

Supplementary Appendix

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A Pre-analysis plan

The pre-analysis plan (PAP) for this project is available at: <http://egap.org/registration/2565>. The PAP comprises an initial submission and two addenda. For transparency, we itemize alignment between the published paper and the PAP, and the deviations from the registered plan.

- All approaches to aggregating data, specifying the statistical model, and coding the independent variable are as pre-registered.
- The NVMS violence measures were pre-registered. The PODES violence measures were pre-registered in the second addendum, after we had seen the results from NVMS (though see below).
- The intolerance outcomes (see main paper, Table 2 and Figure 1) were not pre-registered. We were unaware of the existence of these data until late in the project. The analyses of the impact of Islamist incumbency on expressions of intolerance are thus an unregistered extension of the original investigation.
- Apart from the balance tests, none of the additional analyses provided in the paper’s online appendix were pre-registered. Most were generated in response to reviewer comments and suggestions.
- Two sets of secondary analyses discussed in the initial pre-analysis plan are not presented: those that include *Islamic* parties in the coding of the independent variable (see initial PAP, middle of p.10, bullet point 2) and those that assess results for three dependent variables that rely on a more expansive definition of religious violence (*NVM_Violence_2_count*, *NVM_Violence_3_count*, and *NVM_Violence_4_count* and their dichotomized versions, described as *NVM_Violence_2_binary*, *NVM_Violence_3_binary*, and *NVM_Violence_4_binary*; see initial PAP, pp. 6–7). Fully combining all of these analyses and outcomes yields a very large number of potential models. In retrospect, we regretted having specified so many. We thus took the decision to present only results for the primary estimations. Importantly, these specifications are explicitly described as primary in the PAP.
- The second addendum was motivated by an erroneous initial conclusion. The second addendum begins: “In our initial pre-analysis plan, we prespecified a set of tests to identify the effect of the election of an Islamist-party legislator at the DPRD-II level in Indonesia on subsequent levels of religious violence in the precinct they represent ... Across a range of specifications, we find that the election of an additional Islamist party legislator within a DPRDII precinct had no measurable effect on religious conflict.” This latter claim turned out to be erroneous. As discussed in the published paper, we do find significant results on deaths in the NVMS analysis. We had failed to explore the results on deaths when we wrote the second addendum and had focused only on violence incidents. The change in substantive conclusions brought on by the (pre-registered) deaths analysis obviates the additional analyses described in the second addendum, which were premised on there being a null result across pre-registered outcome measures. That said, we have retained the additional analysis of the PODES outcomes described in the second addendum. As we read more of the literature on violence in Indonesia over the course of the project, we encountered the widespread use of this violence metric. In light of this fact, we came to view estimations using the PODES outcomes as an important check on the NVMS results.

B Unit of analysis

B.1 Aggregation

The treatment variables are collected at the level of the DPRD-II constituency (*daerah pemilihan*). Constituencies are purely political entities, which means they are not referenced in the administrative and survey datasets we use in our analyses. This complicates the task of merging the data since the NVMS, PODES, and IFLS geo-tag data at the *kecamatan* (sub-district) and/or village level. To map these data onto our units of analysis (constituencies), we take advantage of the fact that *kecamatan* are perfectly nested within DPRD-II constituencies. Official maps published by the Indonesian Election Commission allow us to assign complete *kecamatan* to DPRD-II constituencies in all cases.

A further complication is that the number of *kecamatan* increased significantly over the period we investigate. We constructed a crosswalk that tracks all *kecamatan* splits that took place between 2003 and 2014. For outcomes used in the 2004–09 election cycle, we aggregate outcomes (e.g. violence counts or individual survey responses) to the *kecamatan* as they existed in 2004; in the same way, for outcomes used in the 2009–14 election cycle, we aggregate outcomes to the *kecamatan* as they existed in 2009.

B.2 Clustering

We observe sets of constituencies and their corresponding outcomes over two periods. Given the cross-sectional time-series nature of the dataset, there is a possibility of serial correlation in the error terms within geographic units over time. This argues in favor of clustering standard errors by geographic unit. In our application, this would ideally be the DPRD-II constituency: our unit of analysis and the unit of “treatment” assignment. However, a large number of constituency boundaries changed between 2004 and 2009. Therefore, we instead cluster standard errors by *constituency-cluster*. This is the smallest amalgamation of constituencies that remained geographically constant over the 2004 and 2009 election cycles. To illustrate, if a constituency’s boundaries were unchanged 2004 and 2009, then the *constituency-cluster* is comprised of only that constituency. Say, however, that two neighboring constituencies in 2004 were both partitioned prior to the 2009 elections, and two of the broken-off parts were fused to create a third constituency. In this case, the *constituency-cluster* would consist of the original two constituencies in 2004, and then three constituencies in 2009: the two partitioned “parent” constituencies, and the newly formed “child” constituency. Thus, even though constituency boundaries have changed over time, the *constituency-cluster* boundaries remain stable.

C Data and measurement

C.1 “Treatment” indicator

We compiled constituency-level DPRD-II electoral returns for the 2004 and 2009 elections. To do this, we took copies of the original returns archived at the Election Commission of Indonesia (KPU) in Jakarta. We then had these copies digitized by a team of online workers recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform. The returns tally the number of votes by party for each constituency. We next merged lists of the number of seats (i.e. the magnitude) for each constituency. Many of the official returns recorded only vote totals—not the final seat allocations by party. In these cases, since we knew the exact procedure for translating votes into seats (see below), we were still able to back out the number of seats secured by Islamist-party and secular nationalist-party legislators in the constituency. The data are available for the whole country for both elections, barring only a few constituencies where official data were incomplete.

