Supplementary Material

This supplement presents additional analyses to ensure that our results are robust to alternative coding rules for the key independent variables and various model specifications. It also presents a secondary analysis designed to test the underlying causal mechanism in the paper's theoretical argument. As we describe below, the findings presented in this section are nearly identical to our main results, indicating that our findings are robust to how we operationalize our models. We also find support for our causal mechanism.

Table S1: Identifying Sincere Ratifiers

While we treat ratification of humanitarian law as a signal that third party states care about civilian protection during war, we recognize that not all states ratify with sincere intentions. Therefore, we estimate two additional robustness checks here that attempt to better identify the set of third party states that truly care about civilian protection during war. First, we estimate a model that conditions our network variables on Western European and similar states, as we assume these states are more likely to have ratified with sincere intentions. We use two different coding rules to operationalize this variable. First, in the post-1945 period, we code states as "Western European" if they are members of the UN's Western European and Others group. Second, we follow Fazal and Greene (2015) for the pre-1945 period, coding states as "Western European" if they were in Western Europe or were regarded as part of the Western European community while also being original ratifiers of the relevant Conventions. Based on this, we recreate our network variables in the following way: for trade, we calculate total trade with trade partners who are both ratifiers and are coded as "Western European". This value is then divided by total trade with all trade partners. For the alliance measure, we calculate the total military capabilities for allied ratifiers who are also coded as "Western European", and divide by the total capabilities for the entire alliance network.

We report the results of this robustness check in Table S1, Model 1 below. The findings are consistent with the primary results: using these more stringent measures to identify sincere ratifiers, we continue to find that combatants kill significantly fewer civilians as the influence of sincere ratifiers within their trade and alliance networks increases.

As a second robustness check, we condition our network variables on the human rights practices of network members. Accounting for third parties' human rights records is a useful way to identify sincere ratifiers. However, we are only able to conduct this analysis for the post-45 period, as we know of no cross-national human rights data available pre-1945. We use Fariss' (2014) human rights data, which measures state repression while accounting for changes in reporting over time. The measure ranges from -3 to 4, with higher values indicating greater respect for human rights. To create our trade network variable, we calculate each combatant's total trade with trade partners who are both (1) ratifiers and (2) who fall in the top 20% on Fariss' human rights measure, and then divide by total trade with all partners. This ensures that we capture only states with the strongest human rights records in the variable's numerator.[1] For the alliance measure, total capabilities of allies who are (1) ratifiers and (2) fall in the top 20% on the Fariss measure is divided by total capabilities of all allies.

We report the results using these revised network variables in Table S1, Model 2 below. As the results demonstrate, both network variables remain negative and significant. Combatants kill fewer civilians as the influence of allies and trade partners who are both ratifiers and have strong human rights records increases.

[1] The results are consistent using several other cut points (i.e. top 10%, top 30%, etc.).

Table S1: Determinants of Civilian Killing in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003

	European Identity	Human Rights
European Alliance Network	**-1.826*** **(1.035)**	
European Trade Network	**-2.770**** **(1.390)**	
Human Rights Alliance Network		**-11.00**** **(5.123)**
Human Rights Trade Network		**-10.76**** **(4.428)**
Attrition	1.553* (0.842)	0.932 (1.640)
Counterinsurgency	2.922** (1.124)	3.214* (1.851)
War Aims	3.258*** (0.742)	3.414*** (1.236)
Duration	0.493* (0.285)	0.574 (0.416)
Relative Capabilities	2.961** (1.425)	-0.476 (2.693)
Adversary Population	0.419* (0.218)	-0.0737 (0.302)
Treaty Status	0.919 (1.013)	-2.612 (2.121)
Regime Type	1.237 (1.137)	4.317 (3.548)
Military Fatalities	0.396** (0.180)	0.331 (0.280)
Adversary Regime Type	1.046 (0.890)	-1.637 (1.100)
Major Power Ratifier Ally	1.740* (0.937)	2.733* (1.414)
Major Power Ratifier Trade Partner	0.621 (0.913)	-0.172 (1.164)
Distance	-1.637 (1.178)	-6.978** (2.586)

Trade	-0.112	0.219
	(0.129)	(0.291)
European Identity	0.763	5.825***
	(0.893)	(1.852)
Rule of Law		-6.141
		(5.495)
Constant	-11.70***	1.101
	(3.763)	(6.899)
Observations	148	57

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on war * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table S2: Homophily

It is possible that our empirical results reflect the fact that combatants who value civilian protection themselves may be more likely to trade and ally with third parties who also value civilian protection. This homophily-based argument provides an alternative explanation for our key findings. To address this, we include several new variables in the models that proxy this alternative logic. By controlling for similarities between the combatant state and its network members, we can better isolate the impact of the coercion mechanism proposed in the main text.

First, we include two variables coded 1 if the combatant is a democracy and the majority of its allies/trade partners are also democratic. Second, we include variables coded 1 if the combatant is European and a majority of its allies/trade partners are also European. The coding of this variable is based on the Fazal and Greene (2015) coding rules discussed above. Third, we include two variables coded 1 if the combatant and a majority of its allies/trade partners share the same legal system (civil law, common law, or Islamic law) based upon Mitchell and Powell (2011). Each of these measures helps identify how similar the combatant state is to its network members, particularly on characteristics (i.e. democracy, identity, and legal system) that are likely to impact their views towards noncombatant targeting. We report the results in Table S2. Our key network variables remain significant, negative predictors of civilian targeting, even after controlling for the combatant's similarity to its network members. The homophily variables fail to produce consistent results. This suggests that our key variables are not simply picking up a homophily effect, and that our coercion mechanism is likely driving our empirical findings.

