

Online Appendix

Appendix 1. Categorization of national identity types in Taiwan

The following battery, adapted from Wang and Liu (2004), asks respondents to define the different components of “my nation”:

What territory constitutes “my nation”?

- Taiwan only
- Both mainland and Taiwan
- Mainland only

Who are “my countrymen”?

- Taiwanese people only
- Both mainland and Taiwanese people
- Mainland people only

Where does “my legitimate government” govern?

- Governs over Taiwan only
- Governs over both mainland and Taiwan

Is Taiwanese culture part of Chinese culture, or are these two cultures different?

- Taiwanese culture is part of Chinese culture
- Taiwanese culture is different from Chinese culture

The table shows how the responses were categorized into three national identity types. Many respondents (N=329) had mixed identities, where the political versus cultural responses were not logically coherent (for example, saying that “my legitimate government” governs both the mainland and Taiwan, but that the territory of “my nation” is Taiwan only). Because the resulting nation-state linkage was unclear for many of these individuals, it was difficult to develop clear theoretical predictions and they were excluded from the main analysis. Adding them into the pooled regression in Table 2 slightly increases the size of the national identification coefficient (0.21, $p < 0.007$), but does not change the fact that we see no interactive relationship (0.06, $p < 0.67$). For analysis using a different categorization method, see Appendix 8.

	Taiwan Nationalists	New Taiwanese	China Nationalists
	<i>Politically and culturally pro-Taiwan</i>	<i>Politically pro-Taiwan, culturally neutral</i>	<i>Politically and culturally pro-China</i>
Political dimension			
Territory?	Taiwan only	Taiwan only	Mainland and Taiwan
Countrymen?	Taiwanese people only	Taiwanese people only	Mainland and Taiwanese people
Legitimate government?	Taiwan only	Taiwan only	Mainland and Taiwan
Cultural dimension			
Part of Chinese culture or different?	Different	Part of Chinese culture	Part of Chinese culture
N	247	345	83

Appendix 2. Placebo tests

Negative interaction disappears without national identification in South Korea

	Logistic	
	Placebos for "National identification"	
	Interest in election	Satisfaction with democracy
National identification	2.01*	-0.83
	(1.12)	(1.31)
Strength of party preference in outcome	0.40	-0.14
	(0.74)	(0.80)
National x party preference in outcome	0.10	1.12
	(1.21)	(1.41)
Constant	-2.01***	-1.62**
	(0.76)	(0.79)
Controls	√	√
Log pseudolikelihood	-900.28	-899.37
N	1568	1566

*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. All variables rescaled 0-1. Models include the same set of controls as Table 2.

Negative interaction holds with different incentives in South Korea

	Logistic	
	Alternative incentive measures	
	Interest in election	Satisfaction with democracy
National identification	0.64*	0.58*
	(0.37)	(0.41)
Incentive	2.65***	0.57
	(0.39)	(0.46)
National x incentive	-0.82	-0.82
	(0.60)	(0.74)
Constant	-1.83***	-1.84***
	(0.30)	(0.33)
Controls	√	√
Log pseudolikelihood	-1210.45	-1210.02
N	2041	2038

*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. All variables rescaled 0-1. Models include the same set of controls as Table 2.

Negative interaction holds with different incentives in Taiwan

OLS			
Alternative incentive: satisfaction with democracy			
	Taiwan nationalists	New Taiwanese	China nationalists
National identification	0.04 (0.18)	0.13 (0.23)	0.55* (0.29)
Incentive	-0.04 (0.14)	-0.10 (0.17)	0.11 (0.32)
National x incentive	0.09 (0.21)	0.06 (0.25)	-0.27 (0.44)
N	244	342	80

*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. All variables rescaled 0-1. Models include the same set of controls as Table 2.

Appendix 3. Duty to pay taxes and national identification in South Korea and Taiwan

Data for South Korea come from the fifth wave of the World Values Survey, while data for Taiwan come from the same Internet survey used in the article. Similar national and subnational patterns hold for the duty to pay taxes as in the duty to vote. In South Korea, national identification is positively related to the duty to pay taxes and leads to meaningful negative interactions with incentives. In Taiwan, its effect is negligible except for China nationalists, where the coefficient is more than three times larger than in the pooled sample (although not statistically significant).

The question wordings were as follows:

South Korea (World Values Survey):

Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified,

never be justified, or something in between:

Cheating on taxes if you have a chance	Never justifiable	Always justifiable
	1 2 3 4 5 6	7 8 9 10

[Coding: Never=10~Always=1]

Taiwan (Internet survey):

Different people think differently about what it takes to be a good citizen. As far as you are concerned personally, how important is it to not cheat on taxes even if you have the chance?

