Online Appendix

A Figures and Tables

Due to space constraints, we place several Figures and Tables referenced in the manuscript in the Online Appendix.

Figure OA1: Figure 5, Open-Ended Responses, Divided by Party



Note: This figure repeats Figure 5 (reproduced at left) for Democratic and Republican party chairs, plotting the percent of each party who gave a response falling into each category to an open-ended question about the ideal traits for candidates to have.

Figure OA2: Party Leaders' Preferences In Primaries: Generalizability across partisan contexts

(a) Objectively competitive counties



(b) Republican-leaning counties (2012 Obama Vote Share $< 40\%$)



(c) Democratic-leaning counties (2012 Obama Vote Share $> 60\%$)



(d) Subjectively competitive counties



Note: This figure repeats the analysis in Figure 2 in the main text, dividing counties by their partisan leanings. Objectively competitive counties (Panel (a)) are those in which Obama won between 40% and 60% of the two-party vote in the 2012 presidential election. Panel (b) repeats the analysis in only Republican- leaning counties where Obama received less than 40% of the two-party vote. Panel (c) repeats the analysis in counties where Obama won easily with greater than 60% of the vote. Panel (d) repeats the analysis in counties where chairs reported that they perceive between 26% and 75% of races are safe for their party's candidates.

Figure OA3: Party leaders expect extremists to toe the party line

(a) Objectively competitive counties



(b) Subjectively competitive counties



Note: This figure presents results for the conjoint experiment outcome, "Which candidate is more likely to stay loyal to the party?" Objectively competitive counties (Panel (a)) are those in which Obama won between 40% and 60% of the two-party vote in the 2012 presidential election. Subjectively competitive counties (Panel (d)) are those where chairs reported that they perceive between 26% and 75% of races are safe for their party's candidates.

Figure OA4: Party Leaders' Expectations About Electability: Generalizability across partisan contexts

(a) Objectively competitive counties



(b) Republican-leaning counties (2012 Obama Vote Share $< 40\%$)



(c) Democratic-leaning counties (2012 Obama Vote Share $> 60\%$)



(d) Subjectively competitive counties



Note: This figure presents results for the conjoint experiment outcome, "Which candidate is more likely to win the general election?" Panel (a) reports results in counties where Obama won between 40% and 60% of the two-party vote in the 2012 presidential election. Panel (b) repeats the analysis in only Republican- leaning counties where Obama received less than 40% of the two-party vote. Panel (c) repeats the analysis in counties where Obama won easily with greater than 60% of the vote. Panel (d) repeats the analysis in counties where chairs reported that they perceive between 26% and 75% of races are safe for their party's candidates.

Figure OA5: Party leaders expect extremists to be more successful raising money and recruiting volunteers

(a)



(b)



Note: This figure presents results for the conjoint experiment outcome, "Which candidate is more likely to raise enough money?" (Panel (a)) and the outcome "Which candidate is more likely to recruit enough volunteers? (Panel (b)).

Table OA1: Robustness of Partisan Difference in Finding 3 to Control for 2012 Obama Vote Share

	DV = Mentioned Ideological Loyalty
Republican Chair	0.256***
	(0.068)
2012 Obama Vote Share	-0.028
	(0.223)
Constant	0.168*
	(0.099)
Observations	175
R-squared	0.076

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: This table shows that, even controlling for presidential vote share in counties, Republican chairs are more likely to mention ideological loyalty as a desirable trait for candidates.

B Representativeness

This section provides information on how representative NSPL respondents are of the broader population of county party chairs using data from the sampling frame and from another survey of county party chairs.

B.1 Representativeness of Survey Respondents to Sampling Frame

As described in the main text, Figures OA6 and OA7 show the distribution of Obama's 2012 vote share and county population, respectively, among survey respondents and non-respondents. Note that these statistics are not available for the 20% of party chairs in our sampling frame from states whose parties are organized at a level other than county (see Footnote 12 in the main text).

Figure OA6: Obama 2012 County Vote Share Among Survey Respondents and Non-Respondents



Figure OA7: County Population Among Respondents and Non-Respondents



Table OA2: Comparisons of respondents to sampling frame.

Variable	p-value	t-test p-value
County population (log)	0.00	0.00
Obama vote share	0.76	0.74

Table OA3 reports linear regression models predicting whether party leaders responded to the survey as a function of covariates. The only significant coefficient is the finding that party leaders in larger counties were slightly more likely to respond. The first model in Table OA3 shows the results for all parties organized at the county level. As described in Footnote 12 in the main text, in 20% of cases, local political parties are not organized at the county level but instead at levels (e.g., townships, etc.) for which data on Obama vote share and population is not readily available. These parties are therefore missing from the first regression as there is missing data for those two covariates. The second regression contains all the local parties from whom we solicited a response.

We attempted to determine chair gender from first name, although in 20% of cases we were unable to do so conclusively. The omitted category for gender in the regression is this unknown category. The remaining 80% of chairs in the sampling frame were 33% female and 67% male. Chairs with known genders were slightly more likely to respond (by about 2 percentage points, although this is not statistically significant), but there was no difference between the response rates of male and female chairs.

Table OA3: Predictors of NSPL Survey Response

	Counties	All Parties
Female Chair	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Male Chair	0.02	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Republican Chair	0.06	−0.00
	(0.08)	(0.01)
2012 Obama Vote Share	0.00	
	(0.04)	
log(county population)	0.02*	
	(0.01)	
2012 Obama Vote Share X	−0.07	
Republican Chair	(0.06)	
log(county population) X	−0.00	
Republican Chair	(0.01)	
(Intercept)	−0.04	0.17*
	(0.06)	(0.01)
N	4933	6217
R^2	0.01	0.00
F-statistic	3.554	0.6512
F-statistic p-value	0.001	0.58

Standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Note: This table shows predictors of responding to the NSPL from a linear probability model fit the entire sample frame. The first column reports the results for chairs whose parties are organized at the county level (where we have presidential vote share and population data available); the second column shows results for the entire sampling frame.