Table S2: Determinants of Civilian Killing in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003

	Co-Democracy Controls	Co-European Controls	Same Legal System Controls
Alliance Network	**-1.655****	**-1.750****	**-1.711****
	(0.828)	**(0.828)**	**(0.812)**
Trade Network	**-2.637****	**-2.483***	**-2.617****
	(1.322)	**(1.290)**	**(1.283)**

Attrition	1.626*	1.587*	1.642*
	(0.865)	(0.852)	(0.868)
Counterinsurgency	2.954**	3.040**	3.022**
	(1.221)	(1.247)	(1.230)
War Aims	3.158***	3.400***	3.302***
	(0.825)	(0.829)	(0.824)
Duration	0.451	0.479*	0.484*
	(0.276)	(0.267)	(0.271)
Relative Capabilities	2.893**	2.893*	3.107**
	(1.447)	(1.505)	(1.465)
Adversary Population	0.436**	0.444**	0.481**
	(0.213)	(0.219)	(0.221)
Treaty Status	0.974	0.955	0.767
	(1.012)	(1.006)	(1.048)
Regime Type	1.288	1.314	1.252
	(1.114)	(1.149)	(1.123)
Military Fatalities	0.348*	0.304*	0.333*
	(0.190)	(0.182)	(0.188)
Adversary Regime Type	1.229	1.392	1.189
	(0.868)	(0.906)	(0.913)
Major Power Ratifier Ally	1.288	1.102	1.081
	(0.911)	(0.922)	(0.888)
Major Power Ratifier Trade Partner	0.478	0.498	0.531
	(0.899)	(0.912)	(0.912)
Distance	-1.982*	-2.229**	-1.954*
	(1.106)	(1.057)	(1.063)
Trade	0.101	0.108	0.0806
	(0.151)	(0.144)	(0.146)
European Identity	0.857	0.555	0.497
	(1.015)	(0.990)	(0.997)
Co-Democracy w/ Allies	0.886		
	(1.153)		
Co-Democracy w/ Trade Partners	-0.396		
	(1.081)		
Co-European w/ Allies		0.533	

		(0.946)	
Co-European w/ Trade Partners		0.704 (1.133)	
Same Legal System as Allies			0.868 (0.905)
Same Legal System as Trade Partners			0.314 (1.020)
Constant	-11.73*** (3.589)	-11.77*** (3.817)	-12.40*** (3.792)
Observations	148	148	148

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on war, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table S3: Wars with potential to escalate

In the main text, we controlled for whether the combatant has an ally or trade partner that is a major power ratifier. We do this to account for the alternative explanation that the self-interests of major powers explain the statistical findings rather than normative considerations. Specifically, major powers may force war combatants to refrain from targeting civilians because they do not want the war to escalate and draw them into the fight.[2] We estimate several robustness checks to further address this alternative logic.

First, we rerun our analysis on a subsample of wars in which the combatant does not have major power ratifier allies or trade partners. This is a useful robustness check because it excludes potentially cofounding cases from the analysis. The results for this test are reported in Table S3, Model 1. As expected the two key network variables are still negative and statistically significant even among the restricted universe of cases.

Second, we estimate the model on a subset of cases that only includes high-casualty wars. This addresses the related possibility that our results are simply picking up on minor power wars that have low fatalities because major power allies/trade partners are preventing escalation. As reported in Table S3, Model 2, the key network variables are still negative and statistically significant using this sample of cases.

Third, we regress war duration and the number of actors on the network variables to address this concern. If the network variables are simply picking up major power interests in limiting difficult wars, they should also be associated with a decrease in other factors that proxy severe wars, such as the number of war participants and long duration. Put differently, if this alternative logic is correct, states with high-influence ratifiers in their respective networks should be less likely to participate in wars with several war participants and long wars because their powerful network members will force them to avoid escalation, as escalation represents a threat to major power interests. As reported in Table S3, Models 3 and 4, there is no consistent relationship between these different proxies for major powers' incentives to avoid escalation and our network variables.

[2] In Table S6 below, we also control for whether the *adversary* has any major power allies or trade partners. This allows us to further address the possibility that states avoid civilian targeting in order to avoid drawing a powerful state into the fight against them.

This suggests that the network variables are not simply proxies for major powers interests, as we would expect to find significant findings if they served in this capacity.

Fourth, we replace the major power ratifier variables with measures of just major powers. This provides a different way to assess the alternative logic that the self-interests of major powers are driving the results. As expected, both network variables are negative and significant even when we use different rules to code major powers (Table S3, Model 5).

Table S3: Determinants of Civilian Killing in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003

	No Major Powers Ratifiers	High Casualty Wars	Duration DV	Actors DV	Major Powers
Alliance Network	**-2.293****	**-3.194***	**1.039*****	**-0.377**	**-1.471***
	(1.042)	**(1.567)**	**(0.387)**	**(0.270)**	**(0.802)**
Trade Network	**-2.090***	**-4.888***	**-1.119****	**-0.371**	**-2.645****
	(1.236)	**(2.464)**	**(0.471)**	**(0.414)**	**(1.235)**
Attrition	2.226**	3.629	0.758*	0.746**	1.591*
	(1.053)	(2.726)	(0.390)	(0.315)	(0.834)
Counterinsurgency	1.373	4.907	0.567	1.687***	2.952**
	(1.404)	(4.892)	(0.728)	(0.398)	(1.153)
War Aims	3.963***	1.737	0.115	-0.00284	3.327***
	(1.179)	(1.301)	(0.385)	(0.312)	(0.781)
Duration	0.543	0.826		0.630***	0.505*
	(0.358)	(0.531)		(0.120)	(0.259)
Relative Capabilities	2.402	3.509	0.190	0.292	2.735*
	(1.863)	(4.366)	(0.727)	(0.423)	(1.429)
Adversary Population	0.502**	1.875**	0.165	-0.0172	0.350
	(0.251)	(0.740)	(0.116)	(0.0785)	(0.214)
Treaty Status	0.0981	0.0194	1.315***	-0.627*	1.059
	(1.236)	(2.417)	(0.388)	(0.338)	(0.991)
Regime Type	1.685	1.446	-0.347	-0.108	1.456
	(1.081)	(2.287)	(0.439)	(0.445)	(1.060)
Military Fatalities	0.254		0.341*	0.361***	0.355*
	(0.249)		(0.168)	(0.0720)	(0.187)
Adversary Regime Type	1.520	3.203	0.202	-0.0660	1.421
	(1.165)	(1.949)	(0.413)	(0.359)	(0.864)
Major Power		0.640	-0.0141	-0.400	

