**Appendix**

This appendix includes (A) analysis of the common (and domain-specific) movement in social spending preferences over time, (B) the table of ordered logit estimations for the same regression models estimated in Table 1, (C) variations on the models of relative preferences (*R*) in Table 1 focusing on the party of the president and respondents’ party identification, (D) an assessment of the specificity of responsiveness to welfare spending vis-à-vis spending in other domestic domains, (E) discussion of the impact of demographics on over-time change in preferences, (F) replication of Table 1 analyses using an alternative measure of relative preferences (*R*), (G) replication of Table 1 analyses using a logged version of *P*t, (H) tests of alternative specifications of demographic variables, and (I) results using detrended variables.

*A. A Factor Analysis of Spending Preferences*

 Previous research demonstrates that preferences for welfare spending covary with preferences for spending in other domains (Stimson 1991; Wlezien 1995; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). This is especially true for social spending domains, preferences for which correlate highly with Stimson’s measure of policy “mood.” To corroborate this pattern over the longer period encompassed by our analysis, we provide principal component factor analyses of preferences in different domains.

Table A1 reports results of this analysis of “net support” for spending – the percentage saying we are spending “too little” minus the percentage saying we are spending “too much”. The top panel column shows an analysis of the nine domains used in Wlezien (1995) and Soroka and Wlezien (2010): cities, crime, defense, education, the environment, foreign aid, health, space, and welfare. These results reveal two primary factors. The first captures the covariance between preferences in the primary social domains and the second taps that between preferences in the other domains, particularly defense, foreign aid, and space.

Of special importance to us is the first factor, which accounts for approximately 39% of the total variance in spending preferences across the nine domains. Analysis of the five social domains in the second panel of Table A1 reveals slightly more structure, where the single factor accounts for almost 60% of the variance. While preferences in these domains clearly covary, they do not move in perfect sync, i.e., they exhibit independent movement in each of the domains. On average across the five domains 40% of the variance is unique; for welfare, the estimate is 46%. This is important because it supports previous research, which shows that preferences for welfare spending are not the same as those in other spending domains; indeed, roughly half is specific to the domain. Some of the existing research shows further that welfare preferences respond thermostatically to spending on welfare, whereas preferences in the other domains respond more collectively, to spending for the social programs taken together (Wlezien 1995; 2004). This is of obvious relevance to our analysis and is replicated in Appendix section D.

[Table A1 about here]

*B. Ordered Logit Models*

Table 1 in the text shows models estimated using GLS. As discussed in the text, the ordered logit models are included in Table A2. Results are substantially the same, i.e., the signs and statistical significance of the coefficients match those in Table 1.

[Table A2 about here]

*C. On the Effects of Partisanship of the President and Respondent*

Models 1 and 2 in Table A3 re-estimate the model of from column 3 of Table 1 including two partisanship measures. (See discussion the *Modeling Preferences for Welfare Spending* section of the paper.) Model 1 includes the partisanship of the president (Democrat = 1, Republican = 0). Here, the negative coefficient implies that the public may be effectively responding to – or “balancing” – the president, favoring less welfare spending under Democrats, though the effect is not statistically significant or even close (*p* = .53). This comports with previous research (Wlezien 1995). Most importantly, the estimated effects of the economic (and other) variables are statistically indistinguishable from those in Table 1.

Model 2 includes the partisanship of the respondent. Party identification has the expected effect that is significant: using a three-category partisanship variable (Republican/ Independent/ Democrat), Republicans are significantly less likely to support welfare spending, and Democrats are significantly more likely to support welfare spending. When including respondents’ partisanship, the coefficients for the other variables in the model remain essentially the same as in Table 1.

[Table A3 about here]

Note that another possibility is that the impact of partisanship is not just a shift in the level of support for spending but that it moderates the impact of other variables, in particular, spending, on individuals’ relative preferences. Interacting spending with party identification (thus allowing Democrats and Republicans to react differently to spending change) suggests marginally stronger responsiveness amongst Republicans: the coefficient for spending – given the specification, capturing responsiveness amongst Independents – is -0.075 (*p*<.001), with an interaction coefficient of 0.004 (*p*=.54) for Democrats and an interaction coefficient of -0.016 (*p*<.05) for Republicans. These findings are in line with work showing that partisan cohorts exhibit different levels of policy support, but they also move largely in parallel over time (e.g., Soroka and Wlezien 2008; Enns and Wlezien 2011; also see Branham N.d.).

*D. On the Responsiveness of Preferences to Spending on Welfare vis-a-vis Other Social Domains*

We note in the paper (and in the Appendix above) that we focus on welfare in part because it is a salient domain in which preferences respond to domain-specific rather than more global trends in spending (see Wlezien 1995; 2004). Table A4 provides confirmatory results. Model 1 includes a measure of social spending, combining welfare, education and health. The more global spending measure is not statistically significant, and including it produces no statistically significant change in the coefficient for welfare-specific spending or for the other variables in the model. This makes clear that welfare spending preferences do indeed respond to welfare rather than total social spending. Employing an even broader measure, including spending on big cities and the environment produces nearly identical results, as can be seen in Model 2 of Table A4.

