SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDICES

"Organized Labor as the New Undeserving Rich? Mass Media, Class-Based Anti-Union Rhetoric, and Public Support for Unions in the U.S."

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SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX A
Experimental Condition Transcripts

I. LIRR Experiment (MTurk and Qualtrics samples)

Control Condition

POTENTIAL RAIL ROAD STRIKE?: NORTH AMERICA'S BUSIEST COMMUTER TRAIN EXPERIENCING INTERNAL TENSIONS

A Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) strike is looking likelier as the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) of New York and labor unions accused each other of not negotiating properly. Currently, the state-run railroad is stuck in a four-year-long dispute with the MTA over wages, pensions, and work rules. The MTA are offering to give the 5,850 union members an 11 percent raise over six years, however the LIRR unions are requesting 17 percent. The MTA also wants to raise the retirement age for new workers by a year and nearly double new workers' pension contribution, which the unions also disagree with.

The LIRR is the busiest commuter railroad in North America, and serves over 300,000 passengers each day. In 1966, the LIRR became publicly owned by the Metropolitan Commuter Transportation Authority, which was renamed the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) in 1968. Unlike many other commuter trains elsewhere, the LIRR operates twenty-four hours per day, and seven days per week. With over 700 miles of track and well over 100 stations, the LIRR is a reliable means of transportation for many New Yorkers. The LIRR also enables commuters to connect to other transit systems, including Amtrak, ensuring that riders can use the LIRR as a means of getting to dozens of major U.S. cities across the United States.

The LIRR was established in 1834 and has run continuously, enabling passengers to travel between many areas of Long Island and New York City. Commuters who travel on a daily basis are able to purchase a monthly pass, while those who travel on a more occasional basis may purchase one-way or round-trip tickets. Unlike the New York subway system, LIRR ticket rates are based on the distances commuters intend to travel. As such, the LIRR is capable of serving commuters with a variety of traveling needs, and is sure to remain a method of traveling among Long Islanders and tourists for many years to come.

Opposition Condition

POTENTIAL RAIL ROAD STRIKE?: NORTH AMERICA'S BUSIEST COMMUTER TRAIN EXPERIENCING INTERNAL TENSIONS

A Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) strike is looking likelier as the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) of New York and labor unions accused each other of not negotiating properly. Currently, the state-run railroad is stuck in a four-year-long dispute with the MTA over wages, pensions, and work rules. The MTA are offering to give the 5,850 union members an 11 percent raise over six years, however the LIRR unions are requesting 17 percent. The MTA also wants to raise the retirement age for new workers by a year and nearly double new workers' pension contribution, which the unions also disagree with.

There's no justification for any strike. The LIRR union workers aren't happy, but they have shown no willingness to compromise in their negotiations with the MTA. Federal railroad law allows the LIRR union workers to strike, but as the busiest commuter railroad in North America, the Long Island Rail Road serves over 300,000 passengers each day. Unlike many other commuter trains elsewhere, the LIRR operates twenty-four hours per day, and seven days per week. Thus, a potential LIRR worker strike could stand to inconvenience hundreds of thousands of commuters per day. Additionally, this potential strike could come during the tail end of tourist season on Long Island, which could have a negative effect on the local economy.

What commuters really need is for their money to be spent on improved service and reliability, not raises for railroad workers. State officials shouldn't bow to the LIRR union workers' demands; rather, standing firm against the public-sector unions could help state leaders in the eyes of citizens in the state and nationwide. Elected officials in New York should stand up for commuters who depend on the railroad to get to work — and, incidentally, pay for LIRR workers' salaries and benefits. Elected officials and the people of New York should stand together in opposing the demands of the LIRR union workers.

CAR Condition

MILLIONAIRES ON STRIKE?: THE UNFAIR DEMANDS OF LIRR WORKERS

A Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) strike is looking likelier as the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) of New York and labor unions accused each other of not negotiating properly. Currently, the state-run railroad is stuck in a four-year-long dispute with the MTA over wages, pensions, and work rules. The MTA are offering to give the 5,850 union members an 11 percent raise over six years, however the LIRR unions are requesting 17 percent. The MTA also wants to raise the retirement age for new workers by a year and nearly double new workers' pension contribution, which the unions also disagree with.

There's no justification for any strike. The LIRR unions think it's OK for "working class" LIRR workers who make an average of $83,794 a year— plus enjoy pension and health benefits that normal people can only dream of — to get big raises without having to give

anything back on pension benefits or work rules. 28 percent of LIRR workers made above $100,000 in 2013. That doesn't include pension-benefits-for-life that a normal worker would have to save $1.2 million in a retirement pot to guarantee. That's right: The average LIRR retiree is effectively a millionaire. Still, the LIRR union workers aren't happy, and federal railroad law allows them to strike.

The Long Island Rail Road serves over 300,000 passengers each day. A potential LIRR worker strike could stand to inconvenience hundreds of thousands of commuters per day. Additionally, this potential strike could come during the tail end of tourist season on Long Island, which could have a negative effect on the local economy. What commuters really need is for their money to be spent on improved service and reliability and not bigger raises for some of the best paid railroad workers in the world. State officials shouldn't bow to the LIRR workers' demands for more; rather, standing firm against the way public-sector unions drive up ordinary New Yorkers' cost of living could help state leaders in the eyes of citizens in the state and nationwide. Elected officials in New York should stand up for the working folks who depend on the railroad to get to work — and, incidentally, pay for LIRR workers' salaries and benefits. LIRR workers are well compensated, set for life in retirement, and yet they are ready to inconvenience hard working commuters in order to get more. Elected officials and working people of New York should stand together in opposing the demands of greedy union workers.

