A Recruitment and descriptive statistics

The data for the analyses in the article come from quota-sampling done by Qualtrics in October of 2018. Respondents were recruited using a generic survey title (e.g. "UK Policy Attitudes 2018"), and asked screening demographic questions, followed by a series of questions about institutional trust, a series of conjoint experiments concerning immigration, the experiment referred to in the text, and, finally, a series of demographic and attitudinal questions that included the linked fate measure and the subjective likelihood of job loss.

The use of opt-in samples is potentially problematic for research like this if such samples disproportionately attract people who relate to their ethnic, religious, regional, or class groups differently from others. Though online samples are generally younger than the population, and age might be closely tied to linked fate, that is fairly straightforward to correct for using weights. The bigger challenge would be if there were differences across unobservable traits. Unlike research on, for instance, online behavior, where we might expect digital literacy to be quite different across potential sources of respondents (Munger et al., 2018), linked fate does not have obvious ties to recruitment mode.

Where there might be a bigger effect is the mode of interviewing. Issues tied to identity are notoriously subject to interviewer effects, even in telephone polls (Cotter et al., 2002). This kind of social interaction is substantially less salient in an interaction with a web site. Thus, online polls will neither put in-group pressure to conform nor out-group pressure to emphasize a more comprehensive or individualistic set of ties on respondents.

Tables 1-3[1] show the (unweighted) descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the paper for each country. Note that job uncertainty is included here only for those who were working. When used as a control model in some models it was coded as 0 for respondents who were not employed and a dummy for not working was included.

I use iterated post-stratification to match the resulting sample to census data on language spoken as a child, age, ethnicity, generation, education, and region. The weights are trimmed at 8 and $\frac{1}{8}$.

[1]Tables produced with Hlavac (2018).

Statistic	N	Mean	Min	Max
Redistributive preference	2,047	4.16	1	7
Ethnic linked fate	2,006	2.52	1	4
Religious linked fate	2,001	2.29	1	4
Regional linked fate	2,005	2.59	1	4
Class linked fate	2,003	2.51	1	4
Not employed	2,098	0.12	0	1
Union member	2,098	0.18	0	1
Religious attendance	1,215	1.90	1	4
Regional ID	1,862	2.60	1	5
Male	2,098	0.40	0	1
Married	2,098	0.47	0	1
Bachelor's degree	2,098	0.44	0	1
Income (1-7 scale)	2,098	4.10	1	7
Job uncertainty	1,294	1.89	1	5
Age 18-24	2,098	0.13	0	1
Age 25-44	2,098	0.40	0	1
Age 45-64	2,098	0.33	0	1
Age 65+	2,098	0.14	0	1
Survey weight	2,098	1	0.13	7.46

Table 1: Summary statistics for the UK

Statistic	N	Mean	Min	Max
Redistributive preference	1,982	3.81	1	7
Ethnic linked fate	1,957	2.59	1	4
Religious linked fate	1,950	1.90	1	4
Regional linked fate	1,955	2.44	1	4
Class linked fate	1,953	2.55	1	4
Not employed	2,017	0.08	0	1
Union member	2,017	0.19	0	1
Religious attendance	1,187	1.72	1	4
Regional ID	1,806	2.80	1	5
Male	2,017	0.52	0	1
Married	2,017	0.48	0	1
Bachelor's degree	2,017	0.40	0	1
Income (1-7 scale)	2,017	4.08	1	7
Job uncertainty	1,365	1.67	1	5
Age 18-24	2,017	0.11	0	1
Age 25-44	2,017	0.39	0	1
Age 45-64	2,017	0.43	0	1
Age 65+	2,017	0.08	0	1
Survey weight	2,017	1	0.13	8

Table 2: Summary statistics for Germany

Statistic	N	Mean	Min	Max
Redistributive preference	2,027	3.79	1	7
Ethnic linked fate	2,002	2.70	1	4
Religious linked fate	2,000	2.40	1	4
Regional linked fate	2,002	2.91	1	4
Class linked fate	2,000	2.86	1	4
Not employed	2,055	0.14	0	1
Union member	2,055	0.15	0	1
Religious attendance	1,278	2.11	1	4
Regional ID	1,930	2.65	1	5
Male	2,055	0.40	0	1
Married	2,055	0.50	0	1
Bachelor's degree	2,055	0.29	0	1
Income (1-7 scale)	2,055	4.46	1	7
Job uncertainty	1,206	1.82	1	5
Age 18-24	2,055	0.09	0	1
Age 25-44	2,055	0.36	0	1
Age 45-64	2,055	0.40	0	1
Age 65+	2,055	0.15	0	1
Survey weight	2,055	1	0.13	8

