

Online Appendix: Measurement

Party-level indicators:

Clientelism: We asked experts to characterize party strategies on the basis of several statements. We used the following indicator to capture “clientelistic” party strategies:

“Some distinctions have been made in writing on parties between different ideal-typical ways in which parties may build ties with the electorate.” Experts then evaluated the statement: “Specific social or geographic constituencies on the basis of providing them with targeted benefits. Please indicate the importance of each factor on a 7 point scale. A 1 means a factor is not important at all, a 7 means it is very important.”

Continuing parties: Parties were included in 2008 and 2013 expert surveys. Since the criterion for inclusion was that parties should have obtained at least 2% of parliamentary representation, the coefficient for the dummy variable (1=stable parties; 0=new parties) measures the difference between parties included in both surveys and those only included in the 2013 survey.

Electoral success: Percent popular vote in the last election prior to the expert survey.

Governing status: A dummy variable indicating whether a party is part of the government at the time of the survey.

Mass organization: To gauge the organizational characteristics of parties, we use four questions from the expert surveys.

- 1) “Would you please estimate the extent to which each ‘face’ of the party is strong in determining party policy?”

Respondents evaluated the role of the “Party membership” and the “Party apparatus” in shaping party policies by using the response categories “1” (unimportant) to “7” (very important).

- (2) “And does the party have a ‘significant’ membership base in terms of numbers? We realize that the determination of a ‘significant membership base’ is somewhat arbitrary and may vary from country to country depending on its population. Our main concern is to distinguish between parties that have few members and those that relatively large numbers of members. “ (“Yes” or “No”).

(3) “Does the party have an organizational affiliation with any interest group or civil society group, such as trade unions, business associations, church groups, etc?” (response categories are “Yes” or “No”).

Together, these indicators tap the idea of a mass party that has significant membership levels, an elaborate party apparatus, and linkages to other social groups. A factor analysis suggests that these four indicators represent one dimension only. We therefore first re-scaled all variables to have a minimum of “0” and a maximum “1” and then created an additive index which has a theoretical minimum of 0 (if no expert saw a party having any of the four characteristics) to 4 (if all experts saw all traits in a party).¹ Practically, the range is from .2 to 3.1 for parties in CEE (with a mean of 1.71); and a range of .0 to 3.4 for parties in WE (with a mean of 1.91).²

Party stances on regime performance: “What about the party’s view of how well democracy works in [country]? Do parties hold positive (7) or negative views (1)?”

Party left-right ideology: Experts were asked: “In [country], parties may be located to the left or the right of the political spectrum. In general terms, please locate each party on the ideological spectrum in [country], with 1 standing for left wing, and 7 standing for right wing.”

Proportion of prior governing record: We counted how many years a party occupied government offices since 1945 or, if not a democracy, since the beginning of democratic party competition after 1945. Then, we divided the number of years in government by the total number of years a country has been democratic. Italy proved to be a difficult case with its frequent changes in parties and institutions. We deal with this by taking 1994 as the starting point given the substantial changes in Italian institutions. We conducted all analyses with Italy excluded but the results are virtually identical.

Contextual Data.

Government turnovers: We used information about government turnovers assembled by Ieraci (2012) and updated in Ieraci and Poropat (2013; accessed January 17, 2015). The study records changes in all

¹ Cronbach’s alpha is $\alpha=.68$ (West) and $\alpha=.73$ (CEE).

² We extensively validated this indicator with Katz/Mair (1992) data (name withheld). The summary indicator based on Katz/Mair and the RW summary indicator are reasonably strongly linked ($r=.63$; $N=29$), despite the fact that there is at least a 20 year time lag between both studies, and the very different modes of collecting information.

European countries except the Baltics. We coded the information from the Baltic states on the basis of Allan Sikk's list of governments in the three Baltic nations (available at <http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~tjmsasi/>; accessed January 19, 2015). A complete government turnover is defined as a "100 per cent change in the government party composition (Ieraci 2012, p. 535); "semi-turnovers" when the change in party composition "is ≥ 50 per cent" (ibid); and partial turnovers (if change in composition is less than 50 per cent). Results are substantively identical when we only consider major (i.e., semi-change) turnovers in model 6.

HDI: United Nations, 2012.

