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# Appendix A: Coding

Our goal is to create time-series cross-sectional data on public campaign subsidies and party organization subsidies around the world. The unit of analysis is country-years and our coding covers most sovereign countries with national elections from 1900 to 2015. Countries without national elections, some microstates, and territories or dependencies are not included. The excluded sovereign countries are Brunei, China, Cuba, Dominica, Eritrea, Holy See, Kiribati, Kuwait, Laos, North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Sudan, Tonga, Tuvalu, the United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam.

## Source Material

We started with the 2015 IDEA database on public finance laws. IDEA lists answers to 40 questions related to public campaign finance for most countries that currently hold elections. However, the IDEA dataset is a regularly updated cross-section and does not include information about laws and changes over time. Our project introduces separate categories for different types of subsidies as well as their implementation, and covers the full history of political subsidies around the world.

First, we went to IDEA’s data and sources. We focused on question 19 in the IDEA data: are there provisions for direct public funding to political parties? IDEA has four answers for this: 0=no; 1=yes, regular party organization funding; 2=yes, campaign subsidies; 3=yes, both.

IDEA has information for 180 countries. If IDEA did not include a country, we did not code it. Of these excluded countries, most do not hold national elections. The excluded countries that do hold national elections are island microstates: Dominica, Kiribati, and Tuvalu. We believe these exclusions introduce a minimal amount of bias. If IDEA included a country but said there were no funding provisions, we coded all country years after elections began as zeros (elections exist but there are no funding provisions). If IDEA listed any funding provisions, we checked their listed sources. IDEA publishes its sources, which are primarily laws that are in force. IDEA occasionally supplements laws with supranational government reports (for example, an Organization of American States report or an EU commission report), and very occasionally with scholarly sources. We verified these sources, which were mostly available as reported and correct. Occasionally, a law had been removed or there was no English version and the RA could not read the language the law was published in. For example, laws for Gabon and Congo were missing. In another instance, the RA could not understand campaign finance laws published in Icelandic and Japanese and could not find translations.

We also wanted to know if the laws had been implemented or were merely on the books. To verify implementation, we searched for supranational reports, election observer reports, NGO reports, and academic articles. We primarily used supranational reports and election observer reports. Specifically, we relied on the European Union’s Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO), which has very detailed reports on the history, provisions, implementation and public-private dimensions of campaign finance for about 60 countries. We also relied on two reports sponsored by the Organization of American States that covered Central and South America and the Caribbean. For African countries, we relied on the NGO Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa. We also relied on election observer reports from the EU, the Commonwealth, the AU, EISA, and the Carter Center.

To supplement IDEA information, we also tried to corroborate information with the Money, Politics and Transparency project’s website, which has data for about a third of the countries in the dataset and has information on the proportion of funding from public versus private sources, which many of the other sources did not include.

In a couple dozen cases, the laws or reports were ambiguous on some point. Start dates and implementation were our most common ambiguities. For example, one source on Argentina reported that the first finance law passed in 1985, but another suggested there was an earlier law. In another example, IDEA listed Morocco as having party organization subsidies, but we could not verify their sources or find third party information on implementation. In those cases we sought out expert information and asked country experts to provide additional sources where possible. Expert information was extremely helpful and we have noted where we use it in the dataset build code. We gratefully welcome any input from readers who have additional information.

## Variables and Coding

The dataset has five binary variables, one additive index of those, and one ordinal variable. Countries enter the dataset in the year they first hold elections (following the V-Dem dataset). Years prior to a country’s first election are coded as missing. Uruguay was the first country to introduce campaign finance in 1928, Costa Rica followed in 1956, and then Germany in 1967. Thus, practically all countries in the dataset have zeros until the latter half of the 20th century. If IDEA listed a country as having no public campaign finance, the country received 0s for all variables and years.

**Party organization subsidies** (*partyorg\_pubfin*): A binary variable for if a country has implemented regular subsidies to party organizations. This means state subsidies to groups identified as political parties or that run candidates. The subsidies must occur on a predictable, recurring basis between elections. For example, most countries have a law regulating political parties and recognize parties through that framework but some countries, like Bahrain, recognize and fund other groups that run candidates, like Bahrain’s political societies. In most countries, regular means annual, but some countries have biannual, quarterly, or monthly disbursements. This variable was coded as 1 if a source said that the government had distributed money explicitly as subsidies. We coded countries where the distribution was uneven, poorly implemented, or went only to one party as 1s. For example, Kazakhstan has regular funding but a high vote threshold rule gives practically all of it to the ruling party; we coded Kazakhstan as a 1 from the year the funding law passed. A country is coded as a 1 starting in the year that the law was passed, as long as we could verify that it was implemented.

**Public campaign subsidies** (*campaigns\_pubfin*): A binary variable for if a country has implemented election campaign subsidies. This was coded as 1 if a source said that the government had distributed money explicitly as subsidies. We counted regular party disbursements where the government stated that they expected parties to pay for campaigns out of regular funds as 1 and we coded countries where governments increased regular party subsidies during election cycles as 1. For example, Denmark has generous regular party funding where the government explicitly states that parties should use these subsidies for campaigns; Denmark is coded as a 1 for this variable starting in 1988 when the law passed. In a different example, the Dominican Republic distributes regular party subsidies that double during campaign years; the Dominican Republic is coded as a 1 for this variable. We coded countries where the distribution was uneven or went only to one party as 1s. A country is coded as a 1 starting in the year that the law was passed, as long as we could verify that it was implemented.

**Majority of party funding from public sources** (*majority\_pubfin*): A binary variable for if the majority of money going to parties, combining election and regular funds, comes from public or private sources. If the majority of money comes from the government, a country was coded as a 1, otherwise it received a 0. A country is coded as a 1 starting in the year that the major public finance law was passed, as long as we could verify that it was implemented.

Caution: this is the variable with the shakiest coding, because annual data on the proportion of public versus private spending is not available for most countries and it is unclear in most cases with majority public funding which year public funding surpassed private funding. We assumed that a country had minority public funding unless we had a source that stated otherwise. The sources that we used for this variable were government statistics where available, the GRECO reports from the European Union, and the Money, Politics, and Transparency data from Global Integrity. Thus, the variable is coded conservatively and errors in measurement should result in false negatives, i.e., countries that have majority public funding coded as minority public funding.

**Provisions for party organization subsidies** (*partyfin\_onpaper*): A binary variable for if a country had passed a law setting out provisions for regular subsidies to party organizations. Any law, including a constitution, that provided for subsidies counted as a 1, even if the law did not clearly set up a system for administering them or they were not implemented until much later. For example, the 1975 Greek constitution stipulates that public funds should be used for party organizations, but no law established a framework for implementing subsidies until 1992. Thus, we coded Greece as a 1 for the on paper variable from 1975 onward, and as a 1 for the implementation variable from 1992 onward.

**Provisions for public campaign subsidies** (*campaignfin\_onpaper*): A binary variable for if a country had passed a law setting out provisions for election campaign subsidies. Any law, including a constitution, that provided for subsidies counted as a 1, even if the law did not clearly set up a system for administering them or they were not implemented until much later.

**Additive index of public finance variables** (*pubfin\_add*): A simple additive index that adds up a country’s tally of the previous five variables. A country with a 1 for all variables, like Hungary, would receive the maximum of five, a country like Haiti with campaign subsidies on paper that have never been implemented would receive a 1, while a country with a 0 for all, like Guyana, would receive the minimum of 0.

**Even implementation** (*even\_implement*): An ordinal variable for if a country has evenly implemented its subsidies, or whether it discriminates against some parties or candidates. Countries that do not have a law to implement or did not implement a law are coded as 0. Countries that partially or unevenly implemented a law are coded as 1. Countries that fully and evenly implemented a law are coded as 2.

# Appendix B: Country Notes

The following paragraphs summarize the country-specific information that we gathered, with dates, and the source material that we used.

## Afghanistan

IDEA lists Afghanistan as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Albania

The 2000 Law of Political Parties sets up public finance provisions for campaigns and party organizations. Later electoral laws in 2003, 2008, 2010, and 2015 have amended the 2000 law and added funds. It is not entirely clear what the public versus private spending breakdown is, but GRECO reports that public funding is the majority outside of elections and for at least some parties during elections.

Sources:

* Group of States Against Corruption. . (May 15th, 2009). Troisième Cycle d’Evaluation. Retrieved from <https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c1b6f>
* Republic of Albania. (June 19th, 2003). *The Electoral Code of the Republic of Albania*. Retrieved from <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN016504.pdf>
* Republic of Albania. (April 2nd, 2015). *The Electoral Code of the Republic of Albania*. Retrieved from http://www.osce.org/albania/159501?download=true

## Algeria

Public financing in the form of regular party funds has been on the books since a political parties law in 1997. However, election observer reports criticize lack of financing or do not mention it, and we conclude that the 1997 political parties law was not implemented.

Sources:

* Algeria. (March 6th, 1997). *Law on the Political Parties*. Retrieved from http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/africa/DZ/algeria-political-parties-law-1997/view
* The Carter Center. (May 2012). *People’s National Assembly Elections in Algeria*. Retrieved from https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace\_publications/election\_reports/algeria-may2012-final-rpt.pdf
* National Democratic Institute. (May 10th, 2012). *Final Report on Algeria’s Legislative Elections*. Retrieved from https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Algeria-Report-Leg-Elections-ENG.pdf

## Andorra

Andorra has had public campaign finance subsidies and part funding since 2000. GRECO reports that public funding makes up less than half of parties’ spending. Election observers note that a 2015 law strengthens campaign finance regulations and the punishments for violating them.

Sources:

* Group of States Against Corruption. . (May 27th, 2011). *Evaluation Report on Andorra .Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from <https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c29ee>
* Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. (January 28th, 2015). *Needs Assessment Mission Report*. Retrieved from <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/andorra/141736?download=true>
* Butlletí Oficial del Principat d’Andorra. (January 5th, 2001). *Tractats internacionals. Lleis. Sentències del Tribunal Constitucional*. Retrieved from http://www.consellgeneral.ad/fitxers/documents/lleis-1989-2002/llei-qualificada-de-financament-electoral.pdf

## Angola

The Election Law of 2004 introduces public campaign subsidies. EISA confirms that campaign funds are available, but that the government does not always release funds when planned or promised.

Sources:

* Republic of Angola. (June 17th, 2004). *Lei N 7/04*. Retrieved from <http://aceproject.org/eroen/regions/africa/AO/Lei%20No%207%2004%20de%2017%20de%20Junho.pdf/view>
* Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa. (September 9th, 2012). *Report on the General Elections of 31 August 2012 in the Republic of Angola.* Retrieved fromhttps://eisa.org.za/pdf/ang2012report.pdf

## Antigua and Barbuda

IDEA lists Antigua and Barbuda as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Argentina

Argentina introduced campaign finance subsidies in 1985, after transitioning back to a democratic political system. USAID reports that the system has undergone various rounds of reform since 1985 and that public funds constitute a minority of parties’ spending. USAID’s information conflicts with the Money, Politics, Transparency website. We sought expert input from Alejandro Avenburg who confirmed that the system started in 1985 and confirmed USAID’s claim that parties’ funding comes from mostly private sources in a mixed system. However, incumbents can sometimes get majority public funding.

Sources:

* Americas’ Accountability Anti-Corruption Project. (2004). *Political-Party Finance in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico: Lessons  
  for Latin America*. Retrieved from <http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnada553.pdf>
* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *Argentina*. Retrieved from <https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/AR/>
* Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos. (January 15th 2007). Ley de Financamiento de Partidos Politicos. Retrieved from <http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/120000-124999/124231/texact.htm>
* Reforma Politica para la Republica. (December 22nd, 2003). F*inanciamiento de los Partidos Politicos: Aspecto normativo vigente.* Retrieved from<https://www.reforma-politica.com.ar/index.php?pagina=ART-23> (Expert-provided source)

## Armenia

The Law of the Republic of Armenia on Political Parties of 2002 set up a public finance framework. The government gives public money to parties annually, but does not distribute extra campaign finance subsidies. GRECO report says that public contributions are minor relative to private money.

Sources:

* Republic of Armenia. (July 3rd, 2002). *Law of the Republic of Armenia on Political Parties*. Retrieved from http://www.translation-centre.am/pdf/Translat/HH\_orenk/Political\_Parties/Political\_parties\_en.pdf
* Group of States Against Corruption. . (December 3rd, 2010). *Evaluation Report on Armenia . Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c2b33

## Australia

Australia’s Electoral Act of 1918 was amended in 1983 to provide campaign support in the form of subsidies. The country has an unknown private versus public mix of campaign funds because disclosure laws are lax and have been changing.

Sources:

* Brenton Holmes. (March 30th 2012). *Electoral and political financing: the Commonwealth regime and its reforms.* Retrieved from http://www.aph.gov.au/About\_Parliament/Parliamentary\_Departments/Parliamentary\_Library/pubs/BN/2011-2012/ElectoralFinancing

## Austria

In 1975, a law that established regular subsidies to be used for party organizations and their campaigns, however, there are no special allocations for campaigns. GRECO and MPT say that subsidies are very high, but there is no limit on private donations. MPT says that public money constitutes most of the funds.

Sources:

* Group of States Against Corruption. . (December 9th, 2010). *Evaluation Report on Armenia . Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c6555
* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *Austria*. Retrieved from https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/AT/

## Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan established campaign funding under a 1992 law, which also forbade other state subsidies to parties. However, the law did not enter into force until 2003. GRECO makes it clear that Azerbaijan does not have a fully democratic political system and the state does not grant significant campaign funds. Most available funds go to the ruling party.

Sources:

* Group of States Against Corruption. . (October 1st, 2010). *Evaluation Report on Azerbaijan . Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c6608
* Republic of Azerbaijan. (June 2nd 2004). Law on the Political Parties of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Retrieved from https://www.ecoi.net/file\_upload/1226\_1335523947\_azerbaijan-law-political-parties-1992-am2004-en-1.pdf
* Republic of Azerbaijan. (June 18th 2010). Election Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Retrieved from http://publicofficialsfinancialdisclosure.worldbank.org/sites/fdl/files/assets/law-library-files/Azerbaijan\_Elections%20Code\_2003\_as%20amended%20through%202010\_en.pdf

## Bahamas

IDEA lists the Bahamas as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Bahrain

Reports say that political parties are illegal but political societies are allowed, but harassed. Very limited financing outlined in a 1989 law, but only the restrictions appear to have been implemented. Note: Could not verify IDEA sources for Bahrain.

Sources:

* Human Rights Watch. (June 20th, 2013). *“Interfere, Restrict, Control” Limits on Freedom of Association in Bahrain.* Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/06/20/interfere-restrict-control/restraints-freedom-association-bahrain
* The Guardian. (February 15th, 2011). *US Embassy Cables: Guide to Bahrain’s Politics*. https://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/168471
* National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. (2002). *Bahrain’s October 24 and 31 Legislative Elections*. Retrieved from https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/2392\_bh\_electionsreport\_engpdf\_09252008.pdf

## Bangladesh

IDEA lists Bangladesh as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Barbados

The Parliament Act of 1989 provides a small amount of regular funding to party organizations, as well as office space.

Sources:

* Organization of American States. (2005) *From the Grassroots to the Airwaves: Paying for Political Parties and Campaigns in the Carribean*. Retrieved from https://www.oas.org/sap/docs/publications/grassroots.pdf

## Belarus

IDEA lists Belarus as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Belgium

The Law on Financing of Political Parties of 1989 established regular funding. Belgium does not provide any additional funds for electoral campaigns, but the state provides considerable in-kind support to parties through free media, mailing services, and offices.

Sources:

* Group of States Against Corruption. . (May 15th 2009). *Evaluation Report on Belgium. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from <https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c25a2>
* Belgium. (July 20th 1989). *Law on Financing of Political Parties*. Retrieved from <http://www.legislationline.org/topics/country/41/topic/16>
* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *Belgium*. Retrieved from https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/BE/

## Belize

IDEA lists Belize as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Benin

The Constitution of Benin sets out provisions for parties to receive state funds and the 2010 Electoral Law sets out a framework for public campaign subsidies. Note: We could not verify if these laws were implemented and IDEA’s source coverage for Benin was scant.

Sources:

* Republic of Benin. (February 21st, 2003). *Loi N 2001-21 du 21 Février 2003*. Retrieved from http://www.cour-constitutionnelle-benin.org/loiselectorales/loi\_2001-21.htm
* Republic of Benin. (December 27th, 2010). *Loi electorale generale*. Retrieved from http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/africa/BJ/benin-electoral-law-n-b0-2010-33-of-7-january-2011/view

## Bhutan

The Electoral Law of 2008 establishes a campaign fund for candidates, but not regular funding. Unique to Bhutan, candidates are not allowed to raise extra money beyond state subsidies. Bhutan held it’s first election in 2008 and the EU election observer team reported that campaign finance regulations were implemented and closely followed.

Sources:

* Kingdom of Bhutan (2008). *Election Act of the Kingdom of Bhutan*, 2008. Retrieved from <http://publicofficialsfinancialdisclosure.worldbank.org/sites/fdl/files/assets/law-library-files/Bhutan_Election%20Act_2008_en.pdf>
* Kingdom of Bhutan (2008). *Public Election Fund Act of the Kingdom of Bhutan*, 2008. Retrieved from <http://www.ecb.bt/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/PublicElectionFundActEnglish.pdf>
* European Union Election Observer Mission. (May 21st, 2008). *Final Report, National Assembly Elections, 24 March 2008.* Retrieved from http://www.eods.eu/library/eu\_\_eom\_bhutan\_2008\_final\_report.pdf

## Bolivia

Bolivia is one of the only countries to have abolished public funding. The country established public funding in 1999 with a law that established direct state subsidies for elections and organizations. However, the 2008 constitutional process removed monetary subsidies and replaced them with a poorly-regulated in-kind system.

Sources:

* Republic of Bolivia. (June 25th 1999). *Ley de Partidos Políticos.* Retrieved from <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Parties/Bolivia/Leyes/Ley1983.pdf>
* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). Bolivia. Retrieved from https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/BO/

## Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina passed the Political Party Financing Law of 2000, which gives money to parliamentary groups for elections and activities. The law has been relatively evenly implemented, according to an EU commission, and was amended in 2012.

