Online appendix for the article

Elite Communication and the Popular Legitimacy of International Organizations

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Appendix A. Wording of survey questions[1]

INTRO-TEXT
This survey is conducted by researchers at Stockholm University in Sweden.

The purpose of the survey is to get **your opinion on politics in your country and the world**. There are no right or wrong answers to the questions; we are interested in your opinion.

Single choice
When you get together with friends, how often would you say you discuss politics?

0- Never
1- Occasionally
2- Frequently
3- Don't know

Single choice
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

0- You can't be too careful
1-
2-
3-
4-
5-
6-
7-
8-
9-
10- Most people can be trusted
11- Don't know

Single choice
Now let's turn to a few questions about your opinion on politics.

In politics, people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". How would you place your views on this scale?

0- Left
1-
2-
3-

[1] Questions are presented in the order they appear in the questionnaire. These sample questions are taken from the UK questionnaire. "British" in text is changed according to the country in "American" or "German".

4-
5-
6-
7-
8-
9-
10- Right
11- Don’t know

Single choice
How much confidence do you have in the British government?

0- No confidence at all
1-
2-
3-
4-
5-
6-
7-
8-
9-
10- Complete confidence
11- Don’t know

Ranking 1-4
Some people feel that they belong to a larger group that includes people in their own country, their continent or the world as a whole.

Please rank your feeling of belonging from 1 to 4, where 1 refers to the group to which you belong most of all, and 4 refers to the group to which you belong least of all.

Germany:
1. Bundesland
2. Germany
3. Europe
4. The world as a whole
5. Don’t know

UK:
1. Region
2. United Kingdom
3. Europe
4. The world as a whole
5. Don’t know

US:

1. State
2. US
3. North America
4. The world as a whole
5. Don't know

BEGIN EXPERIMENT R O U N D 1

Intro text
Only to the 2400 randomized respondent
Now some questions about what you think about specific statements on international politics.

Intro-text
Only to control group (600 persons)
Now some questions about what you think about international politics.

Single choice for all questions

0- No confidence at all
1-
2-
3-
4-
5-
6-
7-
8-
9-
10- Complete confidence
11- Don't know

Treatment group 1 - 200 respondents
As you may know, most civil society organizations praise the United Nations (UN) for being highly democratic. How much confidence do you personally have in the UN?

Treatment group 2 - 200 respondents
As you may know, most civil society organizations criticize the United Nations (UN) for being highly undemocratic. How much confidence do you personally have in the UN?

Treatment group 3 - 200 respondents

As you may know, most civil society organizations praise the United Nations (UN) for doing a very good job in trying to solve the problems it faces. How much confidence do you personally have in the UN?

Treatment group 4 - 200 respondents
As you may know, most civil society organizations criticize the United Nations (UN) for doing a very poor job in trying to solve the problems it faces. How much confidence do you personally have in the UN?

Treatment group 5 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the United Nations (UN) prides itself for being highly democratic. How much confidence do you personally have in the UN?

Treatment group 6 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the United Nations (UN) admits to being highly undemocratic. How much confidence do you personally have in the UN?

Treatment group 7 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the United Nations (UN) prides itself for doing a very good job in trying to solve the problems it faces. How much confidence do you personally have in the UN?

Treatment group 8 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the United Nations (UN) admits to doing a very bad job when trying to solve the problems it faces. How much confidence do you personally have in the UN?

Treatment group 9 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the British government praises the United Nations (UN) for being highly democratic. How much confidence do you personally have in the UN?

Treatment group 10 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the British government criticizes the United Nations (UN) for being highly undemocratic. How much confidence do you personally have in the UN?

Treatment group 11 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the British government praises the United Nations (UN) for doing a very good job in trying to solve the problems it faces. How much confidence do you personally have in the UN?

Treatment group 12 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the British government criticizes the United Nations (UN) for doing a very poor job in trying to solve the problems it faces. How much confidence do you personally have in the UN?

Control group - 600 respondents
How much confidence do you personally have in the United Nations (UN)?

R O U N D 2

Treatment group 1 - 200 respondents
For US change "European Union (EU)" to "NAFTA (The North American Free Trade Agreement)"
As you may know, most civil society organizations praise the European Union (EU) for being highly democratic. How much confidence do you personally have in the EU?

Treatment group 2 - 200 respondents
As you may know, most civil society organizations criticize the European Union (EU) for being highly undemocratic. How much confidence do you personally have in the EU?

Treatment group 3 - 200 respondents
As you may know, most civil society organizations praise the European Union (EU) for doing a very good job in trying to solve the problems it faces. How much confidence do you personally have in the EU?

Treatment group 4 - 200 respondents
As you may know, most civil society organizations criticize the European Union (EU) for doing a very poor job in trying to solve the problems it faces. How much confidence do you personally have in the EU?

Treatment group 5 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the European Union (EU) prides itself for being highly democratic. How much confidence do you personally have in the EU?

Treatment group 6 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the European Union (EU) admits to being highly undemocratic. How much confidence do you personally have in the EU?

Treatment group 7 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the European Union (EU) prides itself for doing a very good job in trying to solve the problems it faces. How much confidence do you personally have in the EU?

Treatment group 8 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the European Union (EU) admits to doing a very bad job when trying to solve the problems it faces. How much confidence do you personally have in the EU?

Treatment group 9 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the British government praises the European Union (EU) for being highly democratic. How much confidence do you personally have in the EU?