Table 3: Summary statistics for Canada

B Coding details

This section lists the groups that are used to define ethnicity, religion, region, and class, the number of respondents in each group, and the coding of that group as a high or low income group for Section 3.4. In most cases, the coding was done by calculating a national mean income and then comparing each group to that mean, with those above counted as rich and those below counted as poor.

Number of respondents and coding of UK ethnic groups

Ethnic group	Unweighted N	Coding
Bangladeshi	20	Poor
Black African	48	Poor
Black Caribbean	87	Poor
Chinese	41	Rich
Indian	91	Rich
Other ethnic group	58	NA
Other white	87	NA
Pakistani	56	Poor
White - British/English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish	1525	Rich
White - Irish	85	NA

Table 4: This displays the unweighted number of respondents in each ethnic group in the UK. The rightmost column displays the coding used in section 3.4. These are based on the Family Resources Survey for 2014/14 and 2016/17 and reported by the Department of Work and Pensions (2018). I assume that the top-coded category makes 12 times the bottom category.

Number of respondents and coding of UK religions

Religion	Unweighted N	Coding
Missing	83	NA
Buddhist	21	Rich
Catholic	229	Rich
Church of England	576	Rich
Hindu	61	Rich
Jewish	13	Rich
Muslim	103	Poor
Non-religious	800	NA
Other	18	NA
Other Christian	184	Rich
Sikh	10	Poor

Table 5: This displays the unweighted number of respondents in each religious group in the UK. The rightmost column displays the coding used in section 3.4. These are based on the mean wage reported in Heath et al. (2015).

East Midlands	170	Poor
East of England	160	Rich
Greater London	306	Rich
North East	98	Poor
North West	241	Poor
Northern Ireland	42	Poor
Scotland	167	Poor
South East	271	Rich
South West	157	Poor
Wales	115	Poor
West Midlands	185	Poor
Yorkshire and the Humber	186	Poor

Table 6: This displays the unweighted number of respondents in each region in the UK. The rightmost column displays the coding used in section 3.4. Incomes come from https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/regions/data/database.

Number of respondents and coding of Canadian ethnic groups

Ethnic group	Unweighted N	Coding
Chinese	133	Poor
Aboriginal (First Nations, Métis or Inuit)	49	Poor
Black	41	Poor
Other	79	NA
South Asian	112	Poor
White	1641	Rich

Table 7: This displays the unweighted number of respondents each ethnic group in Canada. The rightmost column displays the coding used in section 3.4. These are based on the 2011 National Household Survey (Statistics Canada, 2017).

Number of respondents and coding of Canadian religions

Religion	Unweighted N	Coding
Missing	47	NA
Anglican	124	Rich
Buddhist	40	Poor
Catholic	475	Poor
Hindu	26	Rich
Jewish	29	Rich
Muslim	46	Poor
Non-religious	729	NA
Other	81	NA
Other Christian	303	Rich
Sikh	15	Rich
United Church	140	Rich

Table 8: This displays the unweighted number of respondents each religious group in Canada. The rightmost column displays the coding used in section 3.4. These are based on the 2011 National Household Survey Public Use Microdata. Incomes were transformed from categories to average incomes using midpoint interpolation (assuming those in the top category of "$250,000 or more" make $300,000).

Number of respondents and coding of Canadian Regions

Province	Unweighted N	Coding
Alberta	365	Rich
British Columbia	446	Poor
Manitoba	156	Poor
New Brunswick	85	Poor
Newfoundland and Labrador	72	Poor
Northwest Territories	2	Rich
Nova Scotia	143	Poor
Ontario	557	Rich
Prince Edward Island	11	Poor
Quebec	123	Poor
Saskatchewan	93	Rich
Yukon	2	Rich

Table 9: This displays the unweighted number of respondents each province in Canada. The rightmost column displays the coding used in section 3.4. These are based on 2015 data from Statistics Canada's Longitudinal Administrative Data for the provinces. I then assume that the territories are relatively poor (changing this assumption has no practical effect, as it only affects four respondents).

