

## Tables and figures for the appendix

**Table A1: Duration analysis coefficients with continuous measure of closeness based on poll data**

	Coefficients			
	At time of introduction	After 100 days	After 300 days	After 500 days
Coefficient on closeness index	-0.246*** (0.024)	-0.246*** (0.024)	-0.246*** (0.024)	-0.246*** (0.024)
Controls	Yes			
Wald $\chi^2$	3,150.97			
Log pseudolikelihood	-111,388.57			

\*:  $p < 0.10$ ; \*\*:  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*:  $p < 0.01$

Note: The measure of closeness was constructed as an index equal to 1 minus the difference between the voting intentions for the top two parties in the polls in each country, for each of the 60 days preceding an election. For days before this period, the index is set equal to zero. The higher the index, the more uncertain the election is. Jennings and Wlezien calculate the continuous measure of voting intentions by aggregating poll data on days when polls were published, and averaging the two nearest poll publications on days when no polls were published. We average this index across countries and run a regression with this index as the main explanatory variable. Countries available in their dataset and included in the index are: Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK, Belgium, Denmark and Hungary. Not all elections have data available in certain countries. We took the conservative approach of coding missing elections as having no uncertainty in the index, which should bias the results against the direction we expect, and still obtain significantly negative results. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cox regression with time-varying covariates interacted with natural logarithm of time. Controls include dummy for qualified majority voting (QMV), number of EU members, dummy for cooperation procedure with parliament (cooperation and codecision), dummy for directive, size of backlog, dummy for month of August.

**Table A2: Duration analysis coefficients with binary measure of closeness based on poll data for large countries**

	<b>Coefficients</b>			
	At time of introduction	After 100 days	After 300 days	After 500 days
<b>Close elections</b>	-0.501*** (0.062)	-0.501*** (0.062)	-0.501*** (0.062)	-0.501*** (0.062)
<b>Non-close elections</b>	-0.298*** (0.039)	-0.298*** (0.039)	-0.298*** (0.039)	-0.298*** (0.039)
Controls	Yes			
Wald $\chi^2$	3,001.18			
Log pseudolikelihood	-105,031.21			

\*: p<0.10; \*\*: p<0.05; \*\*\*: p<0.01

Note: This regression includes only elections for large countries for which we have poll data for every election in the period 1976-2009 (Germany, France (presidential elections only), and the UK) using the difference in voting intentions between the top two parties / candidates, based on the last poll before election day. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cox regression with time-varying covariates interacted with natural logarithm of time. Controls include dummy for qualified majority voting (QMV), number of EU members, dummy for cooperation procedure with parliament (cooperation and codecision), dummy for directive, size of backlog, dummy for month of August.

**Table A3: Duration analysis coefficients with binary measure of closeness for all elections, replacing measure of closeness with poll data when available**

	Coefficients			
	At time of introduction	After 100 days	After 300 days	After 500 days
<b>Close elections</b>				
in large member states (1)	-0.422*** (0.039)	-0.422*** (0.039)	-0.422*** (0.039)	-0.422*** (0.039)
in small member states (2)	-0.383*** (0.108)	-0.109*** (0.027)	-0.044 (0.035)	-0.013 (0.043)
<b>Non-close elections</b>				
in large member states (3)	-0.344*** (0.108)	-0.119*** (0.028)	-0.066* (0.039)	-0.041 (0.048)
in small member states (4)	-0.188*** (0.024)	-0.188*** (0.024)	-0.188*** (0.024)	-0.188*** (0.024)
Controls	Yes			
Wald $\chi^2$	3, 123.89			
Log pseudolikelihood	-104,972.05			

\*:  $p < 0.10$ ; \*\*:  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*:  $p < 0.01$

Note: This regression includes all elections (the same countries and time period as the main regression presented in the paper), but replacing our original measure of closeness by that based on voting intentions whenever possible. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cox regression with time-varying covariates interacted with natural logarithm of time. Controls include dummy for qualified majority voting (QMV), number of EU members, dummy for cooperation procedure with parliament (cooperation and codecision), dummy for directive, size of backlog, dummy for month of August.