Treatment group 10 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the British government criticizes the European Union (EU) for being highly undemocratic. How much confidence do you personally have in the EU?

Treatment group 11 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the British government praises the European Union (EU) for doing a very good job in trying to solve the problems it faces. How much confidence do you personally have in the EU?

Treatment group 12 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the British government criticizes the European Union (EU) for doing a very poor job in trying to solve the problems it faces. How much confidence do you personally have in the EU?

Control group – 600 respondents
How much confidence do you personally have in the European Union (EU)?

R O U N D 3

Treatment group 1 - 200 respondents
As you may know, most civil society organizations praise the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for being highly democratic. How much confidence do you personally have in the IMF?

Treatment group 2 - 200 respondents
As you may know, most civil society organizations criticize the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for being highly undemocratic. How much confidence do you personally have in the IMF?

Treatment group 3 - 200 respondents
As you may know, most civil society organizations praise the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for doing a very good job in trying to solve the problems it faces. How much confidence do you personally have in the IMF?

Treatment group 4 - 200 respondents
As you may know, most civil society organizations criticize the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for doing a very poor job in trying to solve the problems it faces. How much confidence do you personally have in the IMF?

Treatment group 5 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) prides itself for being highly democratic. How much confidence do you personally have in the IMF?

Treatment group 6 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) admits to being highly undemocratic. How much confidence do you personally have in the IMF?

Treatment group 7 - 200 respondents

As you may know, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) prides itself for doing a very good job in trying to solve the problems it faces. How much confidence do you personally have in the IMF?

Treatment group 8 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) admits to doing a very bad job when trying to solve the problems it faces. How much confidence do you personally have in the IMF?

Treatment group 9 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the British government praises the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for being highly democratic. How much confidence do you personally have in the IMF?

Treatment group 10 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the British government criticizes the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for being highly undemocratic. How much confidence do you personally have in the IMF?

Treatment group 11 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the British government praises the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for doing a very good job in trying to solve the problems it faces. How much confidence do you personally have in the IMF?

Treatment group 12 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the British government criticizes the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for doing a very poor job in trying to solve the problems it faces. How much confidence do you personally have in the IMF?

Control group - 600 respondents
How much confidence do you personally have in the International Monetary Fund (IMF)?

R O U N D 4

Treatment group 1 - 200 respondents
As you may know, most civil society organizations praise the World Trade Organization (WTO) for being highly democratic. How much confidence do you personally have in the WTO?

Treatment group 2 - 200 respondents
As you may know, most civil society organizations criticize the World Trade Organization (WTO) for being highly undemocratic. How much confidence do you personally have in the WTO?

Treatment group 3 - 200 respondents

As you may know, most civil society organizations praise the World Trade Organization (WTO) for doing a very good job in trying to solve the problems it faces. How much confidence do you personally have in the WTO?

Treatment group 4 - 200 respondents
As you may know, most civil society organizations criticize the World Trade Organization (WTO) for doing a very poor job in trying to solve the problems it faces. How much confidence do you personally have in the WTO?

Treatment group 5 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the World Trade Organization (WTO) prides itself for being highly democratic. How much confidence do you personally have in the WTO?

Treatment group 6 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the World Trade Organization (WTO) admits to being highly undemocratic. How much confidence do you personally have in the WTO?

Treatment group 7 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the World Trade Organization (WTO) prides itself for doing a very good job in trying to solve the problems it faces. How much confidence do you personally have in the WTO?

Treatment group 8 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the World Trade Organization (WTO) admits to doing a very bad job when trying to solve the problems it faces. How much confidence do you personally have in the WTO?

Treatment group 9 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the British government praises the World Trade Organization (WTO) for being highly democratic. How much confidence do you personally have in the WTO?

Treatment group 10 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the British government criticizes the World Trade Organization (WTO) for being highly undemocratic. How much confidence do you personally have in the WTO?

Treatment group 11 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the British government praises the World Trade Organization (WTO) for doing a very good job in trying to solve the problems it faces. How much confidence do you personally have in the WTO?

Treatment group 12 - 200 respondents
As you may know, the British government criticizes the World Trade Organization (WTO) for doing a very poor job in trying to solve the problems it faces. How much confidence do you personally have in the WTO?

Control group - 600 respondents

How much confidence do you personally have in the World Trade Organization (WTO)?

QUESTIONS TO ALL RESPONDENTS

VARIABLES FROM YOUGOV'S PANEL FOR ALL THREE COUNTRIES (NOT PART OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE, ASKED BEFORE THE EXPERIMENT)

Single Choice
What is the highest level of education you have completed?