We construct a “treatment” variable, which is a binary indicator denoting whether an Islamist party won (1) or lost (0) the last allocated seat by less than 1 percent of the total vote against a secular nationalist party.¹ Clearly, this requires that we define which parties are “Islamist” and “secular nationalist.” We performed this classification prior to carrying out data cleaning and analysis. In classifying each party, we relied on a peculiarity of the Indonesian electoral system, whereby parties are required to declare a “foundational ideology,” known as an *azas*. Parties in 2004 and 2009 declared one of two foundational ideologies: *pancasila* or Islam. We classify those parties that take Islam as their foundational ideology as “Islamist.” We classify parties that take *pancasila* as their foundational ideology as “secular nationalist.” We identify a third type of party—what we term “Islam-based parties”—that nominally take *pancasila* as their foundational ideology, but have their roots in mass-based Islamic organizations. Ex ante, we took the decision to omit these parties from all analyses, since their position with respect to divisive political matters is ambiguous. Note that our tripartite coding of parties hews closely to the one employed in prior work on Indonesia’s party system (e.g. [Pepinsky, Liddle and Mujani \(2012\)](#)).

¹The choice of 1 percent was defined in our pre-analysis plan.


In identifying the foundational ideology of each party, we relied on an almanac of Indonesian political parties (Nainggolan and Wahyu 2016). SA Table C1 indicates which parties were classified in the different categories.

Table C1: Major Political Parties by Type (2004-2014)

<i>Type of Party:</i>				
	Secular nationalist		Islam-based	Islamist
2004	PDI-P	PKPI	PKB	PPP
	Golkar	Patriot	PAN	PKS
	Demokrat	Pelopor	PPNUI	PBB
	PKPB	Merdeka		PBR
	PDS	PSI		
	PPDK	Bantaeng		
	Marhaenisme	PPDI		
	PP-Daerah	Buruh		
	Secular nationalist		Islam-based	Islamist
2009	PDI-P	PKPI	PKB	PPP
	Golkar	Patriot	PAN	PKS
	Demokrat	Pelopor	PPNUI	PBB
	PKPB	Merdeka	PKNU	PBR
	PDS	PSI	PMB	
	PPDK	Bantaeng		
	Marhaenisme	PPDI		
	PP-Daerah	Buruh		
	Hanura	Kedaulatan		
	Gerindra	Pemuda		
	Aceh	PPIB		
	PPRN	PRN		
	PDP	PKDI		
	PPPI	PIS		
	PDP			

As we note in the main text, Islamists hold 15 percent of constituency seats in the control condition and 29 percent of the seats in the treatment condition. In SA Figure C1, we show how the distribution of Islamist seat shares (at the constituency level) appears across the two conditions. The large rightward shift induced by the “treatment” (upper panel) is clearly in evidence across the range of the distribution.

Figure C1: First Stage, Histogram



C.2 Dependent variables

C.2.1 Violence outcomes

We measure religious violence using two different data sources, described below. We pre-registered our primary definitions of religious violence, based on the codebooks supplied with the original data. For both data sources, we generated four variables:

- A count of events of religious violence over the five-year legislative term
- A dichotomous variable for whether any such violence took place over the five-year legislative term
- A count of deaths caused by religious violence over the five-year legislative term
- A dichotomous variable for whether any deaths caused by religious violence took place over the five-year legislative term

Dataset 1: National Violence Monitoring System. The National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS) was a project undertaken by the World Bank in Indonesia (Barron, Jaffrey and Varshney 2016). A team of research assistants was tasked with hand-coding newspaper reports of violent incidents. They relied on a wide selection of national and regional newspapers. For each reported incident, they recorded its apparent cause, its severity, the actors involved, its location, and its duration.

While valuable, the NVMS dataset has three limitations. First, prior to 2013, it only recorded violence in 18 provinces with a known history of conflict; roughly half of Indonesia’s provinces are thus excluded from the dataset. Second, it captures several types of violence—not only religious violence. After careful reading of the codebook, we pre-specified that we would count an incident reported in NVMS as an instance of religious conflict if either its cause, or the primary actors involved, were cited as religious. Third, this data relies on newspaper sources that are located in major cities, which may lead to a reporting bias that undercounts rural areas.

Our coding of religious violence (for the NVMS variables) includes the following event categories listed in the NVMS dataset:

- 4404: “Inter-religious Violence triggered by disputes between members of different religious groups”
- 4405: “Intra-religious Violence triggered by disputes over interpretation within a religion (e.g. between sects)”
- Either “actor 1” or “actor 2” is a religious group, i.e. “affiliated with particular religious groups including religious mass organizations”

Dataset 2: PODES. For a second measure of religious conflict, we use the Village Potential Survey (PODES). This is a census of all village chiefs in Indonesia, taken every three years. Included within the survey is a battery of questions regarding the incidence of communal violence over the past year. We take these measures from the 2008 and 2014 surveys, corresponding to the 2004 and 2009 electoral cycles, respectively. One major advantage PODES has over NVMS is that the survey was performed as a census across all villages in Indonesia. Using the PODES data, therefore, we can conduct analyses on constituencies across all 33 Indonesian provinces.

