

Supplementary Information for the paper “Does Government Support Respond to Governments’ Social Welfare Rhetoric or their Spending?”

We report the parameter estimates on the robustness checks described in the main text of the paper.

- Table S1 reports parameter estimates for an economic effects model that includes the misery index (the sum of unemployment and inflation), estimated over all governments (column 1); left-wing governments (column 2); and right-wing governments (column 3). Note that the parameter estimates in column 1 of Table S1 are identical to those we report in column 1 in Table 3 in the main text of the paper. All three sets of estimates support the conclusion that social welfare spending depresses subsequent government support, i.e., the coefficient estimate on the [*government welfare spending* ($t - 1$)] variable is negative and significant in each case.
- Table S2 reports parameter estimates for the model that controls for the (levels and changes in) the generosity index (defined in the main text of the paper), estimated over all governments (column 1); left-wing governments (column 2); and right-wing governments (column 3). Note that the parameter estimates in column 1 of this table are identical to those we report in column 2 in Table 3 in the main text of the paper. All three sets of estimates again support the substantive conclusion that social welfare spending depresses subsequent government support, i.e., the coefficient estimate on the [*generosity index* ($t - 1$)] variable is negative in each case.
- Table S3 reports models estimated over all parties, in which we omit the data from one country at a time. Column 1 reports results with the US data omitted; column 2 reports estimates with the British data omitted; column 3 reports results with Spanish data omitted. All three sets of estimates continue to support our substantive conclusions.
- Table S4 reports models estimated over all parties, where we include an additional control for lagged government social welfare speech interacted with current social welfare spending (column 1); where we include separate controls for unemployment and inflation, in place of the misery index (column 2); where we control for the time to the next election, defined as the *election cycles* variable (column 3); where we lag government welfare speech and spending by two years, rather than by one year (column 4). All four sets of estimates continue to support our substantive conclusions.

Table S1. Economic Effects: Results for Left-wing and Right-wing Governments

	All Governments (1)	Left-wing Governments (2)	Right-wing governments (3)
<i>government support (t – 1)</i>	-0.41** (0.10)	-0.65** (0.13)	-0.37* (0.15)
Δ <i>govt. welfare speech (t)</i>	0.03 (0.08)	-0.12 (0.07)	0.06 (0.23)
<i>govt. welfare speech (t – 1)</i>	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.21* (0.10)	-0.10 (0.23)
Δ <i>govt. welfare spending (t)</i>	-0.89 (0.88)	-1.59 (0.99)	-1.80 (1.35)
<i>govt. welfare spending (t – 1)</i>	-1.53** (0.40)	-2.44** (0.46)	-2.14** (0.75)
Δ <i>misery index (t)</i>	-0.49 (0.40)	-0.36 (0.49)	0.31 (0.68)
<i>misery index (t – 1)</i>	-0.22* (0.09)	-0.51** (0.12)	0.43 (0.28)
Intercept	46.24** (11.49)	80.9** (14.8)	47.0** (18.2)
N	79	38	41
R^2	0.28	0.52	0.30

** $p \leq 0.01$, * $p \leq 0.05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. For these analyses the dependent variable, [Δ *government support (t)*], is the change in the government's support in the current year compared to the previous year. The independent variables are defined in the text.

Table S2. Estimates for the Generosity Index: Left-wing and Right-wing Governments

	All Governments (1)	Left-wing Governments (2)	Right-wing governments (3)
<i>government support (t - 1)</i>	-0.24* (0.10)	-0.34** (0.12)	-0.21 (0.15)
Δ <i>govt. welfare speech (t)</i>	0.05 (0.09)	0.02 (0.07)	0.03 (0.25)
<i>govt. welfare speech (t - 1)</i>	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.10)	-0.08 (0.28)
Δ <i>generosity index (t)</i>	-0.19 (0.88)	-0.11 (1.07)	0.03 (1.68)
<i>generosity index (t - 1)</i>	-0.60** (0.23)	-0.91** (0.26)	-0.70 (0.46)
Δ <i>misery index (t)</i>	-0.73 (0.42)	-1.12* (0.52)	0.24 (0.86)
<i>misery index (t - 1)</i>	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.09)	0.52 (0.38)
Intercept	24.55* (9.83)	38.47** (12.67)	20.31 (14.4)
N	76	35	41
R^2	0.16	0.40	0.14

** $p \leq 0.01$, * $p \leq 0.05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. For these analyses the dependent variable, [Δ *government support (t)*], is the change in the government's support in the current year compared to the previous year. The independent variables are defined in the text.