[Table A4 about here]

*E. Demographics and Over-Time Change in Aggregate Policy Preferences*

 As noted in the text, demographic changes in the survey sample account for some of the over-time change in preferences for redistribution. This is particularly true where the proportion of Blacks and Hispanics is concerned. Based on results in Tables 1 and 2, increasing proportions of both would serve to shift preferences in a pro-welfare direction. Figure A1 accordingly shows the proportion of Blacks and Hispanics in the GSS sample over time. Both increased markedly over the time period, though especially the latter, given immigration. Based on the coefficients in Table 2, these increases will produce an upward trend in *Net Support*. This is just one example of how changes in opinion may be related to over-time changes in demographics. That said, as we see in the paper, the changes in preferences owing to demographics are small relative to those associated with macroeconomics.

[Figure A1 about here]

*F. An Alternative Measure of Relative Preferences (R)*

As noted in the text, there is an alternative version of the spending question that asks about “assistance to the poor,” in addition to “welfare” during a subset of years – 1984-2016. Past work shows the two to be highly correlated over time, but “assistance to the poor” generally garners stronger support overall (Soroka and Wlezien 2010). Appendix Table A5 re-estimates Table 1 using this alternative measure, as a robustness check. Results are very similar, even with the small sample size and reduced number of years for which data are available. The impact of economics is very similar to what we saw with in the text from one model to the next and other variables have similar effects as well. The effect of spending also is similar but for the fully saturated model 3, where the coefficient is negative but insignificant. The estimate is significant (*p*=.06) when the trend is excluded from the model and also note that when estimating the “welfare” model using the same years, the coefficient for spending is halved by comparison with what we observe in Table 1 and the effect is less reliable, with *p*=.05.

[Table A5 about here]

*G. Nonlinear Measure of Spending*

 We note in footnote #10 that logging spending does not fundamentally change results in Table 1 and Appendix Table A6 reports results of the models using this measure. A fourth model then adds the linear version of spending back into the model, which (again) has the effect of making the time trend insignificant. Note that in this last model, although both logged and linear spending are not statistically significant, they are jointly significant (chi=190.79; p<.001).

[Table A6 about here]

*H. Alternative Specifications of Demographic Variables*

 We mention in footnotes #14 and #15 that we have tested other specification of demographic variables used in our analyses. Specifically, we have compared models that use age, logged age, and squared age, to allow for different nonlinearities. All age variables are significant at p < .001, regardless of functional form. Changing the function form of age also make no discernable difference to the variables of substantive interest – coefficients for spending and other macro variables change only at the third decimal place. These models are shown in Appendix Table A7.

[Table A7 about here]

 We have in addition considered alternative versions of the education variables. We are somewhat constrained where education is concerned, as the only consistent education variables in the GSS are (a) last degree earned, and (b) years of school. That said, we have some interest in separately out those who did more than HS but did not complete a degree. We can use years of school to accomplish this, albeit in a rough fashion (>12 but <15 years of schooling). Results in the second column of Table A8 reveals a negative coefficient for both those who finish high school, and those who start but not finish college; and a positive coefficient for those who complete a college degree (all in comparison with those who did not finish high school.) Interacting this somewhat refined education variable with race suggests some variation in the impact of education across racial groups. Results in the final column of Table A8 suggest that, while university education increases support for welfare amongst Whites, it has the opposite effect for Blacks. (The interaction for Blacks in this case is negative, and twice the size of the direct effect.) This certainly matters for those interested in modeling the demographic predictors of welfare support, but the more complex specification shifts the coefficients for our variables of interest – spending and macroeconomics – only at the third decimal place.

[Table A8 about here]

*I. Results Using Detrended Variables*

 We mention in footnotes #23 and #24 the results of analysis in which spending, per capita GDP, and the Gini all are detrended. These results are reported in Table A9. The first model replace GDP with its trending component and the remaining, detrended variation, as referenced in footnote #23. The second includes detrended versions of all macroeconomic variables, while retaining the time trend variable, as referenced in footnote #24. Here we can see that the estimated effects of the economic variables are exactly the same as in column 3 of Figure 1, and the only meaningful changes pertain to the coefficients for the Trend Component of GDP in the first column and the Time Trend variable in the second, both of which are positive and significant. The first of these merely indicates the effect of GDP trend on preferences, which happens to be like that for the detrended component, as discussed in footnote #23. The estimate for Time Trend in the second column represents the net effect of the trends in the variables that we detrended, and is exactly as we expect.

[Table A9 about here]

Appendix Table A1. Principal Components Analyses of Net Support

for Welfare Spending

|  |
| --- |
| 9 Domains |
|  | Factors | Unexplained |
|  | 1 | 2 |  |
| Defense | -.441 | .665 | .362 |
| Welfare | .806 | .129 | .335 |
| Health | .693 | -.384 | .373 |
| Education | .937 | .266 | .229 |
| Environment | .821 | -.410 | .159 |
| Cities | .490 | -.681 | .296 |
| Space | .447 | .699 | .312 |
| Foreign Aid | .557 | .703 | .195 |
| Crime | -.266 | -.749 | .369 |
| Eigenvalue | 3.519 | 2.853 |  |
| Proportion Variance | .391 | .317 |  |
| 5 Domains |
|  | Factors | Unexplained |
|  | 1 |  |  |
| Welfare | .734 |  | .461 |
| Health | .826 |  | .318 |
| Education | .709 |  | .497 |
| Environment | .899 |  | .192 |
| Cities | .673 |  | .547 |
| Eigenvalue | 2.985 |  |  |
| Proportion Variance | .597 |  |  |

N = 30 (years). Table reports factor loadings from unrotated principal components analyses.

