

Online Appendix: Racial Attitudes through a Partisan Lens

Abstract

The material that follows incorporates additional information and analyses referenced in the text.

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Appendix A: Question Wording and Descriptive Statistics

Past discrimination: “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.”

Deserve less: “Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve.”

Try hard: “It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.” (Reverse Coded)

Special favors (Not asked in 2016 CCAP): “Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.” (Reverse Coded)

Special favors (2008 CCAP version): “Many other minority groups have overcome prejudice and worked their way up. African Americans should do the same without any special favors.” (Reverse Coded)

Responses in 4 of the 5 surveys are recorded on 5-point Likert-type scales anchored by strongly agree and strongly disagree. The VOTER Survey differed, with responses recorded on 4-point agree-disagree scales that also included a “don’t know” response. “Don’t knows” were recoded as midpoints on the scale to approximate the 5 category scale. Descriptive statistics for each scale in each data collection used in the main text analyses, grouped by party, are presented in Table A.1.

Table A.1: Descriptives for Racial Resentment Measures

		ANES 1992-1994		CCAP 2008		CCAP 2012		VOTER Survey 2012-2016		CCAP 2016		
Mean	Democrats	0.56	0.57	0.54	0.52	0.54	0.54	0.53	0.53	0.41	0.41	0.40
	Republicans	0.65	0.68	0.79	0.80	0.78	0.81	0.79	0.78	0.78	0.73	0.71
SD	Democrats	0.24	0.23	0.26	0.25	0.27	0.28	0.27	0.27	0.31	0.29	0.28
	Republicans	0.20	0.18	0.19	0.19	0.18	0.18	0.19	0.18	0.20	0.22	0.22
Cronbach’s α	Democrats	0.75	0.74	0.84	0.84	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.87	0.90	0.86	0.85
	Republicans	0.65	0.56	0.73	0.74	0.76	0.70	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.71	0.69

Note: Statistics come from non-Hispanic white respondents completing both waves. Weighted results.

Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses: A Polarizing Political Context Coincides with Polarizing Racial Attitudes

Here I show descriptively that the connection between whites' racial attitudes and partisanship has strengthened considerably over the past three decades. Importantly, however, the pattern of changes in these variables indicates that partisanship should be considered as a potential causal force. First, using data from the face-to-face interviews in the 1986-2016 ANES surveys I present means for racial resentment broken down by party in Figure B.1. Between 1986 and 1990, little difference existed between Democrats and Republicans.¹ But starting in 1992 the partisan gap grows in almost every passing year. It increases to 0.07 points in 1992, hits 0.15 points in 2004, and reaches a current peak of 0.28 points in 2016. Before 2016 most of this change came from Republicans becoming increasingly racially resentful. Republicans averaged a 0.61 on the scale in 1986, and 0.70 come 2016. Between 1986 and 2012, Democrats averaged between a 0.54 and 0.57, but dropped an astonishing 0.14 points between 2012 and 2016 to 0.41.² Between 1986 and 2016, the correlation between the ANES's 7-point partisanship measure and racial resentment strengthened from a paltry 0.06 to a robust 0.49.³




Figure B.1: Whites' average racial resentment levels by party affiliation and the correlation between the two. Four-item index scaled 0-1, with higher values denoting more racial resentment. Face-to-face interviews from the American National Election Studies.

Not only are the means moving apart, but the distributions are changing as well. This is a critically important point. It is not that racially resentful erstwhile Democrats and racially sympathetic erstwhile Republicans have sorted themselves out of the “wrong” party, therefore

¹I include leaners with strong and weak partisans.

²Since 2008, similar partisan gaps have grown on affect and interracial dating measures (Sides, Tesler and Vavreck 2018).

³This relationship implicates both Southern and non-Southern whites. For Southerners the correlation changes from -0.05 to 0.38. For non-Southerners it increases from 0.11 to 0.51.

increasing the correlation between partisanship and racial attitudes. Instead, partisans are moving toward the scale's extremes over time. Figure B.2 breaks down the distribution of Democrats' and Republicans' racial resentment scores, comparing when the items first appear in the American National Election Study with more recent readings. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, little substantive difference existed between partisans.⁴




Figure B.2: Racial resentment's distribution among whites by party in select years. Bars indicate proportion of party identifiers with given level of racial resentment. Four-item index scaled 0-1, with higher values denoting more racial resentment. Face-to-face interviews from the American National Election Studies.

Things change in the 2000s as Republicans increasingly move rightward. In 2004, the most resentful three categories contain 25% of Republicans, up from 16% in 1988. This increases to 28% in 2016 with 14% scoring at the measure's maximum, making it the modal category.

White Democrats' attitudes were much more stable until Barack Obama's second term in office. The substantial drop in the group's average level of racial resentment coincided with a large distributional shift. The least resentful three categories contained 8% of Democrats in 2012, but 24% come 2016. Moreover, the modal white Democrat now places at the scale's

⁴ Racial resentment's distribution does not, for instance, clearly differ by party in 1988 ($\chi^2_{16} = 25.499$, $p = 0.06$).

minimum (12%), while only 2% did in 2012. Not only are partisans' evaluations of blacks increasingly distinct, but their racial attitudes are becoming more extreme.

These changes do not accord with a story where racial attitudes are consistently more central, and thus a more likely causal force, than partisanship. In this same time period, partisanship's distribution changes little. Between 1988 and 2016, the number of whites identifying as any type of Democrat decreases by 1.5 percentage points and the percentage of white Republican identifiers increased by 5 points. Similarly, partisans are not becoming markedly more extreme. Neither party sees more than a 4 percentage point increase in strong partisans in this 28-year window. It makes little sense to consider a less stable construct (racial resentment) as consistently causally prior to a more stable one (partisanship).

Appendix C: Comparing Relative Magnitudes over Time

The main text references an omnibus model stacking the data sets together to assess whether the impact of partisanship on racial attitudes is significantly greater in the Obama era than the Clinton Era. These results are reported in Table C.1. The substantive picture is the same as the results reported in the text. What this analysis offers is insight into whether changes in the effects of partisanship and racial resentment change across data collections. As one indication, the second row compares the effect of partisanship measured in the 2008 CCAP relative to partisanship in the 1992-1994 ANES. The 6 point increase in magnitude is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$). Similarly, moving to the eighth row and second column, the near 8 point decrease in racial resentment's influence between data collections is not significant ($p > 0.05$).

Table C.1: Relationship between Partisanship and Racial Attitudes

	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t
Partisanship _{t-1}	0.041 (0.021)	0.853* (0.025)
Partisanship _{t-1} *CCAP 2008	0.061* (0.022)	0.064* (0.025)
Partisanship _{t-1} *CCAP 2012: March	0.034 (0.036)	0.069* (0.033)
Partisanship _{t-1} *CCAP 2012: August	0.088* (0.036)	0.082* (0.031)
Partisanship _{t-1} *VOTER Survey 2012-2016	0.106* (0.027)	-0.061 (0.032)
Partisanship _{t-1} *CCAP 2016	0.048* (0.024)	0.066* (0.026)
Racial Resentment _{t-1}	0.600* (0.031)	0.127* (0.041)
Racial Resentment _{t-1} *CCAP 2008	0.139* (0.033)	-0.079 (0.041)
Racial Resentment _{t-1} *CCAP 2012: March	0.211* (0.042)	-0.061 (0.049)
Racial Resentment _{t-1} *CCAP 2012: August	0.192* (0.056)	-0.095* (0.048)
Racial Resentment _{t-1} *VOTER Survey 2012-2016	0.237* (0.040)	0.014 (0.049)
Racial Resentment _{t-1} *CCAP 2016	0.191* (0.033)	-0.093* (0.042)
CCAP 2008	-0.123* (0.022)	0.001 (0.026)
CCAP 2012: March	-0.147* (0.028)	-0.014 (0.029)
CCAP 2012: August	-0.162* (0.033)	0.001 (0.032)
VOTER Survey 2012-2016	-0.242* (0.026)	0.025 (0.031)
CCAP 2016	-0.174* (0.023)	0.015 (0.019)
Constant	0.243* (0.022)	0.011 (0.025)
Observations	25,065	25,065
R ²	0.670	0.812
Residual Std. Error	0.153	0.146

Note: *p<0.05

OLS regression results. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models use population weights. Variables scaled 0-1. The 1992-1994 ANES is the baseline data set.

Appendix D: Standardizing Variables to Address Relative Influence

The main text analyses offer two perspectives on the relative influence for each predisposition. The first focuses on estimating the difference in theoretical maximum influence indicated by a min-max change in a predisposition by using a seemingly unrelated regression strategy. But evidence from such comparisons is limited in part due to differences in the variance of the related constructs. The second addresses the sizes of the sample these differences relate as to whether these effects are understated. Even so, some may argue these comparisons do not effectively shed light on each predisposition's relative importance. A third way to address relative influence comes from using standardized coefficients. While methodologists disagree about their utility (cf. King 1986; Luskin 1991), standardizing variables to account for each's distribution can shed light on how much variation in the outcome variable is related to variation in the explanatory variable (Luskin 1991; Gelman and Hill 2007).