US

1 No HS
2 High school graduate
3 Some college
4 2-year
5 4-year
6 Post-grad
8 Skipped
9 Not Asked

UK

1 No formal qualifications
2 Youth training certificate/skillseekers
3 Recognised trade apprenticeship completed
4 Clerical and commercial
5 City & Guilds certificate
6 City & Guilds certificate - advanced
7 ONC
8 CSE grades 2-5
9 CSE grade 1, GCE O level, GCSE, School Certificate
10 Scottish Ordinary/ Lower Certificate
11 GCE A level or Higher Certificate
12 Scottish Higher Certificate
13 Nursing qualification (eg SEN, SRN, SCM, RGN)
14 Teaching qualification (not degree)
15 University diploma
16 University or CNAA first degree (eg BA, B.Sc, B.Ed)
17 University or CNAA higher degree (eg M.Sc, Ph.D)
18 Other technical, professional or higher qualification
19 Don't know
20 Prefer not to say

Germany (two versions of answer categories)

Version 1

1 Noch in schulischer Ausbildung
2 Haupt-(Volks-)schulabschluss
3 Realschul- oder gleichwertiger Abschluss (POS, Mittlere Reife)
4 Abitur, Fachhochschulreife
5 Ohne Schulabschluss
777 keine Angabe

Version 2

1 Keinen Abschluss
2 Noch in Ausbildung
3 Noch im Studium
4 Lehre oder vergleichbarer Abschluss
5 Universitäts- oder Fachhochschulabschluss
777 keine Angabe

Single Choice

Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's annual income?

US

1 Less than $10,000
2 $10,000 - $14,999
3 $15,000 - $19,999
4 $20,000 - $24,999
5 $25,000 - $29,999
6 $30,000 - $39,999
7 $40,000 - $49,999
8 $50,000 - $59,999
9 $60,000 - $69,999
10 $70,000 - $79,999
11 $80,000 - $99,999
12 $100,000 - $119,999
13 $120,000 - $149,999
14 $150,000 or more
15 Prefer not to say
98 Skipped
99 Not Asked

UK

1 under £5,000 per year
2 £5,000 to £9,999 per year
3 £10,000 to £14,999 per year
4 £15,000 to £19,999 per year
5 £20,000 to £24,999 per year
6 £25,000 to £29,999 per year
7 £30,000 to £34,999 per year
8 £35,000 to £39,999 per year
9 £40,000 to £44,999 per year

10 £45,000 to £49,999 per year
11 £50,000 to £59,999 per year
12 £60,000 to £69,999 per year
13 £70,000 to £99,999 per year
14 £100,000 to £149,999 per year
15 £150,000 and over
16 Don't know
17 Prefer not to answer

Germany

1 unter EUR 500
2 EUR 500 bis unter EUR 1.000
3 EUR 1.000 bis unter EUR 1.500
4 EUR 1.500 bis unter EUR 2.000
5 EUR 2.000 bis unter EUR 2.500
6 EUR 2.500 bis unter EUR 3.000
7 EUR 3.000 bis unter EUR 3.500
8 EUR 3.500 bis unter EUR 4.000
9 EUR 4.000 bis unter EUR 4.500
10 EUR 4.500 bis unter EUR 5.000
11 EUR 5.000 bis unter EUR 10.000
12 EUR 10.000 und mehr
777 keine Angabe

Appendix B. Descriptive statistics

TABLE B1. *Country profiles*

Country	*Age*	*Left-right*	*Generalized trust*	*Confidence in domestic government*	*Discuss politics with friends*	*Country*	*Education* (% post-secondary, non-tertiary)	*Gender* (% female)	*Cosmopolitan identity* (% regional or world mentioned first)
Germany						**Germany**			
Mean	46	4.623	4.439	4.498	1.427	%	15.43	50.89	38.19
Std. dev.	14.652	1.896	2.486	2.636	0.644	Std. dev.	0.651	0.500	0.486
UK						**UK**			
Mean	48	4.929	5.266	4.271	1.560	%	65.21	51.77	33.49
Std. dev.	15.815	2.349	2.379	2.702	0.785	Std. dev.	0.983	0.500	0.472
US						**US**			
Mean	43	4.989	4.877	3.909	1.556	%	50.62	50.85	46.16
Std. dev.	14.520	2.965	2.611	2.535	0.763	Std. dev.	0.865	0.500	0.499

Notes: Variables are coded as follows: *Education* is a four-point indicator coded 1 “No formal qualifications or primary school", 2 "Secondary education", 3 "Post-secondary non-tertiary education", and 4 "Tertiary education". *Age* is a continuous variable and gender is dichotomous (1=”female”). *Left-right* is a quasi-continuous variable ranging from 0 “left” to 10 “right”. *Generalized trust* is a quasi-continuous variable ranging from 0 “You can’t be too careful” to 10 “Most people can be trusted”. *Cosmopolitan identity* is a dummy variable coded 1 if the regional organization or world is mentioned first and lower levels third, fourth, or not mentioned, and 0 if otherwise. *Confidence in domestic government* is coded on a quasi-continuous scale ranging from 0 “No confidence at all” to 10 “Complete confidence”. *Discuss politics with friends* is coded 1 “Never”, 2 “Occasionally”, and 3 “Frequently”.

TABLE B2. *Number of observations across groups*

Treatment	*Valence*	*Object*	*Source*	*Round 1*	*Round 2*		*Round 3*	*Round 4*
				(UN)	*(EU)*	*(NAFTA)*	*(IMF)*	*(WTO)*
1	+	Procedure	CSOs	585	405	167	488	522
2	–			549	413	166	502	459
3	+	Performance		605	405	165	517	509
4	–			582	412	165	527	477
5	+	Procedure	IOs	590	417	169	512	498
6	–			584	399	171	509	515
7	+	Performance		580	409	176	532	523
8	–			588	405	174	521	512
9	+	Procedure	Gov.	572	416	163	522	489
10	–			552	417	164	499	470
11	+	Performance		591	405	164	540	510
12	–			580	422	172	507	494
Control group				1776	1247	509	1546	1516

Notes: Number of respondents giving a substantive answer.