Appendix Table A2. Modeling relative preferences, across individuals and

time, ordered logit

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Relative Preferences for Spending  |
|  | B | se | B | se | B | se |
| Spending (100s, per capita) t | -.147\*\*\*  | (.022)  | -.175\*\*\*  | (.015)  | -.205\*\*\*  | (.012) |
| Time Trend | .029\*\*\*  | (.002)  | -.070\*\*\*  | (.024)  | -.010  | (.04) |
| Unemployment t |   |   | .160\*\*\*  | (.037)  | .115\*\*\*  | (.021) |
| GDP (1000s, per capita) t |   |   | .183\*\*\*  | (043)  | .166\*\*\*  | (.018) |
| Gini (\*100) t |   |   |   |  | -.221\*\*\*  | (.034) |
| Female | .010  | (.024)  | .014  | (.025)  | .011  | (.024) |
| Age | -.007\*\*\*  | (.002)  | -.007\*\*\*  | (.002)  | -.007\*\*\*  | (.002) |
| Education (HS) | -.234\*\*\*  | (.027)  | -.233\*\*\*  | (.028)  | -.223\*\*\*  | (.029) |
| Education (HS+) | .057  | (.040)  | .055  | (.039)  | .072  | (.040) |
| Work: Unemployed | .530\*\*\*  | (.069)  | .503\*\*\*  | (.068)  | .499\*\*\*  | (.067) |
| Work: Student/Home/Retired | .309\*\*\*  | (.033)  | .307\*\*\*  | (.034)  | .299\*\*\*  | (.034) |
| Family Income: 2nd Quartile | -.451\*\*\*  | (.029)  | -.458\*\*\*  | (.030)  | -.458\*\*\*  | (.030) |
| Family Income: 3rd Quartile | -.599\*\*\*  | (.038)  | -.614\*\*\*  | (.040)  | -.615\*\*\*  | (.040) |
| Family Income: 4th Quartile | -.650\*\*\*  | (.039)  | -.650\*\*\*  | (.040)  | -.667\*\*\*  | (.039) |
| Race: Black | .923\*\*\*  | (.068)  | .930\*\*\*  | (.071)  | .933\*\*\*  | (.071) |
| Race: Hispanic/Other | .327\*\*\*  | (.057)  | .319\*\*\*  | (.057)  | .320\*\*\*  | (.055) |
| Region: Mid Atlantic | -.196\*  | (.079)  | -.218\*\*  | (.080)  | -.205\*  | (.081) |
| Region: EN Central | -.123  | (.072)  | -.148\*  | (.071)  | -.138  | (.071) |
| Region: WN Central | -.123\*  | (.057)  | -.144\*\*  | (.054)  | -.138\*  | (.055) |
| Region: S Atlantic | -.242\*\*\*  | (.058)  | -.266\*\*\*  | (.056)  | -.255\*\*\*  | (.055) |
| Region: ES Central  | -.258\*\*\*  | (.075)  | -.277\*\*\*  | (.076)  | -.271\*\*\*  | (.076) |
| Region: WE Central | -.270\*\*\*  | (.074)  | -.291\*\*\*  | (.074)  | -.275\*\*\*  | (.074) |
| Region: Mountain | -.139  | (.075)  | -.158\*  | (.076)  | -.150  | (.077) |
| Region: Pacific | -.108  | (.075)  | -.127  | (.076)  | -.115  | (.076) |
| N  | 26,290 |  | 26,290 |  | 26,290 |
| N (groups) | 27 |  | 27 |  | 27 |

Cells contain coefficients and standard errors from an order logit regression estimated with clustered standard errors for years. \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; \*\*\* p < .001.