B.2 Representativeness of Respondents to Open Ended Question to Sampling Frame

Respondents to the open-ended item used in Finding 3 were similarly representative to non-respondents.

Figure OA8: Obama 2012 Two-Party Vote Share Among Open End Respondents and Non-Respondents



Figure OA9: County Population Among Open End Respondents and Non-Respondents



B.3 Comparison to 2008 party leaders survey: Ideology

As another point of comparison, we compare our 2013 survey data to a 2008 survey conducted by Crowder-Meyer (2010) that achieved a high response rate of 45.5%. For this survey, Crowder-Meyer conducted intensive individual follow-up contact with party chairs to encourage more responses. Although our survey response rate was relatively high, this very high response rate survey should be less subject to any potential selection issues and therefore serves as a useful point of comparison.

Figure OA10 plot the distributions of self-reported ideology for Democratic and Republican chairs in the two surveys. Reassuringly, the two samples have almost identical distributions of ideological identification. This suggests that, despite having a lower response rate, the respondents to our 2013 survey are unlikely to be biased in terms of their ideology compared to the population of party chairs. The only notable difference is that slightly more Democratic chairs placed themselves

at the "liberal" position than the "somewhat liberal" or "moderate" in 2013 than in 2008, but as our main result about Democrats is that they do not behave as extremely as Republicans, this should bias against our findings.

Figure OA10: Comparison of sample ideology in 2008 (black) and 2013 (grey) party leaders surveys. Higher values indicate more conservative ideology.



B.4 Professionalization of county party

As a final check of the representativeness of our sample, we evaluated the professionalization and financial resources of our respondents compared to the full sampling frame. We evaluated party professionalization using a strict standard – whether the county party spends money in federal races and a looser standard – whether the county party maintains a year-round physical office.

We evaluated the full set of committees registered with the FEC in 2013-14 using the Committee Master File, to identify all party committees (type X or Y) associated with a county party organization (137 total). We then compared these parties (which may be considered more professional by virtue of having filed with the FEC in order to spend funds in federal elections) to the list of parties that did or did not respond to our survey. 1.88% of our survey respondent parties have committees registered with the FEC, compared to 2.27% of parties that did not respond to our

survey. We also compared the proportion of parties responding to our survey who reported having a year round office (25.96%) with the proportion of parties reporting this same indicator of professionalism in Crowder-Meyer's 2008 survey of county parties (19.63%) with a 45.5% response rate. These small differences, one suggesting slightly less professionalism in our survey respondents (FEC filing), the other suggesting slightly more professionalism in our survey respondents (year round office) leads us to conclude that there is not a substantial bias toward more or less professionalized parties responding to our survey.

C Details of Raw Data Estimation Procedure for Party Leaders' Misperceptions of Public Opinion

Here we explain how we estimate party leaders' misperceptions of public opinion using the raw data despite lacking large county- or state-level samples.

Let C represent the set of all CCES respondents who live in counties where a party leader responded to the survey, with respondents indexed by c and issues by i. Denote opinions expressed on issue i by CCES respondent c as $o_{c,i}$. All the CCES questions we use are binary choice, such that $o_{c,i} \in \{0, 1\}$. Let $p_{c,i}$ represent the perception of the party leader in c's county of average support for issue i; that is, $p_{c,i}$ is a party leader's estimate of $E(o_{c,i})$ for their county. The average of $p_{c,i} - o_{c,i}$ within each county thus captures an estimate of party leaders' average overestimation of support for policy i. For example, suppose a party leader perceives support for a policy in their county at 80% but true support is only 60%. In this example, $E(p_{c,i} - o_{c,i}) = 0.8 - E(o_{c,i}) = 0.8 - 0.6 = 0.2$. Although the estimate for any given chair and county will be imprecise, we can estimate party leaders' *average* overestimation of support for i, by estimating the mean of $p_{c,i} - o_{c,i}$ across all the CCES respondents.[40] To incorporate the CCES weights, we take the weighted mean of this quantity, multiplying by the CCES survey weights w_c, which have mean 1. In addition, because the CCES has many more respondents from larger counties than smaller counties, we weight these estimates inversely to county size so that party leaders from large counties and small counties matter equally. In particular, we weight each CCES observation by $\frac{\bar{s_c}}{s_c}$, where s_c is the size of each CCES respondents' county in 2013 according to the US Census. This makes party leaders the effective unit of analysis and counts party leaders from small and large counties equally. Our results are similar when we weight to mass survey respondents instead of to counties, however.

We seek to estimate y_i, party leaders' average overestimation of county support for issue i. We therefore estimate y_i with:

[40] We acknowledge Doug Rivers for this suggestion.

$$\widehat{y_i} = \frac{\sum_{c \in C} \left[(p_{c,i} - o_{c,i}) w_c * \frac{\bar{s_c}}{s_c} \right]}{n(C)}, \tag{1}$$

where $n(C)$ is the number of CCES respondents.

We can also estimate public opinion in the average county—what party leaders' average perceptions would be if their perceptions were perfectly accurate—using:

$$\widehat{\overline{o_{c,i}}} = \frac{\sum_{c \in C} \left[o_{c,i} w_c * \frac{\bar{s_c}}{s_c} \right]}{n(C)}. \tag{2}$$

This quantity can be interpreted as 'the expectation of county opinion for a party chair respondent chosen at random.'

Likewise, party leaders' mean perception can be estimated with:

$$\widehat{\bar{p}_i} = \frac{\sum_{c \in C} \left[p_{c,i} w_c * \frac{\bar{s_c}}{s_c} \right]}{n(C)} \approx \bar{p}_i. \tag{3}$$

Our analysis at the state level is identical, except with s_c corresponding to the size of each CCES respondents' state. We cluster the standard errors at the county level for our county analysis and at the state level for our state analysis. Note that the county analysis excludes the states where parties are not organized at the county level because the levels at which these parties are organized (parish, etc.) are not available in the CCES data: LA, AK, ND, CT, and MA.