II. United Auto Workers (UAW) Experiment (MTurk Sample)

Control Condition

THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN AUTO INDUSTRY

The fate of the American auto industry is uncertain, and many citizens are wondering what will come of the industry over the course of the next few decades. The auto industry has long been a sizable sector of the U.S. economy. The U.S. is currently second among the largest automobile manufacturers in the world by volume, with approximately 9 million vehicles manufactured annually. The industry's success owes much to production techniques that were implemented in the early 1900s. In particular, the production process was arranged into a series of standardized, sequential steps. Factories themselves were modified to allow for a more efficient inflow of raw materials, and often relied upon machine parts that were interchangeable between factories. Moreover, parts between vehicles, because of their precision-based production and standardization, became interchangeable as well. The advent of mass production marks a decisive turning point in the history of vehicle production in the United States.

The nature of automobile production has changed much since Karl Benz first invented the automobile in 1886, both in terms of the technology involved and the production process itself. Production of automobiles typically involves both machinery and physical labor. The United Auto Workers (UAW) is the main union representing American auto workers. The UAW, founded in 1935 by automobile plant workers, currently represents workers at General Motors, Ford and Chrysler, along with workers in the aerospace and agriculture industries. The United

Auto Workers union was officially recognized by General Motors and Chrysler in 1937, and by Ford in 1941.
The pace of technological development for automobiles has, since the inception of the combustible engine, been rapid, often attracting the attention of various practitioners and experts of the physical sciences. This is due, in no small part, to the demand for automobiles as a means of personal and commercial transportation. Major developments, such as electric ignition, independent suspension, four-wheel brakes, and a wide array of safety features, highlight the various advances in automobile engineering and production over the course of the automobile's long history. The mechanical processes contained within the modern combustible engine, for example, are rather complex, involving an intricate, interconnected system of valves, pistons, spark plugs and belts that, in order for the engine to work properly for even a short-distance trip, must function precisely as designed. Certainly, the more recent advances in computer science will likely enable engineers to design and produce automobiles with increased precision, specificity, and efficiency. Reliance upon such modern technologies has become commonplace within the auto industry, and will likely continue as automakers seek to refine the automobile design and production processes.

Opposition Condition

THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN AUTO INDUSTRY

The fate of the American auto industry is uncertain, and many citizens are wondering what will come of the industry over the course of the next few decades. The nature of automobile production has changed much since Karl Benz first invented the automobile in 1886, both in terms of the technology involved and the production process itself. The United Auto Workers (UAW) is the main union representing American auto workers. The UAW, founded in 1935 by automobile plant workers, currently represents workers at General Motors, Ford and Chrysler, along with workers in the aerospace and agriculture industries. The United Auto Workers union was officially recognized by General Motors and Chrysler in 1937, and by Ford in 1941. Union membership hit 1.5 million in the late 1970s, but a decline in the U.S. auto industry and opening of non-union plants in the South took its toll on membership.

Going forward, policymakers should not give any more assistance to the U.S. auto industry. The main reason for its decline is the lesser quality and competitiveness of its vehicles, and this is why the auto industry should not receive any more assistance from the American people. Without any further assistance from the American public, U.S. automakers and the UAW will be more likely to innovate and develop more reliable, more competitive cars for the global market. Moreover, instead of investing more federal monies on the auto industry, such monies could be better spent in other areas that would generate far greater growth for the U.S. economy such as health and science research, or large-scale infrastructure projects that millions of American citizens want.

It is common knowledge that the weak competitiveness of U.S. automakers helped bankrupt General Motors and the entire Detroit auto industry. U.S. auto manufacturers understandably want to preserve the stature to which they have become accustomed, but

that standard is not sustainable in a competitive economy in which many firms are struggling to make ends meet. The U.S. economy is in need of new growth sectors, and the auto industry has long been a sizable sector of the U.S. economy. However, its lesser product quality and lagging technological competitiveness in the global marketplace cast doubt on the industry's future. The poor performance of the U.S. automakers should remind policymakers that investing more federal monies into the auto industry is unwise. If policymakers care about making the U.S. economy as strong as possible, they should know that there are better investment opportunities than giving more financial support to the auto industry.

CAR Condition

WHO, OR WHAT, KILLED THE AUTO INDUSTRY? UNION GREED

The fate of the American auto industry is uncertain, and many citizens are wondering what will come of the industry over the course of the next few decades. The United Auto Workers (UAW) is the main union representing American auto workers. The UAW, founded in 1935 by automobile plant workers, currently represents workers at General Motors, Ford and Chrysler, along with workers in the aerospace and agriculture industries. Union membership hit 1.5 million in the late 1970s, but a decline in the U.S. auto industry and opening of non-union plants in the South took its toll on membership.

Going forward, policymakers should not give any more assistance to the auto industry. The main reason for its decline is the outrageous salaries of the UAW union workers, and this is why the auto industry does not deserve any more assistance from the American people. UAW workers earn $75 an hour in wages and benefits—almost triple the earnings of the average worker in the private sector. Detroit autoworkers have substantially more health, retirement, and paid time-off benefits than ordinary, working Americans. Behind this is the gold-plated benefits package guaranteed to UAW workers: total pay and benefits for a full-time UAW union worker averages about $140,000 a year—far more than the vast majority of hard-working Americans. The UAW union even has a $33-million lakeside resort and golf club in Onaway, Michigan. These are luxuries that most American workers could only dream of. Without any further assistance from the American public, U.S. automakers and the UAW will be more likely to innovate and develop more reliable, more competitive cars for the global market. Moreover, instead of investing more federal monies in the auto industry, such monies could be better spent in other areas that would generate far greater growth for the U.S. economy such as health and science research, or large-scale infrastructure projects that millions of American citizens want.