**Table A4: Duration analysis individual country coefficients**

	Coefficient	SE	p-value	After 100 days	After 300 days	After 500 days
<b>Close elections</b>						
Germany	-1.131	0.177	0.000	-1.131	-1.131	-1.131
France	-0.437	0.071	0.000	-0.437	-0.437	-0.437
UK	-0.481	0.158	0.002	-0.481	-0.481	-0.481
Italy	-1.135	0.326	0.001	-0.057	0.200	0.320
Spain	-0.629	0.085	0.000	-0.629	-0.629	-0.629
Netherlands	0.197	0.178	0.270	-0.117	-0.192	-0.227
Belgium	-0.572	0.235	0.015	-0.312	-0.251	-0.222
Greece	-0.197	0.054	0.000	-0.197	-0.197	-0.197
Portugal	0.167	0.111	0.135	0.167	0.167	0.167
Austria	-0.342	0.389	0.380	-0.342	-0.342	-0.342
Denmark	-0.132	0.089	0.138	-0.132	-0.132	-0.132
Finland	-0.243	0.090	0.007	-0.243	-0.243	-0.243
Luxembourg	-0.407	0.104	0.000	-0.407	-0.407	-0.407
Poland	0.607	0.189	0.001	0.607	0.607	0.607
Czech Republic	0.408	0.257	0.112	0.408	0.408	0.408
Hungary	-0.275	0.199	0.166	-0.275	-0.275	-0.275
Lithuania	27.279	10.624	0.010	9.151	4.826	2.815
Slovenia	-28.492	5.604	0.000	-10.430	-6.121	-4.118
Latvia	0.146	0.355	0.680	0.146	0.146	0.146
Cyprus	-1.618	0.903	0.073	-0.651	-0.420	-0.313
Malta	-0.895	2.400	0.709	1.121	1.601	1.825
Romania	-11.686	6.099	0.055	-3.628	-1.706	-0.812
<b>Non-close elections</b>						
Germany	0.135	0.227	0.551	-0.201	-0.281	-0.319
France	-0.607	0.179	0.001	-0.351	-0.290	-0.262
UK	-0.283	0.066	0.000	-0.283	-0.283	-0.283
Italy	-0.986	0.287	0.001	-0.250	-0.074	0.007
Spain	0.138	0.068	0.044	0.138	0.138	0.138

Netherlands	1.070	0.286	0.000	-0.059	-0.329	-0.454
Belgium	-0.753	0.116	0.000	-0.753	-0.753	-0.753
Greece	0.364	0.437	0.405	-1.408	-1.831	-2.028
Portugal	0.251	0.283	0.375	-0.226	-0.340	-0.393
Sweden	-0.577	0.141	0.000	-0.577	-0.577	-0.577
Austria	-1.159	0.365	0.001	-0.357	-0.165	-0.076
Denmark	-0.089	0.050	0.075	-0.089	-0.089	-0.089
Finland	-1.079	0.207	0.000	-1.079	-1.079	-1.079
Ireland	0.084	0.048	0.082	0.084	0.084	0.084
Luxembourg	-1.319	0.301	0.000	0.326	0.719	0.901
Poland	-0.321	0.306	0.293	-0.321	-0.321	-0.321
Slovakia	-0.099	0.190	0.603	-0.099	-0.099	-0.099
Lithuania	-0.314	0.223	0.160	-0.314	-0.314	-0.314
Slovenia	-0.121	0.284	0.671	-0.121	-0.121	-0.121
Estonia	-0.802	0.891	0.368	-0.533	-0.469	-0.439
Cyprus	-7.904	3.334	0.018	-3.059	-1.903	-1.366
Bulgaria	-1.765	1.008	0.080	-1.765	-1.765	-1.765