Number of respondents and coding of German Ethnic Groups

Ethnic group	Unweighted N	Coding
Austrians	9	Poor
Bosnians	3	Poor
Croats	5	Poor
Germans	1820	Rich
Greeks	13	Poor
Italians	17	Poor
No information	14	NA
Other	55	NA
Poles	14	Poor
Romanians	9	Poor
Russians	17	Poor
Serbs	6	Poor
Turks	35	Poor

Table 10: This displays the unweighted number of respondents in each ethnic group in Germany. The rightmost column displays the coding used in section 3.4. While data on ethnic incomes in Germany are hard to come by, Luthra (2013) and others have documented substantial inequalities in labour market access and performance across groups, so it seems safe to assume that most non-German groups are relatively poor. Dropping Austrians from the poor group makes little difference to the results.

Number of respondents and coding of German religions

Religion	Unweighted N	Coding
Missing	54	NA
Buddhist	16	NA
Catholic	480	Rich
Hindu	8	Poor
Jewish	15	NA
Muslim	64	Poor
Non-religious	776	NA
Other	54	NA
Protestant	548	Rich
Sikh	2	Poor

Table 11: This displays the unweighted number of respondents of each religion in Germany. The rightmost column displays the coding used in section 3.4. While data on religious incomes in Germany are hard to come by, Koopmans et al. (2018) used an experimental design to document statistically significant labour market discrimination against Muslims and statistically insignificant discrimination against Hindus and Buddhists.

Number of respondents and coding of German Länder

Baden-Wurttemberg	230	Rich
Bavaria	276	Rich
Berlin	149	Poor
Brandenburg	69	Poor
Bremen	18	Poor
Hamburg	72	Rich
Hesse	159	Rich
Lower Saxony	158	Poor
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania	42	Poor
North Rhine-Westphalia	412	Poor
Rhineland-Palatinate	93	Rich
Saarland	25	Poor
Saxony	121	Poor
Saxony-Anhalt	57	Poor
Schleswig-Holstein	81	Poor
Thuringia	55	Poor

Table 12: This displays the unweighted number of respondents by Länder in Germany. The rightmost column displays the coding used in section 3.4. Incomes come from https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/regions/data/database.

C Regressions with no weights

Surveys that require substantial re-weighting to make sure that respondents are representative of the population may be vulnerable to a few outliers driving the results. This appendix therefore re-estimates the models in the paper without using survey weights. The results are broadly similar, with most coefficients on the same order of magnitude and in the same direction as the weighted results.

(Unweighted) Effect of job uncertainty on linked fate (UK)

	Ethnicity	Religion	Region	Class
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Likelihood of Job Loss	0.07***	0.13***	0.08***	0.10***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Group FE	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*No*
Observations	1,233	1,230	1,232	1,232
R^2	0.03	0.15	0.05	0.04

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 13: This shows the results in the UK of regressing a five-category linked fate measure on a five-category likelihood of job loss measure, while controlling for age, income, education, marital status, and being a member of a union, as well as fixed effects for each ethnicity, religion, region, and class in their respective models. Note that the sample is restricted to employed respondents, as the likelihood of job loss was not asked of those who were not employed.

(Unweighted) Effect of job uncertainty on linked fate (Germany)

	Ethnicity	Religion	Region	Class
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Likelihood of Job Loss	0.06*	0.07**	0.04	0.09***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Group FE	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*No*
Observations	1,327	1,321	1,326	1,324
R^2	0.03	0.10	0.03	0.02

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 14: This shows the results in Germany of regressing a five-category linked fate measure on a five-category likelihood of job loss measure, while controlling for age, income, education, marital status, and being a member of a union, as well as fixed effects for each ethnicity, religion, region, and class in their respective models. Note that the sample is restricted to employed respondents, as the likelihood of job loss was not asked of those who were not employed.

(Unweighted) Effect of job uncertainty on linked fate (Canada)

	Ethnicity	Religion	Region	Class
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Likelihood of Job Loss	0.09***	0.13***	0.03	0.002
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Group FE	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*No*
Observations	1,150	1,150	1,150	1,150
R^2	0.04	0.11	0.03	0.02

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 15: This shows the results in Canada of regressing a five-category linked fate measure on a five-category likelihood of job loss measure, while controlling for age, income, education, marital status, and being a member of a union, as well as fixed effects for each ethnicity, religion, and region in their respective models. Note that the sample is restricted to employed respondents, as the likelihood of job loss was not asked of those who were not employed.