Table D.1 reports the results for the main text models that operationalize racial attitudes with racial resentment after standardizing all variables and estimating the models using OLS. This procedure de-means each variable and then divides it by its standard deviation. In support of my hypothesis that partisanship should be more substantively meaningful in its relationship with racial attitudes in political contexts privileging it over other concerns, the results from all models except those from 1992-1994 ANES reveal a larger relative influence for partisanship than racial attitudes.⁵ This is additional evidence that attitude change rather than sorting best explains the dynamics between racial attitudes and partisanship in party-centric political contexts.

Table D.2 extends these analyses to the differential affect measure. Again, this takes the difference between whites' feelings about blacks and their feelings about whites such that higher values denote more negative evaluations of blacks than whites. The results here again point to attitude change rather than sorting as best characterizing the more party-centric political context covered by the VOTER Survey and 2016 CCAP. Partisanship is about 5 times as influential as racial attitudes as measured by differential group affect.

⁵In all cases but the 1992-1994 ANES and the March wave of the 2012 CCAP, partisanship's effect is reliably different than racial resentment's ($p < .05$).

Table D.1: Relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Racial Resentment, Standardized Variables

	ANES 1992-1994		CCAP 2008		CCAP 2012: March		CCAP 2012: August		2012-2016 YOTER Survey		CCAP 2016	
	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t
Partisanship _{t-1}	0.064 (0.034)	0.807* (0.024)	0.145* (0.009)	0.914* (0.006)	0.097* (0.037)	0.910* (0.021)	0.166* (0.038)	0.917* (0.018)	0.170* (0.009)	0.781* (0.008)	0.107* (0.012)	0.914* (0.008)
Racial Resentment _{t-1}	0.635* (0.033)	0.081* (0.026)	0.739* (0.009)	0.033* (0.006)	0.766* (0.027)	0.048* (0.020)	0.733* (0.043)	0.023 (0.018)	0.702* (0.008)	0.101* (0.009)	0.802* (0.011)	0.028* (0.008)
Constant	0.003 (0.034)	0.003 (0.027)	-0.003 (0.008)	0.004 (0.005)	-0.033 (0.028)	-0.006 (0.016)	0.041 (0.032)	0.001 (0.018)	0.008 (0.008)	0.062* (0.007)	0.000 (0.010)	0.004 (0.007)
Observations	592	592	8,866	8,866	726	726	751	751	6,012	6,012	8,116	8,116
R ²	0.424	0.656	0.660	0.865	0.680	0.885	0.663	0.864	0.614	0.682	0.725	0.851
Residual Std. Error	0.753	0.589	0.566	0.358	0.550	0.329	0.543	0.343	0.575	0.522	0.451	0.316

Note: OLS regression results. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables standardized. Analyses use population weights. *p<0.05

Table D.2: Relationship between Partisanship and Affect Differential, Standardized Variables

	ANES 1992-1994		VOTER Survey 2012-2016		CCAP 2016	
	Affect Difference _t	Partisanship _t	Affect Difference _t	Partisanship _t	Affect Difference _t	Partisanship _t
Partisanship _{t-1}	-0.004 (0.042)	0.822* (0.023)	0.189* (0.026)	0.821* (0.018)	0.156* (0.017)	0.919* (0.008)
Affect Difference _{t-1}	0.559* (0.062)	0.016 (0.023)	0.494* (0.032)	0.034* (0.015)	0.554* (0.021)	0.030* (0.008)
Constant	0.017 (0.041)	0.001 (0.027)	0.022 (0.025)	0.063* (0.017)	0.025 (0.015)	0.004 (0.007)
Observations	577	577	5,720	5,720	8,120	8,120
R ²	0.294	0.648	0.317	0.687	0.378	0.851
Residual Std. Error	0.874	0.599	0.821	0.443	0.708	0.316

Note: *p<0.05. OLS regression results. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.

Appendix E: Addressing Measurement Error with Structural Equation Models

In the main text I note that measurement error may potentially affect my conclusions in part by influencing measure stabilities. Here, I replicate the main text analyses using structural equation models as a way to tame measurement error. To facilitate interpretation, I separately report the measurement model results, attitude stabilities, and cross-lagged effects. Finally, to make the comparison as direct as possible I focus only on the respondents included in the main text analysis. Rather than using full information maximum likelihood or some other estimation technique that allows for missingness in my model, I restrict the data to the same respondent set. I then estimate all models via maximum likelihood using the lavaan R package (version 0.5) (Rosseel 2012).

I estimate the same model for all panels. For the measurement component, I freely estimate the factor loadings for each racial resentment item, but constrain the loadings for each item to be equal at $t - 1$ and t . This fixes the meaning of racial resentment over time. To identify these latent variables I therefore set each's metric to unit variance. I also correlate the item error variances over time (e.g., past discrimination at $t - 1$ and past discrimination at t) and between items sharing the same response format (e.g., try hard and special favors are reverse coded). Because it is a single item, partisanship's metric is identified by fixing the single item loading to 1. Finally, the covariances between partisanship and racial resentment are also fixed over time. Table E.1 presents the measurement model components of the SEM results for each data set used in the main text analyses, including the factor loadings and fit indices. The fit results are adequate, although not ideal (Brown 2015).

Tables E.2 and E.3 contain the results from the structural relationships in the cross lagged SEMs. The stability estimates in Table E.2 affirm that each predisposition is highly stable, and also indicate that partisanship is more persistent. But this is not to say they do not change. The results in Table E.3 again support my argument that the relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes is dynamic, and that partisanship becomes more influential in contexts privileging it above other predispositions. In only one case (December-March in the 2012 CCAP) do the substantive conclusions differ from the main text results. Here there is no evidence supporting the racial attitude influence hypothesis, with the effect imprecisely estimated ($p = .104$).

Furthermore, I can address relative magnitudes through a completely standardized solu-

Table E.1: SEM Measurement Model Results

	ANES 1992-1994	CCAP 2008	CCAP 2012: March	CCAP 2012: August	2012-2016 VOTER Survey	CCAP 2016
Special Favors	0.763 (0.037)	0.695 (0.008)	0.707 (0.029)	0.698 (0.025)	0.810 (0.009)	— —
Deserve Less	0.386 (0.036)	0.673 (0.008)	0.597 (0.027)	0.618 (0.024)	0.719 (0.008)	0.724 (0.010)
Try Hard	0.728 (0.039)	0.716 (0.009)	0.722 (0.031)	0.703 (0.027)	0.801 (0.009)	0.933 (0.010)
Past Discrimination	0.416 (0.042)	0.764 (0.009)	0.749 (0.032)	0.711 (0.028)	0.817 (0.010)	0.844 (0.009)
Partisanship	1 (—)	1 (—)	1 (—)	1 (—)	1 (—)	1 (—)
χ^2	172.628	4193.889	460.871	412.831	1932.661	5887.985
DF	30	28	28	28	28	15
CFI	0.932	0.933	0.923	0.933	0.960	0.900
TLI	0.898	0.893	0.877	0.893	0.936	0.812
SRMR	0.106	0.183	0.200	0.189	0.158	0.235
RMSEA [90% CI]	0.09 [0.077, 0.103]	0.13 [0.126, 0.133]	0.146 [0.134, 0.158]	0.135 [0.124, 0.147]	0.106 [0.102, 0.11]	0.22 [0.215, 0.224]
N	592	8866	726	751	6014	8116

Entries denote parameter estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Estimated via maximum likelihood. Factor variances for racial resentment and partisanship item loading fixed to 1 to identify the model. Loadings constrained to equality over time.

Table E.2: Stability Coefficients for Partisanship and Racial Resentment

	ANES 1992-1994		CCAP 2008		CCAP 2012: March		CCAP 2012: August		2012-2016 VOTER Survey		CCAP 2016	
Partisanship	0.845 (0.026)	<i>0.794</i> (0.016)	0.928 (0.005)	<i>0.908</i> (0.002)	0.941 (0.015)	<i>0.923</i> (0.007)	0.947 (0.016)	<i>0.914</i> (0.007)	0.852 (0.008)	<i>0.808</i> (0.005)	0.941 (0.005)	<i>0.915</i> (0.003)
Racial Resentment	0.790 (0.053)	<i>0.619</i> (0.026)	0.879 (0.014)	<i>0.639</i> (0.007)	0.977 (0.051)	<i>0.684</i> (0.021)	0.997 (0.047)	<i>0.684</i> (0.020)	0.986 (0.017)	<i>0.671</i> (0.008)	0.906 (0.014)	<i>0.656</i> (0.006)

Note: * $p < 0.05$

Entries are estimates from cross-lagged structural equation models estimated via maximum likelihood with standard errors in parentheses. Estimates from completely standardized solution included in italics. Measurement results reported in Table E.1.

tion. These results, italicized entries in Tables E.2 and E.3, demonstrate that partisanship’s temporal influence consistently surpasses racial attitudes’ in this later period. Interpreted as the standard deviation change in the outcome produced by a standard deviation change in the predictor, partisanship is 2.5 to 15 times as influential as racial attitudes in the relationship. The conclusions drawn from the main text models receive additional support even after addressing potential differences in measure reliability introduced by measurement error.