D Details of MRP Estimation Procedure

Estimation of an MRP model proceeds in two stages. First, a hierarchical logistic choice model is estimated for the opinion item being studied. Our models include predictors at two different levels. At the individual level, we include random effects for the respondent's education, gender, and race/ethnicity. At the state level, we include individual state random effects and fixed effects for Obama's share of the 2012 Presidential vote in the state (see Lax and Phillips (2009*a*)). State random effects are centered around regional random effects.[41]

D.1 Hierarchical Model

The general form of the model is a varying intercept, varying slope model:

$$\theta_j = logit^{-1}(X_j\beta + \sum_s \alpha^S_{S(j)}) \tag{4}$$

where j indexes cells, each of which is identified by the unique combination of race, gender, education, and state, and S represents subsets of the grouping variables. β represents the fixed effects and is modeled with a uniform prior distribution. α^S are random effects, modeled with hierarchical Gaussian priors.

The response model is specified as:

$$Pr(y=1) = logit^{-1}(\beta_0 + \alpha^{gender}_{j[c]} + \alpha^{race}_{k[c]} + \alpha^{edu}_{l[c]} + \alpha^{gender\times race}_{m[c]} + \alpha^{state}_{s[c]} + \alpha^{region}_{r[c]}) \tag{5}$$

The individual-level random effects are modeled as:

$$\alpha^{gender}_j \sim N(0, \sigma^2_{gender}) \text{ for } j = 1, 2 \tag{6}$$

[41] The models are estimated using the `glmer()` function in `R`.

$$\alpha_k^{race} \sim N(0, \sigma_{race}^2) \text{ for } k = 1, 2, 3 \tag{7}$$

$$\alpha_l^{age} \sim N(0, \sigma_{age}^2) \text{ for } l = 1...4 \tag{8}$$

$$\alpha_m^{edu} \sim N(0, \sigma_{edu}^2) \text{ for } m = 1...4 \tag{9}$$

The state and region effects are modeled:

$$\alpha_s^{state} \sim N(\alpha_{[r]}^{region} + \beta presvote, \sigma_{state}^2) \text{ for } s = 1...50 \tag{10}$$

$$\alpha_r^{region} \sim N(0, \sigma_{region}^2) \text{ for } r = 1...4 \tag{11}$$

This model yields predictions for the share of individuals in any given state who support same-sex marriage or universal health care in all possible combinations of race, gender, and education. Because of the CCES' large sample size, the state-level random effects dominate the estimation, meaning MRP makes only slight adjustments to the disaggregated data from the CCES.

D.2 Poststratification

The final step in constructing state-level estimates is poststratification. We first use data from the US Census American Community Survey 2013 5-Year file to calculate the share of individuals in each state that fall into each 'cell': for example, of all the individuals living in California, what share of them are college-educated white women? These official US Census estimates are exceptionally accurate.

We then merge these cell-level state proportion estimates from the Census with our cell-level opinion estimates from the multilevel regression model to construct the state-level opinion estimates. This poststratification process is a straightforward aggregation process by which estimates

for each cell θ_j in each state are summed in proportion to the share of the state that they represent. Note that the cells in each state are exhaustive and mutually exclusive.

$$\theta_{state} = \frac{\sum_{j \in J_{state}} N_j \theta_j}{\sum_{j \in J_{state}} N_j} \tag{12}$$

The result of this poststratification process are estimates of state support for each issue for each of the nation's states.

E Details of conjoint experiment survey instrument

Table 1 lists the attributes that the hypothetical candidates could have. Attributes were fully randomized, with the exception of age, which was constant, with the first profile always being 43 years old and the second profile always being 47 years old. Two different sents of first names were used for the two profiles in order to ensure that no pair of candidates had the same name. Figure OA11 shows how a respondent on the online survey would have seen the experiment.

Figure OA11: Survey Instrument Example

Suppose there is a primary for an open county board seat in your local party area and the two individuals below are considering running for the seat. We'd like you to consider the following two potential candidates for this office.

	Potential Candidate A	Potential Candidate B
Name	Lauren	Alexander
Age	47	43
Occupation	Small business owner	Factory worker
Experience in party	None	None
Life circumstances	Is independently wealthy	Military veteran
Talents	Well known in community	Physically attractive
Positions and ideology	Somewhat more liberal than the typical voter from your party in your county	Somewhat more conservative than the typical voter from your party in your county

Which one of the above candidates would you be more likely to encourage to run for office?

- ○ Candidate A
- ○ Candidate B

F Conjoint experiment: Robustness and additional outcome variables

This section shows the full results of the conjoint experiments for all dependent variables, for all the treatment variables in the conjoint, and among all the subsamples we mention in the paper. For the full sample, we report the results as both figures and tables; for other subsamples, we present only the figures for space (tables available upon request from the authors). In the party-ideology interactions, the letter "D" or "R" indicates the chair's party, and the ideology label reflects the potential candidate's ideology relative to the median party member. Democratic chairs evaluating a candidate whose ideology is average for the party are the omitted category. Thus, "D.Very conservative" reflects a Democratic chair evaluating a very *moderate* candidate—as a Democratic candidate much more conservative than the party would be more centrist—while "R.Very conservative" reflects a Republican chair evaluating a very *extreme* candidate.

F.1 All conjoint experiment outcomes: full sample

Figure OA12: Conjoint results: Full Sample. Outcome: Which candidate would you encourage to run?



Note: This figure shows the results from the conjoint experiment for the full sample for the outcome, "which candidate would you encourage to run?" Points are average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals. See Section F for interpretation.

Figure OA13: Conjoint results: Full Sample. Outcome: Which candidate is more likely to win the general election?



Note: This figure shows the results from the conjoint experiment for the full sample for the outcome, "which candidate would be more likely to win the general election?" Points are average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals. See Section F for interpretation.