Very important, somewhat important, not very important, not at all important

[Coding: Very important=3, somewhat=2, not very=1, not at all=0]

	South Korea	Taiwan			
		All	Taiwan nationalists	New Taiwanese	China nationalists
	OLS (1)	OLS (2)	OLS (3)	OLS (4)	OLS (5)
National identification	0.43*** (0.12)	0.06 (0.06)	0.09 (0.10)	0.04 (0.09)	0.22 (0.18)
Confidence in government	0.04 (0.11)	0.05 (0.05)	0.13 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.08)	0.09 (0.12)
Income class	0.15* (0.09)	0.07* (0.04)	0.11 (0.07)	0.09 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.08)
Preference for big government	0.30*** (0.08)	-0.0001 (0.04)	0.05 (0.07)	0.006 (0.06)	-0.19* (0.11)
National x confidence in government	-0.11 (0.15)	-	-	-	-
National x income	-0.21* (0.11)	-	-	-	-
National x big government	-0.24** (0.11)	-	-	-	-
Collective values	-0.02 (0.03)	0.24*** (0.05)	0.15 (0.11)	0.03 (0.11)	0.17 (0.19)
Interpersonal trust	-0.01 (0.02)	0.11 (0.07)	0.16* (0.09)	0.35*** (0.07)	0.07 (0.13)
Constant	0.45*** (0.10)	0.40*** (0.07)	0.37*** (0.11)	0.39*** (0.10)	0.64*** (0.20)
Demographic controls	√	√	√	√	√
R-squared	0.09	0.08	0.07	0.10	0.16
N	1175	666	244	342	80

*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. All variables rescaled 0-1.

Appendix 4. Turnout during DPP incumbency, 2000-2008

	Legislative Elections		
	2001	2004	2008
Taiwanese	63.7	54.1	72.4
Chinese or both	68.7	58.6	55.3
Turnout gap	-5.0	-4.5	17.1
N (Taiwanese/Chinese)	52/50	94/97	161/105

Data are from the TEDS Legislative Election surveys. “Taiwanese” and “Chinese or both” refer to respondents’ national self-identification.

The data are from the legislative election surveys conducted by the same university that fielded the Internet survey. No duty to vote question was asked, so to identify individuals who most likely voted out of a sense of citizen duty, I only look at turnout among individuals who expressed no preference in the election outcome. In two out of the three legislative elections under DPP incumbency – especially during the “safe” periods of DPP rule – turnout was still higher among individuals who identified as Chinese or both. The reason why 2008 looks different is most likely because it was merely 10 weeks before the presidential election. Most experts predicted that the KMT would win back the presidency, given the DPP President Chen Shui-bian’s corruption scandals. The potential loss of an opportunity to gradually shift the identity of the state through a prolonged DPP rule may have invoked – more than usual – the national obligation of Taiwan nationalists to vote. During “ordinary” times, however, these patterns suggest that the subnational variation in Table 3 cannot simply be explained away by a partisanship effect.

Appendix 5. Details of the Taiwan survey experiment


Experimental treatment

Control	Treatment
“921 SHAKES THE ISLAND”	“921 SHAKES ISLAND, BUT STRENGTHENS COMMUNITY
<p>On September 21, 1999, a 7.5 magnitude earthquake hit the island at 1:47 in the morning. The disaster, called the “921 earthquake,” did permanent damage to the island’s economy and landscape.</p> <p>A total of 2,145 people died, with another 11,305 injured. 51,711 buildings collapsed entirely into the ground, contributing to the high death toll. The Taiwan Stock Exchange was also closed for almost a week, and several big factories were damaged, causing the country to take a serious economic hit. Nantou County was shaken the most, leaving the landscape in ruins.</p> <p>In total, the damages added up to NT\$300 billion. It was the second deadliest earthquake in the island’s history.</p>	<p>The “921 earthquake,” which hit the island with a force of 7.5 magnitude in 1999 and killed 2,145 people, was a tragedy, but also a moment that brought the national community together.</p> <p>“In my head, any person under that rubble is my own father, mother, or child,” said a soldier who had not slept for several days digging the ruins for survivors. Citizens from all over the island donated food and water for victims, some even opening their homes. Many different charity groups raised a total of NT\$34 billion from individual donations.</p> <p>Despite being the second deadliest earthquake in the island’s history, many remember 921 as the rebirth of national community. It showed the world that people on the island can become one in dark times.</p>