Appendix C. Documentation of paired *t*-tests

TABLE C1. *Differences in means for elite credibility*

Groups of comparison	*Paired differences*	*Number of individuals*
Environmental organizations vs government	0.172***	66973 in 52 countries
Women's organizations vs government	0.162***	65237 in 52 countries
Environmental organizations vs UN	0.232***	64016 in 52 countries
Women's organizations vs UN	0.225***	65756 in 52 countries
Government vs UN	0.063***	65535 in 52 countries
Environmental organizations vs EU	0.254***	14407 in 12 countries
Women's organizations vs EU	0.247***	13584 in 12 countries
Government vs EU	–0.017*	14938 in 12 countries
Environmental organizations vs NAFTA	0.504***	4039 in Mexico and the US
Women's organizations vs NAFTA	0.540***	4076 in Mexico and the US
Government vs NAFTA	0.072*	4075 in Mexico and the US

Notes: Significance levels: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Table shows the difference tests for different combinations of elites. If the estimated difference is positive and statistically significant, it indicates that the first actor is more credible in the eyes of citizens than the second actor. The paired *t*-tests are based on a variable created on the basis of the question of "I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? (*Read out and code one answer for each*): [Environmental organizations]; [Women's organizations]; [The government (in your nation's capital]; [The United Nations (UN)]; [The European Union (EU)]; [North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)]." Answer categories are coded 0 ("none at all"), 1 ("not very much"), 2 ("quite a lot"), and 3 ("a great deal"). Data are from the sixth wave of the World Values Survey at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/.

Appendix D. Numerical results for Figures 1-3

TABLE D1. Communicating elites

Treatment group	*Group of comparison*	*Average treatment effect*	
		Positive	*Negative*
CSO	*Control*	0.356***	–0.235***
		(4.415)	(–3.037)
		N=10962	*N*=10846
IO	*Control*	0.084	–0.351***
		(0.060)	(–4.473)
		N=11000	*N*=10972
Government	*Control*	0.283***	–0.243***
		(3.450)	(–2.965)
		N=10966	*N*=10871
CSO	*IO*	0.272***	0.115*
		(4.781)	(2.130)
		N=8774	*N*=8630
Government	*IO*	0.199**	0.107
		(3.223)	(1.725)
		N=8778	*N*=8655
CSO	*Government*	0.073	0.008
		(1.174)	(1.130)
		N=8740	*N*=8529

Notes: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Numbers are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. Coefficients are based on different samples using weighted data.

TABLE D2. Object of framing

Treatment group	*Group of comparison*	*Average treatment effect*	
		Positive	*Negative*
Procedure	*Control*	0.240**	–0.277***
		(3.210)	(–3.670)
		N=13109	*N*=12963
Performance	*Control*	0.240**	–0.278***
		(3.144)	(–3.690)
		N=13225	*N*=13132
Procedure	*Performance*	0.000	0.001
		(0.004)	(0.030)
		N=13146	*N*=12907

Notes: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Numbers are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. Coefficients are based on different samples using weighted data. All models are estimated using robust standard errors clustered at the level of individuals.

TABLE D3. Valence

Treatment group	*Group of comparison*	*Average treatment effect*
Positive	*Control*	0.240***
		(3.305)
		N=19740
Negative	*Control*	–0.277***
		(–3.868)
		N=19501
Negative	*Positive*	–0.517***
		(14.154)
		N=26053

Notes: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. In the first two columns, entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. All models are estimated using robust standard errors clustered at the level of individuals. The analyses are based on different samples using weighted data.

Appendix E. Subgroup analysis: Numerical results for Figures 4-6

TABLE E1. Numerical results for Figures 4-6

Treatment group	*Group of comparison*	UN	IMF	WTO	EU	NAFTA
Figure 4						
CSO +	*Control*	0.539*** (4.706) N=2966	0.365** (2.895) *N*=2551	0.423** (3.615) *N*=2547	0.100 (0.855) *N*=2057	0.058 (0.206) *N*=841
CSO –	*Control*	–0.276* (–2.242) N=2907	–0.140 (–1.234) *N*=2575	–0.195 (–1.745) *N*=2452	–0.197 (–1.731) *N*=2072	–0.634* (–2.318) *N*=840
IO +	*Control*	0.159 (1.327) *N*=2946	0.092 (0.856) *N*=2590	0.198 (1.716) *N*=2537	–0.023 (–0.206) *N*=2073	–0.227 (–0.762) *N*=854
IO –	*Control*	–0.572*** (–5.136) *N*=2948	–0.275* (–2.319) *N*=2576	–0.300** (–2.713) *N*=2543	–0.267* (–2.321) *N*=2051	–0.126 (–0.472) *N*=854
Government +	*Control*	0.391*** (3.171) *N*=2939	0.221 (1.946) *N*=2608	0.346** (2.701) *N*=2515	0.147 (1.287) *N*=2068	0.253 (0.841) *N*=836
Government –	*Control*	–0.182 (–1.565) *N*=2908	–0.234 (–1.850) *N*=2552	–0.319* (–2.523) *N*=2480	–0.255* (–2.271) *N*=2086	–0.165 (–0.643) *N*=845
Figure 5						
Input +	*Control*	0.407*** (3.887) N=3523	0.217* (2.048) *N*=3068	0.251* (2.437) *N*=3025	0.075 (0.729) *N*=2485	0.165 (0.609) *N*=1008
Input –	*Control*	–0.242*** (–2.299) N=3461	–0.296*** (–2.796) *N*=3056	–0.209* (–2.045) *N*=2960	–0.365*** (–3.606) *N*=2476	–0.282 (–1.143) *N*=1010
Output +	*Control*	0.324*** (3.033) N=3552	0.231* (2.279) *N*=3135	0.390*** (3.536) *N*=3058	0.074 (0.835) *N*=2466	0–.142 (–0.567) *N*=1014
Output –	*Control*	–0.444*** (–4.455) N=3526	–0.144 (–1.346) *N*=3101	–0.335*** (–3.177) *N*=2999	–0.117 (–1.150) *N*=2486	–0.315 (0.303) *N*=1020
Figure 6						
Positive	*Control*	0.364*** (4.012) *N*=5299	0.224* (2.500) *N*=4657	0.321*** (3.523) *N*=4567	0.074 (0.828) *N*=3704	0.018 (0.080) *N*=1513
Negative	*Control*	–0.343*** (–3.865) *N*=5211	–0.218* (–3.383) *N*=4611	–0.273*** (–3.045) *N*=4443	–0.239** (–2.654) *N*=3715	–0.298 (–1.382) *N*=1521