Appendix Table A3. Partisanship and Public Responsiveness

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Relative Preferences for Spending  |
|  | B | se | B | se |
| Spending (100s, pc) t | -.080\*\*\*  | (.010)  | -.078\*\*\*  | (.004) |
| Time Trend | -.002  | (.008)  | -.005  | (.004) |
| Unemployment t | .046\*\*\*  | (.011)  | .044\*\*\*  | (.005) |
| GDP (1000s, per capita) t | .062\*\*\*  | (.011)  | .063\*\*\*  | (.006) |
| Gini (\*100) t | -.088\*\*\*  | (.020)  | -.079\*\*\*  | (.008) |
| Female | .007  | (.009)  | -.000  | (.009) |
| Age | -.003\*\*\*  | (.000)  | -.003\*\*\*  | (.000) |
| Education (HS) | -.090\*\*\*  | (.013)  | -.074\*\*\*  | (.013) |
| Education (HS+) | .014  | (.015)  | .032\*  | (.015) |
| Work: Unemployed | .199\*\*\*  | (.026)  | .189\*\*\*  | (.026) |
| Work: Student/Home/Retired | .112\*\*\*  | (.012)  | .114\*\*\*  | (.011) |
| Family Income: 2nd Quartile | -.178\*\*\*  | (.013)  | -.175\*\*\*  | (.013) |
| Family Income: 3rd Quartile | -.238\*\*\*  | (.014)  | -.230\*\*\*  | (.014) |
| Family Income: 4th Quartile | -.259\*\*\*  | (.015)  | -.238\*\*\*  | (.015) |
| Race: Black | .374\*\*\*  | (.014)  | .299\*\*\*  | (.015) |
| Race: Hispanic/Other | .127\*\*\*  | (.022)  | .099\*\*\*  | (.022) |
| Region: Mid Atlantic | -.077\*\*  | (.024)  | -.066\*\*  | (.024) |
| Region: EN Central | -.055\*  | (.024)  | -.043  | (.023) |
| Region: WN Central | -.056\*  | (.027)  | -.039  | (.027) |
| Region: S Atlantic | -.094\*\*\*  | (.024)  | -.073\*\*  | (.024) |
| Region: ES Central  | -.105\*\*\*  | (.028)  | -.085\*\*  | (.028) |
| Region: WE Central | -.100\*\*\*  | (.026)  | -.088\*\*\*  | (.026) |
| Region: Mountain | -.055\*  | (.028)  | -.038  | (.027) |
| Region: Pacific | -.045  | (.024)  | -.037  | (.024) |
| Party of President (1=Dem) | .017  | (.027)  |   |  |
| Party ID: Strong/Weak Dem |   |   | .111\*\*\*  | (.011) |
| Party ID: Strong/Weak Rep |   |   | -.169\*\*\*  | (.012) |
| Constant | 3.753\*\*\*  | (.881)  | 3.323\*\*\*  | (.404) |
| N  | 26,290 |  | 26,215 |
| N (groups) | 27 |  | 27 |

Cells contain coefficients and standard errors from an GLS regression estimated with random effects for years. \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; \*\*\* p < .001.

Appendix Table A4. Responsiveness to Social Spending

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Relative Preferences for Spending |
|  | B | se | B | se |
| Spending (100s, pc) t | -.066\*\*\*  | (.010)  | -.066\*\*\*  | (.010) |
| Social Spending (100s, pc) t | -.005  | (.005)  | -.005  | (.005) |
| Time Trend | -.005  | (.004)  | -.005  | (.004) |
| Unemployment t | .046\*\*\*  | (.006)  | .046\*\*\*  | (.006) |
| GDP (1000s, per capita) t | .065\*\*\*  | (.006)  | .066\*\*\*  | (.007) |
| Gini (\*100) t | -.081\*\*\*  | (.008)  | -.081\*\*\*  | (.008) |
| Female | .006  | (.009)  | .006  | (.009) |
| Age | -.003\*\*\*  | (.000)  | -.003\*\*\*  | (.000) |
| Education (HS) | -.090\*\*\*  | (.013)  | -.090\*\*\*  | (.013) |
| Education (HS+) | .014  | (.015)  | .014  | (.015) |
| Work: Unemployed | .198\*\*\*  | (.026)  | .198\*\*\*  | (.026) |
| Work: Student/Home/Retired | .112\*\*\*  | (.012)  | .112\*\*\*  | (.012) |
| Family Income: 2nd Quartile | -.178\*\*\*  | (.013)  | -.179\*\*\*  | (.013) |
| Family Income: 3rd Quartile | -.239\*\*\*  | (.014)  | -.239\*\*\*  | (.014) |
| Family Income: 4th Quartile | -.260\*\*\*  | (.015)  | -.260\*\*\*  | (.015) |
| Race: Black | .375\*\*\*  | (.014)  | .375\*\*\*  | (.014) |
| Race: Hispanic/Other | .129\*\*\*  | (.022)  | .129\*\*\*  | (.022) |
| Region: Mid Atlantic | -.078\*\*  | (.024)  | -.078\*\*  | (.024) |
| Region: EN Central | -.055\*  | (.024)  | -.055\*  | (.024) |
| Region: WN Central | -.056\*  | (.027)  | -.056\*  | (.027) |
| Region: S Atlantic | -.094\*\*\*  | (.024)  | -.094\*\*\*  | (.024) |
| Region: ES Central  | -.104\*\*\*  | (.028)  | -.104\*\*\*  | (.028) |
| Region: WE Central | -.100\*\*\*  | (.026)  | -.100\*\*\*  | (.026) |
| Region: Mountain | -.056\*  | (.028)  | -.056\*  | (.028) |
| Region: Pacific | -.045  | (.024)  | -.045  | (.024) |
| Constant | 3.357\*\*\*  | (.419)  | 3.358\*\*\*  | (.421) |
| N  | 26,290 |  | 26,290 |  |
| N (groups) | 27 |  | 27 |  |

Cells contain coefficients and standard errors from an GLS regression estimated with random effects for years. \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; \*\*\* p < .001.

