

Online Appendix for *British Journal of Political Science*

Labor Union Strength and the Equality of Political Representation

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Table A-1: Political Ideology and Specific Policy Opinions

	Self-Reported Political Ideology				
	Very Conservative	Conservative	Moderate	Liberal	Very Liberal
Government should reduce income differences between rich and poor (% yes)	38	45	58	70	77
Providing health care for people who do not already have it (% spend more)	49	57	73	83	88
Providing assistance to poor mothers with young children (% spend more)	34	39	48	59	67
Financial assistance to public schools (% spend more)	49	58	73	83	87
Laws making it more difficult for a woman to get an abortion (% oppose)	28	42	66	78	81
Constitutional amendment banning gay marriage (% oppose)	29	39	61	74	80
Restricting the kinds of guns that people can buy (% government should do more)	42	52	67	76	76

Data source: 2000 and 2004 National Annenberg Election Surveys.

Table A-2: Income and Ideological Distance Between Opinion and State Policy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Proximity Measure:</i>	Standardized	Standardized	Same Scale	Same Scale	Restricted Scale	Restricted Scale
<i>Policy Data:</i>	GLFM	SMR	GLFM	SMR	GLFM	SMR
Respondent's Income (State Relative)	-0.010*** [0.002]	-0.011*** [0.003]	-0.012*** [0.002]	-0.014*** [0.003]	-0.008*** [0.002]	-0.010*** [0.002]
Constant	1.148*** [0.115]	1.164*** [0.117]	1.194*** [0.103]	1.213*** [0.074]	0.906*** [0.032]	0.905*** [0.025]
N	177,043	177,043	177,043	177,043	177,043	177,043

Dependent variable: Linear distance between a citizen's ideology and state policy (smaller distance indicates a citizen is better represented). Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by state reported beneath in brackets. * denotes $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$ using a two-tailed test. GLFM = Gray et al. (2004), SMR = Sorens et al. (2008).

Table A-3: Income and Ideological Distance Between Opinion and State Policy, by Survey Wave

2000	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Proximity Measure:</i>	Standardized	Standardized	Same Scale	Same Scale	Restricted Scale	Restricted Scale
<i>Policy Data:</i>	GLFM	SMR	GLFM	SMR	GLFM	SMR
Respondent's Income (State Relative)	-0.015*** [0.003]	-0.013*** [0.003]	-0.018*** [0.004]	-0.017*** [0.003]	-0.015*** [0.003]	-0.016*** [0.002]
Constant	1.141*** [0.131]	1.161*** [0.132]	1.189*** [0.117]	1.208*** [0.084]	0.859*** [0.038]	0.857*** [0.030]
N	57,482	57,482	57,482	57,482	57,482	57,482

2004	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Proximity Measure:</i>	Standardized	Standardized	Same Scale	Same Scale	Restricted Scale	Restricted Scale
<i>Policy Data:</i>	GLFM	SMR	GLFM	SMR	GLFM	SMR
Respondent's Income (State Relative)	-0.010*** [0.003]	-0.012*** [0.003]	-0.012*** [0.003]	-0.015*** [0.003]	-0.013*** [0.002]	-0.015*** [0.002]
Constant	1.116*** [0.112]	1.127*** [0.117]	1.162*** [0.102]	1.185*** [0.075]	0.878*** [0.033]	0.876*** [0.026]
N	70,946	70,946	70,946	70,946	70,946	70,946

2008	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Proximity Measure:</i>	Standardized	Standardized	Same Scale	Same Scale	Restricted Scale	Restricted Scale
<i>Policy Data:</i>	GLFM	SMR	GLFM	SMR	GLFM	SMR
Respondent's Income (State Relative)	-0.009** [0.004]	-0.011*** [0.003]	-0.009*** [0.003]	-0.013*** [0.003]	-0.011*** [0.002]	-0.012*** [0.002]
Constant	1.202*** [0.099]	1.219*** [0.100]	1.242*** [0.089]	1.258*** [0.064]	1.001*** [0.027]	1.002*** [0.021]
N	48,615	48,615	48,615	48,615	48,615	48,615

Dependent variable: Linear distance between a citizen's ideology and state policy (smaller distance indicates a citizen is better represented). Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by state reported beneath in brackets. * denotes $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$ using a two-tailed test. GLFM = Gray et al. (2004), SMR = Sorens et al. (2008).

Table A-4: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Regression Models in Tables 2 and 3

Variable	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Equality of Political Representation Index	47	-0.02	2.28	-8.44	4.51
Labor Union Membership	47	11.39	5.22	3.30	25.58
Union Household Share of Electorate	47	22.80	8.46	0	43.30
Labor Union Campaign Contributions	47	10.51	6.17	0.69	21.55
Labor/Business Ratio of Campaign Contributions	47	0.33	0.25	0.01	1.53
% Democrats in State Legislature	47	50.39	14.07	18.75	85.00
% Interest Groups For-Profit	47	72.82	4.92	61.70	81.60
State Median Income (\$1000s)	47	41.01	6.23	29.69	55.14
State Income Inequality (Gini Coefficient)	47	0.44	0.02	0.41	0.50

Note: N=47 because Alaska and Hawaii were not surveyed in the NAES and Nebraska has a non-partisan legislature.