Village chiefs reported (1) whether or not communal violence had occurred in the village during the past year, (2) how deadly that violence was, and (3) what was its cause. PODES classifies

violence based on combatants: (a) citizens vs. citizens, (b) village vs. village, (c) citizens vs. police, (d) citizens vs. government, (e) students vs. students, or (f) inter-ethnic conflict. We restrict our analysis to those incidents that *did not* involve either the police or the government (i.e. we exclude (c) and (d) from the list above), since these might capture efforts to mitigate the violence in which we are interested. PODES also classifies the causes of violence. We focus on violence with the following purported cause: “differences in ideology or faith.”

We note two shortcomings associated with the PODES data. First, these questions were only posed to village heads, who may be motivated to misreport instances of such violence (e.g. because violent outbreaks reflect poorly on their competence). Second, PODES also only provides data on violence for one year out of the five-year legislative term.

C.2.2 Tolerance outcomes

We also assess how Islamist representation shapes attitudes toward religious minorities. To do this, we use the fourth and fifth rounds of the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) conducted by the RAND Corporation in partnership with a local firm, Survey Meter. The surveys were carried out face-to-face in 2007 and 2014. The IFLS is a longitudinal household survey that has been conducted five times since 1993. Given its longitudinal structure, the households in IFLS-4 and IFLS-5 are the same as those originally sampled in IFLS-1. The original IFLS-1 sample was rolled out in 13 of the then 26 provinces of Indonesia, representing 83 percent of the total population. Within each of the 13 provinces, enumeration areas were randomly selected using those populated from the 1991 SUSENAS survey. Within each enumeration area, households were randomly drawn from the list of respondents to the SUSENAS survey. In IFLS-4, there were 44,103 respondents and in IFLS-5 there were 50,580 respondents.

Both surveys (IFLS-4 and IFLS-5) posed questions about attitudes toward religious minority groups: “How would you feel if ...”

- (A) “someone with a different faith from you lives in your village?”
- (B) “someone with a different faith from you lives in your neighborhood?”
- (C) “someone with a different faith from you rents a room from you?”
- (D) “someone with a different faith from you held a religious event nearby?”
- (E) “someone with a different faith from you built a place of worship nearby?”

There were four response options:

- (1) “No objection at all”
- (2) “No objection”
- (3) “Object”
- (4) “Strongly object”

In addition to using these raw outcomes measures, we also generate three index measures for the analysis:

- (Mean) Average of respondents answers to questions A–E (above), on the original 4-point scale
- (All) 1 if respondent answered “strongly object” to all five questions; 0 otherwise

(Any) 1 if respondent answered “strongly object” to any of the five questions; 0 otherwise

These surveys also indicate whether another person was present in the room besides the respondent and interviewer (yes/no) at the time of the interview.

In our analyses, we analyze only responses from respondents who report themselves to be Muslim—i.e. majority-group citizens. We collapse survey responses within a constituency by taking the mean (unweighted) across each measure.

C.3 Descriptive statistics

Table C2: Descriptive Statistics (Dependent Variables)

Variable	min	max	mean	sd	N
NVMS Count	0	14	0.307	1.165	466
NVMS (Binary)	0	1	0.150	0.358	466
NVMS Deaths	0	7	0.021	0.334	466
NVMS Deaths (Binary)	0	1	0.009	0.092	466
PODES Count	0	7	0.047	0.389	719
PODES Deaths	0	1	0.004	0.065	719
PODES (Binary)	0	1	0.024	0.152	719
PODES Deaths (Binary)	0	1	0.004	0.065	719
% Villages add security guard	0	1	0.507	0.263	706
% Villages add security post	0	1	0.574	0.268	706
% villages add civil defense force	0	1	0.284	0.214	706
Security index	-1.732	2.339	0.063	0.840	706
Intolerance: other religion live in village	1	3.154	2.181	0.295	348
Intolerance: other religion is neighbor	1	4	2.218	0.331	348
Intolerance: other religion rents room	1.667	4	2.593	0.409	348
Intolerance: other religion marries child	2	4	3.314	0.416	348
Intolerance: other religion building	1.500	4	2.742	0.487	348
Intolerance: mean of 5 item	1.800	3.800	2.610	0.300	348


D Balance tests

The key assumption of our identification strategy is that the allocation of the final seat within a constituency—if narrowly contested between an Islamist and secular nationalist party—is as-if randomly assigned. We pre-specified “narrowly contested” to mean those races in which the difference in total vote-share between the last winner and the first loser was less than 1 percent. To evaluate the validity of this assumption, we conduct six sets of tests.

D.1 Probability of win

Recall we estimate the effect of Islamist party incumbency only using cases in which the two parties contesting the final seat are Islamist and secular nationalist. If the allocation of seats in such races is as good as random, then the probability of Islamist victory should be statistically indistinguishable from 0.5. SA Figure D1 shows the results of exact binomial tests that examine whether the probability of Islamist victory differs from the probability of obtaining 0.5 for bandwidths ranging from 0 percent to 6.5 percent of the total vote. For our estimation sample (races contested by less than 1 percent of total votes), we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the rate at which Islamists win such races is statistically equivalent to a fair coin flip.

