

Wartime Violence and Post-War Women's Representation

Online Appendix (OA)

Dino Hadzic
Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science
Trinity College Dublin
dhadzic@tcd.ie

Margit Tavits
Professor
Department of Political Science
Washington University in St. Louis
tavits@wustl.edu

This online appendix (OA) contains the following:¹

OA1: additional details on the Bosnian case.

OA2: descriptive statistics of key variables.

OA3: a discussion of missing data and comparisons between our sample of 87 municipalities and the 22 municipalities with missing data.

OA4: a detailed discussion of Bosnia's electoral system circa 2000.

OA5: the correlations between our measures of violence severity and various measures of district magnitude.

OA6: minimal (bivariate) model specifications.

OA7: a discussion of the control variables and the theoretical rationale for including them.

OA8: balance tests.

OA9: supplementary model results.

OA1: Details on the Bosnian Case

The history of women's representation in pre-war Bosnia is a complicated one. Due to the country's communist ideology, women were relatively well represented in the country's political institutions. For example, during the 1980s, women constituted as much as 27% of Communist Party members (Borić 2005). Additionally, a system of reserved seats ensured that women were not excluded from the country's legislative institutions. In that vein, in 1986, women made up 24% and 17% of members in the People's Assembly of the Republic of BiH and local/municipal assemblies, respectively (Borić 2005). However, due to the country's authoritarian political system, others have questioned whether women were permitted to be active participants in important decision making (Čaušević 2014; Gavrić and Zagorac 2015). What is clear is that the country's first competitive, multi-party elections in 1990 produced a significant decline in the number of women present in legislative bodies. With the end

¹The reported results cover all outcome variables and years we have analyzed in preparation of this paper. While we considered also analyzing the 1997 and 2004 local elections, which preceded and followed the 2000 elections, complete data on candidate characteristics are not available for 1997 or 2004. Therefore, we decided to only focus on the 2000 local elections. These are the closest elections to the end of the war for which there are complete data available on both the candidates who ran and those who were elected.

of the system of reserved seats that existed earlier, only around 3% and 5% of the elected representatives were women at the national and local levels, respectively (Borić 2005).²

Despite this decline in women's representation in the immediate pre-war period, the wartime years were nevertheless an active time for women's participation. In the words of former university professor and member of Bosnia's wartime presidency, Tatjana Ljujić-Mijatović, "in truth, everyone got involved in politics when the war started – people at universities, everywhere" (Gavrić and Zagorac 2015, 19). In a similar vein, Duška Andrić-Ružičić of the NGO Medica Zenica, once declared how, "this big women's scene in BiH, in the NGO sector, would not exist had it not been for the war" (Zaharijević 2002, 26). Participation took different forms. For instance, over 5,000 women were members of the Bosnian armed forces during the war (Omanić et al. 2010). Additionally, some of the country's most prominent NGOs were founded by women during the war, often with the purpose of engaging in peace activism or providing support and counseling to refugees, women, and children who experienced war trauma. Included among these organizations are Medica Zenica, MAK Bosanka, Duga, and Vive Žene (Čaušević 2014; Gavrić and Zagorac 2015; Zaharijević 2002). This proliferation of NGOs ultimately led to the establishment of ŽAR – The Union of Women's Organizations of the Republic of BiH, a group committed to creating linkages between women's organizations throughout the country (Gavrić and Zagorac 2015).

There are several prominent examples of Bosnian woman who became politically active in wartime and continued to participate after the war. For example, Marina Pendeš was a member of the Croatian Defence Council during the war and is now Bosnia's Minister of Defence. Before assuming that post, she also held elected office at the local and regional levels. Amila Omersoftić founded the Directorate for Refugees during the war and in 1996 founded the Women's Party BiH. Klelija Balta was an activist who founded one of the country's first NGOs, Vive Žene, in 1994 and later served on her municipality's local council.

However, despite this considerable amount of activity and notable examples of women turning their wartime experiences into post-war opportunities, women more generally often had a difficult time gaining public office in the immediate post-war period. For example, Bosnia held its first post-war national elections in 1996, which were closed-list and had no gender quota in place. Of the 42 candidates who were elected to the country's House of Representatives that year, only one (2.4%) was a woman. However, this changed dramatically in 1998, when the gender quota went into effect and the elections were still contested under a closed-list system. In these national elections, 12 (28.6%) women were elected to the House of Representatives. Despite these gains, the introduction of open-lists for subsequent elections was a significant setback for women's representation in Bosnia. In the 2000 national elections, only three (7.1%) female candidates were elected even with the quota in place. In other words, once voters had an opportunity to cast preference votes and alter the candidate order, they appear to have done so in ways that led to a significant decline in women's representation at the national level.

²Both national and local elections were held in 1990. With respect to the national elections, the electoral rule depended on the chamber, with seats to the Chamber of Citizens contested under proportional representation while elections to the Chamber of Municipalities employed a two-stage majoritarian runoff system. The Chamber of Citizens had 130 seats while the Chamber of Municipalities had 110. Like the Chamber of Citizens, local elections were contested under proportional representation.

OA2: Descriptive Statistics

In this section, we report descriptive statistics for the dependent, independent, and control variables and do so in a number of different ways. In every instance, what we present covers the 87 municipalities included in our main analyses. First, Table OA2.1 reports basic descriptive measures such as the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum for each variable. Additionally, we present density plots for these variables in Figure OA2.1. Finally, Figure OA2.2 presents heat maps that display the geographic distribution of these variables across Bosnia's municipalities.³

Table OA2.1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Median	St. dev.	Min.	Max.
Candidates	32.41	32.20	1.89	28.57	38.13
Councilors					
for 1990 election (1990 Councilors)	4.56	4.00	3.68	0.00	17.00
for 2000 election	17.30	17.39	7.64	0.00	35.48
for 1990 and 2000 elections	10.93	8.17	8.75	0.00	35.48
Casualty	2.23	1.70	1.91	0.12	10.33
log(Casualty)	0.50	0.53	0.84	-2.15	2.34
Confirmed dead	1.82	1.61	1.19	0.11	6.77
log(Confirmed dead)	0.36	0.47	0.78	-2.20	1.91
Urban share	33.70	28.23	20.29	5.28	99.78
Income per capita	5.22	4.62	2.47	0.60	13.96
Ethnic polarization	0.72	0.79	0.24	0.04	0.97
Share of women	50.12	50.06	0.83	48.11	52.23

³The municipalities that appear in white are the 22 for which we do not have full data. Additionally, in Table OA2.1 and Figure OA2.1, one of the variables for which we present descriptive information is *Councilors* across both the 1990 and 2000 elections. For Figure OA2.2, we instead report the change in *Councilors*, i.e., the percentage of elected councilors who were women in 2000 *minus* the percentage from 1990.

