Web Appendix for:

"Reserved Ratification": An Analysis of States' Entry of Reservations Upon Ratification of Human Rights Treaties

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Description of the Data

The dataset that we analyze covers 1948 to 2011. It observes, for each state for each treaty, when that state ratified the treaty (and the length of time that passed from when the treaty was open for ratification to the time that state ratified) and the type of reservations it used when it did so.

First key characteristic of the data: Reservations are fairly common.

Out of all states in our sample (199 different states), over 85 percent of them have used a reservation at least once when ratifying a human rights treaty (only 25 of the 199 states have never used a reservation when ratifying a human rights treaty).

In a significant number of cases in which a state ratified a human rights treaty, some type of reservation was used. Out of the 2,207 cases of ratification that we observe, 30 percent involve the use of some kind of a reservation by a state.

Reservations are thus quite common, and important to study in analyses of treaty ratification.

Second key characteristic of the data: Nature of the dependent variables (and how reservations are used together).

From 1948 to 2011, we recorded 2,207 cases of ratification in any way. Out of those 2,207 cases of ratification, 1,538 cases of a state ratifying without reservations, 140 cases of a state ratifying with a nonsubstantive reservation, 474 cases of a state ratifying with a procedural reservation, 104 cases of a state ratifying with an article-qualifying reservation, and 67 cases of a state ratifying with a treaty-qualifying reservation.

In over half of the cases (57 percent) in which a nonsubstantive reservation was used by a state upon ratification, a nonsubstantive reservation was the only type of reservation entered by that state.

Out of the cases of treaty ratification in which a state used a procedural reservation, in over three-quarters of those cases (76 percent), a procedural reservation was the only type of reservation that the state entered.

Article-qualifying and treaty-qualifying reservations were the reservations most often used in conjunction with other types of reservations. Out of the cases of treaty ratification in which a state used an article-qualifying reservation, 39 percent of them were cases in which that state entered only article-qualifying reservations. Out of the cases of treaty ratification in which a state used a treaty-qualifying reservation, 49 percent of them were cases in which that state entered only a treaty-qualifying reservation.

To understand how reservations are used together:

There are 127 cases of non-substantive and procedural reservations being used together. Out of all ratification cases, this is 5.8 percent.

There are 53 cases of non-substantive and article-qualifying reservations being used together. Out of all ratification cases, this is 2.4 percent.

There are 39 cases of non-substantive and treaty-qualifying reservations being used together. Out of all ratification cases, this is 1.8 percent.

There are 90 cases of procedural and article-qualifying reservations being used together. Out of all ratification cases, this is 4.1 percent.

There are 60 cases of procedural and treaty-qualifying reservations being used together. Out of all ratification cases, this is 2.7 percent.

There are 15 cases of article-qualifying and treaty-qualifying reservations being used together. Out of all ratification cases, this is .1 percent.

There are 48 cases of non-substantive, procedural, and article-qualifying reservations being used together. Out of all ratification cases, this is 2.2 percent.

There are 2 cases of non-substantive, procedural, and treaty-qualifying reservations being used together. Out of all ratification cases, this is .001 percent.

There are 3 cases of non-substantive, article-qualifying, and treaty-qualifying reservations being used together. Out of all ratification cases, this is .001 percent.

There are 6 cases of procedural, article-qualifying, and treaty-qualifying reservations being used together. Out of all ratification cases, this is .003 percent.

In 2 cases, a state used all four types of reservations together. Out of all ratification cases, this is .001 percent.

Third key characteristic of the data: the states that have used these reservations. Out of 199 states in our dataset:

33.2 percent have used a nonsubstantive reservation at least once when ratifying a human rights treaty. 81.4 percent have used a procedural reservation at least once when ratifying a human rights treaty. 31.2 percent have used an article-qualifying reservation at least once when ratifying a human rights treaty. 23.1 percent have used a treaty-qualifying reservation at least once when ratifying a human rights treaty.

Table 1 that follows provides summary information for all treaties included in the dataset.

Table 1: Treaties Included in the Sample

Treaty	Date Open for Ratification	Number Ratifying with Reservations	Number Ratifying without Reservations	Percent Reserving
Convention on Genocide	1948	28	98	.22
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination	1966	55	109	.34
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	1966	65	96	.40
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights	1966	45	111	.29
Optional Protocol to International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	1966	5	23	.18
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity	1968	13	39	.25
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid	1973	12	90	.12
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women	1979	72	108	.40
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	1984	41	106	.28

Treaty	Date Open for Ratification	Number Ratifying with Reservations	Number Ratifying without Reservations	Percent Reserving
International Convention Against Apartheid in Sports	1985	1	51	.02
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty	1989	8	65	.11
Convention on the Rights of a Child	1989	68	116	.37
International Covenant on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families	1990	14	29	.33
Agreement Establishing the Fund for the Development of the Indigenous Peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean	1992	1	22	.04
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women	1999	4	92	.04
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of a Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict	2000	136	6	.96
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of a Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, or Child Pornography	2000	16	134	.11
Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	2002	7	56	.11
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities	2006	19	96	.17

Treaty	Date Open for Ratification	Number Ratifying with Reservations	Number Ratifying without Reservations	Percent Reserving
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities	2006	3	68	.04
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities	2006	3	68	.04
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances	2006	2	32	.06
Optional Protocol to International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	2008	1	4	.20
Optional Protocol to the Rights of a Child on a Communications Procedure	2011	0	1	.00

Baseline hazard functions

Figures 1 through 5 plot the smoothed baseline hazard estimates for each way a state can ratify a human rights treaty. They illustrate the the conditional probability a state will ratify a treaty in a particular way given that it has not yet done so. As these figures show, these baseline hazards vary over time. This supports our argument that time must be taken into account in the analysis. The duration models that we use take these factors into account. Moreover, because we use a non-parametric approach it allows us to account for differences in the baseline hazard using the same basic model. Alternative modeling choices would require that we specify a functional form of time when including it in the model. If we omitted time from the model, we would be assuming that the hazard did not vary over time. Therefore these models help bolster our use of a Cox duration model.

Figure 1 shows the hazard estimates for ratification in any way. It shows that the probability a state that has not yet done so will ratify a particular human rights treaty is greatest earlier in the process. The conditional probability of ratifying is lower for states that have waited longer to do so. A state that has not yet ratified a treaty by ten years after it opened for ratification has about a 2.875 percent chance of ratifying that treaty, while a state that has waited twenty years has only a 1.9 percent chance of doing so.[1] This decreasing conditional probability of ratification exists for about twenty-five years. This indicates that during this twenty-five year period, the more time that has passed in which a state has not ratified a particular treaty, the lower the probability that it will do so in the next time period. After about thirty-five years since a treaty opened for ratification, the probability that states that have not yet ratified a particular treaty will do so begins to increase. This is likely because very few cases make it past thirty-five years, and the results are therefore driven by a handful of cases. Indeed, only 6 percent of treaty-country observations fall thirty-five or more years after a treaty was opened for ratification. For this small number of cases, the probability of ratifying is greater for states that have held out longer.

Figure 2 shows a similar trend for ratification without substantive reservations. A state that has not yet ratified a treaty by ten years after it opened for ratification has about a 2 percent chance of ratifying without substantive reservations in the next time period. This conditional probability decreases over time, until about thirty-five years after a treaty opened for ratification, when the probability of ratification without substantive reservations (conditional on not yet having done so) is .85. It then begins to increase. For the small number of states that have held out at least thirty-five years, the probability they will ratify without substantive reservations given that they have not yet done so is greater for states that hold out longer.

Figure 3 shows a slightly different pattern for ratification with procedural reservations. First, it shows that there is a fairly low probability that states will ratify with a procedural reservation at any given point in time, conditional on the fact that they have not yet done so. A state that has waited ten years to ratify a particular treaty with a procedural reservation has about a .53 percent chance of doing so in the next time period. This conditional probability, in general, decreases over time. In other words, states that have gone longer without ratifying with a procedural reservation have a lower probability of doing so. The conditional probability

[1] Note that some minimum number of ratification events is needed before a hazard can be computed (the denominator must be large enough to give a credible estimate). In these data, this does not happen until about year ten.

does plateau (and very slightly increase) from about twenty-five to thirty-five years, showing that states that have not ratified with a procedural reservation within twenty-five years have about the same probability of doing so as those that have not done so within thirty-five years. The conditional probability of ratifying with a procedural reservation then decreases, and then plateaus again after about forty-five years.

Figure 4 shows that there is a low conditional probability that states will ratify with an article-qualifying reservation. It ranges from about .045 percent to about .14 percent. This is consistent with the fact that there are few cases of ratification with article-qualifying reservations. This figure also shows a general trend of a decreasing probability of ratification with an article-qualifying reservation for states that wait longer to do so. Slight increases are evident from years seven to ten and twenty to twenty-two. These increases, however, are quite small. The probability a state that has not ratified with an article-qualifying reservation within seven and a half years is about .1 percent while the probability a state that has waited ten years will do so is about .04 percent greater. The increase from years twenty to twenty-two show is about .005 percent. Overall, the trend is that states that have held out longer to ratify with article-qualifying reservations have a lower conditional probability of doing so than states that have not held out as long. Thus, for example, the probability that a state that has not yet ratified with an article-qualifying reservation within ten years will do so in the next time period is greater than the probability that a state that has not yet ratified with an article-qualifying reservation within twenty years will do so, which is greater than the probability that a state that has not yet ratified with an article-qualifying reservation within forty years will do so.