Table E.3: Cross-Lagged Effects of Partisanship and Racial Resentment

	ANES 1992-1994		CCAP 2008		CCAP 2012: March		CCAP 2012: August		2012-2016 VOTER Survey		CCAP 2016	
Partisanship _{t-1}	0.068	<i>0.017</i>	0.617*	<i>0.158*</i>	0.582*	<i>0.135*</i>	0.674*	<i>0.152*</i>	0.672*	<i>0.152*</i>	0.470*	<i>0.117*</i>
→ Racial Resentment _t	(0.143)	<i>(0.037)</i>	(0.040)	<i>(0.010)</i>	(0.154)	<i>(0.036)</i>	(0.148)	<i>(0.034)</i>	(0.051)	<i>(0.012)</i>	(0.041)	<i>(0.010)</i>
Racial Resentment _{t-1}	0.023*	<i>0.068*</i>	0.004*	<i>0.010*</i>	0.008	<i>0.025</i>	0.005	<i>0.014</i>	0.023*	<i>0.065*</i>	0.005*	<i>0.015*</i>
→ Partisanship _t	(0.009)	<i>(0.027)</i>	(0.002)	<i>(0.005)</i>	(0.005)	<i>(0.016)</i>	(0.005)	<i>(0.016)</i>	(0.003)	<i>(0.008)</i>	(0.002)	<i>(0.005)</i>

Note: * $p < 0.05$

Entries are estimates from cross-lagged structural equation models estimated via maximum likelihood with standard errors in parentheses. Estimates from completely standardized solution included in italics. Measurement models reported in Table E.1.

Appendix F: Analyses Incorporating Additional Core Attitudes

To address the possibility that attitudes correlated with partisanship but omitted from my model explain my findings, I include other core predispositions into the main text models. These include culture war (Goren and Chapp 2017) and economic orientations, as well as immigration attitudes (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). Unfortunately not all data sets contain measures for these orientations captured in the same wave as partisanship and racial resentment, which would cloud temporal comparisons if entered into the models. Nor are operationalizations consistent across data sets, but as best as possible my coding follows existing work (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Goren and Chapp 2017).⁶ Despite these limits my results speak to whether

⁶ The operationalizations for each measure are as follows. In the 1992-1994 ANES I operationalization culture war attitudes using the same four items as Goren and Chapp (2017). One item relates to abortion: “There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view? You can just tell me the number of the opinion you choose.” With responses: (1) By law, abortion should never be permitted. (2) The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest or when the woman’s life is in danger. (3) The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman’s life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established. (4) By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice. Two items asking whether they “favor or oppose laws to protect homosexuals against job discrimination” and “think homosexuals should be allowed to serve in the United States Armed Forces or don’t you think so”, with responses recorded on four-point (strongly) agree/disagree scales. Finally, I included a feeling thermometer for “Gay men and lesbians; that is, homosexuals.” I code each to capture conservative positions and combine them into a 0-1 scale (mean = 0.46, sd = 0.28, $\alpha = 0.75$). For immigration opinion, I combine 5 items. The first asks “Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased a little, increased a lot, decreased a little, decreased a lot, or left the same as it is now?” The next three record responses on four point scales from extremely to not at all likely. These ask how likely is it that “the growing number of Hispanics will improve our culture with new ideas and customs,” “cause higher taxes due to more demands for public services,” and “take jobs away from people already here”. Finally, I include a feeling thermometer for illegal immigrants. I key each to capture conservative positions and combine them into a 0-1 scale (mean = 0.62, sd = 0.18, $\alpha = 0.65$).

In the 2008 CCAP I measure anti-immigration attitude with an item asking respondents if “Illegal immigrants should be arrested and deported as quickly as possible, regardless of their circumstances” or “Illegal immigrants now living in the U.S. should be allowed to become citizens if they pay a fine and meet other requirements.” I key this to indicate anti-immigrant opinion. I capture culture war attitudes with two items, one concerning abortion’s legality (responses: Abortion should always be legal = 0; abortion should be legal with some restrictions; abortion should only be legal in special circumstances.; abortion should be illegal. It should never be allowed = 1) and the other asking whether one supports civil unions for gay couples (responses strongly favor = 0, strongly oppose = 1). I code each to capture opposition and combine them into a 0-1 scale (mean = 0.46, sd = 0.34, $\alpha = 0.71$).

In the 2012 CCAP I measure anti-immigration attitude with 3 items asking respondents if “illegal immigrants make a contribution to American society or are a drain,” if “it should be easier or harder for foreigners to immigrate to the US legally than it is currently” and if they “favor or oppose providing a legal way for illegal immigrants already in the United States to become U.S. citizens?” I key each to capture opposition and combine them into

it's partisanship and racial attitudes themselves, or related factors, that explain my results.

The conclusions drawn from the main text models persist even after accounting for these other presumptively fundamental predispositions. Table F.1 demonstrates that partisanship still has a substantively and statistically significant impact on racial attitudes in a party-centric era. In no case does partisanship no longer explain attitude change in the Obama era or 2016 election models. When conclusions do change they come from the effect racial attitudes have on party switching. The March reinterviews for the 2012 CCAP and the 2016 CCAP analyses each suggested that racial attitudes motivated sorting. Incorporating additional core attitudes introduces additional imprecision into the estimates, dropping the results from conventional levels of statistical significance. That all the explanatory variables are highly correlated suggests multicollinearity could explain the imprecision, but even then the substantive impact appears negligible for at least the 2016 election patterns.

a 0-1 scale (mean = 0.47, sd = 0.31, $\alpha = 0.73$). Culture war attitudes are operationalized with 3 items, one on abortion's legality (responses legal in all cases, legal/illegal in some cases, illegal in all cases), one asking whether someone favors or opposes gay marriage (responses favor or oppose), and a feeling thermometer asking about one's feelings towards gays. I code each to capture negative attitudes or opposition and combine them into a 0-1 scale (mean = 0.44, sd = 0.31, $\alpha = 0.75$). Finally, I measure economic orientations with an item asking if "there is too much or too little regulation of business by the government?" with responses recorded as too much (coded = 1), about right (0.5), or too little (0).

I use the same operationalization scheme as the 2012 CCAP for the VOTER survey, each again scaled 0-1 denoting more conservative attitudes (anti-immigration attitude: mean = 0.58, sd = 0.32, $\alpha = 0.72$; culture war attitudes: mean = 0.53, sd = 0.31, $\alpha = 0.76$).

Finally, for the 2016 CCAP I operationalize culture war attitudes with 3 items. One for whether people "have a favorable or an unfavorable opinion of" gays and lesbians (responses: very favorable = 0, very unfavorable = 1), and two asking whether they favor or oppose "repealing a woman's right to have an abortion" (responses: strongly favor = 0, strongly oppose = 1), and "allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally" (responses: strongly favor = 0, strongly oppose = 1). I then combine these items into a 0-1 scale where higher scores correspond with conservative positions (mean = 0.37, sd = 0.34, $\alpha = 0.81$). I use a similar set for anti-immigration attitudes. One item includes favorability evaluations of illegal immigrants (responses: very favorable = 0, very unfavorable = 1), and two asking whether they favor or oppose "building a wall along the Mexican border" (responses: strongly oppose = 0, strongly favor = 1) and "providing a legal way for illegal immigrants already in the United States to become U.S. citizens" (responses: strongly favor = 0, strongly oppose = 1). Likewise, I combine these items into a 0-1 scale with higher scores denoting anti-immigrant attitudes (mean = 0.56, sd = 0.35, $\alpha = 0.83$).