Controls	Yes
Wald $\chi^2$	3726.49
Log pseudolikelihood	-104,636.89

\*, p<0.10; \*\*, p<0.05; \*\*\*, p<0.01

Note: Robust standard errors. Cox regression with time-varying covariates interacted with natural logarithm of time. Controls include dummy for qualified majority voting (QMV), number of EU members, dummy for cooperation procedure with parliament (cooperation and codecision), dummy for directive, size of backlog, dummy for month of August. Variables for France and Cyprus include both presidential and parliamentary elections. Sweden, Ireland, Slovakia, Estonia and Bulgaria had no close elections between their accession to the EU and June 2009. Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Malta, Romania and Bulgaria had no non-close elections between their accession to the EU and June 2009.

**Table A5: Duration analysis coefficients with election dummies interacted with country population size**

	<b>Coefficients</b>			
	At time of introduction	After 100 days	After 300 days	After 500 days
<b>Close elections x country size</b>	-0.171*** (0.030)	-0.072*** (0.007)	-0.049*** (0.009)	-0.038*** (0.011)
<b>Non-close elections x country size</b>	-0.064*** (0.020)	-0.060*** (0.005)	-0.059*** (0.007)	-0.059*** (0.009)
Controls	Yes			
Wald $\chi^2$	3,132.87			
Log pseudolikelihood	-104,963.27			

\*:  $p < 0.10$ ; \*\*:  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*:  $p < 0.01$

Notes: The regression interacts an election dummy with the log of population size for each country separately and then aggregates these values across countries. The population size was obtained from Eurostat and changes yearly. Population size correlates with other measures of power in EU studies or International Political Economy, such as Council voting weights and market size. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cox regression with time-varying covariates interacted with natural logarithm of time. Controls include dummy for qualified majority voting (QMV), number of EU members, dummy for cooperation procedure with parliament (cooperation and codecision), dummy for directive, size of backlog, dummy for month of August.

**Table A6: Duration analysis coefficients with election dummies interacted with country voting weights in the Council**

	Coefficients			
	At time of introduction	After 100 days	After 300 days	After 500 days
<b>Close elections x voting weight</b>	-0.069*** (0.012)	-0.024*** (0.003)	-0.014*** (0.004)	-0.009* (0.005)
<b>Non-close elections x voting weight</b>	-0.022*** (0.007)	-0.019*** (0.002)	-0.019*** (0.002)	-0.019*** (0.003)
Controls	Yes			
Wald $\chi^2$	3,095.20			
Log pseudolikelihood	-104,987.01			

\*:  $p < 0.10$ ; \*\*:  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*:  $p < 0.01$

Notes: The regression interacts an election dummy with the proportion of Council voting weights for each country (in percentage points) and then aggregates these values across countries. The Council voting weights were obtained from EU treaties directly and change when new members access the EU (in 1973, 1981, 1986, 1995, 2004 and 2007). The coefficient should be interpreted as the effect of one percentage point of voting weight increase, in the countries which have an election at a given point in time, on the hazard rate at that point.

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cox regression with time-varying covariates interacted with natural logarithm of time. Controls include dummy for qualified majority voting (QMV), number of EU members, dummy for cooperation procedure with parliament (cooperation and codecision), dummy for directive, size of backlog, dummy for month of August.

**Table A7: Duration analysis coefficients not broken down by country-size**

	<b>Coefficients</b>			
	At time of introduction	After 100 days	After 300 days	After 500 days
<b>Close elections</b>	-0.605*** (0.093)	-0.213*** (0.024)	-0.120*** (0.031)	-0.077** (0.038)
<b>Non-close elections</b>	-0.422*** (0.082)	-0.208*** (0.021)	-0.157*** (0.029)	-0.133*** (0.035)
Controls	Yes			
Wald $\chi^2$	3,065.99			
Log pseudolikelihood	-104,997.95			

\*:  $p < 0.10$ ; \*\*:  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*:  $p < 0.01$

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cox regression with time-varying covariates interacted with natural logarithm of time. Controls include dummy for qualified majority voting (QMV), number of EU members, dummy for cooperation procedure with parliament (cooperation and codecision), dummy for directive, size of backlog, dummy for month of August.