Figure 5 shows that there is a low conditional probability that states will ratify with a treaty-qualifying reservation. It ranges from about .04 percent to about .066 percent. This is, again, consistent with the fact that there are few cases of ratification with treaty-qualifying reservations. The figure also shows a general trend of the probability of ratification with a treaty-qualifying reservation decreasing over time. States that have held out fewer years to ratify with a treaty-qualifying reservation, in general, have a greater probability of doing so than states that have held out longer. The exception is an increase in probability from years twenty-two to thirty-five. The increase over this time, however, is very slight. States that have not ratified with a treaty-qualifying reservation by thirty-five years after a treaty opened for ratification have about a .0035 greater chance of doing so than states that have not ratified by twenty-two years. Overall, the trend is that states have a very low probability of ratifying with treaty-qualifying reservations, and that those that have held out a longer amount of time to ratify with a treaty-qualifying reservation have a lower conditional probability of doing so than states that have held out a shorter amount of time.



Figure 1: Baseline smoothed hazard estimate for ratification (in any way)



Figure 2: Baseline smoothed hazard estimate for ratification without a substantive reservation



Figure 3: Baseline smoothed hazard estimate for ratification with a procedural reservation



Figure 4: Baseline smoothed hazard estimate for ratification with an article-qualifying reservation



Figure 5: Baseline smoothed hazard estimate for ratification with a treaty-qualifying reservation

Baseline survival estimates

Figures 6 through 10 plot the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for each way a state can ratify a human rights treaty. They illustrate the probability a given state will "survive" to that point in time or beyond without ratifying a given treaty in a particular way (depending on the type of ratification being analyzed).

Figure 6 plots the baseline survival estimates for the risk that a state will ratify a human rights treaty in any way. This figure shows that in the year in which a human rights treaty was opened for ratification (year 1), the probability of survival to that year or beyond is 1. This makes intuitive sense, as no state could ratify the treaty before it was opened for ratification. Ten years after a treaty opened for ratification, the probability a state will survive to that year or beyond (i.e., not have ratified yet) is .875, and the probability it will survive to year thirty or beyond without ratifying is .45. The probability any given state on any given treaty will survive to year fifty or beyond is .32.

Figure 7 plots the baseline survival estimates for the risk that a state will ratify a human rights treaty without substantive reservations. This figure shows that in the year in which a human rights treaty was opened for ratification (year 1), the probability of survival to that year or beyond is 1. This makes intuitive sense, as no state could ratify the treaty before it was opened for ratification, and thus could not have ratified without a substantive reservation. Ten years after a treaty opened for ratification, the probability a state will survive to that year or beyond (i.e., not yet have ratified without substantive reservations) is .74, and the probability it will survive to year thirty or beyond without ratifying without a substantive reservation is .575. The probability any given state on any given treaty will survive to year fifty or beyond without ratifying without a substantive reservation is .48.

Figure 8 plots the baseline survival estimates for the risk that a state will ratify a human rights treaty with a procedural reservation. This figure shows that in the year in which a human rights treaty was opened for ratification (year 1), the probability of survival to that year or beyond is 1. Ten years after a treaty opened for ratification, the probability a state will survive to that year or beyond (i.e., not yet have ratified with a procedural reservation) is .925, and the probability it will survive to year thirty or beyond without ratifying with a procedural reservation is .8825. The probability any given state on any given treaty will survive to year fifty or beyond without ratifying with a procedural reservation is .855.

Figure 9 plots the baseline survival estimates for the risk that a state will ratify a human rights treaty with an article-qualifying reservation. This figure shows that in the year in which a human rights treaty was opened for ratification (year 1), the probability of survival to that year or beyond is 1. Ten years after a treaty opened for ratification, the probability a state will survive to that year or beyond (i.e., not yet have ratified with an article-qualifying reservation) is .987, and the probability it will survive to year thirty or beyond without ratifying with an article-qualifying reservation is .97. The probability any given state on any given treaty will survive to year fifty or beyond without ratifying with an article-qualifying reservation is .9625.

Figure 10 plots the baseline survival estimates for the risk that a state will ratify a human rights treaty with a treaty-qualifying reservation. This figure shows that in the year in which a human rights treaty was opened for ratification (year 1), the probability of survival to that year or beyond is 1. Ten years after a treaty opened for ratification, the probability a state will survive to that year or beyond (i.e., not yet have ratified with a treaty-qualifying reservation)

is .992, and the probability it will survive to year thirty or beyond without ratifying with a treaty-qualifying reservation is .9825. The probability any given state on any given treaty will survive to year fifty or beyond without ratifying with a treaty-qualifying reservation is .975.

Overall, the plots illustrate that there are substantive differences in ratification across the different ways of ratifying. They therefore help to justify our decision to analyze these different methods of ratification separately. They also show that states more frequently ratify with procedural reservations and relatively infrequently ratify with article- or treaty-qualifying reservations. However, while such reservations are not widespread their potential substantive effect significant, and they thus warrant study.



Figure 6: Kaplan-Meier baseline survival estimate for ratification (in any way)



Figure 7: Kaplan-Meier baseline survival estimate for ratification without a substantive reservation



Figure 8: Kaplan-Meier baseline survival estimate for ratification with a procedural reservation



Figure 9: Kaplan-Meier baseline survival estimate for ratification with an article-qualifying reservation



Figure 10: Kaplan-Meier baseline survival estimate for ratification with a treaty-qualifying reservation

Cox Proportional Hazard Regression Estimated Smoothed Hazard Functions for Different Types of Executives

Figures 11 through 20 plot post-estimation smoothed hazard functions (based on Models 1A through 5B in the paper, respectively), comparing the chance a state will ratify in a particular way for different types of executives. Like Figures 1 through 5, they illustrate, for any given point in time, t, the chance a state will ratify a treaty in a particular way at that point in time conditional on the fact that it has not yet done so. The values reported below are very rough estimates of the hazard based on an analysis of the smoothed hazard function plots. This means that it should be noted that the hazard estimates are not exact, as an "eyeballing" of the plots cannot be perfect. Overall, however, the ratio of hazards between the different types of executives reflect the hazard ratios reported in the papers' results.

Figure 11 plots the post-estimation smoothed hazard functions for transitioning and non-transitioning executives, showing the chance that they will ratify a given human rights treaty conditional on the fact that they have not yet done so. As this figure shows, executives of states transitioning away from a more repressive regime have a greater chance of ratifying human rights treaties than non-transitioning executives. Ten years after a treaty opened for ratification, a transitioning executive has about a 3.9 percent chance of ratifying it at that point in time (conditional on the fact that it has not yet done so), while a non-transitioning executive has only a 2.9 percent chance. This increased chance of ratification by a transitioning executive as compared to a non-transitioning executive holds throughout time. In addition, this figure shows that, similar to the baseline conditional probability of ratification, the chance they will ratify (conditional on the fact that they have not yet done so) for both transitioning and non-transitioning executives decreases over time until about thirty-five years after a treaty was opened for ratification, and then increases. Compared to 3.9 and 2.9 at years ten years, thirty years after a treaty was opened for ratification, a transitioning executive has a 1.8 percent chance of ratifying at that point in time (conditional on the fact that it has not yet done so), and a non-transitioning executive has a 1.35 percent chance. This increases slightly, and fifty years after ratification, a transitioning executive that has not yet ratified a given treaty has a 2.4 percent chance of doing so at that point in time and a non-transitioning executive has a 1.8 percent chance. Overall, the difference is fairly significant. The chance a transitioning executive will ratify a human rights treaty is about 33 to 35 percent greater than the chance a non-transitioning executive will do so. These approximate smoothed hazard function calculations therefore reflect the 1.34 hazard ratio derived from the Cox model (Model 1A).

Figure 12 plots the post-estimation smoothed hazard functions for transitioning and non-transitioning executives, showing the chance that they will ratify a given human rights treaty without substantive reservations (conditional on the fact that they have not yet done so). It shows that throughout the entire time a treaty is open for ratification, executives transitioning away from a more repressive regime have a greater chance of ratifying a human rights treaty without substantive reservations than non-transitioning executives. For both types of executives (and similar to the baseline hazard), their chance of ratification without substantive reservations decreases over time, and then increases slightly after thirty-five years. Ten years after a treaty opened for ratification, a transitioning executive has a 2.75 percent chance of ratifying a treaty without a substantive reservation at that point in time (given that it has not yet done so), and

a non-transitioning executive has only a 1.95 percent chance. This chance decreases over time, and thirty years after a treaty opened for ratification, a transitioning executive that has not yet ratified without a substantive reservation have a 1.13 percent chance of doing so at that point in time and a non-transitioning executive has about a .8 percent chance. After about thirty-five years, the chance states will ratify without substantive reservations increases, and fifty years after a treaty opened for ratification, a transitioning executive has a 1.7 percent chance of ratifying without a substantive reservation at that point in time (given that it has not yet done so) and a non-transitioning executive has only about a 1.2 percent chance. Overall, the difference is fairly significant. The chance a transitioning executive will ratify a human rights treaty without substantive reservations is about a 41 to 42 percent greater than the chance a non-transitioning executive will do so. These approximate smoothed hazard calculations therefore reflect the 1.41 hazard ratio derived from the Cox model (Model 1B).

