Appendix:
Agenda Control and Electoral Success in the U.S. House[*]

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Agenda control distributions

Figure 1 describes the distribution of the majority's agenda control outcomes on final passage votes for all of our observations, labeled by the election year (so, 1990 refers to the agenda success of Democrats in the 101st House). While there is a fairly large amount of relative variability across outcomes over sessions, each session is so dominated by successes that many reasonable readers may become amenable to the argument that the distribution of non-success outcomes is a effectively noise.

Figure 1

Four-part agenda measure results.

The results of the iterative modeling exercise using our four-part agenda are effectively identical to the those of the two-part measure presented in the main text. In short, there is not a single iteration of the model in which even the most forgiving criterion would be satisfied. We walk through several descriptions of these results here. First, in Table 1, we simply describe the recovered distribution of parameter estimates for each of the three covariates: *successes*, *blocks*, and *disappointments*, where *rolls* serves as the omitted baseline category. These distributions were built by sampling from the model posterior in each iteration of the exercise. Therefore, the recovered distributions describe every model that can be estimated with our data. As Table 1 shows, each of the covariates are centered on 0 and span it relatively symmetrically — an indication that the impact of these covariates has a central tendency of no effect.

Table 1: Distribution of Parameter Estimates from Iterative Modeling

| | Parameter Quantiles | | |
Variable	0.025	0.5	0.975
Successes	-0.095	-0.048	0.121
Blocks	-1.505	-0.085	2.048
Disappointments	-1.396	0.017	2.138

Table 2 shows the proportion of iterations that support the hypothesis in one or both of two ways: yielding parameter estimates that are positive for all three covariates or yielding the predicted rank-ordering of the covariates: *successes > blocks > disappointments*. Note that this table does discriminate according to statistical significance, but only according to whether or not the parameters are positive or correctly rank-ordered. The results in Table 2 show conclusively that there no model that produces the predicted effects. All positive parameters are recovered in only 10% of the time. The predicted rank-ordering is recovered only 5% of the time and the predicted rank-ordering with all positive parameters is never recovered.

Table 2: Hypothesis Support from Iterative Modeling

| | | Rank-Order Recovered | |
		Yes	No
All Parameters Positive	Yes	0.000	0.100
	No	0.052	0.848

Finally, we can evaluate the proportion of iterations that yield robust parameter estimates in the predicted direction. For this, our robustness criterion is very forgiving, a *t-value* of 1.6 or higher. Using this criterion, there are no models in which all three covariates are statistically robust. Indeed, there is no model in which the *blocks* component ever produces a robust effect. *Successes* produce a robust effect in about 10% of models, and *disappointments* produce a robust effect in almost 5% of models.

These results comport with the results of the simple two-part measure presented in the main text. Taking these various tests together, we believe that the data are quite conclusive — majority agenda control simply does not produce a direct effect on the electoral fortunes of majority members as Cartel Theory predicts.

Roll rate results.

Here, we present estimates using roll rates, the traditional measurement of majority agenda control. Table 2 displays the replication of the our main models. The expectation is that roll rates would produce a negative effect on the electoral performance of House majority candidates. The estimate on roll rates is in the correct direction, but the standard error is over twice the size of the coefficient. In Figure 2, we replicate the iterative modeling exercise. This reveals that fewer than 1 in 1,000 models produces a negative parameter estimate that approaches statistical significance. Further, the smallest t value is just -1.7.

Table 3: Replication of Main Model Using Roll Rates

Party Rolls	−0.509
	(0.347)
Candidate Rolls	0.052***
	(0.019)
Majority-Minority Spending Gap	0.006***
	(0.001)
Majority Controlled District	−0.060
	(0.046)
Majority Incumbent	0.038***
	(0.010)
Minority Controlled District	−0.040
	(0.046)
Minority Incumbent	−0.067***
	(0.013)
Majority Quality Candidate	0.028**
	(0.011)
Minority Quality Candidate	−0.030**
	(0.012)
Majority Unopposed	0.087***
	(0.008)
District Presidential Vote (DPV)	0.141***
	(0.030)
Presidential Election Year (PEY)	−0.087***
	(0.031)
Majority is Presidential Incumbent Party (MPI)	−0.068*
	(0.038)
DPV × PEY	0.119***
	(0.036)
DPV × MPI	−0.009
	(0.042)
PEY × MPI	0.055
	(0.054)
DPV × PEY × MPI	−0.010
	(0.061)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.386***
	(0.021)
Constant	0.340***
	(0.053)
District Variance	0.000
Year Variance	0.003
Observations	7,289
Log Likelihood	3,802.408
Akaike Inf. Crit.	−7,560.816

Figure 2

Simplified Agenda Measure: Roll Rate

Simplified Agenda Measure: Roll Rate

Success only model

On the advice of an anonymous reviewer, we replicate the main model using only the proportion of successes as our agenda control measurement. The estimate is in the right direction, however, it is far from statistically significant.