Balance check of pre-treatment covariates

	Control	Treatment	Difference (C-T)	p-value
Percent female	0.43	0.47	-0.04	0.19
Percent Taiwan Nationalist	0.23	0.26	-0.03	0.38
Percent New Taiwanese	0.35	0.34	0.01	0.71
Percent China Nationalist	0.14	0.14	0	0.97
Mean age category	0.33	0.32	0.01	0.35
Mean education	0.86	0.86	0	0.92
Mean collectivist belief	0.47	0.49	-0.02	0.27
Mean trust in government	0.40	0.42	-0.01	0.27

Appendix 6. Manipulation check for Taiwan survey experiment



The treatment produced the same degree of affective boost in closeness to “my nation” for Taiwan and China nationalists, which means that the divergent results are not due to differential performance of the treatment. Error bars mark 95% confidence intervals.

Appendix 7. Summary statistics of key variables

South Korea

	N	Mean	Median	Standard Deviation	Range
Duty to vote (binary)	2046	0.65	1	0.48	0,1
National identification	2046	1.14	1	0.64	0,2
Party preference in outcome	2040	1.41	2	0.84	0,2
Collective values	2046	5.47	6	2.34	1, 10
Interpersonal trust	2045	1.50	2	0.65	0,3
Political interest	2046	1.76	2	0.81	0,3
Education	2047	1.17	1	0.71	0,3
Age (years)	2047	45.14	45	15.04	19,88
Age-squared	2047	2263.75	2025	1420.28	361,7744
Party identification	1570	1.33	1	0.60	0, 2
Voted (Experiment)	2097	0.78	1	0.42	0,1
Duty to vote (Experiment)	336	0.91	1	0.82	0,2

Taiwan

	N	Mean	Median	Standard Deviation	Range
Duty to vote (strength)	675	1.03	1	0.77	0,2
National identification	675	2.04	2	0.77	0,3
Fairness of elections	675	1.00	1	0.79	0,2
Collective values	675	1.41	1	0.82	0,3
Interpersonal trust	675	2.10	2	0.80	0,4
Political interest	675	0.96	1	0.45	0,2
Education	670	2.61	3	0.71	0,3
Age (Categories)	666	1.17	1	1.15	0,4
Age-squared	666	2.68	1	3.84	0,16
Support tax for China	675	0.10	0	0.23	0,1
Citizen duty (Experiment)	675	0.48	0	0.50	0,1

Appendix 8. Robustness check with alternative categorization of national identity in Taiwan

The national identity categorization used for the survey analysis follows the precedent set in the identity literature on Taiwan, but yields a significant number of “mixed” identities who were excluded, as seen in Appendix 1. To check whether the results are sensitive or specific to the categorization method used, I re-run the analyses in Table 2 using a more inclusive categorization method. Research on generational turnover in Taiwanese identity finds that the significance of the cultural dimension is gradually fading, while the *tongdu* (reunification) or political dimension is gaining in importance (Chang and Wang 2005, Cheng and Wang 2017). Reflecting this change, I re-code the categories without the cultural dimension, adding 158 subjects from the previously “mixed” category. The results can be interpreted as a near future projection of how national identification will shape citizen duty on the island, holding constant the perceptions of nation-state linkage at time of data collection. The substantive patterns remain identical to those in Table 2, and if anything, are more exaggerated in size.

	OLS		
	Taiwan nationalists	New Taiwanese	China nationalists
National identification	0.13 (0.09)	0.38* (0.21)	0.87*** (0.29)
Fairness of election	-0.02 (0.13)	0.28 (0.23)	-.58** (0.28)
National x fairness of election	-0.0003 (0.17)	-0.29 (0.30)	-0.76* (0.41)
Collective values	0.05 (0.06)	0.13 (0.13)	-.36** (0.18)
Interpersonal trust	-0.12 (0.09)	0.17 (0.17)	-0.14 (0.29)
Political interest	0.33*** (0.05)	0.17 (0.12)	-0.01 (0.13)
Education	-0.12* (0.07)	-0.12 (0.11)	0.09 (0.16)
Age	0.36** (0.16)	0.29 (0.30)	0.54 (0.39)
Age-squared	-0.38** (0.18)	-0.24 (0.31)	-0.38 (0.39)
Constant	0.37*** (0.11)	0.01 (0.24)	-0.39** (0.19)
R-squared	0.12	0.11	0.31
N	586	140	94

*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. All variables rescaled to 0-1.