Figure 13 plots the post-estimation smoothed hazard functions for repressive and non-repressive executives, showing the chance that they will ratify a given human rights treaty conditional on the fact that they have not yet done so. As this figure shows, repressive executives have a lower chance of ratifying human rights treaties than non-repressive ones. This holds throughout the entire time a treaty has been open for ratification. This figure also shows that, similar to the baseline hazard, this chance decreases for about the next twenty-five years, and then increases slightly. Ten years after a treaty opened for ratification, a repressive executive has a 2.65 percent chance of ratifying it at that point in time (conditional on the fact that it has not yet done so), while a non-repressive executive that has not yet ratified has a 3.3 chance. Thirty years after a treaty opened for ratification, a repressive executive has a 1.2 percent chance of ratifying it at that point in time (conditional on the fact that it has not yet done so) while a non-repressive executive has a 1.5 percent chance. Fifty years after a treaty opened for ratification, conditional on the fact that it has not yet done so, a repressive executive has a 1.7 percent chance of ratifying it at that point in time and a non-repressive executive has a 2.1 percent chance. In all cases, the difference is fairly significant. The chance a repressive executive will ratify a human rights treaty is only about 79 to 81 percent of the size of the chance a non-repressive executive will do so. These approximate smoothed hazard calculations therefore reflect the .8 hazard ratio derived from the Cox model (Model 2A).

Figure 14 plots the post-estimation smoothed hazard functions for repressive and non-repressive executives, showing the chance that they will ratify a given human rights treaty with a treaty-qualifying reservation (conditional on the fact that they have not yet done so). As this figure shows, the chance of ratifying with a treaty-qualifying reservation is low, overall, but repressive executives have a greater chance of doing so than non-repressive ones. This holds throughout the entire time a treaty has been open for ratification. This figure also shows that these conditional probabilities decrease for about ten years, plateau (or increase slightly) for about the next fifteen years, and then decrease again. In particular, ten years after a treaty opened for ratification, conditional on the fact that it has not yet done so, a repressive executive has a .08 percent chance of ratifying with a treaty-qualifying reservation at that point in time, while a non-repressive executive has only a .045 percent chance. Thirty years after a treaty opened for ratification, a repressive executive that has not yet ratified with a treaty-qualifying reservation has a .0575 percent chance of doing so at that point in time, while a non-repressive executive has only a .0325 percent chance. This holds for about fifteen years, and then decreases. A little less than 40 years after a treaty opened for ratification, a repressive executive

has a .0495 percent chance of ratifying with a treaty-qualifying reservation at that point in time (given that it has not yet done so), while a non-repressive executive has only a .028 percent chance. Overall, while the actual chance of ratifying with a treaty-qualifying reservation at any given point in time is small, the difference between repressive and non-repressive executives' conditional probabilities is significant. The chance a repressive executive will ratify a human rights treaty with a treaty-qualifying reservation is about 76 to 78 percent greater than the chance a non-repressive executive will do so. These approximate smoothed hazard calculations therefore reflect the 1.77 hazard ratio derived from the Cox model (Model 2B).

Figure 15 plots the post-estimation smoothed hazard functions for constrained and unconstrained executives, showing the chance that they will ratify a given human rights treaty with a procedural reservation (conditional on the fact that they have not yet done so). As this figure shows, more constrained executives have a greater chance of doing so than less constrained executives. This holds throughout the entire time a treaty has been open for ratification. This figure also shows that this chance, in general, decreases over time with a slight plateau after twenty-five years. In particular, ten years after a treaty opened for ratification, a highly constrained executive has a .9 percent chance of ratifying with a procedural reservation at that point in time (conditional on the fact that it has not yet done so), while a largely unconstrained executive has only a .37 percent chance. Thirty years after a treaty opened for ratification, a highly constrained executive that has not yet ratified with a procedural reservation has a .22 percent chance of doing so at that point in time, while an unconstrained executive has only a .09 percent chance. A little less than forty years after a treaty opened for ratification, a constrained executive has a .18 percent chance of ratifying with a procedural reservation at that point in time (conditional on the fact that it has not yet done so), while a largely unconstrained executive has only a .075 percent chance. Overall, the difference is quite significant. The chance a highly constrained executive will ratify a human rights treaty with a procedural reservation is about 2.42 to 2.44 times as great as the chance a largely unconstrained executive will do so. These approximate smoothed hazard calculations therefore reflect the 2.43 hazard ratio derived from the Cox model (Model 3A). Note that this ratio is calculated by raising the hazard ratio reported in the table to the power of the difference between the values of the "constrained executive" variable used to calculate these hazard functions. In this case, that is 6.

Figure 16 plots the post-estimation smoothed hazard functions for constrained and unconstrained executives, showing the chance that they will ratify a given human rights treaty with an article-qualifying reservation. As this figure shows, the chance of ratifying with an article-qualifying reservation is fairly low, but more constrained executives have a greater chance of doing so than less constrained executives. This holds throughout the entire time a treaty has been open for ratification. This figure also shows that the chance of ratification with an article-qualifying reservation, in general, decreases over time. In particular, ten years after a treaty opened for ratification, a highly constrained executive has a .125 percent chance of doing so at that point in time (conditional on the fact that it has not yet done so), while a largely unconstrained executive has only a .073 percent chance. Thirty years after a treaty opened for ratification, a highly constrained executive that has not yet ratified with an article-qualifying reservation has a .08 percent chance of doing so at that point in time, while an unconstrained executive has only a .047 percent chance. A little less than forty years after a treaty opened for ratification, a highly constrained executive has a .05 percent chance of doing so at that point

in time (given that it has not yet done so), while a largely unconstrained executive has only a .0295 percent chance. Overall, while the overall chance of ratification with an article-qualifying reservation is low, the difference between the chance of doing so for constrained and unconstrained executives is quite significant. The chance a highly constrained executive will ratify a human rights treaty with an article-qualifying reservation is 69 to 71 percent greater than the chance a largely unconstrained executive will do so. These approximate smoothed hazard calculations therefore reflect the 1.7 hazard ratio derived from the Cox model (Model 3B). Note that this ratio is calculated by raising the hazard ratio reported in the table to the power of the difference between the values of the "constrained executive" variable used to calculate these hazard functions. In this case, that is 6.

Figure 17 plots the post-estimation smoothed hazard functions for executives facing legislatures with different levels of power, showing the chance that they will ratify a given human rights treaty with a procedural reservation conditional on the fact that they have not yet done so. As this figure shows, executives facing a more powerful legislature have a greater chance of doing so than executives facing weaker legislatures. This holds throughout the entire time a treaty has been open for ratification. This figure also shows that the chance of ratification with a procedural reservation, in general, decreases over time, largely plateauing toward the end. In particular, ten years after a treaty opened for ratification, an executive facing a powerful legislature has a .97 percent chance of ratifying with a procedural reservation at that point in time (conditional on the fact that it has not yet done so), while an executive facing a weak legislature has only a .43 percent chance. Thirty years after a treaty opened for ratification, an executive facing a powerful legislature that has not yet ratified with a procedural reservation has a .27 percent chance of doing so at that point in time, while an executive facing a weak legislature has only a .12 percent chance. Fifty years after a treaty opened for ratification, an executive facing a powerful legislature has a .11 percent chance of ratifying with a procedural reservation at that point in time (conditional on the fact that it has not yet done so), while an executive facing a weak legislature has only a .05 percent chance. Overall, the difference between the chance of ratifying with a procedural reservation for executives facing powerful and weak legislatures is quite significant. The chance an executive facing a powerful legislature will ratify a human rights treaty with a procedural reservation at any given point in time is 2.2 to 2.6 times as great as the chance an executive facing a weak legislature will do so. These approximate smoothed hazard calculations therefore reflect the 2.25 hazard ratio derived from the Cox model (Model 4A). note that this ratio is calculated by raising the hazard ratio reported in the table to the power of the difference between the values of the "legislative power" variable used to calculate these hazard functions. In this case, that is .72.

Figure 18 plots the post-estimation smoothed hazard functions for executives facing legislatures with different levels of power, showing the chance that they will ratify a given human rights treaty with an article-qualifying reservation conditional on the fact that they has not yet done so. As this figure shows, while the chance of ratifying with an article-qualifying reservation is low, executives facing a more powerful legislature have a greater chance of doing so than executives facing weaker legislatures. This holds throughout the entire time a treaty has been open for ratification. This figure also shows that the chance of ratifying with an article-qualifying reservation, in general, decreases slightly over time. In particular, ten years after a treaty opened for ratification, an executive facing a powerful legislature has a .1755 percent chance of doing so at that point in time (conditional on the fact that it has not yet done so),

while an executive facing a weak legislature has only a .0625 percent chance. Thirty years after a treaty opened for ratification, an executive facing a powerful legislature that has not yet ratified with an article-qualifying reservation has a .14 percent chance of doing so at that point in time, while an executive facing a weak legislature has only a .05 percent chance. A little less than forty years after a treaty opened for ratification, an executive facing a powerful legislature has a .085 percent chance of ratifying with an article-qualifying reservation at that point in time, while an executive facing a weak legislature has only a .03 percent chance. Overall, the difference between the chance of ratifying with an article-qualifying reservation for executives facing powerful and weak legislatures is significant. The chance an executive facing a powerful legislature will ratify a human rights treaty with an article-qualifying reservation is about 2.8 to 2.83 times as great as the chance an executive facing a weak legislature will do so. These approximate smoothed hazard calculations therefore reflect the 2.82 hazard ratio derived from the Cox model (Model 4B). Note that this ratio is calculated by raising the hazard ratio reported in the table to the power of the difference between the values of the "legislative power" variable used to calculate these hazard functions. In this case, that is .72.