Figure OA14: Conjoint results: Full Sample. Outcome: Which candidate is likely to raise enough money?



Note: This figure shows the results from the conjoint experiment for the full sample for the outcome, "which candidate would be more likely to raise enough money?" Points are average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals. See Section F for interpretation.

Figure OA15: Conjoint results: Full Sample. Outcome: Which candidate is most likely to recruit enough volunteers?



Note: This figure shows the results from the conjoint experiment for the full sample for the outcome, "which candidate would be more likely to recruit enough volunteers?" Points are average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals. See Section F for interpretation.

Figure OA16: Conjoint results: Full Sample. Outcome: Which candidate is most likely to stay loyal to the party?



Note: This figure shows the results from the conjoint experiment for the full sample for the outcome, "which candidate would be more likely to stay loyal to the party?" Points are average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals. See Section F for interpretation.

Table OA4: Conjoint results: Full Sample. Outcome: Which candidate would you encourage to run?

	Dependent variable:
	Encourage to run
Age 47	0.035 (0.025)
Female	0.061** (0.025)
Blue collar	−0.059* (0.031)
White collar 2	0.003 (0.031)
Active and well known in county party organization	0.184*** (0.040)
Active and well known in group important to the party	0.104** (0.040)
Frequent campaign volunteer for last four election cycles	0.125*** (0.041)
Frequent campaign volunteer in last election cycle	0.079** (0.040)
Has flexible work hours	−0.046 (0.041)
Has two young children	−0.113*** (0.040)
Is independently wealthy	−0.089** (0.040)
Military veteran	0.064 (0.041)
Experienced fundraiser for local charities	0.035 (0.044)
Hard worker	0.054 (0.044)
Physically attractive	0.026 (0.044)
Talented public speaker	0.073* (0.044)
Well known in community	0.055 (0.044)
R.Average	0.090 (0.059)
D.Conservative	−0.145*** (0.055)
R.Conservative	−0.021 (0.058)
D.Liberal	−0.056 (0.055)
R.Liberal	−0.310*** (0.059)
D.Very conservative	−0.375*** (0.054)
R.Very conservative	0.025 (0.058)
D.Very liberal	−0.196*** (0.056)
R.Very liberal	−0.500*** (0.059)
Constant	0.514*** (0.067)
Observations	1,345
R^2	0.163
Adjusted R^2	0.147
Residual Std. Error	0.462 (df = 1318)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Full sample. See Section F for interpretation.

Table OA5: Conjoint results: Full Sample. Outcome: Which candidate is more likely to win the general election?

	Dependent variable:
	Win the general
Age 47	0.031 (0.025)
Female	0.014 (0.025)
Blue collar	-0.189^{***} (0.031)
White collar 2	-0.108^{***} (0.031)
Active and well known in county party organization	0.149^{***} (0.040)
Active and well known in group important to the party	0.080^{**} (0.040)
Frequent campaign volunteer for last four election cycles	0.093^{**} (0.041)
Frequent campaign volunteer in last election cycle	0.116^{***} (0.040)
Has flexible work hours	-0.081^{**} (0.040)
Has two young children	-0.095^{**} (0.040)
Is independently wealthy	-0.072^{*} (0.040)
Military veteran	0.040 (0.041)
Experienced fundraiser for local charities	0.041 (0.044)
Hard worker	0.064 (0.044)
Physically attractive	0.034 (0.044)
Talented public speaker	0.086^{**} (0.044)
Well known in community	0.062 (0.044)
R.Average	0.081 (0.058)
D.Conservative	-0.080 (0.055)
R.Conservative	-0.110^{*} (0.058)
D.Liberal	-0.150^{***} (0.055)
R.Liberal	-0.225^{***} (0.059)
D.Very conservative	-0.216^{***} (0.054)
R.Very conservative	-0.047 (0.058)
D.Very liberal	-0.214^{***} (0.056)
R.Very liberal	-0.371^{***} (0.059)
Constant	0.601^{***} (0.067)
Observations	1,437
R^2	0.107
Adjusted R^2	0.091
Residual Std. Error	0.477 (df = 1410)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Full sample. See Section F for interpretation.

Table OA6: Conjoint results: Full Sample. Outcome: Which candidate is more likely to raise enough money?

	Dependent variable:
	Raise enough money
Age 47	−0.028 (0.025)
Female	−0.004 (0.025)
Blue collar	−0.282*** (0.030)
White collar 2	−0.200*** (0.030)
Active and well known in county party organization	0.117*** (0.039)
Active and well known in group important to the party	0.106*** (0.039)
Frequent campaign volunteer for last four election cycles	0.032 (0.040)
Frequent campaign volunteer in last election cycle	0.077** (0.039)
Has flexible work hours	0.020 (0.039)
Has two young children	−0.105*** (0.039)
Is independently wealthy	0.239*** (0.039)
Military veteran	0.010 (0.039)
Experienced fundraiser for local charities	0.199*** (0.043)
Hard worker	0.003 (0.043)
Physically attractive	−0.020 (0.043)
Talented public speaker	0.001 (0.043)
Well known in community	0.020 (0.043)
R.Average	−0.026 (0.057)
D.Conservative	−0.058 (0.053)
R.Conservative	−0.051 (0.057)
D.Liberal	−0.050 (0.053)
R.Liberal	−0.108* (0.058)
D.Very conservative	−0.074 (0.053)
R.Very conservative	0.086 (0.057)
D.Very liberal	−0.100* (0.055)
R.Very liberal	−0.212*** (0.058)
Constant	0.572*** (0.065)
Observations	1,425
R^2	0.160
Adjusted R^2	0.144
Residual Std. Error	0.463 (df = 1398)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Full sample. See Section F for interpretation.

Table OA7: Conjoint results: Full Sample. Outcome: Which candidate is more likely to recruit enough volunteers?