Table F.1: Relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Racial Resentment, with additional attitudes

	ANES 1992-1994		CCAP 2008		CCAP 2012: March		CCAP 2012: August		2012-2016 YOTER Survey		CCAP 2016	
	Racial Resentment _{t-1}	Partisanship _{t-1}	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t
Partisanship _{t-1}	0.030 (0.022)	0.812* (0.028)	0.071* (0.005)	0.902* (0.005)	0.066* (0.022)	0.884* (0.017)	0.041* (0.020)	0.892* (0.018)	0.063* (0.010)	0.734* (0.010)	0.051* (0.007)	0.895* (0.006)
Racial Resentment _{t-1}	0.558* (0.034)	0.087* (0.044)	0.689* (0.008)	0.036* (0.007)	0.707* (0.029)	0.027 (0.023)	0.744* (0.028)	-0.008 (0.026)	0.690* (0.013)	0.065* (0.014)	0.710* (0.008)	-0.008 (0.007)
Anti-Immigration Attitudes _{t-1}	0.067 (0.041)	-0.022 (0.053)	0.051* (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.134* (0.022)	0.039* (0.017)	0.082* (0.021)	0.054* (0.019)	0.140* (0.010)	0.065* (0.011)	0.127* (0.008)	0.053* (0.007)
Culture War Attitudes _{t-1}	0.088* (0.028)	0.163* (0.036)	0.052* (0.006)	0.035* (0.005)	0.005 (0.023)	0.055* (0.018)	0.052* (0.022)	0.052* (0.020)	0.093* (0.010)	0.118* (0.010)	0.018* (0.007)	0.029* (0.006)
Economic Orientations _{t-1}					0.039* (0.017)	0.042* (0.013)	0.065* (0.017)	0.020 (0.015)	0.063* (0.008)	0.019* (0.007)		
Constant	0.190* (0.027)	-0.003 (0.035)	0.114* (0.004)	0.009* (0.004)	0.062* (0.016)	-0.029* (0.013)	0.033* (0.016)	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.023* (0.007)	0.009* (0.007)	0.051* (0.004)	0.020* (0.004)
Observations	521	521	8,717	8,717	652	652	669	669	5,588	5,588	7,079	7,079
R ²	0.455	0.674	0.673	0.866	0.710	0.893	0.737	0.867	0.648	0.705	0.741	0.854
Residual Std. Error	0.157	0.203	0.145	0.133	0.142	0.113	0.129	0.119	0.171	0.183	0.134	0.116

Note: *p<0.05

OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Analyses employ population weights. Variables scaled 0-1.

What's interesting, too, is the relationships between these additional attitudes and racial resentment. In all cases one or more of these orientations explains racial attitude change, but to my knowledge no extant work suggests why these relationships should exist. Most likely, as with partisanship, these attitudes motivate selection into certain information environments where, upon encountering information on race, individuals then update their attitudes to maintain belief system coherence. The interrelationships between these attitudes are interesting and other work should consider investigating them in greater detail in future work. But the point remains: my account that the relationship between racial attitudes and partisanship is dynamic, with partisanship shaping racial attitudes, holds.

Appendix G: Analyses with Additional Party-Centric Era Panels

I also conducted additional analyses relating racial resentment and partisanship in other data collections to demonstrate that the effect I find for partisanship on racial attitudes does not come from the data collections used in the main text analyses or the specific time periods employed. Here, I focus on the 2006 and 2010 waves of the 2006-2008-2010 General Social Survey (GSS) panel, the 2008-2012 CCAP panel, and the 2010 and 2014 waves of the 2010-2012-2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study panel.⁷ These data shed light on different parts of President Obama's tenure in office, including reactions to his seeking the Democratic Party's nomination (GSS) and reactions to his first term (CCAP). Similarly, the GSS and CCES shed light on whether presidential election years uniquely privilege partisanship in the relationship, or if lower salience midterm elections still see similar patterns.

Importantly, these panels vary in their operationalization of racial resentment. Only the CCAP contains the full four-item set. The CCES contains just two items (special favors and past discrimination) and the GSS contains a single item (special favors) to which I add other items based on prior work (Kinder and Chudy 2016, see also Tesler 2016).⁸ All analyses again focus on non-Hispanic whites.⁹

Table G.1 shows that the results from the analyses using full and truncated versions of the racial resentment measure reflect the results presented in the main text. In each model lagged partisanship has a substantive and statistically significant impact on racial attitudes ($p < 0.05$). Lagged racial resentment similarly shapes subsequent partisanship in these analyses.

Table G.2 extends these results using the GSS operationalization of racial resentment. In all instances lagged partisanship has a reliable impact of subsequent racial attitudes. And likewise for lagged racial attitudes. The consistency in results across data collections also suggests that partisanship's effect is not driven by focusing on surveys occurring in election years or non-election years.

The 2006-2010 results are particularly interesting here as they can speak most directly to how white partisans respond to an information shock—Barack Obama's candidacy and election. In this polarized political context, whites were more likely to respond to this information by aligning their racial attitudes with their partisanship than shift their partisan allegiances.

Moreover, while these lagged effects not statistically distinguishable, partisanship appears the most substantively meaningful. These estimates reflect variation along the range of the measure so if cases are unevenly distributed then the estimates may overestimate the measure's influence. That similar amounts of whites place at the ends of the partisanship measure

⁷ I also considered other panels including the 2000-2004, 2004-2006, and 2008-2009-2010 ANES and the 2006-2012 Portraits of American Life Study. They unfortunately do not contain sufficient sample sizes, suitable items, or measured racial attitudes at different times temporally than partisanship which affects any analyses.

⁸ These additional items are: "On the average, African Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing than White people. Do you think these differences are mainly due to discrimination?" and "On the average, African Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing than White people. Do you think these differences are because most African Americans just don't have the motivation or will power to pull themselves out of poverty?" Responses to each were recorded as Yes/No, with disagreeing to the first and agreeing with the second coded as racially resentful responses. The last item takes the difference between respondents' ratings of whites and blacks on a 7-point scale asking them to rate each group as hardworking or lazy. This operationalization makes an adequate scale: α 2006 = 0.62 and 2010 = 0.63.

⁹The CCAP and CCES again relied on YouGov's online panel. The GSS conducted face-to-face interviews. The substantive results do not

Table G.1: Relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Racial Resentment, CCAP and CCES Panels

	2008-2012 CCAP		2010-2014 CCES	
	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t
Partisanship _{t-1}	0.119* (0.010)	0.815* (0.011)	0.112* (0.007)	0.862* (0.006)
Racial Resentment _{t-1}	0.748* (0.015)	0.105* (0.016)	0.822* (0.009)	0.101* (0.007)
Constant	0.118* (0.010)	0.031* (0.010)	0.044* (0.006)	-0.007 (0.005)
Observations	2,204	2,204	7,238	7,238
R ²	0.642	0.770	0.671	0.831
Residual Std. Error	0.165	0.177	0.168	0.137

Note: *p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.

Table G.2: Relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Racial Resentment, GSS Panels

	2006-2010		2008-2012		2010-2014	
	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t
Partisanship _{t-1}	0.096* (0.026)	0.740* (0.028)	0.101* (0.026)	0.784* (0.027)	0.092* (0.027)	0.820* (0.026)
Racial Resentment _{t-1}	0.495* (0.035)	0.120* (0.038)	0.605* (0.037)	0.162* (0.037)	0.575* (0.038)	0.116* (0.036)
Constant	0.271* (0.024)	0.051* (0.026)	0.200* (0.026)	0.025 (0.027)	0.204* (0.024)	0.006 (0.022)
Observations	508	508	493	493	505	505
R ²	0.358	0.634	0.388	0.657	0.396	0.727
Residual Std. Error	0.182	0.198	0.191	0.195	0.186	0.173

Note: *p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.

makes these differences more substantively consequential in light of racial resentment's skewed distribution. Few people place at racial resentment's minimum in any data collection making the coefficient estimates speak to an unlikely comparison given the data (for a similar argument on relative effect sizes, see Goren and Chapp 2017). For example, the CCAP and CCES results indicate that 46-47% of white respondents, those identifying as strong partisans, separate by an average of 11-12 percentage points in racial resentment. In sharp contrast, while a similar difference manifests between those scoring at racial resentment's poles, this group makes up 22% of CCAP respondents and 35% in the CCES. With between a third to over twice again as many people potentially implicated in aligning their racial attitudes with their partisanship, the relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes appears to be better characterized by people attitude change than party switching. These conclusions are further supported by results from models using standardized variables. Similarly, including immigration and culture war attitudes does not affect the conclusions suggested by the results in Table G.1.¹⁰

¹⁰ Unfortunately the GSS's ballot assignment halves my effective sample size when including culture war attitudes, with the case loss substantially decreasing the estimates' precision. But the results are still in the expected

Appendix H: Investigating Obama's Role

Some existing work suggests President Obama was central to the connection between racial attitudes and partisan change. Specifically, those with more negative (positive) racial attitudes are more likely to evaluate Obama negatively (positively) and change their partisanship or racial attitudes accordingly (e.g., Tesler 2013, 2016). It could therefore be the case that the effects I find in the main text and supplemental analyses are solely attributable to Obama and by missing this connection my argument about partisanship's influence is incomplete. Even the 2016 CCAP analyses may feature the imprint of a two-term black president.