**Table A8: Main regression with coefficients of control variables**

	<b>Coefficients</b>			
	At time of introduction	After 100 days	After 300 days	After 500 days
<b>Close elections</b>				
in large member states (1)	-0.895*** (0.180)	-0.441*** (0.042)	-0.333*** (0.053)	-0.283*** (0.066)
in small member states (2)	-0.404*** (0.100)	-0.072*** (0.026)	0.007 (0.033)	0.044 (0.041)
<b>Non-close elections</b>				
in large member states (3)	-0.324*** (0.108)	-0.159*** (0.029)	-0.119*** (0.040)	-0.101** (0.049)
in small member states (4)	-0.290*** (0.101)	-0.212*** (0.025)	-0.194*** (0.034)	-0.185*** (0.042)
QMV in council	0.443*** (0.020)	0.443*** (0.020)	0.443*** (0.020)	0.443*** (0.020)
Number of EU member states	-0.068*** (0.008)	-0.012*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)
Cooperation with EP	-7.752*** (0.385)	-2.134*** (0.095)	-0.794*** (0.059)	-0.171*** (0.068)
Co-decision with EP	-6.136*** (0.388)	-1.678*** (0.094)	-0.615*** (0.045)	-0.120** (0.049)
Directive	-3.885*** (0.213)	-1.197*** (0.052)	-0.556*** (0.036)	-0.258*** (0.042)
Backlog	0.689*** (0.043)	0.137*** (0.011)	0.006 (0.015)	-0.056*** (0.018)
August	1.775*** (0.287)	-2.778*** (0.145)	-3.864*** (0.219)	-4.368*** (0.256)
Observations	14,396			
Decision days	5,936,931			
Controls	Yes			
Wald $\chi^2$	3,121.10			
Log pseudolikelihood	-104,961.86			

\*: p<0.10; \*\*: p<0.05; \*\*\*: p<0.01

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cox regression with time-varying covariates interacted with natural logarithm of time.

**Table A9: Duration analysis coefficients with election dummy defined as 30 days prior to election**

	<b>Coefficients</b>			
	At time of introduction	After 100 days	After 300 days	After 500 days
<b>Close elections</b>				
in large member states (1)	-1.450*** (0.276)	-0.494*** (0.060)	-0.265*** (0.069)	-0.159* (0.088)
in small member states (2)	-0.892*** (0.143)	-0.193*** (0.035)	-0.026 (0.042)	0.052 (0.052)
<b>Non-close elections</b>				
in large member states (3)	-0.235 (0.147)	-0.289*** (0.039)	-0.302*** (0.055)	-0.308*** (0.067)
in small member states (4)	-0.249*** (0.033)	-0.194*** (0.033)	-0.180*** (0.034)	-0.174*** (0.034)
Controls	Yes			
Wald $\chi^2$	3,133.76			
Log pseudolikelihood	-104,955.30			

\*: p<0.10; \*\*: p<0.05; \*\*\*: p<0.01

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cox regression with time-varying covariates interacted with natural logarithm of time. Controls include dummy for qualified majority voting (QMV), number of EU members, dummy for cooperation procedure with parliament (cooperation and codecision), dummy for directive, size of backlog, dummy for month of August.

**Table A10: Duration analysis coefficients using average closeness measure (based on elections *prior* to election under consideration)**

	Coefficients			
	At time of introduction	After 100 days	After 300 days	After 500 days
<b>Close elections</b>				
in large member states (1)	-0.366*** (0.032)	-0.366*** (0.032)	-0.366*** (0.032)	-0.366*** (0.032)
in small member states (2)	-0.263*** (0.023)	-0.263*** (0.023)	-0.263*** (0.023)	-0.263*** (0.023)
<b>Non-close elections</b>				
in large member states (3)	-0.436*** (0.125)	-0.157*** (0.033)	-0.091** (0.046)	-0.060 (0.056)
in small member states (4)	-0.144*** (0.115)	0.023 (0.028)	0.063* (0.038)	0.081* (0.047)
Controls	Yes			
Wald $\chi^2$	3, 211.60			
Log pseudolikelihood	-104,933.66			