Institutional integrity: an additive index of 2012 World Bank scores on corruption, rule of law, and electoral integrity (<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#faq-2>; accessed October 2, 2014).

Lijphart scores of 2 institutional dimensions (executives-parties dimension and federal-unitary dimension) is taken from Vatter and Bernauer (2009).

Unemployment, inflation: IMF/Eurostat, 2012;

Table A1: Parties included in 2008 and 2013 surveys (2008 and 2013 entries list the number of experts who completed a survey for a party system in a given year.)

Country: West	Party Name in RW survey	Acronym	2008	2013	Party family
Austria 2008: 10 2013: 9	Social Democratic Party of Austria	SPO	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
	Austrian People's Party	OVP	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
	The Greens	GRUNE	Yes	Yes	Green
	Freedom Party of Austria	FPO	Yes	Yes	Nationalist
	Alliance for the Future of Austria	BZO	Yes	Yes	Nationalist
	Team Stronach	TS	No	Yes	Nationalist
Belgium 2008: 10 2013: 8	Christian-Democratic & Flemish	CDV	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
	New Flemish Alliance	N-VA	Yes	Yes	Conservative/Separatist
	Reform Movement	MR	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Flemish Interest	VB	Yes	Yes	Nationalist
	Flemish Liberals and Democrats	VLD	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Socialist Party	PS	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
	Socialist Party. Different	SPA	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
	Humanist Democratic Centre	CDH	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
	Ecologists	ECOLO	Yes	Yes	Green
	List Dedecker	LDD	Yes	Yes	Nationalist
	The Flemish Greens	GROEN	Yes	Yes	Green
	National Front	FN	Yes	No	Nationalist
Denmark 2008: 9 2013: 9	Denmark's Liberal Party	V	Yes	Yes	Conservative
	Social Democracy	S	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
	Danish People's Party	DF	Yes	Yes	Nationalist
	Socialist People's Party	SF	Yes	Yes	Socialist
	Conservative People's Party	KF	Yes	Yes	Conservative
	Radical Liberals	RV	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Unity List - The Red-Greens	EL	Yes	Yes	Socialist
	Liberal Alliance (2008: New Alliance)	NA	Yes	Yes	Conservative
Finland 2008: 9 2013: 8	Finnish Centre	KESK	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	National Coalition Party	KOK	Yes	Yes	Conservative
	Finnish Social Democratic Party	SDP	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
	Left Alliance	VAS	Yes	Yes	Socialist
	Green Alliance	VIHR	Yes	Yes	Green
	Finnish Christian Democrats	KD	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
	Swedish People's Party in Finland	SFP	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	True Finns	PS	Yes	Yes	Nationalist
France 2008: 10 2013: 6	Union for a Popular Movement	UMP	Yes	Yes	Conservative
	Socialist Party	PS	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
	Democratic Movement	MoDem	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	French Communist Party	PCF	Yes	No	Communist
	National Front	FN	Yes	Yes	Nationalist
	The Greens	VERTS	Yes	Yes	Green

Merges with FDG	New Centre	NC	Yes	Yes	Conservative
	Radical Party of the Left	PRG	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
	Movement for France	MPF	Yes	No	Nationalist
	Communist Revolutionary League	LCR	Yes	No	Communist
	Radical Party	PR	No	Yes	Centrist
	Left Front	FDG	No	Yes	Communist
	Centrist Alliance	AC	No	Yes	Centrist
Germany 2008: 10 2013: 9	Christian Democracy Union	CDU	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
	Christian Social Union	CSU	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
	Social Democratic Party of Germany	SPD	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
	Free Democratic Party	FDP	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	The Left (Party of Democratic Socialism, PDS)	DIE LINKE	Yes	Yes	Socialist
	Alliance 90/The Greens	GRUNE	Yes	Yes	Green
	Piratenpartei	Piraten	No	Yes	Centrist
Greece 2008: 10 2013: 9	New Democracy	ND	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	PASOK	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
	Communist Party of Greece	KKE	Yes	Yes	Communist
	Coalition of the Left, the Movements and the Ecology	SYN	Yes	No	Socialist
	Popular Orthodox Rally	LAOS	Yes	No	Nationalist
	Coalition of the Radical Left	SYRIZA	No	Yes	Socialist
	Independent Greeks	ANEL	No	Yes	Nationalist
	Golden Dawn	XA	No	Yes	Nationalist
Democratic Left	DIMAR	No	Yes	Socialist	
Ireland 2008: 10 2013: 7		FF	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
	Fine Gael	FG	Yes	Yes	Conservative
	Labour Party	LAB	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
	Sinn Fein	SF	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Green Party	GP	Yes	Yes	Green/Socialist
	Progressive Democrats	PD	Yes	No	Centrist
	Socialist	SP	Yes	Yes	Socialist
People Before Profit Alliance	PBP	No	Yes	Communist	
Italy 2008: 10 2013: 8	Left Democrats	Left_Dem	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
	Communist Refoundation Party	PRC	Yes	No	Communist
	Italian Democratic Socialists	SDI	Yes	No	Social-democrat
	Italian Radicals	RI	Yes	No	Centrist
	Party of Italian Communists	PdCI	Yes	No	Communist
	Italy of Values	IdV	Yes	No	Centrist
	Green Federation	VERDI	Yes	No	Green
	Forward Italy	FI	Yes	No	Conservative
	National Alliance	AN	Yes	No	Nationalist
	Union of Christian and Centre Democrats	UDC	Yes	No	Christian-democrat
	League North	LN	Yes	Yes	Nationalist/Separatist
	The People of Freedom	PDL	No	Yes	Christian-democrat
	Union of the Centre	UDC	No	Yes	Christian-democrat