Ratifier Ally		(2.116)	(0.423)	(0.346)	
Major Power Ratifier Trade Partner		0.896 (1.398)	0.110 (0.452)	0.194 (0.359)	
Distance	-1.768 (1.288)	-3.168* (1.704)	0.140 (0.503)	0.564 (0.551)	-1.902* (0.972)
Trade	0.242 (0.146)	0.315 (0.535)	0.00172 (0.0667)	0.0527 (0.0525)	-0.0303 (0.147)
European Identity	1.961* (1.133)	2.176 (2.115)	-0.844* (0.462)	-0.267 (0.355)	0.815 (0.963)
Civilian Targeting			0.0741* (0.0415)	0.0624* (0.0370)	
Major Power Ally					1.437* (0.817)
Major Power Trade Partners					1.188 (1.079)
Constant	-12.96*** (4.434)	-36.11** (14.03)	1.432 (2.157)	1.810 (1.457)	-10.59*** (3.813)
Observations	98	38	148	148	148

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on war * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table S4: Interaction Terms

In Table S4 (Model 1) below, we interact our key network variables with the treaty status of the combatant to ensure that our results are not dependent upon whether the war participant ratified the relevant treaties. The interaction terms are not significant, which suggests that the impact of third party ratifiers is not conditional on whether the combatant state itself ratified the relevant treaty. Thus, our unconditional argument on the indirect impact of the law holds: third party ratifiers are able to influence the behavior of their alliance/trade partners, even if those partners have not themselves ratified the relevant treaties.

In Table S4 (Model 2), we also interact our two key network variables with the relative military capabilities of each combatant. We estimate this robustness check because the combatant's relative military strength may also affect the network's ability to influence combatant behavior: stronger combatants may be less reliant on third parties for military success. The interaction terms are not significant, indicating that the influence of our key variables is not conditional on the military capabilities of the combatant.

Table S4: Determinants of Civilian Killing in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003

	Treaty Status	Relative Military Capabilities
Alliance Ratifier Network	-2.749**	0.158
	(1.127)	(1.561)
Treaty Status	1.410	0.945
	(1.657)	(1.021)
Treaty Status*Alliance Ratifier Network	**1.450**	
	(1.577)	
Trade Ratifier Network	-1.205	-3.249
	(1.568)	(2.201)
Treaty Status*Trade Ratifier Network	**-1.953**	
	(1.833)	
Attrition	1.662*	1.652*
	(0.864)	(0.880)
Counterinsurgency	3.161**	2.833**
	(1.370)	(1.325)
War Aims	3.047***	3.107***
	(0.802)	(0.825)
Duration	0.464	0.475*
	(0.283)	(0.280)
Relative Capabilities	2.745*	4.157*
	(1.417)	(2.437)
Adversary Population	0.387*	0.397*
	(0.218)	(0.215)
Regime Type	0.927	1.147
	(1.125)	(1.159)
Military Fatalities	0.316	0.323*
	(0.193)	(0.185)
Adversary Regime Type	1.293	1.375
	(0.855)	(0.857)
Major Power Ratifier Ally	0.999	1.136
	(0.895)	(0.892)
Major Power Ratifier Trade Partner	0.482	0.604
	(0.919)	(0.920)
Distance	-1.949*	-2.035*
	(1.077)	(1.099)

Trade	0.109	0.102
	(0.152)	(0.148)
European Identity	0.638	0.707
	(0.994)	(0.939)
Alliance Ratifier Network*Relative Capabilities		**-3.647**
		(2.631)
Trade Ratifier Network*Relative Capabilities		**1.112**
		(2.868)
Constant	-10.61***	-11.38***
	(3.700)	(3.828)
Observations	148	148

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on war * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table S5: Dropping coalitions, Dropping cases

In Table S5, we estimate several models that use alternative case selection criteria and alternative strategies to deal with non-independence across cases. In the first model, we drop all wars with multiple states on one side (i.e. coalitions). As reported in Table S5 (Model 1), our key network variables remain negative and statistically significant. Second, we include a new variable in the model that controls for the number of states on each side as an alternative way to address the influence of coalition cases (Table S5, Model 2). Once again, the results are consistent with those in the main text when we do this.

There may be some concern that the errors terms across combatants from the same war are not independent. We cluster our standard errors in the main text to account for this. Here, we run another robustness check. Specifically, we follow existing research (Bennett and Stam 1998; Stam 1996) by randomly dropping all but one observation from each war in the dataset and rerunning our analysis on the resulting subsample of combatants. This test ensures that the results are not dependent upon the inclusion of observations for which the dependent variables (and the error terms) are not clearly independent. The results for this robustness check are consistent with those in the main text (Table S5, Model 3).