However, while Obama may be potentially influential as a signal of racial progress that suggests racial discrimination is over and thus motivates respondents to double down on denying discrimination, or as a positive exemplar who highlights the obstacles black Americans face, it seems unlikely that he alone explains the patterns observed. First, from a theoretical perspective these arguments suggest that his election and administration created a shock to which people reacted. This implies that attitude change or sorting should occur largely in the early Obama years as people become used to these new political realities. But if Obama alone mattered, the patterns I find during his second term or the 2016 election make less sense. That partisanship's estimated effect remains fairly consistent across models spanning different periods of Obama's time in office suggests a more general pattern. It seems a richer theoretical account emphasizes the broader information environment, and how partisanship influences interpretations of it, rather than privileging distinct stimuli. This is certainly not to say that Obama did not matter for shaping individuals' political thinking; that evidence is substantial (Tesler 2016). Rather, I modify this slightly to note that he was one piece of a larger, party-centric context that featured many potentially race-related stimuli to which people could respond (Engelhardt ND), a feature particularly characteristic of his second term. Acknowledging this provides for a richer picture of the connection between politics and race.¹¹

Second, identifying exhaustive causal mediators requires considering other factors correlated with evaluations of Obama that could explain their connection to the relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes that encourages changing one or the other. This is not to say that considering possible attitudinal mechanisms connecting partisanship and racial attitudes is not important. It is by providing insight into why these relationships exist. Rather, analyses can suggest possible paths for influence and then incorporate how sensitive these paths are to unaccounted for factors that violate assumptions required to claim the proposed mediator exhausts possible mechanisms (see Imai et al. 2011; Acharya, Blackwell and Sen 2016). Obama evaluations may matter, but they matter alongside other potentially unmeasured factors.

To demonstrate, the panels in Figure H.1 provide the estimates and confidence intervals for a mediation analysis following the Baron-Kenny regression procedure (Baron and Kenny 1986)

direction for each model in all data sets.

¹¹ Indeed, the descriptive patterns presented in the main text indicate that the largest polarization in racial attitudes came during President Obama's second term. If Obama alone mattered for this shift it seems like this change should have happened during his first term in office. But this latter period saw the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement and increased attention to police brutality and the persistence of racial discrimination, as well as Donald Trump's presidential campaign. These movements, and the media attention they generated, offered information to which partisans could, and seemingly did, respond.

using the 2008-2012 CCAP and the 2012-2016 VOTER Survey.¹² The total effect result corresponds with the regression results reported above and in the main text (e.g., partisanship_{t-1} on racial attitudes_t). The average direct effect (ADE) results denote the estimated cross-lagged effect for partisanship or racial attitudes after incorporating evaluations of Barack Obama.¹³ Finally, the average causal mediation effect (ACME) signifies the portion of the relationship between partisanship or racial attitudes and the other outcome mediated by Obama evaluations.

Comparing the total effects with the ACME offers evidence for the mediating influence of Obama evaluations. Figure H.1 shows that whites' feelings about Obama help explain the relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes. But they are not the whole story. Lagged partisanship and racial attitudes still have statistically and substantively significant direct influences on the respective outcome, evidence indicating that other mechanisms are at work.




Figure H.1: Point estimates and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for the average total effect, average causal mediation effect (ACME), and average direct effect (ADE).

These results, however, are only part of the account. The panels in Figure H.2 contain results from sensitivity analyses for the preceding outcomes. They speak to how much the ACME changes given levels of confounding by unobservables. The approach relates the proportion of variation in the mediator (Obama evaluations) and the outcome (racial attitudes or partisanship) explained by the confounder to the estimated ACME (Imai et al. 2011). Specifically, I hypothesize unobserved confounding to affect the mediator and outcome in opposite ways (e.g., more positive Obama evaluations produce less resentful attitudes).

¹² Mediation and sensitivity analysis results calculated using the `mediation` R package (version 4.4.5) (Tingley et al. 2014) which follows Imai et al. (2011). Other approaches yield similar outcomes (Acharya, Blackwell and Sen 2016).

¹³ This item asks how favorable one feels toward Barack Obama, with responses recorded on 4-point scales ranging from very favorable to very unfavorable. I scale this to run 0-1 with higher values denoting more positive evaluations. Each are asked at $t - 1$.




Figure H.2: Sensitivity analyses for mediation results presented in Figure H.1.

At first glance these results suggest robustly estimated mediation effects for Obama evaluations. The bounds for unexplained variance (e.g., variation suggesting possible confounding as indicated by the limits of the contour lines) are relatively low, a trait Imai and colleagues (2011) note “indicates a more robust estimate of the ACME because there is less room for an unobserved confounder to bias the result” (777). Yet closer inspection reveals greater sensitivity. Relatively low levels of confounding actually switch the sign for the ACME. The top two panels, for example, indicate that if one or more unobserved variables explain over 10% of Obama evaluations and over 5% of racial attitudes or partisanship, then the ACMEs reported in Figure H.1 are incorrect. More generally, even small amounts of original variance explained

by confounders results in ACME estimates of 0 (from 0.2% to 0.5% depending on the model). How people evaluate Barack Obama may facilitate the relationship between racial attitudes and partisanship, but theoretical expectations and these results suggest there's much more to the story. Exploring possible mechanisms is certainly worth other work considering.

Appendix I: Alternative Operationalizations of Racial Attitudes

I report here additional analyses using alternative measures for racial attitudes. The first addresses racial group stereotypes. The 2006-08-10 General Social Survey (GSS) panel survey includes four items asking respondents if they thought whites and blacks “tend to be hard-working or if they tend to be lazy” and “tend to be unintelligent or tend to be intelligent,” with responses recorded on 7-point scales. Similarly, the 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES)’s online panel asked respondents if whites and blacks “in general” are hardworking or lazy, trustworthy or untrustworthy, and intelligent or unintelligent, with responses recorded on 0-100 scales.¹⁴ As with the group favorability items I take the difference between whites’ ratings of blacks and their ratings of whites to create 0-1 measures of endorsing anti-black stereotypes. I focus on the 2006-2010 waves for the GSS and waves 3 and 5 for the NAES (summer and winter 2008 respectively).¹⁵ Again, all observations come from non-Hispanic whites and given the GSS’s face-to-face interviews I focus only on those interviewed by a white or non-white interviewer in both 2006 and 2010.¹⁶

The first four columns in Table I.1 contain the results using stereotypes. They provide inconsistent evidence for a dynamic relationship between partisanship and group characterizations. Rather, the results offer more consistent evidence for the partisanship influence hypothesis. First, the GSS analyses demonstrate that partisanship does have a meaningful cross-lagged effect. Between 2006 and 2010 whites’ partisan ties motivate them to modify how much they negatively stereotype black Americans relative to white Americans ($\beta_1 = 0.025, p < 0.05$). At the same time, there’s no evidence that stereotypes motivated sorting in this period. Second, the NAES results similarly support partisanship as a causal force ($\beta_1 = 0.034, p < 0.05$). But here, evidence also supports those holding negative stereotypes of black Americans in summer 2008 diverging in their partisanship ($\alpha_2 = 0.107, p < 0.05$). While racial attitudes appear more influential here, this difference is quite overstated because it applies to the full range of the stereotype measure, a range anchored by under 1% of respondents. Racial attitudes implicates many fewer respondents than the 34% of whites identifying as strong partisans. Furthermore, results from models using standardized variables suggest that partisanship is twice as influential.

Finally, the fifth and sixth columns in Table I.1 address beliefs about interracial marriage. This item is frequently used to capture old fashion racism, a preference for social distance based on race (Tesler 2013).¹⁷ The results indicate that no dynamic relationship appears to exist between partisanship and in-marriage preference. Opposing interracial marriage is related to

¹⁴ The NAES sample came from Knowledge Networks’s Knowledge Panel with participants recruited by random-digit telephone dialing. If households lacked internet access they were provided it to participate in the panel. Unfortunately the NAES lacks any measure approximating racial resentment to which I can compare effects across racial attitude measures using the same respondents.

¹⁵ GSS₀₆: mean = 0.55, sd = 0.08. GSS₁₀: mean = 0.54, sd = 0.08. NAES_{wave3}: mean = 0.53, sd = 0.09. NAES_{wave5}: mean = 0.53, sd = 0.08.

¹⁶ After model diagnostics suggested misspecification (King and Roberts 2017), I transformed the NAES stereotype measure using a Box-Cox transformation to normalize each variable.

¹⁷ Specifically, this takes two items asking “How about having a close relative or family member marry a black/white person? Would you be very in favor of it happening, somewhat in favor, neither in favor nor opposed to it happening, somewhat opposed, or very opposed to it happening?” It’s coded such that 1 = strongly opposing someone marrying a black person and strongly favoring marrying a white person, and 0 = no in-marriage preference.

Table I.1: Relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Racial Attitudes

	GSS 2006-2010		2008 NAES (July-December)		GSS 2006-2010	
	Anti-Black Stereotypes _t	Partisanship _t	Anti-Black Stereotypes _t	Partisanship _t	Same-Race Marriage Preference _t	Partisanship _t
Partisanship _{t-1}	0.025* (0.012)	0.776* (0.034)	0.034* (0.007)	0.898* (0.009)	0.026 (0.022)	0.762* (0.034)
Anti-Black Stereotypes _{t-1}	0.309* (0.050)	0.078 (0.141)	0.415* (0.018)	0.107* (0.022)		
Same-Race Marriage Preference _{t-1}					0.584* (0.038)	0.143* (0.059)
Constant	0.357* (0.027)	0.067 (0.077)	-0.377* (0.012)	0.118* (0.015)	0.232* (0.027)	0.026 (0.042)
Observations	364	364	2,938	2,938	378	378
R ²	0.113	0.598	0.164	0.787	0.395	0.591
Residual Std. Error	0.073	0.206	0.022	0.146	0.137	0.208

Note: * $p < 0.05$. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.

party switching ($p < 0.05$), but partisanship has no relationship to in-marriage preferences.