Appendix Table A5. Modeling relative preferences, across individuals and time,

using “assistance to the poor”, 1984-2016

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Relative Preferences for Spending  |
|  | B | se | B | se | B | se |
| Spending (100s, per capita) t | -.041\*\*\*  | (.008)  | -.076\*\*\*  | (.014)  | -.023  | (.016) |
| Time Trend | .010\*\*\*  | (.002)  | -.001  | (.005)  | .001  | (.005) |
| Unemployment t |   |   | .046\*\*\*  | (.007)  | .017\*  | (.008) |
| GDP (1000s, per capita) t |   |   | .030\*\*\*  | (.005)  | .032\*\*\*  | (.005) |
| Gini (\*100) t |   |   |   |   | -.067\*\*\*  | (.009) |
| Female | .058\*\*\*  | (.010)  | .056\*\*\*  | (.010)  | .056\*\*\*  | (.010) |
| Age | -.003\*\*\*  | (.000)  | -.003\*\*\*  | (.000)  | -.003\*\*\*  | (.000) |
| Education (HS) | -.053\*\*\*  | (.014)  | -.051\*\*\*  | (.014)  | -.049\*\*\*  | (.014) |
| Education (HS+) | -.125\*\*\*  | (.016)  | -.124\*\*\*  | (.016)  | -.120\*\*\*  | (.016) |
| Work: Unemployed | .065\*  | (.026)  | .061\*  | (.026)  | .062\*  | (.026) |
| Work: Student/Home/Retired | -.001  | (.012)  | -.002  | (.012)  | -.004  | (.012) |
| Family Income: 2nd Quartile | -.041\*\*  | (.013)  | -.041\*\*  | (.013)  | -.040\*\*  | (.013) |
| Family Income: 3rd Quartile | -.086\*\*\*  | (.014)  | -.087\*\*\*  | (.014)  | -.087\*\*\*  | (.014) |
| Family Income: 4th Quartile | -.140\*\*\*  | (.016)  | -.139\*\*\*  | (.016)  | -.142\*\*\*  | (.016) |
| Race: Black | .282\*\*\*  | (.014)  | .284\*\*\*  | (.014)  | .283\*\*\*  | (.014) |
| Race: Hispanic/Other | .056\*\*  | (.020)  | .054\*\*  | (.020)  | .054\*\*  | (.020) |
| Region: Mid Atlantic | -.087\*\*\*  | (.025)  | -.090\*\*\*  | (.025)  | -.086\*\*\*  | (.025) |
| Region: EN Central | -.160\*\*\*  | (.024)  | -.162\*\*\*  | (.024)  | -.160\*\*\*  | (.024) |
| Region: WN Central | -.203\*\*\*  | (.027)  | -.207\*\*\*  | (.027)  | -.204\*\*\*  | (.027) |
| Region: S Atlantic | -.152\*\*\*  | (.024)  | -.154\*\*\*  | (.024)  | -.152\*\*\*  | (.024) |
| Region: ES Central  | -.194\*\*\*  | (.028)  | -.196\*\*\*  | (.028)  | -.193\*\*\*  | (.028) |
| Region: WE Central | -.218\*\*\*  | (.026)  | -.220\*\*\*  | (.026)  | -.219\*\*\*  | (.026) |
| Region: Mountain | -.169\*\*\*  | (.028)  | -.170\*\*\*  | (.028)  | -.169\*\*\*  | (.028) |
| Region: Pacific | -.148\*\*\*  | (.025)  | -.150\*\*\*  | (.025)  | -.146\*\*\*  | (.025) |
| Constant | 2.922\*\*\*  | (.034)  | 1.903\*\*\*  | (.163)  | 4.623\*\*\*  | (.397) |
| N  | 19,138 |  | 19,138 |  | 19,138 |
| N (groups) | 21 |  | 21 |  | 21 |

Cells contain coefficients and standard errors from an GLS regression estimated with random effects for years. Ordered logit models are included in Appendix Table A1. \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; \*\*\* p < .001.

Appendix Table A6. Modeling relative preferences, across individuals and time, using logged spending