Figure OA2.1: Variable Density Plots





Figure OA2.2: Variable Heat Maps



OA3: Missing Data

In our analyses, 22 (out of 109) municipalities are excluded. This missingness is driven by three factors:

- Two municipalities did not hold local elections in 2000, which reduces our sample to 107.
- As noted in the main text (footnote 5), we pooled our data for post-war *Candidates* and *Councilors* at the pre-war municipal level. We needed to do so because most of our variables (*Casualty*, *Confirmed dead*, *1990 Councilors*, etc.) are only available at that level. This procedure was possible for most of Bosnia’s current municipalities. While new municipalities were created after the war, in most cases they were entirely carved out of pre-war ones (which enables pooling). However, there are exceptions to this general pattern. Three of Bosnia’s current municipalities were carved out of parts of *two* different pre-war municipalities. Therefore, for six municipalities we are unable to pool the data for post-war *Candidates* and *Councilors* at the pre-war level. This further reduces our sample to 101.
- Finally, for 15 municipalities, data for *1990 Councilors* were not available. We made every effort to obtain these data, including contacting Bosnia’s three main statistical agencies and visiting the FBiH’s Federal Bureau of Statistics. Out of these municipalities, one is already included among those where pooling at the pre-war level was not possible (see second point above). Therefore, these missing cases further reduce our sample by 14 municipalities. Ultimately, this means our final sample includes 87 municipalities.

Below we conduct several checks to address concerns that our results might be driven by missing data. First, because 14 of the 22 municipalities not included in the main analyses are dropped due to missingness in *1990 Councilors*, we replicate Table 1 from the main text without including *1990 Councilors* as a control. Table OA3.1 reports models where the sample includes 101 municipalities and shows that the results do not change.⁴

We performed two additional checks as well. First, we created two datasets, (a) one containing the 87 municipalities for which we have full data and (b) one containing the 22 municipalities for which at least some data are missing. Then, we performed wilcoxon tests comparing the 87 municipalities to what remains of the 22 across every relevant variable. As an illustrative example, 14 of the 22 municipalities that are excluded from the analysis do contain information for *Candidates*. Therefore, the comparison is between the 87 municipalities in our sample and the 14 that are excluded but do have data for *Candidates*. The results from these comparisons are presented in Table OA3.2. The only variable for which we find some evidence that our 87 municipalities are significantly different from the excluded ones is *Urban share*. However, in substantive terms, the difference is fairly modest. The

⁴This exercise is not possible for Table 2 of the main text, where we examine the relationship between violence and the electoral success of female candidates. This is because we employ difference-in-differences for that analysis, and so *1990 Councilors* is incorporated into the panel structure of the data (i.e., the dependent variable is measured at both 1990 and 2000).

average value of *Urban share* for the 87 included municipalities is 34 while for the excluded ones it is 27.

Next, we performed a similar exercise designed to examine whether adding any missing municipalities to the 87 alters the sample in meaningful ways across any relevant variables. For example, consider *Candidates* again. As just noted, we do have data on *Candidates* for 14 of the 22 municipalities not included in the main analyses. We added these municipalities to the sample of 87 and then performed wilcoxon tests comparing the original 87 municipalities to the enlarged sample of 101 across *Candidates*. Again, this is supposed to determine whether adding missing municipalities alters our sample in significant ways. The results from these comparisons are presented in Table OA3.3 and show that none of the differences between the sample of 87 and the “filled-out” samples are significant. In sum, there is little evidence that the 87 municipalities in our sample are systematically different from the municipalities that are excluded from the analyses.

Table OA3.1: Wartime Violence and Female Candidates, Not Controlling for 1990 Councilors

Variables	Model 1: Candidates	Model 2: Candidates
log(Casualty)	0.481* (0.251)	
log(Confirmed dead)		0.571* (0.271)
Urban share	0.056* (0.011)	0.055* (0.011)
Income per capita	-0.029 (0.086)	-0.031 (0.086)
Ethnic polarization	-1.023 (0.931)	-1.132 (0.928)
Share of women	-0.152 (0.246)	-0.123 (0.246)
Constant	38.813* (12.271)	37.518* (12.259)
Municipalities	101	101
N	101	101
R^2	0.331	0.336

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is *Candidates* (on 0-100 scale). One-tailed *t*-tests were used. * $p < 0.05$

Table OA3.2: Wilcoxon Tests Comparing Municipalities in the Sample to Municipalities with Missing Data

Variable	# Missing	# in Comparison Group	<i>p-value</i>
Candidates	8	14	0.705
Councilors (in 1990)	15	7	0.613
Councilors (in 2000)	8	14	0.426
Casualty	0	22	0.355
log(Casualty)	0	22	0.355
Confirmed dead	0	22	0.408
log(Confirmed dead)	0	22	0.408
Urban share	0	22	0.049
Income per capita	0	22	0.659
Ethnic polarization	0	22	0.250
Share of women	0	22	0.321

Table OA3.3: Wilcoxon Tests Comparing Municipalities in the Sample to Filled-Out Data

Variable	# Missing	# in Comparison Group	<i>p-value</i>
Candidates	8	101	0.918
Councilors (in 1990)	15	94	0.921
Councilors (in 2000)	8	101	0.828
Casualty	0	109	0.756
log(Casualty)	0	109	0.756
Confirmed dead	0	109	0.781
log(Confirmed dead)	0	109	0.781
Urban share	0	109	0.509
Income per capita	0	109	0.882
Ethnic polarization	0	109	0.699
Share of women	0	109	0.739

OA4: Rules and Regulations for 2000 Local Elections

In this section, we describe Bosnia's electoral system in more detail. To do so, we rely on primarily two documents: (a) the 2000 *Rules and Regulations* of the OSCE's Provisional Election Commission and (b) the 2001 *Election Law of BiH*. Please note that changes to the country's electoral institutions and rules have occurred over time, and therefore, the contents of this section apply to the 2000 local elections rather than prior or subsequent elections.

First, important to note is that the 2000 local elections were overseen by the OSCE, and more specifically, administered by the Provisional Election Commission (PEC) that was established for this purpose.⁵ However, the PEC cooperated extensively with local actors in order to successfully administer the elections. More specifically, election administration consisted of primarily three layers, the PEC, the Municipal Election Commissions (MECs), and the Polling Station Committees (PSCs). The PEC supervised the conduct of the MECs while MECs were responsible for ensuring that the PSCs properly carried out their duties. Generally speaking, the responsibilities of the PEC were "higher-level" and included such things as maintaining the Central Voters Register, approving the participation of political parties in the elections, certifying the parties' electoral lists, designing the ballot, etc. The MECs' responsibilities primarily consisted of assisting voters, parties/candidates, and polling station workers leading up to the elections. Their duties included assisting voters with the registration process, informing parties and candidates of their rights and obligations when asked, and delivering all relevant election materials to the polls before election day. Finally, members of the PSCs were the actual election day works responsible for ensuring that individuals who appeared at the polls were registered, monitoring the voting process, and counting the ballots.