	Dependent variable:
	Recruit enough volunteers
Age 47	−0.002 (0.026)
Female	0.052** (0.026)
Blue collar	0.048 (0.031)
White collar 2	0.062** (0.031)
Active and well known in county party organization	0.172*** (0.040)
Active and well known in group important to the party	0.142*** (0.041)
Frequent campaign volunteer for last four election cycles	0.224*** (0.042)
Frequent campaign volunteer in last election cycle	0.149*** (0.041)
Has flexible work hours	−0.049 (0.041)
Has two young children	−0.069* (0.041)
Is independently wealthy	−0.158*** (0.041)
Military veteran	−0.044 (0.041)
Experienced fundraiser for local charities	0.152*** (0.045)
Hard worker	0.096** (0.045)
Physically attractive	0.096** (0.045)
Talented public speaker	0.101** (0.044)
Well known in community	0.175*** (0.045)
R.Average	−0.053 (0.059)
D.Conservative	−0.120** (0.055)
R.Conservative	−0.026 (0.059)
D.Liberal	−0.043 (0.056)
R.Liberal	−0.126** (0.060)
D.Very conservative	−0.211*** (0.055)
R.Very conservative	0.0003 (0.059)
D.Very liberal	−0.129** (0.057)
R.Very liberal	−0.282*** (0.060)
Constant	0.364*** (0.068)
Observations	1,419
R^2	0.081
Adjusted R^2	0.064
Residual Std. Error	0.484 (df = 1392)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Full sample. See Section F for interpretation.

Table OA8: Conjoint results: Full Sample. Outcome: Which candidate is more likely to stay loyal to the party?

	Dependent variable:
	Stay loyal to the party
Age 47	0.061** (0.024)
Female	0.017 (0.024)
Blue collar	0.014 (0.030)
White collar 2	0.019 (0.030)
Active and well known in county party organization	0.158*** (0.038)
Active and well known in group important to the party	0.117*** (0.039)
Frequent campaign volunteer for last four election cycles	0.208*** (0.039)
Frequent campaign volunteer in last election cycle	0.150*** (0.038)
Has flexible work hours	−0.066* (0.039)
Has two young children	−0.107*** (0.039)
Is independently wealthy	−0.153*** (0.039)
Military veteran	−0.021 (0.039)
Experienced fundraiser for local charities	0.048 (0.043)
Hard worker	0.091** (0.042)
Physically attractive	0.073* (0.042)
Talented public speaker	0.024 (0.042)
Well known in community	0.026 (0.042)
R.Average	−0.011 (0.057)
D.Conservative	−0.309*** (0.053)
R.Conservative	−0.012 (0.056)
D.Liberal	−0.062 (0.053)
R.Liberal	−0.390*** (0.057)
D.Very conservative	−0.363*** (0.052)
R.Very conservative	0.038 (0.056)
D.Very liberal	−0.167*** (0.054)
R.Very liberal	−0.524*** (0.057)
Constant	0.531*** (0.065)
Observations	1,423
R^2	0.175
Adjusted R^2	0.159
Residual Std. Error	0.459 (df = 1396)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Full sample. See Section F for interpretation.

Table OA9: Conjoint results: Full Sample. Outcome: Which candidate is more likely to be an effective legislator?

	Dependent variable:
	Be an effective legislator
Age 47	0.068*** (0.025)
Female	0.023 (0.025)
Blue collar	−0.055* (0.030)
White collar 2	−0.021 (0.031)
Active and well known in county party organization	0.126*** (0.039)
Active and well known in group important to the party	0.096** (0.040)
Frequent campaign volunteer for last four election cycles	0.123*** (0.041)
Frequent campaign volunteer in last election cycle	0.095** (0.040)
Has flexible work hours	0.010 (0.040)
Has two young children	−0.039 (0.040)
Is independently wealthy	−0.057 (0.040)
Military veteran	0.061 (0.040)
Experienced fundraiser for local charities	−0.006 (0.044)
Hard worker	0.073* (0.044)
Physically attractive	0.012 (0.044)
Talented public speaker	0.046 (0.043)
Well known in community	0.017 (0.044)
R.Average	0.066 (0.058)
D.Conservative	−0.146*** (0.054)
R.Conservative	−0.029 (0.058)
D.Liberal	−0.062 (0.055)
R.Liberal	−0.338*** (0.060)
D.Very conservative	−0.374*** (0.054)
R.Very conservative	0.006 (0.058)
D.Very liberal	−0.174*** (0.056)
R.Very liberal	−0.495*** (0.059)
Constant	0.527*** (0.066)
Observations	1,389
R^2	0.143
Adjusted R^2	0.127
Residual Std. Error	0.467 (df = 1362)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Full sample. See Section F for interpretation.

F.2 Conjoint outcomes with multiple comparisons correction

In Tables OA10, OA11, OA12, OA13, OA14, OA15, and OA16, we report the full-sample conjoint experiment results after applying a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons to the p-values. By design, this adjustment makes some of the estimated AMCEs not significant at $p < 0.05$, but in most cases the ideology manipulations that are the focus of our analysis remain significant even after this correction. Note that these regressions use separately estimate the "liberal"/"very liberal" and "conservative"/"very conservative" categories and use Democratic chairs with typical candidates as a baseline.

Table OA10: Conjoint results: Full Sample with Bonferroni correction. Outcome: Which candidate would you encourage to run?