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Relative Preferences for Spending  |
|  | B | se | B | se | B | se | B | se |
| Logged Spending (100s, per capita) t | -.356\*\*\*  | (.037)  | -.424\*\*\*  | (.033)  | -.453\*\*\*  | (.025) | -.255  | (.274) |
| Spending (100s, per capita) t |  |  |  |  |  |  | -.033  | (.046) |
| Time Trend | .010\*\*\*  | (.001)  | -.029\*\*\*  | (.005)  | -.011\*  | (.004) | -.007  | (.007) |
| Unemployment t |   |   | .057\*\*\*  | (.008)  | .042\*\*\*  | (.006) | .043\*\*\*  | (.008) |
| GDP (1000s, per capita) t |   |   | .072\*\*\*  | (.008)  | .066\*\*\*  | (.006) | .063\*\*\*  | (.009) |
| Gini (\*100) t |   |   |   |   | -.066\*\*\*  | (.009) | -.072\*\*\*  | (.015) |
| Female | .007  | (.009)  | .007  | (.009)  | .007  | (.009) | .007  | (.009) |
| Age | -.003\*\*\*  | (.000)  | -.003\*\*\*  | (.000)  | -.003\*\*\*  | (.000) | -.003\*\*\*  | (.000) |
| Education (HS) | -.091\*\*\*  | (.013)  | -.091\*\*\*  | (.013)  | -.090\*\*\*  | (.013) | -.090\*\*\*  | (.013) |
| Education (HS+) | .013  | (.015)  | .012  | (.015)  | .015  | (.015) | .014  | (.015) |
| Work: Unemployed | .201\*\*\*  | (.026)  | .199\*\*\*  | (.026)  | .198\*\*\*  | (.026) | .198\*\*\*  | (.026) |
| Work: Student/Home/Retired | .114\*\*\*  | (.012)  | .113\*\*\*  | (.012)  | .112\*\*\*  | (.012) | .112\*\*\*  | (.012) |
| Family Income: 2nd Quartile | -.178\*\*\*  | (.013)  | -.178\*\*\*  | (.013)  | -.179\*\*\*  | (.013) | -.178\*\*\*  | (.013) |
| Family Income: 3rd Quartile | -.237\*\*\*  | (.014)  | -.239\*\*\*  | (.014)  | -.239\*\*\*  | (.014) | -.238\*\*\*  | (.014) |
| Family Income: 4th Quartile | -.258\*\*\*  | (.015)  | -.257\*\*\*  | (.015)  | -.260\*\*\*  | (.015) | -.260\*\*\*  | (.015) |
| Race: Black | .374\*\*\*  | (.014)  | .374\*\*\*  | (.014)  | .374\*\*\*  | (.014) | .374\*\*\*  | (.014) |
| Race: Hispanic/Other | .129\*\*\*  | (.022)  | .127\*\*\*  | (.022)  | .128\*\*\*  | (.022) | .128\*\*\*  | (.022) |
| Region: Mid Atlantic | -.076\*\*  | (.024)  | -.079\*\*  | (.024)  | -.077\*\*  | (.024) | -.077\*\*  | (.024) |
| Region: EN Central | -.053\*  | (.024)  | -.056\*  | (.024)  | -.055\*  | (.024) | -.055\*  | (.024) |
| Region: WN Central | -.054\*  | (.027)  | -.057\*  | (.027)  | -.056\*  | (.027) | -.056\*  | (.027) |
| Region: S Atlantic | -.092\*\*\*  | (.024)  | -.095\*\*\*  | (.024)  | -.094\*\*\*  | (.024) | -.094\*\*\*  | (.024) |
| Region: ES Central  | -.103\*\*\*  | (.028)  | -.105\*\*\*  | (.028)  | -.104\*\*\*  | (.028) | -.104\*\*\*  | (.028) |
| Region: WE Central | -.100\*\*\*  | (.026)  | -.102\*\*\*  | (.026)  | -.100\*\*\*  | (.026) | -.100\*\*\*  | (.026) |
| Region: Mountain | -.055\*  | (.028)  | -.057\*  | (.028)  | -.056\*  | (.028) | -.056\*  | (.028) |
| Region: Pacific | -.045  | (.025)  | -.047  | (.024)  | -.045  | (.024) | -.045  | (.024) |
| Constant | 2.453\*\*\*  | (.064)  | .237  | (.260)  | 3.162\*\*\*  | (.452) | 3.303\*\*\*  | (.616) |
| N  | 26,290 | 26,290 | 26,290 | 26,290 |
| N (groups) | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 |

Cells contain coefficients and standard errors from an GLS regression estimated with random effects for years. Ordered logit models are included in Appendix Table A1. \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; \*\*\* p < .001.

Appendix Table A7. Additional models of relative preferences for welfare spending: alternative specifications for age