Notes: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. In the first two columns, entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. All models are estimated using robust standard errors clustered at the level of individuals. The analyses are based on different samples using weighted data.

Appendix F: Results including country dummies

TABLE F1. *Replication of Figure 1 (Appendix Table D1) including country dummies*

Treatment group	*Group of comparison*	*Average treatment effect*	
		Valence	
		Positive	*Negative*
CSO	*Control*	0.357***	–0.239***
		(4.475)	(–3.013)
		N=10962	*N*=10846
IO	*Control*	0.088	–0.349***
		(0.120)	(–4.521)
		N=11000	*N*=10972
Government	*Control*	0.284***	–0.244***
		(3.503)	(–2.988)
		N=10966	*N*=10871
CSO	*IO*	0.271***	0.110*
		(4.761)	(2.040)
		N=8774	*N*=8630
Government	*IO*	0.197**	0.106
		(3.203)	(1.690)
		N=8778	*N*=8655
CSO	*Government*	0.073	0.006
		(1.168)	(1.107)
		N=8740	*N*=8529

Notes: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Numbers are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. Coefficients are based on different samples using weighted data.

TABLE F2. *Replication of Figure 2 (Appendix Table D2) including country dummies*

Treatment group	*Group of comparison*	*Average treatment effect* *Valence*	
		Positive	*Negative*
Procedure	*Control*	0.242**	–0.277***
		(3.155)	(–3.742)
		N=13109	*N*=12963
Performance	*Control*	0.241**	–0.280***
		(3.210)	(–3.784)
		N=13225	*N*=13132
Procedure	*Performance*	0.001	0.003
		(0.030)	(–0.062)
		N=13146	*N*=12907

Notes: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Numbers are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. Coefficients are based on different samples using weighted data. All models are estimated using robust standard errors clustered at the level of individuals.

TABLE F3. *Replication of Figure 3 (Appendix Table D3) including country dummies*

Treatment group	*Group of comparison*	*Average treatment effect*
Positive	*Control*	0.242*** (3.371) *N*=19740
Negative	*Control*	–0.278*** (–3.941) *N*=19501
Negative	*Positive*	–0.519*** (14.223) *N*=26053

Notes: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. In the first two columns, entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. All models are estimated using robust standard errors clustered at the level of individuals. The analyses are based on different samples using weighted data.

TABLE F4. *Replication of Figures 4-6 (Appendix Table E) including country dummies*

Treatment group	*Group of comparison*	UN	IMF	WTO	EU	NAFTA
Figure 4						
CSO +	*Control*	0.532*** (4.705) N=2966	0.364** (2.903) *N*=2551	0.420** (3.612) *N*=2547	0.092 (0.795) *N*=2057	0.058 (0.206) *N*=841
CSO –	*Control*	–0.272* (–2.459) N=2907	–0.144 (–1.280) *N*=2575	–0.194 (–1.747) *N*=2452	–0.204 (–1.808) *N*=2072	–0.634* (–2.318) *N*=840
IO +	*Control*	0.153 (1.304) *N*=2946	0.093 (0.864) *N*=2590	–0.202 (1.763) *N*=2537	–0.025 (–0.224) *N*=2073	–0.227 (–0.762) *N*=854
IO –	*Control*	–0.590*** (–5.562) *N*=2948	–0.264* (–2.268) *N*=2576	–0.306** (–2.787) *N*=2543	–0.267* (–2.385) *N*=2051	–0.126 (–0.472) *N*=854
Government +	*Control*	0.414*** (3.433) *N*=2939	0.222 (1.980) *N*=2608	0.254* (2.471) *N*=2515	0.149 (1.318) *N*=2068	0.253 (0.841) *N*=836
Government –	*Control*	–0.186 (–1.548) *N*=2908	–0.232 (–1.863) *N*=2552	–0.208* (–2.051) *N*=2480	–0.260* (–2.331) *N*=2086	–0.165 (–0.643) *N*=845
Figure 5						
Input +	*Control*	0.398*** (3.823) N=3523	0.221* (2.113) *N*=3068	0.387*** (3.545) *N*=3025	0.071 (0.695) *N*=2485	0.165 (0.609) *N*=1008
Input –	*Control*	–0.241* (–2.306) N=3461	–0.291** (–2.780) *N*=3056	–0.332** (–2.673) *N*=2960	–0.372*** (–3.706) *N*=2476	–0.282 (–1.143) *N*=1010
Output +	*Control*	0.341*** (3.271) N=3552	0.228* (2.257) *N*=3135	0.343** (2.673) *N*=3058	0.073 (0.724) *N*=2466	0–.142 (–0.567) *N*=1014
Output –	*Control*	–0.460*** (–4.775) N=3526	–0.145 (–1.363) *N*=3101	–0.309* (–2.483) *N*=2999	–0.119 (–1.176) *N*=2486	–0.315 (0.303) *N*=1020
Figure 6						
Positive	*Control*	0.369*** (4.131) *N*=5299	0.224* (2.519) *N*=4657	0.320*** (3.543) *N*=4567	0.072 (0.821) *N*=3704	0.018 (0.080) *N*=1513
Negative	*Control*	–0.349*** (–3.997) *N*=5211	–0.215* (–2.377) *N*=4611	–0.271** (–3.058) *N*=4443	–0.243** (–2.782) *N*=3715	–0.298 (–1.382) *N*=1521