Figure 19 plots the post-estimation smoothed hazard functions for executives facing judiciaries with different levels of independence, showing the chance that they will ratify a given human rights treaty with a procedural reservation conditional on the fact that they have not yet done so. As this figure shows, executives facing a more independent judiciary have a greater chance of ratifying with a procedural reservation than executives facing less independent judiciaries. This holds throughout the entire time a treaty has been open for ratification. This figure also shows that the chance these executives will ratify with a procedural reservation, in general, decreases over time, largely plateauing toward the end. In particular, ten years after a treaty opened for ratification, an executive facing a highly independent judiciary has a 1.05 percent chance of ratifying with a procedural reservation at that point in time (conditional on the fact that it has not yet done so), while an executive facing a less independent judiciary has only a .375 percent chance. Thirty years after a treaty opened for ratification, an executive facing a highly independent judiciary that has not yet ratified with a procedural reservation has a .24 percent chance of doing so at that point in time, while an executive facing a less independent judiciary has only a .085 percent chance. A little less than forty years after a treaty opened for ratification, an executive facing a highly independent judiciary has a .325 percent chance of ratifying with a procedural reservation at that point in time (conditional on the fact that it has not yet done so), while an executive facing a less independent judiciary has only a .115 percent chance. Overall, the difference between the chance of ratifying with a procedural reservations for executives facing judiciaries with different levels of independence is quite significant. The chance an executive facing a highly independent judiciary will ratify a human rights treaty with a procedural reservation is 2.8 to 2.82 times as great as the chance an executive facing a less independent judiciary will do so. These approximate smoothed hazard calculations therefore reflect the 2.81 hazard ratio derived from the Cox model (Model 5A). Note that this ratio is calculated by raising the hazard ratio reported in the table to the power of the difference between the values of the "judicial independence" variable used to calculate these hazard functions. In this case, that is .985.

Figure 20 plots the post-estimation smoothed hazard functions for executives facing judiciaries with different levels of independence, showing the chance that they will ratify a given human rights treaty with an article-qualifying reservation conditional on the fact that they have

not yet done so. As this figure shows, while the chance of ratifying with an article-qualifying reservation is fairly low, executives facing a more independent judiciary have a greater chance of doing so than executives facing weaker judiciaries. This holds throughout the entire time a treaty has been open for ratification. This figure also shows that the chance of ratifying with an article-qualifying reservation at a certain point in time generally decreases slightly over time. In particular, ten years after a treaty opened for ratification, an executive facing a highly independent judiciary has a .15 percent chance of ratifying with an article-qualifying reservation (conditional on the fact that it has not yet done so), while an executive facing a less independent judiciary has only a .058 percent chance. Thirty years after a treaty opened for ratification, an executive facing a highly independent judiciary that has not yet ratified with an article-qualifying reservation has a .095 percent chance of doing so, while an executive facing a less independent judiciary has only a .037 percent chance. A little less than forty years after a treaty opened for ratification, an executive facing a highly independent judiciary has a .0675 percent chance of ratifying with an article-qualifying reservation (conditional on the fact that it has not yet done so), while an executive facing a less independent judiciary has only a .026 percent chance. Overall, the difference between the chance executives facing judiciaries with different levels of independence will ratify with an article-qualifying reservation is quite significant. The chance an executive facing a highly independent judiciary will ratify a human rights treaty with an article-qualifying reservation is to 2.57 to 2.59 times as great as the chance an executive facing a less independent judiciary will do so. These smoothed approximate hazard calculations therefore reflect the 2.57 hazard ratio derived from the Cox model (Model 5B). Note that this ratio calculated by raising the hazard ratio reported in the table to the power of the difference between the values of the "judicial independence" variable used to calculate these hazard functions. In this case, that is .985.



Figure 11: Smoothed hazard functions for transitioning versus non-transitioning executives regarding ratification (in any way)



Figure 12: Smoothed hazard functions for transitioning versus non-transitioning executives regarding ratification without substantive reservations



Figure 13: Smoothed hazard functions for repressive versus non-repressive executives regarding ratification (in any way)



Figure 14: Smoothed hazard functions for repressive versus non-repressive executives regarding ratification with treaty-qualifying reservations



Figure 15: Smoothed hazard functions for constrained versus unconstrained executives regarding ratification with procedural reservations



Figure 16: Smoothed hazard functions for constrained versus unconstrained executives regarding ratification with article-qualifying reservations



Figure 17: Smoothed hazard functions for executives more constrained by the legislature versus those less constrained by the legislature regarding ratification with procedural reservations



Figure 18: Smoothed hazard functions for executives more constrained by the legislature versus those less constrained by the legislature regarding ratification with article-qualifying reservations



Figure 19: Smoothed hazard functions for executives facing a more independent judiciary versus a less independent one regarding ratification with procedural reservations



Figure 20: Smoothed hazard functions for executives facing a more independent judiciary versus a less independent one regarding ratification with article-qualifying reservations

Cox Proportional Hazard Regression Estimated Survival Functions for Different Types of Executives

Figures 21 through 30 plot estimated survival functions (based on Models 1A through 5B in the paper, respectively), comparing the survival rates of different types of executives. Like Figures 1 through 5 above, they illustrate the probability that a state on any given treaty will "survive" to that point in time or later (where survival refers to the fact that a state has not ratified in particular way, depending on the type of ratification being analyzed). These figures differ from the baseline survival estimates above, as they show the survival estimates when the independent variables take on various values. The estimates used to derive these figures come from the models reported in the paper. These figures therefore provide additional substantive information about the nature of the relative risk that different types of executives have regarding the ratification of human rights treaties, and using particular types of reservations when they do so. We discuss these substantive results below.

Figure 21 plots survival estimates for executives transitioning from a more repressive regime versus the survival estimates for non-transitioning executives with regard to ratification of human rights treaties, in general. The calculations underpinning the graph stem from the results of Model 1A in the paper. As this figure shows, the probability that a transitioning executive will "survive" to year twenty or beyond without ratifying a given treaty is about .42. In contrast, the probability that a non-transitioning executive will survive to year twenty or beyond is about .52. A non-transitioning executive is more likely to "survive" without ratifying than a transitioning executive. In other words, a transitioning executive is more likely to have ratified before year twenty than a non-transitioning executive. The probability of survival decreases over time for both types of executives, and the probability a transitioning executive will not have ratified within forty years is about .4, while the probability a non-transitioning executive will not have done so within forty years is .55. Again, a transitioning executive is less likely to have survived forty years without ratifying (i.e., more likely to have ratified within forty years) than a non-transitioning executive. In general, over time, transitioning executives therefore have a greater risk of ratification than non-transitioning executives.

Figure 22 plots survival estimates for executives transitioning from a more repressive regime versus the survival estimates for non-transitioning executives with regard to ratification of human rights treaties without entering substantive reservations. The calculations underpinning the graph stem from the results of Model 1B in the paper. As this figure shows, the probability that a transitioning executive will "survive" to year twenty or beyond without ratifying a given treaty without a substantive reservation is about .55. In contrast, the probability that a non-transitioning executive will survive to year twenty or beyond is about .65. A non-transitioning executive is more likely to have "survived" without ratifying with a substantive reservation than a transitioning executive. In other words, a transitioning executive is more likely to have ratified without a substantive reservation before year twenty than a non-transitioning executive. The probability of survival decreases over time for both types of executives, and the probability a transitioning executive will not have ratified without a substantive reservation within forty years is about .44, while the probability a non-transitioning executive will not have done so within forty years is .55. Again, a transitioning executive is less likely to have survived forty years without ratifying without a substantive reservation (i.e., more likely to have done so) than

a non-transitioning executive. In general, over time, transitioning executives therefore have a greater risk of ratifying without substantive reservations than non-transitioning executives.

Figure 23 plots survival estimates for repressive executives versus the survival estimates for non-repressive executives with regard to the ratification of human rights treaties, in general. The calculations underpinning the graph stem from the results of Model 2A in the paper. As this figure shows, the probability that a repressive executive will "survive" to year twenty or beyond without ratifying a given treaty is about .55. In contrast, the probability that a non-repressive executive will survive to year twenty or beyond is about .48. A repressive executive is more likely to "survive" without ratifying than a non-repressive executive. A repressive executive is thus less likely to have ratified before year twenty than a non-repressive executive. The probability of survival decreases over time for both types of executives, and the probability a repressive executive will not have ratified within forty years is about .45, while the probability a non-repressive executive will not have done so within forty years is .36. Again, a repressive executive is more likely to have survived forty years without ratifying (i.e., less likely to have ratified within forty years) than a non-repressive executive. In general, over time, repressive executives therefore have a lower risk of ratification than non-repressive executives.