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Relative Preferences for Spending |
|  | B | se | B | se | B | se |
| Spending (100s, pc) t | -.075\*\*\*  | (.005)  | -.075\*\*\*  | (.005)  | -.075\*\*\*  | (.005)  |
| Time Trend | -.004  | (.005)  | -.004  | (.005)  | -.004  | (.005)  |
| Unemployment t | .044\*\*\*  | (.007)  | .044\*\*\*  | (.007)  | .044\*\*\*  | (.007)  |
| GDP (1000s, per capita) t | .061\*\*\*  | (.008)  | .061\*\*\*  | (.008)  | .061\*\*\*  | (.007)  |
| Gini (\*100) t | -.080\*\*\*  | (.011)  | -.080\*\*\*  | (.011)  | -.081\*\*\*  | (.011)  |
| Female | .007  | (.009)  | .008  | (.009)  | .006  | (.009)  |
| Age | -.003\*\*\*  | (.000)  |   |   |   |   |
| Age (logged) |  |  | -.128\*\*\*  | (.013)  |  |  |
| Age (squared) |  |  |  |  | -.000\*\*\*  | (.000)  |
| V1: Education (HS) | -.090\*\*\*  | (.013)  | -.090\*\*\*  | (.013)  | -.089\*\*\*  | (.013)  |
| V1: Education (HS+) | .014  | (.015)  | .016  | (.015)  | .014  | (.015)  |
| V2: Education (12 yrs) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| V2: Education (13-15 yrs) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| V2: Education (>15 yrs) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Work: Unemployed | .198\*\*\*  | (.026)  | .199\*\*\*  | (.026)  | .198\*\*\*  | (.026)  |
| Work: Student/Home/Retired | .112\*\*\*  | (.012)  | .105\*\*\*  | (.011)  | .115\*\*\*  | (.012)  |
| Family Income: 2nd Quartile | -.178\*\*\*  | (.013)  | -.176\*\*\*  | (.013)  | -.180\*\*\*  | (.013)  |
| Family Income: 3rd Quartile | -.238\*\*\*  | (.014)  | -.234\*\*\*  | (.014)  | -.243\*\*\*  | (.014)  |
| Family Income: 4th Quartile | -.260\*\*\*  | (.015)  | -.254\*\*\*  | (.015)  | -.265\*\*\*  | (.015)  |
| Race: Black | .374\*\*\*  | (.014)  | .376\*\*\*  | (.014)  | .374\*\*\*  | (.014)  |
| Race: Hispanic/Other | .128\*\*\*  | (.022)  | .128\*\*\*  | (.022)  | .129\*\*\*  | (.022)  |
| Region: Mid Atlantic | -.077\*\*  | (.024)  | -.077\*\*  | (.024)  | -.078\*\*  | (.024)  |
| Region: EN Central | -.055\*  | (.024)  | -.055\*  | (.024)  | -.055\*  | (.024)  |
| Region: WN Central | -.056\*  | (.027)  | -.056\*  | (.027)  | -.056\*  | (.027)  |
| Region: S Atlantic | -.094\*\*\*  | (.024)  | -.093\*\*\*  | (.024)  | -.094\*\*\*  | (.024)  |
| Region: ES Central  | -.104\*\*\*  | (.028)  | -.104\*\*\*  | (.028)  | -.105\*\*\*  | (.028)  |
| Region: WE Central | -.100\*\*\*  | (.026)  | -.100\*\*\*  | (.026)  | -.100\*\*\*  | (.026)  |
| Region: Mountain | -.056\*  | (.028)  | -.055\*  | (.028)  | -.056\*  | (.028)  |
| Region: Pacific | -.045  | (.024)  | -.045  | (.024)  | -.045  | (.024)  |
| Constant | 3.467\*\*\*  | (.539)  | 3.785\*\*\*  | (.539)  | 3.422\*\*\*  | (.527)  |
| N  | 26,290 |  | 26,290 |  | 26,215 |
| N (groups) | 27 |  | 27 |  | 27 |

Cells contain coefficients and standard errors from an GLS regression estimated with random effects for years. \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; \*\*\* p < .001.

Appendix Table A8. Additional models of relative preferences for welfare spending: alternative specifications for education (and race)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Relative Preferences for Spending |
|  | B | se | B | se | B | se |
| Spending (100s, pc) t | -.075\*\*\*  | (.005)  | -.074\*\*\*  | (.004)  | -.074\*\*\*  | (.004) |
| Time Trend | -.004  | (.005)  | -.006  | (.004)  | -.006  | (.004) |
| Unemployment t | .044\*\*\*  | (.007)  | .045\*\*\*  | (.006)  | .045\*\*\*  | (.006) |
| GDP (1000s, per capita) t | .061\*\*\*  | (.008)  | .064\*\*\*  | (.006)  | .064\*\*\*  | (.006) |
| Gini (\*100) t | -.080\*\*\*  | (.011)  | -.080\*\*\*  | (.009)  | -.080\*\*\*  | (.009) |
| Female | .007  | (.009)  | .008  | (.010)  | .008  | (.010) |
| Age | -.003\*\*\*  | (.000)  | -.003\*\*\*  | (.000)  | -.003\*\*\*  | (.000) |
| V1: Education (HS) | -.090\*\*\*  | (.013)  |   |   |   |  |
| V1: Education (HS+) | .014  | (.015)  |   |   |   |  |
| V2: Education (12 yrs) |   |   | -.076\*\*\*  | (.013)  | -.068\*\*\*  | (.015) |
| V2: Education (13-15 yrs) |   |   | -.091\*\*\*  | (.015)  | -.079\*\*\*  | (.017) |
| V2: Education (>15 yrs) |   |   | .048\*\*  | (.015)  | .064\*\*\*  | (.017) |
| Work: Unemployed | .198\*\*\*  | (.026)  | .198\*\*\*  | (.026)  | .197\*\*\*  | (.026) |
| Work: Student/Home/Retired | .112\*\*\*  | (.012)  | .113\*\*\*  | (.012)  | .112\*\*\*  | (.012) |
| Family Income: 2nd Quartile | -.178\*\*\*  | (.013)  | -.174\*\*\*  | (.013)  | -.172\*\*\*  | (.013) |
| Family Income: 3rd Quartile | -.238\*\*\*  | (.014)  | -.236\*\*\*  | (.014)  | -.234\*\*\*  | (.014) |
| Family Income: 4th Quartile | -.260\*\*\*  | (.015)  | -.261\*\*\*  | (.015)  | -.260\*\*\*  | (.015) |
| Race: Black | .374\*\*\*  | (.014)  | .381\*\*\*  | (.015)  | .447\*\*\*  | (.027) |
|  V2: Education (12 yrs) \* Black |   |   |   |   | -.059  | (.037) |
|  V2: Education (13-15 yrs) \* Black |   |   |   |   | -.094\*  | (.040) |
|  V2: Education (>15 yrs) \* Black |   |   |   |   | -.159\*\*\*  | (.045) |
| Race: Hispanic/Other | .128\*\*\*  | (.022)  | .122\*\*\*  | (.022)  | .106\*  | (.043) |
|  V2: Education (12 yrs) \* Hisp |   |   |   |   | .025  | (.061) |
|  V2: Education (13-15 yrs) \* Hisp |   |   |   |   | .040  | (.062) |
|  V2: Education (>15 yrs) \* Hisp |   |   |   |   | .003  | (.059) |
| Region: Mid Atlantic | -.077\*\*  | (.024)  | -.068\*\*  | (.025)  | -.068\*\*  | (.025) |
| Region: EN Central | -.055\*  | (.024)  | -.049\*  | (.024)  | -.048\*  | (.024) |
| Region: WN Central | -.056\*  | (.027)  | -.047  | (.027)  | -.046  | (.027) |
| Region: S Atlantic | -.094\*\*\*  | (.024)  | -.086\*\*\*  | (.024)  | -.085\*\*\*  | (.024) |
| Region: ES Central  | -.104\*\*\*  | (.028)  | -.092\*\*  | (.028)  | -.092\*\*  | (.028) |
| Region: WE Central | -.100\*\*\*  | (.026)  | -.094\*\*\*  | (.027)  | -.093\*\*\*  | (.027) |
| Region: Mountain | -.056\*  | (.028)  | -.057\*  | (.028)  | -.057\*  | (.028) |
| Region: Pacific | -.045  | (.024)  | -.036  | (.025)  | -.036  | (.025) |
| Constant | 3.467\*\*\*  | (.539)  | 3.315\*\*\*  | (.417)  | 3.325\*\*\*  | (.417) |
| N  | 26,290 |  | 25,117 |  | 25,117 |
| N (groups) | 27 |  | 27 |  | 27 |