In another robustness check, we drop all of the occupation cases from the model. The Valentino et al. (2006) data that we rely on includes 12 post-war occupation cases. We exclude these cases from the sample in order to ensure that our results hold for interstate wars only. As Table S5 (Model 4) indicates, our results are robust to dropping occupations.

Table S5: Determinants of Civilian Killing in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003

	No Coalitions	Control for Coalitions	Random Cases	No Occupations
Alliance Network	**-1.504*** **(0.882)**	**-1.618*** **(0.824)**	**-2.141**** **(1.065)**	**-1.700*** **(0.893)**
Trade Network	**-2.636*** **(1.461)**	**-2.356*** **(1.305)**	**-3.970**** **(1.670)**	**-2.834**** **(1.312)**
Attrition	0.892 (0.961)	1.576* (0.899)	1.905* (1.084)	1.801** (0.862)
Counterinsurgency	2.876** (1.291)	3.053** (1.206)	3.347* (1.962)	4.771*** (1.415)
War Aims	3.130*** (0.828)	3.112*** (0.815)	2.316* (1.300)	3.264*** (0.828)
Duration	0.661** (0.291)	0.492* (0.277)	0.605* (0.310)	0.495* (0.280)
Relative Capabilities	2.184 (1.632)	2.538* (1.490)	1.947 (2.163)	2.967* (1.551)
Adversary Population	0.370 (0.224)	0.408* (0.212)	0.597* (0.314)	0.434* (0.229)
Treaty Status	1.417 (0.995)	0.848 (0.981)	0.771 (1.335)	0.730 (1.196)
Regime Type	1.682 (1.064)	1.120 (1.126)	0.700 (1.276)	1.274 (1.162)
Military Fatalities	0.204 (0.201)	0.320* (0.189)	0.384* (0.226)	0.277 (0.204)
Adversary Regime Type	1.355 (1.011)	1.165 (0.874)	1.749 (1.206)	1.268 (0.885)
Major Power Ratifier Ally	1.815* (1.044)	1.202 (0.910)	0.743 (1.241)	1.240 (0.937)
Major Power Ratifier Trade Partner	0.194 (0.985)	0.525 (0.919)	1.198 (1.054)	0.493 (0.965)
Distance	-2.060* (1.228)	-2.313** (1.099)	-1.374 (1.280)	-2.422** (1.115)
Trade	0.0329 (0.147)	0.0874 (0.148)	0.120 (0.190)	0.192 (0.165)

European Identity	0.228	0.830	1.180	0.439
	(1.075)	(0.939)	(1.822)	(1.003)
Actors		0.878		
		(1.248)		
Constant	-9.634**	-10.93***	-14.44***	-11.44***
	(3.770)	(3.614)	(5.176)	(3.896)
Observations	122	148	79	136

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on war. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table S6: Adding and dropping controls

Table S6 presents models with additional controls, as well as models with more parsimonious sets of controls. First, we add two variables: 1) post-45 dummy variable, and 2) US dummy variable. We create a post-45 dummy variable that equals 1 for wars that occurred after 1945 and zero for pre-1945. We include this variable because it is possible that general norms about protecting civilians in war may explain our results, rather than our specific argument on allies and trade partners. We also create a variable to account for the United States; the US is involved in many wars and has influential trade and alliance partners, as well as a stated commitment to the protection of civilians. Thus, we want to ensure that our results are robust even when controlling for this potentially influential case. In Table S6 (Model 1), we present the results with these additional controls. Both trade and alliance networks are robust to the inclusion of these additional variables.

Second, we include additional control variables to account for adversary characteristics. Specifically, we include controls for adversary strategy (attrition and counterinsurgency), and adversary war aims. As reported in Table S6 (Model 2), the results are consistent with those in the main text; our key network variables remain negative and statistically significant.

Third, we present a more parsimonious, baseline model in Table S6, Model 3. This robustness check shows that the results for our main variables of interest are consistent when only controls for the key alternative explanations are included. As reported below, our two key network variables are negative and statistically significant even with this more parsimonious model specification.

Fourth there may be concern that our strategic variables are partially co-determined with, or even caused by, civilian targeting, rather than the other way around. Targeting civilian populations, for example, may cause wars to develop into lengthy wars of attrition. While we cannot test this possibility directly because we lack time-varying information on civilian deaths and the adoption of these strategies, we drop attrition, counterinsurgency, and war duration from the models, and the results are consistent with those in the main text (Table S6, Model 4). These results suggest that our key findings are not sensitive to the inclusion of the strategic variables.

Finally, we control for whether the *adversary* has major power ratifier allies or trade partners. This addresses the possibility that combatants are dissuaded from targeting noncombatants not because their own network members (major power or otherwise) are pressuring them, but because they are worried about drawing their adversary's powerful supporters into the war to fight against them (this relates to the discussion from Table S3 above). As the results in Table S6 Model 5 demonstrate, the results for our key network variables hold when including these controls.

Table S6: Determinants of Civilian Killing in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003