(Unweighted) Effect of inequality prime on linked fate

	Ethnicity			Region	
	Canada	UK	Germany	Canada	Germany
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Ethnic prime	0.06	0.03	0.03		
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)		
Regional prime				0.07	0.07
				(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	2.67***	2.51***	2.58***	2.88***	2.39***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Observations	1,281	1,313	1,300	1,353	1,292
R^2	0.001	0.0003	0.0002	0.002	0.001

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 16: This displays the impact of priming ethnic or regional inequalities on perceptions of linked fate. Note that the ethnic models include only those respondents who received the ethnic prime or the control prime (inequality only) and the regional models include only those who received the regional prime or the control prime.

(Unweighted) Effect of inequality prime on linked fate (out-groups only)

	Ethnicity			Region	
	Canada	UK	Germany	Canada	Germany
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Ethnic prime	0.11	0.22**	0.13		
	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.18)		
Regional prime				0.09	0.10*
				(0.06)	(0.06)
Constant	2.71***	2.32***	2.25***	2.89***	2.36***
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Excludes	White	White British	Germans	Ont/BC	Bavaria/Berlin
Observations	212	351	144	704	1,015
R^2	0.004	0.01	0.003	0.003	0.003

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 17: This displays the impact of priming ethnic or regional inequalities on perceptions of linked fate. The samples are exclude ethnic majority members (Whites/White British/Germans) and residents of the advantaged regions (Ontario and British Columbia/Bavaria and Berlin. Note that the ethnic models include only those respondents who received the ethnic prime or the control prime (inequality only) and the regional models include only those who received the regional prime or the control prime.

(Unweighted) Effect of religious attendance on religious linked fate

	All	Canada	UK	Germany
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Religious attendance	0.30***	0.30***	0.29***	0.28***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Religion FE	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*
Observations	3,658	1,272	1,209	1,177
R^2	0.22	0.24	0.23	0.16
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 18: This shows the results in three countries of regressing a five-category religious linked fate measure on a four category religious attendance measure, while controlling for age, income, education, marital status, and being a member of a union, as well as fixed effects for each religion. Note that the samples are restricted to respondents who identified a religious affiliation.

(Unweighted) Effect of union membership on working class linked fate

	All	Canada	UK	Germany
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Union	0.003	0.05	0.21*	−0.15
	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.15)
Observations	1,613	634	510	469
R^2	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 19: This shows the results in three countries of regressing a five-category class linked fate measure on union membership, while controlling for age, income, education, and marital status. Note that the samples are restricted to respondents whose income placed them in our definition of working class (and so they were asked about linked fate with reference to the working class).

(Unweighted) Effect of regional identification on linked fate

	All	Canada	UK	Germany
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Regional ID	0.05***	0.08***	0.03*	0.05**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Region FE	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*
Observations	5,587	1,926	1,857	1,804
R^2	0.07	0.04	0.04	0.03

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 20: This shows the results in three countries of regressing a five-category regional linked fate measure on a five-category Moreno-style regional identity measure, while controlling for age, income, education, marital status, and being a member of a union, as well as fixed effects for each region.



Figure 1: This shows effect of a one unit change in linked fate on redistributive attitudes. All models are OLS regressions controlling for age, gender, marital status, education, income, likelihood of job loss, union membership, the treatment condition, and group/region fixed effects. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

D Regressions with no (or added) controls

Just as survey weights might alter the inferences we draw in a survey like this, the choice of controls might also affect results. Though the controls in the paper are chosen carefully to account for possible confounding relationships, this appendix re-estimates all models without controls and adds controls into the models (in Table 6 and 7) that, because they are random experiments, did not include controls. The results are broadly similar to those in the paper.

(No controls) Effect of job uncertainty on linked fate (UK)

	Ethnicity	Religion	Region	Class
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Likelihood of Job Loss	0.07***	0.16***	0.08***	0.09***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Group FE	*No*	*No*	*No*	*No*
Observations	1,233	1,230	1,232	1,232
R^2	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.01

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 21: This shows the results in the UK of regressing a five-category linked fate measure on a five-category likelihood of job loss measure. Note that the sample is restricted to employed respondents, as the likelihood of job loss was not asked of those who were not employed.