\*: p<0.10; \*\*: p<0.05; \*\*\*: p<0.01

Note: In this model, we looked at the rolling historical average of electoral closeness from the first free universal suffrage elections since 1945 until the particular election for which closeness is being calculated. Compared to our main regression, it remains the case that close elections have a larger effect on the duration of negotiations than non-close elections. Notable differences include the smaller coefficient on close elections in large states (compared to the main regression) and the larger effect of non-close elections, at the time of introduction. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cox regression with time-varying covariates interacted with natural logarithm of time. Controls include dummy for qualified majority voting (QMV), number of EU members, dummy for cooperation procedure with parliament (cooperation and codecision), dummy for directive, size of backlog, dummy for month of August.

**Table A11: Duration analysis coefficients using average closeness measure (based on *all* elections)**

	Coefficients			
	At time of introduction	After 100 days	After 300 days	After 500 days
<b>Close elections</b>				
in large member states (1)	-0.385*** (0.033)	-0.385*** (0.033)	-0.385*** (0.033)	-0.385*** (0.033)
in small member states (2)	-0.177*** (0.024)	-0.177*** (0.024)	-0.177*** (0.024)	-0.177*** (0.024)
<b>Non-close elections</b>				
in large member states (3)	-0.416*** (0.121)	-0.146*** (0.032)	-0.081* (0.044)	-0.051 (0.054)
in small member states (4)	-0.071 (0.111)	-0.124*** (0.028)	-0.137*** (0.038)	-0.143*** (0.047)
Controls	Yes			
Wald $\chi^2$	3166.54			
Log pseudolikelihood	-104,962.52			

\*: p<0.10; \*\*: p<0.05; \*\*\*: p<0.01

Note: Because the measure used in the previous model has the downside of having fewer data points, we ran another model that used each country's historical average from the first universal suffrage free elections since 1945 until the country's last election in our data set. Compared to our main regression, it remains the case that close elections have a larger effect on the duration of negotiations than non-close elections. Notable differences include the smaller coefficient on close elections in large states (compared to the main regression) and the larger effect of non-close elections, at the time of introduction. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cox regression with time-varying covariates interacted with natural logarithm of time. Controls include dummy for qualified majority voting (QMV), number of EU members, dummy for cooperation procedure with parliament (cooperation and codecision), dummy for directive, size of backlog, dummy for month of August.

**Table A12: Duration analysis coefficients close election defined as less than 3% difference between first two parties**

	<b>Coefficients</b>			
	At time of introduction	After 100 days	After 300 days	After 500 days
<b>Close elections</b>				
in large member states (1)	-1.004*** (0.230)	-0.565*** (0.057)	-0.461*** (0.073)	-0.412*** (0.090)
in small member states (2)	-0.413*** (0.144)	-0.052 0.034	0.034 (0.042)	0.074 (0.053)
<b>Non-close elections</b>				
in large member states (3)	-0.324*** (0.103)	-0.208*** (0.026)	-0.180*** (0.037)	-0.167*** (0.046)
in small member states (4)	-0.334*** (0.087)	-0.222*** (0.022)	-0.195*** (0.030)	-0.183*** (0.037)
Controls	Yes			
Wald $\chi^2$	3,149.15			
Log pseudolikelihood	-104,951.13			

\*: p<0.10; \*\*: p<0.05; \*\*\*: p<0.01

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cox regression with time-varying covariates interacted with natural logarithm of time. Controls include dummy for qualified majority voting (QMV), number of EU members, dummy for cooperation procedure with parliament (cooperation and codecision), dummy for directive, size of backlog, dummy for month of August.