For a party to contest local/municipal elections, most needed to be reviewed and certified by the PEC before appearing on the ballot. Among the items the party was required to submit to the PEC for review were the signatures of support the party collected. The required number of signatures varied depending on the number of registered voters residing in the relevant municipality. For instance, for municipalities with fewer than 1,000 registered voters, the requirement was 50 signatures. For municipalities that had between 1,000 and 10,000 registered voters, the PEC required 100 signatures. Finally, for municipalities with more than 10,000 registered voters, the requirement was 200 signatures.

If the party was successful at receiving certification, the next step included submitting their candidate list(s) to the PEC for review and approval. In order for an individual to appear as a candidate on a list they needed to be a registered voter in the municipality. All submitted lists required the signatures of their proposed candidates in order to indicate the candidate's consent to appear on the list. Additionally, the party's president was also required to sign the list in order to demonstrate that the party leadership approves of the candidates.

Among the things the PEC reviewed was whether the list satisfied the gender quota requirement. As noted in the main text, the quota required that at least around one-third of the candidates be women. More specifically, the number of women that needed to appear

⁵This was the case for all prior post-war elections in Bosnia (at the national, regional, and local levels). After 2000, that responsibility was transferred to domestic actors.

on the list was calculated in the following way: the total number of candidates was divided by three and then that value was rounded to the nearest integer. Additionally, the quota required that one of the top three, two of the top six, and three of the top nine candidates be women. Judging from our review of the candidate lists, compliance appears to have been high. This may in part be explained by the fairly severe penalties a party could incur if it did not comply with the quota. For example, the PEC was permitted to partially approve the list, striking those sections that violated the quota rule from the rest of the list. Alternatively, the PEC could rearrange the order of the candidates in order for the list to be in compliance.

Finally, the elections were held on Saturday, April 8, 2000, and polls were open from 7:00am to 7:00pm. In casting their ballots, voters were allowed to support one party list and the distribution of votes for the lists determined how many seats were allocated to each party. Additionally, voters could indicate their preference for any number of candidates that appeared on the party list they supported (from none to all the candidates on the voter's preferred list). The candidate preference votes determined the final order of the candidates in the list.

OA5: Violence and District Magnitude

Table OA5.1 presents correlations (with corresponding p -values) between our various violence measures and (a) district magnitude in 1990, (b) district magnitude in 2000, and (c) change in district magnitude between 1990 and 2000 (calculated as the number of seats in 1990 minus the number in 2000). As the table shows, the correlations between violence and district magnitude are all insignificant.

Table OA5.1: Correlations between Violence and District Magnitude

	1990 Magnitude	2000 Magnitude	Change in Magnitude
Casualty	-0.051 ($p = 0.639$)	0.082 ($p = 0.450$)	-0.108 ($p = 0.318$)
log(Casualty)	-0.017 ($p = 0.879$)	0.148 ($p = 0.172$)	-0.107 ($p = 0.323$)
Confirmed dead	-0.071 ($p = 0.515$)	0.101 ($p = 0.350$)	-0.143 ($p = 0.187$)
log(Confirmed dead)	-0.006 ($p = 0.954$)	0.167 ($p = 0.122$)	-0.107 ($p = 0.326$)

OA6: Minimal Model Specifications

In this section, we present results from minimal (bivariate) model specifications. The estimations use the same sample of 87 municipalities that are employed in the main analysis. The dependent variable is either *Candidates* or *Change in councilors*. The latter variable corresponds to the value of *Councilors* in 2000 minus the value of *Councilors* in 1990. Therefore, negative values for *Change in councilors* indicate that women's representation decreased from 1990 to 2000, while positive values indicate that it increased. In Figure 6.1, we plot these dependent variables against our measures of violence severity (the log of either *Casualty* or *Confirmed dead*). The plots also include best fit lines, coefficient estimates, and corresponding p -values from simple bivariate regressions. Tables OA6.1 and OA6.2 present the full regression output for these models. As the figure and tables show, we detect the expected associations between violence and women's participation and representation.

Figure OA6.1: Bivariate Relationships between Dependent and Independent Variables




Table OA6.1: Wartime Violence and Female Candidates, Minimal Specifications

Variables	Model 1: Candidates	Model 2: Candidates
log(Casualty)	0.470* (0.238)	
log(Confirmed dead)		0.577* (0.254)
Constant	32.172* (0.233)	32.197* (0.219)
Municipalities	87	87
N	87	87
R^2	0.044	0.057

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is *Candidates* (on 0-100 scale). One-tailed *t*-tests were used. * $p < 0.05$

Table OA6.2: Wartime Violence and Female Councilors, Minimal Specifications

Variables	Model 1: Change in Councilors	Model 2: Change in Councilors
log(Casualty)	-1.947* (1.057)	
log(Confirmed dead)		-2.217* (1.134)
Constant	13.715 (1.032)	13.546 (0.976)
Municipalities	87	87
N	87	87
R^2	0.038	0.043

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is *Change in councilors* (on -100-100 scale). One-tailed *t*-tests were used. * $p < 0.05$

OA7: Discussion of Control Variables

In this section, we provide a more detailed discussion of the control variables we included for the models presented in Table 1 of the main text. This section covers *Urban share*, *Income per capita*, *Ethnic polarization*, and *Share of women*. *1990 Councilors* is already discussed in the main text.

Urban share measures the percentage of the population composed of urban residents. Urban locations can suffer more violence because they are more densely populated (Weidmann 2011). Modern values and attitudes may also prevail in these settings (Pugh and Cobble 2001), thereby making women more likely to run for office.

Income per capita measures a municipality's level of pre-war wealth. Conflict is wealth destroying, and greater wealth could therefore dissuade potential belligerents from engaging in it (Collier and Hoeffler 2002). Additionally, development may increase women's presence in politics (Matland 1998).

Ethnic polarization measures the extent to which the distribution of ethnic groups in a municipality is bimodal, using the formula from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). Highly polarized locales are especially susceptible to violence (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2015). Additionally, in places where two groups reach demographic parity, social and political life may be especially adversarial, and prior work shows that women are more prone than men to avoid adversarial politics (Coffé and Bolzendahl 2017).

Share of women is the percentage of the pre-war population that was made up by women. In wartime, women may be subjected to higher levels of violence simply because they constitute a higher share of the population. We may also observe a higher number of women running for political office as a consequence of their numerical advantage, irrespective of their experience and skill set.

OA8: Balance Tests

In this section, we perform a series of balance tests to determine how similar municipalities that experienced varying levels of violence were across pre-war characteristics. First, in Tables OA8.1 through OA8.4, we regress various measures of violence severity (*Casualty*, $\log(\textit{Casualty})$, *Confirmed dead*, or $\log(\textit{Confirmed dead})$) on a series of pre-war indicators, including *Urban share*, *Income per capita*, *Ethnic polarization*, *Share of women*, and *1990 Councilors*. The results from these balance tests indicate that only *Ethnic polarization* predicts violence severity. All other indicators are insignificant.