	Dependent variable:
	Encourage to run
Age 47	0.035 (0.025)
Female	0.061 (0.025)
Blue collar	−0.059 (0.031)
White collar 2	0.003 (0.031)
Active and well known in county party organization	0.184*** (0.040)
Active and well known in group important to the party	0.104 (0.040)
Frequent campaign volunteer for last four election cycles	0.125* (0.041)
Frequent campaign volunteer in last election cycle	0.079 (0.040)
Has flexible work hours	−0.046 (0.041)
Has two young children	−0.113 (0.040)
Is independently wealthy	−0.089 (0.040)
Military veteran	0.064 (0.041)
Experienced fundraiser for local charities	0.035 (0.044)
Hard worker	0.054 (0.044)
Physically attractive	0.026 (0.044)
Talented public speaker	0.073 (0.044)
Well known in community	0.055 (0.044)
R.Average	0.090 (0.059)
D.Conservative	−0.145 (0.055)
R.Conservative	−0.021 (0.058)
D.Liberal	−0.056 (0.055)
R.Liberal	−0.310*** (0.059)
D.Very conservative	−0.375*** (0.054)
R.Very conservative	0.025 (0.058)
D.Very liberal	−0.196** (0.056)
R.Very liberal	−0.500*** (0.059)
Constant	0.514*** (0.067)
Observations	1,345
R^2	0.163
Adjusted R^2	0.147
Residual Std. Error	0.462 (df = 1318)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Full sample with Bonferroni correction. See Section F for interpretation.

Table OA11: Conjoint results: Full Sample with Bonferroni correction. Outcome: Which is more likely to win the primary?

	Dependent variable:
	Win the primary
Age 47	−0.017 (0.025)
Female	0.024 (0.025)
Blue collar	−0.096** (0.030)
White collar 2	−0.032 (0.030)
Active and well known in county party organization	0.156*** (0.039)
Active and well known in group important to the party	0.109 (0.040)
Frequent campaign volunteer for last four election cycles	0.096 (0.041)
Frequent campaign volunteer in last election cycle	0.106 (0.039)
Has flexible work hours	−0.072 (0.040)
Has two young children	−0.113 (0.039)
Is independently wealthy	−0.090 (0.040)
Military veteran	0.039 (0.040)
Experienced fundraiser for local charities	0.055 (0.043)
Hard worker	0.063 (0.043)
Physically attractive	0.020 (0.043)
Talented public speaker	0.093 (0.043)
Well known in community	0.032 (0.043)
R.Average	0.002 (0.057)
D.Conservative	−0.176** (0.054)
R.Conservative	−0.072 (0.058)
D.Liberal	−0.122 (0.054)
R.Liberal	−0.319*** (0.058)
D.Very conservative	−0.316*** (0.053)
R.Very conservative	0.036 (0.058)
D.Very liberal	−0.190** (0.055)
R.Very liberal	−0.484*** (0.058)
Constant	0.607*** (0.066)
Observations	1,447
R^2	0.125
Adjusted R^2	0.109
Residual Std. Error	0.472 (df = 1420)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Full sample with Bonferroni correction. See Section F for interpretation.

Table OA12: Conjoint results: Full Sample with Bonferroni correction. Outcome: Which is more likely to win the general election?

	Dependent variable:
	Win the general
Age 47	0.031 (0.025)
Female	0.014 (0.025)
Blue collar	−0.189*** (0.031)
White collar 2	−0.108** (0.031)
Active and well known in county party organization	0.149*** (0.040)
Active and well known in group important to the party	0.080 (0.040)
Frequent campaign volunteer for last four election cycles	0.093 (0.041)
Frequent campaign volunteer in last election cycle	0.116* (0.040)
Has flexible work hours	−0.081 (0.040)
Has two young children	−0.095 (0.040)
Is independently wealthy	−0.072 (0.040)
Military veteran	0.040 (0.041)
Experienced fundraiser for local charities	0.041 (0.044)
Hard worker	0.064 (0.044)
Physically attractive	0.034 (0.044)
Talented public speaker	0.086 (0.044)
Well known in community	0.062 (0.044)
R.Average	0.081 (0.058)
D.Conservative	−0.080 (0.055)
R.Conservative	−0.110 (0.058)
D.Liberal	−0.150 (0.055)
R.Liberal	−0.225*** (0.059)
D.Very conservative	−0.216*** (0.054)
R.Very conservative	−0.047 (0.058)
D.Very liberal	−0.214*** (0.056)
R.Very liberal	−0.371*** (0.059)
Constant	0.601*** (0.067)
Observations	1,437
R^2	0.107
Adjusted R^2	0.091
Residual Std. Error	0.477 (df = 1410)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Full sample with Bonferroni correction. See Section F for interpretation.

Table OA13: Conjoint results: Full Sample with Bonferroni correction. Outcome: Which is more likely to raise enough money?

	Dependent variable:
	Raise enough money
Age 47	−0.028 (0.025)
Female	−0.004 (0.025)
Blue collar	−0.282*** (0.030)
White collar 2	−0.200*** (0.030)
Active and well known in county party organization	0.117* (0.039)
Active and well known in group important to the party	0.106 (0.039)
Frequent campaign volunteer for last four election cycles	0.032 (0.040)
Frequent campaign volunteer in last election cycle	0.077 (0.039)
Has flexible work hours	0.020 (0.039)
Has two young children	−0.105 (0.039)
Is independently wealthy	0.239*** (0.039)
Military veteran	0.010 (0.039)
Experienced fundraiser for local charities	0.199*** (0.043)
Hard worker	0.003 (0.043)
Physically attractive	−0.020 (0.043)
Talented public speaker	0.001 (0.043)
Well known in community	0.020 (0.043)
R.Average	−0.026 (0.057)
D.Conservative	−0.058 (0.053)
R.Conservative	−0.051 (0.057)
D.Liberal	−0.050 (0.053)
R.Liberal	−0.108 (0.058)
D.Very conservative	−0.074 (0.053)
R.Very conservative	0.086 (0.057)
D.Very liberal	−0.100 (0.055)
R.Very liberal	−0.212*** (0.058)
Constant	0.572*** (0.065)
Observations	1,425
R^2	0.160
Adjusted R^2	0.144
Residual Std. Error	0.463 (df = 1398)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Full sample with Bonferroni correction. See Section F for interpretation.

Table OA14: Conjoint results: Full Sample with Bonferroni correction. Outcome: Which is more likely to recruit enough volunteers?