Notes: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. In the first two columns, entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. All models are estimated using robust standard errors clustered at the level of individuals. The analyses are based on different samples using weighted data.

Appendix G: Country-specific results

TABLE G1. *Replication of Figure 1 (Appendix Table D1): Germany*

Treatment group	*Group of comparison*	*Average treatment effect*	
		Valence	
		Positive	*Negative*
CSO	*Control*	0.166	–0.265*
		(1.499)	(–2.410)
		N=3949	*N*=3900
IO	*Control*	–0.088	–0.267*
		(0.804)	(–2.461)
		N=3946	*N*=3930
Government	*Control*	0.170	–0.427***
		(1.538)	(–3.918)
		N=3950	*N*=3920
CSO	*IO*	0.254***	0.002
		(3.342)	(0.033)
		N=3154	*N*=3080
Government	*IO*	0.258**	0.106*
		(3.447)	(2.126)
		N=3146	*N*=3100
CSO	*Government*	–0.004	0.163*
		(0.047)	(2.177)
		N=3149	*N*=3070

Notes: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Numbers are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. Coefficients are based on different samples using weighted data.

TABLE G2. *Replication of Figure 2 (Appendix Table D2): Germany*

Treatment group	*Group of comparison*	*Average treatment effect* *Valence*	
		Positive	*Negative*
Procedure	*Control*	0.112	–0.340**
		(1.060)	(–3.262)
		N=4731	*N*=4667
Performance	*Control*	0.053	–0.300**
		(0.501)	(–2.855)
		N=4739	*N*=4708
Procedure	*Performance*	0.059	–0.041
		(0.907)	(–0.680)
		N=4720	*N*=4625

Notes: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Numbers are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. Coefficients are based on different samples using weighted data. All models are estimated using robust standard errors clustered at the level of individuals.

TABLE G3. *Replication of Figure 3 (Appendix Table D3): Germany*

Treatment group	*Group of comparison*	*Average treatment effect*
Positive	*Control*	0.083 (0.819) *N*=7095
Negative	*Control*	–0.320** (–3.189) *N*=7000
Negative	*Positive*	–0.402*** (8.842) *N*=9345

Notes: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. In the first two columns, entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. All models are estimated using robust standard errors clustered at the level of individuals. The analyses are based on different samples using weighted data.

TABLE G4. *Replication of Figures 4-6 (Appendix Table E): Germany*

Treatment group	*Group of comparison*	UN	IMF	WTO	EU
Figure 4					
CSO +	*Control*	0.487** (3.191) N=1025	0.212 (0.763) *N*=954	0.088 (0.576) *N*=934	–0.083 (–0.533) *N*=1063
CSO –	*Control*	–0.368* (–2.514) N=995	–0.159 (–1.009) *N*=968	–0.227 (–1.385) *N*=897	–0.303* (–1.995) *N*=1040
IO +	*Control*	–0.082 (–0.531) *N*=1008	–0.137 (0.913) *N*=964	–0.082 (0.538) *N*=933	–0.212 (–1.388) *N*=1041
IO –	*Control*	–0.454*** (–3.071) *N*=1015	–0.062 (–0.410) *N*=963	–0.276 (–1.892) *N*=928	–0.277 (–1.760) *N*=1024
Government +	*Control*	0.246 (3.326) *N*=1007	0.135 (0.873) *N*=986	0.354* (2.271) *N*=919	–0.019 (–0.122) *N*=1038
Government –	*Control*	–0.494*** (–3.332) *N*=991	–0.294 (–1.938) *N*=952	–0.459*** (–2.954) *N*=927	–0.463** (–3.063) *N*=1050
Figure 5					
Input +	*Control*	0.312* (2.267) N=1217	0.116 (0.831) *N*=1155	0.222 (1.609) *N*=1119	–0.111 (–0.805) *N*=1252
Input –	*Control*	–0.457*** (–3.393) N=1183	–0.147 (–1.062) *N*=1150	–0.436** (–3.131) *N*=1100	–0.520*** (–3.774) *N*=1242
Output +	*Control*	0.129 (0.923) N=1216	0.034 (2.245) *N*=1164	0.354* (2.272) *N*=919	0.099 (0.707) *N*=1240
Output –	*Control*	–0.421** (–3.179) N=1211	–0.195 (–1.408) *N*=1148	–0.460** (–2.947) *N*=927	–0.182 (–1.313) *N*=1249
Figure 6					
Positive	*Control*	0.220*** (1.824) *N*=1826	0.041 (0.338) *N*=1734	0.172 (1.432) *N*=1666	–0.105 (–0.864) *N*=1869
Negative	*Control*	–0.439*** (–3.722) *N*=1787	–0.171 (–1.417) *N*=1713	–0.323** (–2.677) *N*=1632	–0.349** (–2.886) *N*=1868