(No controls) Effect of job uncertainty on linked fate (Germany)

	Ethnicity	Religion	Region	Class
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Likelihood of Job Loss	0.08***	0.08**	0.06**	0.10***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Group FE	*No*	*No*	*No*	*No*
Observations	1,327	1,321	1,326	1,324
R^2	0.01	0.005	0.003	0.01

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 22: This shows the results in Germany of regressing a five-category linked fate measure on a five-category likelihood of job loss measure. Note that the sample is restricted to employed respondents, as the likelihood of job loss was not asked of those who were not employed.

(No controls) Effect of job uncertainty on linked fate (Canada)

	Ethnicity	Religion	Region	Class
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Likelihood of Job Loss	0.06*	0.16***	0.05*	0.002
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Group FE	*No*	*No*	*No*	*No*
Observations	1,150	1,150	1,150	1,150
R^2	0.003	0.02	0.003	0.0000

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 23: This shows the results in Canada of regressing a five-category linked fate measure on a five-category likelihood of job loss measure, while controlling for age, income, education, marital status, and being a member of a union, as well as fixed effects for each ethnicity, religion, and region in their respective models. Note that the sample is restricted to employed respondents, as the likelihood of job loss was not asked of those who were not employed.

(No controls) Effect of religious attendance on religious linked fate

	All	Canada	UK	Germany
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Religious attendance	0.38***	0.33***	0.38***	0.39***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Religion FE	*No*	*No*	*No*	*No*
Observations	3,659	1,272	1,209	1,177
R^2	0.15	0.13	0.17	0.13
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 24: This shows the results in three countries of regressing a five-category religious linked fate measure on a four category religious attendance measure. Note that the samples are restricted to respondents who identified a religious affiliation.

(No controls) Effect of union membership on working class linked fate

	All	Canada	UK	Germany
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Union	0.07	0.21	0.33**	−0.14
	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Observations	1,613	634	510	469
R^2	0.001	0.005	0.01	0.01
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 25: This shows the results in three countries of regressing a five-category class linked fate measure on union membership. Note that the samples are restricted to respondents whose income placed them in our definition of working class (and so they were asked about linked fate with reference to the working class).

(With controls) Effect of inequality prime on linked fate

	Ethnicity			Region	
	Canada	UK	Germany	Canada	Germany
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Ethnic prime	0.06	0.10**	−0.04		
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)		
Regional prime				0.06	0.15***
				(0.05)	(0.05)
Observations	1,281	1,313	1,300	1,353	1,292
R^2	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.05

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 26: This displays the impact of priming ethnic or regional inequalities on perceptions of linked fate. Note that the ethnic models include only those respondents who received the ethnic prime or the control prime (inequality only) and the regional models include only those who received the regional prime or the control prime. All models control for age, gender, education, income, marital status, and union membership, as well as ethnicity or region as appropriate.

(With controls) Effect of inequality prime on linked fate (out-groups only)

	Ethnicity			Region	
	Canada	UK	Germany	Canada	Germany
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Ethnic prime	0.22*	0.20**	−0.01		
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.19)		
Regional prime				0.12*	0.21***
				(0.06)	(0.06)
Excludes	White	White British	Germans	Ont/BC	Bavaria/Berlin
Observations	212	351	144	704	1,015
R^2	0.24	0.12	0.21	0.09	0.06

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 27: This displays the impact of priming ethnic or regional inequalities on perceptions of linked fate. The samples are exclude ethnic majority members (Whites/White British/Germans) and residents of the advantaged regions (Ontario and British Columbia/Bavaria and Berlin. Note that the ethnic models include only those respondents who received the ethnic prime or the control prime (inequality only) and the regional models include only those who received the regional prime or the control prime. All models control for age, gender, education, income, marital status, and union membership, as well as ethnicity or region as appropriate.

(No controls) Effect of regional identification on linked fate

	All	Canada	UK	Germany
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Regional ID	0.06***	0.09***	0.05***	0.07***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Region FE	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*
Observations	5,587	1,926	1,857	1,804
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 28: This shows the results in three countries of regressing a five-category regional linked fate measure on a five-category Moreno-style regional identity measure.