It is common knowledge that the lavish salaries of the UAW helped bankrupt General Motors and the entire Detroit auto industry, helping pull what was once America's greatest city into decay and poverty. UAW workers understandably want to preserve the luxuriant standard of living to which they have become accustomed, but that standard is not sustainable in a competitive economy in which ordinary American workers are struggling to make ends meet. Congress should not tax all Americans in order to maintain UAW workers' affluent lifestyles. The benefits that the UAW unions receive have been a major force driving the automakers'

current fiscal woes. Consequently, Congress should not force normal working Americans to pay for high wages and benefits for the wealthy UAW workers.

III. Teachers Union Experiment (MTurk Sample)

Control Condition

POTENTIAL SCHOOL STRIKE IN WHITE OAKS? TEACHERS UNION AND SCHOOL DISTRICT ADMINSTRATORS UNABLE TO COME TO AGREEMENT

A teachers union strike in White Oaks school district is looking likelier as union members have been unable reach an agreement with the school district's leadership and local mayor's office. A variety of issues are on the table, chief among them the issue of salary and benefits. Administrators considered a 4 percent pay raise to teachers last year but dropped that to 2 percent a year for four years. Because the teachers union disagrees with this and several other of the administration's demands, it has announced that it plans to strike in the coming month unless an adequate compromise is reached.

The most recent data from the U.S. Census Bureau indicates that nearly thirty thousand people currently reside in the district of White Oaks, though this figure often fluctuates between seasons. The median age of White Oaks residents is 42.9 years, which is slightly higher than the median age across the entire state (41.8 years). The district is also balanced in terms of gender, with males outnumbering females by only one quarter of one percentage point. The White Oaks school district currently encompasses over ten
thousand households, which translates into thousands of children in the K-12 school age range. The district was originally founded in the early part of the 20th century as a private school system, but was eventually transformed into a public school district in the 1930s. This switch to a public school district increased the size of the student body to a considerable degree, particularly because the school district lines were redrawn so as to include hundreds of new households.

The White Oaks school district currently spans nearly thirty-five square miles, and includes nine elementary schools, three middle schools, and two high schools. The White Oaks district colors were originally red and white, but were later changed to red and blue and have remained so up until the present day. Both of the White Oaks high schools have football, basketball, baseball and soccer teams, and both are within close proximity to two of the state's major universities. In early 2006, the district launched the official website for the White Oaks school district, which, in addition to serving other functions, informs parents and White Oaks residents of upcoming events, the school newsletter, school closing information in the event of inclement weather, and faculty and staff contact information.

Opposition Condition

POTENTIAL SCHOOL STRIKE IN WHITE OAKS? TEACHERS UNION WON'T COME TO AGREEMENT WITH SCHOOL DISTRICT ADMINSTRATORS

A teachers union strike in White Oaks school district is looking likelier as union members have been unable reach an agreement with the school district's leadership and local mayor's office. A variety of issues are on the table, chief among them the issue of salary and benefits. Administrators considered a 4 percent pay raise to teachers last year but dropped that to 2 percent a year for four years. Because the teachers union disagrees with this and several other of the administration's demands, it has announced that it plans to strike in the coming month unless an adequate compromise is reached.

There is no good reason for the teachers to strike. The negotiation from the start involved the school administration offering a raise, but the teachers union has not shown enough willingness to compromise and are now planning to go on strike if they don't get what they want. The strike would keep thousands of children out of school for an indefinite amount of time, a disservice to them and to their education. Not to mention that, innumerable parents would be forced to take off of work in order to care for their children who would otherwise be in school. Such a disruption in work attendance has the potential to harm the local economy here in White Oaks. White Oaks school district currently encompasses over ten thousand households, which translates into thousands of children in the K-12 school age range. The White Oaks school district currently spans nearly thirty-five square miles, and includes nine elementary schools, three middle schools, and two high schools. The district was originally founded in the early part of the 20th century as a private school system, but was eventually transformed into a public school district in the 1930s. This switch to a public school district increased the size of the student body to a considerable degree, particularly because the school district lines were redrawn so as to include hundreds of new households.

Citizens, families, and local organizations should oppose this strike. What citizens of White Oaks really need is for their money to spent on improving existing schools with better equipment and facilities, not raises for teachers. City officials shouldn't bow to the teachers union workers' demands; rather, standing firm against the public-sector unions could help these leaders in the eyes of citizens in White Oaks and nationwide. School district officials in White Oaks should stand up for parents and children who depend on the schools being open — and, incidentally, pay for teachers' salaries and benefits. Elected officials and the people of White Oaks should stand together in opposing the teachers union's demands.

CAR Condition

POTENTIAL SCHOOL STRIKE IN WHITE OAKS? OVERPAID TEACHERS UNION DEMANDS EVEN MORE MONEY

A teachers union strike in White Oaks school district is looking likelier as union members have been unable reach an agreement with the school district's leadership and local mayor's office. A variety of issues are on the table, chief among them the issue of salary and benefits. Administrators considered a 4 percent pay raise to teachers last year but dropped that to 2 percent a year for four years. Because the teachers union disagrees with this and several other of the

administration's demands, it has announced that it plans to strike in the coming month unless an adequate compromise is reached.

There is no good reason for the teachers to strike. White Oaks teachers are among the highest paid in the nation, and this is not because they work so hard: White Oaks has the shortest school year of any major city, which means these greedy union teachers are already working far fewer days per year than the typical working American. Moreover, median family income has fallen 7 percent since 2008, so most Americans would be delighted with an 8 percent raise over four years—not the White Oaks Teachers Union. The negotiation from the start involved the school administration offering a raise, while the teachers union asked for an even bigger raise and are planning to go on strike if they don't get what they want. There is not even a thought of cutting their compensation or basing it on performance—like so many of us ordinary workers often experience.

