous panel wave would support the same party at the current panel, stratified by lagged issue concerns. These computations are based on the parameter estimates reported in Figure 2 and Table A.2A, of the effects of lagged issue concerns on GSOEP respondents' current partisanship.

Figure S2: Predicted Stability of Respondents' Issue Concerns, as a Function of their Lagged Party Support



Notes: Figure S3 displays the computed likelihoods that German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) respondents who were concerned with a certain issue at the previous panel wave would be concerned with the same issue at the current panel, stratified by lagged partisanship. These computations are based on the parameter estimates reported in Figure 2 and Table A.2B, of the effects of lagged partisanship on GSOEP respondents' current issue concern.