	Dependent variable:
	Recruit enough volunteers
Age 47	−0.002 (0.026)
Female	0.052 (0.026)
Blue collar	0.048 (0.031)
White collar 2	0.062 (0.031)
Active and well known in county party organization	0.172*** (0.040)
Active and well known in group important to the party	0.142** (0.041)
Frequent campaign volunteer for last four election cycles	0.224*** (0.042)
Frequent campaign volunteer in last election cycle	0.149*** (0.041)
Has flexible work hours	−0.049 (0.041)
Has two young children	−0.069 (0.041)
Is independently wealthy	−0.158*** (0.041)
Military veteran	−0.044 (0.041)
Experienced fundraiser for local charities	0.152** (0.045)
Hard worker	0.096 (0.045)
Physically attractive	0.096 (0.045)
Talented public speaker	0.101 (0.044)
Well known in community	0.175*** (0.045)
R.Average	−0.053 (0.059)
D.Conservative	−0.120 (0.055)
R.Conservative	−0.026 (0.059)
D.Liberal	−0.043 (0.056)
R.Liberal	−0.126 (0.060)
D.Very conservative	−0.211*** (0.055)
R.Very conservative	0.0003 (0.059)
D.Very liberal	−0.129 (0.057)
R.Very liberal	−0.282*** (0.060)
Constant	0.364*** (0.068)
Observations	1,419
R^2	0.081
Adjusted R^2	0.064
Residual Std. Error	0.484 (df = 1392)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Full sample with Bonferroni correction. See Section F for interpretation.

Table OA15: Conjoint results: Full Sample with Bonferroni correction. Outcome: Which is more likely to stay loyal to the party?

	Dependent variable:
	Stay loyal to the party
Age 47	0.061 (0.024)
Female	0.017 (0.024)
Blue collar	0.014 (0.030)
White collar 2	0.019 (0.030)
Active and well known in county party organization	0.158*** (0.038)
Active and well known in group important to the party	0.117* (0.039)
Frequent campaign volunteer for last four election cycles	0.208*** (0.039)
Frequent campaign volunteer in last election cycle	0.150*** (0.038)
Has flexible work hours	−0.066 (0.039)
Has two young children	−0.107 (0.039)
Is independently wealthy	−0.153*** (0.039)
Military veteran	−0.021 (0.039)
Experienced fundraiser for local charities	0.048 (0.043)
Hard worker	0.091 (0.042)
Physically attractive	0.073 (0.042)
Talented public speaker	0.024 (0.042)
Well known in community	0.026 (0.042)
R.Average	−0.011 (0.057)
D.Conservative	−0.309*** (0.053)
R.Conservative	−0.012 (0.056)
D.Liberal	−0.062 (0.053)
R.Liberal	−0.390*** (0.057)
D.Very conservative	−0.363*** (0.052)
R.Very conservative	0.038 (0.056)
D.Very liberal	−0.167* (0.054)
R.Very liberal	−0.524*** (0.057)
Constant	0.531*** (0.065)
Observations	1,423
R^2	0.175
Adjusted R^2	0.159
Residual Std. Error	0.459 (df = 1396)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Full sample with Bonferroni correction. See Section F for interpretation.

Table OA16: Conjoint results: Full Sample with Bonferroni correction. Outcome: Which is more likely to be an effective legislator?

	Dependent variable:
	Be an effective legislator
Age 47	0.068 (0.025)
Female	0.023 (0.025)
Blue collar	−0.055 (0.030)
White collar 2	−0.021 (0.031)
Active and well known in county party organization	0.126** (0.039)
Active and well known in group important to the party	0.096 (0.040)
Frequent campaign volunteer for last four election cycles	0.123* (0.041)
Frequent campaign volunteer in last election cycle	0.095 (0.040)
Has flexible work hours	0.010 (0.040)
Has two young children	−0.039 (0.040)
Is independently wealthy	−0.057 (0.040)
Military veteran	0.061 (0.040)
Experienced fundraiser for local charities	−0.006 (0.044)
Hard worker	0.073 (0.044)
Physically attractive	0.012 (0.044)
Talented public speaker	0.046 (0.043)
Well known in community	0.017 (0.044)
R.Average	0.066 (0.058)
D.Conservative	−0.146 (0.054)
R.Conservative	−0.029 (0.058)
D.Liberal	−0.062 (0.055)
R.Liberal	−0.338*** (0.060)
D.Very conservative	−0.374*** (0.054)
R.Very conservative	0.006 (0.058)
D.Very liberal	−0.174** (0.056)
R.Very liberal	−0.495*** (0.059)
Constant	0.527*** (0.066)
Observations	1,389
R^2	0.143
Adjusted R^2	0.127
Residual Std. Error	0.467 (df = 1362)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
	Full sample with Bonferroni correction.

F.3 All conjoint experiment outcomes: weighted to county population

The figures in this section report the estimated AMCEs from the conjoint experiment after weighting by log(county population).

Figure OA17: Conjoint results: Weighted to county population



Note: This figure shows the results from the conjoint experiment for the full sample after weighting responses by log(county population) for the outcome, "which candidate would you encourage to run?" Points are average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure OA18: Conjoint results: Weighted to county population



Note: This figure shows the results from the conjoint experiment for the full sample after weighting responses by log(county population) for the outcome, "which candidate would be more likely to win the general election?" Points are average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure OA19: Conjoint results: Weighted to county population



Note: This figure shows the results from the conjoint experiment for the full sample after weighting responses by log(county population) for the outcome, "which candidate would be more likely to raise enough money?" Points are average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure OA20: Conjoint results: Weighted to county population



Note: This figure shows the results from the conjoint experiment for the full sample after weighting responses by log(county population) for the outcome, "which candidate would be more likely to recruit enough volunteers?" Points are average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure OA21: Conjoint results: Weighted to county population



Note: This figure shows the results from the conjoint experiment for the full sample after weighting responses by log(county population) for the outcome, "which candidate would be more likely to stay loyal to the party?" Points are average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals.