The strike would keep thousands of children out of school for an indefinite amount of time, a disservice to them and to their education. Not to mention that innumerable parents would be forced to take off of work in order to care for their children who would otherwise be in school. Such a disruption in work attendance has the potential to harm the local economy here in White Oaks. Citizens, families, and local organizations should oppose this strike. These teachers already take home nearly $30,000 per year more than the average, hardworking White Oaks family. This strike is not about giving our kids a great education; it's about greedy union teachers, who are paid an average of $71,000 per year plus gold-plated health care packages, wanting even more money. At the same time, thousands of hardworking families struggle to scrape by and, now, also have to worry about whether their children will have a school to go to next month. What citizens of White Oaks really need is for their money to spent on improving existing schools with better equipment and facilities, not raises for rich teachers.

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX B
Bibliographies Containing Experiment Source Materials
and Real-World Examples of Class-Based Anti-Union Rhetoric (CAR)

I. Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) Union Workers

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SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX C
Question Wording and Variable Measurement

EDUCATION
Respondents were asked, "What level of education have you achieved?" Response options ranged from 1= "Less than High School" to 5 = "MD, PhD, JD or other higher degree".

INCOME
Respondents were asked: "What is your annual income range?" Response options ranged from 1= "Below $20,000" to 9= "$90,000 or more".

AGE
Respondents were asked the following question: "What is your age?" Respondents then entered their age manually.

GENDER
Respondents were asked the following question: "What is your gender?" This variable is coded "1" for respondents who selected the "Male" response option, and "0" for respondents who responded the "Female" response option.

RACE
Respondents were asked to select the racial category that best describes them. From this variable, we created dummy variables for African Americans (Black) and Hispanics (Hispanic), treating the remaining respondents as the excluded category.

PARTY ID
Respondents were asked, "Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a(n):". Response options ranged from 1= "Strong Democrat" to 7= "Strong Republican".

UNION MEMBERSHIP
Respondents were asked the following question: "Do you belong to, or have you ever belonged to, a labor union?" Respondents who indicated either being a "Current Member" or a "Past Member" were coded as "1"; respondents who indicated having never belonged to a labor union were coded as "0".

CITIZENSHIP
Respondents were asked: "Are you a U.S. citizen?" Respondents who selected "Yes" were coded "1"; respondents who selected "No" were coded "0". Non-citizens were excluded from the analyses.

WORKER IDENTITY
We measured Worker ID using two items. The first item asked, "Of the things that are important to who you are, how important is it to you to think of yourself as a working person?" The response options were: 1 = "Not Important At All", 2= "Slightly Important", 3= "Very Important". The second item asked, "How strongly do you identify as a working person?" The response options were: 1="Not At All", 2="Not Strongly", 3="Somewhat Strongly", 4="Very

Strongly". Given their high correlation, these two items were combined to form a single additive scale, ranging from lowest Worker ID ("0") to highest Worker ID ("1").

SIMILARITY

To measure perceived similarity to target union workers, respondents were asked, "How similar or dissimilar do you believe you are to the average [target union] worker? Response options ranged from 1= "Very Dissimilar" to 4= "Very Similar".

DESERVINGNESS

To measure the extent to which union workers are perceived as deserving of public support, respondents were asked the following question: "To what extent do you agree with the following statement: Union workers deserve the support of other working Americans in their struggles for improved wages, benefits, and work conditions." Response options ranged from 1= "Strongly Disagree" to 4= "Strongly Agree".

POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR UNIONS

We measured political support for unions using two separate survey questions.

The first question captured whether or not respondents believed laws should allow workers to strike. Respondents were asked, "Presently in the United States, several states have adopted laws that prohibit workers from going on strike, while other states allow workers to strike. In your opinion, do you think states laws should allow workers to strike or prohibit workers from striking?" The response options were "Prohibit workers from going on strike" (coded "0") and "Allow workers to strike" (coded "1").

The second question captured the extent to which respondents believed it is important that laws enable workers to engage in collective bargaining. Respondents were asked, "In your opinion, how important is it to have strong laws that give workers the right to form and join unions in their workplace?" Response options ranged from 1="Not that important" to 4="Very Important".

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX D
Auxiliary Results Tables

Table D1. Effect of Experimental Treatments on Solidarity with Union Workers—MTurk Survey Experiments

	LIRR Experiment		UAW Experiment		Teachers Experiment			
	Similarity		*Deservingness*		*Similarity*		*Deservingness*	
Treatments								
Opposition	-.106	(.205)	-.292^	(.222)	-.071	(.204)	-.568**	(.214)
CAR	-1.17***	(.212)	-.972***	(.226)	-1.36***	(.214)	-.795***	(.215)
Controls								
Education	.332	(.491)	.832^	(.517)	.376	(.482)	-.279	(.488)
Income	-.296	(.302)	-.989**	(.333)	.412^	(.304)	-.467^	(.313)
Age	-.006	(.007)	-.016*	(.007)	.012*	(.007)	-.005	(.007)
Male	-.280^	(.175)	-.169	(.187)	.009	(.170)	-.400*	(.174)
Black	.443^	(.328)	.616*	(.325)	.000	(.294)	-.128	(.301)
Hispanic	-.146	(.399)	.611^	(.432)	.214	(.432)	.399	(.444)
Party ID	-1.56***	(.355)	-2.13***	(.351)	-1.89***	(.332)	-2.78***	(.353)
Union Membership	.787***	(.245)	.289	(.233)	.586**	(.218)	.526*	(.227)
Thresholds								
Cut 1	-2.01	(.396)	-4.44	(.473)	-1.36	(.385)	-4.91	(.450)
Cut 2	-.374	(.384)	-2.76	(.432)	.077	(.379)	-2.96	(.405)
Cut 3	2.39	(.441)	-.030	(.411)	2.60	(.416)	-.187	(.383)
N	493		455		503		503	

Notes: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from ordered logistic regression models, standard errors are in parentheses.
^p<..10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Based upon one-tailed hypothesis tests.