Table 4: Main model replication using only successes as the agenda control measure.

Party Successes	0.324
	(0.300)
Candidate Successes	−0.052***
	(0.019)
Majority-Minority Spending Gap	0.006***
	(0.001)
Majority Controlled District	−0.060
	(0.046)
Majority Incumbent	0.038***
	(0.010)
Minority Controlled District	−0.040
	(0.046)
Minority Incumbent	−0.067***
	(0.013)
Majority Quality Candidate	0.028**
	(0.011)
Minority Quality Candidate	−0.030**
	(0.012)
Majority Unopposed	0.087***
	(0.008)
District Presidential Vote (DPV)	0.141***
	(0.030)
Presidential Election Year (PEY)	−0.083***
	(0.032)
Majority is Presidential Incumbent Party (MPI)	−0.065*
	(0.038)
DPV × PEY	0.120***
	(0.036)
DPV × MPI	−0.009
	(0.042)
PEY × MPI	0.055
	(0.055)
DPV × PEY × MPI	−0.011
	(0.061)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.387***
	(0.021)
Constant	0.067
	(0.285)
District Variance	0.000
Year Variance	0.003
Observations	7,289
Log Likelihood	3,801.741
Akaike Inf. Crit.	−7,559.482
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Binary DV models.

Here we replicated the models shown in the main text replacing the dependent variable with an indicator for majority victory. All agenda control measures are still null.

Table 5: Model with binary dependent variable.

| | Dependent variable: | |
| | Majority Victory | |
	Simple	Disaggregated
Party Wins	4.508	
	(5.250)	
Party Successes		5.857
		(5.153)
Party Blocks		10.418
		(16.207)
Party Disappointments		26.309*
		(14.841)
Candidate Wins	−0.331	
	(0.541)	
Candidate Successes		−0.136
		(0.555)
Candidate Blocks		−1.351
		(10.041)
Candidate Disappointments		−10.315
		(9.291)
Majority-Minority Spending Gap	0.111***	0.110***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Majority Controlled District	−1.208*	−1.205*
	(0.708)	(0.707)
Majority Incumbent	0.995***	0.993***
	(0.215)	(0.215)
Minority Controlled District	−0.979	−0.974
	(0.701)	(0.701)
Minority Incumbent	−1.777***	−1.777***
	(0.230)	(0.230)
Majority Quality Candidate	1.149***	1.151***
	(0.204)	(0.205)
Minority Quality Candidate	−1.109***	−1.111***
	(0.208)	(0.209)
Majority Unopposed	−2.251***	−2.274***
	(0.174)	(0.175)
District Presidential Vote (DPV)	3.113***	3.228***
	(0.993)	(0.989)
Presidential Election Year (PEY)	−2.501***	−2.505***
	(0.708)	(0.707)
Majority is Presidential Incumbent Party (MPI)	−1.592*	−1.638*
	(0.833)	(0.836)
DPV × PEY	3.814***	3.754***
	(1.350)	(1.345)
DPV × MPI	−0.214	−0.217
	(1.436)	(1.434)
PEY × MPI	2.313*	2.116*
	(1.263)	(1.264)
DPV × PEY × MPI	−1.734	−1.686
	(2.197)	(2.191)
Lagged Dependent Variable	5.423***	5.425***
	(0.562)	(0.563)
Constant	−6.344	−8.119
	(5.100)	(5.067)
District Variance	0.027	0.025
Year Variance	0.592	0.571
Observations	7,289	7,289
Log Likelihood	−2,015.000	−2,013.023
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,072.000	4,076.046

Note: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Incumbents only

The table below presents results from models restricting the analysis to majority incumbents only. Agenda measures remain null.

Table 6: Model restricted to majority incumbents.