We also performed an additional exercise to examine how substantively significant differences between high and low violence municipalities were pre-war. We dichotomized our independent variables ($\log(\textit{Casualty})$ and $\log(\textit{Confirmed dead})$) at their median values and plotted the densities of high and low violence municipalities across various indicators. These densities are presented in Figure OA8.1. Municipalities above the median level of $\log(\textit{Casualty})$ are shown with a solid line, while municipalities at or below the median are shown with a dashed line.⁶ In substantive terms, there appear to be no large differences between the density plots of high and low violence municipalities across our balance variables. In order to test for balance more formally, we performed wilcoxon tests comparing high and low violence municipalities and report the p -values beneath each plot. Once again, only *Ethnic polarization* is statistically significant when comparing the two sets of municipalities. The absence of large and significant imbalances across most of our balance variables suggests that high and low violence municipalities are relatively similar across pre-war characteristics. In sum, there is little evidence that our analyses are overestimating the association between violence and women’s participation and representation.

Table OA8.1: Balance Tests for Casualty

Variables	Model 1: Casualty	Model 2: Casualty	Model 3: Casualty	Model 4: Casualty	Model 5: Casualty	Model 6: Casualty
Urban share	-0.000 (0.010)					-0.007 (0.014)
Income per capita		0.012 (0.084)				-0.007 (0.104)
Ethnic polarization			3.362* (0.770)			3.575* (0.840)
Share of women				-0.091 (0.251)		0.246 (0.285)
1990 Councilors					-0.042 (0.056)	-0.009 (0.060)
Constant	2.237* (0.401)	2.173* (0.483)	-0.186 (0.585)	6.800 (12.559)	2.426* (0.328)	-12.338 (14.219)
Municipalities	87	87	87	87	87	87
N	87	87	87	87	87	87
R^2	0.000	0.000	0.183	0.002	0.007	0.192

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is *Casualty*. Two-tailed t -tests were used. * $p < 0.05$

⁶Performing this exercise with *Casualty* and *Confirmed dead* rather than their logarithmic transformations produces the same sets (high and low violence) of municipalities.

Table OA8.2: Balance Tests for log(Casualty)

Variables	Model 1: log(Casualty)	Model 2: log(Casualty)	Model 3: log(Casualty)	Model 4: log(Casualty)	Model 5: log(Casualty)	Model 6: log(Casualty)
Urban share	0.003 (0.005)					0.000 (0.005)
Income per capita		0.020 (0.037)				-0.001 (0.039)
Ethnic polarization			2.237* (0.288)			2.239* (0.314)
Share of women				-0.157 (0.110)		-0.041 (0.107)
1990 Councilors					-0.004 (0.025)	0.017 (0.022)
Constant	0.401* (0.177)	0.399 (0.213)	-1.110* (0.219)	8.363 (5.490)	0.521* (0.145)	0.833 (5.321)
Municipalities	87	87	87	87	87	87
N	87	87	87	87	87	87
R ²	0.005	0.003	0.415	0.024	0.000	0.421

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is *log(Casualty)*. Two-tailed *t*-tests were used. **p* < 0.05

Table OA8.3: Balance Tests for Confirmed dead

Variables	Model 1: Confirmed dead	Model 2: Confirmed dead	Model 3: Confirmed dead	Model 4: Confirmed dead	Model 5: Confirmed dead	Model 6: Confirmed dead
Urban share	0.004 (0.006)					0.000 (0.008)
Income per capita		0.026 (0.052)				-0.002 (0.063)
Ethnic polarization			2.360* (0.467)			2.418* (0.511)
Share of women				-0.062 (0.157)		0.103 (0.173)
1990 Councilors					-0.022 (0.035)	-0.009 (0.036)
Constant	1.694* (0.250)	1.683* (0.302)	0.123 (0.355)	4.944 (7.851)	1.923* (0.205)	-5.056 (8.646)
Municipalities	87	87	87	87	87	87
N	87	87	87	87	87	87
R ²	0.004	0.003	0.231	0.002	0.005	0.236

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is *Confirmed dead*. Two-tailed *t*-tests were used. **p* < 0.05

Table OA8.4: Balance Tests for log(Confirmed dead)

Variables	Model 1: log(Confirmed dead)	Model 2: log(Confirmed dead)	Model 3: log(Confirmed dead)	Model 4: log(Confirmed dead)	Model 5: log(Confirmed dead)	Model 6: log(Confirmed dead)
Urban share	0.004 (0.004)					0.003 (0.005)
Income per capita		0.025 (0.034)				0.002 (0.036)
Ethnic polarization			2.100* (0.266)			2.052* (0.288)
Share of women				-0.161 (0.102)		-0.085 (0.098)
1990 Councilors					-0.001 (0.023)	0.016 (0.020)
Constant	0.224 (0.164)	0.234 (0.198)	-1.148* (0.202)	8.446 (5.088)	0.368* (0.135)	2.968 (4.878)
Municipalities	87	87	87	87	87	87
N	87	87	87	87	87	87
R ²	0.011	0.006	0.423	0.029	0.000	0.436

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is $\log(\text{Confirmed dead})$. Two-tailed t -tests were used. * $p < 0.05$

Figure OA8.1: Variable Density Plots, Dichotomized at Median of log(Casualty)





Figure OA8.2: Variable Density Plots, Dichotomized at Median of log(Confirmed dead)



OA9: Supplementary Model Results

This section includes supplementary model results that are referred to throughout the paper.

