

Appendix: Career Ambitions and Legislative Participation: The Moderating Effect of Electoral Institutions

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Table ?? provides an overview of career ambitions by prospective electoral system.

Table A1: Career Ambitions by Electoral System

	CLPR	CLPR/STV	OLPR	Semi-OLPR	SMP/STV	STV
European Career	695	209	330	191	0	37
National Career	164	0	116	35	28	11
Other	693	0	522	199	138	28

Note: CLPR: France, Germany, Greece (- 2009), Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and Spain.

CLPR/STV: United Kingdom (European elections)

OLPR: Austria, Bulgaria (2014), Finland, Greece (2014), Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, and Sweden.

Semi-OLPR: Belgium, Bulgaria (- 2009), Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Latvia, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

SMP: United Kingdom (National elections).

STV: Ireland, and Malta.

Now, we report the results from additional analysis of voting participation and attendance. In particular, we first limit the votes to legislative votes only. Then, we limit the investigation to close votes, e.i. votes where the difference between the number of yes and no votes is less than 100. In Table ?? we report the result from the analysis of voting participation in legislative votes. Our two key findings remains. First, the estimate for those with a national career ambition are lower than for those with European career ambition. Second, the difference in participation between national and European level career is larger in candidate-centered systems than in party centered systems. This holds for both measures of career ambitions.

In Table ?? we only investigated participation in close votes. By close, we mean that the difference between Yes and No votes was less than 100. Again, we see that the two key findings hold up for both measures of career ambitions.

Table A2: Hierarchical Binomial Models: Participation in Legislative Roll Call Votes

	Model A1	Model A2	Model A3	Model A4
EP incumbent	-0.096 [-0.099 , -0.093]	-0.126 [-0.14 , -0.112]	-0.108 [-0.112 , -0.105]	-0.092 [-0.099 , -0.086]
National background	-0.213 [-0.218 , -0.209]	-0.158 [-0.177 , -0.139]	-0.228 [-0.232 , -0.224]	-0.039 [-0.047 , -0.03]
Non-political career	-0.097 [-0.1 , -0.093]	0.014 [0 , 0.029]	0.237 [0.23 , 0.245]	-0.1 [-0.107 , -0.093]
Age	0.078 [0.064 , 0.092]	0.26 [0.194 , 0.326]	0.114 [0.1 , 0.128]	0.629 [0.602 , 0.657]
Leader (Group)	0.044 [0.041 , 0.048]	0.113 [0.099 , 0.126]	0.047 [0.043 , 0.05]	0.09 [0.084 , 0.095]
Leader (Committee)	0.069 [0.066 , 0.073]	0.049 [0.034 , 0.064]	0.069 [0.066 , 0.072]	0.068 [0.061 , 0.074]
National (Candidate)	-0.419 [-0.428 , -0.409]	-0.093 [-0.135 , -0.052]		-0.216 [-0.234 , -0.197]
National (Party)	-0.29 [-0.296 , -0.284]	-0.182 [-0.209 , -0.155]		-0.277 [-0.289 , -0.265]
EU (Candidate)	0.054 [0.048 , 0.06]	0.182 [0.158 , 0.206]		0.203 [0.191 , 0.215]
Semi-OLPR (National)			0.152 [0.135 , 0.169]	
CLPR (national)			0.03 [0.02 , 0.04]	
CLPR (EP)			0.331 [0.323 , 0.34]	
CLPR/STV (EP)			0.426 [0.414 , 0.437]	
OLPR (EP)			0.409 [0.4 , 0.417]	
Semi-OLPR (EP)			0.266 [0.255 , 0.277]	
STV (National)			0.146 [0.116 , 0.176]	
STV (EP)			0.333 [0.314 , 0.353]	
SMP/STV (National)			0.013 [-0.004 , 0.03]	
Political group intercepts	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Member state intercepts	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
EP intercept	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Hierarchical Binomial Models with random intercept for political groups, member states, and parliamentary term. Dependent Variable: Participation in Legislative Roll Call Votes (all, daily, all,survey). Estimates are posterior mode and 95 percent posterior probability intervals.