Cells contain coefficients and standard errors from an GLS regression estimated with random effects for years. \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; \*\*\* p < .001.

Table A9. Additional models of relative preferences for welfare spending: detrended macroeconomic variables

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Relative Preferences for Spending  |
|  | B | se | B | se |
| Spending (100s, per capita) t | -.075\*\*\*  | (.005)  |   |  |
|  Detrended component |   |   | -.075\*\*\*  | (.005) |
| Time Trend |   |   | .004\*\*\*  | (.001) |
| Unemployment t | .044\*\*\*  | (.007)  |   |  |
|  Detrended component |   |   | .044\*\*\*  | (.007) |
| GDP (1000s, per capita) t |  |  |  |  |
|  Trend component | .055\*\*\*  | (.004)  |   |  |
|  Detrended component | .061\*\*\*  | (.008)  | .061\*\*\*  | (.008) |
| Gini (\*100) t  | -.080\*\*\*  | (.011)  |   |  |
|  Detrended component |   |   | -.080\*\*\*  | (.011) |
| Female | .007  | (.009)  | .007  | (.009) |
| Age | -.003\*\*\*  | (.000)  | -.003\*\*\*  | (.000) |
| Education (HS) | -.090\*\*\*  | (.013)  | -.090\*\*\*  | (.013) |
| Education (HS+) | .014  | (.015)  | .014  | (.015) |
| Work: Unemployed | .198\*\*\*  | (.026)  | .198\*\*\*  | (.026) |
| Work: Student/Home/Retired | .112\*\*\*  | (.012)  | .112\*\*\*  | (.012) |
| Family Income: 2nd Quartile | -.178\*\*\*  | (.013)  | -.178\*\*\*  | (.013) |
| Family Income: 3rd Quartile | -.238\*\*\*  | (.014)  | -.238\*\*\*  | (.014) |
| Family Income: 4th Quartile | -.260\*\*\*  | (.015)  | -.260\*\*\*  | (.015) |
| Race: Black | .374\*\*\*  | (.014)  | .374\*\*\*  | (.014) |
| Race: Hispanic/Other | .128\*\*\*  | (.022)  | .128\*\*\*  | (.022) |
| Region: Mid Atlantic | -.077\*\*  | (.024)  | -.077\*\*  | (.024) |
| Region: EN Central | -.055\*  | (.024)  | -.055\*  | (.024) |
| Region: WN Central | -.056\*  | (.027)  | -.056\*  | (.027) |
| Region: S Atlantic | -.094\*\*\*  | (.024)  | -.094\*\*\*  | (.024) |
| Region: ES Central  | -.104\*\*\*  | (.028)  | -.104\*\*\*  | (.028) |
| Region: WE Central | -.100\*\*\*  | (.026)  | -.100\*\*\*  | (.026) |
| Region: Mountain | -.056\*  | (.028)  | -.056\*  | (.028) |
| Region: Pacific | -.045  | (.024)  | -.045  | (.024) |
| Constant | 3.638\*\*\*  | (.351)  | 1.934\*\*\*  | (.031) |
| N  | 26,290 |  | 26,290 |  |
| N (groups) | 27 |  | 27 |  |

Cells contain coefficients and standard errors from an GLS regression estimated with random effects for years. \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; \*\*\* p < .001.

Appendix Figure A1. Changes in the Racial Composition of the GSS