Table D2. Analysis of Main Treatment Effects by Partisanship and Political Interest—MTurk Survey Experiments

LIRR Experiment

(DV = *Similarity*)

	Democrats		*Republicans*		*Low-Interest*		*High Interest*	
Treatments								
Opposition	-.194	(.285)	-.003	(.446)	-.212	(.257)	.293	(.364)
CAR	-1.48***	(.294)	-1.35**	(.488)	-1.029	(.263)	-1.36***	(.380)
Controls								
Education	.468	(.679)	-.355	(1.20)	.496	(.682)	.306	(.721)
Income	-.900*	(.444)	-.366	(.632)	.037	(.383)	-.822^	(.522)
Age	.006	(.010)	-.021^	(.015)	-.010	(.010)	-.001	(.012)
Male	-.282	(.241)	-.379	(.396)	-.402*	(.213)	-.044	(.320)
Black	.240	(.387)	1.53^	(1.10)	.632^	(.399)	.085	(.618)
Hispanic	.033	(.539)	.967	(1.50)	.120	(.513)	-.646	(.687)
Party ID					-1.38**	(.465)	-2.02***	(.582)
Union Membership	.925**	(.370)	1.13*	(.516)	.744**	(.299)	.821*	(.445)
Thresholds								
Cut 1	-1.47	(.503)	-1.70	(.842)	-2.04	(.522)	-1.85	(.648)
Cut 2	-.051	(.491)	.133	(.824)	-.280	(.509)	-.434	(.625)
Cut 3	2.97	(.561)	2.93	(1.08)	3.29	(.665)	1.63	(.666)
N	262		110		327		166	

Notes: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from ordered logistic regression models, standard errors are in parentheses. *Democrats* / *Republicans* are respondents who placed themselves as either "Strong Democrat/Republican" "Democrat/Republican" or "Democrat-leaner/Republican-leaner". *Low* (*High*) *Interest* respondents are those scoring below (above) the mean value of political interest.

^p<..10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Based upon one-tailed hypothesis tests.

Table D2 (Continued)

	UAW Experiment (DV = *Deservingness*)			
	Democrats	*Republicans*	*Low-Interest*	*High Interest*
Treatments				
Opposition	-.227 (.314)	-.611^ (.450)	-.347 (.309)	-.336 (.332)
CAR	-.944** (.328)	-1.86*** (.474)	-1.05*** (.309)	-.921** (.349)
Controls				
Education	.751 (.754)	.893 (1.01)	.677 (.787)	.866 (.705)
Income	-1.36** (.476)	-.626 (.637)	-1.02* (.473)	-.984* (.487)
Age	.003 (.010)	-.054*** (.014)	-.009 (.011)	-.018* (.009)
Male	.142 (.269)	-.147 (.364)	-.124 (.266)	-.131 (.294)
Black	.228 (.393)	2.71* (1.19)	.678^ (.436)	.542 (.513)
Hispanic	.883^ (.548)	.726 (1.09)	.666 (.583)	.383 (.684)
Party ID			-1.38** (.502)	-2.62*** (.518)
Union Membership	.101 (.315)	.244 (.491)	.446 (.318)	.149 (.362)
Thresholds				
Cut 1	-3.80 (.657)	-4.84 (.912)	-4.37 (.689)	-4.39 (.702)
Cut 2	-1.89 (.557)	-2.73 (.817)	-2.41 (.626)	-2.86 (.649)
Cut 3	1.10 (.544)	.248 (.817)	.778 (.608)	-.724 (.617)
N	238	124	267	188

Notes: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from ordered logistic regression models, standard errors are in parentheses. *Democrats* / *Republicans* are respondents who placed themselves as either "Strong Democrat/Republican" "Democrat/Republican" or "Democrat-leaner/Republican-leaner". *Low* (*High*) *Interest* respondents are those scoring below (above) the mean value of political interest.
^p<..10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Based upon one-tailed hypothesis tests.

Table D2 (Continued)

	Teachers Experiment (DV = *Similarity*)			
	Democrats	*Republicans*	*Low-Interest*	*High Interest*
Treatments				
Opposition	-.092 (.295)	-.571^ (.414)	.011 (.263)	-.213 (.339)
CAR	-1.29*** (.305)	-1.78*** (.450)	-1.30*** (.274)	-1.51*** (.360)
Controls				
Education	.231 (.684)	.569 (1.07)	.518 (.633)	.354 (.774)
Income	.192 (.454)	.924^ (.629)	.527^ (.398)	.365 (.501)
Age	.029** (.011)	.003 (.012)	.006 (.009)	.021* (.011)
Male	-.125 (.244)	.358 (.352)	-.042 (.220)	.119 (.283)
Black	.287 (.363)	-1.54 (1.32)	-.570^ (.429)	.518 (.420)
Hispanic	.492 (.540)	.890 (1.01)	.118 (.683)	.288 (.571)
Party ID			-1.95*** (.460)	-1.75*** (.487)
Union Membership	.733* (.309)	.374 (.482)	.547* (.288)	.556^ (.351)
Thresholds				
Cut 1	-.561 (.522)	-.034 (.729)	-1.55 (.515)	-.914 (.621)
Cut 2	1.02 (.519)	1.29 (.735)	-.111 (.504)	.550 (.617)
Cut 3	3.55 (.582)	5.36 (1.24)	2.79 (.573)	2.67 (.656)
N	250	136	314	189

Notes: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from ordered logistic regression models, standard errors are in parentheses. *Democrats* / *Republicans* are respondents who placed themselves as either "Strong Democrat/Republican" "Democrat/Republican" or "Democrat-leaner/Republican-leaner". *Low* (*High*) *Interest* respondents are those scoring below (above) the mean value of political interest.