	Additional Controls	Adversary Controls	Baseline Model	Drop Strategic Controls	Adversary Major Powers Controls
Alliance Network	**-1.673****	**-1.535***	**-1.689****	**-2.328*****	**-1.506***
	(0.833)	**(0.826)**	**(0.804)**	**(0.860)**	**(0.762)**
Trade Network	**-2.778****	**-2.490***	**-1.938***	**-2.932****	**-2.862****
	(1.395)	**(1.271)**	**(1.053)**	**(1.287)**	**(1.298)**
Attrition	1.744**	1.649**	1.522*		1.494*
	(0.875)	(0.780)	(0.860)		(0.808)
Counterinsurgency	2.925**	3.838**	2.921***		2.657**
	(1.205)	(1.793)	(1.077)		(1.252)
War Aims	3.184***	3.084***	3.033***		3.049***
	(0.819)	(0.797)	(0.795)		(0.840)
Duration	0.491*	0.388	0.407		0.396
	(0.276)	(0.319)	(0.262)		(0.269)
Relative Capabilities	2.772*	2.875*	2.873**	2.895*	1.344
	(1.458)	(1.597)	(1.198)	(1.527)	(1.468)
Adversary Population	0.412*	0.406*	0.454**	0.126	0.425*
	(0.223)	(0.218)	(0.217)	(0.205)	(0.224)
Treaty Status	0.876	1.016		-0.817	1.588
	(1.049)	(1.008)		(0.915)	(1.080)
Regime Type	1.201	1.038		0.548	1.636
	(1.294)	(1.136)		(1.084)	(1.162)
Military Fatalities	0.343*	0.290	0.399**	0.886***	0.412**
	(0.183)	(0.201)	(0.175)	(0.166)	(0.181)
Adversary Regime Type	1.118	1.201		0.880	0.821
	(1.007)	(0.872)		(0.883)	(0.857)
Major Power Ratifier Ally	1.106	1.162	1.305	1.205	1.619*
	(0.995)	(0.906)	(0.801)	(0.938)	(0.821)
Major Power Ratifier Trade Partner	0.608	0.645	0.895	0.513	0.429
	(0.942)	(0.884)	(0.906)	(1.091)	(0.994)
Distance	-1.749	-1.997*		-1.878*	-2.140**
	(1.156)	(1.084)		(1.081)	(1.070)

Trade	0.110	0.109		0.288**	0.0770
	(0.159)	(0.151)		(0.136)	(0.148)
European Identity	0.823	0.677		1.347	1.213
	(0.950)	(0.965)		(1.012)	(0.938)
Post-1945	0.317				
	(0.939)				
U.S.	-0.940				
	(1.403)				
Adversary Counterinsurgency		0.0260			
		(0.0376)			
Adversary Attrition		0.00695			
		(0.0112)			
Adversary War Aims		1.028			
		(0.742)			
Adversary Major Power Ratifier Ally					-2.131**
					(0.840)
Adversary Major Power Ratifier Trade Partner					0.435
					(.992)
Constant	-11.35***	-11.11***	-11.09***	-6.328*	-10.63***
	(3.772)	(3.867)	(3.772)	(3.628)	(3.839)
Observations	148	148	148	148	148

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on war * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table S7: New DV, Out of Network States

Table S7 includes alternative specifications of the DV and accounts for 'out of network' third parties. First, we recode our response variable to a categorical variable with four values. We do this to help account for any outliers, and as another robustness check based on model specification. This alternative response variable equals 0 when the combatant did not kill any civilians, equals 1 when it killed at least 1 civilian but less than or equal to 5,000, equals 2 when a participant targeted more than 5,000 but less than or equal to 50,000, and equals 3 when it killed more than 50,000 noncombatants. We use ordered probit to estimate the model given the ordered nature of the response variable. The findings clearly indicate that the alliance and trade network ratifier variables are both associated with less civilian targeting in wars (Table S7, Model 1).

Finally, we assess the impact of "out-of network" third parties, those who are not allies or trade partners with a given combatant. Our main analysis does not directly identify whether network members actually have a greater impact on combatant behavior than non-network third parties. By including measures of the strength

of ratifiers who are non-allies and non-trade partners, we can more directly assess whether existing network ties are necessary to provide the opportunity for third parties to influence combatant behavior during war.

To do this, we create two out-of-network variables: 1) non-allies, and 2) non-trade partners. Specifically, for the non-alliance variable, we first identify the set of all non-ally states for each war combatant. We then code whether the third party (i.e. non-ally) ratified the relevant treaty. Finally, we create a ratio of the military capabilities for all ratifier non-allies over the total military capabilities for all non-allies (ratifier and non-ratifier). We use the same procedure for the trade out-of-network variable, producing final variables that capture the power ratio of ratifier states to non-ratifier states that do not trade with the war combatant. Importantly, we weight the trade variable by military capabilities instead of trade here, since it is not possible to weight by trade for non-trading states. Thus, both out-of-network variables identify willing third parties who, according to our argument, do not have the opportunity to coerce. As such, we expect these variables to be unrelated to the intentional targeting of noncombatants, as one of our key conditions is absent.

The results for these variables are presented in Table S7, Model 2. As expected, both out-of-network variables are statistically insignificant, while both network variables remain significant in this analysis. These results clearly indicate that war participants kill fewer civilians only when third party states have both the opportunity and willingness to engage in coercion.

Table S7: Determinants of Civilian Killing in Interstate Wars, 1900-2003

	Four Category DV	Out of Network Controls
Alliance Network	**-0.682****	**-1.742****
	(0.285)	**(0.809)**
Trade Network	**-0.907****	**-2.578****
	(0.409)	**(1.279)**
Attrition	0.546**	1.657*
	(0.264)	(0.877)
Counterinsurgency	0.826**	2.872**
	(0.378)	(1.182)
War Aims	0.857***	3.241***
	(0.256)	(0.801)
Duration	0.135	0.516*
	(0.0904)	(0.276)
Relative Capabilities	0.855	2.957**
	(0.526)	(1.452)
Adversary Population	0.127*	0.443**
	(0.0688)	(0.221)
Treaty Status	0.461	0.739
	(0.301)	(1.055)
Regime Type	0.585*	0.922

	(0.331)	(1.092)
Military Fatalities	0.145**	0.310
	(0.0579)	(0.193)
Adversary Regime Type	0.505*	1.381
	(0.293)	(0.906)
Major Power Ratifier Ally	0.294	1.233
	(0.279)	(0.925)
Major Power Ratifier Trade Partner	0.244	0.584
	(0.316)	(0.925)
Distance	-0.927**	-2.390**
	(0.361)	(1.172)
Trade	0.0511	0.0767
	(0.0436)	(0.144)
European Identity	0.397	0.520
	(0.345)	(0.994)
Non-Ally Ratifier Strength		-3.357
		(3.978)
Non-Trade Partner Ratifier Strength		-0.509
		(1.363)
Constant		-9.156**
		(4.250)
Observations	148	148

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on war * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Cut-points omitted.