Considered alongside the analyses from the main text, these results suggest that partisanship's influence on racial attitudes is not isolated to racial resentment or general group evaluations. It also shapes stereotypes. It does not, however, affect same-race marriage preferences. This mix of relationships appears to reflect patterns in the elite information environment where messages frequently relate to the themes of racial resentment (Haney López 2014; Engelhardt ND), occasionally implicate racial stereotypes (Dixon 2017), and do not appear to speak to old fashioned racist beliefs. That partisanship shapes multiple dimensions of racial animus (Kinder 2013) speaks to its influence in a party-centric political context.

I also consider here the subcomponents of the racial affect measure employed in the text. Jardina (2019) proposes that feeling thermometers can in part include ingroup affinity. Consequently, the differenced affect measure I employ includes both ingroup love and outgroup hate. Changes in ingroup favorability may then masquerade as outgroup animus according to the current metric if feelings about whites have some political origins but attitudes about blacks do not.

Tables I.2 and I.3 look at the relationship between partisanship and their feelings about whites and blacks, respectively. I reverse code the black favorability item so it runs in the direction of my hypotheses. As with the differenced affect measure, the estimates reveal no dynamic relationship between partisanship and group affect in the 1992-1994 ANES, a pattern that remains unchanged when not restricting the observations to those where the race of interviewer did not change across waves.

This changes in the 2000s data collections. I focus first on the results for white affect. The results in both the VOTER Survey and the 2016 CCAP support both the partisanship influence hypothesis and the racial attitude influence hypothesis accounts. White partisans' feelings about their racial ingroup increasingly polarize by party, with differences between 0.072 and 0.104 points on wave 2 favorability ratings ($p < 0.05$). Whites' ingroup feelings also motivate them to switch parties, but this appears more influential between December 2011 and December 2016 (0.056) than within the 2016 election itself (0.038). Finally, in both cases partisanship's influence is larger than white affect's, suggesting that attitude more than party

Table I.2: Relationship between Partisanship and White Affect

	ANES 1992-1994		VOTER Survey 2012-2016		CCAP 2016	
	White Affect	Partisanship	White Affect	Partisanship	White Affect	Partisanship
Partisanship _{t-1}	0.011 (0.020)	0.869* (0.027)	0.072* (0.007)	0.834* (0.008)	0.104* (0.007)	0.928* (0.004)
White Affect _{t-1}	0.401* (0.035)	0.021 (0.046)	0.425* (0.014)	0.056* (0.014)	0.412* (0.011)	0.038* (0.006)
Constant	0.410* (0.028)	0.066 (0.037)	0.382* (0.011)	0.061* (0.012)	0.379* (0.009)	0.011 (0.006)
Observations	577	577	5,722	5,722	8,120	8,120
R ²	0.188	0.648	0.165	0.686	0.186	0.851
Residual Std. Error	0.158	0.209	0.181	0.189	0.196	0.118

Note:*p<0.05. OLS regression results. Standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.

Table I.3: Relationship between Partisanship and Negative Black Affect

	ANES 1992-1994		VOTER Survey 2012-2016		CCAP 2016	
	Negative Black Affect	Partisanship	Negative Black Affect	Partisanship	Negative Black Affect	Partisanship
Partisanship _{t-1}	-0.016 (0.022)	0.868* (0.027)	0.074* (0.008)	0.836* (0.008)	0.058* (0.008)	0.929* (0.004)
Negative Black Affect _{t-1}	0.565* (0.040)	0.011 (0.048)	0.490* (0.012)	0.023* (0.011)	0.552* (0.009)	0.021* (0.005)
Constant	0.189* (0.019)	0.078* (0.024)	0.118* (0.006)	0.096* (0.006)	0.114* (0.005)	0.034* (0.003)
Observations	577	577	5,722	5,722	8,120	8,120
R ²	0.261	0.648	0.243	0.686	0.352	0.851
Residual Std. Error	0.172	0.209	0.201	0.189	0.212	0.118

Note:*p<0.05. OLS regression results. Standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.

switching does more to explain changes in the correlation here.¹⁸

The estimates in Table I.3 offer a similar picture. A dynamic relationship exists between negative attitudes about blacks and whites' partisanship in both the VOTER Survey and 2016 CCAP. Further, the estimates again suggest partisanship is relatively more influential than racial attitudes.¹⁹

Further, comparing across affect measures, the relationship between group ratings and partisanship does not seem to consistently favor partisanship's effects as asymmetrically influencing ingroup or outgroup evaluations. In 2016 partisanship's effect on white affect is nearly twice its effect on black affect, which is suggestive of partisans responding to the political context. Accounts of the 2016 election suggest a rise of white identity politics (Sides, Tesler and Vavreck 2018), with available information potentially contributing to attitudes about outgroups, as I argue is possible, and also possible altering ingroup commitment (Jardina 2019).

¹⁸The differences in coefficient estimates presented in Table I.2 is only reliable in the CCAP data. When using standardized variables the differences increase, with partisanship's relationship with white affect measured later yielding a larger relationship.

¹⁹As with the results for evaluations of whites, the differences in coefficient estimates are more reliably estimated in the CCAP data. The VOTER survey approaches significance ($p < 0.07$, one-tailed). Standardizing the variables, however, magnifies the differences between each, with partisanship's influence greater than negative black affect.

Appendix J: Alternative Operationalization of Partisanship

In two data sets I generate substitute measures of partisanship employing differenced feeling thermometers. This new measure offers additional variation, potentially overcoming limitations from using the traditional 7-point branched ANES measure. Higher values on the outcome denote greater relative favorability for Republicans over Democrats, mirroring in part an attachment to the Republican Party. The results in Table J.1 below demonstrates that this alternative measure of partisanship still shapes racial attitudes.

Table J.1: Relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Racial Resentment. Alternative Partisanship Operationalization.

	ANES 1992-1994		CCAP 2016	
	Racial Resentment _t	Relative Republican Favorability _t	Racial Resentment _t	Relative Republican Favorability _t
Relative Republican Favorability _{t-1}	0.112* (0.037)	0.713* (0.030)	0.110* (0.006)	0.810* (0.007)
Racial Resentment _{t-1}	0.596* (0.030)	0.108* (0.024)	0.777* (0.007)	0.107* (0.007)
Constant	0.210* (0.024)	0.116* (0.020)	0.065* (0.004)	0.052* (0.004)
Observations	574	574	8,116	8,116
R ²	0.436	0.534	0.727	0.732
Residual Std. Error	0.158	0.127	0.138	0.148

Note: *p<0.05. OLS regression results. Standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses employ population weights.

Appendix K: Examining Political Awareness’s Moderating Effect Using Group Affect

Table K.1: Political Awareness’s Moderating Effect on the relationship between Whites’ Partisanship and Affect Differential

	1992-1994 ANES				2012-2016 VOTER Survey			
	Low Awareness		High Awareness		Low Awareness		High Awareness	
	Affect Difference _t	Partisanship _t	Affect Difference _t	Partisanship _t	Affect Difference _t	Partisanship _t	Affect Difference _t	Partisanship _t
Partisanship _{t-1}	-0.017 (0.022)	0.774* (0.051)	0.018 (0.012)	0.909* (0.031)	0.056* (0.007)	0.800* (0.012)	0.085* (0.006)	0.878* (0.009)
Affect Difference _{t-1}	0.739* (0.070)	0.035 (0.158)	0.469* (0.043)	0.060 (0.108)	0.515* (0.018)	0.159* (0.034)	0.618* (0.019)	-0.032 (0.030)
Constant	0.176* (0.041)	0.087 (0.094)	0.270* (0.024)	0.039 (0.060)	0.230* (0.011)	0.045* (0.021)	0.132* (0.011)	0.078* (0.016)
Observations	194	194	383	383	2,573	2,573	2,689	2,689
R ²	0.377	0.551	0.249	0.693	0.266	0.625	0.368	0.775
Residual Std. Error	0.100	0.226	0.079	0.199	0.115	0.219	0.096	0.148

Note: *p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.

The results in Table K.1 replicate the main text analysis exploring political awareness’s conditioning role but using the affect operationalization for racial attitudes. The results offer similar insights. As with the main results using this operationalization, little dynamic relationship exists between partisanship and racial attitudes in the 1990s, and this holds for both the most and least aware (again defined here as those scoring at or above, or below, the median of political awareness in each data set).

