

A Country level data.

SuR	CIRC	Total no. of recommendations		Total no. of sincere recommendations		% of 'specific' recommendations		% of specific recommendations 'accepted'		No. of 'action' recomm.	Difference, 'post-action' recomm.	% of implemented recommendations within 2yrs.	
		1st Wave	2nd Wave	1st Wave	2nd Wave	1st Wave	2nd Wave	1st Wave	2nd Wave	1st Wave	2nd-1st Wave	fully	partly
Algeria	3	36	170	29	121	8.33	33.53	33.33	12.28	16	17	na	na
Argentina	12	41	133	36	97	9.76	23.31	100.00	74.19	19	11	na	na
Azerbaijan	2	91	167	72	119	19.78	23.35	44.44	100	51	3	6.59	13.19
Bahamas	13	73	113	72	96	45.21	40.71	30.30	28.26	42	2	0	0
Bahrain	5	12	176	12	151	33.33	46.59	75.00	80.49	7	20	na	na
Bangladesh	7	100	232	75	166	21.00	27.59	52.38	40.63	41	21	1	14
Barbados	13	64	117	59	96	31.25	42.74	25.00	48	36	5	0	0
Benin	8	35	129	28	97	20.00	26.36	100.00	88.24	16	11	na	na
Botswana	10	101	176	92	136	32.67	31.25	42.42	38.18	56	7	0	0.99
Brazil	12	15	170	8	143	13.33	18.24	100.00	100	6	35	na	na
Burkina Faso	9	86	166	70	121	26.74	28.31	56.52	61.70	48	16	6.98	8.14
Burundi	9	104	174	94	145	25.96	29.89	55.56	73.08	56	17	5.77	19.23
Cameroon	3	97	177	84	126	38.14	41.24	48.65	52.05	53	0	2.06	21.65
Canada	14	114	216	108	188	41.23	39.81	63.83	40.7	79	15	6.14	7.02
Cape Verde	13	50	123	47	90	34.00	26.02	82.35	100	29	11	0	0
Colombia	11	112	167	98	125	26.79	24.55	66.67	51.22	67	11	11.61	66.07
Cuba	0	148	386	87	224	20.95	23.58	12.90	6.59	44	45	0	0
Czech Rep.	12	37	161	37	145	45.95	48.45	94.12	89.74	31	19	na	na
Djibouti	7	80	179	48	124	18.75	24.58	40.00	63.64	27	15	0	0
Ecuador	10	12	139	10	89	8.33	16.55	100.00	86.96	9	17	na	na
Finland	13	17	87	14	74	5.88	28.74	100.00	88	3	6	na	na
France	12	36	166	33	136	33.33	19.88	0.00	69.7	23	13	55.56	25
Gabon	5	41	115	38	88	53.66	28.70	0.00	87.88	31	20	na	na
Germany	10	72	203	65	172	30.56	28.08	63.64	63.16	43	24	13.89	44.44
Ghana	10	56	150	54	118	26.79	35.33	46.67	67.92	39	10	na	na
Guatemala	11	62	138	56	119	40.32	22.46	100.00	64.52	51	26	na	na

Table A1. Country level data.

Note: na: not available; %: percentage; no.: number; recomm.: recommendations.