Table A-5: Labor Union Lobbying and the Equality of Political Representation

	(1)	(2)
Labor Union Lobbying Expenditures	-0.020 [0.159]	-0.075 [0.168]
% Democrats in State Legislature	--	0.054 [0.053]
% Interest Groups For-Profit	--	-0.170* [0.090]
State Median Income	--	-0.008 [0.079]
State Income Inequality	--	-31.755 [19.941]
Constant	1.043 [0.653]	25.275** [9.742]
R ²	.01	.40
N	16	16

Dependent variable is the Equality of Political Representation Index (higher value indicates a more equal weighting of citizens' political opinions). Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients with standard errors reported beneath in brackets. * denotes $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$ using a two-tailed test.

Table A-6: Robustness Check with % Racial Minority Variable Added to Model

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Labor Union Membership	0.176** [0.077]	--	0.225** [0.088]
Labor Union Campaign Contributions	--	0.009 [0.062]	-0.076 [0.067]
% Democrats in State Legislature	-0.009 [0.026]	0.004 [0.027]	-0.010 [0.026]
% Interest Groups For-Profit	-0.079 [0.066]	-0.119 [0.072]	-0.098 [0.068]
State Median Income	-0.001 [0.065]	0.079 [0.063]	0.008 [0.065]
State Income Inequality	-27.678 [24.202]	-11.586 [24.968]	-26.523 [24.145]
% Racial Minority (Non-White)	-0.007 [0.036]	-0.038 [0.037]	-0.014 [0.036]
Constant	16.784 [10.896]	11.111 [11.277]	17.722 [10.893]
R ²	.30	.21	.32
N	47	47	47

Dependent variable is the Equality of Political Representation Index (higher value indicates a more equal weighting of citizens' political opinions). Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients with standard errors reported beneath in brackets. * denotes $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$ using a two-tailed test.

Table A-7: Running Feasible Generalized Least Squares Regression on the Six Separate Sets of State Income/Proximity Regression Coefficients

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Proximity Measure:</i>	Standardized	Standardized	Same Scale	Same Scale	Restricted Scale	Restricted Scale
<i>Policy Data:</i>	GLFM	SMR	GLFM	SMR	GLFM	SMR
Labor Union Membership	0.001* [0.001]	0.001*** [0.000]	0.001* [0.001]	0.001** [0.000]	0.001** [0.000]	0.001** [0.000]
Labor Union Campaign Contributions	-0.000 [0.000]	-0.000 [0.000]	-0.000 [0.001]	-0.000 [0.000]	-0.000 [0.000]	-0.000 [0.000]
% Democrats in State Legislature	-0.000 [0.000]	-0.000 [0.000]	-0.000 [0.000]	-0.000 [0.000]	-0.000 [0.000]	-0.000 [0.000]
% Interest Groups For-Profit	-0.001* [0.000]	-0.001** [0.000]	-0.001** [0.000]	-0.001 [0.000]	-0.000 [0.000]	-0.000 [0.000]
State Median Income	0.000 [0.000]	0.000 [0.000]	0.000 [0.000]	0.001** [0.000]	-0.000 [0.000]	0.000 [0.000]
State Income Inequality	-0.170 [0.105]	-0.197** [0.096]	-0.145 [0.111]	-0.134 [0.095]	-0.156* [0.082]	-0.155** [0.078]
Constant	0.110** [0.056]	0.117** [0.052]	0.108* [0.059]	0.055 [0.053]	0.096** [0.044]	0.084** [0.043]
N	47	47	47	47	47	47

Dependent variable is the income/proximity slope coefficient for a state (higher value indicates a more equal weighting of citizens' political opinions). Cell entries are feasible generalized least squares regression coefficients with standard errors reported beneath in brackets. Observations are weighted by the inverse of the income/proximity coefficient's standard error in the first stage (state-level) regression. * denotes $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$ using a two-tailed test. GLFM = Gray et al. (2004), SMR = Sorens et al. (2008).

Table A-8: Equality of Political Representation Does Not Predict State Union Membership

Equality of Political Representation Index	0.327 [0.333]
Public Sector Collective Bargaining Law	4.743*** [1.741]
% Private Sector Employees in Construction	-0.727 [0.630]
% Private Sector Employees in Manufacturing	-0.030 [0.127]
Constant	14.306** [6.449]
R ²	.42
N	48

Dependent variable is the average percentage of nonagricultural wage and salary employees (including employees in the public sector) in a state who are union members for 2000-2006. Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients with standard errors reported beneath in brackets. * denotes $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$ using a two-tailed test.