	Five Star Movement	M5S	No	Yes	Other
	Civic Choice	SC	No	Yes	Centrist
Netherlands	Christian Democratic Appeal	CDA	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
2008: 9	Labour Party	PvdA	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
2013: 9	Socialist Party	SP	Yes	Yes	Socialist
	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	VVD	Yes	Yes	Conservative
	Freedom Party	PVV	Yes	Yes	Conservative
	Green Left	GL	Yes	Yes	Green
	Christian Union	CU	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
	Democrats 66	D66	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Party for the Animals	PvdD	Yes	Yes	Green
	List Rita Verdonk	VERDONK	Yes	No	Centrist
	Reformed Political Party	SGP	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
	50 Plus	50+	No	Yes	Centrist
Portugal	Socialist Party	PS	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
2008: 10	Social Democratic Party	PSD	Yes	Yes	Conservative
2013: 7	Portuguese Communist Party	PCP	Yes	Yes	Communist
	Ecological Party The Greens	PEV	Yes	No	Green
	Democratic Social Centre	CDS-PP	Yes	Yes	Conservative
	Left Bloc	BE	Yes	Yes	Socialist
Spain	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	PSOE	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
2008: 10	People's Party	PP	Yes	Yes	Conservative
2013: 9	United Left	IU	Yes	Yes	Socialist
	Initiative for Catalonia Greens	ICV	Yes	Yes	Green
	Convergence and Union of Catalonia	CiU	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Republican Left of Catalonia	ERC	Yes	No	Nationalist/Separatist
	Basque National Party	EAJ-PNV	Yes	Yes	Nationalist/Separatist
	Canarian Coalition	CC	Yes	No	Centrist/Separatist
	Galician Nationalist Bloc	BNG	Yes	No	Socialist/Separatist
	Basque Solidarity	EA	Yes	No	Nationalist/Separatist
	Aragonese Council	CHA	Yes	No	Socialist/Separatist
	Navarre Yes	Na-Bai	Yes	No	Nationalist/Separatist
	Union, Progress, and Democracy	UPyD	No	Yes	Centrist
	Amaiur	AMAIUR	No	Yes	Socialist
Sweden	Social Democratic Workers' Party	SAP	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
2008: 10	Moderate Rally Party	M	Yes	Yes	Conservative
2013: 7	Centre Party	C	Yes	Yes	Conservative
	Liberal People's Party	FP	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Christian Democrats	KD	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
	Left Party	VP	Yes	Yes	Socialist
	Environment Party The Greens	MP	Yes	Yes	Green
	Sweden Democrats	SD	Yes	Yes	Nationalist
UK	Labour Party	LAB	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat

2008: 10	Conservative Party	CON	Yes	Yes	Conservative
2013: 7	Liberal Democrats	LD	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Scottish National Party	SNP	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat/Separatist
	Plaid Cymru	PC	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat/Separatist
	UK Independence Party	UKIP	No	Yes	Nationalist