	Dependent variable:	
	Majority Voteshare	
	Simple	Disaggregated
PartyCandidate Wins	0.125	
	(0.440)	
Party Successes		0.180
		(0.488)
Party Blocks		−0.096
		(1.527)
Party Disappointments		1.140
		(1.350)
Candidate Wins	−0.055***	
	(0.020)	
Candidate Successes		−0.038*
		(0.021)
Candidate Blocks		0.382
		(0.364)
Candidate Disappointments		−0.283
		(0.352)
Majority-Minority Spending Gap	0.009***	0.009***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Majority Unopposed	0.087***	0.086***
	(0.008)	(0.008)
District Presidential Vote (DPV)	0.001	0.010
	(0.041)	(0.042)
Presidential Election Year (PEY)	−0.126***	−0.124***
	(0.043)	(0.045)
Majority is Presidential Incumbent Party (MPI)	−0.149***	−0.153***
	(0.054)	(0.056)
DPV × PEY	0.192***	0.186***
	(0.051)	(0.051)
DPV × MPI	0.153**	0.151**
	(0.067)	(0.067)
PEY × MPI	0.181**	0.163**
	(0.079)	(0.082)
DPV × PEY × MPI	−0.234**	−0.223**
	(0.095)	(0.095)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.481***	0.484***
	(0.029)	(0.029)
Constant	0.275	0.188
	(0.418)	(0.472)
District Variance	0.000	0.000
Year Variance	0.005	0.005
Observations	3,661	3,661
Log Likelihood	2,017.365	2,023.258
Akaike Inf. Crit.	−4,002.731	−4,006.515
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Calendar weighting

There is good reason to believe that some votes are simply more important than others in determining the quality of the party brand as a function of their proximity to the election (e.g., Lindstädt and Vander Wielen 2011), and, even though canonical work by Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2005) focuses on the "pure" portion of agenda-setting failures, as has other work aimed at discovering the effect of roll-call voting on individual electoral performance (Carson et al. 2010), it is certainly worth exploring different calendar-oriented weights on majority's agenda-setting performance. Here, we explore a few different weighting schemes that apply different scales to each given its proximity to the end of the legislative period. Each vote is assigned a weight of: $\frac{1}{(d_i/w)+1}$, where d_i is the number of days from end of the legislative session for vote i and $w \in (0, \infty)$ is an arbitrary scaling factor that determines how salient timing is to the weight of the vote. When $w \to 0$, only the last day of voting matters, when $w \to \infty$ all days are equally salient to the roll call record. Some sample scaling parameters are plotted (with jittered points) in Figure 3 to show how w effects the relative vote weights. On each plot, we have marked the weights of votes taken 30 and 120 days from the end of the session relative to votes on the last day of the session, which we designate as the final day of House voting before the election, where all post-electoral votes are dropped.

Figure 3: Plotting the effects of alternate w scales.

What we hope the figure illustrates is that small scaling parameters, values of, say less than 100, place far too much weight on the last few two months of voting and values of 10 or less effectively place all the weight on the last month where any votes taken on the session's final day count 4 times as heavily as votes taken 30 days before session terminates and 13 times as heavily as votes taken 120 from session's end.