Notes: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. In the first two columns, entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. All models are estimated using robust standard errors clustered at the level of individuals. The analyses are based on different samples using weighted data.

TABLE G5. *Replication of Figure 1 (Appendix Table D1): UK*

Treatment group	*Group of comparison*	*Average treatment effect* *Valence*	
		Positive	*Negative*
CSO	*Control*	0.439***	–0.151
		(3.970)	(–1.391)
		N=3643	*N*=3591
IO	*Control*	0.289**	–0.371***
		(2.619)	(–3.404)
		N=3650	*N*=3638
Government	*Control*	0.361***	–0.268*
		(3.256)	(–2.456)
		N=3649	*N*=3610
CSO	*IO*	0.150	0.220**
		(1.716)	(2.594)
		N=2891	*N*=2827
Government	*IO*	0.072	0.103
		(0.812)	(1.233)
		N=2897	*N*=2846
CSO	*Government*	0.078	0.118
		(0.874)	(1.420)
		N=2890	*N*=2799

Notes: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Numbers are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. Coefficients are based on different samples using weighted data.

TABLE G6. *Replication of Figure 2 (Appendix Table D2): UK*

Treatment group	*Group of comparison*	*Average treatment effect*	
		Valence	
		Positive	*Negative*
Procedure	*Control*	0.324**	–0.307***
		(3.091)	(–2.961)
		N=4334	*N*=4290
Performance	*Control*	0.400***	–0.224*
		(3.830)	(–2.171)
		N=4407	*N*=4348
Procedure	*Performance*	–0.076	–0.083
		(–1.055)	(–1.199)
		N=4339	*N*=4236

Notes: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Numbers are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. Coefficients are based on different samples using weighted data. All models are estimated using robust standard errors clustered at the level of individuals.

TABLE G7. *Replication of Figure 3 (Appendix Table D3): UK*

Treatment group	*Group of comparison*	*Average treatment effect*
Positive	*Control*	0.326***
		(3.696)
		N=6540
Negative	*Control*	–0.265**
		(–2.714)
		N=6437
Negative	*Positive*	–0.627***
		(12.073)
		N=8575

Notes: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. In the first two columns, entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. All models are estimated using robust standard errors clustered at the level of individuals. The analyses are based on different samples using weighted data.

TABLE G8. *Replication of Figures 4-6 (Appendix Table E): UK*

Treatment group	*Group of comparison*	UN	IMF	WTO	EU
Figure 4					
CSO +	*Control*	0.578*** (3.777) N=994	0.462** (2.655) *N*=839	0.419* (2.457) *N*=789	0.273 (1.604) *N*=1021
CSO –	*Control*	–0.012 (0.075) N=968	–0.268 (–1.602) *N*=837	–0.280 (–1.676) *N*=754	–0.102 (–0.611) *N*=1032
IO +	*Control*	0.552*** (3.325) *N*=988	0.127 (0.705) *N*=845	–0.298 (1.799) *N*=785	0.164 (1.003) *N*=1032
IO –	*Control*	–0.406** (–2.597) *N*=977	–0.517** (–3.056) *N*=846	–0.316 (–1.924) *N*=788	–0.256 (–1.576) *N*=1027
Government +	*Control*	0.716*** (4.505) *N*=983	0.108 (0.637) *N*=850	0.277 (1.847) *N*=934	0.317 (1.911) *N*=1030
Government –	*Control*	–0.368* (–2.320) *N*=985	–0.374* (2.208) *N*=848	–0.339* (–2.202) *N*=898	–0.052 (–0.315) *N*=1036
Figure 5					
Input +	*Control*	0.525*** (3.631) N=1175	0.245 (1.554) *N*=992	0.406** (2.639) *N*=955	0.257 (1.705) *N*=1233
Input –	*Control*	–0.209 (–1.463) N=1154	–0.492** (–3.241) *N*=1004	–0.257 (–1.760) *N*=914	–0.220 (–1.507) *N*=1234
Output +	*Control*	0.698*** (4.945) N=1191	0.215 (1.382) *N*=1035	0.312 (1.752) *N*=786	0.247 (1.690) *N*=1226
Output –	*Control*	–0.301*** (–2.151) N=1177	–0.293 (–1.932) *N*=1020	–0.293 (–1.675) *N*=741	–0.055 (–0.374) *N*=1237
Figure 6					
Positive	*Control*	0.614*** (4.944) *N*=1767	0.230 (1.690) *N*=1510	0.344** (2.646) *N*=1418	0.252* (1.978) *N*=1835
Negative	*Control*	–0.255*** (–2.072) *N*=1723	–0.388** (–2.914) *N*=1517	–0.297* (–2.311) *N*=1341	–0.136 (–1.074) *N*=1847

Notes: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. In the first two columns, entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. All models are estimated using robust standard errors clustered at the level of individuals. The analyses are based on different samples using weighted data.