Table S8-S12: Secondary Analysis

This section examines the mechanism underlying the paper's theoretical argument by assessing whether third party ratifiers are actually more likely to punish combatants who kill civilians during conflict than third party non-ratifiers. We expect states who fail to curb violence toward civilian populations to suffer punishment at the hands of allies and trade partners who have ratified the Hague/Geneva/Protocols, as these states have demonstrated their normative commitment to the protection of civilian life during war through their ratification of the relevant legal conventions.[3] Evidence that third parties act when combatants fail to protect

[3] We acknowledge that, based on a game theoretic logic, one should never see punishment occur, as combatants will recognize the increased risk of punishment and will therefore alter their behavior, preventing the need for third parties to punish their allies or trade partners. Of course, there are likely to be several off-the-equilibrium path cases where combatants target civilians even after accounting for third party reactions.

civilians will lend additional support to the argument presented in the main text by providing evidence that the proposed mechanism is in fact at work.[4] To this end, we examine whether the number of civilians killed in conflict influences the duration of alliances or the volume of trade between combatants and their ratifier network partners.

We first examine how wartime behavior influences dyadic trade. Once again, we expect the number of noncombatants killed to significantly reduce dyadic trade between the combatant and ratifier trade partners, while we expect noncombatant deaths to have no significant effect on dyadic trade with non-ratifier states, as only the former will have incentives to punish combatants who target noncombatant populations during war. We test these expectations using directed dyad-year data. The response variable is the natural log of dyadic trade volume between states. We use ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors clustered on the dyad to test this argument. We use the following controls in the model: distance, dyadic military balance, joint democracy, major-minor power, major-major powers, war outcome, total population, and GDP.[5] See description of controls at the end of the supplement (page 26) for information on measurement of these variables. In an additional robustness check, we also control for WTO/GATT membership in order to ensure that our model is consistent with existing models predicting trade flows. We cannot include this variable in the main model because it is relevant only after the establishment of the GATT in 1948.

We then assess the relationship between noncombatants targeted in war and the duration of alliances. Our expectation is that ratifier allies will be more likely to terminate their alliance ties with the combatant state as the number of civilians killed increases, whereas noncombatant deaths will have no significant impact on the likelihood that a non-ratifier ally terminates the alliance. We test this argument by examining the duration of all alliances contained in the COW data since 1903.[6] The unit of analysis is the directed dyad alliance year. The response variable is a binary variable that equals 1 if the alliance terminates in a given year, and zero otherwise. Given the binary nature of this variable, we employ a probit estimator with robust standard errors, clustered on the dyad, with controls for time dependence. We also include a standard set of control variables in the model including dyadic military balance, joint democracy, major-minor power, major-major powers, war outcomes, total population, GDP, distance and cubic polynomials of time.

The key explanatory variable in both analyses is the response variable from the primary analysis: the natural log of the number of noncombatants intentionally killed by the war participant. If the state did not kill any civilians or it was not involved in a war, this variable equals zero. We lag this variable five years in our analyses to account for the possibility that wartime behavior influences third party punishment for a period of time after the war ends. We estimate our models on two separate samples for ease of presentation and interpretation: first, we present the effect of noncombatants killed when a state's ally (trade partner) is a non-ratifier and second, we present the impact of civilian deaths when a state's ally (trade partner) is a ratifier.

This is because a combatant's utility function includes several factors aside from third party calculations, such as domestic political support and expectations regarding victory in conflict. By examining these off-the-equilibrium path cases, we are able to assess implications of the argument's underlying logic.

[4] The additional tests presented below provide evidence in support of the underlying mechanism in our argument. However, we do not contend that they are conclusive. Due to data limitations, we are unable to conduct more comprehensive tests on the implications of our argument. It would be ideal to assess how allies and trade partners react to civilian targeting during the war, rather than after it. Unfortunately, data on civilian deaths is available only at the war level (rather than yearly). We are unable to determine, therefore, whether a third party sanction during war took place before or after civilian deaths. Despite this limitation, the findings still provide evidence that is suggestive of the underlying mechanism in our theoretical argument.

[5] Using the natural log of bilateral trade flows as the response variable, as well distance and economic development for both states ensures that our model specification is consistent with a gravity model of trade. We drop the cubic polynomials of time from this model.

[6] We start the analysis in 1903 because the first war in our data set ended in 1902 (Boer War).

That is, the first sample includes only non-ratifier third parties, while the second sample includes only ratifier third parties. Based on the logic of our argument, we expect noncombatant deaths to have no significant impact in the non-ratifier samples, while we expect noncombatant deaths to significantly increase the likelihood of alliance termination and significantly decrease the volume of trade in the ratifier samples.

We present the results for the two trade and two alliance models below. First, as expected, the number of noncombatants killed has no significant effect on trade volume among non-ratifier trade partners, as the variable fails to reach standard levels of significance in this sample (Table S8, Model 1). On the other hand, noncombatant deaths is negative and statistically significant in the ratifier sample (Table S8, Model 2). That is, increasing the number of civilian deaths significantly decreases trade volume with ratifier trade partners in the aftermath of the conflict. This suggests that states pay an economic price for intentionally targeting civilians when their trading partners are ratifiers. In contrast, a war participant is unlikely to suffer a loss of trade for killing noncombatants when it trades with non-ratifiers. These results are presented in Table S8, Models 1 and 2. The models presented in Table S9, which include the WTO/GATT membership control, furthermore, produce similar results: trade with non-ratifiers is unaffected by noncombatant deaths, while trade with ratifiers is significantly reduced (Table S9).