The remaining columns reinforce the main text conclusions that changes in the political context can make partisanship a causal force and that this appears to come from people responding to the information environment. The results again show that partisanship motivates attitude change, but the politically aware change the most. The main text results extend to an additional dimension of racial animus. Where things do change is in racial attitudes’ effect on party switching. Here, the least politically aware were the most likely to adopt new party loyalties to fit with their racial attitudes. The more negatively they felt about blacks relative to whites, the more they identified as Republicans ($\hat{\alpha}_2 = 0.159$, $p < 0.05$). The results do not offer any evidence that the most aware switched parties between 2012 and 2016 ($\hat{\alpha}_2 = -0.032$, $p > 0.1$). This divergence across dimensions suggests that group affect may be more readily mapped on to the political system for the less politically aware.

Appendix L: Replicating the Main Analyses with an Alternative Analytic Strategy

An additional procedure for evaluating causal patterns comes from Miller (1999). This method classifies individuals based on whether they are located consistently on predisposition measures across survey waves, or whether one or both predispositions of interest change over time. From there, causal patterns can be identified by looking at the percentage of individuals who change one predisposition to align with its partner in a proposed relationship. The distribution of cases among these categories helps shed light on plausible patterns of causation, and suggests the dominant causal direction in a given time period. Here, I look at the percentage of individuals who remain at the same level of partisanship and change their racial attitudes in a congruent direction (e.g., more racially sympathetic for Democrats) and the percentage of individuals at the same level of racial resentment (reduced here to a 6-category scale to address potential measurement error issues) who change their party attachments in a congruent direction (e.g., more Republican for racially resentful individuals).²⁰ When added together these cases provide the total percentage of respondents available for identifying a causal relationship, and they can be used to explore the more influential part of a predisposition (e.g., more Republicans change their racial attitudes than Democrats).

The results from this exercise, reported in Table L.1, reinforce the conclusions from the cross-lagged analyses that partisanship exerts a causal force on racial attitudes, and that this influence is relatively greater in recent years when compared to the 1990s. First, in the 1992-1994 ANES data, some 28% of cases allow for determining whether partisanship or racial resentment is a causal force. Within this set, half of these causal cases support partisanship, while the other half support racial attitudes. Further, Republicans become more racially resentful at a rate slightly greater than Democrats become more racially sympathetic (rate = 1.19:1). Racially resentful individuals, those scoring above the scale's midpoint, are also twice as likely to become more attached to the Republican Party than racially sympathetic individuals decrease their attachments to the same (1.96:1).²¹ This procedure therefore helps shed light on where most of the causal action is occurring in the 1990s by revealing that more change occurs among Republicans and the racially resentful.

Turning to the 2008 election and the CCAP data, much the same pattern holds. Between March and October, some 23% of cases can identify causal patterns. In contrast to the 1990s, though, party loyalties matter much more than racial attitudes. Over three times as many whites bring their racial attitudes into alignment with their partisan ties than vice versa (3.6:1). Of these cases where causal leverage can be attributed to partisanship, Democrats are moderately more likely than Republicans to change their racial attitudes (1.25:1). Racially resentful whites are also twice as likely to express greater identification with the Republican Party than their racially sympathetic counterparts do with the Democratic Party (2:1). Like the 1992-1994

²⁰ Changing the number of categories does shape the picture presented, but do not change the substantive results. Analyses using fewer categories make racial attitudes seem more stable, but still present a substantively similar picture as those presented here. More categories do much more to privilege partisanship in the relationship. By focusing on fewer categories I present a more stringent test of my hypotheses, and still observe the proposed relationship.

²¹ Changes in party attachments can include reducing one's attachment to the same party (e.g., strong to weak Republican) or switching to another category entirely (e.g., pure independent to lean Republican).

Table L.1: Distribution of Cases featuring Partisanship or Racial Attitudes as a Plausible Cause

Causal Forces		1992-1994 ANES	2008 CCAP	2012 CCAP: March	2012 CCAP: August	2012-2016 VOTER Survey	2016 CCAP
Partisanship Updating Racial Attitudes	Democrats	6%	10%	9%	10%	13%	8%
	Republicans	8%	8%	9%	9%	8%	8%
	Total	14%	18%	18%	19%	21%	16%
Racial Attitudes Updating Partisanship	Racially Resentful	9%	4%	3%	4%	6%	3%
	Racially Sympathetic	5%	2%	1%	2%	2%	2%
	Total	14%	5%	4%	6%	8%	5%
Causal total		28%	23%	22%	25%	29%	22%

ANES results, those with more negative racial attitudes provide more of the causal force. But in contrast to these results, partisanship causes a greater share of predisposition change than do racial attitudes, and among these cases Democrats appear more influential.

These patterns are remarkably similar when moving to the 2012 CCAP. For the March reinterviews, 22% of cases allow for plausibly identifying racial attitudes or partisanship as a cause and partisanship matters much more. This increases to 25% for the August group. For both sets of respondents, about four times as many whites update their racial attitudes as alter their partisan allegiances. Moreover, Republicans and Democrats are about equally likely to change their attitudes. When considering those updating their partisan ties, the racially resentful are more likely to weaken their attachments to, or abandon, the Democratic Party than the racially sympathetic are to change their loyalties to the Democratic Party. But this is more common among the March reinterview group than the August pool.

These trends persist when looking at changes between 2012 and 2016. Some 29% of cases can be used to identify causal patterns, and 72% of these speak to partisanship's influence. Some 21% of respondents align their racial attitudes with their party loyalties, and these patterns favor Democrats. Only 8% of cases support racial attitudes having any influence. But of these, the racially resentful are thrice as likely as the racially sympathetic to modify their party loyalties to fit with their racial attitudes.

Finally, the 2016 CCAP data extend these patterns. Some 22% of cases allow for identifying causal patterns, and over three-fourths of these implicate partisanship. Within this group, partisans are indistinguishable. And again, the racially resentful are slightly more likely to change their party loyalties than are the racially sympathetic (1.5:1).

Using a different analytical strategy I again demonstrate that partisanship can change racial attitudes, and that this is more likely in a party-centric political context. What's more, this procedure also sheds light on who is most likely to update their racial attitudes or their partisanship. No partisan group seems especially prone to updating their attitudes, but if anything Democrats are unique. But racially resentful individuals are somewhat more likely to align their party loyalties appropriately than racially sympathetic individuals are to update theirs.

Table M.1: Average Levels of Racial Resentment by Party for Consistent Partisans

	CCAP 2008		CCAP 2012			VSG 2012-2016		CCAP 2016		
	March	October	December - March	December - August	2012	2016	June	Nov-Dec		
Democrats	0.53	0.52	0.53	0.53	0.55	0.53	0.50	0.41	0.40	0.39
Republicans	0.79	0.80	0.80	0.82	0.76	0.79	0.78	0.79	0.73	0.72

Note: Non-Hispanic white respondents completing both waves and not changing parties. Weighted results.

Appendix M: Party Differences in Attitude Change

Here I report additional results speaking to the possibility of differential attitude change. Table L.1 showed that observations where partisanship is a plausible cause do not disproportionately favor either party. Table M.1 provides average levels of racial resentment by party for Whites whose partisanship does not change across time. Strength of attachment can change between leaning, weak, or strong partisans so long as the category itself remains consistent. They offer mixed evidence for whether Democrats or Republicans are changing more as this varies over time. Between 2008 and 2012, Whites in both parties change to largely similar degrees. But after 2012, Democrats exhibit much more change than Republicans. Paired with the evidence from Table L.1, it may be that while the number of Republicans and Democrats changing attitudes is similar, Democrats who did change their attitudes did so to a greater degree.

I also assess changes using linear models. I relate wave 2 racial attitudes to wave 1 partisanship, but here I use the 3 category version used to provide group means. To assess relative magnitudes of change I use pure Independents as a comparison category. Such comparisons may be imprecise if Independents trend with either Democrats or Republicans. If so, then estimates about whether Democrats or Republicans are changing more will be muddled because the reference category changes concurrently. Even so, as less politically engaged individuals Independents' racial attitudes are likely least susceptible to change in the way I argue is possible. Further, if partisans are responding to the information environment, then using Independents as a baseline seems reasonable because their attitudes potentially relate more directly to a baseline information stream. If Democrats' attitudes diverge more than Republicans, then novel information may disproportionately emphasize structural barriers to black success and positive information about the group. If Republicans' attitudes diverge more, then their information stream disproportionately features negative information about blacks. At the very least these analyses speak to whether Democrats' or Republicans' subsequent racial attitudes are unique relative Independents'.

I present the results from these analyses in Table M.2. The estimates consistently point to Democrats as the most distinct group. In all cases Democrats' and Republicans' subsequent racial attitudes are distinguishable from one another ($p < 0.05$). Relative to Independents, Democrats are also unique in each data collection but the 1992-1994 ANES. Average differences here range between -0.046 and -0.099 points. Republicans, in contrast, only diverge from Independents in 3 data collections, with differences between 0.020 and 0.041 points. This evidence suggests that both Democrats' and Republicans' attitudes are changing. Further, if asymmetries in change exist, the evidence presented here suggests it may be Democrats driving this more than Republicans.