Table 7: Some scaling alternatives for calendar-weighted agenda measures

	w = 250		w = 100		w = 10	
	Simple	Disaggregated	Simple	Disaggregated	Simple	Disaggregated
Party Wins	0.376		0.355		0.186	
	(0.308)		(0.270)		(0.150)	
Party Successes		0.428		0.379		0.090
		(0.337)		(0.305)		(0.216)
Party Blocks		0.648		0.882		1.063
		(1.149)		(1.082)		(0.824)
Party Disappointments		0.869		0.523		0.156
		(1.001)		(0.871)		(0.445)
Candidate Wins	−0.055***		−0.056***		−0.047***	
	(0.020)		(0.020)		(0.017)	
Candidate Successes		−0.052**		−0.055***		−0.049***
		(0.020)		(0.020)		(0.017)
Candidate Blocks		−0.238		−0.350		−0.388*
		(0.361)		(0.339)		(0.202)
Candidate Disappointments		−0.336		−0.357		−0.361*
		(0.347)		(0.324)		(0.195)
Majority-Minority Spending Gap	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Majority Controlled District	−0.060	−0.060	−0.060	−0.060	−0.060	−0.060
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Majority Incumbent	0.038***	0.038***	0.038***	0.038***	0.038***	0.038***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Minority Controlled District	−0.040	−0.040	−0.040	−0.040	−0.040	−0.040
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Minority Incumbent	−0.067***	−0.067***	−0.067***	−0.067***	−0.067***	−0.067***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Majority Quality Candidate	0.028**	0.028**	0.028**	0.028**	0.028**	0.028**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Minority Quality Candidate	−0.030**	−0.030**	−0.030***	−0.030**	−0.030***	−0.030***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Majority Unopposed	0.087***	0.087***	0.087***	0.087***	0.088***	0.087***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
District Presidential Vote (DPV)	0.141***	0.142***	0.141***	0.142***	0.144***	0.144***
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Presidential Election Year (PEY)	−0.085***	−0.086***	−0.085***	−0.087***	−0.087***	−0.087***
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Majority is Presidential Incumbent Party (MPI)	−0.066*	−0.066*	−0.068*	−0.066	−0.066*	−0.058
	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.042)
DPV × PEY	0.119***	0.120***	0.119***	0.120***	0.117***	0.119***
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
DPV × MPI	−0.009	−0.009	−0.010	−0.010	−0.015	−0.015
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)
PEY × MPI	0.058	0.052	0.059	0.058	0.057	0.061
	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.057)
DPV × PEY × MPI	−0.010	−0.013	−0.008	−0.012	−0.004	−0.008
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.386***	0.386***	0.386***	0.386***	0.385***	0.385***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Constant	0.020	−0.042	0.042	0.014	0.197	0.286
	(0.294)	(0.327)	(0.257)	(0.296)	(0.142)	(0.209)
District Variance	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Year Variance	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Observations	7,289	7,289	7,289	7,289	7,289	7,289
Log Likelihood	3,802.265	3,803.987	3,802.423	3,803.709	3,801.081	3,801.761
Akaike Inf. Crit.	−7,560.529	−7,555.975	−7,560.846	−7,555.417	−7,558.163	−7,551.522

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8: Decomposition of the $w = 10$ results

	Wins	Successes	Blocks	Disappointments	Rolls	Disaggregated
Party Wins	0.186 (0.150)					
Party Successes		0.165 (0.154)				0.090 (0.216)
Party Blocks			0.755 (0.780)			1.063 (0.824)
Party Disappointments				−0.244 (0.293)		0.156 (0.445)
Party Rolls					−0.161 (0.205)	
Candidate Wins	−0.047*** (0.017)					
Candidate Successes		−0.045*** (0.017)				−0.049*** (0.017)
Candidate Blocks			−0.027 (0.096)			−0.388* (0.202)
Candidate Disappointments				−0.056 (0.093)		−0.361* (0.195)
Candidate Rolls					0.048*** (0.017)	
Majority-Minority Spending Gap	0.006*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)
Majority Controlled District	−0.060 (0.046)	−0.060 (0.046)	−0.060 (0.046)	−0.060 (0.046)	−0.060 (0.046)	−0.060 (0.046)
Majority Incumbent	0.038*** (0.010)	0.038*** (0.010)	0.043*** (0.010)	0.043*** (0.010)	0.038*** (0.010)	0.038*** (0.010)
Minority Controlled District	−0.040 (0.046)	−0.040 (0.046)	−0.040 (0.046)	−0.039 (0.046)	−0.040 (0.046)	−0.040 (0.046)
Minority Incumbent	−0.067*** (0.013)	−0.067*** (0.013)	−0.067*** (0.013)	−0.067*** (0.013)	−0.067*** (0.013)	−0.067*** (0.013)
Majority Quality Candidate	0.028** (0.011)	0.028** (0.011)	0.028** (0.011)	0.028** (0.011)	0.028** (0.011)	0.028** (0.011)
Minority Quality Candidate	−0.030*** (0.012)	−0.030*** (0.012)	−0.030** (0.012)	−0.030** (0.012)	−0.030*** (0.012)	−0.030*** (0.012)
Majority Unopposed	0.088*** (0.008)	0.088*** (0.008)	0.089*** (0.008)	0.088*** (0.008)	0.087*** (0.008)	0.087*** (0.008)
District Presidential Vote (DPV)	0.144*** (0.030)	0.142*** (0.030)	0.140*** (0.030)	0.137*** (0.030)	0.143*** (0.030)	0.144*** (0.030)
Presidential Election Year (PEY)	−0.087*** (0.033)	−0.086*** (0.033)	−0.079** (0.031)	−0.087*** (0.032)	−0.082** (0.032)	−0.087*** (0.033)
Majority is Presidential Incumbent Party (MPI)	−0.066* (0.040)	−0.065 (0.040)	−0.046 (0.037)	−0.065* (0.038)	−0.059 (0.039)	−0.058 (0.042)
DPV × PEY	0.117*** (0.036)	0.118*** (0.036)	0.120*** (0.036)	0.123*** (0.036)	0.118*** (0.036)	0.119*** (0.036)
DPV × MPI	−0.015 (0.042)	−0.014 (0.042)	−0.011 (0.042)	−0.008 (0.042)	−0.014 (0.042)	−0.015 (0.042)
PEY × MPI	0.057 (0.056)	0.055 (0.056)	0.047 (0.054)	0.062 (0.056)	0.049 (0.055)	0.061 (0.057)
DPV × PEY × MPI	−0.004 (0.061)	−0.006 (0.061)	−0.011 (0.061)	−0.014 (0.061)	−0.006 (0.061)	−0.008 (0.061)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.385*** (0.021)	0.386*** (0.021)	0.386*** (0.022)	0.387*** (0.022)	0.386*** (0.021)	0.385*** (0.022)
Constant	0.197 (0.142)	0.216 (0.144)	0.314*** (0.052)	0.335*** (0.053)	0.329*** (0.053)	0.286 (0.209)
District Variance	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Year Variance	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Observations	7,289	7,289	7,289	7,289	7,289	7,289
Log Likelihood	3,801.081	3,800.749	3,800.755	3,799.938	3,801.326	3,801.761
Akaike Inf. Crit.	−7,558.163	−7,557.498	−7,557.510	−7,555.876	−7,558.653	−7,551.522