- Table OA9.1 and OA9.2 present the results from Table 1 of the main text while controlling for *Population density* and *Population size* (logarithmically transformed), respectively, rather than *Urban share*. *Population density* is measured in hundreds of municipality residents per square kilometer. *Population size* is simply the number of municipality residents.
- Tables OA9.3 and OA9.4 present the results from Table 1 of the main text while (a) controlling for ethnic fractionalization rather than polarization and (b) controlling for both ethnic fractionalization and polarization. In the main text, we opted to only control for ethnic polarization because of the high level of correlation between polarization and fractionalization ($r = 0.881$).
- Tables OA9.5 and OA9.6 present the results from Table 1 of the main text while including ethnicity dummies rather than ethnic polarization as controls. For Table OA9.5, each dummy variable assumes a value of 1 if the relevant ethnic group constituted a *majority or plurality* of the municipality’s pre-war population, 0 otherwise. *Bosniak majority/plurality* is the reference level. For Table OA9.6, each dummy variable assumes a value of 1 if the relevant ethnic group constituted a *majority* of the municipality’s pre-war population, 0 otherwise. Municipalities where no group constituted a majority (*No majority group*) is the reference level.
- Table OA9.7 presents the results from Table 1 of the main text while controlling for pre-war economic and social gender inequality. *Employment share* measures the percentage of pre-war public sector workers that were women. *Illiteracy share* measures the percentage of the pre-war illiterate population that was composed of women.
- Tables OA9.8 through OA9.10 present the results from model specifications that accommodate the bounded nature of the dependent variables. Table OA9.8 corresponds to Table 1 of the main text and shows beta regression results. For these models, we converted *Candidates* into a proportion (0-1 scale) and this variable (*Candidates proportion*) serves as the dependent variable. Table OA9.9 also corresponds to Table 1 of the main text and the models employ logit transformed values of *Candidates* as the dependent variable. Finally, Table OA3.10 corresponds to Table 2 of the main text. Because the value for *Councilors* is 0 for 16 cases (14 pre-war and 2 post-war cases) and proportions/percentages that equal 0 (a) cannot be accommodated by beta regression and (b) their logit transformations are undefined, we opted to estimate two-limit tobit regressions instead. We did not estimate tobit regressions for the *Candidates* models because none of the values for that dependent variable are censored, i.e., there are no cases where *Candidates* assumes a value of 0 or 100.
- Table OA9.11 presents the results from negative binomial models where the dependent variable is either the *number* of male candidates (Models 1 and 2) or female candidates (Models 3 and 4). Because the dependent variable is always a count, we also include a control for the municipality’s population size (logarithmically transformed).

- Table OA9.12 presents results from difference-in-differences models where the independent variable is some measure of how “militarized” the violence was in the municipality. *Military share* is the percentage of all casualties (military and civilian) that were military. *Casualty difference* is measured as the number of military casualties as a percentage of the population *minus* the number of civilian casualties as a percentage of the population. For both variables, the higher the value, the more militarized the violence was. Because the military/civilian status of casualties is not available for five of the municipalities in our original sample of 87, the sample is reduced to 82 municipalities. Because we have no strong priors about the association between how militarized the violence was and women’s representation, two-tailed *t*-tests were used.
- Tables OA9.13 presents results from models where the dependent variable measures how fractionalized the votes that accrued to men were. Specifically, the index captures the probability that two randomly selected votes that were received by male candidates in a municipality were received by two *different* male candidates. Because the range of a traditional fractionalization index is quite limited (0 to 1), we have converted the index onto a 0 to 100 scale. Higher values indicate that the votes received by men were more dispersed. Two-tailed *t*-tests were used because we have no theoretical priors about how violence severity should be associated with vote fractionalization.
- Table OA9.14 presents the same results as Table OA9.13, except now the dependent variable captures how dispersed the votes received by female candidates were. All other modeling decisions remain the same.
- Tables OA9.15 and OA9.16 show the results of the direct-effect analyses where we account for the mediating effect of post-war demographic gender balance.
- Tables OA9.17 through OA9.23 presents the results from models that estimate the association between violence severity and women’s list placement. *Relative placement* is the dependent variable for the models presented in Table OA9.17, while *Top 10*, *Top 5*, *Top 4*, *Top 3*, *Top 2*, and *Top 1* are the dependent variables for the models presented in Tables OA9.18, OA9.19, OA9.20, OA9.21, OA9.22, and OA9.23, respectively. Because we have no strong priors about the association between violence and women’s list placement, two-tailed *t*-tests were used.
- Table OA9.24 presents the results from a direct-effect analysis where we account for the mediating effect of average list length. Specifically, the mediator is the average length of all electoral lists that appeared on the ballot in a particular municipality.

Table OA9.1: Wartime Violence and Female Candidates, Population Density Control

Variables	Model 1: Candidates	Model 2: Candidates
log(Casualty)	0.561* (0.261)	
log(Confirmed dead)		0.666* (0.283)
Population density	0.157* (0.044)	0.153* (0.043)
Income per capita	0.095 (0.081)	0.089 (0.080)
Ethnic polarization	-0.758 (0.938)	-0.873 (0.934)
Share of women	0.054 (0.243)	0.084 (0.243)
1990 councilors	0.112* (0.053)	0.111* (0.053)
Constant	28.677* (12.152)	27.365* (12.108)
Municipalities	87	87
N	87	87
R^2	0.374	0.380

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is *Candidates* (on 0-100 scale). One-tailed *t*-tests were used. * $p < 0.05$

Table OA9.2: Wartime Violence and Female Candidates, Population Size Control

Variables	Model 1: Candidates	Model 2: Candidates
log(Casualty)	0.661* (0.267)	
log(Confirmed dead)		0.810* (0.287)
log(Population size)	0.729* (0.231)	0.730* (0.228)
Income per capita	0.111 (0.082)	0.102 (0.081)
Ethnic polarization	-1.030 (0.970)	-1.233 (0.962)
Share of women	0.353 (0.246)	0.384 (0.244)
1990 councilors	0.126* (0.054)	0.122* (0.053)
Constant	6.519 (12.811)	5.211 (12.703)
Municipalities	87	87
N	87	87
R^2	0.352	0.366

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is *Candidates* (on 0-100 scale). One-tailed *t*-tests were used. * $p < 0.05$

Table OA9.3: Wartime Violence and Female Candidates, Ethnic Fractionalization Control

Variables	Model 1: Candidates	Model 2: Candidates
log(Casualty)	0.475* (0.219)	
log(Confirmed dead)		0.553* (0.240)
Urban share	0.052* (0.012)	0.050* (0.012)
Income per capita	-0.069 (0.089)	-0.071 (0.088)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.869 (1.090)	-0.964 (1.092)
Share of women	-0.093 (0.245)	-0.065 (0.245)
1990 councilors	0.120* (0.050)	0.120* (0.050)
Constant	35.291* (12.177)	34.019* (12.185)
Municipalities	87	87
N	87	87
R^2	0.408	0.412

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is *Candidates* (on 0-100 scale). One-tailed *t*-tests were used. * $p < 0.05$

Table OA9.4: Wartime Violence and Female Candidates, Ethnic Polarization and Fractionalization Controls

Variables	Model 1: Candidates	Model 2: Candidates
log(Casualty)	0.582* (0.274)	
log(Confirmed dead)		0.670* (0.294)
Urban share	0.050* (0.012)	0.048* (0.012)
Income per capita	-0.064 (0.089)	-0.066 (0.089)
Ethnic polarization	-1.310 (1.986)	-1.342 (1.943)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.514 (2.365)	0.454 (2.326)
Share of women	-0.093 (0.246)	-0.061 (0.246)
1990 councilors	0.108* (0.053)	0.108* (0.053)
Constant	35.661* (12.234)	34.179* (12.227)
Municipalities	87	87
N	87	87
R^2	0.411	0.416

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is *Candidates* (on 0-100 scale). One-tailed *t*-tests were used. * $p < 0.05$

Table OA9.5: Wartime Violence and Female Candidates, Ethnic Majority/Plurality Dummy Controls