Figure 2: This shows effect of a one unit change in linked fate on redistributive attitudes. All models are OLS regressions. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

E Alternative measurement of uncertainty

Hypothesis 1 suggested that linked fate would be higher among people who believe that it is likely that they will lose their job in the following year. An alternative measure of economic uncertainty is low income. While not all people with low income are in unstable situations, it is probably more common to see sudden economic fluctuations among the poor. To test this, Figure 3 shows the effect of a dummy for having income below a 4 on the seven point scale on linked fate across the four dimensions used in the paper. It shows that outside the UK, there is a clear positive effect. In the UK, on the other hand, there does not appear to be a strong relationship between income and linked fate.



Figure 3: This shows effect of being low income (below 4 on a 7 point scale) on linked fate across four dimensions in each country separately and in a pooled model. All models are OLS regressions with basic demographic controls and group/region fixed effects (except for class, which is directly determined by income). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

F Details on the experiment

The experiment consisted of a three randomly and orthogonally assigned alterations to a simple question about government efforts to reduce inequality:

> [context][group][argument]. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement that "the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels, even if that means raising taxes"?

where the [argument] is the focus of the linked fate analysis. The three possible values of the argument were

- say that inequality is too high
- say that ethnic minorities have a much tougher time getting hired for a job, or
- say that it is easier to get ahead for a person in [cities] than elsewhere in [country]

where the cities were "Berlin or Munich" in Germany and "Toronto or Vancouver" in Canada. In the UK, due to a survey programming error, the cities remained "Toronto or Vancouver." Since there is no way to know how respondents interpreted that, I have dropped these respondents from analyses of the experimental effects.

The possible values for [group] were

- business leaders
- experts
- politicians
- religious leaders
- unions

and for [context] were

- Some
- The (country) economy is growing, but some
- In an increasingly globalizing world, some
- In an increasingly unstable labour market, some

F.1 Balance

The priming experiment assigned respondents to a control group, an ethnic argument (in all three countries), or a regional argument (in Germany or Canada) about inequalities. Tables 29-31 show that the treatment groups were balanced on standard demographics. These rightmost column in each displays the p-value corresponding to the joint F-test from a linear regression of the demographic on dummies for each of the treatment conditions. Across the 27 demographics (3 countries, nine dimensions), only one has a p-value below 0.05, and another below 0.1. This is about

UK Balance Tests

	Demographic	Control	Ethnic	p-value
1	Year of birth	1972	1973	0.26
2	Income (1-7)	4.06	4.09	0.71
3	Bachelor	0.45	0.44	0.66
4	Male	0.41	0.41	0.96
5	Married	0.46	0.47	0.67
6	Not working	0.13	0.11	0.47
7	Working - union member	0.17	0.18	0.76
8	Working - not member	0.66	0.68	0.41
9	Religious attendance (1-4)	1.90	1.96	0.41

Table 29: This displays the balance tests for the priming experiment in the UK.

the number of statistically significant differences we expect from complete randomization.

German Balance Tests

	Demographic	Control	Regional	Ethnic	p-value
1	Year of birth	1972.32	1972.47	1972.63	0.93
2	Income (1-7)	4.03	4.11	4.10	0.73
3	Bachelor	0.43	0.36	0.40	0.03
4	Male	0.50	0.54	0.53	0.29
5	Married	0.48	0.46	0.50	0.34
6	Not working	0.10	0.09	0.07	0.16
7	Working - union member	0.17	0.20	0.20	0.33
8	Working - not member	0.72	0.69	0.70	0.51
9	Religious attendance (1-4)	1.67	1.71	1.77	0.35

Table 30: This displays the balance tests for the priming experiment in Germany.

	Demographic	Control	Regional	Ethnic	p-value
1	Year of birth	1970.56	1969.54	1971.25	0.12
2	Income (1-7)	4.45	4.44	4.48	0.90
3	Bachelor	0.29	0.32	0.28	0.23
4	Male	0.39	0.38	0.42	0.28
5	Married	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.99
6	Not working	0.16	0.15	0.13	0.23
7	Working - union member	0.13	0.17	0.16	0.08
8	Working - not member	0.70	0.67	0.69	0.49
9	Religious attendance (1-4)	2.09	2.17	2.06	0.32

Table 31: This displays the balance tests for the priming experiment in Canada.

Appendix References

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