Sources:

* Group of States Against Corruption. . (May 27th 2011). *Evaluation Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c4694
* Bosnia and Herzegovina. (November 16th, 2012). *Law on Political Party Financing*. Retrieved from http://www.parliament.am/library/Political%20parties/Bosnia%20and%20Herzegovina.pdf

## Botswana

IDEA lists Botswana as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Brazil

Brazil has regular subsidies that are distributed to political parties. The 1995 Political Party Law establishes a *Fundo Partidiário* for regular organizational activities. Most parties spend their subsidies on campaigns, but even with public financing most party money comes from private and largely corporate sources.

Sources:

* Republic of Brazil. (September 19th, 1995). *Lei dos Partidos Políticos.* Retrieved from http://www.tse.jus.br/legislacao/codigo-eleitoral/lei-dos-partidos-politicos/lei-dos-partidos-politicos-lei-nb0-9.096-de-19-de-setembro-de-1995
* Republic of Brazil. (September 30th, 1997). *Lei das Eleições.* Retrieved from <http://www.tse.jus.br/legislacao/codigo-eleitoral/lei-das-eleicoes/lei-das-eleicoes-lei-nb0-9.504-de-30-de-setembro-de-1997>
* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *Brazil.* Retrieved from https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/BR/

## Bulgaria

In 1995, Bulgaria passed the Political Parties Act, which established public funding for campaigns and party organizations. The law has been evenly implemented. Public money makes up the majority of most parties’ budgets.

Sources:

* Group of States Against Corruption. . (May 27th 2011). *Evaluation Report on Bulgaria. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from <https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c94ba>
* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *Bulgaria*. Retrieved from <https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/BG/>
* Bulgaria. (April 1st, 2005). *Political Parties Act*. Retrieved from https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/workinggroup4/2012-August-27-29/Responses\_NVs\_2012/20120419\_Bulgaria\_English\_9.pdf

## Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso’s 2000 Party Finance Law established public subsidies for campaigns and organizations. The law has been implemented and funds distributed, and the law has been amended several times.

Sources:

* Burkina Faso. (2009). *An Portant Financement des Partis et Formations Politiques et des Campagnes Electorales*. Retrieved from <http://www.ambaburkina-fr.org/le-financement-des-partis-et-formations-politiques-et-des-campagnes-electorales/>
* Abdouramane Boly and Salifou Sampinbogo. (November 2006). *Le mode de financement des partis politiques au Burkina Faso.* Retrieved from https://www.accpuf.org/images/pdf/publications/bulletins/b6/tome1/Bulletin6-TI-Ch2.4-BurkinaFaso.pdf

## Burundi

An EU election observer report says that while election funds are on the books in a 2003 law, they are not actually implemented. The same law prohibits state funds to party organizations. A 2011 amendment may allow for state finance of orgs, but no indication that it is in effect.

Sources:

* European Union Election Observer Mission. (2010). *Rapport Final: Elections communales, présidentielle, legislatives, sénatoriales et collinaires 2010*. Retrieved from <http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/africa/BI/burundi-final-report-eu-2010/view>
* Republic of Burundi. (September 10th, 2011). *Portant Organisation et Fonctionnement des Partis Politiques*. Retrieved from Fohttps://www.assemblee.bi/IMG/pdf/loi%20n°1\_16\_du\_10\_septembre\_2011.pdf

## Cambodia

IDEA lists Cambodia as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Cameroon

A 2000 law established both public subsidies for elections and for party organizations. However, the law appears to have been poorly and unevenly implemented, and when used, primarily serves to strengthen the ruling party. Note that sources for Cameroon were scarce and vague.

Sources:

* Republic of Cameroon. (December 19th, 2000). *Law N° 2000/015 of 19 December 2000 relating to the Public Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns*. Retrieved from <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwj_jvK1krvRAhVl4IMKHdHUAKAQFggoMAI&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.track.unodc.org%2FLegalLibrary%2FLegalResources%2FCameroon%2FLaws%2FCameroon%2520Law%2520on%2520Funding%2520of%2520Political%2520Parties%25202000.pdf&usg=AFQjCNE4pIgnVBRMgFPc1lKPJzBlpLAfyg&bvm=bv.143423383,d.amc>
* Transparency International. (January 17, 2013). *Observing Campaign Expenses in Cameroon*. Retrieved from http://www.ti-cameroon.org/index.php/activites/elections/115-electoral-observation-perspectives-from-civil-society-montego-bay-jamaica-5-7-december-2012

## Canada

The Canadian Election Expenses Act of 1974 established public campaign finance in the form of campaign expenditure reimbursement. Additionally, Elections Canada verifies that there was a quarterly allowance, which was calculated as a per vote subsidy, from 2004 to 2015. The Elections Act has been regularly amended and was last amended in 2016.

Sources:

* Elections Canada. (nd). *A History of the Vote in Canada*. Retrieved from http://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=res&dir=his&document=chap4&lang=e#a44
* Canada. (January 1st, 2016). *Canada Elections Act*. Retrieved from http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/E-2.01/page-56.html#h-137

## Cape Verde

Cape Verde’s 2010 Electoral Code provides for campaign subsidies. However, sources are scarce and we could not verify implementation or if Cape Verde had campaign finance laws prior to 2010.

Sources:

* Cape Verde. (March 9th, 2010). *Lei numero 56. Altera o Código Eleitoral*. Retrieved from http://publicofficialsfinancialdisclosure.worldbank.org/sites/fdl/files/assets/law-library-files/Cape%20Verde\_Law%2056-VII%20Amending%201999%20Electoral%20Code\_2010\_pt.pdf

## Central African Republic

IDEA lists the Central African Republic as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Chad

The Chadian electoral code of 2009 says that parties will be reimbursed for campaign expenses, and there is no mention of public finance in the 1996 constitution. However, we could not verify whether or not the law has been implemented.

Sources:

* Chad. (December 23rd, 2009). *Loi N.3 Portant Code Électoral*. Retrieved from http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/africa/TD/tchad-loi-nb0-003-pr-2009-portant-code-electoral/view

## Chile

Chile began to regulate campaign financing in 1987, with a reporting law. In 2003, Law 19884 introduced campaign subsidies in the form of a 20% refund on election spending. Most money comes from private sources, but a 2016 amendment to the 1987 law gives money to party organizations ever trimester.

Sources:

* Americas’ Accountability Anti-Corruption Project. (2004). *Political-Party Finance in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico: Lessons  
  for Latin America*. Retrieved from <http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnada553.pdf>
* Republic of Chile. (2003). *Ley número 19884. Sobre Transparencia, Límite y Control del Gasto Electoral*. Retrieved from <https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=29994>
* Republic of Chile. (March 23rd, 1987). *Ley Orgánico* *Constitucional de los Partidos Políticos*. Retrieved from http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Parties/Chile/Leyes/Ley19884.pdf

## Colombia

The 1991 constitution put public campaign finance in the constitution and the government assumed partial responsibility starting in 1991. A 1994 law introduced permanent organizational financing, and a 2003 law increased subsidies but made applying for them harder, cutting down the number of political parties. A majority of most parties’ funding comes from private sources.

Sources:

* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *Colombia*. Retrieved from https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/CO/
* Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas. (2011). *Financiamiento de los Partidos Políticos en América Latina*. Retrieved from https://www.oas.org/es/sap/docs/deco/financiamiento\_partidos\_s.pdf

## Comoros

IDEA lists Comoros as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Congo (DRC)

Public campaign finance laws appear on the books, but have been implemented extremely unevenly if at all since the first election in 2006. A 2008 law sets up regular funds and campaign funds, but was not set to be implemented until 2012 and we could not find verification that it ever was.

Sources:

* Freedom House. (2012). *Countries at a Crossroads: Democratic Republic of Congo*. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2012/democratic-republic-congo
* African Democracy Encyclopedia Project. (2006). *DRC: Party Funding and Finances*. Retrieved from <https://eisa.org.za/wep/drcparties2.htm>
* The Carter Center. (November 28th, 2011). *Presidential and Legislative Elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo*. Retrieved from https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace\_publications/election\_reports/drc-112811-elections-final-rpt.pdf

## Costa Rica

In 1956, Costa Rica became the second country to implement public campaign financing. Article 96 of the constitution sets out a campaign finance framework. Despite this, funding is only for campaigns, and most party funding comes from private sources.

Sources:

* Americas’ Accountability Anti-Corruption Project. (2004). *Political-Party Finance in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico: Lessons  
  for Latin America*. Retrieved from <http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnada553.pdf>
* Casas Zamora, Kevin. (2012). Paying for Democracy: Political Finance and State Funding for Parties. Oxford: ECPR Monographs Press.
* Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas. (2011). *Financiamiento de los Partidos Políticos en América Latina*. Retrieved from https://www.oas.org/es/sap/docs/deco/financiamiento\_partidos\_s.pdf

## Cote d'Ivoire

A 2004 law sets up campaign subsidies and party funding, and the law was implemented in Cote d’Ivoire’s 2010 elections, though implementation was uneven and lacked oversight.

Sources:

* Cote d’Ivoire. (July 15th, 2005). Decision Relative au Financement sur Fonds Publics des Partis et Groupments Politiques et des Candidats au l’Election Presidentielle. Retrieved from https://www.loidici.com/Cotedivoire/Cotedivoiredecisionsimportantesgbagbofinanc.php
* The Carter Center. (2011). *International Election Observation Mission to Cote d’Ivoire*. Retrieved from https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace\_publications/election\_reports/cote-diviore-2010-2011-elections-final-rpt.pdf

## Croatia

Croatia introduced a law in 2006 that governs political finance and establishes both campaign and party organization funds.

Sources:

* Group of States Against Corruption. . (December 4th, 2009). *Evaluation Report on Croatia. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c2e8f
* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *Croatia*. Retrieved from [https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/HR/](https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/BG/)

## Cyprus

Cyprus has had public funding for parties and organizations in Parliament since 1991. All parties have received subsidies since 2006. Private funds remain unregulated, however.

Sources:

* Group of States Against Corruption. . (April 1st, 2011). *Evaluation Report on Cyprus. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c2f2c

## Czech Republic

Political financing is regulated under the 1991 Law on Political Parties and Movements, which is frequently amended. It is unclear whether the law initially had public funds (see footnote 29 in the GRECO report) but parties received public funds by 2000 and continue to rely on state financing. Public funds are substantial and over 50% of many parties’ budgets.

Sources:

* Group of States Against Corruption. . (April 1st, 2011). *Evaluation Report on the Czech Republic. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c314d

## Denmark

Denmark has significant annual public funding, based on a 1986 law that went into effect in 1987. Parties are expected to use some of the annual disbursement for elections, and do nor receive extra election funding.

Sources:

* Group of States Against Corruption. . (July 2nd, 2009). *Evaluation Report on Denmark. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c3217

## Djbouti

IDEA lists Djbouti as a country with party organization funding, but has scarce sources. We sought expert input from Daniel Ogbaharya on 2/10/17, who corroborated that there is very little publicly available information. He provided sources elaborating the electoral regime and use of state resources with no mention of political finance.

Sources:

* The International Republican Institute. (2005). *Djbouti: 2005 Election Pre-Assessment Report.* Retrieved from http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\_docs/pnadc712.pdf
* Institute for Security Studies. (April 14th, 2011). *Elections, Politics and External Involvement in Djbouti.* Retrieved from https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SitRep2011\_15AprDjibouti.pdf

## Dominican Republic

Since 1997, the Dominican Republic has offered regular public funding to party organizations that doubles in campaign years. Private contributions are large and unregulated, and probably outweigh public money.

Sources:

* The Dominican Republic. (1997). *Ley Electoral de la República Dominicana*. Retrieved from <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Electoral/DomRep/leyelectoral.pdf>
* Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas. (2011). *Financiamiento de los Partidos Políticos en América Latina*. Retrieved from https://www.oas.org/es/sap/docs/deco/financiamiento\_partidos\_s.pdf

## Ecuador

Ecuador’s 1978 Ley de Partidos Políticos established regular organizational funding. The law has been reformed many times, most significantly in 2000. Organizational funding now includes extra campaign funds. Ecuador’s public funding is generous by regional standards and party expenditures are technically capped, but in practice, there are high private donations that frequently exceed the caps.

Sources:

* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *Ecuador.* Retrieved from <https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/EC/>
* Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas. (2011). *Financiamiento de los Partidos Políticos en América Latina*. Retrieved from https://www.oas.org/es/sap/docs/deco/financiamiento\_partidos\_s.pdf

## Egypt

IDEA lists Egypt as a country without any public finance provisions.

## El Salvador

Campaign finance is enshrined in El Salvador’s Constitution and was implemented in a 1992 electoral law.

Sources:

* Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas. (2011). *Financiamiento de los Partidos Políticos en América Latina*. Retrieved from https://www.oas.org/es/sap/docs/deco/financiamiento\_partidos\_s.pdf
* Republic of El Salvador. (December 14th, 1992). *Código Electoral*. Retrieved from http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/mesicic3\_slv\_sc\_electoral.pdf
* Republic of El Salvador. (1983). *Constitution of 1983*. Retrieved from http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/ElSal/ElSal83.html

## Equatorial Guinea

IDEA lists Equatorial Guinea as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Estonia

The 1994 Political Parties Act established regular funding for political parties. The government does not issue additional funding for campaigns. State subsidies are parties’ main source of funding.

Sources:

* Group of States Against Corruption. (April 4th, 2008). *Evaluation Report on Estonia. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806cc177
* Estonia. (May 11th, 1994). *Political Parties Act.* Retrieved from https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/502062014001/consolide

## Ethiopia

Ethiopia set up a skewed campaign finance system in 1993 that funnels money to the ruling party. A 2008 amendment sets out possibility of regular and election funding. Most parties’ primary funding source is donations from the diaspora, especially for opposition parties.

Sources:

* Ethiopia. (2008). *Political Parties Registration Proclamation*. Retrieved from http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/africa/ET/political-parties-registration-proclamation-no-573-1/view
* Teshome, Wondwosen (2009). “Political Finance in Africa: Ethiopia as a Case Study.” *World Academy of Science, Engineering, and Technology*, n. 31, p. 854-867.

## Fiji

IDEA lists Fiji as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Finland

The Act on Political Parties of 1969 sets up regulations, and the 1973 Decree on Subsidies implements public funding. The Finnish government currently provides political parties with annual funding, and dispenses additional electoral funds.

Sources:

* Group of States Against Corruption. (December 7th, 2007). *Evaluation Report on Finland. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c5d07

## France

France introduced political finance legislation in 1988. The legislation included subsidies for campaigns and organizations and additional amendments added more monitoring and restrictions. Public funding is the main source of money for France’s political parties.

Sources:

* Group of States Against Corruption. (February 19th, 2009). *Evaluation Report on France. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c5dcf

## Gambia

IDEA lists Gambia as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Gabon

Gabon has scant publicly available sources on campaign finance. We found mention of three laws from 1996 that may establish and regulate political financing, but we were unable to verify those laws or their implementation. A EU election observation mission in 2016 reported that campaign finance is under-regulated and that the incumbent had state funding while other candidates had little or none.

Sources:

* European Union Election Observer Mission. (2016). *Rapport Final: Elections présidentielle, 27 aout 2016*. Retrieved from https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/gabon\_moe\_rapport\_final\_0.pdf

## Georgia

The 1997 Organic Law of Georgia on Political Unions sets up multiple sources of funding for party organizations, including campaign subsidies and regular organizational funding. Still, large parties depend significantly on private donations to cover their budgets.

Sources:

* Group of States Against Corruption. (May 27th 2011). *Evaluation Report on Georgia. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c62d3
* Georgia. (1997). *Organic Law of Georgia on Political Unions of Citizens.* Retrieved from <http://europam.eu/data/mechanisms/PF/PF%20Laws/Georgia/Georgia_Law%20on%20Political%20Unions%20of%20Citizens%202012.pdf>
* Georgia. (October 27th, 2015). *Election Code of Georgia*. Retrieved from http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF(2016)004-e
* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *Georgia.* Retrieved from https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/GE/

## Germany

Germany instituted public finance for party organizations in 1967, following a court decision. The Political Parties Act of 1967 establishes regular funding for party organizations and Germany does not have separate funds for elections. Despite generous subsidies, funding is primarily based on membership fees and donations; public money makes up 30-40% of parties’ income.

Sources:

* Group of States Against Corruption. (December 4th, 2009). *Evaluation Report on Germany. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from <https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c6362>

## Ghana

IDEA lists Ghana as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Greece

Public funding for political activities is enshrined in the 1975 Greek constitution. Public financing is regulated by a 2002 law that provides regular organizational funds and campaign subsidies. The law has been amended several times to adjust disclosure guidelines and subsidy amounts. Greek parties rely heavily on subsidies; which make up 60-90% of parties’ operational budgets. We sought additional expert input from Maria Gavouneli on 1/3/2017.

Sources:

* Group of States Against Corruption. (December 9th, 2005). *Evaluation Report on Greece. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c644d

## Grenada

IDEA lists Grenada as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Guatemala

Guatemala offers regular organizational funding to political parties, which is governed by the 2007 Electoral and Political Party Law. However, most campaign and party finance in Guatemala is private and largely unregulated.

Sources:

* Asemblea Nacional Constituyente. (January 2007). *Ley Electoral y de los Partidos Políticos*. <http://old.congreso.gob.gt/Pdf/Normativa/LeyElectoral.PDF>
* Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas. (2011). *Financiamiento de los Partidos Políticos en América Latina*. Retrieved from https://www.oas.org/es/sap/docs/deco/financiamiento\_partidos\_s.pdf

## Guinea

IDEA lists Guinea as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Guinea-Bissau

IDEA lists Guinea-Bissau as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Guyana

IDEA lists Guyana as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Haiti

Haiti has a 1987 constitutional provision that opens the door for a public finance system. However, according to one of the only sources we could fine, the provision has never been elaborated on or implemented.

Sources:

* *Paying for Political Parties and Campaigns in the Caribbean*. Retrieved from https://www.oas.org/sap/docs/publications/grassroots.pdf

## Honduras

State campaign funding is in the 1983 constitution, but was not implemented until 2004, under a electoral law. Honduran campaign subsidies are low and only for elections; most parties rely heavily on private donations.

Sources:

* Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas. (2011). *Financiamiento de los Partidos Políticos en América Latina*. Retrieved from https://www.oas.org/es/sap/docs/deco/financiamiento\_partidos\_s.pdf

## Hungary

A 1989 law established robust funding for parties and campaigns, which political parties continue to depend on for the majority of their operational and campaign expenses.

Sources:

* Hungary. (1989). *Act XXXIII of 1989 on the Operation and Financial Management of Political Parties*. Retrieved from https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0ahUKEwiB6qDY-r\_TAhXhiVQKHbPHBGIQFggkMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl%2Fparty-law%2F4dd27714-1b94-4e59-a9b1-089884e5412d.pdf&usg=AFQjCNG0DQEuYR1Pkvbr6elPcY4Su0ibZg
* Group of States Against Corruption. (June 11th, 2010). *Evaluation Report on Hungary. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c6b30
* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *Hungary.* Retrieved from https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/HU/

## Iceland

Iceland has regular funding for party organizations. Political finance is regulated under a 2006 law and the majority of parties’ budgets comes from the state. Note that we could only find the law in Icelandic and could not read it.

Sources:

* Group of States Against Corruption. (April 4th, 2008). *Evaluation Report on Iceland. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c6778

## India

IDEA lists India as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Indonesia

Since 2008, Indonesia has supplied parties with a regular subsidy for operational expenses. The law was amended in 2011. Most party funding and campaign funds come from private sources.

Sources:

* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *Indonesia*. Retrieved from <https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/ID/>
* Republic of Indonesia. (2011). *Law of the Republic of Indonesia. Number 2 Year 2011.* http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/asia/ID/indonesia-law-2-2011-on-political-parties-2011/

## Iran

IDEA lists Iran as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Iraq

IDEA lists Iraq as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Ireland

The Irish Electoral Acts of 1997 through 2005 comprehensively reformed Ireland’s campaign finance system. The first act established basic public financing. Political parties rely on state subsidies for both operational expenses and campaign funds.

Sources:

* Ireland. (1997). *Electoral Act, 1997*. Retrieved from http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1997/act/25/enacted/en/html
* Group of States Against Corruption. (December 4th, 2009). *Evaluation Report on Ireland. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c68f6

## Israel

Israel established public political finance in 1973. Parties depend on state subsidies for the majority of their budgets; however, candidates depend on citizens’ donations to cover campaign costs. The Knesset has amended the 1973 law and expanded its scope multiple times.

Sources:

* Israel. (1973). *Political Parties Financing Law, 5733-1973*. Retrieved from https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=5&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwig-r\_JnczRAhUN3GMKHVh9DooQFgg0MAQ&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.track.unodc.org%2FLegalLibrary%2FLegalResources%2FIsrael%2FLaws%2FIsrael%2520Financing%2520of%2520Political%2520Parties%2520Act%25201973.pdf&usg=AFQjCNH54XELO1f-1pl4xtUQOZtWIxNVFw&bvm=bv.144224172,d.amc
* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *Israel*. Retrieved from https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/IL/
* Library of Congress. (July 1st, 2015). *Campaign Finance: Israel*. Retrieved from https://www.loc.gov/law/help/campaign-finance/israel.php

## Italy

Italy had no regulations until a major political finance scandal in the 1970s. In 1974, it introduced regulations, including public funding to party organizations and campaigns. However, subsequent scandals spurred reactionary reforms and subsidies were abolished by a 2014 bill, which phases out subsidies by 2017.

Sources:

* Pizzimenti, Eugenio. 2016. “Italy.” In Norris, Pippa, and Andrea Abel van Es, Eds. *Checkbook Elections?: Political Finance in Comparative Perspective*. Oxford University Press.

## Jamaica

IDEA lists Jamaica as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Japan

Japan established regular party subsidies in 1994 but parties and candidates primarily rely on private funding. Note that the law is in Japanese and we could not verify it, and sources disagree if the law also establishes campaign subsidies.

Sources:

* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *Japan* Retrieved from https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/JP/
* Japan. (1994). *Political Party Subsidies Act*. Retrieved from http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/asia/JP/japan-political-party-subsidies-act-1994/view

## Jordan

Jordan moved towards a multi-party system in 1989, and expanded into political financing with a 2007 party law that mentioned finance, and a 2008 financing law that introduced a system of state subsidies to parties. Continued reforms and amendments have expanded these laws.

Sources:

* International Republican Institute. (July 2012). Jordan Political Parties Law Comparison (2007 and 2012 laws). Retrieved from https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwiMj8XcrszRAhVLImMKHfH2CnUQFggpMAM&url=http%3A%2F%2Fstatic.ow.ly%2Fdocs%2F2012%2520and%2520%25202007%2520Jordan%2520PP%2520Law%2520Comparison\_Hw9.pdf&usg=AFQjCNGrwnK9EpQXPqKcC3yIUR1f76UzfA&bvm=bv.144224172,d.cGc
* Nahar, Ghazi Saleh. (2012). “The Impact of Political Parties on the 2007 Jordanian Parliamentary Elections.” *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*. 2(16), 121-133. Retrieved from http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol\_2\_No\_16\_Special\_Issue\_August\_2012/13.pdf
* Hussainy, Mohammed. (December 2012). *The State’s Contribution in Financing Political Parties in Jordan*. Retrieved from http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/amman/09595.pdf

## Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan has had public political financing of political parties since 2009. Subsidies are based on amount of votes that a party received in the last election. With over 80% of votes, the lion's share of state funds goes to ruling party. Kazakhstan has scant publicly available sources on political finance and we sought Medet Tiulegenov’s input on 2/18/17.

Sources:

* Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. (July 29th, 2015). *Republic of Kazakhstan Early Presidential Election 26 April 2015*. Retrieved from http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/kazakhstan/174811?download=true
* Dr. Tiulegenov provided this source, which states that state money is 42% of ruling party's budget. It is in Kazahk and I can’t translate it into a proper citation: https://radiotochka.kz/14049-partiya-nur-otan-otchitalas-o-svoih-dohodah.html

## Kenya

Kenya’s 2011 Political Parties Act established a regular fund that parties can use for organizational expenses. The fund is unevenly distributed across parties and parties depend primarily on private money.

Sources:

* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *Kenya*. Retrieved from https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/KE/
* Republic of Kenya. (2011). *The Political Parties Act, 2011*. Retrieved from http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/PoliticalPartiesAct.pdf
* Republic of Kenya. (December 27th, 2013). *Kenya Gazette Supplement*. Retrieved from http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/ElectionCampaignFinancingAct2013.pdf

## South Korea

The Political Funds Act of 2010 established a state subsidy to parties. The subsidy increases during elections. Parties rely on public funding for a third of their expenses.

Sources:

* Republic of Korea. (2010). *Political Fund Act*. Retrieved from https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjLlfe4tMzRAhUDS2MKHW61BH8QFggaMAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Faceproject.org%2Fero-en%2Fregions%2Fasia%2FKR%2Fkorea-republic-of-political-fund-act-2005%2Fat\_download%2Ffile&usg=AFQjCNHJjP0YvTD3iL2bDIAwhI6xSVd-9A&bvm=bv.144224172,d.cGc
* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *South Korea.* Retrieved from https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/KR/

## Kyrgyzstan

IDEA lists Kyrgyzstan as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Latvia

Sources disagree on the state of political financing in Latvia. IDEA reports that there are regular subsidies while GRECO reports that Latvia does not have direct subsidies for parties or campaigns and the Latvian Law on Political Organization Financing corroborates GRECO. Public financing may be in the works.

Sources:

* Latvia.(September 25th, 2008). Law on Financing of Political Organizations. Retrieved from http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/europe/LV/latvia-law-on-financing-of-political-organisations/view
* Group of States Against Corruption. (October 10th, 2008). *Evaluation Report on Latvia. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c6cf4

## Lebanon

IDEA lists Lebanon as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Lesotho

Lesotho has campaign and organizational subsidies for political parties but scant source material. A 2011 law establishes both types of funding, a 1992 law has no mention, and one source claims that campaign funds available since 1993. We have not verified implementation.

Sources:

* African Democracy Encyclopedia. Project (May 2006). *Lesotho: Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/lesparties2.htm
* Lesotho. (1992). *National Assembly Election Order, 1992.* Retrieved from https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwitr9We8M7RAhXkjFQKHeWdA6kQFggcMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Faceproject.org%2Fero-en%2Fregions%2Fafrica%2FLS%2Flesotho-national-assembly-elections-order-1992%2Fat\_download%2Ffile&usg=AFQjCNFXaQoq2p2nkgynk0NMZqAMDlIWCw&bvm=bv.144224172,d.cGw
* Lesotho. (2011). *National Electoral Act of 2011.* Retrieved from http://www.iec.org.ls/election%20act/elections%20regulations.pdf
* The Commonwealth (2012). *Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group. Lesotho Parliamentary Elections*. Retrieved from http://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/news-items/documents/120815.pdf

## Liberia

IDEA lists Liberia as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Libya

IDEA lists Libya as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Liechenstein

Liechenstein has provided annual funding to party organizations since 1984. The ratio of public to private funds varies, but public funds generally make up the majority of most parties’ budgets.

Sources:

* Group of States Against Corruption. (March 16th, 2016). *Evaluation Report on Liechenstein. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from <https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c727f>
* Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. (January 28th, 2015). *Principality of Lichtenstein 2009 Parliamentary Elections* *Needs Assessment Mission Report*. Retrieved from http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/liechtenstein/35797?download=true

## Lithuania

A 1992 presidential election law stipulates that campaign financing will be regulated by a specific law. Until 2004, several disparate laws regulated aspects of campaign finance. In 2004, these laws were consolidated in the Law on Financing and Financial Control of Political Parties and Campaigns, which also set out public subsidies for campaigns and parties.

Sources:

* Group of States Against Corruption. (July 2nd, 2009). *Evaluation Report on Lithuania. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c761b
* Republic of Lithuania. (August 23rd, 2004). *Law on Financing and Financial Control of Political Parties and Campaigns*. Retrieved from https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjnyKnCqM\_RAhVM4GMKHXRgAm4QFggaMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.legislationline.org%2Fdownload%2Faction%2Fdownload%2Fid%2F4011%2Ffile%2FLithuania\_Law\_funding%2520political%2520part\_campaigns\_2004\_am2011\_en.pdf&usg=AFQjCNGOcXWCRZ6THjYYyq0i2ow88Mkg5A&bvm=bv.144224172,d.cGw

## Luxembourg

Luxembourg has several laws that regulate political financing and state subsidies to campaigns and parties. A 1999 law partially reimbursed campaign expenses. A 2007 law introduces regular funding. Sources are not clear on the ratio of public to private funding, but it appears to be mostly public after 2007.

Sources:

* Luxembourg. (December 21st, 2007). *Loi du 21 décembre 2007 portant réglementation du financement des partis politiques*. Retrieved from http://legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/loi/2007/12/21/n8/jo
* Group of States Against Corruption. (June 13th, 2008). *Evaluation Report on Luxembourg. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c76d3
* Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. (October 9th, 2013). *Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg Early Parliamentary Elections* *Needs Assessment Mission Report*. Retrieved from <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/106879?download=true>

## Macedonia

Macedonia regulates its political finance system under the 2004 Law on Financing of Political Parties, and Electoral Code. In 2006, the code was updated to include regular subsidies to party organizations.

Sources:

* Group of States Against Corruption. (March 26th, 2010). *Evaluation Report on Macedonia. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c99b0
* The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. (November 13th 2012) *Electoral Code of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.* Retrieved from http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF(2013)013-e
* The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. (March 8th, 2006). *Law on Financing Political Parties*. Retrieved from https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0ahUKEwiYk5ezh-vRAhVI4WMKHeQrCrMQFggcMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.legislationline.org%2Fdocuments%2Fid%2F17180&usg=AFQjCNFAlaE-Wzhq-HLOmZlOt69U97qxpQ

## Madagascar

Madagascar passed a law in 2009 that started to regulate political finance, but implementation was halted by a five year political crisis. As of the 2013 elections, public campaign financing had not been implemented and is barely regulated.

Sources:

* Madagascar. (2010). *Loi n 2009-002*. Partis Politiques. Retrieved from http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/africa/MG/madagascar-loi-nb0-2009-002-partis-politiques/view
* Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa. (December 22nd, 2013). *Mission D’Observation du Second Tour de L’Election Presidentielle et des Elections Legislatives du 20 Decembre 2013 a Madagascar*. Retrieved from https://www.eisa.org.za/pdf/mad2013eom4.pdf
* Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa. (nd)*. EISA Madagascar: Chronological Overview of Work.* Retrieved from <https://www.eisa.org.za/index.php/eisa-madagascar-chronological-overview-of-work/>

## Malawi

Malawi included provisions for campaign financing in its 1994 constitution. However, election observers report that no campaign or party finance system has been implemented.

Sources:

* Republic of Malawi. (1994). *Constitution of the Republic of Malawi*. Retrieved from <http://www.cpaafricaregion.org/sites/default/files/attachments/pdfs/constitution-malawi.pdf>
* Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa. (2009). *EISA Election Observer Mission Report.* Retrieved from https://www.eisa.org.za/pdf/mal2009eomr.pdf
* Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa. (March 15th, 2014). *EISA Pre-Election Assessment Mission.* Retrieved from ttps://www.eisa.org.za/pdf/mal2014pam.pdf

## Malaysia

IDEA lists Malaysia as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Maldives

Sources conflict, but election observers report that the Maldives does not have a clear political finance system, and no funds have been officially distributed.

Sources:

* Transparency International Maldives. (May 9th 2009). *Domestic Observation of the 2009 Maldivinian Parliamentary Elections*. Retrieved from <http://transparency.mv/files/download/b56ff34b94e9c41983be8c3ac21b6a3f.pdf>
* Election Commission Republic of Maldives. (nd). *Political Parties.* Retrieved from http://www.elections.gov.mv/political-parties-8.html

## Mali

A 2005 political party law established a system of regular state subsidies to parties in Mali. Jessica Gottlieb confirm on 2/13/17 that party subsidies are available and distributed to registered parties. Campaign subsidies are not available and the public subsidies are a minority of party and candidate income.

Sources:

* Mali. (August 18th, 2005). *Portant Charte des Partis Politiques..* Retrieved from <https://eisa.org.za/pdf/mali2005chartepartis.pdf>
* African Union. (2013). La *Mission D’Observation de L’Union Africaine a L’Election Presidentielle de 11 Aout 2013 au Mali.* Retrieved from https://eisa.org.za/pdf/mali2013au5.pdf

## Malta

IDEA lists Malta as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Marshall Islands

IDEA lists the Marshall Islands as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Mauritania

IDEA lists Mauritania as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Mauritius

IDEA lists Mauritius as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Mexico

Public campaign finance is enshrined in Mexico’s constitution. Mexico instituted a campaign finance framework in 1977. The state made public campaign funds available in 1986, and introduced general funds in 1989 as part of a transition to a competitive multi-party system. In 1996, public finance became more important than private.

Sources:

* Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas. (2011). *Financiamiento de los Partidos Políticos en América Latina*. Retrieved from https://www.oas.org/es/sap/docs/deco/financiamiento\_partidos\_s.pdf
* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *Mexico.* Retrieved from https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/MX/

## Micronesia

IDEA lists Micronesia as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Moldova

Sources disagree about the state of Moldova’s public finance structure. We sought expert input from Lee Cojocaru on 2/11/17, who confirmed that there are annual subsidies to parties based on a 1991 law, but no campaign finance apart from that. The majority of money in politics in Moldova comes from private sources.

Sources:

* Group of States Against Corruption. (April 1st, 2011). *Evaluation Report on Moldova. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c9a94
* Republic of Moldova. (April 21st, 2016). *Electoral Code of the Republic of Moldova*. Retrieved from <http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF(2016)031-e>

## Monaco

Parties only coalesced after the 2002 constitutional reform. There is a flat rate campaign reimbursement set out in a 1968 election law but, because campaign costs have risen at a rate much higher than the flat rate, only a minority of party funding comes from the state. There are no clear public financing laws beyond the reimbursement.

Sources:

* Group of States Against Corruption. (March 23rd, 2013). *Evaluation Report on Monaco. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c9434
* Principality of Monaco. (February 23rd 1968). Loi n. 839 du 23/02/1968 sur les élections nationales y communales. Retrieved from http://www.legimonaco.mc/305/legismclois.nsf/TNC/F130189D26AFF45CC125773F00386F3E!OpenDocument

## Mongolia

A 2005 law establishes the possibility of state funding, however, it does not appear to have been implemented and election observer reports do not mention campaign finance.

Sources:

* Mongolia. (January 28th, 2005). *Law of Mongolia: Law of Political Parties.* Retrieved from https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwio4-zqqevRAhVH-mMKHZbqDHMQFggaMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.legislationline.org%2Fdownload%2Faction%2Fdownload%2Fid%2F4821%2Ffile%2FMongolia\_Party%2520Law\_2005\_en.pdf&usg=AFQjCNHQWEZElNOLBkxFRPmsa5tlzfyrQg&bvm=bv.145824273,bs.2,d.cGc
* International Republican Institute. (2008). *Mongolia Parliamentary Elections, June 29th, 2008. Election Observation Mission Final Report*. Retrieved from http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/fields/field\_files\_attached/resource/mongolias\_2008\_parliamentary\_elections\_-\_english\_version\_0.pdf

## Montenegro

Montenegro legislated a campaign finance framework in 2008 and 2009, which includes campaign and party organization subsidies. The Group of States Against Corruption confirms that the framework has been thoroughly implemented; however, the relative importance of private and public money is unclear.

Sources:

* Montenegro. (2008). Law on the Financing of Political Entities and Election Campaigns. http://www.antikorupcija.me/media/documents/law\_on\_financing\_of\_political\_entities\_and\_election\_campaigns.pdf
* Group of States Against Corruption. (December 3rd, 2010). *Evaluation Report on Montenegro. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c97b7

## Morocco

Morocco has a political finance system but few publicly available sources in languages our team speaks. We sought expert input from Hind Arroub on 2/9/17, who confirmed that there is a public finance system that includes party organization subsidies. The system was authorized by a 1986 letter from the king. Parties mostly rely on state funding.

## Mozambique

IDEA claims that Mozambique subsidizes political campaigns, but we could not find the law that IDEA cites. The Carter Center election observer report on the 2014 elections reports that some campaign funds were released but were poorly regulated.

Sources:

* The Carter Center. (October 2014). *Presidential, Legislative, and Provincial Assembly Elections in Mozambique*. Retrieved from https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace\_publications/election\_reports/mozambique-finalrpt-061616.pdf
* Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa. (2009). *EISA Election Observer Mission Report.* Retrieved from https://www.eisa.org.za/pdf/eommoz2009.pdf

## Myanmar/Burma

IDEA lists Myanmar as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Namibia

Namibia established public campaign funds in the 1992 Electoral Act and Article 49 of the 1990 Constitution. However, EISA reports that private money is unregulated.

Sources:

* Namibia. (August 31st, 1992). *Electoral Act, 1992*. Retrieved from http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/africa/NA/namibia-electoral-act-1992/view
* Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa. (2014). *EISA Pre-Election Assessment Mission Report.* Retrieved from <https://www.eisa.org.za/pdf/nam2014eisa1.pdf>
* Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa. (2009). *EISA Technical Assessment Team Report.* Retrieved from https://www.eisa.org.za/pdf/eomnam2009.pdf

## Nauru

IDEA lists Nauru as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Nepal

IDEA lists Nepal as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Netherlands

The 1999 Political Parties Subsidization Act and the 1999 Regulation on Subsidization of Political Parties introduced broad state subsidies for party organizations. Both acts have been amended several times since with increased subsidies. Public funds are close to half of parties’ budgets but not quite. The government issues annual funding, and does not increase amounts during election years.

Sources:

* Group of States Against Corruption. (June 13th, 2008). *Evaluation Report on the Netherlands. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c7965
* The Netherlands. (July 22nd, 2011). *The Subsidies Act for Political Parties*. Retrieved from https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjm6qSYye3RAhUiS2MKHZg0CG8QFgghMAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.legislationline.org%2Fdownload%2Faction%2Fdownload%2Fid%2F4825%2Ffile%2FNL\_political\_parties\_2011\_en.pdf&usg=AFQjCNFgNhjaHMEqgL9nAP3cQy8kxb5wdw&bvm=bv.145822982,d.cGc

## New Zealand

New Zealand provides considerable support for parties, but through indirect means like media allocations and in-kind office space. Thus, we coded New Zealand as not offering state funds or subsidies to parties and campaigns. We sought expert input from Jack Vowles on 2/14/17 to confirm this assessment, and he corroborated that public finance for campaigns and parties is substantial but indirect. Vowles stated that the government started a program in 1938 to allocate time on state-owned radio to campaigns. This continued in 1963 when all TV was government-owned and time was allocated for free. In 1989, the government started allocating funds which to be spent on media allotments.

Sources:

* Geddis, Andrew. (2004). "Regulating the Funding of Election Campaigns in New Zealand: A Critical Overview." *Otago Law Review* 10:575.
* Library of Congress. (May 16th, 2016). *Regulation of Campaign Finance and Free Advertising: New Zealand.* https://www.loc.gov/law/help/campaign-finance-regulation/newzealand.php

## Nicaragua

Nicaragua’s Electoral Law regulates campaign finance and includes state subsidies for campaigns. The Electoral Law has been amended many times and the earliest mention we could confirm for the beginning of the subsidies was 2000.

Sources:

* Nicaragua. (2012). *Ley Número 331 -- Ley Electoral*. Retrieved from <http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/americas/NI/leyes-electorales/nicaragua-ley-no.-331-ley-electoral-2012/view>
* Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas. (2011). *Financiamiento de los Partidos Políticos en América Latina*. Retrieved from https://www.oas.org/es/sap/docs/deco/financiamiento\_partidos\_s.pdf

## Niger

Niger put state subsidies for parties on the books in 2010. However, election monitors note that while some funds are distributed, most go to the ruling party and the disbursement process has irregularities.

Sources:

* Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa. (2016). *Mission D’évaluation Pré-électorale Rapport.* Retrieved from <https://www.eisa.org.za/pdf/niger2015pam.pdf>
* Republique du Niger. (December 16th, 2010). *Ordinance 2010-85*. Retrieved from https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwj51qyL4O3RAhVFMGMKHVtwDdsQFggaMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Faceproject.org%2Fero-en%2Fregions%2Fafrica%2FNE%2Fniger-ordinance-nb0-2010-85-regulating-the-status%2Fat\_download%2Ffile&usg=AFQjCNGEMLSO9veyF9rFLpMz2vsyoaqh-A&bvm=bv.145822982,d.cGc

## Nigeria

IDEA lists Nigeria as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Norway

Norway has had public funding for party organizations since at least 1975 (we would appreciate expert input on a definitive start date). Unlike most of other countries in the region, Norway’s the state largely does not oversee parties’ spending. A majority of Norwegian parties’ budgets comes from the state.

Sources:

* Statistics Norway. (September 12th, 2016). *Political Parties’ Financing, 2015*. Retrieved from https://www.ssb.no/en/partifin
* Group of States Against Corruption. (February 19th, 2009). *Evaluation Report on Norway. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/16806c7a5e

## Pakistan

IDEA lists Pakistan as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Palau

IDEA lists Nigeria as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Panama

State subsidies to political activities are enshrined in the Panamanian Constitution of 1972. However, the state did not provide subsidies until 1997. Currently, Panama split subsidies between campaigns and party organizations. Sources cannot establish if the majority of party and campaign budgets come from public or private sources because parties are not required to report their accounts.

Sources:

* Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas. (2011). *Financiamiento de los Partidos Políticos en América Latina*. Retrieved from <https://www.oas.org/es/sap/docs/deco/financiamiento_partidos_s.pdf>
* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *Panama*. Retrieved from https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/PA/

## Papua New Guinea

Papua New Guinea’s 2003 Political Party Law sets up a public finance system for parties but it does not appear to have been implemented; election observer reports do not mention campaign finance infrastructure.

Sources:

* Papua New Guinea. (2003). Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates. Retrieved from http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/pacific/PG/papua-new-guinea-organic-law-on-the-integrity-of/view
* Commonwealth Pacific Islands Forum Election Assessment Team. (2007) *Papua New Guinea National Election, June-August 2007.* Retrieved from <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=9&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjmt6j5se_RAhUB3SYKHTp6A3AQFghRMAg&url=http%3A%2F%2Faceproject.org%2Fero-en%2Fregions%2Fpacific%2FPG%2Fpapua-new-guinea-national-election-observation%2Fat_download%2Ffile&usg=AFQjCNGtRbWeeTj1448C3rhev6YWMfeAqQ>
* Global Integrity. (2007). *Global Integrity Report 2007: Papua New Guinea*. Retrieved from https://www.globalintegrity.org/research/reports/global-integrity-report/global-integrity-report-2007/gir-scorecard-2007-papua-new-guinea/

## Paraguay

Paraguay has had both campaign subsidies and party organization subsidies from the national government since 1996. Public subsidies have been implemented unevenly and the law is vaguely worded. While Paraguay has both types of subsidies, private funds from unreported sources dominate money in politics.

Sources:

* Paraguay. (1996). Código Electoral Paraguayo. Retrieved from <https://www.oas.org/es/sap/deco/moe/Paraguay2013/docs/CODIGO_ELECTORAL.pdf>
* Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas. (2011). *Financiamiento de los Partidos Políticos en América Latina*. Retrieved from <https://www.oas.org/es/sap/docs/deco/financiamiento_partidos_s.pdf>
* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *Paraguay*. Retrieved from https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/PY/

## Peru

Peru put regular party subsidies in the 2003 Political Party Law. However, sources agree that money has never been disbursed to parties under the law.

Sources:

* Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas. (2011). *Financiamiento de los Partidos Políticos en América Latina*. Retrieved from <https://www.oas.org/es/sap/docs/deco/financiamiento_partidos_s.pdf>
* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *Peru*. Retrieved from https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/PE/

## Philippines

IDEA lists the Philippines as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Poland

Poland offers both campaign and party organization subsidies and has since 1997. The subsidies are generous and compromise the majority of parties’ and campaigns’ budgets.

Sources:

* Poland. (June 27th, 1997). Act of 27 June 1997 on Political Parties. Retrieved from https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwj\_vPexve\_RAhXBSCYKHXVCBscQFggcMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl%2Fparty-law%2F4e4ab093-1c40-4702-94ff-08e084e5412d.pdf&usg=AFQjCNFP9vNvLT2y5-syDHtg1ycozDRnDQ
* Group of States Against Corruption. (December 5th, 2008). *Evaluation Report on the Poland. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from <https://rm.coe.int/16806c7adc>
* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *Poland*. Retrieved from https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/PL/

## Portugal

Since 2003, Portugal supplies parties and campaigns with regular subsidies. Public money forms a considerable 70-90% of parties’ budgets.

Sources:

* Group of States Against Corruption. (December 3rd, 2010). *Evaluation Report on the Poland. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from <https://rm.coe.int/16806c7bcc>

## Republic of Congo, Brazzaville

The Congolese Constitution of 2015 provides for public funding, but election observers made no mention of public money or campaign finance in a report on the 2016 elections, suggesting that the measures have not been implemented. We could not find a separate law that IDEA lists as a source and we found few independent sources.

Sources:

* African Union. (2016). *Mission D’observation de l’Union Africaine pour la Premier Tour de l’election Presidentielle de la Republique du Congo 20 mars 2016.* Retrieved from https://www.eisa.org.za/pdf/con2016au.pdf

## Romania

Romania implemented regular party subsidies in 1989 and has expanded its political finance framework several times since. Expert input from Lee Cojocaru on 2/11/17 clarified that a 2006 amendment introduced campaign subsidies as well. Still, most money in the Romanian political system comes from private sources.

Sources:

* Group of States Against Corruption. (December 10th, 2010). *Evaluation Report on the Romania. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/16806c7cc7
* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *Romania.* Retrieved from https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/RO/

## Russia

Russia has had a comprehensive campaign finance system since 2001, though it is unevenly implemented to favor the ruling party. Funding is allocated after elections to compensate for electoral costs, and then annually based on vote share. A 2001 law regulates parties, and a flurry of different election laws regulate elections. We sought expert input from Iryna Solonenko on 2/12/17: the framework started in 2001 and continued with the amendments. The state provides the majority of money in politics, billions of rubles, to parties over the 3% threshold.

Sources:

* Russian Federation. (February 22nd, 2012). *Federal Law on Political Parties of the Russian Federation*. Retrieved from http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF(2012)001-e
* Group of States Against Corruption. (March 22nd, 2012). *Evaluation Report on the Russian Federation. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/16806c7d45
* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *Russia.* Retrieved from https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/RU/
* Wilson, Kenneth. (2007). Party finance in Russia: Has the 2001 law ‘on political parties’ made a difference? Europe-Asia Studies, 59(7) .
* Nstarikov. (July 15th, 2016). *How much do political parties cost Russia?* Retrieved from <https://nstarikov.ru/blog/68245>

## Rwanda

The 2003 constitution, amended in 2007, provides for campaign subsidies and a regular party funding scheme. The framework has been implemented, but funding remains largely unregulated and primarily from private sources.

Sources:

* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *Rwanda.* Retrieved from https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/RW/
* Rwanda. (May 4th, 2007). *Organic Law Governing Political Organizations and Politicians in Rwanda*. Retrieved from <http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Rwanda/orglaw.pdf>
* Commonwealth Secretariat. (August 9th 2010). *Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group*. Retrieved from https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwi705W60\_nRAhVNxWMKHXZiCc4QFggaMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Faceproject.org%2Fero-en%2Fregions%2Fafrica%2FRW%2Frwanda-observation-report-presidential-elections-1%2Fat\_download%2Ffile&usg=AFQjCNEBdIGYdGthfqdnWISLZRDbku6xHg&bvm=bv.146094739,d.cGc

## Saint Kitts

IDEA lists Saint Kitts as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Saint Lucia

IDEA lists Saint Lucia as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Saint Vincent

Sources conflict on Saint Vincent. IDEA lists Saint Vincent as a country with regular party subsidies and an OAS report agrees that "a few years ago, parties agreed to an annual subvention (p.26)." However, the statement has no date and a 2016 election observer report stated that there was no funding from the government.

Sources:

* Commonwealth Election Observer Team. (2016). *Saint Vincent and the Grenadines General Elections 9 December 2015*. Retrieved from <http://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/press-release/documents/160408%20POL%20CEOT%20SVG%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf>
* Organization of American States. (2005) *From the Grassroots to the Airwaves: Paying for Political Parties and Campaigns in the Carribean*. Retrieved from https://www.oas.org/sap/docs/publications/grassroots.pdf

## San Marino

Since 2005, San Marino has provided parties with annual funding. The funding amount doubles in election years to offset campaign costs. Most money in politics in San Marino comes from public funds.

Sources:

* Group of States Against Corruption. (July 12th, 2016). *Evaluation Report on San Marino. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from <https://rm.coe.int/16806c9cd3>
* San Marino. (November 23rd, 2005). *Finanziamento dei Partiti e Movimenti Politici.* Retrieved from https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwi11eKKuLPSAhVHw2MKHVTbCkQQFggaMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.consigliograndeegenerale.sm%2Fon-line%2Fhome%2Farchivio-leggi-decreti-e-regolamenti%2Fdocumento17023292.html&usg=AFQjCNEdSftgIv065ec5EonTSPyCu-KvUA&bvm=bv.148073327,d.cGc

## São Tomé and Príncipe

São Tomé and Príncipe has a 2004 law on the books that establishes a framework for campaign finance, including campaign subsidies and party subsidies, but it does not appear to have been implemented and does not feature in election observer results.

Sources:

* São Tomé and Príncipe. (2004). Lei de financiamento dos partidos politicos e das campanhas eleitorais. Retrieved from https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwiIrNuW2PnRAhVW\_mMKHWfNBT4QFggdMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Faceproject.org%2Fero-en%2Fregions%2Fafrica%2FST%2Fsao-tome-and-principe-finance-law-2004%2Fat\_download%2Ffile&usg=AFQjCNHD1\_isAqFY5iZaDLIF4NgrPsgIQg&bvm=bv.146094739,d.cGc
* African Union. (2016). *African Union Observer Mission to the 17 July 2016 Presidential Election of the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe*. Retrieved from <https://www.au.int/web/sites/default/files/newsevents/reports/31096-rp-aueom_stp_preliminary_statement_eng-2.pdf>
* Freedom House. (2015). *São Tomé and Príncipe*. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/s-o-tom-and-pr-ncipe

## Senegal

IDEA lists Senegal as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Serbia

Serbia has both campaign subsidies and disbursements to political parties on a regular basis. Political financing started in 2003 with a financing law that has since been amended.

Sources:

* Serbia. (June 14th 2011). *Law on Financing of Political Activities of Serbia*. Retrieved from http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF(2014)035-e
* Group of States Against Corruption. (October 1st, 2010). *Evaluation Report on Serbia. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/16806ca355
* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *Serbia.* Retrieved from https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/RS/

## Seychelles

IDEA lists the Seychelles as a country with both public campaign funds and party funds. The 2012 Political Parties Act sets up a framework for both; however, we could not verify implementation.

Sources:

* Seychelles. (2012). Political Parties (Registration and Regulation) Act. Retrieved from http://www.seylii.org/sc/legislation/consolidated-act/173

## Sierra Leone

IDEA lists Sierra Leone as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Singapore

IDEA lists Singapore as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Slovakia

The 2005 Act of Political Parties regulates financing, however, quality of implementation and exact dates for the beginning of campaign subsidies and party funds should be clarified.

Sources:

* Slovakia. (February 4th, 2005). *Act of Political Movements and Political Parties*. Retrieved from <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjs6fuS3_nRAhXlx1QKHfLKBdoQFggaMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.legislationline.org%2Fdownload%2Faction%2Fdownload%2Fid%2F4200%2Ffile%2F3.%2520SVK%2520Act%2520on%2520Political%2520Parties_2005_en.pdf&usg=AFQjCNEnrHUl96cfBJMygcfF6J2PEBVk_Q&bvm=bv.146094739,d.cGc>
* Group of States Against Corruption. (February 15th, 2008). *Evaluation Report on Slovakia. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/16806ca464

## Slovenia

A 2005 party law provides money for parties. According to IDEA, a separate election law provides money for campaigns; however, we could not find the law listed. Most money in politics appears to come from public sources.

Sources:

* Slovenia. (2005). *Slovenia Political Parties Act 2007*. http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/europe/SI/slovenia-political-parties-act-2007/view
* Group of States Against Corruption. (December 7th, 2007). *Evaluation Report on Slovenia. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/16806ca782
* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *Slovenia.* Retrieved from https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/SI/

## Solomon Islands

Sources conflict on whether the Solomon Islands has any public campaign or party funds: IDEA lists the Solomon Islands as a country with regular party subsidies while Money, Politics, and Transparency claims that there is no public money for parties or campaigns. The Political Parties Integrity Act establishes a framework for party subsidies, but we could not verify implementation.

Sources:

* Solomon Islands. (May 27th, 2014). *Political Parties Integrity Act, 2014*. Retrieved from http://www.parliament.gov.sb/files/legislation/9th%20Parliament/Acts/2014/Political%20Parties%20Integrity%20Act%202014.pdf
* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *Solomon Islands.* Retrieved from https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/SB/

## South Africa

Sources conflicted slightly on the nature of public money for political activities in South Africa. We sought expert input from Adam Harris on 2/14/17, who clarified that campaign funding is based on previous election results. The framework comes from the 1994 constitution. Most of the money in South African politics is from private and unregulated sources.

Sources:

* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *South Africa.* Retrieved from <https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/ZA/>
* South Africa. (1997). *Public Funding of Political Parties Act 103 of 1997*. Retrieved from https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjXmof2gfrRAhVJ5WMKHcACCdoQFggaMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.elections.org.za%2Fcontent%2FDocuments%2FLaws-and-regulations%2FPolitical-Party-Funding%2FPublic-Funding-of-Represented-Political-Parties-Regulations%2F&usg=AFQjCNFayCFp59HmQoAt9eCotfFZ-18nNA&bvm=bv.146094739,d.cGw
* Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa. (March 2011). *South Africa: Political Party Funding.* Retrieved from https://eisa.org.za/wep/souparties2.htm
* Lowry, Michael. (2008). “Legitimizing Elections through the Regulation of Campaign Financing: A Comparative Constitutional Analysis and Hope for South Africa.” *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review*, 3(2), 185-212.
* Electoral Commission of South Africa. (nd) *Party Funding*. Retrieved from <http://www.elections.org.za/content/Parties/Party-funding/>

## Spain

Since 1985, Spain has provided campaign subsidies and regular funding to political parties. The 1985 law was overhauled in 2007. Most of the money in Spanish politics now comes from public sources.

Sources:

* Spain. (June 20th, 1985). *Ley orgánica 5/1985, de 19 de junio, del Régimen Electoral General*. Retrieved from http://noticias.juridicas.com/base\_datos/Admin/lo5-1985.t1.html#c7
* Group of States Against Corruption. (May 15th, 2009). *Evaluation Report on Spain. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/16806c9d72

## Sri Lanka

Sources disagree on the status of public funds for political activities in Sri Lanka. Article 127 of the Parliament Elections Act of 1981 establishes a campaign finance framework with subsidies, but implementation appears to be partial and irregular.

Sources:

* Sri Lanka. (1981). *Parliament Elections Act (No. 1of 1981)*. Retrieved from <http://www.commonlii.org/lk/legis/num_act/pea1o1981259/s127.html>
* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *Sri Lanka.* Retrieved from <https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/LK/>

## Sudan

IDEA lists Sudan as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Suriname

IDEA lists Suriname as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Swaziland

IDEA lists Swaziland as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Sweden

Sweden has regular funding for political organizations. Sources were vague on when public money for politics started. We received expert input from Peter Esaiasson on 2/13/17, who confirmed that party subsidies were first implemented in 1965, and then expanded in later reforms. Campaign funding exists as indirect, in-kind support, primarily through media allocations.

Sources:

* Sweden. (1972). State Financial Support to Political Parties, 1972. Retrieved from http://europam.eu/?module=legislation&country=Sweden
* Group of States Against Corruption. (February 19th 2009). *Evaluation Report on Sweden. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/16806ca1b2
* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *Sweden.* Retrieved from https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/SE/

## Switzerland

IDEA lists Switzerland as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Syria

IDEA states that the Syrian government offers regular party subsidies but we could not find their sources or independently verify that claim.

## Taiwan

The Election and Recall Act sets out yearly-apportioned subsidies to parties. We sought expert input on implementation from Jay Kao on 2/9/17, who confirmed that party subsidies started in 2003. The subsidies act has been amended repeatedly, and most parties, other than the largest, rely on state subsidies. Candidates, separate from parties, first received campaign subsidies on 1989.

Sources:

* Taiwan. (December 14th, 2016). *Civil Servants Election and Recall Act*. Retrieved from http://law.moj.gov.tw/eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=D0020010

## Tajikistan

IDEA codes Tajikistan as having state funds for campaigns. However, the cited law does not establish funds for campaigns and election observers say there is not a clear campaign finance framework.

Sources:

* Republic of Tajikistan. (2010). Law of the Republic of Tajikistan of Political Parties. Retrieved from <http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Tajikistan/POLITICALPARTIES.pdf>
* Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. (August 31st, 2006. *Needs Assessment Mission Report*. Retrieved from <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/tajikistan/20727?download=true>

## Tanzania

Tanzania has a 2002 law on the books that establishes party subsidies, but the law does not appear to have been implemented, per election observer reports.

Sources:

* Tanzania. (2002). *The Political Parties Act*. Retrieved from <http://www.parliament.am/library/Political%20parties/Tanzania.pdf>
* European Union Election Observation Mission. (October 27th, 2015). *Preliminary Statement.* Retrieved from https://eisa.org.za/pdf/tan2016eu.pdf

## Thailand

The Thai Constitution of 1997 provides for campaign and party subsidies. Expert input from Allen Hicken on 2/9/17 confirmed that campaign and party subsidies started in 1998, and have been amended and extended. However, subsidies were suspended following a military coup and political crisis. Most money in Thai politics comes from private sources.

Sources:

* Napisa Waitoolkiat & Paul Chambers (2015) “Political Party Finance in Thailand Today: Evolution, Reform, and Control.” *Critical Asian Studies*, 47(4), 611-640.
* Thailand. (October 6th, 2007). *Organic Law on Parties 2007*. Retrieved from <http://thailaws.com/law/t_laws/tlaw0498.pdf>
* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *Thailand.* Retrieved from https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/TH/

## Timor-Leste

East Timor implemented regular party subsidies in 2008. While the subsidies are mentioned and appear to have been implemented according to election observers, implementation is uneven.

Sources:

* Timor-Leste. (April 16th, 2008). *Legal regime for the financing of political parties*. Retrieved from <https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/79905/86121/F971990906/TMP79905.pdf>
* European Union Election Observation Mission. (2012). *Final Report Parliamentary Election 2012*. Retrieved from http://www.eods.eu/library/EUEOM%20FR%20TIMOR%20LESTE%2028.09.2012\_en.pdf

## Togo

IDEA codes Togo as a country with regular party subsidies, but we could not verify IDEA’s sources or find independent sources.

## Trinidad and Tobago

IDEA lists Trinidad and Tobago as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Tunisia

Tunisia set up and distributed a small campaign subsidy under a 2014 law.

Sources:

* Tunisia. (May 26th, 2014). *Organic Law on Elections and Referenda*. Retrieved from <http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/africa/TN/tunisia-organic-law-on-elections-and-referenda/view>
* African Union. (October 2014). *La Mission D’Observation de L’Union Africaine pour les Elections Legislatives.* Retrieved from https://www.eisa.org.za/pdf/tun2014au7.pdf

## Turkey

IDEA says both, MPT agrees and says mostly public financing. Financing in 1982 constitution and set up in a 1983 law on parties

Sources:

* Group of States Against Corruption. (March 26th, 2010). *Evaluation Report on Turkey. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/16806c9c31
* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *Turkey.* Retrieved from https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/TR/

## Turkmenistan

IDEA lists Turkmenistan as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Uganda

Under a 2005 law, Uganda supplies parties and campaigns with public subsidies. Election observers note campaign subsidies have been implemented but delivery can be late and uneven.

Sources:

* Uganda. (2005). *The Political Parties and Organizations Act of 2005*. Retrieved from <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwj42vDfqPrRAhVIImMKHZrkAhYQFggjMAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Faceproject.org%2Fero-en%2Fregions%2Fafrica%2FUG%2Fuganda-political-parties-and-organisations-act%2Fat_download%2Ffile&usg=AFQjCNHyLc6o5t-h1M1APB8JpTvQjabduA>
* Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa. (February 18th, 2015). *EISA Election Observer Mission Report.* Retrieved from https://eisa.org.za/pdf/uga2016eomr.pdf

## Ukraine

Since 2003, Ukraine has regulated political finance with several interrelated laws that have been implemented, repealed, and then replaced. Subsidies for campaign and parties started in 2003, but the laws were then repealed in 2007. We sought expert input from Sokol Lleschi, who confirmed this timeline and added that Ukraine instituted ad-hoc campaign reimbursement in 2006 and 2007, before passing a more comprehensive law that established new subsidies in 2015. Most funding for political activities in Ukraine comes from private sources.

Sources:

* Group of States Against Corruption. (October 21st, 2011). *Evaluation Report on Ukraine. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/16806ca325
* Ukraine. (2003). Law of Ukraine on Political Parties in Ukraine. Retrieved from http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/7110

## United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has a system of regular subsidies to parties. The earliest reference to organizational money is "short money," a bill introduced in 1975 that gave money to opposition parties. A 1983 law regulates more comprehensively and was reformed in 2000. Most money in politics in the UK comes from private sources.

Sources:

* Group of States Against Corruption. (February 15th, 2008). *Evaluation Report on the United Kingdom. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/16806ca480
* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *United Kingdom.* Retrieved from https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/GB/
* Library of Congress. (July 1st, 2015). Campaign Finance: United Kingdom. Retrieved from https://www.loc.gov/law/help/campaign-finance/uk.php

## United States

The United States makes campaign subsidies available to candidates. Political finance is regulated under the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act. Most money in politics in the United States comes from private sources.

Sources:

* Federal Elections Commission. (August 1996). *Public Funding of Presidential Elections.* Retrieved from http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/pubfund.shtml#anchor686308
* Group of States Against Corruption. (December 9th, 2011). *Evaluation Report on the United States. Transparency of Political Party Funding*. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/16806ca589

## Uruguay

Uruguay was the first country to enact public campaign subsidies in 1928. In 1955, the country also became the first to introduce direct party subsidies.

Sources:

* Casas-Zamora, Kevin. (2005). *Paying for democracy: political finance and state funding for parties*. ECPR Press.
* Money, Politics, and Transparency. (nd). *Uruguay.* Retrieved from https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/UY/

## Uzbekistan

Under a 2004 law, Uzbekistan introduced campaign and party subsidies.

Sources:

* Uzbekistan. (April 30th 2004). *Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan about Financing of Political Parties*. Retrieved from <http://cis-legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=6589>
* Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. (December 4th, 2016). *Needs Assessment Mission Report*. Retrieved from http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/uzbekistan/276216?download=true

## Vanuatu

IDEA lists Vanuatu as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Venezuela

IDEA lists Venezuela as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Yemen

A 2001 law establishes the possibility of government subsidies to political parties, but we were unable to verify implementation.

Sources:

* Yemen. (1991). *Yemen Law No. 66: Governing Parties and Political Organizations*. http://al-bab.com/yemen-law-no-66-1991-governing-parties-and-political-organisations

## Zambia

IDEA lists Zambia as a country without any public finance provisions.

## Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe’s 1992 finance law introduced annual subsidies to parties that mostly benefited the ruling party. The opposition later challenged the law and lowered the threshold for receiving subsidies.

Sources:

* Zimbabwe. (1992). Political Parties Finance Act. Retrieved from <http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/africa/ZW/Political%20Parties%20(Finance)%20Act%20Chapter%202%2011.pdf>
* Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa. (May 2006). Zimbabwe: Party Regulation and Funding. Retrieved from https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/zimpartiesc.htm

# Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics and Robustness Checks

This section provides additional information on variables from the main text, as well as alternative modeling choices and robustness checks. The first section defines and describes all variables used in the main text and the following robustness checks. The second section walks the reader through alternative specifications of and checks on the statistical models.

**Descriptive Statistics**

Table C1 provides the name, variable label in the replication data, definition, and source of all of the variables from the models in the main text and the appendix. Our original public finance subsidy index comes from an original dataset based on factual coding, as described in Appendices A and B. The other variables come from the Varieties of Democracy Project, specifically the Version 8+ dataset. The V8+ dataset includes all V-Dem variables as well as economic and demographic variables gathered from other sources.

Finally, we use three economic variables from Fariss et al (2017). The authors are associated with V-Dem and use data from the Maddison Project, from which V8+ sources economic background factors. The authors supplement the Maddison Project’s data with historical estimates from several more sources and then combine the estimates in a latent variable model to generate a more accurate and complete time series of important GDP and population variables.

We introduce and analyze controls for natural resources, trade, and media censorship in Table C14. We include these controls in Table C14 because some studies on corruption have found a strong and significant relationship between natural resources, trade, and media censorship and national-level corruption (see Treisman 2007 for a thorough treatment of the literature). All four variables (trade consists of imports and exports) come from the V-Dem V8+ dataset. The natural resources variable was originally developed by Haber and Menaldo (2011) and included in the V8+ dataset. The trade variables, imports and exports, come from Barbieri and Keshk (2016). Finally, the media censorship variable comes from V-Dem and is coded by experts. We do not include these variables in our main models because they do not meaningfully change the estimated effect of the PFSI on corruption or significantly improve the fit of the benchmark model. However, they do restrict our sample size. Therefore, we have relegated them to the appendix.

### Table C1: Variable Definitions and Sources

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| *Name (label)* | *Definition* | *Sources* |
| Corruption index  (*v2x\_corrV8*) | Corruption index based on country expert responses to the question: “How pervasive is political corruption?” | Varieties of Democracy Project, Version 8 |
| PFSI stock (ln) (*pubfinindexstock1log*) | Additive index of political finance subsidy measures, transformed into a stock variable and then logged. | Political Finance Subsidy dataset, based on national laws, third party reports, and experts |
| PFSI (V-Dem)(*v2elpubfinV8*) | Ordinal variable of country expert responses to the question: “Is significant public financing available for parties’ and/or candidates’ campaigns for national office?” Variable converted to interval by V-Dem measurement model. | Varieties of Democracy Project, Version 8 |
| Polyarchy (*v2x\_polyarchyV8*) | Electoral democracy index based on country expert responses to the question: “To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved?” | Varieties of Democracy Project, Version 8 |
| GDP per capita (log) (*Fariss\_Maddison\_gdppc\_1990\_ln*) | Gross domestic product per capita in constant 1990 dollars. Maddison Project data supplemented by historical estimates, combined in a dynamic, three-dimensional latent trait model. | Fariss, Christopher J., Charles D. Crabtree, Therese Anders, Zachary M. Jones, Fridolin J. Linder, Jonathan N. Markowitz. 2017. “Latent Estimation of GDP, GDP per capita, and Population from Historic and Contemporary Sources.” Working paper. |
| GDP Growth  (*Fariss\_gdp\_growth*) | Growth of gross domestic product per capita in constant 1990 dollars. Maddison Project data supplemented by historical estimates, combined in a dynamic, three-dimensional latent trait model. | Fariss, Christopher J., Charles D. Crabtree, Therese Anders, Zachary M. Jones, Fridolin J. Linder, Jonathan N. Markowitz. 2017. “Latent Estimation of GDP, GDP per capita, and Population from Historic and Contemporary Sources.” Working paper. |
| Urbanization (*Fariss\_e\_miurbani*) | Proportion of a country that resides in urban areas. Maddison Project data supplemented by historical estimates combined in a dynamic, three-dimensional latent trait model. | Fariss, Christopher J., Charles D. Crabtree, Therese Anders, Zachary M. Jones, Fridolin J. Linder, Jonathan N. Markowitz. 2017. “Latent Estimation of GDP, GDP per capita, and Population from Historic and Contemporary Sources.” Working paper. |
| Executive corruption index  (*v2x\_execorrV8*) | Executive corruption index based on country expert responses to two questions: “How routinely do members of the executive, or their agents grant favors in exchange for  bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?” | Varieties of Democracy Project, Version 8 |
| Legislative corruption (*v2lgcrrptflip*) | Ordinal variable of country expert responses to the question: “Do members of the legislature abuse their position for financial gain?” Variable converted to interval by V-Dem measurement model, then flipped by authors to go from least corrupt to most corrupt. | Varieties of Democracy Project, Version 8 |
| Public sector corruption index (*v2x\_pubcorrV8*) | Public sector corruption index based on country expert responses to two questions: “To what extent do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?” | Varieties of Democracy Project, Version 8 |
| Judicial corruption (*v2jucorrdcflip*) | Ordinal variable of country expert responses to the question: “How often do individuals or businesses make undocumented extra payments or bribes in order to speed up or delay the process or to obtain a favorable judicial decision?” Variable converted to interval by V-Dem measurement model, then flipped by authors to go from least corrupt to most corrupt. | Varieties of Democracy Project, Version 8 |
| Media corruption  (*v2mecorrptflip*) | Ordinal variable of country expert responses to the question: “Do journalists, publishers, or broadcasters accept payments in exchange for altering news coverage?” Variable converted to interval by V-Dem measurement model, then flipped by authors to go from least corrupt to most corrupt. | Varieties of Democracy Project, Version 8 |
| Donation disclosure   (*v2eldonateV8\_stock\_1900\_1*) | Ordinal variable of country expert responses to the question: “Are there disclosure requirements for donations to national election campaigns?” Variable converted to interval by V-Dem measurement model. | Varieties of Democracy Project, Version 8 |
| Regular elections (*v2x\_elecregV8*) | Binary variable of country expert responses to the question: “At this time, are regularly scheduled national elections on course, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent?” | Varieties of Democracy Project, Version 8 |
| Media censorship (*v2mecenefmV8*) | Ordinal variable of country expert responses to the question: “Does the government directly or indirectly attempt to censor the print or broadcast media?” Variable converted to interval by V-Dem measurement model. | Varieties of Democracy Project, Version 8 |
| Imports (*e\_cow\_importsV8*) | Total value of a country’s imports in current US millions of dollars. | Original data from Barbieri and Keshk (2016), released with the Varieties of Democracy dataset, Version 8 |
| Exports (*e\_cow\_exportsV8*) | Total value of a country’s exports in current US millions of dollars. | Original data from Barbieri and Keshk (2016), released with the Varieties of Democracy dataset, Version 8 |
| Natural resource income (*e\_Total\_Resources\_Income\_PCV8*) | The real value in US dollars of a country’s petroleum, coal, natural gas, and metals production. | Original data from Haber and Menaldo (2011), released with the Varieties of Democracy dataset, Version 8 |

Table C2 describes the dimensions of all variables from the models in the main text as well as the additional control variables introduced in the robustness checks. Most of the variables come from the Varieties of Democracy Project and are continuous variables with a normal distribution. The economic and demographic variables are continuous and several are logged to address their skewed distributions. Finally, we have one binary variable: the regular elections indicator from V-Dem.

### Table C2: Descriptive statistics

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Scale** | **Minimum** | **Maximum** | **Mean** | **Standard Deviation** |
| Corruption index (V-Dem) | Continuous, 0-1 | .005 | .977 | .452 | .281 |
| PFSI stock (ln) | Continuous, 0-6 | 0 | 5.593 | .607 | 1.351 |
| PFSI (V-Dem) | Continuous, -3-4 | -2.595 | 3.764 | -.689 | 1.320 |
| Polyarchy | Continuous, 0-1 | .007 | .930 | .306 | .279 |
| GDP per capita (log) | Continuous | 4.653 | 14.400 | 7.815 | 1.098 |
| Urbanization | Continuous, 0-1 | .008 | 1 | .357 | .251 |
| GDP Growth | Continuous | -47.253 | 73.723 | .076 | 2.971 |
| Donation disclosure | Continuous, -3-4 | -2.583 | 3.876 | -.852 | 1.195 |
| Regular elections | Binary, 0, 1 | 0 (36%) | 1 (64%) |  |  |
| Executive corruption | Continuous, 0-1 | .009 | .977 | .456 | .296 |
| Legislative corruption | Continuous, -3-4 | -3.381 | 3.278 | -.060 | 1.365 |
| Public sector corruption | Continuous, 0-1 | .004 | .979 | .436 | .288 |
| Judicial corruption | Continuous, -3-4 | -3.331 | 3.288 | -.351 | 1.361 |
| Media corruption | Continuous, -3-4 | -3.525 | 3.189 | .171 | 1.633 |
| Media censorship | Continuous, -3-4 | -3.103 | 3.608 | -.163 | 1.527 |
| Imports | Continuous | .0314 | 2519305 | 23518.240 | 114499.100 |
| Exports | Continuous | .003 | 2818427 | 22313.470 | 103936.900 |
| Natural resource income | Continuous | 0 | 81161.850 | 594.626 | 3251.086 |

We summarize the political finance subsidy index (PFSI) and its component parts before we present tables with alternative index constructions in the robustness checks. Table C3 summarizes the binary variables that make up the PFSI, as well as the dimensions of the different PFSI constructions (note that the PFSI components and sources are defined in the main text and in Appendix A).

### Table C3: PFSI descriptive statistics

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Variable Type** | **Minimum** | **Maximum** | **Mean** | **Standard Deviation** |
| PFSI stock, logged, 1% | Continuous, 0-6 | 0 | 5.593 | .607 | 1.351 |
| PFSI stock, logged, 10% | Continuous, 0-4 | 0 | 3.931 | .516 | 1.134 |
| PFSI stock, unlogged, 1% | Continuous, 0-268 | 0 | 267.778 | 7.638 | 23.834 |
| PFSI level | Ordinal, 0-5 | 0 | 5 | .559 | 1.326 |
| PFSI PCA construction | Continuous, -1-7 | -.792 | 6.461 | .001 | 1.896 |
| Party subsidy | Binary, 0, 1 | 0 (86%) | 1 (14%) |  |  |
| Party subsidy implement | Binary, 0, 1 | 0 (88%) | 1 (12%) |  |  |
| Candidate subsidy | Binary, 0, 1 | 0 (87%) | 1 (13%) |  |  |
| Candidate subsidy implement | Binary, 0, 1 | 0 (88%) | 1 (12%) |  |  |
| Majority public funding | Binary, 0, 1 | 0 (94%) | 1 (6%) |  |  |

Finally, Figure C1 displays the correlations between the variables in the main text’s data tables. We do not display all correlations between the variables used in the main text as well as the appendix because the figure becomes too crowded. We invite interested readers to explore the replication data further on their own (replication data is hosted on the lead author’s website and on Dataverse).

**Figure C1: Heat map of correlations between variables**



*Color-coded pairwise correlations between variables in the data tables. Red numbers indicate negative correlations while blue numbers indicate positive correlations. The darker the number, the stronger the correlation.*

**Robustness Check Summaries**

Tables C4 and C5 summarize the results of the robustness checks. In the tables, a checkmark means that the coefficient on the public finance index (PFSI) in the robustness check is consistent with the results reported in the main text. “Consistent” means that the coefficient is negative and has a p-value of less than .1.

We use a logged stock variable as our independent variable of interest in the tables in the main text. We use a stock version of the index in order to operationalize our expectation that the duration of subsidies impacts their effects, but that subsidies have diminishing marginal effects over time. We also log the variable because it is highly skewed. However, there are several other ways to construct the main independent variable that are arguably as theoretically appropriate. We could have used the additive index without transforming it, giving more weight to the existence of the regulations. We could also have used a different depreciation rate; for example, a 10% depreciation rate translates to marginal effects that diminish at a faster rate. Table C4 summarizes the effects of these variable construction choices. The main results do not change meaningfully with these different constructions.

### Table C4: Changes to the PFSI

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Index, level | PCA | Unlogged | 10% depreciation |
| Bivariate | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Benchmark | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Full Controls | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

The models reported in the main text are panel analyses with fixed effects and five-year forward lags that use the full sample. We selected these models because we are looking at cross-sectional effects over time and expect that there is a lag between when regulations are implemented and when their full effects are felt. We use the full sample because we believe in using all available data. However, there are several alternative choices that we could have made and that would have been theoretically defensible. We summarize those modeling choices’ effects on the IV of interest here. Similar to changes in independent variable construction, we can see that the main results are generally robust.

### Table C5: Changes to estimator or sample

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Random effects | 1 year lag | 10 year lag | Lagged DV | Alternate DV | Pooled OLS | 1960+ |
| Bivariate |  | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Benchmark |  | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Full Controls |  | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

In addition to these changes, we also analyze models with additional control variables (described in the following section), with interactions between the PFSI and other covariates, and dropping potentially influential cases. The tables in the following pages present the full results from the robustness checks summarized above.

**Robustness Checks and Data Tables**

Table C6 presents the results of three time-series cross-sectional models where corruption is regressed against the unlogged and level version of the Political finance subsidy index (PFSI). An ordinary least squares estimator is employed along with country and year fixed effects, with errors clustered by country. Right side variables are lagged five years behind the outcome.

Model 1 includes only the variable of theoretical interest, the unlogged and level PFSI. Model 2 adds several covariates commonly regarded as causes of corruption: GDP per capita, polyarchy and polyarchy squared. Owing to the ubiquity of these variables in studies of corruption, and their strong performance in our models, we regard this as a benchmark model. In Model 3, we add several additional covariates that are less central in the literature but may nonetheless serve as confounders. This includes urban population, GDP growth, and regular elections. Results are significant and stable across all model specifications where the unlogged and level PFSI is the predictor.

### Table C6: PFSI, unlogged and level, and corruption, 1900-2015

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Outcome (Y)* | Corruption Index | Corruption Index | Corruption Index |
|  | **1** | **2** | **3** |
| **PFSI** | -.029\*\*\*\*  (.006) | -.014\*\*\* (.005) | -.014\*\*  (.005) |
| Polyarchy |  | .183\*  (.105) | .231\* (.135) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Polyarchy 2 |  | -.356\*\*\* (.117) | -.391\*\*\* (.141) |
|  |  |  |  |
| GDP per capita (logged) |  | -.043\*\*\* (.014) | -.039\*\*\* (.013) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Urbanization |  |  | -.127 (.104) |
|  |  |  |  |
| GDP Growth |  |  | -.001\* |
|  |  |  | (.000) |
| Regular Elections |  |  | .016 (.014) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Year FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Country FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| *Countries* | 157 | 157 | 153 |
| *Years* | 111 | 111 | 110 |
| *Obs* | 11,271 | 10,783 | 10,434 |
| *R2 (within)* | (0.13) | (0.19) | (0.19) |

*Outcome:* corruption in different sectors (V-Dem), forward-lagged by five years. *Estimator:* ordinary least squares panel analysis with two-way fixed effects (unit and time) and standard errors clustered by country. \*≤p.1 \*\*p≤.05 \*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*\*\*≤p.001

The results in Table C6 are generally consistent with the results presented in the main text of the paper. While the magnitude of the coefficients shifts slightly, the signs and standard errors are largely unchanged.

Table C7 presents the results of three time-series cross-sectional models where corruption is regressed against a political finance subsidy index constructed through principal components analysis. An ordinary least squares estimator is employed along with country and year fixed effects, with errors clustered by country. Right side variables are lagged five years behind the outcome.

Model 1 includes only the variable of theoretical interest, the PCA index. Model 2 adds several covariates commonly regarded as causes of corruption: GDP per capita, polyarchy and polyarchy squared. In Model 3, we add several additional covariates that are less central in the literature but may nonetheless serve as confounders. This includes urban population, GDP growth, and regular elections. Results are significant and stable across all model specifications and the results do not differ significantly from those that use the additive index.

### Table C7: PFSI, constructed through PCA, and corruption, 1900-2015

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Outcome (Y)* | Corruption Index | Corruption Index | Corruption Index |
|  | **1** | **2** | **3** |
| **PFSI (PCA)** | -.020\*\*\*\*  (.004) | -.010\*\*\* (.004) | -.010\*\*  (.004) |
| Polyarchy |  | .183\*  (.105) | .231\* (.135) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Polyarchy 2 |  | -.356\*\*\* (.117) | -.392\*\*\* (.142) |
|  |  |  |  |
| GDP per capita (logged) |  | -.043\*\*\* (.014) | -.040\*\*\* (.013) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Urbanization |  |  | -.128 (.102) |
|  |  |  |  |
| GDP Growth |  |  | -.001\* |
|  |  |  | (.000) |
| Regular Elections |  |  | .016 (.014) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Year FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Country FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| *Countries* | 157 | 157 | 153 |
| *Years* | 111 | 111 | 110 |
| *Obs* | 11,271 | 10,783 | 10,434 |
| *R2 (within)* | (0.13) | (0.19) | (0.19) |

*Outcome:* corruption in different sectors (V-Dem), forward-lagged by five years. *Estimator:* ordinary least squares panel analysis with two-way fixed effects (unit and time) and standard errors clustered by country. \*≤p.1 \*\*p≤.05 \*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*\*\*≤p.001

Moving on, Table C8 presents results using the unlogged PFSI stock variable. The results in Table C8 are consistent with the results presented in the main text: the signs and p-values are consistent across the changes in scale. An ordinary least squares estimator is employed along with country and year fixed effects, with errors clustered by country. Right side variables are lagged five years behind the outcome.

Model 1 includes only the variable of theoretical interest, the unlogged PFSI stock variable. Model 2 adds several covariates commonly regarded as causes of corruption: GDP per capita, polyarchy and polyarchy squared. We regard this as a benchmark model. In Model 3, we add several additional covariates that are less central in the literature but may nonetheless serve as confounders. This includes urban population, GDP growth, and regular elections. Results are significant and stable across all model specifications where the unlogged PFSI stock variable is the predictor.

### Table C8: Unlogged PFSI stock variable and corruption, 1900-2015

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Outcome (Y)* | Corruption Index | Corruption Index | Corruption Index |
|  | **1** | **2** | **3** |
| **PFSI stock (1%)** | -.002\*\*\*  (.001) | -.001\*\* (.000) | -.001\*\*  (.000) |
| Polyarchy |  | .144  (.105) | .190 (.133) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Polyarchy 2 |  | -.325\*\*\* (.114) | -.358\*\*\* (.137) |
|  |  |  |  |
| GDP per capita (logged) |  | -.045\*\*\* (.014) | -.040\*\*\* (.013) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Urbanization |  |  | -.140 (.103) |
|  |  |  |  |
| GDP Growth |  |  | -.001\* |
|  |  |  | (.000) |
| Regular Elections |  |  | .014 (.014) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Year FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Country FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| *Countries* | 157 | 157 | 153 |
| *Years* | 111 | 111 | 110 |
| *Obs* | 11,271 | 10,783 | 10,434 |
| *R2 (within)* | (0.12) | (0.19) | (0.19) |

*Outcome:* corruption in different sectors (V-Dem), forward-lagged by five years. *Estimator:* ordinary least squares panel analysis with two-way fixed effects (unit and time) and standard errors clustered by country. \*≤p.1 \*\*p≤.05 \*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*\*\*≤p.001

Continuing on, Table C9 reports results for the logged PFSI stock variable with a 10% depreciation rate instead of a 1% depreciation rate. Changing the depreciation of the stock from 1% to 10% decreases the influence of the past and reduces the variation in the sample. An ordinary least squares estimator is employed along with country and year fixed effects, with errors clustered by country. Right side variables are lagged five years behind the outcome.

Model 1 includes only the variable of theoretical interest, the logged PFSI stock variable with a 10% depreciation rate. Model 2 adds several covariates commonly regarded as causes of corruption: GDP per capita, polyarchy and polyarchy squared. Owing to the ubiquity of these variables in studies of corruption, and their strong performance in our models, we regard this as a benchmark model. In Model 3, we add several additional covariates that are less central in the literature but may nonetheless serve as confounders. This includes urban population, GDP growth, and regular elections. Results are significant and stable across all model specifications where the logged PFSI stock variable with a 10% depreciation rate is the predictor. Again, Table C9 demonstrates that this change in variable construction affects the magnitude of the estimates, but not the sign or significance.

### Table C9: PFSI, stock with a 10% depreciation rate, and corruption, 1900-2015

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Outcome (Y)* | Corruption Index | Corruption Index | Corruption Index |
|  | **1** | **2** | **3** |
| **PFSI stock 10% (ln)** | -.037\*\*\*\*  (.008) | -.019\*\*\* (.007) | -.019\*\*\*  (.007) |
| Polyarchy |  | .169  (.106) | .213 (.135) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Polyarchy 2 |  | -.340\*\*\* (.117) | -.372\*\*\* (.141) |
|  |  |  |  |
| GDP per capita (logged) |  | -.044\*\*\* (.014) | -.039\*\*\* (.013) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Urbanization |  |  | -.136 (.103) |
|  |  |  |  |
| GDP Growth |  |  | -.001\* |
|  |  |  | (.000) |
| Regular Elections |  |  | .015 (.014) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Year FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Country FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| *Countries* | 157 | 157 | 153 |
| *Years* | 111 | 111 | 110 |
| *Obs* | 11,271 | 10,783 | 10,434 |
| *R2 (within)* | (0.13) | (0.19) | (0.19) |

*Outcome:* corruption in different sectors (V-Dem), forward-lagged by five years. *Estimator:* ordinary least squares panel analysis with two-way fixed effects (unit and time) and standard errors clustered by country. \*≤p.1 \*\*p≤.05 \*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*\*\*≤p.001

In Table C10, we move to the robustness checks summarized in Table C5 of this section of the appendix. We start with random effects; using random effects instead of fixed effects generates results that are almost identical to those from the fixed effects models. We see only small shifts in the magnitude of the estimates. An ordinary least squares estimator is employed along with random effects, with errors clustered by country. Right side variables are lagged five years behind the outcome.

### Table C10: PFSI and corruption with random effects, 1900-2015

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Outcome (Y)* | Corruption Index | Corruption Index | Corruption Index |
|  | **1** | **2** | **3** |
| **PFSI stock (ln)** | -.033\*\*\*\*  (.006) | -.016\*\*\* (.006) | -.017\*\*\*  (.006) |
| Polyarchy |  | .152  (.106) | .196 (.134) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Polyarchy 2 |  | -.331\*\*\* (.117) | -.363\*\*\* (.141) |
|  |  |  |  |
| GDP per capita (logged) |  | -.047\*\*\*\* (.013) | -.041\*\*\* (.013) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Urbanization |  |  | -.154\* (.093) |
|  |  |  |  |
| GDP Growth |  |  | -.001\* |
|  |  |  | (.000) |
| Regular Elections |  |  | .014 (.014) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Year FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Country FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| *Countries* | 157 | 157 | 153 |
| *Years* | 111 | 111 | 110 |
| *Obs* | 11,271 | 10,783 | 10,434 |
| *R2 (within)* | (0.13) | (0.20) | (0.19) |

*Outcome:* corruption in different sectors (V-Dem), forward-lagged by five years. *Estimator:* ordinary least squares panel analysis with random effects (unit and time) and standard errors clustered by country. \*≤p.1 \*\*p≤.05 \*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*\*\*≤p.001

Model 1 includes only the variable of theoretical interest, the logged PFSI stock variable. Model 2 adds several covariates commonly regarded as causes of corruption: GDP per capita, polyarchy and polyarchy squared, our benchmark model. In Model 3, we add several additional covariates that are less central in the literature but may nonetheless serve as confounders. This includes urban population, GDP growth, and regular elections. Results are significant and stable across all model specifications. This provides some assurance that our results are not the product of measurement error for the treatment variable.

### Table C11: PFSI and corruption with a one year lag, 1900-2015

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Outcome (Y)* | Corruption Index | Corruption Index | Corruption Index |
|  | **1** | **2** | **3** |
| **PFSI stock (ln)** | -.034\*\*\*\*  (.007) | -.018\*\*\* (.006) | -.019\*\*\*  (.006) |
| Polyarchy |  | .108  (.111) | .121 (.140) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Polyarchy 2 |  | -.333\*\*\* (.119) | -.319\*\* (.142) |
|  |  |  |  |
| GDP per capita (logged) |  | -.042\*\*\* (.014) | -.039\*\*\* (.013) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Urbanization |  |  | -.113 (.101) |
|  |  |  |  |
| GDP Growth |  |  | -.001 |
|  |  |  | (.001) |
| Regular Elections |  |  | .015 (.015) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Year FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Country FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| *Countries* | 157 | 157 | 153 |
| *Years* | 115 | 115 | 110 |
| *Obs* | 11,891 | 11,434 | 10,453 |
| *R2 (within)* | (0.15) | (0.23) | (0.24) |

*Outcome:* corruption in different sectors (V-Dem), forward-lagged by one year. *Estimator:* ordinary least squares panel analysis with fixed effects (unit and time) and standard errors clustered by country. \*≤p.1 \*\*p≤.05 \*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*\*\*≤p.001

Table C11 reports results from analyses in which right side variables are lagged one year behind the outcome instead of five years. Table C11 presents the results of three time-series cross-sectional models where corruption is regressed against the logged PFSI stock variable. An ordinary least squares estimator is employed along with country and year fixed effects, with errors clustered by country.

Model 1 includes only the variable of theoretical interest, the logged PFSI stock variable. Model 2 adds several covariates commonly regarded as causes of corruption: GDP per capita, polyarchy and polyarchy squared. In Model 3, we add several additional covariates that are less central in the literature but may nonetheless serve as confounders. This includes urban population, GDP growth, and regular elections. Across these specifications, the magnitude of the estimates is larger and the p-values are smaller using a one-year lag than a five-year lag.

Of course, the shorter lags also include more observations in the samples. We use the five-year lag in the main results instead of the one-year lag because of the theoretical expectation that policies take time from passage to implementation to measurable results.

Table C12 summarizes the results from analyses with ten-year lags instead of five-year lags. Table C12 presents the results of three time-series cross-sectional models where corruption is regressed against the logged PFSI stock variable. An ordinary least squares estimator is employed along with country and year fixed effects, with errors clustered by country.

### Table C12: Political finance and corruption with a ten year lag, 1900-2015

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Outcome (Y)* | Corruption Index | Corruption Index | Corruption Index |
|  | **1** | **2** | **3** |
| **PFSI stock (ln)** | -.031\*\*\*\*  (.006) | -.016\*\* (.006) | -.016\*\*\*  (.006) |
| Polyarchy |  | .172\*  (.101) | .243\* (.124) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Polyarchy 2 |  | -.281\*\* (.113) | -.340\*\* (.133) |
|  |  |  |  |
| GDP per capita (logged) |  | -.043\*\*\* (.015) | -.036\*\* (.014) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Urbanization |  |  | -.171 (.109) |
|  |  |  |  |
| GDP Growth |  |  | -.000 |
|  |  |  | (.000) |
| Regular Elections |  |  | .018 (.013) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Year FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Country FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| *Countries* | 156 | 156 | 152 |
| *Years* | 106 | 106 | 105 |
| *Obs* | 10,498 | 9,984 | 9,660 |
| *R2 (within)* | (0.11) | (0.14) | (0.24) |

*Outcome:* corruption in different sectors (V-Dem), forward-lagged by ten years. *Estimator:* ordinary least squares panel analysis with fixed effects (unit and time) and standard errors clustered by country. \*≤p.1 \*\*p≤.05 \*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*\*\*≤p.001

Model 1 includes only the variable of theoretical interest, the logged PFSI stock variable. Model 2 adds several covariates commonly regarded as causes of corruption: GDP per capita, polyarchy and polyarchy squared. Owing to the ubiquity of these variables in studies of corruption, and their strong performance in our models, we regard this as a benchmark model. In Model 3, we add several additional covariates that are less central in the literature but may nonetheless serve as confounders. The results are generally consistent with those reported in the main text of the paper.