Variables	Model 1: Candidates	Model 2: Candidates
log(Casualty)	0.446* (0.229)	
log(Confirmed dead)		0.510* (0.247)
Urban share	0.051* (0.012)	0.050* (0.012)
Income per capita	-0.076 (0.090)	-0.078 (0.090)
Croat majority/plurality	0.241 (0.569)	0.248 (0.562)
Serb majority/plurality	0.149 (0.389)	0.147 (0.387)
Share of women	-0.080 (0.250)	-0.051 (0.251)
1990 councilors	0.123* (0.051)	0.123* (0.051)
Constant	34.237* (12.270)	32.861* (12.297)
Municipalities	87	87
N	87	87
R^2	0.405	0.408

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. *Bosniak majority/plurality* is the reference level for the ethnicity dummies. The dependent variable is *Candidates* (on 0-100 scale). One-tailed *t*-tests were used. * $p < 0.05$

**Table OA9.6: Wartime Violence and Female Candidates, Ethnic Majority
Dummy Controls**

Variables	Model 1: Candidates	Model 2: Candidates
log(Casualty)	0.469* (0.245)	
log(Confirmed dead)		0.565* (0.267)
Urban share	0.050* (0.012)	0.049* (0.012)
Income per capita	-0.063 (0.090)	-0.066 (0.089)
Bosniak majority	0.815* (0.448)	0.823* (0.445)
Croat majority	0.986 (0.717)	1.084 (0.721)
Serb majority	0.649 (0.463)	0.672 (0.462)
Share of women	-0.113 (0.251)	-0.088 (0.250)
1990 councilors	0.130* (0.050)	0.130* (0.050)
Constant	35.259* (12.314)	34.092* (12.264)
Municipalities	87	87
N	87	87
R^2	0.433	0.438

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. *No majority group* is the reference level for the ethnicity dummies. The dependent variable is *Candidates* (on 0-100 scale). One-tailed *t*-tests were used. * $p < 0.05$

Table OA9.7: Wartime Violence and Female Candidates, Economic and Social Gender Inequality Controls

Variables	Model 1: Candidates	Model 2: Candidates
log(Casualty)	0.547* (0.259)	
log(Confirmed dead)		0.633* (0.281)
Urban share	0.050* (0.012)	0.049* (0.012)
Income per capita	-0.055 (0.092)	-0.058 (0.091)
Ethnic polarization	-0.845 (0.937)	-0.933 (0.937)
Share of women	-0.102 (0.281)	-0.065 (0.280)
1990 councilors	0.114* (0.052)	0.113* (0.052)
Employment share	0.010 (0.025)	0.007 (0.025)
Illiteracy share	-0.018 (0.061)	-0.018 (0.061)
Constant	37.168* (12.595)	35.478* (12.585)
Municipalities	87	87
N	87	87
R^2	0.413	0.417

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is *Candidates* (on 0-100 scale). One-tailed *t*-tests were used. * $p < 0.05$

Table OA9.8: Wartime Violence and Female Candidates, Beta Regression

Variables	Model 1: Candidates proportion	Model 2: Candidates proportion
log(Casualty)	0.025* (0.011)	
log(Confirmed dead)		0.029* (0.012)
Urban share	0.002* (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)
Income per capita	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)
Ethnic polarization	-0.040 (0.040)	-0.044 (0.040)
Share of women	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.011)
1990 councilors	0.005* (0.002)	0.005* (0.002)
Constant	-0.572 (0.530)	-0.638 (0.529)
Municipalities	87	87
N	87	87
pseudo- R^2	0.403	0.408

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is *Candidates proportion* (on 0-1 scale). One-tailed z -tests were used. * $p < 0.05$

Table OA9.9: Wartime Violence and Female Candidates, Logit Transformed Candidates

Variables	Model 1: Logit transformed candidates	Model 2: Logit transformed candidates
log(Casualty)	0.025* (0.012)	
log(Confirmed dead)		0.029* (0.013)
Urban share	0.002* (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)
Income per capita	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)
Ethnic polarization	-0.041 (0.042)	-0.045 (0.041)
Share of women	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.011)
1990 councilors	0.005* (0.002)	0.005* (0.002)
Constant	-0.564 (0.552)	-0.630 (0.551)
Municipalities	87	87
N	87	87
R^2	0.403	0.408

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the logit transformation of *Candidates*. One-tailed *t*-tests were used. * $p < 0.05$

Table OA9.10: Wartime Violence and Female Councilors, Two-Limit Tobit Regression

Variables	Model 1: Councilors	Model 2: Councilors
log(Casualty) × 2000 Election	−2.262* (0.802)	
log(Confirmed dead) × 2000 Election		−2.566* (0.864)
2000 Election	14.502 (0.791)	14.300 (0.747)
Municipalities	87	87
N	174	174
log-likelihood	−468	−467

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is *Councilors* (on 0-100 scale). One-tailed *t*-tests were used. The intercept term is dropped to allow for municipality fixed effects (not shown). * $p < 0.05$

Table OA9.11: Wartime Violence and the Number of Male and Female Candidates, Negative Binomial Models

Variables	Model 1: Female candidates	Model 2: Male candidates	Model 3: Female candidates	Model 4: Male candidates
log(Casualty)	0.178* (0.053)	0.151* (0.050)		
log(Confirmed dead)			0.193* (0.058)	0.162* (0.055)
Urban share	0.005* (0.003)	0.003 (0.002)	0.005* (0.003)	0.003 (0.002)
Income per capita	0.016 (0.018)	0.017 (0.017)	0.016 (0.018)	0.017 (0.017)
Ethnic polarization	-0.230 (0.190)	-0.166 (0.180)	-0.222 (0.191)	-0.156 (0.181)
Share of women	-0.054 (0.052)	-0.058 (0.049)	-0.045 (0.052)	-0.051 (0.050)
1990 councilors	-0.017 (0.011)	-0.020 (0.010)	-0.017 (0.011)	-0.020 (0.010)
log(Population size)	0.520* (0.050)	0.503* (0.047)	0.522* (0.050)	0.504* (0.048)
Constant	1.286 (2.758)	2.425 (2.621)	0.851 (2.785)	2.067 (2.645)
Municipalities	87	87	87	87
N	87	87	87	87
AIC	747	865	748	866

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is listed in the column heading. One-tailed *t*-tests were used. * $p < 0.05$

Table OA9.12: Wartime Violence and Female Councilors, Military Measures

Variables	Model 1: Councilors	Model 2: Councilors	Model 3: Councilors
Military share \times Post-War	0.002 (0.062)		
log(Military share) \times Post-War		0.079 (3.152)	
Casualty difference \times Post-War			-0.484 (0.793)
Post-War	12.363* (4.510)	12.204 (13.285)	12.773* (1.141)
Municipalities	82	82	82
N	164	164	164
R^2	0.904	0.904	0.905

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with clustered (on municipality and election year) robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is *Councilors* (on 0-100 scale). Two-tailed *t*-tests were used. The intercept term is dropped to allow for municipality fixed effects (not shown).
* $p < 0.05$

Table OA9.13: Wartime Violence and Male Vote Fractionalization

Variables	Model 1: Male vote fractionalization	Model 2: Male vote fractionalization
log(Casualty)	0.307 (0.218)	
log(Confirmed dead)		0.331 (0.238)
Urban share	0.013 (0.010)	0.012 (0.010)
Income per capita	-0.025 (0.076)	-0.025 (0.076)
Ethnic polarization	0.325 (0.787)	0.332 (0.787)
Share of women	-0.364 (0.210)	-0.348 (0.210)
1990 councilors	0.020 (0.044)	0.020 (0.044)
Constant	114.022* (10.450)	113.294* (10.475)
Municipalities	87	87
N	87	87
R^2	0.127	0.127

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is *Male vote fractionalization* (on 0-100 scale). Two-tailed *t*-tests were used. * $p < 0.05$

Table OA9.14: Wartime Violence and Female Vote Fractionalization

Variables	Model 1: Female vote fractionalization	Model 2: Female vote fractionalization
log(Casualty)	0.596 (0.443)	
log(Confirmed dead)		0.658 (0.483)
Urban share	0.026 (0.020)	0.024 (0.020)
Income per capita	-0.033 (0.155)	-0.035 (0.155)
Ethnic polarization	2.218 (1.599)	2.203 (1.598)
Share of women	-0.568 (0.426)	-0.537 (0.427)
1990 councilors	0.060 (0.089)	0.059 (0.089)
Constant	120.082* (21.222)	118.627* (21.262)
Municipalities	87	87
N	87	87
R^2	0.180	0.180

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is *Female vote fractionalization* (on 0-100 scale). Two-tailed *t*-tests were used. * $p < 0.05$

Table OA9.15: Wartime Violence and Female Candidates, Mediating Effect of Gender Balance

Variables	Model 1: Candidates	Model 2: Candidates
log(Casualty)	0.442* (0.241)	
log(Confirmed dead)		0.495* (0.284)
Urban share	0.029* (0.010)	0.029* (0.010)
Income per capita	-0.066 (0.091)	-0.067 (0.091)
Ethnic polarization	-1.110 (0.910)	-1.132 (0.908)
Share of women	-0.361 (0.247)	-0.334 (0.253)
1990 councilors	0.108* (0.051)	0.107* (0.051)
Constant	7.988 (11.498)	7.207 (11.682)
Municipalities	87	87
N	87	87
R^2	0.258	0.262

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is *Candidates* (on 0-100 scale). One-tailed *t*-tests were used. * $p < 0.05$

Table OA9.16: Wartime Violence and Female Councilors, Mediating Effect of Gender Balance

Variables	Model 1: Councilors	Model 2: Councilors
log(Casualty) × 2000 Election	-2.345* (1.373)	
log(Confirmed dead) × 2000 Election		-2.769* (1.562)
2000 Election	13.466 (1.515)	13.246 (1.460)
Municipalities	87	87
N	174	174
R^2	0.994	0.995

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is *Councilors* (on 0-100 scale). One-tailed *t*-tests were used. The intercept term is dropped to allow fixed effects for municipality (not shown). * $p < 0.05$

Table OA9.17: Wartime Violence and Women’s List Placement, Relative Placement Outcome

Variables	Model 1: Relative placement	Model 2: Relative placement	Model 3: Relative placement	Model 4: Relative placement
log(Casualty)	−0.218* (0.102)		−0.224* (0.108)	
log(Confirmed dead)		−0.280* (0.110)		−0.291* (0.114)
Urban share	0.004 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)
Income per capita	−0.035 (0.036)	−0.034 (0.035)	−0.034 (0.029)	−0.033 (0.029)
Ethnic polarization	−0.087 (0.367)	−0.001 (0.363)	−0.077 (0.338)	0.016 (0.337)
Share of women	−0.268* (0.098)	−0.283* (0.097)	−0.267* (0.084)	−0.282* (0.083)
1990 councilors	−0.020 (0.021)	−0.019 (0.020)	−0.021 (0.020)	−0.021 (0.020)
Constant	17.427* (4.875)	18.076* (4.831)	17.052* (4.575)	17.504* (4.461)
Candidates mediator	No	No	Yes	Yes
Municipalities	87	87	87	87
N	87	87	87	87
R^2	0.212	0.230	0.220	0.243

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are bootstrapped for Models 3 and 4. The dependent variable is *Relative placement*. Two-tailed *t*-tests were used. * $p < 0.05$

Table OA9.18: Wartime Violence and Women's List Placement, Top 10 Outcome

Variables	Model 1: Top 10	Model 2: Top 10	Model 3: Top 10	Model 4: Top 10
log(Casualty)	1.364* (0.380)		0.734* (0.277)	
log(Confirmed dead)		1.633* (0.407)		0.911* (0.294)
Urban share	0.048* (0.017)	0.044* (0.017)	-0.009 (0.014)	-0.010 (0.013)
Income per capita	-0.125 (0.133)	-0.129 (0.131)	-0.052 (0.089)	-0.055 (0.088)
Ethnic polarization	-1.092 (1.370)	-1.388 (1.347)	-0.049 (0.935)	-0.270 (0.889)
Share of women	-0.038 (0.365)	0.046 (0.360)	0.074 (0.232)	0.119 (0.234)
1990 councilors	0.301* (0.077)	0.299* (0.075)	0.176* (0.056)	0.176* (0.055)
Constant	31.327 (18.184)	27.617 (17.920)	-9.020 (12.972)	-10.532 (12.944)
Candidates mediator	No	No	Yes	Yes
Municipalities	87	87	87	87
N	87	87	87	87
R^2	0.437	0.455	0.242	0.269

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are bootstrapped for Models 3 and 4. The dependent variable is *Top 10* (on 0-100 scale). Two-tailed *t*-tests were used. * $p < 0.05$

Table OA9.19: Wartime Violence and Women’s List Placement, Top 5 Outcome

Variables	Model 1: Top 5	Model 2: Top 5	Model 3: Top 5	Model 4: Top 5
log(Casualty)	2.125* (0.596)		1.459* (0.600)	
log(Confirmed dead)		2.647* (0.634)		1.900* (0.630)
Urban share	0.059* (0.027)	0.053 (0.027)	-0.001 (0.026)	-0.003 (0.025)
Income per capita	0.093 (0.209)	0.087 (0.204)	0.171 (0.140)	0.163 (0.139)
Ethnic polarization	-3.682 (2.150)	-4.356* (2.097)	-2.581 (1.972)	-3.200 (1.862)
Share of women	-0.400 (0.572)	-0.262 (0.560)	-0.283 (0.430)	-0.186 (0.428)
1990 councilors	0.318* (0.120)	0.311* (0.117)	0.185* (0.089)	0.184* (0.091)
Constant	44.586 (28.537)	38.501 (27.897)	1.980 (24.278)	-0.963 (23.674)
Candidates mediator	No	No	Yes	Yes
Municipalities	87	87	87	87
N	87	87	87	87
R^2	0.356	0.387	0.167	0.207

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are bootstrapped for Models 3 and 4. The dependent variable is *Top 5* (on 0-100 scale). Two-tailed *t*-tests were used. * $p < 0.05$

Table OA9.20: Wartime Violence and Women's List Placement, Top 4 Outcome

Variables	Model 1: Top 4	Model 2: Top 4	Model 3: Top 4	Model 4: Top 4
log(Casualty)	2.211* (0.571)		1.539* (0.523)	
log(Confirmed dead)		2.820* (0.601)		2.072* (0.496)
Urban share	0.059* (0.026)	0.053* (0.025)	-0.002 (0.028)	-0.004 (0.026)
Income per capita	-0.185 (0.200)	-0.192 (0.193)	-0.107 (0.162)	-0.115 (0.160)
Ethnic polarization	-2.582 (2.060)	-3.418 (1.987)	-1.468 (1.904)	-2.257 (1.704)
Share of women	-0.174 (0.548)	-0.024 (0.531)	-0.055 (0.496)	0.052 (0.486)
1990 councilors	0.270* (0.115)	0.263* (0.111)	0.136 (0.091)	0.135 (0.092)
Constant	35.220 (27.342)	28.691 (26.440)	-7.856 (26.897)	-10.913 (26.108)
Candidates mediator	No	No	Yes	Yes
Municipalities	87	87	87	87
N	87	87	87	87
R^2	0.324	0.370	0.157	0.215

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are bootstrapped for Models 3 and 4. The dependent variable is *Top 4* (on 0-100 scale). Two-tailed *t*-tests were used. * $p < 0.05$

Table OA9.21: Wartime Violence and Women's List Placement, Top 3 Outcome

Variables	Model 1: Top 3	Model 2: Top 3	Model 3: Top 3	Model 4: Top 3
log(Casualty)	2.120* (0.609)		1.474* (0.602)	
log(Confirmed dead)		2.795* (0.640)		2.082* (0.585)
Urban share	0.024 (0.028)	0.018 (0.027)	-0.034 (0.024)	-0.036 (0.023)
Income per capita	0.065 (0.213)	0.058 (0.206)	0.140 (0.184)	0.131 (0.184)
Ethnic polarization	-2.237 (2.196)	-3.225 (2.118)	-1.167 (2.283)	-2.120 (2.017)
Share of women	-0.165 (0.585)	-0.014 (0.566)	-0.051 (0.461)	0.058 (0.456)
1990 councilors	0.206 (0.123)	0.198 (0.118)	0.078 (0.127)	0.076 (0.124)
Constant	39.759 (29.154)	33.230 (28.177)	-1.636 (25.651)	-4.498 (25.044)
Candidates mediator	No	No	Yes	Yes
Municipalities	87	87	87	87
N	87	87	87	87
R^2	0.233	0.286	0.130	0.184

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are bootstrapped for Models 3 and 4. The dependent variable is *Top 3* (on 0-100 scale). Two-tailed *t*-tests were used. * $p < 0.05$

Table OA9.22: Wartime Violence and Women's List Placement, Top 2 Outcome

Variables	Model 1: Top 2	Model 2: Top 2	Model 3: Top 2	Model 4: Top 2
log(Casualty)	2.592 (1.334)		1.340 (1.136)	
log(Confirmed dead)		3.242* (1.444)		1.818 (1.256)
Urban share	0.130* (0.061)	0.122* (0.061)	0.017 (0.064)	0.015 (0.063)
Income per capita	-0.244 (0.467)	-0.251 (0.464)	-0.098 (0.422)	-0.105 (0.421)
Ethnic polarization	0.355 (4.813)	-0.494 (4.777)	2.427 (3.928)	1.713 (3.884)
Share of women	-2.567* (1.281)	-2.397 (1.277)	-2.346* (1.136)	-2.252 (1.147)
1990 councilors	0.462 (0.269)	0.454 (0.267)	0.213 (0.259)	0.212 (0.263)
Constant	137.344* (63.902)	129.881* (63.561)	57.207 (61.049)	54.552 (61.071)
Candidates mediator	No	No	Yes	Yes
Municipalities	87	87	87	87
N	87	87	87	87
R^2	0.218	0.229	0.125	0.133

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are bootstrapped for Models 3 and 4. The dependent variable is *Top 2* (on 0-100 scale). Two-tailed *t*-tests were used. * $p < 0.05$

Table OA9.23: Wartime Violence and Women’s List Placement, Top 1 Outcome

Variables	Model 1: Top 1	Model 2: Top 1	Model 3: Top 1	Model 4: Top 1
log(Casualty)	3.274* (1.485)		2.422* (1.205)	
log(Confirmed dead)		3.957* (1.608)		3.002* (1.309)
Urban share	0.107 (0.068)	0.098 (0.068)	0.030 (0.078)	0.026 (0.077)
Income per capita	-0.238 (0.520)	-0.248 (0.517)	-0.139 (0.542)	-0.150 (0.543)
Ethnic polarization	-2.340 (5.357)	-3.130 (5.319)	-0.930 (4.333)	-1.650 (4.386)
Share of women	-0.932 (1.426)	-0.729 (1.421)	-0.782 (1.168)	-0.632 (1.161)
1990 councilors	0.290 (0.299)	0.283 (0.297)	0.121 (0.306)	0.120 (0.307)
Constant	53.725 (71.112)	44.707 (70.768)	-0.809 (63.189)	-5.800 (62.274)
Candidates mediator	No	No	Yes	Yes
Municipalities	87	87	87	87
N	87	87	87	87
R^2	0.142	0.153	0.064	0.075

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are bootstrapped for Models 3 and 4. The dependent variable is *Top 1*. Two-tailed *t*-tests were used. * $p < 0.05$

Table OA9.24: Wartime Violence and Female Candidates, Mediating Effect of Average List Length

Variables	Model 1: Candidates	Model 2: Candidates
log(Casualty)	0.554* (0.282)	
log(Confirmed dead)		0.639* (0.322)
Urban share	0.038* (0.010)	0.037* (0.011)
Income per capita	-0.027 (0.101)	-0.029 (0.100)
Ethnic polarization	-0.340 (1.121)	-0.413 (1.139)
Share of women	0.101 (0.231)	0.132 (0.237)
1990 councilors	0.130* (0.058)	0.129* (0.058)
Constant	22.631* (11.652)	21.252* (11.887)
Municipalities	87	87
N	87	87
R^2	0.431	0.435

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient estimates with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is *Candidates* (on 0-100 scale). One-tailed *t*-tests were used. * $p < 0.05$

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