F.4 All conjoint experiment outcomes: counties where Obama received between 40% and 60% of the two-party vote in 2012

322 respondents were from these counties.

Figure OA22: Conjoint results: Objectively competitive counties



Note: This figure shows the results from the conjoint experiment for counties where Obama received between 40% and 60% of the two-party vote in 2012 for the outcome, "which candidate would you encourage to run?" Points are average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure OA23: Conjoint results: Objectively competitive counties



Note: This figure shows the results from the conjoint experiment for counties where Obama received between 40% and 60% of the two-party vote in 2012 for the outcome, "which candidate would be more likely to win the general election?" Points are average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure OA24: Conjoint results: Objectively competitive counties



Note: This figure shows the results from the conjoint experiment for counties where Obama received between 40% and 60% of the two-party vote in 2012 for the outcome, "which candidate would be more likely to raise enough money?" Points are average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure OA25: Conjoint results: Objectively competitive counties



Note: This figure shows the results from the conjoint experiment for counties where Obama received between 40% and 60% of the two-party vote in 2012 for the outcome, "which candidate would be more likely to recruit enough volunteers?" Points are average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure OA26: Conjoint results: Objectively competitive counties



Note: This figure shows the results from the conjoint experiment for counties where Obama received between 40% and 60% of the two-party vote in 2012 for the outcome, "which candidate would be more likely to stay loyal to the party?" Points are average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals.

F.5 All conjoint experiment outcomes: counties where the chair perceives between 26% and 75% of races are safe for his or her party's candidates

389 respondents were from these counties.

Figure OA27: Conjoint results: Subjectively competitive counties



Note: This figure shows the results from the conjoint experiment for chairs who perceive between 26% and 75% of races are safe for his or her party's candidates for the outcome, "which candidate would you encourage to run?" Points are average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure OA28: Conjoint results: Subjectively competitive counties



Note: This figure shows the results from the conjoint experiment for chairs who perceive between 26% and 75% of races are safe for his or her party's candidates for the outcome, "which candidate would be more likely to win the general election?" Points are average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure OA29: Conjoint results: Subjectively competitive counties



Note: This figure shows the results from the conjoint experiment for chairs who perceive between 26% and 75% of races are safe for his or her party's candidates for the outcome, "which candidate would be more likely to raise enough money?" Points are average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure OA30: Conjoint results: Subjectively competitive counties



Note: This figure shows the results from the conjoint experiment for chairs who perceive between 26% and 75% of races are safe for his or her party's candidates for the outcome, "which candidate would be more likely to recruit enough volunteers?" Points are average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure OA31: Conjoint results: Subjectively competitive counties



Note: This figure shows the results from the conjoint experiment for chairs who perceive between 26% and 75% of races are safe for his or her party's candidates for the outcome, "which candidate would be more likely to stay loyal to the party?" Points are average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals.

F.6 All conjoint experiment outcomes: counties where the chair perceives between 76% and 100% of races are safe for his or her party's candidates

255 respondents are in this category.

Figure OA32: Conjoint results: Subjectively competitive counties that support the respondent's party.



Note: This figure shows the results from the conjoint experiment for chairs who believe between 76% and 100% of races are safe for his or her party's candidates for the outcome, "which candidate would you encourage to run?" Points are average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure OA33: Conjoint results: Subjectively competitive counties that support the respondent's party.



Note: This figure shows the results from the conjoint experiment for chairs who believe between 76% and 100% of races are safe for his or her party's candidates for the outcome, "which candidate would be more likely to win the general election?" Points are average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure OA34: Conjoint results: Subjectively competitive counties that support the respondent's party.



Note: This figure shows the results from the conjoint experiment for chairs who believe between 76% and 100% of races are safe for his or her party's candidates for the outcome, "which candidate would be more likely to raise enough money?" Points are average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure OA35: Conjoint results: Subjectively competitive counties that support the respondent's party.



Note: This figure shows the results from the conjoint experiment for chairs who believe between 76% and 100% of races are safe for his or her party's candidates for the outcome, "which candidate would be more likely to recruit enough volunteers?" Points are average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure OA36: Conjoint results: Subjectively competitive counties that support the respondent's party.



Note: This figure shows the results from the conjoint experiment for chairs who believe between 76% and 100% of races are safe for his or her party's candidates for the outcome, "which candidate would be more likely to stay loyal to the party?" Points are average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals.

F.7 All conjoint experiment outcomes: counties where the chair perceives between 0% and 25% of races are safe for his or her party's candidates

343 respondents are in this category.

Figure OA37: Conjoint results: Subjectively competitive counties that oppose the respondent's party.



Note: This figure shows the results from the conjoint experiment for chairs who believe between 0% and 25% of races are safe for his or her party's candidates for the outcome, "which candidate would you encourage to run?" Points are average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure OA38: Conjoint results: Subjectively competitive counties that oppose the respondent's party.



Note: This figure shows the results from the conjoint experiment for chairs who believe between 0% and 25% of races are safe for his or her party's candidates for the outcome, "which candidate would be more likely to win the general election?" Points are average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure OA39: Conjoint results: Subjectively competitive counties that oppose the respondent's party.



Note: This figure shows the results from the conjoint experiment for chairs who believe between 0% and 25% of races are safe for his or her party's candidates for the outcome, "which candidate would be more likely to raise enough money?" Points are average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure OA40: Conjoint results: Subjectively competitive counties that oppose the respondent's party.



Note: This figure shows the results from the conjoint experiment for chairs who believe between 0% and 25% of races are safe for his or her party's candidates for the outcome, "which candidate would be more likely to recruit enough volunteers?" Points are average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure OA41: Conjoint results: Subjectively competitive counties that oppose the respondent's party.



Note: This figure shows the results from the conjoint experiment for chairs who believe between 0% and 25% of races are safe for his or her party's candidates for the outcome, "which candidate would be more likely to stay loyal to the party?" Points are average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals.