Online Appendix to

"Crazy like a Fox? Are Leaders with Reputations for Madness More Successful at International Coercion?

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Part 1: Coding Madness Reputations

Part 1.1: Word Search Procedures

The following search guidelines were used by my research assistants:

Step 1: Access the database Lexis-Nexis Academic

Use beta version – the search is more flexible, and it allows you to preview the results more.

Step 2: Run the search.

Run the following search: *(leader OR president OR prime minister) w/5 (crazy OR insane OR irrational OR unpredictable OR erratic OR hawkish OR resolute)*

Enter the exact phrase above into the search box and make sure the search is set to "terms and connectors" instead of natural language.

Search only "Major World Publications (English)." Do not make any other exclusions.

To avoid getting more than 3,000 results (the maximum that can be displayed), it is necessary to split up the search by increments of time. If you get a warning that there are more than 3,000 results, edit the search by making the search timeframe smaller.

Step 3: Look at each result and decide whether it is relevant

Sort the results oldest to newest, so that you can easily keep track of where you are if you want to take a break. (Write down where you are every time you do take a break.)

Click the "expanded view" button in order to see the part(s) of the article that contain the search words without actually clicking on the article.

Look at each result and determine if it refers to the leader of a country using one of the adjectives you searched for. You will be able to reject most results by looking at the expanded view within the main search results page. Sometimes you may also be able to quickly accept a result as referring to a leader by looking only at the expanded view on the main search page. If you cannot easily tell whether a result should count, you should click on preview and read more of the text.

If it is still ambiguous, you should record it and let me decide if it counts. Do not hesitate at all to record ambiguous cases. I will go through everything you record myself, and while I might decide that some of the ambiguous ones do not count, I would much rather have the opportunity to make that decision myself.

Tips on what to count:

- Count adjectives when they are used to describe not only the leader him/herself but also something related to the leader's personality or stance (leader's image, leader's policy, leader's personality, leader's will, leader's approach, leader's stand, leader's decision, leader's attitude). However, if the adjective is used in a specific context that has no relation to foreign policy, place a Y in the "Not FP Context" box. If it is not clear whether it is FP context, put a ? in the "Not FP Context" box. Treat trade policy and internal conflicts as foreign policy.
- Count adjectives describing something a leader does, including general descriptions of a leader's behavior and also specific actions taken by the leader personally. However, if the adjective is used in a specific context that has no relation to foreign policy, place a Y in the "Not FP Context" box. If it is not clear whether it is foreign policy, put a ? in the "Not FP Context" box. Treat trade policy and internal conflicts as foreign policy.
- Count adjectives used to describe the leader's administration, government, or party, unless the sentence makes a contrast between the leader and his/her administration, government, or party. Also count adjectives used to describe actions/stances taken by the leader's administration, government, or party.
- Count when it says the leader is perceived as or believed to be [some adjective].
- Count it when other people are quoted as referring to the leader with some adjective.
- Count repeated uses of the same quote in different sources.

Tips on what **not** to count:

- Do not count it when the leader (or the leader's campaign/administration) is quoted as referring to the leader himself/herself by some adjective.
- Do not count references to specific people in the leader's administration other than the leader.
- Do not count descriptions of leader's statements, speeches, remarks, rhetoric, words, tone, noises, etc. Do not count when it says a leader "sounded ____."
- Do not count references to future or previous leaders, only the current leader. If you are not sure if someone is the current top leader, place a Y in the "not sure if leader" box.
- Do not count adjectives that are negated. For example, "___ is not an erratic leader," or "___ denied that ___ is irrational," or "once regarded as ___."
- Do not count general references that do not refer to a specific leader. For example, "America needs a resolute leader."

I personally reviewed all recorded search results to ensure consistency. Two research assistants independently searched for results covering the years 1986-2005 in order to ensure that no relevant results were omitted. The years 2006-2010 were only searched by only one research assistant, but she had extensive training and experience from covering 1986-2005, and I spot-checked her work by performing some searches myself.

Part 1.2: Examples of How Madness Words Are Used

Sometimes the madness adjectives are used by the journalist to give general background. For example:

- "Some officials argue that President Kim is **insane** and has so little grasp of reality that he believes the crisis has been orchestrated by the Americans and South Koreans as part of a plot to provoke a war that will result in a reunited Korea." – James Adams, *Sunday Times*, June 5, 1994

- "But in a nation exhausted by upheaval, revolution and war, and increasingly wary of the sometimes **irrational** spontaneity that marks President Mikheil Saakashvili's leadership, the buzz around the former UN ambassador continues to grow." – *Irish Times*, April 14, 2009

Other times, the madness adjectives are used in interviews and quotations.[1] For example:

- "Describing the Iraqi leader as 'this **crazy** man,' Mr. Shamir said it would be a danger for the entire world if a substantial part of the Iraqi army and its arsenal survives. – John Gray, *Globe and Mail*, February 23, 1991

- "They want to try [to] get the maximum world pressure, but it's very hard because it's an irrational country with an **irrational** leader who doesn't care about the fate of his own people." – Prime Minister John Howard, quoted speaking about North Korea, in *The Australian*, October 16, 2006

Other times, they are used by media commentators giving their opinion. For example:

- "The missile defence system is geared mostly toward rogue states, such as North Korea and Iran, both of which have leaders I would generously call **insane**." – Rondi Adamson, *Toronto Star*, February 26, 2006

[1] I drop quotations in a robustness check because they might be motivated by strategic factors rather than genuine perceptions.

Part 1.3: Regression Used To Predict Expected Articles per Leader-Year (Used for Normalization)

This regression is intended to predict the expected number of articles per year that would appear for a typical leader, based on characteristics of the leader's country. This gives me the denominator that I use to divide the count of madness words.

The sole purpose of this is to wipe out the effect of systemic coverage biases in the Lexis-Nexis database. So as not to bias downward the perceived madness scores of leaders who receive heightened press coverage *precisely because* they are perceived as mad, I am essentially seeking to estimate the amount of coverage that the leader would receive in Lexis-Nexis if the leader was an "average" leader. Therefore, except for controlling for the leader's time in office, I use country-level variables rather than leader-level variables to make the prediction.

Factors that might interact with or affect a leader's reputation for madness are controlled for at later stages. For example, there might be concern that perceived madness affects the frequency with which a leader becomes involved in conflict and that conflict frequency, in turn, might affect the frequency with which the leader is called mad. Since the relationship between perceived madness and conflict frequency is of theoretical interest, I do not want to wipe it out with this initial transformation of the variable. However, I do control for it at later stages.

Table A1: Tobit Model Predicting Total Articles

	(1)
Leader Time in Office During Year	12.987***
	(2.735)
Population	3.432
	(2.450)
Per Capita GDP	0.060*
	(0.033)
Democracy	-364.947
	(631.453)
Permanent UNSC Member	6488.081***
	(1020.875)
Commonwealth: UK, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand	10808.433***
	(949.070)
United States	44588.238***
	(1635.819)
Europe	1372.152
	(919.853)
Africa	2116.121**
	(898.807)
Middle East	3932.887***
	(935.763)
Asia	1769.656**
	(817.031)
year=1987	722.598
	(2162.145)
year=1988	1127.334
	(2125.341)
year=1989	-2157.880
	(2200.608)
year=1990	1169.329

	(2236.918)
year=1991	2820.156
	(2107.577)
year=1992	3993.893*
	(2177.943)
year=1993	1765.575
	(2175.296)
year=1994	3905.965*
	(2124.086)
year=1995	3562.144*
	(2053.075)
year=1996	2917.003
	(2102.248)
year=1997	3175.432
	(2087.707)
year=1998	5495.356***
	(2075.522)
year=1999	4536.737**
	(2041.584)
year=2000	4976.653**
	(2004.245)
year=2001	5336.741***
	(2014.378)
year=2002	6021.156***
	(2057.344)
year=2003	7584.413***
	(2019.229)
year=2004	5858.695***
	(1965.102)
year=2005	5483.163***
	(1989.362)

year=2006	6420.734***
	(1959.674)
year=2007	6656.893***
	(2019.251)
year=2008	7017.246***
	(1963.881)
year=2009	6678.740***
	(1989.883)
year=2010	6513.146***
	(1960.157)
Constant	-9561.105***
	(2032.987)
Observations	654

Note: N is relatively small because I only searched for total articles (the dependent variable) in the 554 leader-years in which there was at least one article referring to the leader with one of the relevant madness, unpredictability, or resolve adjectives, plus a random sample of another 100 years in which none of these adjectives were used to describe a leader. Despite not being purely random, the sample does display considerable variation in the number of articles. The coefficients may be biased upwards because leaders who receive little press coverage are less likely to be included in the sample, but since this bias affects all of the predictions, it is not highly problematic for generating expected values to normalize by.

Part 2: Data and Results

Part 2.1: Summary Statistics and Figures

Table A2: Summary Statistics from General Deterrence (MID Initiation) Dataset

Variable	Mean	SD	Median	Min	Max
Initiation	0.007	0.083	0	0	1
Continuous Madness Rep., A	0.023	0.134	0	0	6.461
Continuous Madness Rep., B	0.023	0.134	0	0	6.461
Strong Madness Reputation, Leader A	0.005	0.067	0	0	1
Slight Madness Reputation, Leader A	0.120	0.325	0	0	1
Strong Madness Reputation, Leader B	0.005	0.067	0	0	1
Slight Madness Reputation, Leader B	0.120	0.325	0	0	1
Recent MID Initiations, Leader A	0.507	0.787	0.200	0	4.800
Recent MID Initiations, Leader B	0.507	0.787	0.200	0	4.800
Military Capabilities, State A	0.031	0.049	0.007	0.000	0.208
Military Capabilities, State B	0.031	0.049	0.007	0.000	0.208
% Capabilities Held by State A	0.500	0.240	0.500	0.002	0.998
Democracy, State A	0.534	0.499	1	0	1
Democracy, State B	0.534	0.499	1	0	1
Joint Democracy	0.288	0.453	0	0	1
Land Contiguity	0.151	0.358	0	0	1
Distance	3.871	2.783	3.851	0.005	11.989
Dyad Length (Days)	0.729	0.343	1	0.003	1.003
Peace Years	39.614	36.886	33	0	194

Table A3: Summary Statistics for Crisis Bargaining (MID Reciprocation) Dataset

Variable	Mean	SD	Median	Min	Max
Reciprocation	0.418	0.493	0	0	1
Continuous Madness Rep., A	0.065	0.352	0	0	3.457
Continuous Madness Rep., B	0.115	0.433	0	0	3.457
Strong Madness Reputation, Leader A	0.019	0.137	0	0	1
Slight Madness Reputation, Leader A	0.117	0.321	0	0	1
Strong Madness Reputation, Leader B	0.065	0.246	0	0	1
Slight Madness Reputation, Leader B	0.077	0.267	0	0	1
Recent MID Initiations, Leader A[2]	0.803	0.898	0.500	0	4.400
Recent MID Initiations, Leader B	0.497	0.687	0.250	0	4.800
Military Capabilities, State A	0.026	0.045	0.007	0.000	0.208
Military Capabilities, State B	0.017	0.038	0.004	0.000	0.208
% Capabilities Held by State A	0.482	0.176	0.499	0.002	0.997
Democracy, State A	0.397	0.489	0	0	1
Democracy, State B	0.336	0.473	0	0	1
Joint Democracy	0.132	0.339	0	0	1
Land Contiguity	0.553	0.497	1	0	1
Distance	1.521	1.883	0.784	0.005	11.718
First Act Hostility Level	3.260	0.662	3	2	4

[2] I count MID initiations over the past five years, but when a leader has been in office less than five years, I can only count the MID initiations since he/she entered office. Therefore, I average over the number of years I am counting.

Figure A1: *Madness Reputation* Distribution, Omitting Zero Values



Part 2.2: Determinants of Madness Reputation

Table A4: Tobit and Probit Models Predicting Madness Reputation Measures

	(1) Predicting Continuous Measure	(2) Predicting *Slight Madness Reputation*	(3) Predicting *Strong Madness Reputation*
Democracy	0.596***	0.582***	0.198
	(0.170)	(0.182)	(0.329)
Personalist Regime	0.236	0.228	0.096
	(0.191)	(0.217)	(0.231)
Real GDP	0.007	0.013	-0.028
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.026)
Leader Is Former Rebel	0.106	-0.059	0.433
	(0.165)	(0.242)	(0.302)
Leader Military Service	-0.098	-0.098	-0.068
	(0.164)	(0.210)	(0.260)
Leader Age	-0.005	-0.003	-0.008
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.012)
Leader Gender	0.134	0.059	
	(0.401)	(0.392)	
Leader Years in Office	0.074***	0.052***	0.096***
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.023)
Leader Education	-0.106	-0.079	-0.107
	(0.079)	(0.096)	(0.158)
Recent MID Initiations	0.628***	0.421***	0.733***
	(0.106)	(0.129)	(0.214)
GDP Change	-0.027	-0.046	0.381
	(0.542)	(0.663)	(0.415)
Constant	-2.815***	-2.463***	-3.348***
	(0.631)	(0.549)	(0.864)
Observations	1,916	1,916	1,916

Note: Standard errors are clustered by leader. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Gender is excluded from Model 3 because it is a perfect negative predictor.

Part 2.3: Observations with the Highest Influence

Table A5: Observations with the Highest Values of Cook's D in the Initiation Regression

Leader A	Leader B	Year	Cook's D
Kim Il-Sung	Hosokawa	1994	0.024
Saddam Hussein	Kaifu	1991	0.023
Saddam Hussein	Khalifah Ath-Thani	1991	0.023
Saddam Hussein	Isa Ibn Al-Khalifah	1991	0.022
Saddam Hussein	Kohl	1991	0.022
Saddam Hussein	Jabir As-Sabah	1999	0.021
Saddam Hussein	Jabir As-Sabah	1991	0.021
Saddam Hussein	Jabir As-Sabah	1992	0.021
Bush	Milosevic	1992	0.020
Bush	Saddam Hussein	1991	0.020
Blair	Mugabe	2002	0.020
Major	Milosevic	1992	0.020
Mitterrand	Milosevic	1992	0.020
Bush	Saddam Hussein	1992	0.020
Mitsotakis	Milosevic	1992	0.019
Ibn Al-Khalifah	Saddam Hussein	1994	0.019
Clinton	Saddam Hussein	1994	0.019
Schroder	Saddam Hussein	1999	0.019
Major	Saddam Hussein	1991	0.019
Chirac	Saddam Hussein	1999	0.019

Note: A common rule of thumb is that values of Cook's D above 1 are potentially problematic.

Table A6: Observations with the Highest Values of Cook's D in the Reciprocation Regression

Leader A	Leader B	Year	MID No.	Cook's D
Kim Jong-Il	Roh Moo Hyun	2007	4479	0.013
Saddam Hussein	Jabir As-Sabah	1999	4274	0.013
Ahmadinejad	al-Maliki	2007	4536	0.011
Noriega	Reagan	1989	3901	0.011
Saddam Hussein	Kaifu	1991	3971	0.011
Ahmadinejad	al-Maliki	2010	4547	0.010
Ayatollah Khomeini	Reagan	1988	2834	0.009
Netanyahu	Saddam Hussein	1998	4273	0.009
Obama	Hugo Chavez	2010	4506	0.009
Bush	Saddam Hussein	1991	3974	0.008
Bush	Saddam Hussein	1992	3552	0.008
Deng Xiaoping	Yeltsin	1994	4104	0.007
Howard	Saddam Hussein	2003	4273	0.007
Rafsanjani	Bush	1991	3973	0.006
Deng Xiaoping	Gorbachev	1986	2718	0.006
Bush	Kim Jong-Il	2003	4455	0.006
Reagan	Ayatollah Khomeini	1987	2740	0.006
Kim Il-Sung	Hosokawa	1994	4022	0.006
Alfonsin	Chiang Ching-Kuo	1986	2579	0.005
Khatami	Bush	2004	4519	0.005

Note: A common rule of thumb is that values of Cook's D above 1 are potentially problematic.

Part 2.4: More Details on Matching Procedure

I use Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM), which creates a completely balanced sample based on coarsened versions of the variables used in matching (Iacus, King, and Porro 2012). Coarsening the variables means establishing cutpoints in the range of values taken by each variable so that all values between any given pair of cutpoints are substantively similar enough to be treated as equal for purposes of matching.

After coarsening, the CEM algorithm creates strata that contain all observations with equivalent values of the coarsened variables. Strata that do not contain at least one treated observation and one control observation are dropped, and observations in these strata are not included in the matched sample. Because leaders with madness reputations are rare, there is a risk of losing many observations due to dropped strata. Therefore, I use a low cutoff (any madness reputation) for the treatment variable and a relatively small number of matching variables, with only a few cutpoints. Specifically, I match on (1) whether the country is Western, (2) whether the country was involved in more than two MIDs in the last five years, (3) whether the regime is personalist, (4) whether the leader is a former rebel, and (5) whether the leader has been in office 0-4 years, 5-8 years, or over 8 years.

Since some strata contain more than one of each type of observation, the algorithm also assigns weights to account for the size of the strata, and regressions in the matched sample account for these weights. Although coarsened variables are used for matching, the original variables are used for regressions in the matched sample.

Part 2.5: Robustness Check Tables for General Deterrence (Initiation) Regressions

Note: The model specifications are the same as in Model 2 in Table 2, except for the changes specified in the title of each model. Results for the standard control variables and constant are omitted in order to enable tables to fit on a single page, for easier reading.

Table A7: Alternate Indicator Cutoffs and Dropping Outliers (Initiation Model)

	(1) Top 5% Indicator Cutoff	(2) Top 20% Indicator Cutoff	(3) Top 40% Indicator Cutoff	(4) Cont. Measure, Drop Top 16%
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.831***	0.237	0.128	
	(0.270)	(0.182)	(0.135)	
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	0.058	0.085	0.099	
	(0.068)	(0.071)	(0.073)	
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	1.083***	0.918***	0.616***	
	(0.250)	(0.125)	(0.105)	
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	0.289***	0.116	0.130	
	(0.070)	(0.079)	(0.089)	
Cont Madness Rep, Leader A				0.200**
				(0.084)
Cont Madness Rep, Leader B				0.908***
				(0.299)
Observations	62384	62384	62384	62077

Table A8: Address Regional and Time Bias (Initiation Model)

	(1) Region Fixed Effects	(2) Time Fixed Effects
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.115	0.155
	(0.207)	(0.213)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	0.106	0.122*
	(0.072)	(0.071)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	0.918***	0.908***
	(0.145)	(0.139)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	0.134*	0.189**
	(0.076)	(0.076)
Observations	62384	62384

Table A9: Address Pro-Western Bias and Strategic Use of Madness Adjectives (Initiation Model)

	(1) Drop Quotations	(2) Control for US Affinity	(3) Only Non-US Sources	(4) Drop English-Speaking Western Countries
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.309	0.178	0.344*	0.219
	(0.222)	(0.213)	(0.201)	(0.222)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	0.169**	0.079	0.141*	-0.047
	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.099)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	1.003***	0.920***	0.927***	0.741***
	(0.172)	(0.144)	(0.151)	(0.192)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	0.276***	0.135*	0.214***	0.070
	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.113)
Affinity with US, State A		0.063		
		(0.101)		
Affinity with US, State B		-0.095		
		(0.090)		
Observations	62384	57730	62384	45980

Table A10: Address Potentially Confounding Leader and Country Characteristics (Initiation Model)

	(1) Control for Time in Office	(2) Drop Leaders in Office <5 Years	(3) Matched Sample	(4) Control for Bluffing Reputation
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.166	0.280	-0.780**	0.088
	(0.213)	(0.255)	(0.304)	(0.210)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	0.100	0.038	0.206	0.082
	(0.071)	(0.097)	(0.150)	(0.072)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	0.956***	0.730***	0.737***	0.904***
	(0.137)	(0.168)	(0.144)	(0.138)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	0.174**	0.180*	0.063	0.152**
	(0.075)	(0.095)	(0.087)	(0.076)
Years in Office, Leader B	-0.011**			
	(0.005)			
Recent Bluffs,[3] Leader A				-0.404***
				(0.096)
Recent Bluffs, Leader A				-0.048
				(0.095)
Observations	62384	32962	35396	62384

[3] I consider a leader to have bluffed in a MID if the leader's country threatened or showed force, but did not actually use force and did not achieve a winning outcome. For initiators (Side A), I consider only victory for Side A and Yield by Side B to be winning outcomes. For targets (Side B), who are more likely to favor the status quo, I consider anything except victory for Side A and Yield by Side B to be winning outcomes.

Table A11: Adjustments to the Madness Measure (Initiation Model)

	(1) Compare to Resolve Reputation	(2) Drop Words Used outside FP Context	(3) 5-Year Average	(4) 10-Year Average
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.162	0.165	0.150	0.085
	(0.210)	(0.209)	(0.143)	(0.140)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	0.097	0.137*	-0.003	-0.015
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.064)	(0.061)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	0.898***	0.903***	0.677***	0.719***
	(0.137)	(0.145)	(0.152)	(0.139)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	0.141*	0.195**	0.155**	0.100
	(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.071)	(0.074)
Strong Resolve Rep, Leader B	0.044			
	(0.136)			
Slight Resolve Rep, Leader B	0.054			
	(0.076)			
Observations	62384	62384	62384	62384

Table A12: Different Sample and Dependent Variables (Initiation Model)

	(1) No Politically Relevant Restriction	(2) Only Dyads with a MID in Last 15 Years	(3) Forceful MID DV	(4) Fatal MID DV
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.175	-0.260	-0.011	0.297
	(0.131)	(0.201)	(0.252)	(0.212)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	0.222***	0.002	0.022	-0.188*
	(0.062)	(0.076)	(0.093)	(0.106)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	0.874***	0.520***	0.789***	0.812***
	(0.077)	(0.127)	(0.150)	(0.156)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	0.278***	0.135*	0.089	0.038
	(0.067)	(0.080)	(0.096)	(0.116)
Observations	605264	11092	62384	62384

Table A13: Interaction (Initiation Model)

Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.162
	(0.211)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	0.909***
	(0.141)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	0.050
	(0.076)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	0.092
	(0.083)
Slight Madness Rep A X Slight Madness Rep B	0.440*
	(0.227)
Observations	62384

Note: I do not interact the *Strong Madness Reputation* indicators for A and B because there are no politically relevant dyads in my sample where both leaders have strong madness reputations.

Figure A2: Predicted Probabilities Based on the Model Above



Initiation seems to be more likely when both leaders are viewed as slightly mad, but the confidence bounds are very wide, so we cannot be confident in this finding.

Part 2.6: Robustness Check Tables for Crisis Bargaining (Reciprocation) Regressions

Note: The model specifications are the same as in Model 4 in Table 2, except for the changes specified in the title of each model. Results for the standard control variables and constant are omitted in order to enable tables to fit on a single page, for easier reading.

Table A14: Alternate Indicator Cutoffs and Dropping Outliers (Recip Model)

	(1) Top 5% Indicator Cutoff	(2) Top 10% Indicator Cutoff	(3) Top 20% Indicator Cutoff	(4) Cont. Measure, Dropping Top 1%
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.693***	0.707***	0.247	
	(0.219)	(0.222)	(0.183)	
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	-0.166	-0.169	-0.143	
	(0.199)	(0.211)	(0.217)	
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	0.694*	-0.271	-0.602***	
	(0.402)	(0.223)	(0.196)	
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	-0.493***	-0.370**	-0.072	
	(0.147)	(0.164)	(0.195)	
Continuous Madness Rep, A				0.110
				(0.121)
Continuous Madness Rep, B				0.046
				(0.123)
Observations	759	759	759	753

Table A15: Address Regional and Time Bias (Recip Model)

	(1) Region Fixed Effects	(2) Time Fixed Effects
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.264**	0.580***
	(0.132)	(0.218)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	-0.140	-0.006
	(0.198)	(0.204)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	-0.546**	-0.396*
	(0.222)	(0.222)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	-0.242	-0.067
	(0.176)	(0.172)
Observations	759	759

Table A16: Address Pro-Western Bias and Strategic Use of Madness Adjectives (Recip Model)

	(1) Drop Quotations	(2) Control for US Affinity	(3) Only Non-US Sources	(4) Drop English-Speaking Western Countries
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.222	0.396***	0.440*	0.496***
	(0.253)	(0.139)	(0.256)	(0.145)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	-0.080	-0.014	-0.133	-0.229
	(0.183)	(0.199)	(0.217)	(0.217)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	-0.455**	-0.446**	-0.221	-0.617**
	(0.225)	(0.200)	(0.231)	(0.275)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	-0.339**	-0.262	-0.377**	-0.587**
	(0.152)	(0.176)	(0.164)	(0.287)
Affinity with US, State A		-0.411*		
		(0.239)		
Affinity with US, State B		0.015		
		(0.202)		
Observations	759	723	759	651

Table A17: Address Potentially Confounding Leader and Country Characteristics (Recip Model)

	(1) Control for Years in Office	(2) Drop Leaders in Office <5 Years	(3) Matched Sample	(4) Drop Strategic Blunders	(5) Control for Bluffing Reputation
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.440***	0.480***	0.714*	0.439***	0.296**
	(0.156)	(0.155)	(0.394)	(0.159)	(0.146)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	-0.161	-0.504*	0.317	-0.065	-0.142
	(0.216)	(0.281)	(0.329)	(0.220)	(0.189)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	-0.549***	-0.866*	-0.448	-0.618***	-0.604***
	(0.200)	(0.446)	(0.520)	(0.199)	(0.200)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	-0.207	0.023	0.083	-0.183	-0.187
	(0.175)	(0.214)	(0.290)	(0.187)	(0.175)
Years in Office, Leader A	0.001				
	(0.011)				
Recent Bluffs, [4] Leader A					-0.504*
					(0.296)
Recent Bluffs, Leader B					-0.313*
					(0.183)
Observations	759	449	347	707	759

[4] I consider a leader to have bluffed in a MID if the leader's country threatened or showed force, but did not actually use force and did not achieve a winning outcome. For initiators (Side A), I consider only victory for Side A and Yield by Side B to be winning outcomes. For targets (Side B), who are more likely to favor the status quo, I consider anything except victory for Side A and Yield by Side B to be winning outcomes.

Table A18: Adjustments to the Madness Measure (Recip Model)

	(1) Compare to Resolve Reputation	(2) Drop Words Used outside FP Context	(3) 5-Year Average	(4) 10-Year Average
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.402**	0.722***	0.075	-0.060
	(0.160)	(0.225)	(0.174)	(0.171)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	-0.244	-0.163	-0.228	-0.247
	(0.220)	(0.241)	(0.188)	(0.182)
Strong Resolve Rep, Leader A	0.569*			
	(0.330)			
Slight Resolve Rep, Leader A	0.042			
	(0.249)			
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	-0.572***	-0.331	-0.295	-0.324*
	(0.201)	(0.221)	(0.189)	(0.190)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	-0.208	-0.236	-0.558***	-0.106
	(0.186)	(0.177)	(0.137)	(0.135)
Observations	759	759	759	759

Table A19: Dropping Some MIDs (Recip Model)

	(1) Drop MIDs Beginning with Force	(2) Drop Non-Revisionist MIDs	(3) Retain Only One Observation per MID Target
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.371**	-0.367	0.428***
	(0.167)	(0.430)	(0.157)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	-0.315	0.044	-0.258
	(0.248)	(0.199)	(0.265)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	-0.496**	-0.759***	-0.287
	(0.207)	(0.249)	(0.191)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	-0.179	-0.411	-0.157
	(0.221)	(0.265)	(0.218)
Observations	468	491	644

Table A20: Interaction (Recip Model)

Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.442***
	(0.153)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	-0.549***
	(0.200)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	-0.156
	(0.211)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	-0.202
	(0.225)
Slight Madness Rep A X Slight Madness Rep B	-0.030
	(0.435)
Observations	759

Note: I do not interact the *Strong Madness Reputation* indicators for A and B because there are no MIDs in which two leaders with strong madness reputations faced each other.

Figure A3: Predicted Probabilities Based on the Model Above



None of these predicted probabilities are significantly different from each other.

Table A21: Conflict Selection Model (Recip Model)

Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.867***
	(0.256)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	-0.237
	(0.275)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	-0.249
	(0.269)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	-0.295
	(0.200)
Rho	-0.108
	(0.226)
Observations	62384

Note: Rho is insignificant, indicating that this type of model is not actually necessary.

Part 2.7: Results for interaction with military capabilities

Table A22: Interactions with Relative Capabilities

	(1) Deterrence	(2) Crisis Bargaining
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.156	-1.901
	(0.211)	(1.468)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	0.093	0.949***
	(0.072)	(0.295)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	1.773***	-0.561***
	(0.270)	(0.215)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	0.318	-0.200
	(0.250)	(0.184)
% of Military Capabilities Held by A	0.100	0.982*
	(0.189)	(0.563)
Strong Madness Rep A X % Capabilities		4.690
		(3.155)
Slight Madness Rep A X % Capabilities		-2.746***
		(0.610)
Strong Madness Rep B X % Capabilities	-2.327***	
	(0.648)	
Slight Madness Rep B X % Capabilities	-0.279	
	(0.415)	
Observations	62384	759

Note: I do not include a three-way interaction because *Strong* and *Slight Madness Reputation* are mutually exclusive variables. The standard control variables are included, but not shown.

Part 2.8: Tables Supporting Footnotes

Table A23: Tests Mentioned in Footnotes (Initiation Model)

	(1) Retain Tiny Countries	(2) Drop Extreme Outlier	(3) Count Recent MIDs by Country[5]	(4) Count Only Losing Recent MIDs by Leader[6]
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.156	0.164	0.118	0.219
	(0.210)	(0.211)	(0.213)	(0.210)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	0.089	0.097	0.199***	0.253***
	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.072)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	0.914***	0.913***	0.869***	0.895***
	(0.140)	(0.141)	(0.138)	(0.139)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	0.163**	0.160**	0.161**	0.176**
	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.077)
Observations	67522	62366	62384	62384

[5] The *Recent MIDs* variable in this regression counts all MIDs in which a state was involved, whether as initiator or target, and whether under the current or previous leader.

[6] Like the *Recent MIDs* variable in the main models, the *Recent MIDs* variable in this regression counts MIDs initiated by the current leader, but further restricts the count to only **losing** MIDs. Arguably, initiating unwinnable MIDs might create a stronger reputation for madness.

Table A24: More Tests Mentioned in Footnotes (Initiation Model)

	(1) Minimalist Model[7]	(2) Logged Madness Measure
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.151	
	(0.211)	
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	0.073	
	(0.070)	
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	0.890***	
	(0.140)	
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	0.139*	
	(0.073)	
Logged Continuous Madness Rep, A		0.344*
		(0.186)
Logged Continuous Madness Rep, B		0.923***
		(0.139)
Observations	62384	62384

[7] This model drops the controls for State A Capabilities, State B Capabilities, State A Democracy, State B Democracy, and Distance.

Table A25: Tests Mentioned in Footnotes (Recip Model)

	(1) Retain Tiny Countries	(2) Count All Recent MIDs[8]	(3) Count Only Recent Losing MIDs Initiated by Leader[9]
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.462***	0.245**	0.431***
	(0.143)	(0.117)	(0.163)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	-0.142	-0.223	-0.199
	(0.210)	(0.202)	(0.202)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	-0.525***	-0.711***	-0.535***
	(0.200)	(0.199)	(0.196)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	-0.195	-0.260	-0.191
	(0.175)	(0.177)	(0.183)
Observations	773	759	759

[8] The *Recent MIDs* variable in this regression counts all MIDs in which a state was involved, whether as initiator or target, and whether under the current or previous leader.

[9] Like the *Recent MIDs* variable in the main models, the *Recent MIDs* variable in this regression counts MIDs initiated by the current leader, but further restricts the count to only **losing** MIDs. Arguably, initiating unwinnable MIDs might create a stronger reputation for madness.

Table A26: More Tests Mentioned in Footnotes (Recip Model)

	(1) Minimalist Model[10]	(2) Logged Madness Measure	(3) Cluster by Leader A	(4) Cluster by Country B
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.420***		0.442**	0.442
	(0.151)		(0.213)	(0.362)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	-0.125		-0.160	-0.160
	(0.214)		(0.210)	(0.185)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	-0.515***		-0.549**	-0.549
	(0.196)		(0.244)	(0.383)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	-0.189		-0.207	-0.207
	(0.184)		(0.168)	(0.212)
Logged Continuous Madness Rep, A		0.430***		
		(0.163)		
Logged Continuous Madness Rep, B		-0.161		
		(0.240)		
Observations	759	759	759	759

[10] This model drops the controls for State A Capabilities, State B Capabilities, State A Democracy, State B Democracy, and Distance.