Figure 24 plots survival estimates for repressive executives versus the survival estimates for non-repressive executives with regard to the ratification of human rights treaties with a treaty-qualifying reservation. The calculations underpinning the graph stem from the results of Model 2B in the paper. As this figure shows, the probability that a repressive executive will "survive" to year twenty or beyond without ratifying a given treaty with a treaty-qualifying reservation is about .984. In contrast, the probability that a non-repressive executive will survive to year twenty or beyond is about .991. A non-repressive executive is more likely to "survive" without ratifying with a treaty-qualifying reservation than a repressive executive. A repressive executive is thus more likely to have ratified with a treaty-qualifying reservation before year twenty than a non-repressive executive. The probability of survival decreases over time for both types of executives, and the probability a repressive executive will not have ratified with a treaty-qualifying reservation within forty years is about .973, while the probability a non-repressive executive will not have done so within forty years is .985. Again, a repressive executive is less likely to have survived forty years without ratifying with a treaty-qualifying reservation (i.e., more likely to have done so) than a non-repressive executive. In general, over time, repressive executives therefore have a greater risk of ratifying with a treaty-qualifying reservation than non-repressive executives.

Figure 25 plots survival estimates for constrained executives versus the survival estimates for unconstrained executives with regard to the ratification of human rights treaties with a procedural reservation. The calculations underpinning the graph stem from the results of Model 3A in the paper. As this figure shows, the probability that a constrained executive will "survive" to year twenty or beyond without ratifying a given treaty with a procedural reservation is about .83. In contrast, the probability that an unconstrained executive will survive to year twenty or beyond is about .93. An unconstrained executive is more likely to "survive" without ratifying with a procedural reservation than a constrained executive. A constrained executive is thus more likely to have ratified with a procedural reservation before year twenty than an unconstrained one. The probability of survival decreases over time for both types of executives, and the probability a constrained executive will not have ratified with a procedural reservation within forty years is about .8, while the probability an unconstrained executive will not have

done so within forty years is .915. Again, a constrained executive is less likely to have survived forty years without ratifying with a procedural reservation (i.e., more likely to have done so) than an unconstrained executive. In general, over time, constrained executives therefore have a greater risk of ratifying with a procedural reservation than unconstrained executives.

Figure 26 plots survival estimates for constrained executives versus the survival estimates for unconstrained executives with regard to the ratification of human rights treaties with an article-qualifying reservation. The calculations underpinning the graph stem from the results of Model 3B in the paper. As this figure shows, the probability that a constrained executive will "survive" to year twenty or beyond without ratifying a given treaty with an article-qualifying reservation is about .974. In contrast, the probability that an unconstrained executive will survive to year twenty or beyond is about .985. An unconstrained executive is more likely to "survive" without ratifying with an article-qualifying reservation than a constrained executive. A constrained executive is thus more likely to have ratified with an article-qualifying reservation before year twenty than an unconstrained one. The probability of survival decreases over time for both types of executives, and the probability a constrained executive will not have ratified with an article-qualifying reservation within forty years is about .96, while the probability an unconstrained executive will not have done so within forty years is .976. Again, a constrained executive is less likely to have survived forty years without ratifying with an article-qualifying reservation (i.e., more likely to have done so) than an unconstrained executive. In general, over time, constrained executives therefore have a greater risk of ratifying with an article-qualifying reservation than unconstrained executives.

Figure 27 plots survival estimates for executives facing a powerful legislature versus the survival estimates for executives facing a weak legislature with regard to the ratification of human rights treaties with a procedural reservation. The calculations underpinning the graph stem from the results of Model 4A in the paper. As this figure shows, the probability that an executive facing a powerful legislature will "survive" to year twenty or beyond without ratifying a given treaty with a procedural reservation is about .815. In contrast, the probability that an executive facing a weak legislature will survive to year twenty or beyond is about .915. An executive facing a weak legislature is more likely to "survive" without ratifying with a procedural reservation than an executive facing a powerful legislature. An executive facing a powerful legislature is thus more likely to have ratified with a procedural reservation before year twenty than an unconstrained one. The probability of survival decreases over time for both types of executives, and the probability an executive facing a powerful legislature will not have ratified with a procedural reservation within forty years is about .77, while the probability an executive facing a weak legislature will not have done so within forty years is .89. Again, an executive facing a powerful legislature is less likely to have survived forty years without ratifying with a procedural reservation (i.e., more likely to have done so) than an executive facing a weak legislature. In general, over time, executives facing a powerful legislature therefore have a greater risk of ratifying with a procedural reservation than executives facing a weak legislature.

Figure 28 plots survival estimates for executives facing a powerful legislature versus the survival estimates for executives facing a weak legislature with regard to the ratification of human rights treaties with an article-qualifying reservation. The calculations underpinning the graph stem from the results of Model 4B in the paper. As this figure shows, the probability that an executive facing a powerful legislature will "survive" to year twenty or beyond without ratifying a given treaty with an article-qualifying reservation is about .965. In contrast, the

probability that an executive facing a weak legislature will survive to year twenty or beyond is about .987. An executive facing a weak legislature is more likely to "survive" without ratifying with an article-qualifying reservation than an executive facing a powerful legislature. An executive facing a powerful legislature is thus more likely to have ratified with an article-qualifying reservation before year twenty than an unconstrained one. The probability of survival decreases over time for both types of executives, and the probability an executive facing a powerful legislature will not have ratified with an article-qualifying reservation within forty years is about .945, while the probability an executive facing a weak legislature will not have done so within forty years is .98. Again, an executive facing a powerful legislature is less likely to have survived forty years without ratifying with an article-qualifying reservation (i.e., more likely to have done so) than an executive facing a weak legislature. In general, over time, executives facing a powerful legislature therefore have a greater risk of ratifying with an article-qualifying reservation than executives facing a weak legislature.

Figure 29 plots survival estimates for executives facing a highly independent judiciary versus the survival estimates for executives facing a largely non-independent judiciary with regard to the ratification of human rights treaties with a procedural reservation. The calculations underpinning the graph stem from the results of Model 5A in the paper. As this figure shows, the probability that an executive facing a highly independent judiciary will "survive" to year twenty or beyond without ratifying a given treaty with a procedural reservation is about .81. In contrast, the probability that an executive facing a largely non-independent judiciary will survive to year twenty or beyond is about .93. An executive facing a largely non-independent judiciary is more likely to "survive" without ratifying with a procedural reservation than an executive facing a highly independent judiciary. An executive facing a highly independent judiciary is thus more likely to have ratified with a procedural reservation before year twenty than an unconstrained one. The probability of survival decreases over time for both types of executives, and the probability an executive facing a highly independent judiciary will not have ratified with a procedural reservation within forty years is about .775, while the probability an executive facing a largely non-independent judiciary will not have done so within forty years is .915. Again, an executive facing a highly independent judiciary is less likely to have survived forty years without ratifying with a procedural reservation (i.e., more likely to have done so) than an executive facing a largely non-independent judiciary. In general, over time, executives facing a highly independent judiciary therefore have a greater risk of ratifying with a procedural reservation than executives facing a largely non-independent judiciary.

Figure 30 plots survival estimates for executives facing a highly independent judiciary versus the survival estimates for executives facing a largely non-independent judiciary with regard to the ratification of human rights treaties with an article-qualifying reservation. The calculations underpinning the graph stem from the results of Model 5B in the paper. As this figure shows, the probability that an executive facing a highly independent judiciary will "survive" to year twenty or beyond without ratifying a given treaty with an article-qualifying reservation is about .969. In contrast, the probability that an executive facing a largely non-independent judiciary will survive to year twenty or beyond is about .988. An executive facing a largely non-independent judiciary is more likely to "survive" without ratifying with an article-qualifying reservation than an executive facing a highly independent judiciary. An executive facing a highly independent judiciary is thus more likely to have ratified with an article-qualifying reservation before year twenty than an unconstrained one. The probability of survival decreases over time for both

types of executives, and the probability an executive facing a highly independent judiciary will not have ratified with an article-qualifying reservation within forty years is about .953, while the probability an executive facing a largely non-independent judiciary will not have done so within forty years is .982. Again, an executive facing a highly independent judiciary is less likely to have survived forty years without ratifying with an article-qualifying reservation (i.e., more likely to have done so) than an executive facing a largely non-independent judiciary. In general, over time, executives facing a highly independent judiciary therefore have a greater risk of ratifying with an article-qualifying reservation than executives facing a largely non-independent judiciary.



Figure 21: Survival estimates for transitioning versus non-transitioning executives regarding ratification (in any way)



Figure 22: Survival estimates for transitioning versus non-transitioning executives regarding ratification without substantive reservations



Figure 23: Survival estimates for repressive versus non-repressive executives regarding ratification (in any way)



Figure 24: Survival estimates for repressive versus non-repressive executives regarding ratification with treaty-qualifying reservations



Figure 25: Survival estimates for constrained versus unconstrained executives regarding ratification with procedural reservations



Figure 26: Survival estimates for constrained versus unconstrained executives regarding ratification with article-qualifying reservations



Figure 27: Survival estimates for executives more constrained by the legislature versus those less constrained by the legislature regarding ratification with procedural reservations



Figure 28: Survival estimates for executives more constrained by the legislature versus those less constrained by the legislature regarding ratification with article-qualifying reservations



Figure 29: Survival estimates for executives facing a more independent judiciary versus a less independent one regarding ratification with procedural reservations



Figure 30: Survival estimates for executives facing a more independent judiciary versus a less independent one regarding ratification with article-qualifying reservations

Robustness Checks

We run several models to check the robustness of the results for the event history analyses reported in the paper. While we discuss in the paper why these models are not as appropriate for purposes of testing our theory as the event history analyses, we do find that the results reported in the paper are largely consistent across these models as well. The first set of models runs Heckman selection models, the second set run the event history models from the paper while including a measure of human rights protections as a control variable, and the third set of models are frailty models to check the robustness of the paper's results to unobserved heterogeneity across different treaties.