Table S3. Estimates While Omitting One Country at a Time

	US Data Removed (1)	UK Data Removed (2)	Spanish Data Removed (3)
<i>government support (t - 1)</i>	-0.42** (0.10)	-0.43** (0.13)	-0.37** (0.11)
Δ <i>govt. welfare speech (t)</i>	0.05 (0.06)	0.02 (0.10)	0.05 (0.15)
<i>govt. welfare speech (t - 1)</i>	0.02 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.13)	-0.00 (0.16)
Δ <i>govt. welfare spending (t)</i>	-0.62 (0.81)	-1.52 (1.49)	-0.81 (1.12)
<i>govt. welfare spending (t - 1)</i>	-1.03* (0.42)	-1.58** (.49)	-1.53** (0.47)
Δ <i>misery index (t)</i>	-0.36 (0.34)	-0.37 (0.55)	-0.57 (0.70)
<i>misery index (t - 1)</i>	-0.21* (0.08)	-0.27* (0.13)	0.00 (0.26)
Intercept	35.97** (11.63)	49.58** (14.34)	41.78** (14.08)
N	51	51	56
R ²	0.31	0.29	0.29

** $p \leq 0.01$, * $p \leq 0.05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. For these analyses the dependent variable, [Δ *government support (t)*], is the change in the government's support in the current year compared to the previous year. The independent variables are defined in the text.

Table S4. Analyses of Government Support: Additional Robustness Checks

	Speech × Spending (1)	Separate Unempl. & Infl. (2)	Election cycles (3)	Two-Year Lags (4)
<i>government support (t – 1)</i>	-0.039** (0.10)	-0.41** (0.10)	-0.42** (0.10)	-0.35** (0.11)
Δ <i>govt. welfare speech (t)</i>	0.03 (0.08)	0.04 (0.08)	0.03 (0.08)	
<i>govt. welfare speech (t – 1)</i>	-0.56 (0.62)	0.00 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.10)	
Δ <i>govt. welfare spending (t)</i>	-1.63 (1.06)	-1.65 (1.14)	-0.74 (0.94)	
<i>govt. welfare spending (t – 1)</i>	-1.88** (0.56)	-1.45** (0.45)	-1.56** (0.41)	
<i>govt. welfare speech (t – 1)</i> × <i>govt. welfare spending (t)</i>	0.03 (0.03)			
Δ <i>misery index (t)</i>	-0.46 (0.40)		-0.45 (0.41)	-0.30 (0.36)
<i>misery index (t – 1)</i>	-0.22* (0.09)		-0.24* (0.10)	-0.12 (0.09)
Δ <i>unemployment (t)</i>		-0.15 (0.54)		
<i>unemployment (t – 1)</i>		-0.29* (0.14)		
Δ <i>inflation (t)</i>		-0.62 (0.59)		
<i>inflation (t – 1)</i>		0.48 (0.48)		
<i>Election cycle (t)</i>			-0.38 (0.57)	
Δ <i>govt. welfare speech be- tween (t – 2) and (t)</i>				0.00 (0.07)
<i>govt. welfare speech (t – 2)</i>				0.01 (0.10)
Δ <i>govt. welfare spending be- tween (t – 2) and (t)</i>				-1.34* (0.54)
<i>govt. welfare spending (t – 2)</i>				-1.23** (0.47)
Intercept	51.94** (13.36)	44.93** (12.40)	48.81** (12.51)	36.51** (13.53)
N	79	79	79	69
R ²	0.29	0.28	0.28	0.22

** $p \leq 0.01$; * $p \leq 0.05$; two-tailed tests.

Notes. Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. For these analyses the dependent variable, [Δ *government support (t)*], was the change in the government’s support in the current year compared to the previous year. The independent variables are defined in the text.