Also as expected, the number of noncombatants killed has no significant effect on alliance termination in the non-ratifier sample (Table S10, Model 1) while the noncombatant deaths variable is positive and statistically significant in the ratifier sample (Table S10, Model 2). This indicates that *non-ratifier* allies are no more or less likely to end an alliance when their ally intentionally targets civilians during war, while *ratifier* allies are significantly more likely to end the alliance as the number of civilian deaths increases.

Finally, we estimate additional models to further assess the robustness of these findings. Specifically, we interact the key variable – the number of noncombatants killed – with the treaty status of the combatant in both the trade flows and alliance duration models. This additional test assesses the possibility that third party network members might only punish combatants who are themselves ratifiers of the relevant conventions with reduced trade or terminated alliance ties.

Results for the trade model are reported in Table S11. The interaction term is not significant in the model estimated on non-ratifier third party states. However, the interaction term is significant in the ratifier third party state model (Table S11, Model 2). While this may seem problematic, the first differences are statistically significant for both ratifier and non-ratifier war participants. This suggests that third party ratifiers punish both combatant ratifiers and non-ratifiers when they intentionally kill civilians. Turning to the alliance duration models, as expected, the interaction term is not significant in both the non-ratifier and ratifier models (Table S12, Models 1 and 2). The results indicate that third party coercion in the form of abrogated alliance ties is not conditional on the treaty status of the war participant.

Taken together, these results provide further evidence to bolster the findings presented in our primary analysis. They suggest that international law does, in fact, exert an indirect effect on war combatant behavior through the third party mechanism proposed in our theoretical argument. When allies and trade partners value the protection of civilians in war, as evidenced by their decision to ratify the relevant legal agreements, they are more likely to sanction combatants who kill noncombatants by ending alliance ties or reducing bilateral trade. On the other hand, non-ratifier states, who are unlikely to ascribe particular importance or salience to the norms espoused in the Hague and Geneva Conventions, are unlikely to sanction states that intentionally target noncombatants in war.

Table S8: Third Party Coercion, Trade Flows

	Non-ratifiers	Ratifiers
Intentional Civilian Deaths	**0.000125**	**-0.0211*** **
	(0.00681)	**(0.00432)**
Distance	-0.179***	-0.338***
	(0.0143)	(0.0123)
Military Balance	0.0543	0.0846***
	(0.0401)	(0.00438)
Joint Democracy	1.058***	1.407***
	(0.0640)	(0.0340)
Major-Minor Dyad	1.110***	1.715***
	(0.0947)	(0.0637)
Major-Major Dyad	2.027***	3.567***
	(0.361)	(0.210)
Victory State 1	0.00441	0.554***
	(0.0742)	(0.0294)
Victory State 1	-0.219***	0.536***
	(0.0705)	(0.0294)
Population State 1	0.318	1.028***
	(0.248)	(0.114)
Population State 2	-0.634**	0.989***
	(0.305)	(0.114)
GDP State 1	0.0008803***	0.0007001***
	(0.0001164)	(0.0000291)
GDP State 2	0.0010506 ***	0.0000719***
	(0.0000461)	(2.95e-06)
Constant	1.988***	3.752***
	(0.121)	(0.102)
Observations	94073	888757

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on dyad * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table S9: Third Party Coercion, Trade Flows

	Non-ratifiers WTO Models	Ratifiers WTO Models
Intentional Civilian Deaths	**0.0126**	**-0.0145*** **
	(0.00867)	**(0.00444)**
Distance	-0.224***	-0.374***
	(0.0176)	(0.0136)
Military Balance	-0.151***	0.0791***
	(0.0442)	(0.00452)
Joint Democracy	0.938***	1.152***
	(0.0627)	(0.0340)
Major-Minor Dyad	1.027***	1.896***
	(0.117)	(0.0673)
Major-Major Dyad	1.962***	4.577***
	(0.507)	(0.317)
Victory State 1	0.235***	0.538***
	(0.0859)	(0.0294)
Victory State 1	0.316***	0.519***
	(0.115)	(0.0283)
Population State 1	0.390	0.985***
	(0.256)	(0.112)
Population State 2	-1.26***	0.992***
	(0.318)	(0.0000284)
GDP State 1	0.0008464***	0.0000649***
	(0.0001156)	(0.0000284)
GDP State 2	0.001064***	0.0000649***
	(.0000446)	(2.88e-06)
WTO State 1	0.525***	0.537***
	(0.0337)	(0.0176)
WTO State 2	-0.0225	0.589***
	(0.0323)	(0.0172)
Constant	2.196***	3.350***
	(0.149)	(0.113)
Observations	78184	869076

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on dyad * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table S10: Third Party Coercion, Alliance Termination

	Non-ratifiers	Ratifiers
Intentional Civilian Deaths	**0.0196**	**0.0221****
	(0.0156)	**(0.0105)**
Distance	-0.0332***	-0.0114
	(0.0115)	(0.00743)
Military Balance	-0.0567	-0.0109
	(0.106)	(0.0167)
Joint Democracy	0.0671	-0.202***
	(0.111)	(0.0587)
Major-Minor Dyad	-0.0685	0.262***
	(0.206)	(0.0711)
Major-Major Dyad	-0.338	0.181
	(0.399)	(0.162)
Victory State 1	0.976***	0.311***
	(0.191)	(0.0891)
Victory State 2	0.0749	0.531***
	(0.460)	(0.0741)
Population State 1	-0.360	0.106
	(2.011)	(0.226)
Population State 2	-12.699**	0.0718821
	(5.531921)	(0.2291169)
GDP State 1	0.0002756**	0.0000283
	(0.0001267)	(0.0000179)
GDP State 2	0.0006125***	3.51e-06**
	(0.0002347)	(1.71e-06)
Constant	-1.666***	-2.142***
	(0.113)	(0.0712)
Observations	11343	70942