Selection Models

As we discuss in detail in the paper, selection models are not the most appropriate way to test our argument. Rather than being a decision to ratify followed by a decision regarding what reservations to enter (as assumed by a selection model), ratification and reservation decisions are inextricably linked together – and often occur simultaneously. Despite the difference in substantive accuracy of the selection modeling process, the results of these models are largely substantively consistent with our theoretical argument demonstrating the robustness of our results. The results of the models analyzing transitioning and repressive ratification of human rights treaties, in general (using a simple probit analysis), are reported in Table 2 in this Web Appendix. A model reporting transitioning executives' selection into ratification without substantive reservations is reported in Table 3. A model reporting repressive executives' selection into the use of treaty-qualifying reservations are reported in Table 4. Models reporting selection of executives constrained in various ways into the use of procedural reservations are reported in Table 5. Models reporting selection of executives constrained in various ways into the use of article-qualifying reservations are reported in Table 6.

The selection models yield results that are largely consistent with the analysis reported in the paper. The nature of the difference in risk for different types of regimes ratifying in different ways that are yielded by selection models is substantively similar to the results reported in the paper. Models 1A and 1B in Tables 2 and 3 show that regimes transitioning away from more repressive regimes that have ratified human rights treaties are more likely to ratify human rights treaties and, more specifically, of doing so without entering any substantive reservations. Model 2A in Table 2 shows that repressive executives are less likely to ratify human rights treaties, in general, than non-repressive executives. Model 2B in Table 4 shows that repressive executives that do ratify are more likely to ratify with treaty-qualifying reservations when compared to the likelihood that non-repressive regimes will do so. Model 3A in Table 5 shows that more constrained executives that ratify human rights treaties are more likely to ratify with procedural reservations than less constrained executives. Digging deeper into the institutional sources of this constraining effect, Models 4A, 4B, 5A, and 5B in Tables 5 and 6 show that executives facing a more powerful legislature and executives facing a more independent judiciary are more likely to ratify with procedural and/or article-qualifying reservations. While some of these results are not statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level, many of them are. Most importantly, all these results are substantively consistent with the predictions of our argument – all demonstrate effects in the direction predicted by our theory. The one exception to this consistency in the results is Model 3B in Table 6. The results indicate that constrained executives are less (rather than more) likely to ratify with article-qualifying reservations. The negative effect, however, is not statistically significant, and thus does not explicitly contradict the predictions of our argument. Moreover, this result is not necessarily surprising, as the results of Model 3B reported in the paper are also the least substantively significant of all the results, and thus likely not as robust as the results of the other models.

Overall, despite the fact that selection models are not as consistent with our theoretical argument as event history models, the results reported here indicate that the results reported in the paper are fairly robust, even if the actual ratification/reservation process is not modeled in the most appropriate way.

The fact that ρ is statistically significant in most of the selection models tells us that the

ratification phase and the reservation phases have correlated errors. This means that we need to control for the ratification process to understand the reservation process. This tells us that the simple probit model would not be appropriate, which is useful information as the current literature tends to study reservations without taking into account the ratification phase.

Table 2: Analyzing Transitioning and Repressive Executives' Ratification, in general (probit models)

	Model 1A:	Model 2A:
Transitioning executive	0.012	
	(0.021)	
Repressive executive		-0.007
		(0.018)
Islamic law	-0.029	-0.027
	(0.018)	(0.019)
Common law	-0.115**	-0.117**
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Prior ratifiers (ln)	0.080**	0.081**
	(0.028)	(0.028)
Constant	-2.419**	-2.418**
	(0.140)	(0.140)
Observations	104,764	104,764
log pseudolikelihood	-10364.208	-10364.298
Wald χ^2	72.47	72.21
prob $> \chi^2$	.000	.000

Non-exponentiated coefficients reported.

Standard errors clustered by country-treaty are reported in parentheses.

Table 3: Analyzing Transitioning Executives' Ratification Without Reservations (selection model)

	Model 1B:
No substantive reservations equation:	
Transitioning executive	0.082*
	(0.047)
Constant	2.559**
	(0.059)
Ratification equation (selection equation):	
Islamic law	-0.043**
	(0.017)
Common law	-0.117**
	(0.015)
Prior ratifiers (ln)	0.015
	(0.032)
Constant	-2.083**
	(0.158)
Observations	104,764
log pseudolikelihood	-11498.35
Wald test of independent equations: χ^2	4.51
prob $> \chi^2$	.034
ρ	-.952
	(.082)

Non-exponentiated coefficients reported.

Standard errors clustered by country-treaty are reported in parentheses.

Table 4: Analyzing Repressive Executives' Use of Treaty-Qualifying Reservations (selection model)

	Model 2B:
Use of treaty-qualifying reservations equation:	
Repressive executive	0.247**
	(0.073)
Constant	-3.326**
	(0.048)
Ratification equation:	
Islamic law	-0.047**
	(0.018)
Common law	-0.123**
	(0.015)
Prior ratifiers (ln)	0.072**
	(0.026)
Constant	-2.369**
	(0.133)
Observations	104,764
log pseudolikelihood	-10641.91
Wald test of independent equations: χ^2	63.33
prob $> \chi^2$	.000
ρ	.934
	(.027)

Non-exponentiated coefficients reported.

Standard errors clustered by country-treaty are reported in parentheses.

Table 5: Analyzing Executive Constraints and the use of Procedural Reservations (selection models)

	Model 3A:	Model 4A:	Model 5A:
Use of Procedural Reservations equation:			
Executive constraints	0.037**		
	(0.014)		
Legislative power		0.433**	
		(0.168)	
Judicial independence			0.489*
			(0.209)
Constant	-2.626***	-2.286***	-2.275*
	(0.277)	(0.689)	(1.052)
Ratification equation:			
Islamic law	-0.028	-0.035	-0.034
	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.028)
Common law	-0.177***	-0.121***	-0.112***
	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Prior ratifiers (ln)	0.070	0.125*	0.093*
	(0.039)	(0.049)	(0.043)
Constant	-2.414***	-2.660***	-2.496***
	(0.200)	(0.251)	(0.218)
Observations	104,442	104,674	104,681
log pseudolikelihood	-10005.07	-11057.17	-11086.16
Wald test of independent equations: χ^2	4.37	1.33	.55
prob $> \chi^2$	.037	.248	.458
ρ	.785	.638	.560
	(.194)	(.387)	(.586)

Non-exponentiated coefficients reported.

Standard errors are clustered by country-treaty and are reported in parentheses.

Table 6: Analyzing Executive Constraints and the use of Article-Qualifying Reservations (selection models)

	Model 3B:	Model 4B:	Model 5B:
Ratification with article-qualifying reservations equation:			
Executive constraints	-0.017		
	(0.013)		
Legislative power		0.078	
		(0.151)	
Judicial independence			0.006
			(0.093)
Constant	-3.071***	-3.151***	-3.119***
	(0.066)	(0.049)	(0.054)
Ratification equation:			
Islamic law	-0.040*	-0.058**	-0.053**
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Common law	-0.176***	-0.116***	-0.113***
	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Prior ratifiers (ln)	0.090**	0.132***	0.098***
	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.029)
Constant	-2.514***	-2.692***	-2.522***
	(0.161)	(0.173)	(0.147)
Observations	104,442	104,674	104,681
log pseudolikelihood	-9408.513	-10375.87	-10423.54
Wald test of independent equations: χ^2	3.80	35.86	35.47
prob $> \chi^2$	.051	.000	.000
ρ	.955	.938	.972
	(.085)	(.035)	(.020)

Non-exponentiated coefficients reported.

Standard errors clustered by country-treaty are reported in parentheses.

Event History Models with Human Rights Protections Control Variable

As we discuss in the paper, problems arise with missing data when we include measures of human rights protections as control variables in the analysis. Because this study covers so many years, we face a problem with including variables controlling for human rights protections in a state, as the data from early years in our analysis has not yet begun to be collected. Including such variables drops over thirty years from from the analysis and risks losing data for many states – data that all falls in the earlier years of treaties' ratification processes. When these variables are dropped, we therefore face a significant problem with left censoring. It is the early ratifiers of many of these agreements that are dropped, and thus their risk of ratifying in different ways (which is a substantial part of the data) is omitted from the analysis. In addition, we examine a broad range of human rights agreements that seek to protect many different kinds of rights. It is not clear what specific rights being protected in a state might help to explain ratification across this wide array of different agreements. Given these two issues, we do not include a variable indicating a state's level of human rights protections in the analysis – a choice that is consistent with other recent works in the ratification/reservations literature (e.g., Simmons 2009; Koremenos 2016). However, to test the robustness of our results, we do run models including these human rights protections.