Figure D1: Exact Binomial Test: $pr(\text{IslamistVictory}) \neq 0.5$



D.2 Constituency attributes

If the party that wins narrowly contest races for the last seat is decided as-if randomly, we should observe that constituencies where Islamists narrowly win are similar to those where Islamists narrowly lose the last seat. To test this, we conduct balance tests. First, we examine balance along a range of “pre-treatment” demographic and economic attributes of constituencies. Second, we examine attributes of contemporaneous electoral outcomes in the constituencies that enter our estimation sample—attributes that should not have been affected by the outcome of the race for the last seat. Finally, we evaluate the comparative performance in first-round seat allocations of the two parties contesting the last seat. We report the p-values from tests comparing constituencies in which Islamists closely won against those in which they closely lost the last seat. These p-values are derived from OLS, Komolgorov-Smirnov tests,² χ^2 tests,³ and negative binomial regressions.⁴

²We use the `ks.boot` function from the `Matching` package in R. This permits using the test even when the two compared distributions are not continuous.

³Only when the number of categories is less than 5 or fewer than 10 percent of cells in the crosstabulation of treatment status and the outcome contain 0.


⁴This is used when the outcome is an integer count.

Table D1: Descriptive Statistics (Balance Outcomes)

Variable	min	max	mean	sd	N
Islamist (all) first round voteshare	0	0.444	0.037	0.071	719
Islamist (all) first round seats	0	4	0.349	0.665	719
Islamist (close) first round voteshare	0	0.375	0.008	0.034	719
Islamist (close) first round seats	0	3	0.070	0.300	719
Secular (all) first round voteshare	0	0.667	0.253	0.142	719
Secular (all) first round seats	0	8	2.273	1.433	719
Secular (close) first round voteshare	0	0.500	0.034	0.079	719
Secular (close) first round seats	0	5	0.299	0.709	719
Dapil Seat Quota	304	53,233	7,289.885	6,220.715	719
Total Votes (#)	2,652	425,863	62,576.620	52,345.060	719
Dapil Seats (#)	3	19	8.701	2.112	719
Unallocated Seats after First Round	1	13	5.669	1.594	719
Effective Number of Parties	1.842	25.446	8.931	3.776	719
Number of Secular Parties Competing	3	29	17.630	5.622	719
Number of Islamist Parties Competing	1	8	3.933	0.371	719
Households in Agriculture (%)	0	0.982	0.618	0.272	703
Households in Slums (%)	0	0.220	0.013	0.029	710
Households with Electricity (%)	0.027	1.036	0.714	0.230	710
Households with Electricity (%)	0.027	1.036	0.714	0.230	710
Transfers from Kabupaten Govt (Rp)	1,484	203,215	29,541.510	25,127.030	710
Secondary Schools per 10k	0	4.435	0.801	0.516	710
Average Distance to District Capital	0.624	7,322	45.337	389.807	710
Villages with Bars/Nightclubs (%)	0	1	0.047	0.109	710
Village with Muslim Majority (%)	0	1	0.904	0.233	710
Mosques per 10k	0.148	35.076	10.821	5.627	710
Churches per 10k	0	56.379	2.873	5.972	710
Madrasahs per 10k	0	17.931	1.673	2.442	708
Mean Village Ethnic Fractionalization	0.003	0.859	0.294	0.238	689
Mean Village Religious Fractionalization	0	0.540	0.099	0.114	689


Demographic/economic balance tests SA Figure D2 plots the p-values for tests examining differences between treated and control constituencies on pre-treatment demographic and economic attributes. Across the various measures, there are no statistically significant differences between constituencies in which Islamists narrowly win the race for the last seat versus those constituencies in which they lose.

Figure D2: Balance Tests of constituency Attributes (lagged PODES data)




Election-related balance tests It could also be that the dynamics of the elections in which Islamists narrowly win the race for the last seat are different than those in which they lose. SA Figure D3 shows that there are no significant differences in attributes of the elections between constituencies in which Islamists won the last seat versus those in which secular nationalists win the last seat.

Figure D3: Balance Tests of Contemporaneous Election Attributes



Balance tests for election results in first-round of seat allocation Finally, it could be that the performance of different types of parties in the first round of seat allocation might determine how well they do in the allocation of the last seat. Thus parties that win the last seat might have performed systematically better or worse in overall voting. SA Figure D4 shows that there are no significant differences in the performance of secular nationalist or Islamist parties in the first round of seat assignment between places where Islamists won versus lost the last seat. We examine two sets of outcome measures. The “close” indicator denotes that the measure is for the secular and Islamist parties that contested the last seat, whereas “all” indicates that the measure is calculated for either all Islamist or all secular parties competing in the constituency (per our classification of parties).

Figure D4: Balance Tests of the Results in the First Round of the Seat-Allocation Procedure (Contemporaneous Election)




Balance tests for segregation and fractionalization We conduct additional balance tests that look for differences in the distributions of ethnic/religious segregation and fractionalization across treatment and control constituencies. We construct these measures using the data given in [Tajima, Samphantharak and Ostwald \(2018\)](#). The measures of fractionalization are calculated at the village level. We aggregate them to constituencies, taking means across villages, weighting by village population size.