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Competition weighted measures

An anonymous reviewer asked that we investigate whether variability in the salience of the votes may effect our findings. To this end we have weighted each vote by its competitiveness: $1 - \frac{win - 0.5}{0.5}$, where, win is the proportion of votes on the winning side. Potential win values constrain the measure $\in (0, 1]$. The weighting assigns a value of 0 to unanimous votes and a value of nearly 1 to votes winning just a bare majority. In the disaggregated model the disappointments parameter comes up as significantly positive, but no other portion of the agenda does — this does not support the key implication of the model.

Table 9: Replication of main models with competition-weighted agenda measures.

	Simple	Disaggregated
Party Wins	0.116	
	(0.150)	
Party Successes		0.219
		(0.164)
Party Blocks		0.630
		(0.718)
Party Disappointments		1.116**
		(0.465)
Candidate Wins	−0.046***	
	(0.014)	
Candidate Successes		−0.037***
		(0.014)
Candidate Blocks		−0.094
		(0.206)
Candidate Disappointments		−0.289
		(0.200)
Majority-Minority Spending Gap	0.006***	0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Majority Controlled District	−0.061	−0.060
	(0.046)	(0.046)
Majority Incumbent	0.037***	0.037***
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Minority Controlled District	−0.040	−0.039
	(0.045)	(0.045)
Minority Incumbent	−0.067***	−0.067***
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Majority Quality Candidate	0.028**	0.028**
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Minority Quality Candidate	−0.030**	−0.030**
	(0.012)	(0.012)
Majority Unopposed	0.087***	0.086***
	(0.008)	(0.008)
District Presidential Vote (DPV)	0.143***	0.149***
	(0.030)	(0.030)
Presidential Election Year (PEY)	−0.082**	−0.086***
	(0.032)	(0.031)
Majority is Presidential Incumbent Party (MPI)	−0.059	−0.062*
	(0.038)	(0.038)
DPV × PEY	0.119***	0.118***
	(0.036)	(0.036)
DPV × MPI	−0.009	−0.012
	(0.042)	(0.042)
PEY × MPI	0.052	0.032
	(0.056)	(0.055)
DPV × PEY × MPI	−0.010	−0.012
	(0.061)	(0.061)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.386***	0.385***
	(0.021)	(0.021)
Constant	0.259*	0.126
	(0.142)	(0.163)
District Variance	0.000	0.000
Year Variance	0.003	0.003
Observations	7,289	7,289
Log Likelihood	3,802.405	3,805.419
Akaike Inf. Crit.	−7,560.810	−7,558.838
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01