^p<..10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Based upon one-tailed hypothesis tests.

Table D2 (Continued)

	Teachers Experiment (DV = *Deservingness*)			
	Democrats	*Republicans*	*Low-Interest*	*High Interest*
Treatments				
Opposition	-.980*** (.319)	-.256 (.410)	-.434 (.469)	-.650* (.348)
CAR	-1.04*** (.319)	-.480 (.414)	-.428 (.458)	-.525^ (.353)
Controls				
Education	.598 (.708)	-1.98* (1.04)	-.276 (1.06)	-.035 (.821)
Income	-.924* (.475)	-.139 (.608)	.660 (.683)	-.867* (.519)
Age	.003 (.010)	-.018^ (.012)	-.029* (.016)	-.002 (.011)
Male	-.328 (.259)	-.453^ (.334)	-.840* (.396)	-.196 (.285)
Black	-.043 (.377)	1.33 (1.27)	.481 (.624)	-.344 (.446)
Hispanic	.708 (.576)	.473 (1.01)	.121 (.968)	.462 (.618)
Party ID			-2.27** (.858)	-3.57*** (.537)
Union Membership	.616* (.315)	.700^ (.500)	.358 (.528)	.576^ (.355)
Thresholds				
Cut 1	-3.98 (.638)	-3.62 (.764)	-5.63 (1.02)	-4.62 (.719)
Cut 2	-1.95 (.553)	-1.75 (.704)	-3.20 (.888)	-3.12 (.668)
Cut 3	.920 (.537)	.779 (.742)	-.032 (.842)	-.526 (.626)
N	250	136	128	189

Notes: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from ordered logistic regression models, standard errors are in parentheses. *Democrats* / *Republicans* are respondents who placed themselves as either "Strong Democrat/Republican" "Democrat/Republican" or "Democrat-leaner/Republican-leaner". *Low* (*High*) *Interest* respondents are those scoring below (above) the mean value of political interest.

^p<..10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Based upon one-tailed hypothesis tests.

Table D3. Moderated Effect of CAR on Solidarity with Union Workers—MTurk Survey Experiments

	LIRR Experiment		UAW Experiment		Teachers Experiment			
	Similarity		*Deservingness*		*Similarity*		*Deservingness*	
Treatments								
Opposition	-.303	(.527)	-.657	(.564)	-.050	(.550)	-.049	(.556)
CAR	-.227	(.502)	-.146	(.545)	-.556	(.538)	-.071	(.553)
Moderator								
Worker ID	.958*	(.532)	.053	(.520)	.427	(.489)	.629^	(.492)
Interaction								
Opposition × Worker ID	.286	(.765)	.539	(.781)	-.049	(.741)	-.764	(.745)
CAR × Worker ID	-1.51*	(.723)	-1.24*	(.753)	-1.18*	(.729)	-1.07^	(.746)
Controls								
Education	.361	(.492)	.789^	(.520)	.355	(.483)	-.316	(.490)
Income	-.295	(.308)	-1.06***	(.338)	.414^	(.307)	-.443^	(.315)
Age	-.006	(.007)	-.015*	(.007)	.012*	(.007)	-.005	(.007)
Male	-.250^	(.177)	-.178	(.188)	-.011	(.171)	-.429**	(.176)
Black	.504^	(.332)	.651*	(.327)	-.027	(.297)	-.145	(.303)
Hispanic	-.117	(.401)	.662^	(.436)	.218	(.432)	.422	(.446)
Party ID	-1.62***	(.357)	-2.17***	(.353)	-1.90***	(.332)	-2.76***	(.354)
Union Membership	.796***	(.248)	.288	(.235)	.566**	(.219)	.504*	(.228)
Thresholds								
Cut 1	-1.41	(.526)	-4.45	(.562)	-1.11	(.495)	-4.52	(.543)
Cut 2	.239	(.520)	-2.75	(.527)	.334	(.491)	-2.57	(.508)
Cut 3	3.04	(.572)	.001	(.511)	2.86	(.523)	.212	(.496)
N	493		455		503		503	
Effect Size								
Δ in Pr (Y= Sim/Des) due to Control→CAR								
-Worker ID @ min value	-.041		-.023		-.124		-.014	
-Worker ID @ max value	-.343		-.290		-.364		-.231	

Notes: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from ordered logistic regression models, standard errors are in parentheses.
^p<..10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Based upon one-tailed hypothesis tests.