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SuR	CIRC	Total no. of recommendations		Total no. of sincere recommendations		% of 'specific' recommendations		% of specific recommendations 'accepted'		No. of 'action' recomm.	Difference, 'post-action' recomm.	% of implemented recommendations within 2yrs.	
		1st Wave	2nd Wave	1st Wave	2nd Wave	1st Wave	2nd Wave	1st Wave	2nd Wave	1st Wave	2nd-1st Wave	fully	partly
India	8	30	170	28	133	36.67	32.94	0.00	0	18	20	na	na
Indonesia	6	13	180	13	129	23.08	33.89	33.33	67.21	7	21	na	na
Japan	13	62	177	60	143	46.77	34.46	58.62	52.46	43	17	na	na
Liechtenstein	13	48	92	40	70	33.33	36.96	56.25	76.47	23	1	0	0
Luxembourg	13	47	128	42	92	23.40	25.00	0.00	81.25	26	6	2.13	0
Mali	8	46	148	41	128	26.09	27.70	58.33	60.98	28	14	6.52	15.22
Montenegro	10	55	127	49	105	29.09	23.62	100.00	86.67	39	21	10.91	3.64
Morocco	4	16	160	13	99	25.00	19.38	75.00	87.1	4	12	na	na
Netherlands	12	52	130	47	117	28.85	30.00	46.67	28.21	34	12	na	na
Pakistan	2	101	199	89	139	29.70	34.17	80.00	35.29	73	10	na	na
Peru	10	39	136	27	96	20.51	27.21	25.00	67.57	19	13	na	na
Philippines	10	24	165	19	121	41.67	32.73	60.00	48.15	16	23	na	na
Poland	11	33	124	30	112	39.39	34.68	0.00	93.02	24	13	na	na
Rep. of Korea	11	47	175	46	152	51.06	37.14	25.00	36.92	40	16	na	na
Romania	9	55	159	52	118	21.82	18.87	75.00	56.67	34	4	50.91	34.55
Russian Fed.	2	121	242	97	187	45.45	30.58	36.36	36.49	78	26	0	0
Serbia	10	79	145	73	114	18.99	24.83	60.00	91.67	53	6	15.19	20.25
South Africa	10	29	153	26	110	41.38	29.41	0.00	66.67	21	14	na	na
Sri Lanka	4	95	208	87	151	31.58	32.69	20.00	25	71	13	na	na
Switzerland	12	47	184	47	161	61.70	39.67	24.14	38.36	39	21	na	na
Tonga	9	51	97	47	86	37.25	54.64	68.42	60.38	30	-3	0	0
Tunisia	1	28	165	19	135	0.00	36.36	*	70	11	23	na	na
Turkmenistan	0	87	188	80	138	37.93	37.77	21.21	0	62	11	0	3.45
Tuvalu	11	51	97	44	78	49.02	44.33	92.00	44.19	32	9	3.92	1.96
Ukraine	8	44	147	41	127	22.73	33.33	80.00	63.27	29	13	na	na
UAE	2	74	205	60	157	31.08	41.95	34.78	25.58	37	16	0	0
UK	13	35	137	32	124	31.43	35.04	45.45	43.75	22	10	na	na
Uzbekistan	0	140	206	126	168	31.43	31.07	11.36	32.81	98	23	0.71	12.86
Zambia	7	38	127	32	112	31.58	36.22	50.00	28.26	23	9	na	na

Table A1 (conti.). Country level data.

Note: *Tunisia did not receive 'specific' recommendations; na: not available; %: percentage; no.: number; recomm.: recommendations.

Human rights performance	Total no. of recomm.			Diff.			'Pre-action' recomm.			Diff.			'Action' recomm.			Diff.			'Post-action' recomm.			Diff.		
	<i>1st Wave</i>	<i>2nd Wave</i>	<i>2nd-1st Wave</i>	<i>1st Wave</i>	<i>2nd Wave</i>	<i>2nd-1st Wave</i>	<i>1st Wave</i>	<i>2nd Wave</i>	<i>2nd-1st Wave</i>	<i>1st Wave</i>	<i>2nd Wave</i>	<i>2nd-1st Wave</i>	<i>1st Wave</i>	<i>2nd Wave</i>	<i>2nd-1st Wave</i>	<i>1st Wave</i>	<i>2nd Wave</i>	<i>2nd-1st Wave</i>						
<i>Top group</i>	52.07	145.83	93.76	47.28	117.90	70.62	8	14.48	6.48	33.24	83.79	50.55	6.03	19.62	13.59									
<i>Middle group</i>	52.5	157.07	104.57	44.21	123.21	79.00	8.5	12.86	4.36	28.21	88.71	60.50	7.50	21.64	14.14									
<i>Bottom group</i>	86.17	206.08	119.92	70.25	147.00	76.75	11.92	16.17	4.25	49.83	105.75	55.92	8.50	25.08	16.58									
<i>All SuRs</i>	59.62	161.84	102.22	51.51	125.60	74.09	8.98	14.44	5.45	35.58	89.84	54.25	6.95	21.33	14.38									

Table A2. Average numbers of recommendations.

Note: 'Average number of pre-action recommendations' refers to recommendations of action category '1' and '3'; recomm.: recommendations; Diff.: Difference.

B Sincere recommendations.

Friendship relations exist among states, with all the same consequences as friendship among individuals. Among other things, states are more tactful in their criticism of states that are their friends. This has the effect, in the UPR, of states phrasing their recommendations to their friends more gently – and misleadingly so, viewed from the outside. When commenting on the human rights practices of their friends, states will engage in the polite fiction that their friends are already engaged in good practices, and recommend that they ‘continue’ or ‘maintain’ or ‘expand’ those good practices that are already underway – when in truth no such good practices are already underway, and what the states are really meaning to recommend, in this veiled fashion, is that their friend initiate such actions. All of the informants we interviewed in Geneva who were familiar with the UPR described this practice and warned us to beware of it in our analysis of UPR recommendations.