Country CEE	Party Name in RW survey	Acronym	2008	2013	Party family
Bulgaria 2008: 11 2013: 7	Bulgarian Socialist Party	BSP	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
	GERB	GERB	Yes	Yes	Conservative
	National Movement for Stability and Progress	NDSV	Yes	No	Centrist
	Movement for Rights and Freedoms	DPS	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Union of Democratic Forces	SDS	Yes	No	Christian-democrat
	National Union Attack	ATAKA	Yes	Yes	Nationalist
	Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria	DSB	Yes	Yes	Conservative
	Bulgarian People's Union Movement "Citizen's Bulgaria"	BNS DBG	Yes No	No Yes	Conservative Centrist
Czech-Republic 2008: 10 2013: 9	Civic Democratic Party		Yes	Yes	Conservative
		ODS			
	Czech Social Democratic Party	CSSD	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia		Yes	Yes	Communist
		KSCM			
	Christian and Democratic Union	KDU-CSL	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
	Green Party	SZ	Yes	Yes	Green
	Public Affairs	VV	No	Yes	Centrist
Traditional Responsibility Party	TOP09	No	Yes	Conservative	
Party of Civic Rights	SPOZ	No	Yes	Social-democrat	
Estonia 2008: 10 2013: 9	Estonian Reform Party	RF (RE)	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Estonian Centre Party	EK	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Pro Patria and Res Publica Union	Irl	Yes	Yes	Conservative
	Social Democratic Party	SDE	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
	Estonian Greens	Er	Yes	Yes	Green
	Estonian People's Union	RL	Yes	No	Social-democratic
	Conservative People's Party	EKRE	No	Yes	Conservative
Hungary 2008: 9 2013: 10	Hungarian Socialist Party	MSZP	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
	Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Union	FIDESZ	Yes	Yes	Conservative
	Union of Free Democrats	SZDSZ	Yes	No	Centrist
	Hungarian Democratic Forum	MDF	Yes	No	Christian-democrat
	Christian Democratic People's Party	KDNP	Yes	No	Christian-democrat
	Hungarian Justice Party	MIEP	Yes	No	Nationalist
	Politics Can Be Different	LMP	No	Yes	Green
	Movement for a Better Hungary	JOBBIK	No	Yes	Nationalist
	Together 2014	Egyutt	No	Yes	Centrist
Latvia 2008: 10	People's Party	TP	Yes	No	Conservative
	Union of Greens and Peasants	ZZS	Yes	Yes	Socialist

2013: 8	New Era	JL	Yes	No	Conservative
	Harmony Centre	SC	Yes	Yes	Socialist
	Latvia's First Party / Latvia's Way	LPP	Yes	No	Centrist
	Fatherland and Freedom	TB/LNNK	Yes	No	Conservative
	For Human Rights in United Latvia	PCTVL	Yes	No	Socialist
	Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party	LSdSP	Yes	No	Social-democrat
	Reform Party	RP	No	Yes	Centrist
	Unity	V	No	Yes	Conservative
	National Alliance	TB/LNNK	No	Yes	Nationalist
	Latvian Green Party	LZP	No	Yes	Green
Lithuania 2008: 10 2013: 9	Lithuanian Social Democratic Party	LSDP	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
	Fatherland Union	TS-LK	Yes	Yes	Conservative
	New Union - Social Liberals	NS	Yes	No	Centrist
	Order and Justice - Liberal Democrats	TiT	Yes	Yes	Nationalist
	Liberal's Movement of the Republic of Lithuania		Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Labour Party	LrLS			
	Liberal and Centre Union	DP	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Lithuanian Peasant Popular Union	LCS	Yes	No	Centrist
	Lithuanian Peasants' Electoral Alliance	LVLS	Yes	No	Conservative
	Lithuanian Peasants' Electoral Alliance	LrA	Yes	Yes	Conservative
	Lithuanian Peasant and Greens Union	LVZS	No	Yes	Conservative
	Way of Courage	DK	No	Yes	Other
	Lithuanian Green Party	LLZP	No	Yes	Green
	Civic Democratic Party	PDP	Yes	No	Conservative
	Poland 2008: 9 2013: 11	Law and Justice	PIS	Yes	Yes
Civic Platform		PO	Yes	Yes	Conservative
Democratic Left Alliance		LiD	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland		SrP	Yes	No	Other
League of Polish Families		LPr	Yes	No	Nationalist
Polish People's Party		PSL	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
United Poland		SP	No	Yes	Nationalist
Palikot's Movement		RP	No	Yes	Social-democrat
Romania 2008: 8 2013: 10	Social Democratic Party	PSD	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
	Democratic Liberal Party	PDL	Yes	Yes	Conservative
	National Liberal Party	PNL	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Great Romania Party	PRM	Yes	No	Nationalist
	Conservative Party	PC	Yes	Yes	Conservative
	Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania		Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
	New Generation Party	UDMR			
	Liberal Democratic Party	PNG	Yes	No	Nationalist
	Christian Democratic National Peasants' Party	PLD	Yes	No	Christian-democrat
	Christian Democratic National Peasants' Party		Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
	National Initiative Party	PNTCD			
	New Republic Party	PIN	Yes	No	Social-democrat
	Civic Force	PNR	No	Yes	Centrist
	People's Party-Dan Diaconescu	FC	No	Yes	Christian-democrat
	PP-DD	No	Yes	Other	
Slovakia	Christian Democratic Movement	KDH	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat

2008: 10	People's Party - Movement for a Democratic Slovakia	HZDS	Yes	No	Nationalist
2013: 10	Slovak Democratic and Christian Union	SDKU	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
	Direction - Social Democracy	Smer	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
	Party of the Hungarian Coalition	MKP	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Slovak National Party	SNS	Yes	Yes	Nationalist
	Ordinary People and Independent Personalities	OL'aNO	No	Yes	Conservative
	Bridge	MH	No	Yes	Centrist
	Freedom and Solidarity	SAS	No	Yes	Centrist
	New Majority Party	N	No	Yes	Christian-democrat
Slovenia	Liberal Democracy of Slovenia	LDS	Yes	No	Centrist
2008: 9	Slovenian Democratic Party	SDS	Yes	Yes	Conservative
2013: 8	Social Democrats	SD	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
	Slovenian People's Party	SLS	Yes	Yes	Conservative
	New Slovenia - Christian People's Party	NS	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
	Slovenian National Party	SNS	Yes	No	Nationalist
	Democratic Pensioners' Party of Slovenia	DSUS	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Positive Slovenia	PS	No	Yes	Social-democrat
	Civic List	DL	No	Yes	Centrist

SI 1: Variance components of expert judgments at the expert, party, and country-level

We assessed the characteristics of expert level responses following the strategies proposed by Steenbergen and Marks (2007) as well as Coma and van Ham (2015). We find that experts arrive at comparable judgments on all but the clientelism variable. For example, the intra-class correlation for the ideology variable (.76) is nearly identical to the values that Steenbergen and Marks (2007 p. 352) report for their integration indicator. Moreover, the range of standard deviations of expert judgment is generally comparable to what both Steenbergen and Marks as well as Coma and van Ham report (2015, p. 312). However, the clientelism indicator is an exception in our study, presumably because the question about specific party appeals is a much harder to answer. Question difficulty, as Coma and van Ham note, tend to increase uncertainty among experts and thus introduce a greater degree of expert-level variance. Note, however, that excluding this variable does not influence the results of the study one bit. We therefore include it because some arguments in the literature suggest that clientelism especially in CEE may influence the behavior of political elites (Kitschelt et al. 1999).

Table SI 1: Variance decomposition of variables used in the manuscript

Variable	Regime Evaluations	Ideology	Mass Organization	Clientelism
Fixed effects				
Grand Mean	3.85 (.14)	4.09(.12)	1.86(.06)	4.1(.09)
Variance components				
National	.20 (.14)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.01(.00)
Party	1.89 (.23)	2.31(.25)	.66(.07)	.03(.01)
Expert	1.1 (.04)	.72(.03)	.47(.02)	.07(.01)
Intra-Class Correlations				
National	.06	.00	.00(.00)	.01
Party	.66	.76	.59(.03)	.32
Total N Observations				
	1413	1430	1371	1407

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. N country=24, N parties=179; N experts=206. Total country-party-expert observation is N=1552; actual N is lower than the theoretical maximum because of the occasional “Don’t Know” response by experts to a question.