Table D4. Re-estimation of Models in Table D3 including Additional Controlled Interactions—MTurk Survey Experiments

	LIRR Experiment		UAW Experiment		Teachers Experiment			
	Similarity		*Deservingness*		*Similarity*		*Deservingness*	
Treatments								
Opposition	-.162	(.633)	-.485	(.663)	.274	(.663)	-.383	(.669)
CAR	-.498	(.597)	.393	(.677)	-.186	(.673)	.239	(.688)
Moderator								
Worker ID	.978*	(.536)	.037	(.522)	.473	(.491)	.600	(.495)
Interactions								
Opposition × Worker ID	.427	(.776)	.527	(.795)	-.054	(.746)	-.896	(.753)
CAR × Worker ID	-1.90***	(.740)	-1.27*	(.754)	-1.22*	(.735)	-.912	(.750)
Controls								
Education	.256	(.495)	.812^	(.522)	.332	(.486)	-.322	(.494)
Income	-.245	(.522)	-.818^	(.551)	.887*	(.511)	.203	(.529)
Age	-.006	(.007)	-.015*	(.007)	.013*	(.007)	-.003	(.007)
Male	-.257^	(.178)	-.201	(.190)	.003	(.172)	-.388*	(.177)
Black	.483^	(.333)	.652*	(.328)	-.030	(.297)	-.203	(.304)
Hispanic	-.143	(.405)	.682^	(.437)	.233	(.435)	.346	(.449)
Party ID	-1.87***	(.576)	-1.77***	(.602)	-1.74***	(.540)	-3.28***	(.579)
Union Membership	.783***	(.248)	.274	(.235)	.557***	(.220)	.531*	(.230)
Controlled Interactions								
Opposition × Income	-1.10^	(.717)	-.178	(.775)	-.641	(.721)	.177	(.756)
CAR × Income	1.10^	(.730)	-.516	(.781)	-.836	(.745)	-2.08**	(.750)
Opposition × Party ID	.265	(.847)	-.263	(.815)	-.320	(.771)	.866	(.790)
CAR × Party ID	.417	(.833)	-.872	(.823)	-.218	(.790)	.607	(.794)
Thresholds								
Cut 1	-1.57	(.559)	-4.25	(.601)	-.853	(.546)	-4.52	(.594)
Cut 2	.113	(.553)	-2.52	(.572)	.595	(.543)	-2.53	(.565)
Cut 3	2.94	(.599)	.222	(.557)	3.13	(.573)	.296	(.551)
N	493		455		503		503	

Notes: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from ordered logistic regression models, standard errors are in parentheses.
^p<..10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Based upon one-tailed hypothesis tests.

Table D5. Effect of Experimental Treatments on Solidarity with Union Workers—Qualtrics Survey Experiments

	LIRR Experiment			
	Similarity		*Deservingness*	
Treatments				
Opposition	-.140	(.198)	.001	(.205)
CAR	-1.05***	(.208)	-.783***	(.211)
Controls				
Education	-.130	(.467)	-.502	(.481)
Income	.563*	(.302)	-.231	(.308)
Age	-.017**	(.006)	-.008^	(.006)
Male	-.171	(.170)	-.261^	(.173)
Black	.233	(.268)	.229	(.270)
Hispanic	.702**	(.296)	.901**	(.316)
Party ID	-.561*	(.278)	-1.49***	(.290)
Union Membership	1.19***	(.192)	.881***	(.199)
Thresholds				
Cut 1	-1.51	(.368)	-3.96	(.420)
Cut 2	-.048	(.360)	-2.16	(.385)
Cut 3	2.23	(.393)	.442	(.374)
N	517		517	

Notes: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from ordered logistic regression models, standard errors are in parentheses.
^p<..10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Based upon one-tailed hypothesis tests.

Table D6. Analysis of Main Treatment Effects by Partisanship and Political Interest—Qualtrics Survey Experiments

	LIRR Experiment (DV = *Similarity*)			
	Democrats	*Republicans*	*Low-Interest*	*High Interest*
Treatments				
Opposition	-.103 (.282)	-.072 (.357)	-.369^ (.277)	.104 (.290)
CAR	-1.10*** (.293)	-.672* (.379)	-1.33*** (.314)	-.901*** (.291)
Controls				
Education	-.472 (.638)	-.377 (.943)	-.340 (.689)	.030 (.653)
Income	.317 (.430)	1.09* (.577)	.720^ (.447)	.158 (.427)
Age	-.003 (.009)	-.021* (.010)	-.007 (.008)	-.035*** (.009)
Male	-.340^ (.246)	.086 (.301)	-.246 (.258)	-.219 (.238)
Black	.217 (.312)	-.176 (1.585)	-.278 (.391)	.507^ (.384)
Hispanic	.770* (.387)	.711 (.584)	.084 (.463)	.953** (.399)
Party ID			-.403 (.412)	-.523^ (.387)
Union Membership	1.02*** (.269)	1.34*** (.338)	.893*** (.283)	1.45*** (.272)
Thresholds				
Cut 1	-1.08 (.486)	-.722 (.629)	-1.23 (.506)	-2.56 (.602)
Cut 2	.343 (.480)	.726 (.627)	.242 (.499)	-.973 (.579)
Cut 3	2.47 (.524)	2.77 (.699)	2.83 (.585)	1.26 (.600)
N	258	169	260	257

Notes: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from ordered logistic regression models, standard errors are in parentheses. *Democrats* / *Republicans* are respondents who placed themselves as either "Strong Democrat/Republican" "Democrat/Republican" or "Democrat-leaner/Republican-leaner". *Low* (*High*) *Interest* respondents are those scoring below (above) the mean value of political interest.

^p<..10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Based upon one-tailed hypothesis tests.