Table C13 summarizes results when we restrict the sample to 1960 and later. Table C13 presents the results of three time-series cross-sectional models where corruption is regressed against the logged PFSI stock variable. An ordinary least squares estimator is employed along with country and year fixed effects, with errors clustered by country. Right side variables are lagged five years behind the outcome.

### Table C13: Political finance and corruption, 1960-2015

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Outcome (Y)* | Corruption Index | Corruption Index | Corruption Index |
|  | **1** | **2** | **3** |
| **PFSI stock (ln)** | -.020\*\*\*\*  (.006) | -.010\* (.006) | -.011\*\*  (.006) |
| Polyarchy |  | .325\*\*  (.130) | .339\* (.176) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Polyarchy 2 |  | -.531\*\*\*\* (.142) | -.529\*\*\* (.175) |
|  |  |  |  |
| GDP per capita (logged) |  | -.043\*\*\* (.015) | -.042\*\*\* (.015) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Urbanization |  |  | -.142 (.114) |
|  |  |  |  |
| GDP Growth |  |  | -.001\*\* |
|  |  |  | (.000) |
| Regular Elections |  |  | .007 (.018) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Year FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Country FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| *Countries* | 157 | 157 | 153 |
| *Years* | 51 | 51 | 51 |
| *Obs* | 7,083 | 7,056 | 6,856 |
| *R2 (within)* | (0.08) | (0.17) | (0.17) |

*Outcome:* corruption in different sectors (V-Dem), forward-lagged by five years. *Estimator:* ordinary least squares panel analysis with fixed effects (unit and time) and standard errors clustered by country. \*≤p.1 \*\*p≤.05 \*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*\*\*≤p.001

Model 1 includes only the variable of theoretical interest, the logged PFSI stock variable. Model 2 adds several covariates commonly regarded as causes of corruption: GDP per capita, polyarchy and polyarchy squared. Owing to the ubiquity of these variables in studies of corruption, and their strong performance in our models, we regard this as a benchmark model. In Model 3, we add several additional covariates that are less central in the literature but may nonetheless serve as confounders. Results are significant and stable across all model specifications.

Table C14 auditions additional control variables that have an established relationship with corruption (Treisman 2007), namely natural resource income to governments from Haber and Menaldo’s (2011) dataset, imports and exports from Barbieri and Keshk (2016), and media censorship from V-Dem. Table C14 presents the results of four time-series cross-sectional models where corruption is regressed against the logged PFSI stock variable as well as these addition controls. An ordinary least squares estimator is employed along with country and year fixed effects, with errors clustered by country in all models. Right side variables are lagged five years behind the outcome. The following analyses demonstrate that the addition of these control variables barely affects the political finance variable and minimally improves model fit.

### Table C14: Political finance and corruption 1900-2015, additional controls

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Outcome (Y)* | Corruption Index | Corruption Index | Corruption Index | Corruption Index |
|  | **1** | **2** | **3** | **4** |
| **PFSI stock (1%), logged** | -.013\*\*  (.006) | -.016\*\*\* (.006) | -.011\*  (.006) | -.011\*  (.007) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Polyarchy | .036  (.111) | .264\*\*\*  (.101) | .097 (.119) | .083 (.111) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Polyarchy 2 | -.204\*  (.122) | -.365\*\*\* (.115) | -.292\*\* (.103) | -.236\* (.125) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP per capita (logged) | -.042\*\*\*  (.015) | -.043\*\*\* (.013) | -.028\*\* (.013) | -.033\*\* (.016) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Natural Resource Income | .001\*  (.001) |  |  | .000  (.000) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Media Censorship |  | -.016\*  (.008) |  | .008  (.007) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Imports |  |  | -.000 (.000) | .000  (.000) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Exports |  |  | .000 (.000) | .000  (.000) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Year FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Country FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| *Countries* | 146 | 157 | 150 | 143 |
| *Years* | 107 | 111 | 111 | 107 |
| *Obs* | 8,818 | 10,743 | 9,343 | 8,250 |
| *R2 (within)* | (0.17) | (0.21) | (0.17) | (0.18) |

*Outcome:* corruption in different sectors (V-Dem), forward-lagged by five years. *Estimator:* ordinary least squares panel analysis with two-way fixed effects (unit and time) and standard errors clustered by country. \*≤p.1 \*\*p≤.05 \*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*\*\*≤p.001

All four models include the benchmark specification. Model 1 adds a variable measuring natural resource income from Haber and Menaldo (2011). Model 2 includes a media censorship variable from V-Dem. Model 3 considers import and export data from Correlates of War. Model 4 combines these additional specifications into a garbage can model. None of these controls are consistently significant in the models or have large substantive effects, and including them decreases the fit of the benchmark model.

Moving on, Table C15 introduces interactions between the PFSI and the covariates in the full controls model. These analyses look for additional nonlinearities in the relationship between the PFSI and corruption.

### Table C15: Political finance and corruption, with additional interactions, 1900-2015

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Outcome (Y)* | Corruption Index  **Model 1: Interaction with Polyarchy** | Corruption Index  **Model 2: Interaction with GDP** | Corruption Index  **Model 3: Interaction with Urbanization** | Corruption Index  **Model 4:**  **Interaction with Growth** |
| PFSI stock (ln) (authors) | .004  (.016) | .029 (.055) | -.026\*\*\*\* (.005) | -.027\*\*\*\*  (.005) |
| PFSI stock (ln) interaction | -.030 (.019) | -.005  (.006) | .399\*\*\*  (.078) | .258\*\* (.112) |
| Polyarchy | .147  (.123) | .160  (.130) | -.639\*\*\*  (.139) | -.504\*\*\* (.145) |
| Polyarchy2 | -.288\*\* (.124) | -.318\*\* (.135) | .776\*\*\*\* (.210) | .628\*\*\* (.327) |
| GDP per capita (log) | -.037\*\*\* (.013) | -.035\*\*\* (.013) | -.002 (.009) | .005 (.010) |
| Urbanization | -.151  (.104) | -.150 (.105) | -.200\*\*\* (.060) | -.200\*\*\* (.060) |
| GDP Growth | .001\*\*  (.000) | .001\*  (.000) | .001\*\*  (.000) | .001\*\*  (.000) |
| Regular Elections | -.012 (.013) | -.013 (.013) | .031\*\* (.011) | .031\*\* (.011) |
| Year FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Country FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| *Countries* | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 |
| *Years* | 111 | 111 | 111 | 111 |
| *Obs* | 10,482 | 10,482 | 10,482 | 10,482 |
| *R2 (within)* | (0.20) | (0.20) | (0.20) | (0.20) |

*Outcome:* corruption in different sectors (V-Dem), forward-lagged by five years. *Estimator:* ordinary least squares panel analysis with two-way fixed effects (unit and time) and standard errors clustered by country. \*≤p.1 \*\*p≤.05 \*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*\*\*≤p.001

The interaction terms and their constituent terms render inconsistent estimates. These mixed results suggest that political finance subsidies and corruption do not have a relationship that is captured by subsidies’ conditional relationship with other covariates.

Table C16 reports estimates from lagged dependent variable models, where corruption is regressed against our political finance subsidy index (PFSI). An ordinary least squares estimator is employed along with country and year fixed effects, with errors clustered by country. For this analysis, we examined the data in five-year intervals. When the dependent variable is included as a regressor, it unsurprisingly predicts later levels of corruption and the effects of the other regressors shrink. Still, political finance continues to have significant if smaller effects.

### Table C16: Political finance and corruption with a lagged DV, 1900-2015

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Outcome (Y)* | Corruption Index | Corruption Index | Corruption Index |
|  | **1** | **2** | **3** |
| Lagged corruption index | .786\*\*\*\*  (.025) | .747\*\*\*\* (.025) | .726\*\*\*\*  (.030) |
| **PFSI stock (ln)** | -.007\*\*\*  (.002) | -.005\* (.002) | -.005\*\*  (.002) |
| Polyarchy |  | .077\*  (.043) | .071 (.055) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Polyarchy 2 |  | -.090\* (.048) | -.086 (.058) |
|  |  |  |  |
| GDP per capita (logged) |  | -.007 (.006) | -.008 (.006) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Urbanization |  |  | -.074\* (.041) |
|  |  |  |  |
| GDP Growth |  |  | -.001 |
|  |  |  | (.001) |
| Regular Elections |  |  | .001 (.007) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Year FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Country FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| *Countries* | 156 | 156 | 152 |
| *Years* | 22 | 22 | 21 |
| *Obs* | 2,169 | 2,089 | 1,964 |
| *R2 (within)* | (0.66) | (0.64) | (0.61) |

*Outcome:* corruption in different sectors (V-Dem), forward-lagged by five years. *Estimator:* ordinary least squares panel analysis with fixed effects (unit and time) and standard errors clustered by country. \*≤p.1 \*\*p≤.05 \*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*\*\*≤p.001

Model 1 includes only the lagged dependent variable and the variable of theoretical interest, PFSI. Model 2 adds several covariates commonly regarded as causes of corruption: GDP per capita, polyarchy, and polyarchy squared. Owing to the ubiquity of these variables in studies of corruption, and their strong performance in our models, we regard this as a benchmark model. In Model 3, we add several additional covariates that are less central in the literature but may nonetheless serve as confounders. Results remain generally significant across all model specifications where PFSI is the predictor.

Continuing on, Table C17 drops influential regions from the sample. An ordinary least squares estimator is employed along with country and year fixed effects, with errors clustered by country in all models. Right side variables are lagged five years behind the outcome. The following analyses demonstrate that dropping influential regions slightly affects the PFSI estimates’ magnitudes and standard errors, but estimates remain negative and significant at the .10 level.

### Table C17: Political finance and corruption 1900-2015, excluding influential regions

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Outcome (Y)* | Corruption Index | Corruption Index | Corruption Index |
|  | **1** | **2** | **3** |
|  | **E. Europe and post-USSR excluded** | **Latin America excluded** | **W. Europe and N. America excluded** |
| **PFSI stock (1%), logged** | -.017\*\*  (.006) | -.013\*\* (.006) | -.016\*  (.009) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Polyarchy | .052  (.093) | .320\*\*  (.127) | .266\*\* (.125) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Polyarchy 2 | -.227\*\*  (.105) | -.499\*\*\*\* (.135) | -.461\*\*\* (.117) |
|  |  |  |  |
| GDP per capita (logged) | .051\*\*\*  (.013) | -.056\*\* (.017) | -.042\*\*\* (.015) |
|  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Year FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Country FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| *Countries* | 157 | 157 | 157 |
| *Years* | 111 | 111 | 111 |
| *Obs* | 9,708 | 8,901 | 8,703 |
| *R2 (within)* | (0.21) | (0.26) | (0.21) |

*Outcome:* corruption in different sectors (V-Dem), forward-lagged by five years. *Estimator:* ordinary least squares panel analysis with two-way fixed effects (unit and time) and standard errors clustered by country. \*≤p.1 \*\*p≤.05 \*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*\*\*≤p.001

All three models include the benchmark specification. No region is dramatically different by average score over time, as Figure 1 in the main text demonstrates. However, readers may wonder if a region containing an influential case or particularly good corruption scores drive the results. Table C17 demonstrates that no one region accounts for the results. Model 1 drops Eastern Europe and the former USSR, which is influential for remarkably rapid adoption and improvement in corruption scores post-1989. Model 2 drops Latin America, which is influential as the frontrunner region. Model 3 drops Western Europe and North America, which is influential as the region with the highest PFSI scores. The robustness checks support the same general pattern. All robustness checks agree on the signs of the effects: political finance measures have negative estimated effects on corruption measures. Similarly, the magnitude of the estimated effects stay in a tight range.

Table C18 and Table C19 drop influential countries from the sample. In Table C18, Uruguay, Finland, and Israel are excluded because they have extreme values on the PFSI. In Table C19, Costa Rica and Germany are excluded because they are early adopters. We also exclude all five in Table C19, Model 3 to ensure that the results are not driven by the combined effect of the influential cases.

### Table C18: Political finance and corruption 1900-2015, excluding influential countries

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Outcome (Y)* | Corruption Index | Corruption Index | Corruption Index |
|  | **1** | **2** | **3** |
|  | **Uruguay excluded** | **Finland excluded** | **Israel excluded** |
| **PFSI stock (1%), logged** | -.018\*\*\*  (.006) | -.017\*\*\*  (.006) | -.017\*\*\*  (.006) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Polyarchy | .153  (.107) | .164  (.106) | .158  (.106) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Polyarchy 2 | -.326\*\*\*  (.119) | -.337\*\*\*  (.118) | -.329\*\*\*  (.118) |
|  |  |  |  |
| GDP per capita (logged) | .043\*\*\*  (.014) | .045\*\*\*\*  (.014) | .044\*\*\*  (.014) |
|  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Year FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Country FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| *Countries* | 156 | 156 | 156 |
| *Years* | 111 | 111 | 111 |
| *Obs* | 10,672 | 10,672 | 10,721 |
| *R2 (within)* | (0.20) | (0.20) | (0.21) |

*Outcome:* corruption in different sectors (V-Dem), forward-lagged by five years. *Estimator:* ordinary least squares panel analysis with two-way fixed effects (unit and time) and standard errors clustered by country. \*≤p.1 \*\*p≤.05 \*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*\*\*≤p.001

An ordinary least squares estimator is employed along with country and year fixed effects, with errors clustered by country in all models. Right side variables are lagged five years behind the outcome. The analyses demonstrate that dropping influential countries affects the PFSI estimates’ magnitudes and standard errors slightly, but estimates remain negative and significant at the .05 level.

### Table C19: Political finance and corruption 1900-2015, excluding influential countries

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Outcome (Y)* | Corruption Index | Corruption Index | Corruption Index |
|  | **2** | **3** | **3** |
|  | **Costa Rica excluded** | **Germany excluded** | **All five excluded** |
| **PFSI stock (1%), logged** | -.017\*\*\*  (.006) | -.018\*\*\*  (.006) | -.018\*\*\*  (.007) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Polyarchy | .179  (.112) | .187  (.114) | .143  (.107) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Polyarchy 2 | -.377\*\*\*  (.121) | -.393\*\*\*  (.124) | -.317\*\*\*  (.121) |
|  |  |  |  |
| GDP per capita (logged) | .053\*\*  (.021) | .052\*\*  (.021) | .045\*\*\*  (.014) |
|  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Year FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Country FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| *Countries* | 156 | 156 | 152 |
| *Years* | 111 | 111 | 111 |
| *Obs* | 10,721 | 10,721 | 10,285 |
| *R2 (within)* | (0.20) | (0.21) | (0.20) |

*Outcome:* corruption in different sectors (V-Dem), forward-lagged by five years. *Estimator:* ordinary least squares panel analysis with two-way fixed effects (unit and time) and standard errors clustered by country. \*≤p.1 \*\*p≤.05 \*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*\*\*≤p.001

We can more systematically search for influential cases by obtaining the hat matrix for the covariates in the benchmark model. The values on the matrix’s diagonal are a measure of leverage. We can then use these values to identify potentially influential cases. Note that the large sample size of this study dilutes the potential influence of any one observation.

In OLS analyses without fixed effects, we can use a variety of measures of leverage and influence to identify key observations. For example, in addition to hat values, Cook’s Distance is an intuitive measure of influence frequently used in OLS diagnostics. Adding time and country fixed effects to a model, however, introduces complications for calculating a given observation’s influence on the regression line. We employ three approaches to demonstrate that our results are robust to influential cases. First, we use standard diagnostics on a bivariate OLS without time and country fixed effects and do not find any influential values of the PFSI using Cook’s Distance. Second, we compute hat values for individual observations in our benchmark model and then remove all countries with any observation over two accepted cut points. Third, we graph leverage and remove the cases with extreme values. In all three strategies, the PFSI remains a negative and significant predictor of corruption.

First, we analyzed a bivariate OLS model that regressed our PFSI on V-Dem’s corruption index. This model does not include fixed effects, lags, or controls, but it allows us to use standard regression diagnostics in an uncomplicated framework. We do not include a data table here because we are interested in the diagnostics, not the particulars of the estimates. The PFSI in this analysis has a coefficient of -.028 and a standard error of .002, which is similar to the estimates in the bivariate models with fixed effects. We then apply diagnostics for influential cases to the model, as Figure C2 demonstrates.

### Figure C2: Cook’s Distance values from a bivariate OLS model



Figure C2 plots leverage and standardized residuals, as well as the Cook’s Distance values for the model R (for readers following along with the replication data and code, the influential case analyses were done in R instead of Stata due to R’s superior graphic capabilities and online help community, which suggested several workarounds for identifying influential cases in fixed effects models). Figure C2 indicates that all observations are within accepted Cook’s Distance bounds. If any observations were outside of these bounds, Figure C2 would show the extreme observations separated from the rest by dashed red lines.

We do see some observations on the right side of the figure with considerably higher leverage than most others. As we will see in the following tables and figures, Uruguay is the main culprit, with some help from Costa Rica. When we remove these observations, as we did in Tables C18 and C19, our estimates remain negative and significant.

Moving back to multivariate territory, we create a hat matrix with the covariates from the benchmark model and extract the hat values for each observation. An observation has high leverage and could be influential if the hat value is more than twice the average hat value, or three times the average for large sample sizes. We use both cut points to remove any country with an observation about these values and then analyze the remaining sample using the benchmark model with fixed effects for country and year in Table C20.

### Table C20: Political finance and corruption 1900-2015, excluding potentially influential cases

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| *Outcome (Y)* | Corruption Index | Corruption Index |
|  | **1** | **2** |
|  | **Cut point at .00086** | **Cut point at .00129** |
| **PFSI stock (1%), logged** | -.016\*\*\*  (.003) | -.020\*\*\*  (.001) |
|  |  |  |
| Polyarchy | .304\*\*\*  (.034) | .089\*\*\*  (.023) |
|  |  |  |
| Polyarchy 2 | -.488\*\*\*\*  (.039) | -.259\*\*\*\*  (.024) |
|  |  |  |
| GDP per capita (logged) | -.042\*\*\*  (.004) | .046\*\*\*  (.003) |
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |
| Year FE | ✓ | ✓ |
| Country FE | ✓ | ✓ |
| *Countries* | 93 | 152 |
| *Years* | 111 | 111 |
| *Obs* | 5,468 | 10,294 |
| *R2 (within)* | (0.09) | (0.20) |

*Outcome:* corruption in different sectors (V-Dem), forward-lagged by five years. *Estimator:* ordinary least squares panel analysis with two-way fixed effects (unit and time). \*≤p.1 \*\*p≤.05 \*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*\*\*≤p.001

Table C20 demonstrates that the PFSI remains a negative and significant predictor, even when we use conservative thresholds for identifying influential observations. Model 1 removes 67 countries with potentially influential observations from the analysis and the results remain similar to the benchmark model in the main text. Model 2 removes four countries with influential observations from the analysis and returns similar estimates.