Table A3: Hierarchical Binomial Models: Participation in Close Roll Call Votes

	Model A5	Model A6	Model A7	Model A8
EP incumbent	-0.096	-0.1	-0.12	-0.084
	[-0.099 , -0.093]	[-0.114 , -0.085]	[-0.126 , -0.115]	[-0.096 , -0.072]
National background	-0.213	-0.132	-0.191	0.002
	[-0.218 , -0.209]	[-0.151 , -0.112]	[-0.199 , -0.184]	[-0.015 , 0.018]
Non-political career	-0.097	-0.02	0.111	-0.113
	[-0.1 , -0.093]	[-0.034 , -0.005]	[0.1 , 0.122]	[-0.127 , -0.1]
Age	0.078	0.132	-0.083	0.588
	[0.064 , 0.092]	[0.064 , 0.2]	[-0.11 , -0.055]	[0.534 , 0.643]
Leader (Group)	0.044	0.085	0.057	0.074
	[0.041 , 0.048]	[0.072 , 0.099]	[0.051 , 0.062]	[0.062 , 0.085]
Leader (Committee)	0.069	0.068	0.049	0.041
	[0.066 , 0.073]	[0.053 , 0.083]	[0.043 , 0.055]	[0.029 , 0.054]
National (Candidate)	-0.419	-0.166		-0.203
	[-0.428 , -0.409]	[-0.208 , -0.124]		[-0.239 , -0.167]
National (Party)	-0.29	-0.204		-0.322
	[-0.296 , -0.284]	[-0.232 , -0.177]		[-0.345 , -0.3]
EU (Candidate)	0.054	0.085		0.133
	[0.048 , 0.06]	[0.059 , 0.111]		[0.11 , 0.156]
Semi-OLPR (National)			-0.016	
			[-0.046 , 0.014]	
CLPR (National)			-0.128	
			[-0.145 , -0.112]	
CLPR (EP)			0.187	
			[0.175 , 0.199]	
CLPR/STV (EP)			0.165	
			[0.147 , 0.184]	
OLPR (EP)			0.245	
			[0.232 , 0.258]	
Semi-OLPR (EP)			0.13	
			[0.112 , 0.148]	
STV (National)			-0.163	
			[-0.223 , -0.102]	
STV (EP)			0.057	
			[0.024 , 0.091]	
SMP/STV (National)			-0.13	
			[-0.158 , -0.1]	
Political group intercepts	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Member state intercepts	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
EP intercept	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Hierarchical Binomial Models with random intercept for political groups, member states, and parliamentary term. Dependent Variable: Participation in close Roll Call Votes (all, daily, all,survey). Estimates are posterior mode and 95 percent posterior probability intervals.

Then, in Table ?? we control for national parties specific effects by replacing the political group and country specific intercepts with national party intercept. The main pattern in the results is similar to those reported above.

Table A4: Hierarchcial Binomial Models: National parties random effects

	Model A9	Model A10
National (Candidate)	-0.415 [-0.424 , -0.406]	-0.304 [-0.378 , -0.231]
National (Party)	-0.292 [-0.298 , -0.286]	-0.36 [-0.405 , -0.316]
EU (Candidate)	-0.028 [-0.034 , -0.022]	0.14 [0.1 , 0.181]
EP incumbent	-0.127 [-0.131 , -0.124]	0.079 [0.056 , 0.102]
National background	-0.167 [-0.171 , -0.162]	-0.008 [-0.038 , 0.022]
Non-political career	-0.089 [-0.093 , -0.086]	-0.166 [-0.188 , -0.143]
Age	0.244 [0.23 , 0.258]	-1.304 [-1.403 , -1.205]
Leader (Group)	0.024 [0.021 , 0.027]	0.013 [-0.009 , 0.034]
Leader (Committee)	0.044 [0.041 , 0.048]	0.05 [0.027 , 0.072]
EP intercept	Yes	Yes
National parties intercept	Yes	Yes

Note: Hierarchcial Binomial Models with random intercept for national parties and parliamentary term. Dependent Variable: Participation in Roll Call Votes / Participation in Debates. Estimates are posterior mode and 95 percent posterior probabily intervals.