SI 2: Predicting standard deviations of expert level responses

We estimate the influence of party and national characteristics on the standard deviations of expert responses for the variables used in the manuscript. In modeling them, we followed Steenbergen and Marks (2007) and Comi and van Ham (2015) and include the following predictors. At the party-level, we include two measures of electoral success (governing and electoral success in the last election); one economic left-right indicator; one cultural issue indicator (measuring cultural liberalism vs cultural conservatism). We also include party dummies, with extreme left parties serving as a reference category. We also included a predictor of the spread of parties on the variable in question (e.g., how much spread is there among parties regarding the ideology/democracy/organization/clientelism variables?) We measured this as the standard deviation of party-level positions. At the country-level, we controlled for region (East-West); democratic regime duration, and GDP/capita.

The results in table 4 suggest that hardly any predictor relates systematically to the variance at the expert level. We see that greater ideological dispersion of parties lowers the standard deviation by a bit ($b=-.395$), just as the spread of parties along the regime performance evaluations lowers the disagreement among experts ($b=0.335$). There is also the occasional significant effect of a party dummy though we would also note that there is no overarching pattern suggesting that experts agree more when certain conditions prevail—most coefficients are insignificant, just as they are in prior studies.

Table SI 2: Predicting Standard Deviations of Expert-Level Responses of Core Variables in the Study

	Democratic Performance	Party left-right ideology	Mass Organization	Clientilism
Support in last election (%)	0.000808 (0.00311)	-0.00330 (0.00305)	0.00295* (0.00145)	-0.00421 (0.00453)
Incumbent Party	-0.0312 (0.0608)	0.0517 (0.0594)	-0.00525 (0.0283)	-0.0277 (0.0868)
Economic Left-Right Stance	0.00745 (0.00991)	-0.0142 (0.00976)	-0.0124** (0.00463)	0.0120 (0.0145)
Cultural Liberal-Conservative Stance	0.00643 (0.00876)	0.0132 (0.00858)	-0.00202 (0.00408)	0.0160 (0.0126)
East-West	0.0359 (0.213)	-0.123 (0.171)	-0.0608 (0.0830)	0.143 (0.184)
Socialists party family	0.0990 (0.140)	-0.426** (0.138)	0.0264 (0.0659)	0.247 (0.204)
Greens	0.225 (0.134)	-0.174 (0.131)	0.119 (0.0624)	0.0297 (0.192)
Social Democrat	0.125 (0.112)	-0.153 (0.110)	-0.120* (0.0527)	-0.151 (0.164)
Centrist Liberal	0.124 (0.107)	-0.132 (0.104)	0.0414 (0.0501)	-0.208 (0.153)
Christian Democrats	-0.00825 (0.104)	-0.279** (0.102)	0.0894 (0.0485)	-0.322* (0.150)
Conservatives	-0.0286 (0.103)	-0.110 (0.101)	0.0126 (0.0485)	-0.0895 (0.149)
Length of Democracy since 1945	-0.00188 (0.00705)	-0.000636 (0.00535)	-0.00129 (0.00287)	0.00552 (0.00599)
GDP/capita	-5.94e-07 (8.27e-06)	-1.26e-06 (6.14e-06)	-3.83e-06 (3.32e-06)	6.93e-06 (7.14e-06)
Standard deviation of parties' democracy position	-0.335* (0.157)			
Standard deviation of parties' left-right ideology		-0.395* (0.155)		
Standard deviation of parties' mass organization			0.0165 (0.109)	
Standard deviation of parties' clientilism position				0.167 (0.189)
Constant	4.905 (14.16)	2.895 (10.73)	3.548 (5.786)	-10.02 (12.06)
Observations	179	179	179	179
Number of groups	24	24	24	24

Multi-level analyses, with Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Figure SI 3: Correlating the World Bank and Varieties of Democracy Indicators

Do World Bank scores measure the quality of institutions? We downloaded the new Varieties of Democracy data which contains several useful indicators about the performance of a regime. This information is partially gathered on the basis of expert surveys that include about 5 experts per country (Pemstein et al. 2015, p. 10); partially on the basis of research teams that apply sophisticated statistical estimation techniques to estimate country scores. We think this will be a valuable source for information on aspects of regimes' performance that is not captured by the World Bank. While a full cross-validation of these varied sources goes beyond the score of this paper, we provide a preliminary check of their overlap. To this end, we selected several indicators that, on the basis of the codebook description, measure the concept of institutional quality in ways that are comparable to those tapped by the World Bank (page numbers refer to the VoD codebook):

Rigorous and impartial administration (v2clrspct, p. 207),

Equality before the law (v2clrspct, p. 256),

Political corruption index (v2x_corr, p. 262)

Electoral component index (v2x_EDcomp_thick, p. 44)

Clean election index (v2xel_frefair, p. 52)


(A few indicators tapping electoral fraud like estimates of vote buying have mostly missing data for our countries).