Table D6. (Continued)

	LIRR Experiment (DV = *Deservingness*)			
	Democrats	*Republicans*	*Low-Interest*	*High Interest*
Treatments				
Opposition	.180 (.298)	-.059 (.351)	.104 (.286)	-.089 (.300)
CAR	-.772** (.308)	-.976** (.366)	-.971*** (.314)	-.627* (.293)
Controls				
Education	-.823 (.669)	-.730 (.933)	-.209 (.686)	-.794 (.686)
Income	-.119 (.450)	-.090 (.561)	-.165 (.454)	-.379 (.439)
Age	.006 (.009)	-.014^ (.009)	-.012^ (.008)	-.008 (.009)
Male	-.410^ (.254)	-.030 (.294)	-.122 (.260)	-.347^ (.245)
Black	.285 (.316)	-1.55 (1.643)	-.047 (.384)	.292 (.400)
Hispanic	1.14** (.428)	.184 (.606)	.987* (.487)	.783* (.426)
Party ID			-1.59*** (.432)	-1.54*** (.405)
Union Membership	1.06*** (.289)	.837** (.337)	.534* (.294)	1.19*** (.279)
Thresholds				
Cut 1	-3.14 (.581)	-2.95 (.655)	-3.92 (.579)	-4.36 (.662)
Cut 2	-1.35 (.525)	-1.14 (.619)	-2.22 (.534)	-2.42 (.609)
Cut 3	1.31 (.521)	1.04 (.627)	.352 (.514)	.263 (.592)
N	258	169	260	257

Notes: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from ordered logistic regression models, standard errors are in parentheses. *Democrats* / *Republicans* are respondents who placed themselves as either "Strong Democrat/Republican" "Democrat/Republican" or "Democrat-leaner/Republican-leaner". *Low* (*High*) *Interest* respondents are those scoring below (above) the mean value of political interest.

^p<..10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Based upon one-tailed hypothesis tests.

Table D7. Moderated Effect of CAR on Solidarity with Union Workers—Qualtrics Survey Experiments

	LIRR Experiment			
	Similarity		*Deservingness*	
Treatments				
Opposition	-.244	(.715)	1.29*	(.718)
CAR	-.530	(.726)	1.66*	(.721)
Moderator				
Worker ID	1.33*	(.579)	1.88***	(.592)
Interactions				
Opposition × Worker	.135	(.832)	-1.54*	(.837)
CAR × Worker ID	-.609	(.856)	-3.01***	(.858)
Controls				
Education	.000	(.472)	-.509	(.486)
Income	.463^	(.306)	-.280	(.312)
Age	-.016**	(.006)	-.007	(.006)
Male	-.154	(.171)	-.244^	(.174)
Black	.291	(.270)	.275	(.271)
Hispanic	.638*	(.299)	.893**	(.317)
Party ID	-.510*	(.280)	-1.48***	(.291)
Union Membership	1.18***	(.193)	.885***	(.199)
Thresholds				
Cut 1	-.331	(.621)	-2.40	(.646)
Cut 2	1.16	(.622)	-.564	(.631)
Cut 3	3.47	(.650)	2.09	(.638)
N	517		517	

Notes: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from ordered logistic regression models, standard errors are in parentheses.
^p<..10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Based upon one-tailed hypothesis tests.

Table D8. Re-estimation of Models in Table D5 including Additional Controlled Interactions—Qualtrics Survey Experiments

	LIRR Experiment			
	Similarity		*Deservingness*	
Treatments				
Opposition	-.303	(.822)	1.10^	(.831)
CAR	-.782	(.805)	1.34*	(.808)
Moderator				
Worker ID	1.33*	(.584)	2.02***	(.599)
Interactions				
Opposition × Worker	.126	(.837)	-1.72*	(.848)
CAR × Worker ID	-.611	(.857)	-3.22***	(.867)
Controls				
Education	-.033	(.478)	-.464	(.491)
Income	.469	(.448)	-.949	(.463)
Age	-.016*	(.006)	-.007	(.006)
Male	-.138	(.172)	-.214	(.175)
Black	.292	(.270)	.298	(.272)
Hispanic	.623*	(.300)	.913**	(.320)
Party ID	-.718^	(.477)	-1.34**	(.486)
Union Membership	1.18***	(.193)	.903***	(.199)
Controlled Interactions				
Opposition × Income	.102	(.563)	.915^	(.583)
CAR × Income	-.055	(.565)	1.07*	(.576)
Opposition × Party ID	.045	(.647)	-.253	(.657)
CAR × Party ID	.662	(.682)	-.074	(.678)
Thresholds				
Cut 1	-.454	(.646)	-2.51	(.678)
Cut 2	1.04	(.646)	-.675	(.664)
Cut 3	3.36	(.673)	2.00	(.668)
N				

Notes: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from ordered logistic regression models, standard errors are in parentheses.
^p<..10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Based upon one-tailed hypothesis tests.

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX E
Manipulation Checks & Placebo Tests

TABLE E1. Manipulation Check and Placebo Test Results from Follow-up MTurk Experiment

	LIRR Union Experiment			UAW Experiment			Teachers Union Experiment		
	Opposition	*CAR*	*Diff.*	*Opposition*	*CAR*	*Diff.*	*Opposition*	*CAR*	*Diff.*
Manipulation Checks									
Article made you think about your own job/salary	2.28	2.84	.56**	2.24	2.84	.60***	2.26	2.73	.47**
Article made you think about people's economic class	2.83	3.22	.38*	2.78	3.22	.44**	2.84	3.05	.21
Placebo Tests									
Article was informative	3.18	3.22	.13	3.12	3.32	.20	3.08	3.05	-.03
Article was detailed	3.06	3.27	.21	3.07	3.27	.20	3.01	3.10	.09

Notes: Table reports means for each item across the "Opposition" and "CAR" treatment conditions. For manipulation checks, response options ranged from "Not at all" (1) to "Very much" (5); for placebo tests, response options ranged from "Not at all" (1) to "Extremely" (5). Approximately 100 respondents in each condition; total N=600. *=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***=p<.001 (two-tailed tests).