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on dyad * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table S11: Third Party Coercion, Trade Flows

	Non-ratifiers	Ratifiers
Intentional Civilian Deaths	0.00136	-0.0802***
	(0.00889)	(0.0120)
Treaty Status	0.278***	0.384***
	(0.0320)	(0.0283)
Treaty Status*Trade Flows	**0.000213**	**0.0630*** **
	(0.0101)	**(0.0118)**
Distance	-0.181***	-0.339***
	(0.0142)	(0.0124)
Military Balance	-0.0101	0.0624***
	(0.0405)	(0.00473)
Joint Democracy	1.053***	1.394***
	(0.0639)	(0.0341)
Major-Minor Dyad	1.129***	1.737***
	(0.0935)	(0.0639)
Major-Major Dyad	2.035***	3.594***
	(0.363)	(0.206)
Victory State 1	0.00394	0.555***
	(0.0737)	(0.0293)
Victory State 1	-0.223***	0.532***
	(0.0689)	(0.0292)
Population State 1	0.2537235	1.002472***
	(0.249)	(0 1148798)
Population State 2	-0.4442867	0.9766199 ***
	(0.3045948)	(0.11427)
GDP State 1	.0008472***	0.0006911***
	(0.0001147)	(0.000029)
GDP State 2	.00010104***	0.0000707***
	(0.0000452)	(2.94e-06)
Constant	1.859***	3.420***
	(0.119)	(0.104)
Observations	94073	888757

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on dyad * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table S12: Third Party Coercion, Alliance Termination

	Non-ratifiers	Ratifiers
Intentional Civilian Deaths	0.0445**	0.00659
	(0.0212)	(0.0206)
Treaty Status	0.278***	-0.198***
	(0.0952)	(0.0501)
Treaty Status*Intentional Civilian Deaths	**-0.0345**	**0.0168**
	(0.0289)	**(0.0221)**
Distance	-0.0377***	-0.0105
	(0.0118)	(0.00746)
Military Balance	-0.128	0.0146
	(0.106)	(0.0157)
Joint Democracy	0.0580	-0.193***
	(0.108)	(0.0596)
Major-Minor Dyad	-0.0653	0.246***
	(0.202)	(0.0719)
Major-Major Dyad	-0.355	0.173
	(0.391)	(0.163)
Victory State 1	0.964***	0.321***
	(0.188)	(0.0883)
Victory State 2	0.0700	0.519***
	(0.429)	(0.0736)
Population State 1	-0.545	0.163
	(0.2.01)	(0.223)
Population State 2	11.564**	0.094
	(5.565)	(0.231)
GDP State 1	0.000279**	0.0000289
	(0.0001261)	(0.0000177)
GDP State 2	0.0005736**	4.16e-06**
	(0.0002333)	(1.69e-06)
Constant	-1.786***	-2.015***
	(0.131)	(0.0760)
Observations	11343	70942

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on dyad * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table S13: Descriptive Statistics

In Table S13, we include basic summary statistics for the key network variables and all of the control variables from the main analysis.

Table S13: Descriptive Statistics			
Variable	Mean/Mode	Minimum	Maximum
Alliance Network	.47	0	1
Trade Network	.57	0	1
Treaty Status	1	0	1
Democracy	0	0	1
Adversary Regime Type	0	0	1
Major Power Ratifier Ally	0	0	1
Major Ratifier Trade Partner	1	0	1
Distance	0	0	1
Trade	6.5	0	14.5
European Identity	0	0	1
Attrition	1	0	1
Counterinsurgency	0	0	1
Duration	5.3	.69	8.2
Military Capabilities	.51	.04	.94
Adversary Population	17.3	13.1	20.4

Supplementary Analysis Control Variables (Tables S8-S12)

Military Balance: This is measured as a ratio of military capabilities between both states in the dyad. The measure is the average ratio of three separate indicators of military capabilities:
1) total military personnel, 2) military expenditures, and 3) expenditures per soldier. Each ratio is the combatant's value over the total available for each specific measure in the dyad. The final variable is the average of all three ratios. The primary source for this variable is the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities dataset version 3.02 (Singer 1987).

Distance: The natural logarithm of the distance in kilometers between the capitals of the two states (Bennett and Stam 2000)

Joint Democracy: The variable equals one when both states are democracy (6 or greater on the net-polity scale), and zero otherwise. Data is from Jaggers and Marshall (2004)

Major/Minor Power: The variable equals one if the dyad consists of one major power and one minor power, and zero otherwise.

Major/Major Power: The variable equals one if the dyad consists of major powers, and zero otherwise.

War Outcome: Two separate variables are used. The first variable equals 1 if the first state in the dyad won an interstate war, and zero otherwise. The second variable equals 1 if the second state in the dyad won an interstate war, and zero otherwise. Data is from Valentino et al. (2006)

Total Population: Two separate variables are used. The first one is the total population of the first state in the dyad and the second is the total population for the second state in the dyad. Data is from Singer et al. 1972.

GDP: We use Fordham and Walker's (2005) estimated measure of gross domestic product. We use their measure because standard sources (i.e. World Bank) lack data on pre-1945 values of GDP.