We first reversed the polarity of the corruption indicator so that high values on all variables indicate institutions with integrity. We then standardized each variable (because of the different ranges), and created an additive index. (All items load strongly on a first factor in an exploratory factor analysis).

We find a strong correlation between the World Bank and the Vod quality indicators (Figure 1; $r=.87$).

Given the overlap, using this indicator does not change the multivariate results.

Figure SI 3: Institutional Quality of World Bank and Varieties of Democracy data (r=.87)



SI 4: Tables by East-West, models

In addition to the interaction terms reported in the manuscript, we also regressed each model within the East and the West in order to check whether party-level predictors. Because of the reduced number of countries, especially $N=10$ in CEE, we include country fixed effects to control for national level factors. For the West, the results confirm that the influence of governing experience and mass organizations reflect those found in the pooled party data set. For CEE, the results generally confirm the pooled analyses, though given the reduced number of cases the Proportion variable is borderline significant. Note, though, that the size of coefficients in CEE is significant and nearly identical ($b=1.39$) when we pool the data and include an interaction effect between postwar incumbency and the East dummy. In this case, the conditional Proportion variable is significant at the $p=.05$ level.

SI 4 Table: Model 5 in table 2 estimated within regions

	CEE	WE
% Postwar incumbent	1.259*	1.844**
	(0.601)	(0.499)
Mass organization	0.836**	0.384*
	(0.214)	(0.192)
Incumbent party	0.575	0.915**
	(0.329)	(0.195)
Support in last election (%)	0.0274	-0.00833
	(0.0169)	(0.0117)
Clientelism	-0.161	-0.155
	(0.0865)	(0.0994)
Ideology	0.778	1.136**
	(0.674)	(0.389)
Ideology squared	-0.0875	-0.121*
	(0.0782)	(0.0493)
Stable party	-0.989**	-0.202
	(0.370)	(0.314)
FIDESZ	3.556**	
	(0.489)	
MSZP	-1.857**	
	(0.346)	
Constant	1.436	0.407
	(1.670)	(1.027)
Observations	71	108
Number of groups	10	14

Entries are multi-level coefficients using Stata 13's xtmixed procedure. Robust Standard errors in parentheses. Country dummies included but not shown for reasons of space. ** <.01, * <.05 levels of significance.

Figure SI 5: The marginal effect of governing record by Lijphart's executive-parties dimension
Based on model 7 in table 2 adding an interaction term between past election support by executive parties dimension.





Figure SI 6: A Change in Governing Status Leads to Changes in Regime Evaluations:

Older Democracies (before 1990)

Newer Democracies (1990 onwards):



Note: Dots denote mean changes in regime evaluations; bar heights represent 95% confidence intervals. "Lost Incumbency" denotes a party was in government in 2007/2008 and in the opposition by 2013; gained incumbency the reserve.

SI 7: Does parties' commitment to strengthening democratic institutions affect their performance Stances?

We tentatively tested the idea that parties' commitment to a liberal democracy influences their stances on the performance of a regime. We hypothesized that the more parties are committed to strengthening democratic institutions, the more likely they are to view the current regime negatively, especially when these institutions do not work well. While a full test is not possible with our party-level data (as explained below), we were able to conduct a preliminary test of this argument which suggest that our main results remain intact.

Our expert survey asks respondents to indicate parties' commitment to a democracy after a filter question. The filter first requires that respondents select from a list of several divisions those four issues that are the most salient in a party system. They could also add divisions if they preferred:

- A. Economy: redistributive issues (for example, tax levels, welfare state spending)
- B. Economy: State-run versus market economy
- C. Democracy: strengthening democratic institutions
- D. Ethnic rights (for example, minorities)
- E. Nationalism and Internationalism (for example, views about the EU)
- F. Religiosity (role of church)
- G. Social rights (for example, choice of non-conformist lifestyle, women's rights, etc)
- H. Views of the Communist past and its legacies
- I. Regional divisions
- J. Urban-rural divisions

After selecting the four issues, we asked them to indicate the position of parties on these issues.