The measures of segregation are given only at the district-level. For the tests of balance on “District Religious Segregation” and “District Ethnic Segregation” in SA Figure [D5](#), we therefore have to employ a different estimation strategy. Specifically, using districts as the unit of analysis, we regress the district-level outcomes on the share of district elections won by Islamists, which is instrumented by the share of *close* elections in the district won by Islamists, controlling at both stages for the share of elections in the district that were contested narrowly between Islamists and secularists. (Note that K-S tests cannot be implemented for this type of analysis.)

The p-values from the results of these balance tests are presented in SA Figure [D5](#). We observe no significant differences in the level of ethnic/religious fractionalization or segregation across treatment and control units.

Figure D5: Balance Tests of Religious and Ethnic Segregation and Fractionalization



D.3 Placebo test with lagged dependent variable

We also conduct a placebo test using lagged NVMS data.⁵ It could be the case that the observed effects are driven by pre-treatment imbalances in the incidence and lethality of violence across the treatment and control constituencies. To examine this possibility, we run our main analysis using lagged outcome data from the NVMS data (2003 and 2008). The results are presented in SA Table D2. The outcomes of this analysis betray no signs that the observed effects are a function of an imbalance in pre-treatment levels of violence.

Table D2: Estimated Effects of Islamist Victory on Religious Violence: NVMS (Placebo)

	NVMS			
	Events	Deaths	Events	Deaths
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Islamist Win	0.125 (0.851)	0.809 (0.971)	-0.014 (0.031)	0.012 (0.019)
Constant	-0.410 (0.610)	0.786 (0.594)	0.132*** (0.023)	0.036*** (0.013)
Count	Y	Y	N	N
Binary	N	N	Y	Y
N	466	466	466	466

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Count models use negative binomial regression; binary outcomes use OLS. Standard errors are clustered by constituency-clusters. In the NVMS there are 363 clusters. Observations are constituencies in which the last seat was contested by Islamist and secular nationalist parties with a margin less than 1 percent.

⁵Note, we cannot perform such a test using PODES because causes of violence were not recorded in the PODES surveys prior to 2004.

E Supplementary analyses

E.1 Security outcomes

To capture the effect of Islamist incumbency on district-level security expenditures, we employ an instrumental variables approach.⁶ These budgetary decisions are made at the district level, rather than the constituency level. This means the independent variable of interest is the share of seats held by Islamists at the district level, which is a higher level of aggregation than the unit of analysis at which our identification strategy operates. To work around this challenge, we implement two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach. Here, the endogenous variable is the fraction of seats in the district legislature held by Islamist parties. The instrument is the fraction of seats held by Islamists that were awarded by winning the last seat in a constituency against a secular nationalist party, and within less than 1 percent of the vote. Because this instrument is also a function of the number of constituencies in which Islamists contested the last seat narrowly against a secular nationalist party, these models also condition on the fraction of seats in the district legislature which were contested closely by Islamists and secular nationalists. The results are presented in SA Table E1. We do not see evidence that district-level security budgets are affected by more Islamists winning seats in the district legislature.

Table E1: Estimated Effects of Islamist Victory on Local Security Spending

	Kabupaten Security Spending (% of total)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Islamist Close Wins (% of all seats)	0.010 (0.015)	0.006 (0.015)		
Islamist Wins (% of all seats)			0.006 (0.010)	0.004 (0.010)
Reduced Form	X	X		
Instrumental Variables			X	X
Covariates	Linear	Saturated	Linear	Saturated
N	853	853	853	853

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Standard errors are robust. Observations are kabupaten (districts). IV specifications instrument for the fraction of seats won by Islamists with the fraction of final seats won by Islamists by less than 1 percent. Covariates are either the fraction of final seats contested closely between Islamists and secular nationalist parties specified as either linearly or as dummies for each fraction.

⁶Data on district-level expenditures were obtained from the Indonesian Ministry of Finance. The data are accessible at: <https://goo.gl/ar8B6U>. We analyze data in the final complete year of the legislative term for each election cycle (i.e. 2008 and 2013).

We investigate whether Islamist incumbency causes citizens to invest more in local security infrastructure. We draw on the 2008 and 2014 PODES surveys. Village chiefs were asked to list what types of local security investments had been undertaken in the village over the past year. The police are heavily centralized in Indonesia, and are minimally present in Indonesian villages. As a consequence, communities frequently band together to fund local security. For outcomes, we focus on the four questions asking whether, in the past year:

- a security post had been built in the village
- a security guard had been employed
- civil defense force (*hansip*) had been raised
- an index that averages all three measures

Because these questions are asked at the level of the village, we take as the dependent variables the fraction of villages within the constituency that invested in each of these security measures. Employing our core estimation strategy, SA Table E2 shows that constituencies in which Islamists narrowly won the last allocated seat against a secular nationalist party invest in more security across the board, but that this difference is only significant at conventional levels for the hiring of security guards and the security index.

Table E2: Estimated Effects of Islamist Victory on Local Security Measures

	Security Guard	Security Post	Civil Defense	Security Index
Islamist Win	0.046** (0.020)	0.018 (0.020)	0.024 (0.015)	0.118* (0.062)
Constant	0.483*** (0.015)	0.565*** (0.017)	0.271*** (0.012)	0.000 (0.050)
N	706	706	706	706

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Standard errors clustered by 562 constituency clusters. Observations are constituencies in which the last seat was contested by Islamist and secular nationalist parties with a margin less than 1 percent.