As reported in the main text, we developed in response an operational indicator of ‘sincere’ recommendations (ones not affected by this ‘polite fiction’ practiced when states are making recommendations to their friends). That operational indicator deems all ‘post-action’ (‘continue’ etc.) recommendations from State A to State B ‘sincere’ if and only if State A makes at least one recommendation requiring ‘action’ from State B at the same time. When one state makes only ‘post-action’ recommendations to another state, we eliminate all those recommendations from our analysis on the grounds that they might be recommendations contaminated by the polite fictions that friends adopt in their dealing with one another.

Table 2 shows that sincere recommendations were only 86 per cent of total recommendations for all states in Wave 1, and only about 78 per cent of total recommendations in Wave 2. That table further shows that the proportion of total recommendations that were sincere was highest for those recommendations directed at the top group of human rights performers and lowest for those directed

at the bottom group of human rights performers, within each wave of the UPR.

Table B1 below indicates which states made, and which states received, the most insincere recommendations as we have operationalized that concept. In each case we calibrate that as a proportion of the total number of recommendations (whether sincere or insincere) that the state makes or receives.¹

In Table B1 we confine our attention to states that were States under Review in UPR sessions 1 through 4 (and hence repeat reviews in sessions 13 through 16). There are other states that made a substantial proportion of insincere recommendations in those sessions, but which were not themselves under review in those sessions. (Some 69 per cent of Saudi Arabia's and 73 per cent of Viet Nam's recommendations were 'insincere' by our operationalization, for example, but since neither state was a SuR in those sessions those states do not appear in the left hand columns of Table B1.) We make this restriction, because we want to explore the possibility of reciprocal friendship relations systematically affecting patterns of recommendation making in the UPR - i.e., do states that make a large proportion of 'friendly', insincere recommendations receive a large proportion of 'friendly', insincere recommendations in return?

Table B1 shows the top twenty countries which received and made relatively large proportions of insincere recommendations. Eleven out of these top twenty countries (55 per cent) and five out of the top ten countries (50 per cent) appear in both columns suggesting a substantial extent of reciprocal back-scratching.

As we also see from Table B1, the practice of insincere recommendations is the particular province of poor human rights performers. 40 per cent of makers and recipients of insincere recommendations are in the bottom group of human rights

¹This is important, because different states make vastly different numbers of total recommendations. In the Wave 1 sessions under examination, for example, the UK made 12 insincere recommendations: that is a high number in absolute terms (only 8 states made more insincere recommendations than that in those sessions), but it is a smaller percentage (7.74 per cent) of the total of 155 recommendations made by the UK across those sessions. In comparison, Belarus also made 12 insincere recommendations across those sessions, but that is a much higher percentage (66.67 per cent) of the total of 18 recommendations made by Belarus across those Sessions.

performers. Put differently, within this group of poor human rights performers 75 per cent of states is actively and passively involved in making and receiving insincere recommendations.

Rank	States making largest proportion of insincere recommendations		States receiving largest proportion of insincere recommendations	
	<i>Recommending state</i>	%	<i>SuRs</i>	%
1	Uzbekistan*	100.00	Brazil	46.67
2	Burundi	75.00	<i>Cuba*</i>	41.22
3	Ghana	70.00	<i>Djibouti</i>	40.00
4	Botswana	66.67	<i>Tunisia*</i>	32.14
5	<i>Cuba*</i>	66.67	Peru	30.77
6	<i>Bangladesh</i>	51.43	<i>Bangladesh</i>	25.00
7	<i>Benin</i>	50.00	<i>Azerbaijan*</i>	20.88
8	<i>Morocco*</i>	50.00	<i>Philippines</i>	20.83
9	<i>Philippines</i>	45.16	<i>Benin</i>	20.00
10	<i>Azerbaijan*</i>	40.74	<i>Russian Federation*</i>	19.83
11	Republic of Korea	39.29	<i>Algeria*</i>	19.44
12	Bahrain	37.50	<i>United Arab Emirates*</i>	18.92
13	<i>Tunisia*</i>	37.50	<i>Morocco*</i>	18.75
14	<i>United Arab Emirates*</i>	33.33	Burkina Faso	18.60
15	Indonesia	31.58	Finland	17.65
16	<i>Djibouti</i>	25.00	Ecuador	16.67
17	South Africa	20.59	Liechtenstein	16.67
18	India	20.00	Zambia	15.79
19	<i>Algeria*</i>	19.58	Tuvalu	13.73
20	<i>Russian Federation*</i>	14.63	Cameroon*	13.40

Table B1. Ranking of states making and receiving insincere recommendations.

Note: * indicates that state is in the bottom group of human rights performers; *italics* denote that a state made and received a large proportion of insincere recommendations.