Table M.2: Relationship between Partisanship and Racial Resentment

	ANES 1992-1994	CCAP 2008	CCAP 2012: March	CCAP 2012: August	2012-2016 VOTER Survey	CCAP 2016
Democrat _{t-1}	-0.029 (0.022)	-0.063* (0.006)	-0.060* (0.018)	-0.099* (0.022)	-0.082* (0.007)	-0.046* (0.005)
Republican _{t-1}	0.006 (0.022)	0.020* (0.006)	0.009 (0.018)	0.007 (0.021)	0.041* (0.007)	0.022* (0.004)
Racial Resentment _{t-1}	0.594* (0.030)	0.735* (0.007)	0.805* (0.026)	0.775* (0.025)	0.825* (0.011)	0.787* (0.007)
Constant	0.277* (0.028)	0.193* (0.007)	0.162* (0.022)	0.198* (0.026)	0.098* (0.010)	0.124* (0.005)
Observations	592	8,866	693	721	6,014	8,116
R ²	0.426	0.661	0.689	0.676	0.617	0.725
Residual Std. Error	0.158	0.147	0.147	0.143	0.178	0.138

Note: *p<0.05. OLS regression results. Standard errors in parentheses. Pure Independents are the reference category.

Appendix N: Measurement Invariance of Racial Resentment

It could be the case that comparing the 1990s and the 2000s is complicated by changes in the political context separate from partisanship’s increased relevance. Importantly, changes may introduce social desirability pressures which affect how people report their racial attitudes. Responses to the racial resentment items, for instance, may now contain both racial resentment the attitude but also presentational concerns. These additional considerations then affect the relationship between observed partisanship and racial attitudes.

One piece of evidence suggests that how attitudes are expressed does not appear to be changing in ways that affect observed relationships. The results from the General Social Survey panel presented in Table G.2 are consistent with my claim that changes in political context allow for partisanship to shape racial attitudes, albeit with a different operationalization of racial resentment. Further, the GSS conducted face-to-face interviews, removing the possibility that changes in the relationship between racial attitudes and partisanship over time conflate changes in mode with changes in political context.

To offer a more direct test, if changes in political context introduced new social desirability concerns, then responses to face-to-face surveys should look different from responses completed online in the latter time period. To test this I use the 2016 ANES which used a similar sampling frame to select respondents to its web and face-to-face surveys which allows for as similar as possible mode comparison without explicit random assignment of participants to mode. With these data I use a confirmatory factor analysis procedure which assesses changes in model fit between three nested models (Brown 2015; Wicherts and Dolan 2010, see Davidov 2009 and Pérez and Hetherington 2014 for political science applications of this approach). The first model estimates a factor model for racial resentment allowing all parameters to vary by mode. This tests configural invariance which requires all four racial resentment items capture the same dimension. The second constrains each item’s factor loading to be the same by mode. This tests metric invariance and establishes whether the factors have the same meaning. If this second model fits worse than the first model, then racial resentment’s meaning varies by mode. The final model constrains item intercepts to equality across groups. If this third model fits worse than the second model, then group-specific factor(s) are affecting item responses (Wicherts and Dolan 2010), for instance social desirability pressures.

Conventionally, a significant change in χ^2 values between sequential models is used as evidence against invariance (Brown 2015). But most recommendations recommend evaluating

Table N.1: Measurement Invariance of Racial Resentment by Mode

	χ^2	CFI	SRMR	RMSEA	$\Delta\chi^2$	$\Delta\chi^2$ p-value	Δ CFI	Δ SRMR	Δ RMSEA
Configural	1.53	1.000	0.001	0.000					
Metric	15.2	0.998	0.022	0.039	13.7	<0.01	-0.002	0.021	0.039
Scalar	31.5	0.995	0.030	0.047	16.3	<0.01	-0.003	0.008	0.008
Scalar (Partial)	19.8	0.997	0.028	0.037	4.64	<0.10	-0.001	0.006	-0.002

Note: The configural model freely estimates item loadings using the *deserve less* item to define the dimensions. The metric model constrains item loadings to equality. The scalar model constrains item intercepts. The scalar (partial) model frees the intercept for *past discrimination*. Data from the 2016 ANES. One residual correlation estimated between *try hard* and *special favors*.

multiple measures of model fit (Chen 2007). Consequently, I look at changes in χ^2 as well as changes in the comparative fit index (CFI), standardized root mean square residual (SRMR), and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA).

I present the model fit estimates in Table N.1. They offer no evidence that racial resentment’s meaning varies by mode, suggesting whites’ responses to the racial resentment items are not contaminated by social desirability concerns. While there is a significant change in χ^2 imposing the factor equality constraints, the patterns of change in the CFI, SRMR, and RMSEA do not suggest violations of measure invariance (Chen 2007). The change in CFI of -0.002 is below the recommended level of -0.005. By not passing Chen’s (2007) first condition, that the change in the RMSEA of 0.039 does surpass the 0.010 recommended does not suggest an invariance violation. RMSEA is sensitive to sample size and the change in the SRMR is below the recommended level of 0.025 (Chen 2007).

The test of scalar invariance, which speaks to the potential for social desirability concerns shaping how whites respond to the racial resentment items, offers a similar picture. While a significant change in χ^2 exists when imposing the intercept equality constraints, the changes in CFI and RMSEA do not suggest a meaningful change in model fit. Here suggested benchmarks are -0.005 for the CFI and either 0.010 for the RMSEA or 0.005 for the SRMR (Chen 2007).

To address any additional concerns with declines in fit for this test, I also offer evidence that the racial resentment measure meets partial scalar invariance by mode. This minimum standard establishes construct comparability across groups with at least one item in addition to the anchor item constrained to equality across groups (Byrne, Shavelson and Muthen 1989; Brown 2015). The final row in Table N.1 allows the intercept for *past discrimination* to vary by mode and doing so produces a model whose fit is not reliably different from the metric model.

This evidence thus does not suggest social desirability or similar concerns appreciably affect how whites respond to the racial resentment items. The meaning of the racial resentment items does not vary by mode, nor do these groups bring to bear additional considerations when responding to the items. In the context of the present analyses, changes in the relationship between partisanship and racial resentment appear to relate more to changes in attitudes rather than changes in how these attitudes are expressed.²²

An additional test considers face-to-face interviews in the ANES but compares responses across years. If social desirability concerns shape how whites express their racial attitudes,

²²Additional analyses offer no evidence that partisans are differentially affected. Comparing mode effects within party yields at least partial scalar invariance freeing the intercepts for *past discrimination* for Republicans or *special favors* for Democrats.

Table N.2: Measurement Invariance of Racial Resentment Over Time

	χ^2	CFI	SRMR	RMSEA	$\Delta\chi^2$	$\Delta\chi^2$ p-value	Δ CFI	Δ SRMR	Δ RMSEA
Configural	3.81	0.999	0.005	0.027					
Metric	8.56	0.999	0.019	0.024	4.74	>0.10	-0.001	0.014	-0.003
Scalar	119.90	0.962	0.055	0.107	111.34	<0.001	-0.037	0.036	0.083
Scalar (Partial)	11.66	0.998	0.021	0.028	3.10	<0.08	-0.001	0.002	0.004

Note: The configural model freely estimates item loadings using the *past discrimination* item to define the dimensions. The metric model constrains item loadings to equality. The scalar model constrains item intercepts. The scalar (partial) model frees the intercepts for *try hard* and *special favors*. Data from the 1992 and 2016 ANES. One residual correlation estimated between *try hard* and *special favors*.

then this should introduce error into the measures comparing the 1990s and 2000s. To test this, I use data from the 1992 and 2016 ANES surveys, focusing on face-to-face interviews. The test remains the same as with the mode analysis.

The model fit estimates, presented in Table N.2 offer no evidence that racial resentment’s meaning varies across surveys. As with the mode analyses, while there is a significant change in χ^2 imposing the factor equality constraints, the patterns of change in the CFI, SRMR, and RMSEA do not suggest invariance (Chen 2007). Neither the CFI, SRMR, or RMSEA display changes that pass benchmarks suggesting the items violate the equality of meaning requirement.

The first test of scalar invariance is not satisfied, however. There is a significant change in χ^2 as well as changes in the CFI, SRMR, and RMSEA that surpass suggested benchmarks. This suggests that some unobserved factor that differs between respondents in 1992 and 2016 is affecting responses to the items. But the racial resentment items meet partial scalar invariance by freely estimating *special favors* and *try hard*, as the fourth row shows. This is a sufficient condition for comparing the measure temporally without concern that additional considerations like social desirability concerns are shaping responses (Byrne, Shavelson and Muthen 1989; Brown 2015).²³

²³Looking only at Democrats or Republicans yields the same pattern: partial scalar invariance by freeing *special favors* and *try hard*.

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