E.2 Binary coding of intolerance outcomes

We implement an alternative coding scheme for our intolerance measures by constructing a binary indicator variable. Recall that the questions asked respondents how they would feel if a member of another religion engaged in each of five hypothetical scenarios. Respondents could respond that they would “strongly object” (4), “object” (3), “not object” (2), or “not object at all” (1). In the main analysis, we do not alter the ordinal coding scheme provided by IFLS. In this supplementary analysis, we recode the outcome variable to take the following values:

$$Y_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if “strongly object” or “object”} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

The results of this analysis are presented in SA Table E3. The results are virtually identical to those presented in the main analysis.

Table E3: Effects of Islamist Victory on Self-reported Intolerance (IFLS)

	Intolerance Items					Mean	Index	
	Village	Neighbor	Room	Marriage	Building		“All”	“Any”
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Islamist Win	0.005 (0.007)	0.010 (0.009)	0.007 (0.018)	-0.006 (0.033)	0.002 (0.025)	0.003 (0.014)	0.011*** (0.004)	-0.017 (0.033)
Constant	0.026*** (0.005)	0.031*** (0.005)	0.101*** (0.012)	0.462*** (0.023)	0.171*** (0.017)	0.158*** (0.009)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.517*** (0.023)
N	348	348	348	348	348	348	348	348

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Results for 10911 collapsed to constituency-level means. Standard errors clustered by 283 constituency clusters. Observations are constituencies in which the last seat was contested by Islamist and secular parties with a margin less than 1 percent. Intolerance measures indicate strong objection (1) or weak or no objection (0) to the following questions: How do you feel if ... (A) someone with a different faith from you lives in your village? (B) someone with a different faith from you lives in your neighborhood? (C) someone with a different faith from you rents a room from you? (D) someone with a different faith from you marries one of your close relatives or children? (E) people who have a different faith from you build a house of worship in your community?

E.3 Spillover effects

Does the impact of electing Islamists locally spill over to neighboring constituencies within the same district? We construct a measure of within-district violence that occurs outside the constituencies in our main estimation sample—that is, in constituencies where a close Islamist/secular election did *not* occur. In SA Table E4 we regress this measure on the share of close elections won by Islamists in the district, controlling for the total number of close Islamist/secular elections. We do not see consistent evidence that Islamist incumbency increases the incidence of violence in neighboring constituencies.

Table E4: Estimated Effects of Islamist Close Victories on Religious Violence (In-district Spillovers)

	PODES				NVMS			
	Events	Deaths	Events	Deaths	Events	Deaths	Events	Deaths
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Close Islamist Win (% of seats)	-11.595 (16.731)	-20.099 (28.991)	-0.394 (0.479)	-0.145 (0.203)	4.896 (6.002)	30.491* (15.895)	0.164 (1.099)	0.095 (0.411)
Close Islamist Win or Lose (% of seats)	-32.182** (13.619)	-21.994 (16.078)	-0.982** (0.420)	-0.141 (0.127)	-27.017*** (9.327)	-34.965 (26.576)	-2.950** (1.154)	-0.705* (0.407)
Count	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N
Binary	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
N	491	491	491	491	313	313	313	313


*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Count models use negative binomial regression; binary outcomes use OLS. Standard errors are robust. In the NVMS and PODES samples, there are 313 and 491 districts, respectively. Observations are kabupaten in which the last seat was contested by Islamist and secular nationalist parties with a margin less than 1 percent in at least one constituency.

E.4 Restricted analysis of PODES

The paper's main analyses show somewhat contradictory findings using the NVMS and PODES data. The divergence could possibly result from differences in geographic coverage. PODES covers all of Indonesia's 33 provinces, whereas NVMS document violence in only 18 provinces. We present two pieces of evidence against this possible explanation. First, it might be that the difference in results stems from regional differences in support for Islamist parties. To probe this possibility, we examine Islamist vote share across the provinces both covered and not covered by NVMS in SA Figure E1. Note, the average Islamist vote share in the provinces not covered by NVMS was 17.4 percent; in the NVMS provinces it was 18.3 percent; in other words, they appear very similar on this dimension.

Figure E1: Provincial Islamist Vote Share, by Cycle and NVMS Coverage



As a more formal test of the possibility that it is differences in geography that drive the divergence in results, we analyze the PODES data, restricting the sample only to the 18 provinces covered by NVMS. We present the results in SA Table E5. We find Islamist incumbency to have even larger impacts on the incidence of violent events motivated by religion, and still no evidence of a change in fatalities.

Table E5: Effects of Islamist Victory on Religious Violence (PODES)—NVMS Sample

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Events	Deaths	Events	Deaths
Islamist Win	1.575** (0.697)	-0.805 (1.224)	0.039** (0.016)	-0.005 (0.008)
Constant	-3.784*** (0.593)	-4.700*** (0.700)	0.014* (0.008)	0.009 (0.006)
Count	Y	Y	N	N
Binary	N	N	Y	Y
Observations	466	466	466	466

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Standard errors clustered by 363 constituency-clusters. Observations are constituencies in which the last seat was contested by Islamist and secular parties with a margin less than 1 percent.