Tables 7 and 8 in this Web Appendix report the results of models controlling for a state's level of physical integrity rights protections and Tables 9 and 10 report the results of models controlling for a state's level of protection of civil and political rights. The results of all models are largely substantively consistent with the results reported in the paper, and illustrate that our results are likely not being driven by the omission of human rights variables.

Models 1A and and 1B in Table 7 show that even when controlling for a state's level of physical integrity rights protections, executives in states transitioning away from more repressive regimes have an increased risk of ratifying human rights treaties, and of doing so without entering substantive reservations. Models 2A and 2B in Table 7 show that even when controlling for a state's level of physical integrity rights protections, repressive executives have a decreased risk of ratifying human rights treaties, in general, and a greater risk of ratifying with treaty-qualifying reservations when compared to the risk that non-repressive executives will do so. Models 3A, 3B, 4A, 4B, 5A, and 5B in Table 8 show that more constrained executives have an increased risk of ratifying with procedural reservations and/or article-qualifying reservations. This is true both for executives facing a more powerful legislature and executives facing a more independent judiciary. All of these results are substantively consistent with our theoretical predictions.

Models 1A and and 1B in Table 9 show that even when controlling for a state's level of civil and political rights protections, executives in states transitioning away from more repressive regimes have an increased risk of ratifying human rights treaties, and of doing so without entering substantive reservations. Model 2A in Table 9 show that even when controlling for a state's level of physical integrity rights protections, repressive executives have a greater risk of ratifying with treaty-qualifying reservations when compared to the risk that non-repressive executives will do so. Models 3A, 3B, 4A, 4B, 5A, and 5B in Table 10 show that more constrained executives have an increased risk of ratifying with procedural reservations and/or article-qualifying reservations. This is true both for executives facing a more powerful legislature as well as ex-

ecutives facing a more independent judiciary.[2] All of these results are substantively consistent with our theoretical predictions. The one exception to this consistency are the results in Model 2B in Table 9, which show that repressive executives have an increased (rather than decreased) risk of ratifying human rights treaties. The effect, however, is not statistically significant, and thus does not explicitly contradict the predictions of our argument.

[2]Note that in Model 5A in Table 10 the independent judiciary variable violates the proportional hazard assumption that underpins the Cox event history models. Analyzing the combined coefficients of the two independent judiciary variables (the independent judiciary variable and the variable interacting the independent judiciary measure with the natural log of time) shows that executives facing a more independent judiciary have a statistically significant, increased risk of ratifying with procedural reservations for the first 40 years a treaty is open for ratification. This covers almost the entire time span a treaty is open for ratification, and is thus consistent with our argument.

Table 7: Analyzing Transitioning and Repressive Executives' Ratification Choices (including control for physical integrity rights protections)

	Model 1A: Ratification, in general	Model 1B: No substantive reservations	Model 2A: Ratification, in general	Model 2B: Treaty-qualifying reservations
Transitioning executive	1.232**	1.331***		
	(0.078)	(0.095)		
Repressive executive			0.874*	1.647
			(0.057)	(0.539)
Islamic law	0.389***	0.804*	0.399***	4.209***
	(0.084)	(0.070)	(0.087)	(1.425)
Islamic law × ln(time)	1.490***		1.492***	
	(0.136)		(0.136)	
Common law	0.446***	0.613***	0.432***	1.214
	(0.084)	(0.045)	(0.082)	(0.368)
Common law × ln(time)	1.211*		1.212*	
	(0.100)		(0.100)	
Prior ratifiers (ln)	0.701	0.495*	0.692	1.632
	(0.190)	(0.154)	(0.191)	(2.281)
Physical integrity rights	0.984	0.979	0.977*	1.040
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.064)
Observations	41,267	48,406	41,267	69,519
log pseudolikelihood	-10609.382	-8047.636	-10612.438	-322.714
Wald χ^2	88.08	85.15	80.25	35.44
prob $> \chi^2$	.000	.000	.000	.000

Hazard ratios reported.

Standard errors are clustered by country-treaty and are reported in parentheses.

Table 8: Analyzing Executive Constraints and the use of Reservations (including control for physical integrity rights protections)

	Model 3A: Procedural	Model 3B: Article-qualifying	Model 4A: Procedural	Model 4B: Article-qualifying	Model 5A: Procedural	Model 5B: Article-qualifying
Executive constraints	1.157***	1.053				
	(0.035)	(0.066)				
Legislative power			2.244**	3.378		
			(0.613)	(2.112)		
Judicial independence					4.496***	3.616*
					(1.120)	(2.209)
Islamic law	0.295*	4.731***	0.297**	5.495***	0.320*	5.750***
	(0.148)	(1.335)	(0.138)	(1.556)	(0.149)	(1.645)
Islamic law × ln(time)	2.110***		1.969***		2.080***	
	(0.430)		(0.373)		(0.395)	
Common law	0.996	1.086	0.465*	1.036	0.760*	0.870
	(0.128)	(0.293)	(0.176)	(0.270)	(0.096)	(0.221)
Common law × ln(time)			1.414*			
			(0.235)			
Prior ratifiers (ln)	0.965	0.873	1.141	0.743	0.727	0.763
	(0.563)	(0.752)	(0.653)	(0.620)	(0.408)	(0.604)
Physical integrity rights	0.970	0.976	0.989	0.951	0.893***	0.887
	(0.027)	(0.056)	(0.025)	(0.049)	(0.027)	(0.059)
Observations	57,548	61,745	62,979	67,436	64,218	68,743
log pseudolikelihood	-2330.770	-469.703	-2495.496	-491.914	-2545.077	-517.003
Wald χ^2	44.11	44.23	30.59	53.90	57.14	54.65
prob $> \chi^2$	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

Hazard ratios reported.

Standard errors are clustered by country-treaty and are reported in parentheses.

Table 9: Analyzing Transitioning and Repressive Executives' Reservations (including control for civil and political rights protections)

	Model 1A: Ratification, in general	Model 1B: No substantive reservations	Model 2A: Ratification, in general	Model 2B: Treaty-qualifying reservations
Transitioning executive	1.192**	1.301***		
	(0.077)	(0.093)		
Repressive executive			1.025	1.551
			(0.080)	(0.582)
Islamic law	0.437***	0.902	0.435***	4.144***
	(0.096)	(0.086)	(0.096)	(1.326)
Islamic law × ln(time)	1.503***		1.504***	
	(0.139)		(0.139)	
Common law	0.449***	0.606***	0.437***	1.098
	(0.086)	(0.045)	(0.083)	(0.362)
Common law × ln(time)	1.194*		1.196*	
	(0.099)		(0.100)	
Prior ratifiers (ln)	0.676	0.465*	0.710	4.338
	(0.187)	(0.146)	(0.199)	(6.521)
Civil rights protections	1.025***	1.020*	1.030***	0.980
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.042)
Observations	41,096	48,192	41,096	69,423
log pseudolikelihood	-10554.387	-8021.747	-10558.031	307.794
Wald χ^2	94.38	84.01	86.38	37.24
prob $> \chi^2$	.000	.000	.000	.000

Hazard ratios reported.

Standard errors clustered by country-treaty are in parentheses.

Table 10: Analyzing Executive Constraints and the use of Reservations (including control for civil and political rights protections)

	Model 3A: Procedural	Model 3B: Article-qualifying	Model 4A: Procedural	Model 4B: Article-qualifying	Model 5A: Procedural	Model 5B: Article-qualifying
Executive constraints	1.226***	1.118				
	(0.049)	(0.103)				
Legislative power			2.336*	5.789*		
			(0.785)	(4.228)		
Judicial independence					20.459***	4.530**
					(10.285)	(2.349)
Judicial independence × ln(time)					0.538**	
					(0.106)	
Islamic law	0.246**	4.514***	1.325	4.630***	1.282	4.328***
	(0.126)	(1.345)	(0.196)	(1.418)	(0.196)	(1.351)
Islamic law × ln(time)	2.224***					
	(0.465)					
Common law	0.973	0.996	0.424*	1.018	0.745*	0.867
	(0.125)	(0.275)	(0.165)	(0.277)	(0.095)	(0.223)
Common law × ln(time)			1.452*			
			(0.248)			
Prior ratifiers (ln)	1.123	1.558	1.369	1.300	0.869	1.554
	(0.673)	(1.157)	(0.804)	(0.985)	(0.500)	(1.090)
Civil rights protections	0.945*	0.935	0.990	0.918*	0.917***	0.890**
	(0.022)	(0.049)	(0.019)	(0.038)	(0.021)	(0.040)
Observations	57,475	61655	62887	67327	64126	68634
log pseudolikelihood	-2284.670	-446.351	-2459.017	-467.374	-2504.990	-492.949
Wald χ^2	50.65	43.22	13.97	54.57	48.75	63.99
prob > χ^2	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

Hazard ratios reported.

Standard errors clustered by country-treaty are in parentheses.

Frailty Models

We recognize that there may be unobserved heterogeneity across different human rights treaties that may affect our results. We therefore run frailty models to help account for this unobserved heterogeneity, the results of which are reported in Tables 11 and 12. Frailty models account for this unobserved heterogeneity by allowing the risk of ratification to vary by treaty. These models are thus similar to random effects models. One problem with these models, however, is that in some of the models with less data there were gaps in the data which make it more problematic to interpret these models as we have to assume that these gaps do not matter, making them less appropriate to use than standard event history models.