**Table A13: Duration analysis coefficients after excluding early election**

	Coefficients			
	At time of introduction	After 100 days	After 300 days	After 500 days
<b>Close elections</b>				
in large member states (1)	-0.973*** (0.249)	-0.364*** (0.054)	-0.218*** (0.067)	-0.150* (0.086)
in small member states (2)	-0.518*** (0.143)	-0.082*** (0.036)	0.021 (0.043)	0.070 (0.053)
<b>Non-close elections</b>				
in large member states (3)	-0.109*** (0.035)	-0.109*** (0.035)	-0.109*** (0.035)	-0.109*** (0.035)
in small member states (4)	-0.984*** (0.177)	-0.259*** (0.040)	-0.086* (0.048)	-0.005 (0.060)
Controls	Yes			
Wald $\chi^2$	3,002.87			
Log pseudolikelihood	-105,016.60			

\*:  $p < 0.10$ ; \*\*:  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*:  $p < 0.01$

Notes: A notable difference between this and our main regression is the large and significant coefficient of non-close elections in small member states at the introduction of the proposal. However, the magnitude of this coefficient decreases rapidly over time and becomes smaller than the coefficient for close elections in large member states after 100 days and that for non-close elections in large member states after 300 days. The high coefficient at the start of the proposal seems to be a mechanical consequence of the quick decrease of the coefficient's value over time. The quicker decrease suggests that some early non-close elections in small states lengthened the duration of negotiation at later stages of the process. Once these elections are removed, this effect disappears. The other difference to our main regression is that the effect of elections in large member states decreases more quickly when early elections are removed from the analysis. However, their effect remains larger than that of other elections up to more than 500 days after the start of a negotiation, and therefore applies to most proposals. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cox regression with time-varying covariates interacted with natural logarithm of time. Controls include dummy for qualified majority voting (QMV), number of EU members, dummy for cooperation procedure with parliament (cooperation and codecision), dummy for directive, size of backlog, dummy for month of August.

**Table A14: Duration analysis coefficients controlling for recessions**

	<b>Coefficients</b>			
	At time of introduction	After 100 days	After 300 days	After 500 days
<b>Close elections</b>				
in large member states (1)	-0.408*** (0.042)	-0.408*** (0.042)	-0.408*** (0.042)	-0.408*** (0.042)
in small member states (2)	-0.448*** (0.102)	-0.079*** (0.026)	0.009 (0.033)	0.050 (0.041)
<b>Non-close elections</b>				
in large member states (3)	-0.369*** (0.107)	-0.167*** (0.029)	-0.119*** (0.040)	-0.097** (0.049)
in small member states (4)	-0.208*** (0.025)	-0.208*** (0.025)	-0.208*** (0.025)	-0.208*** (0.025)
<b>Period of recession</b>	-0.349*** (0.104)	-0.092*** (0.030)	-0.031 (0.041)	-0.002 (0.049)
Controls	Yes			
Wald $\chi^2$	3,124.39			
Log pseudolikelihood	-104,958.42			

\*: p<0.10; \*\*: p<0.05; \*\*\*: p<0.01

Notes: The coefficients of our main explanatory variables are scarcely lower than in our main regression after inclusion of this variable at all relevant points in time. This suggests that, while recessions and a decreasing growth do slow the process of proposal adoption, they do not explain away the effect of elections. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cox regression with time-varying covariates interacted with natural logarithm of time. Controls include dummy for qualified majority voting (QMV), number of EU members, dummy for cooperation procedure with parliament (cooperation and codecision), dummy for directive, size of backlog, dummy for month of August.