E.5 Heterogeneous treatment effects


E.5.1 Regent Islamist co-partisanship

We consider whether there is an interaction effect between electing Islamist legislators and the partisanship of the district regent. Having an Islamist regent could amplify the effect of an additional Islamist legislator on the incidence and lethality of religious conflict. We obtained data on the partisan affiliation of district regents who were elected between 2005–2008.⁷ Regents serve five-year terms. Taking the main dataset, we restrict our analysis to district-election cycles that overlap with the dates during which sampled regents held office. For these cases, we assign a district-election cycle a “1” if the sitting regent had an Islamist endorsement, and zero otherwise.⁸ We then analyze violence that took place during the period of time in which both the regent and the district legislature held office. SA Figure E2 estimates the effect of an additional Islamist legislator on the incidence and lethality of religious violence, conditional on co-partisanship with the district executive, using the empirical strategy outlined in the main paper. There is no statistically significant evidence of heterogeneity.

⁷We are very grateful to Priya Mukherjee (College of William & Mary) for collecting and sharing these data with us.

⁸Note that during this period, 58 percent of incumbent regents were endorsed by more than one party.


Figure E2: Heterogenous Treatment Effect, by Regent Islamist Co-partisanship



E.5.2 Islamist seat share

In SA Figure E3, we consider the effect of electing an additional Islamist legislator on the incidence and lethality of religious violence, interacted with the share of all seats in the constituency held by Islamist legislators.

Figure E3: Heterogenous Treatment Effect, by Islamist Seat Share



E.6 Election related violence

To what extent is the effect of Islamist incumbency on violence driven by violence that occurs close to elections? We repeat our main analysis excluding cases of violence that took place within three months of the next election. The results are presented in SA Table E6. The point estimates are substantively identical to those reported in the main analysis, suggesting that campaign-related violence is not a primary driver of the results. (Note that we are only able to perform this analysis using NVMS data, since the PODES data do not provide time stamps for incidents of violence.)

Table E6: Estimated Effects of Islamist Victory on Religious Violence (Excluding 3 months prior to elections)


	NVMS			
	Events (1)	Deaths (2)	Events (3)	Deaths (4)
Islamist Win	0.411 (0.309)	20.100*** (1.228)	0.005 (0.032)	0.016** (0.008)
Constant	-1.462*** (0.229)	-23.303*** (1.072)	0.145*** (0.024)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Count	Y	Y	N	N
Binary	N	N	Y	Y
N	466	466	466	466

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Count models use negative binomial regression; binary outcomes use OLS. Standard errors are clustered by constituency-clusters. In the NVMS sample there are 363 clusters. Observations are constituencies in which the last seat was contested by Islamist and secular nationalist parties with a margin less than 1 percent.

We also plot the event count data from the NVMS, as well as red lines indicating the 2004, 2009, and 2014 election, in SA Figure E4. There appears to be no clustering of religious violence around elections.

Figure E4: NVMS Religious Violence Events Time Series



E.7 Electoral system reform between 2004 and 2009

Following democratization in 1999, Indonesia held its first legislative elections using a system of closed-list proportional representation. In 2004, it switched to semi-open-list proportional representation. Voters were required to cast votes for a party, and had the option of also casting a vote for a party-affiliated candidate (“personal vote”). Parties continued to submit an ordered list of candidates, as they had done previously under the closed-list system. However, under the new system of semi-open-list, candidates could jump to the top of a party’s list by winning personal votes in excess of the constituency-determined electoral quota number (total votes cast divided by total seats to be allocated).

In 2008, the Indonesian supreme court declared this system to be insufficiently democratic and forced the implementation of a fully open-list PR system. Starting in 2009, the order of party lists was completely determined by the personal votes received by individual party-affiliated candidates. This is thought to have significantly reduced the power of party machines.

These rule changes are described in the following sources:

- International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2004. “Some questions about the electoral system for the 2004 Indonesian general elections answered.” Jakarta.
- Sherlock, Stephen, 2009. “Indonesia’s 2009 elections: The new electoral system and the competing parties.” Centre for Democratic Institutions.

E.7.1 Fixed effects analysis

We explore the possibility that the results of our main analysis differ across election cycles. We conduct two sets of tests. First, we implement our main analysis with an election-cycle fixed effect. The results of this additional test are presented in SA Table E7. The point estimates are substantively identical to those presented in the main analysis.

Table E7: Estimated Effects of Islamist Victory on Religious Violence (Fixed Effects)

	PODES				NVMS			
	Events (1)	Deaths (2)	Events (3)	Deaths (4)	Events (5)	Deaths (6)	Events (7)	Deaths (8)
Islamist Win	1.026 (0.626)	-0.779 (1.254)	0.021** (0.011)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.317 (0.306)	20.037*** (0.642)	-0.001 (0.032)	0.016** (0.008)
Count	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N
Binary	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
N	719	719	719	719	466	466	466	466

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

All models include election-cycle fixed effects. Count models use negative binomial regression; binary outcomes use OLS. Standard errors are clustered by constituency-clusters. In the NVMS and PODES samples, there are 363 and 569 clusters, respectively. Observations are constituencies in which the last seat was contested by Islamist and secular nationalist parties with a margin less than 1 percent.

E.7.2 Split sample analysis

We also conduct a split sample analysis to assess whether the findings vary noticeably across the two election cycles. Results for the 2004–2009 election cycle are presented in SA Table E8. Results for the 2009–2014 election cycle are presented in SA Table E9. The estimates appear qualitatively similar across the two cycles. Interestingly, in the NVMS 2009–14 data there do seem to be indications that Islamist incumbency exacerbates the incidence of violent religious events (SA Table E9, columns 5 and 7). For PODES, the direction of effects is the same across both cycles, however, the point estimates are larger for the “events” dependent variables in 2004–09.

Table E8: Estimated Effects of Islamist Victory on Religious Violence (2004 Only)

	PODES				NVMS			
	Events (1)	Deaths (2)	Events (3)	Deaths (4)	Events (5)	Deaths (6)	Events (7)	Deaths (8)
Islamist Win	1.531* (0.821)	-19.203 (8,040.387)	0.037** (0.019)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.160 (0.370)	19.061 (6,581.666)	-0.044 (0.047)	0.014 (0.011)
Constant	-3.714*** (0.679)	-5.100*** (1.000)	0.012 (0.014)	0.006 (0.004)	-1.163*** (0.271)	-23.303 (6,581.666)	0.187*** (0.035)	0.000 (0.008)
Count	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N
Binary	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
N	368	368	368	368	251	251	251	251

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Count models use negative binomial regression; binary outcomes use OLS. Standard errors are clustered by constituency-clusters. In the NVMS and PODES samples, there are 234 and 347 clusters, respectively. Observations are constituencies in which the last seat was contested by Islamist and secular nationalist parties with a margin less than 1 percent.

Table E9: Estimated Effects of Islamist Victory on Religious Violence (2009 Only)

	PODES				NVMS			
	Events (1)	Deaths (2)	Events (3)	Deaths (4)	Events (5)	Deaths (6)	Events (7)	Deaths (8)
Islamist Win	0.271 (1.035)	-0.017 (1.414)	0.005 (0.013)	-0.0001 (0.008)	0.877* (0.497)	18.709 (2,465.690)	0.048 (0.047)	0.019 (0.013)
Constant	-4.060*** (0.761)	-5.159*** (1.000)	0.011 (0.009)	0.006 (0.006)	-1.638*** (0.370)	-21.303 (2,465.690)	0.111*** (0.033)	-0.000 (0.009)
Count	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N
Binary	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
N	351	351	351	351	215	215	215	215

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Count models use negative binomial regression; binary outcomes use OLS. Standard errors are clustered by constituency-clusters. In the NVMS and PODES samples, there are 199 and 324 clusters, respectively. Observations are constituencies in which the last seat was contested by Islamist and secular nationalist parties with a margin less than 1 percent.


E.8 Party and candidate characteristics

We would ideally like to examine how candidate characteristics, and candidates' strategies, vary by party type and across areas with higher and lower Muslim population shares. Unfortunately, such data is not available for the 2004 and 2009 election cycles. However, it *is* available for the forthcoming 2019 DPRD-II elections, for which this kind of information has been released for the first time. We cross-tabulate data on individual candidate characteristics and platforms for nearly 250,000 2019 candidates, by party and local religious demography (measured at the district level using the 2010 census). We take patterns in the 2019 data to be indicative about party strategies and candidate selection in the 2004 and 2009 election cycles, though of course we recognize this is a strong assumption, particularly for the 2004 election when the semi-open-list PR system was operating.


We find that in all places, candidates running under an Islamist banner use religious rhetoric—judged based on their official campaign slogans—more than their secular nationalist counterparts (SA Figure E5a). The use of such rhetoric by Islamists is somewhat more common in areas with a greater Muslim population share. Such rhetoric is equally prevalent in both NVMS and non-NVMS provinces (SA Figure E5b).

In SA Figures E6a–E9b, we cross-tabulate the 2019 candidate information on (a) Hajj completion, (b) rates of college completion (c) past political experience, and (e) number of children. Interestingly, across all types of districts, candidates from Islamist parties are less likely to have past political experience. For all other outcomes, and across all districts, Islamist candidates look broadly very similar to their secular nationalist counterparts. Moreover, NVMS and non-NVMS provinces do not appear different with respect to these candidate characteristics.

Figure E5: Candidate Platform Content




(a) by District Religious Composition




(b) by NVMS Coverage

Note: Of 231,255 legislative candidates in our dataset, 69,624 submitted campaign platforms. We assigned candidates a binary variable if they used words with religious significance. We looked only at words that occurred more than 100 times in the total term document matrix.

Figure E6: Candidate Hajj Completion Rates




(a) by District Religious Composition




(b) by NVMS Coverage

Note: Roughly 7.6 percent of all candidates in our sample have completed the Hajj, as indicated by the honorific title “H.” or “Hj.” preceding candidate names.

Figure E7: Candidate College Completion Rates




(a) by District Religious Composition




(b) by NVMS Coverage

Note: College includes those have completed associate degrees (D1/D2) and bachelor degrees (S1).

Figure E8: Candidate Holding Legisative Office at the time of Running




(a) by District Religious Composition




(b) by NVMS Coverage

Figure E9: Candidate Average Number of Children



(a) by District Religious Composition




(b) by NVMS Coverage

E.9 Sharia laws, by district religiosity

SA Figure E10 presents data on the passage of sharia laws, by district demographics and by Islamist seat share in the DPRD-II. Data on the number sharia laws passed come from Michael Buehler, *The Politics of Shari'a Law: Islamist Activists and the State in Democratizing Indonesia* (Cambridge University Press, 2016).

Figure E10: Sharia Law Passages, by District Religious Composition and Islamist Vote Share



Note: Numbers at the base of the bars indicate the count of districts in each category.