We would like to ask you next about the main parties' positions on the issues you just identified. Please note that we are interested in the official position of the party as represented by the main party leaders
For those who selected division C, we then asked:

We would like to ask you next about the main parties' positions on the issues you just identified. Please note that we are interested in the official position of the party as represented by the main party leaders. (We ask you later to assess the extent to which a political party is internally divided on its policy stances.) Beginning with issue 1, could you now situate parties in Germany? Please use a seven-point scale to score the position of a party. A score of 7 indicates the most strongly liberal position and a score of 1 indicates the least liberal position on any particular issue. If a party has no stance on a given issue, please give it a score of 99.

We use "liberal" in the European sense that "Most Liberal" means: (A) Anti-distribution, (B) pro-market, (C) pro-democracy, (D) pro-ethnic rights, (E) internationalist, (F) secular, (G) pro-social rights, (H) pro-national, (I) pro-urban.

At the other extreme, we use "least liberal" to mean: (A) Pro-distribution, (B) anti-market, (C) anti-democracy, (D) anti-ethnic rights, (E) nationalist, (F) religious, (G) anti-social rights, (H) regionalist, (I) rural.

Because of the filter question, many experts especially in Western Europe did not select this issue. If we adopt a broad brush and include parties if even just a single expert selected the "democracy" item, then we have responses for all 70 parties in CEE; and for 88 parties in WE.³ The results displayed in table SI 7 indicate that none of the coefficients for parties' **democratic principles** are statistically significant. Note

³ When we limit the analyses to party systems where at least 5 experts provided information, the data set is reduced to 69 parties in 9 countries for the East and West combined.

that we use nearly all parties for CEE and a substantial number of parties in WE, though for the West we note that about one third of the parties have fewer than 3 expert responses for this variable. We thus must view these results as tentative, which is the reason for why we don't include them in the paper. Still, the empirical patterns suggest—especially for the East where we have more complete information—that the democracy indicator is statistically insignificant. Moreover, there is no interaction between quality of institutions and their democratic commitment. In other words, at least by this measure, the commitment of parties to strengthening democratic institutions fails to influence democracy evaluations even when institutions work poorly and when parties have reasons to aim to strengthen them.

Table SI 7:

VARIABLES	Performance Stances	Performance Stances
% Postwar incumbent	1.861**	1.887**
	(0.429)	(0.429)
Mass organization	0.374**	0.379**
	(0.138)	(0.138)
Incumbent party	0.836**	0.822**
	(0.167)	(0.168)
Support in last election (%)	0.0171	0.0171
	(0.00881)	(0.00879)
Clientelism	-0.166*	-0.172*
	(0.0738)	(0.0741)
Ideology	0.830**	0.825**
	(0.301)	(0.300)
Ideology squared	-0.0867*	-0.0854*
	(0.0365)	(0.0365)
Stable party	-0.262	-0.259
	(0.213)	(0.213)
FIDESZ	3.107**	3.075**
	(0.906)	(0.905)
MSZP	-2.206*	-2.180*
	(0.900)	(0.899)
Democratic principles	0.0926	0.0263
	(0.0610)	(0.107)
Institutional quality	0.284**	0.198
	(0.0852)	(0.141)
Principles*quality		0.0177
		(0.0234)
Length of Democracy since 1945	-0.0103	-0.00912
	(0.0117)	(0.0118)
Lijphart's executive party dimension	-0.0244	-0.0293
	(0.0885)	(0.0886)
GDP/capita	-5.43e-05*	-5.23e-05
	(2.72e-05)	(2.72e-05)
Unemployment	-2.514	-2.600
	(1.627)	(1.628)
Inflation	-40.58**	-40.39**
	(10.96)	(10.94)
Constant	22.86	20.81
	(23.52)	(23.63)
<i>Variance Components</i>		
Country-level	.00	.00
Party-level	.71**	.71**
<i>Model Fit</i>		
Deviance	-196.58	-196.29
AIC	433.16	434.59

BIC	494.41	498.91
N parties (countries)	158 (22)	158 (22)

Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<.01, * p<.05