**Table A15: Duration analysis coefficients controlling for GDP growth**

	<b>Coefficients</b>			
	At time of introduction	After 100 days	After 300 days	After 500 days
<b>Close elections</b>				
in large member states (1)	-0.323*** (0.044)	-0.323*** (0.044)	-0.323*** (0.044)	-0.323*** (0.044)
in small member states (2)	-0.581*** (0.103)	-0.105*** (0.026)	0.008 (0.034)	0.061 (0.042)
<b>Non-close elections</b>				
in large member states (3)	-0.326*** (0.109)	-0.143*** (0.030)	-0.099** (0.042)	-0.079 (0.051)
in small member states (4)	-0.179*** (0.026)	-0.179*** (0.026)	-0.179*** (0.026)	-0.179*** (0.026)
<b>GDP growth (percentage points)</b>	0.165*** (0.032)	0.028*** (0.010)	-0.005 (0.012)	-0.020 (0.014)
Controls	Yes			
Wald $\chi^2$	2,575.78			
Log pseudolikelihood	-92,258.47			

\*: p<0.10; \*\*: p<0.05; \*\*\*: p<0.01

Note: In comparison, the coefficients in our main regression are slightly lower at the start of the negotiation process after inclusion of this variable but quickly regain levels close to those presented in our main regression as the negotiation progresses. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cox regression with time-varying covariates interacted with natural logarithm of time. Controls include dummy for qualified majority voting (QMV), number of EU members, dummy for cooperation procedure with parliament (cooperation and codecision), dummy for directive, size of backlog, dummy for month of August.

**Table A16: Duration analysis coefficients controlling range of ideological positions**  
**Coefficients**

	At time of introduction	After 100 days	After 300 days	After 500 days
<b>Close elections</b>				
in large member states (1)	-0.499*** (0.043)	-0.499*** (0.043)	-0.499*** (0.043)	-0.499*** (0.043)
in small member states (2)	-0.397*** (0.103)	-0.061*** (0.026)	0.020 (0.035)	0.057 (0.043)
<b>Non-close elections</b>				
in large member states (3)	-0.219*** (0.110)	-0.202*** (0.030)	-0.198*** (0.043)	-0.196** (0.052)
in small member states (4)	-0.321*** (0.103)	-0.218*** (0.026)	-0.193*** (0.036)	-0.182*** (0.044)
<b>Ideological range</b>	0.004 (0.005)	0.011*** (0.001)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.002)
Controls	Yes			
Wald $\chi^2$	3,097.56			
Log pseudolikelihood	-102,512.94			

\*: p<0.10; \*\*: p<0.05; \*\*\*: p<0.01

Note: Each government's measure is itself a weighted average of the RILE measure of the different parties represented in the government. It should therefore capture how the ideological disagreements among negotiating actors affects the duration of proposals. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cox regression with time-varying covariates interacted with natural logarithm of time. Controls include dummy for qualified majority voting (QMV), number of EU members, dummy for cooperation procedure with parliament (cooperation and codecision), dummy for directive, size of backlog, dummy for month of August.

**Table A17: Duration analysis controlling for the Commission's time in office**

	<b>Coefficients</b>			
	At time of introduction	After 100 days	After 300 days	After 500 days
<b>Close elections</b>				
in large member states (1)	-0.888*** (0.180)	-0.437*** (0.042)	-0.329*** (0.053)	-0.279*** (0.066)
in small member states (2)	-0.409*** (0.101)	-0.075*** (0.026)	0.005 (0.033)	0.042 (0.041)
<b>Non-close elections</b>				
in large member states (3)	-0.316*** (0.108)	-0.154*** (0.029)	-0.116*** (0.040)	-0.098** (0.049)
in small member states (4)	-0.285*** (0.101)	-0.208*** (0.025)	-0.189*** (0.034)	-0.180*** (0.042)
<b>Commission's final year?</b>	0.056** (0.024)	0.056** (0.024)	0.056** (0.024)	0.056** (0.024)
Controls	Yes			
Wald $\chi^2$	3127.56			
Log pseudolikelihood	-104,959.11			

\*: p<0.10; \*\*: p<0.05; \*\*\*: p<0.01

Note: We added a variable for the Commission's time in office. Following theories of legislative time (e.g. Döring 1995), this decision is based on the consideration that the pressure to adopt as many laws as possible leads to bottlenecks at the end of the legislative term. Since the Commission's discretion in the introduction of new proposals should therefore decrease towards the end of its term, we added a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the time period under consideration is within the last year of term of a given commission.