Finally, we examine the observations graphically to identify influential countries, using several tools for calculating and displaying leverage. Figure C3 plots leverage clustered by country. The tallest stack of values is Uruguay.

### Figure C3: Leverage clustered by country



Table C18, Model 1 removes Uruguay from the sample and reports estimates from the benchmark model, thus we do not reproduce the estimates here. Additionally, Table C19, Model 3 and Table C20 remove several combinations of high leverage countries from the sample and estimate the benchmark model on the remaining observations, finding that the PFSI is a consistently negative and significant predictor.

Figure C4 ranks observations by their leverage, as measured by hat values, and displays them in quantiles. Figure C4 demonstrates that most observations have a small amount of leverage, which is what we would expect with a large sample. However, some of the observations have much higher values and the plot shows a sudden jump from .0013 to a cluster of observations with hat values over .0020. When we look at the country-years, these observations are almost entirely from Uruguay, with Costa Rica contributing a few in the .0015-.0020 range.

### Figure C4: Hat values by quantile



The observations in the top right of the plot are the extreme values. Again, these observations are primarily from Uruguay’s time series, with assistance from Costa Rica. Table C18, Model 1 removes Uruguay from the sample while Table C19, Model 2 removes Costa Rica; thus, we do not re-estimate the models here. Note that Figure C4 displays a jump to extreme values at .0013, suggesting that the cut point of .00129 in Table C20, Model 2 is particularly appropriate for identifying potentially influential cases to exclude.

Alternatively, we can remove the unit structure that we have imposed on our sample and pool our observations. Pooling the observations allows us to explore the spatial variation in the sample. Table C21 does so with a pooled ordinary least squares framework.

### Table C21: Pooled OLS, PFSI and Corruption 1900-2015

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **1** | **2** | 3 |
| **PFSI stock (ln)** | -.037\*\*\*\*  (.009) | -.049\*\*\*\* (.010) | -.023\*\*  (.010) |
| Polyarchy |  |  | -.159 (.132) |
| Polyarchy2 |  |  | -.233 (.148) |
| GDP per capita (log) |  |  | -.060\*\*\* (.018) |
| Population |  |  | .014\* (.008) |
| English Legal Origin |  |  | -.078\*\*  (.038) |
| % Protestants |  |  | -.002\*\*\* (.001) |
| Year dummies |  | ✓ | ✓ |
| Regional dummies |  | ✓ | ✓ |
| *Countries* | 157 | 157 | 157 |
| *Years* | 111 | 111 | 111 |
| *Obs* | 11,271 | 11,271 | 10,783 |
| *R2* | (0.02) | (0.55) | (0.67) |

*Outcome:* political corruption (V-Dem), forward-lagged by five years. *Estimator:* pooled ordinary least squares with standard errors clustered by country. \*≤p.1 \*\*p≤.05 \*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*\*\*≤p.001

Table C21 presents cross-sectionally dominated models. Model 1 presents pooled results without any explicit time or spatial structure while Models 2 and 3 include dummies for years and regions. Model 3 includes the benchmark controls while adding time invariant controls on judicial system origins and religion that performed well in specification tests. The PFSI estimates are consistent with the results in the main text.

The pooled OLS models are also useful for estimating the impact of political subsidies on corruption as measured by other entities with shorter time series. For example, the Transparency International Corruptions Perceptions Index is highly correlated with the V-Dem corruption index, but we do not use it in our main analyses because it has a much shorter time series: it starts in 1995. Note that the TI index runs from most corrupt (0) to least corrupt (100), meaning that a positive estimate indicates that political finance reform reduces corruption.

### Table C22: Pooled OLS, PFSI and Transparency International Corruption Data 1995-2015

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **1** | **2** | 3 |
| **PFSI stock (ln)** | 4.314\*\*\*\*  (.950) | 1.697\*\* (.679) | .897\*  (.502) |
| Polyarchy |  |  | -23.071 (17.992) |
| Polyarchy2 |  |  | 41.600\*\* (18.281) |
| GDP per capita (log) |  |  | 9.196\*\*\*\* (1.638) |
| Population |  |  | -1.417\*\*\* (.470) |
| English Legal Origin |  |  | 3.190\* (1.780) |
| % Protestants |  |  | .159\*\*\*\*  (.046) |
| Year dummies |  | ✓ | ✓ |
| Regional dummies |  | ✓ | ✓ |
| *Countries* | 157 | 157 | 157 |
| *Years* | 20 | 20 | 20 |
| *Obs* | 2,493 | 2,493 | 2,493 |
| *R2* | (0.12) | (0.63) | (0.82) |

*Outcome:* political corruption (Transparency International), forward-lagged by five years. *Estimator:* pooled ordinary least squares with standard errors clustered by country. \*≤p.1 \*\*p≤.05 \*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*\*\*≤p.001

Table C22 contains additional cross-sectional models. Model 1 presents pooled results without any explicit time or spatial structure while Models 2 and 3 include dummies for years and regions. Model 3 includes the benchmark controls while adding time invariant controls on judicial system origins and religion that performed well in specification tests. The PFSI estimates are consistent with the estimates in models using the V-Dem measure of corruption.

Table C23 takes the World Bank’s Control of Corruption estimates as the dependent variable. Similar to the Transparency International measure, the World Bank’s corruption data start in 1996. Note that the World Bank estimates run from no control over corruption (-2.5) to total control over corruption (2.5), meaning that a positive estimate indicates that political finance reform reduces corruption.

### Table C23: Pooled OLS, PFSI and World Bank Corruption Data 1996-2015

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **1** | **2** | 3 |
| **PFSI stock (ln)** | .227\*\*\*\*  (.040) | 1.04\*\*\* (.033) | .050\*\*  (.024) |
| Polyarchy |  |  | -1.138 (.737) |
| Polyarchy2 |  |  | 2.500\*\*\* (.765) |
| GDP per capita (log) |  |  | .373\*\*\*\* (.070) |
| Population |  |  | -.070\*\*\*\* (.020) |
| English Legal Origin |  |  | .120 (.080) |
| % Protestants |  |  | .007\*\*\*\* (.002) |
| Year dummies |  | ✓ | ✓ |
| Regional dummies |  | ✓ | ✓ |
| *Countries* | 157 | 157 | 157 |
| *Years* | 19 | 19 | 19 |
| *Obs* | 2,622 | 2,622 | 2,622 |
| *R2* | (0.15) | (0.60) | (0.82) |

*Outcome:* political corruption (World Bank), forward-lagged by five years. *Estimator:* pooled ordinary least squares with standard errors clustered by country. \*≤p.1 \*\*p≤.05 \*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*\*\*≤p.001

Table C23, Model 1 presents pooled results without any explicit time or spatial structure while Models 2 and 3 include dummies for years and regions. Model 3 includes the benchmark controls while adding time invariant controls on judicial system origins and religion that performed well in specification tests. The PFSI estimates are consistent with the estimates in models with the V-Dem measure as well as the Transparency International measure used in Table C22.

Table C24 delves further into the unexpectedly large coefficient on judicial corruption in Table 4 of the main text. We hypothesized that political finance subsidies would impact the judiciary but were surprised that the estimated effect was much higher than the estimated effect for elected officials in the legislature and the executive. In Table C24, we introduce controls for judicial independence and judicial accountability. As expected, these controls are negative and significant as well. Including these controls reduces the estimated coefficient on judicial corruption. The smaller coefficient is close to the estimate for legislative corruption.

### Table C24: PFSI and judicial corruption 1900-2015

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **1** | **2** | **3** | **4** |
| **PFSI stock (ln)** | -.085\*\*\*  (.024) | -.070\*\*\*  (.022) | -.075\*\*\*  (.024) | -.066\*\*\*  (.022) |
| Polyarchy | 1.042\*\* (.448) | 2.149\*\*\*\* (.417) | 1.313\*\*\* (.445) | 2.106\*\*\*\* (.407) |
| Polyarchy2 | -1.757\*\*\* (.493) | -2.156\*\*\*\* (.457) | -1.745\*\*\*\* (.472) | -2.057\*\*\*\* (.447) |
| GDP per capita (log) | -.186\*\*\* (.055) | -.162\*\*\*\* (.049) | -.168\*\*\* (.054) | -.155\*\*\* (.050) |
| Judicial independence |  | -1.134\*\*\*\*  (.222) |  | -.894\*\*\*  (.252) |
| Judicial accountability |  |  | -.221\*\*\*\*  (.054) | -.161\*\*\*  (.061) |
| Year fixed effects | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Country fixed effects | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| *Countries* | 157 | 157 | 157 | 157 |
| *Years* | 111 | 111 | 111 | 111 |
| *Obs* | 10,806 | 10,771 | 10,789 | 10,766 |
| *R2 (within)* | (0.19) | (0.23) | (0.23) | (0.26) |

*Outcome:* corruption in the judiciary (V-Dem), forward-lagged by five years. *Estimator:* ordinary least squares panel analysis with two-way fixed effects (unit and time) and standard errors clustered by country. \*≤p.1 \*\*p≤.05 \*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*\*\*≤p.001

Table C24 demonstrates that the PFSI has a large, significant, and negative impact on judicial corruption, even after accounting for judicial independence and accountability. We expected this effect to be negative and significant, but we do not have a theoretically-grounded reason for why this estimate is so much larger than the others. We encourage future researchers to take up this question.

Table C25 revisits the possibility that experts coding the V-Dem corruption measures see political finance reforms and record a decrease in corruption. If political finance reforms affect corruption, expert perceptions should be captured in both the V-Dem measure of political finance and the corruption measures. Thus, we can clean the PFSI estimate of that measurement error by regressing the V-Dem measure of political finance on the V-Dem measure of corruption.

However, by including both measures of political finance in the model, we introduce considerable collinearity. Thus, we analyze models with a variety of controls.

### Table C25: PFSI, V-Dem subsidy measure, and corruption 1900-2015

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **1** | **2** | **3** | **4** |
| **PFSI stock (ln) (authors)** | -.018\*\*\*  (.007) | -.016\*\* (.007) | -.013\*\*  (.006) | -.007  (.006) |
| **Public subsidies (V-Dem)** | -.045\*\*\*\*  (.010) | -.034\*\*\*\*  (.009) | -.031\*\*\*\*  (.008) | -.034\*\*\*\*  (.009) |
| Polyarchy |  |  | .160\*\*\*\* (.033) | .172\* (.102) |
| Polyarchy2 |  |  |  | -.325\*\*\* (.111) |
| GDP per capita (log) |  | -.053\*\*\*\* (.014) | -.045\*\*\* (.013) | -.037\*\*\* (.014) |
| Year fixed effects | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Country fixed effects | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| *Countries* | 157 | 157 | 157 | 157 |
| *Years* | 111 | 111 | 111 | 111 |
| *Obs* | 11,271 | 10,863 | 10,778 | 10,783 |
| *R2 (within)* | (0.19) | (0.22) | (0.25) | (0.23) |

*Outcome:* political corruption (V-Dem), forward-lagged by five years. *Estimator:* ordinary least squares panel analysis with two-way fixed effects (unit and time) and standard errors clustered by country. \*≤p.1 \*\*p≤.05 \*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*\*\*≤p.001

Table C25 demonstrates that the PFSI remains generally consistent when we clean the dependent variable of measurement error by regressing the V-Dem measure of political finance on the dependent variable. The PFSI does not reach conventional levels of significance in the final model with benchmark controls (p=.27). We posit that this is due to collinearity and evaluate that line of reasoning with an alternative dependent variable in Table C26.

Table C26 addresses the criticisms of the V-Dem corruption index by substituting another measure of corruption for the dependent variable: The Political Risk Services Group’s corruption data in their International Country Risk Guide. We treat this analysis as a useful robustness check but do not include this analysis in the main text or our public replication files because the data is proprietary. The Political Risk Services Group is a for-profit company that sells their data; their licensing policy does not permit us to include this data in our replication materials.

### Table C26: PFSI and ICRG Corruption Scores 1984-2003

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 Year Lag 1 | 1 Year Lag 2 | 1 Year Lag 3 | 5 Year Lag 4 |
| **PFSI stock (ln)** | -.125\*  (.067) | -.144\*\* (.066) | -.152\*\*  (.068) | -.102  (.068) |
| Polyarchy |  | .058  (1.353) | .817 (1.500) | .206 (1.360) |
| Polyarchy2 |  | .749 (1.367) | .071 (.1.471) | .095 (1.422) |
| GDP per capita (log) |  | -.105 (.307) | .160 (.313) | -.040 (.276) |
| Urbanization |  |  | 2.508 (2.102) |  |
| GDP Growth |  |  | .002  (.014) |  |
| Regular Elections |  |  | -.325\* (.181) |  |
| Year fixed effects | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Country fixed effects | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| *Countries* | 124 | 124 | 122 | 124 |
| *Years* | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 |
| *Obs* | 2,235 | 2,235 | 2,196 | 2,223 |
| *R2 (within)* | (0.19) | (0.21) | (0.22) | (0.19) |

*Outcome:* political corruption (V-Dem), with varying lags. *Estimator:* ordinary least squares panel analysis with two-way fixed effects (unit and time) or random effects and standard errors clustered by country. \*≤p.1 \*\*p≤.05 \*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*\*\*≤p.001

Table C26 demonstrates that for the two decades that the ICRG corruption data covers, the PFSI remains a negative and significant predictor of corruption. We vary the lags for this analysis because we have a comparatively short time series. The PFSI barely crosses conventional levels of insignificance (p=.11) with a five year lag. Estimates using the V-Dem dependent variable and the same time period generate similar results.

To summarize, the robustness checks in the preceding pages support the same general pattern. All robustness checks agree on the signs of the effects: political finance measures have negative estimated effects on corruption measures. Similarly, the magnitude of the estimated effects fall in a tight range.

The majority of the robustness checks produce estimates that are statistically significant at the conventionally accepted p<.05 level. While the p-values of the estimates shift across the robustness checks, they stay in a constrained range: virtually all of the p-values for the political finance estimates that are over .05 barely cross the line. If we use the less conservative p<.1 level, virtually every political finance estimate in this section is statistically significant. We see p-values above .05 primarily when we greatly restrict the sample, which is not surprising for a project that tracks small effects that accumulate over time. In conclusion, the robustness checks find very similar patterns in the data across changes in specification, variable construction, and sample.

# Appendix D: Interviews

One of the co-authors conducted research in Asunción between May 20th and August 15th 2017. He conducted 10 elite interviews, and followed a snowball sampling protocol to schedule interviews with politicians, civil society actors, and academics familiar with Paraguayan political finance regulations.

The study went through the University of Texas at Austin Institutional Review Board review process and received expedited approval with a waiver of documentation of consent. The author followed an oral consent script with interviewees that was approved by IRB. In accordance with IRB data security and confidentiality guidelines, the interviews that were audio recorded were recorded on a password-protected iPhone, and lasted between 30 and 60 minutes. All audio files were uploaded to a password-protected Dropbox and deleted off the iPhone. The author then transcribed the interviews and translated them into English for use in the case study. All elected officials were considered public figures and we use their real names. For the other interviewees, we follow IRB confidentiality protocols and assign the interviewees pseudonyms, identify them here only by their profession, and intentionally scramble identifying details.

## Interviews

The coauthor began his interviewee searches by contacting a non-profit that has worked on political finance projects. In this organization, a program manager granted him an interview at the organization’s offices on May 27th, and put him in touch with the organization director, as well as an activist lawyer with experience working on campaign finance reform, and both granted interviews. He interviewed the former on June 29th at the organization’s offices, and the latter on June 30th at this person’s place of work. Additionally, he contacted former legislator Sebastian Acha, at his current consulting office. He agreed to grant the coauthor an interview, which was conducted on June 27th. The coauthor contacted former president Federico Franco through Franco’s foundation, and he granted an interview on July 4th. Through personal acquaintances, the coauthor was able to speak with two Liberal Party operators. He met the first at the person’s office on July 19th and the other at an Asunción café on July 22nd. Through personal acquaintances, he was also able to secure an interview with former Liberal legislator Carlos Riveros, who granted an interview in his home on July 19th. When he spoke with former Interior Minister they were unable to find interview time but he was put in contact with former Colorado legislator and former Electoral Tribunal public servant Edmundo Rolón; and also, a former electoral prosecutor. The coauthor held an interview with Edmundo Rolón at his office on July 7th and with the former electoral prosecutor at his office on July 17th.

Interviews were semi-structured and guided by the following questions:

English

1. How did you become involved in campaign finance and regulations?
2. How did the 1996 law start?
3. Why did you/others support/oppose the 1996 law?
4. What did people debate about the 1996 law?
5. What was controversial? What did everyone agree on?
6. What alternatives were proposed?
7. What effects did you think the law would have?
8. What effects did the law have?
9. What were the unintended or unforeseen effects of the law?
10. What are the current debates about public campaign finance?
11. What would you like to change about the law?

Español

1. Como usted se involuncró en el financiamiento publico de las campañas electorales y su regulación?
2. Como empezó la ley de 1996?
3. Porque usted (u otros) apoyó (apoyaron) o se oponió a (se opusieron a) la ley de 1996?
4. Cuales fueron los debates sobre la ley de 1996?
5. Que fue controversial? En que había consenso?
6. Cuales fueron las alternativas propuestas o debateadas?
7. Usted pensó que la ley tendría cuales efectos?
8. Y la ley tendría realizó cuales efectos?
9. Cuales fueron los efectos imprevistos de la ley?
10. Cuales son los debates atuales sobre el financiamiento public de las campañas electorales?
11. Le gustaria cambiar la ley? Como?

**Schedule**

Anonymous, Asunción, May 27th

Sebastian Acha, Asunción, June 27

Anonymous, Asunción, June 29th

Anonymous, Asunción, June 30

Federico Franco, Asunción, July 3

Edmundo Rolón, Asunción, July 7

Anonymous, Asunción, July 17

Carlos Riveros, Asunción, July 19

Anonymous, Asunción, July 19

Anonymous, Asunción, July 20