Across the board, the results of these models support the results reported in the paper. As Models 1A and 1B in Table 11 show, executives transitioning away from more repressive regimes have a statistically significant increased risk of ratifying human rights treaties and doing so without entering substantive reservations when compared to non-transitioning executives. As Models 2A and 2B in Table 11 show, when compared to non-repressive executives, repressive executives have a statistically significant decreased risk of ratifying human rights treaties and an increased risk of using treaty-qualifying reservations. As Models 3A, 3B, 4A, 4B, 5A, and 5B show, constrained executives, those specifically constrained by a more powerful legislature, and those specifically constrained by the existence of a more independent judiciary have a statistically significant increased risk of ratifying with procedural and/or article-qualifying reservations. All of these results are consistent with those reported in the paper, helping to demonstrate that unobserved heterogeneity across treaties is not driving our results.

Table 11: Analyzing Transitioning and Repressive Executives' Reservations (frailty models)

	Model 1A: Ratification, in general	Model 1B: No substantive reservations	Model 2A: Ratification, in general	Model 2B: Treaty-qualifying reservations
Transitioning executive	1.361**	1.427**		
	(0.080)	(0.094)		
Repressive executive			0.816**	1.766**
			(0.043)	(0.491)
Islamic law	0.422**	0.806**	0.439**	3.033**
	(0.078)	(0.056)	(0.082)	(0.825)
Islamic law × ln(time)	1.380**		1.381**	
	(0.110)		(0.111)	
Common law	0.661**	0.615**	0.471**	1.611*
	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.072)	(0.410)
Common law × ln(time)			1.148**	
			(0.078)	
Prior ratifiers (ln)	0.696**	0.820*	0.712**	1.660
	(0.074)	(0.094)	(0.075)	(2.650)
Observations	65,877	74,948	65,877	103,533
log likelihood	-15661.767	-12243.263	-15665.159	-458.148
LR test $\bar{\chi}^2$	1689.09	882.26	1681.34	74.31
prob $\geq \bar{\chi}^2$	.000	.000	.000	.000
Wald χ^2	149.83	128.18	138.57	34.97
prob $> \chi^2$	.000	.000	.000	.000
θ	1.122	.843	1.116	2.432
	(.297)	(.234)	(.296)	(.990)

Hazard ratios reported. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Frailty models reported, clustered by treaty.

Table 12: Analyzing Executive Constraints and the use of Reservations (frailty models)

	Model 3A: Procedural	Model 3B: Article-qualifying	Model 4A: Procedural	Model 4B: Article-qualifying	Model 5A: Procedural	Model 5B: Article-qualifying
Executive constraints	1.172**	1.105*				
	(0.030)	(0.061)				
Legislative power			3.416**	5.810**		
			(0.809)	(3.134)		
Judicial independence					3.184**	2.746**
					(0.551)	(1.112)
Islamic law	0.396**	4.229**	0.413**	5.148**	0.477*	5.025**
	(0.172)	(1.080)	(0.168)	(1.232)	(0.194)	(1.281)
Islamic law × ln(time)	1.794**		1.642**		1.671**	
	(0.326)		(0.278)		(0.284)	
Common law	0.954	1.084	0.397**	0.943	0.256**	0.874
	(0.107)	(0.253)	(0.134)	(0.210)	(0.087)	(0.196)
Common law × ln(time)			1.460**		1.586**	
			(0.214)		(0.234)	
Prior ratifiers (ln)	1.018	0.459	1.037	0.585	0.897	0.433
	(0.397)	(0.257)	(0.432)	(0.434)	(0.314)	(0.232)
Observations	78,900	84,081	91,289	96,999	92,215	97,933
log likelihood	-2747.309	-592.057	-3094.942	-630.848	-3123.285	-670.304
LR test $\bar{\chi}^2$	660.66	117.48	737.87	131.45	738.86	138.27
prob $\geq \bar{\chi}^2$	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Wald χ^2	48.95	36.69	44.98	47.61	64.22	44.42
prob $> \chi^2$	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
θ	2.251	4.131	2.281	4.308	2.288	4.328
	(.628)	(1.766)	(.634)	(1.821)	(.636)	(1.824)

Hazard ratios reported. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Frailty models reported, clustered by treaty.

Alternative Explanations for Transitioning Executives' Use of Reservations

In the paper, we argue that executives transitioning away from a more repressive regime have a greater risk of ratifying human rights treaties and of doing so without entering substantive reservations. We argue that this is because they desire to "lock in" policies to protect human rights in order to prevent a return to the type of repressive regime the country had previously. However, there are potential alternative explanations for this same ratification strategy. For example, newly developing bureaucracies of the executive branches of transitioning regimes might simply not have the capacity to analyze the legal ramifications of international treaties and construct reservations to head them off. They are therefore less likely to enter reservations. Similarly, the elites of transitioning democracies are argued to have a strong interest in conforming to international human rights norms, and might therefore ratify and do so without reservations in order to most strongly signal their commitment to those norms. We therefore run models that control for these potential alternative explanations.

To control for the difficulty bureaucracies might face in analyzing the legal ramifications of international treaties, we include two variables: (1) the length of the treaty (logged to account for skewness) and (2) whether or not the state was involved in the actual negotiation of the treaty text. First, we expect that it is more difficult to analyze the ramifications of longer treaties. With longer treaties, there is more material to cover, and there are more clauses and articles that can exert various effects that must be analyzed. Longer treaties will thus demand greater resources for analysis. Second, taking into account a country's legal experience in the construction of the treaty might also address this alternative explanation. States involved in the negotiation likely better understand the treaty's ramifications, as this is often a key part of the discussion in negotiations. We therefore control for whether or not a state was involved in the actual negotiation of the treaty.

Finally, the elites of transitioning democracies are argued to have a strong interest in conforming to international human rights norms (Moravcsik 2000), and might therefore ratify and do so without reservations in order to most strongly signal their commitment to those norms. We expect that the variable that captures the number of states that have already ratified a treaty helps to address this alternative explanation. Indeed, the literature shows that states are more likely to ratify a human rights treaty when more states have already ratified it (e.g. Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006; Neumayer 2007; Wotipka and Tsutsui 2008; Simmons 2009; Goodliffe, et al. 2010). One key reason for this result is international pressure (i.e., a norm of ratification). Controlling for this variable should therefore address the ratification pressure that states might feel.

Models 1A and 1B in Table 13 show that even controlling for these potential alternative explanations, the results in support of our argument about transitioning executives' ratification strategies holds. Even controlling for treaty length, whether or not a state was involved in the negotiation of the treaty, and the amount of prior ratifiers, Model 1A shows that transitioning executives have a greater risk of ratifying, in general, and Model 1B shows that they have a greater risk of ratifying without substantive reservations. Our argument is therefore robust to the inclusion of variables that might provide alternative explanations for these results.

We also recognize that transitioning executives, in general, might face political instabilities, and that addressing those instabilities could arguably require them to constrain individual freedoms. Transitioning executives might therefore need to use article-qualifying reservations

to deal with the transitional challenges they face. We do not expect this to hold, as we are not focusing on transitioning regimes, in general, but are specifically focusing on executives transitioning away from more repressive regimes. The leaders of these types of regimes are likely to have preferences that favor more democratic values than the regimes that preceded them. We therefore expect that they would not be likely to work to institute policies that constrain individual freedoms, and thus not need to use article-qualifying reservations in order to do so. We find that this holds empirically. Model 1C in Table 13 reports the results of a model that analyzes the risk that the elites of executives transitioning away from repressive regimes will ratify with article-qualifying reservations. These types of executives do not have an increased risk of ratifying with article-qualifying reservations. They actually have a lower risk of doing so than other types of executives. This decreased risk, however, is not statistically significant. These results are consistent with our argument that executives transitioning away from more repressive regimes are likely to seek to "lock in" policies that protect human rights, and thus to ratify human rights treaties, and moreover, to do so without substantive reservations.

Table 13: Analyzing Transitional Executives Use of Reservations

	Model 1A: Ratification, in general	Model 1B: No substantive reservations	Model 1C: Article-qualifying reservations
Transitioning executive	1.307**	1.382**	0.779
	(0.076)	(0.089)	(0.255)
Islamic law	0.452**	0.845**	3.269**
	(0.081)	(0.057)	(0.671)
Islamic law × ln(time)	1.387**		
	(0.108)		
Common law	0.500**	0.650**	1.069
	(0.077)	(0.038)	(0.224)
Common law × ln(time)	1.179**		
	(0.080)		
Prior ratifiers (ln)	0.848**	0.795**	0.821
	(0.052)	(0.048)	(0.290)
Treaty length (ln)	1.191**	1.065*	
	(0.036)	(0.037)	
Negotiator	1.688**	1.902**	
	(0.241)	(0.303)	
Negotiator × ln(time)	0.848**	0.796**	
	(0.058)	(0.061)	
Observations	65,877	74,948	102,716
log pseudolikelihood	-16473.991	-12672.118	-762.367
Wald χ^2	175.11	136.94	36.56
prob $> \chi^2$	.000	.000	.000

Hazard ratios reported.

Standard errors clustered by country-treaty are in parentheses.

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