TABLE G9. *Replication of Figure 1 (Appendix Table 1): US*

Treatment group	*Group of comparison*	*Average treatment effect* *Valence*	
		Positive	*Negative*
CSO	*Control*	0.494**	–0.036
		(2.595)	(–1.698)
		N=3370	*N*=3355
IO	*Control*	0.077	–0.425*
		(0.415)	(–2.306)
		N=3404	*N*=3404
Government	*Control*	0.337	–0.007
		(1.707)	(–0.035)
		N=3367	*N*=3341
CSO	*IO*	0.419**	0.119
		(3.184)	(0.955)
		N=2738	*N*=2723
Government	*IO*	0.261	0.432**
		(1.717)	(2.660)
		N=2735	*N*=2709
CSO	*Government*	0.159	–0.313*
		(1.025)	(2.001)
		N=2701	*N*=2660

Notes: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Numbers are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. Coefficients are based on different samples using weighted data.

TABLE G10. *Replication of Figure 2 (Appendix Table 2): US*

Treatment group	*Group of comparison*	*Average treatment effect*	
		Valence	
		Positive	*Negative*
Procedure	*Control*	0.308	–0.166
		(1.668)	(–0.930)
		N=4404	*N*=4006
Performance	*Control*	0.291	–0.318
		(1.632)	(–1.796)
		N=4079	*N*=4076
Procedure	*Performance*	0.017	0.152
		(0.144)	(–1.362)
		N=4087	*N*=4046

Notes: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Numbers are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. Coefficients are based on different samples using weighted data. All models are estimated using robust standard errors clustered at the level of individuals.

TABLE G11. *Replication of Figure 3 (Appendix Table 3): US*

Treatment group	*Group of comparison*	*Average treatment effect*
Positive	*Control*	0.300 (1.748) *N*=6105
Negative	*Control*	–0.242 (–1.436) *N*=6064
Negative	*Positive*	–0.542*** (–5.959) *N*=8133

Notes: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. In the first two columns, entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. All models are estimated using robust standard errors clustered at the level of individuals. The analyses are based on different samples using weighted data.

TABLE G12. *Replication of Figures 4-6 (Appendix Table E): US*

Treatment group	*Group of comparison*	UN	IMF	WTO	NAFTA
Figure 1					
CSO +	*Control*	0.534* (1.972) N=947	0.577 (1.767) *N*=758	0.798** (2.990) *N*=824	0.058 (0.206) *N*=841
CSO –	*Control*	–0.463 (–1.789) N=944	–0.028 (0.101) *N*=770	–0.071 (–0.290) *N*=801	–0.634* (–2.318) *N*=840
IO +	*Control*	–0.012 (–0.042) *N*=950	0.358 (1.509) *N*=781	–0.245 (0.930) *N*=819	–0.227 (–0.762) *N*=854
IO –	*Control*	–0.947*** (–3.931) *N*=956	–0.238 (–0.831) *N*=767	–0.332 (–1.272) *N*=827	–0.126 (–0.472) *N*=854
Government +	*Control*	0.294 (1.038) *N*=949	0.473 (1.760) *N*=772	0.383 (1.626) *N*=984	0.253 (0.841) *N*=836
Government –	*Control*	0.346 (1.224) *N*=932	–0.004 (–0.014) *N*=752	–0.078 (–0.335) *N*=970	–0.165 (–0.643) *N*=845
Figure 2					
Input +	*Control*	0.360 (1.442) N=1131	0.337 (1.312) *N*=921	0.560* (2.125) *N*=984	0.165 (0.609) *N*=1008
Input –	*Control*	–0.044 (–0.177) N=1124	–0.256 (–0.975) *N*=902	–0.281 (–1.137) *N*=985	–0.282 (–1.143) *N*=1010
Output +	*Control*	0.202 (0.833) N=1145	0.594* (2.481) *N*=936	0.361 (1.121) *N*=810	0–.142 (–0.567) *N*=1014
Output –	*Control*	–0.676** (–3.021) N=1138	0.090 (0.341) *N*=933	–0.147 (–0.493) *N*=812	–0.315 (0.303) *N*=1020
Figure 3					
Positive	*Control*	0.274 (1.315) *N*=1706	0.467* (2.183) *N*=4657	0.470* (2.221) *N*=1483	0.018 (0.080) *N*=1513
Negative	*Control*	–0.351 (–1.713) *N*=1692	–0.075 (–0.336) *N*=4611	–0.183 (–0.884) *N*=1470	–0.298 (–1.382) *N*=1521

Notes: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. In the first two columns, entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. All models are estimated using robust standard errors clustered at the level of individuals. The analyses are based on different samples using weighted data.

Appendix H: Balance tests

TABLE H1. *Balance tests*

Treatment group (as collapsed for analysis in Figures 1-3)	*Valence*	*Education*	*Age*	*Gender*	*Left-right*	*Generalized trust*	*Cosmopolitan identity*	*Confidence in domestic government*	*Discuss politics with friends*
Object									
Procedure	+	0.35	0.09	0.23	0.20	0.78	0.24	0.51	0.27
Procedure	–	0.23	0.60	0.26	**0.04**	0.97	0.11	0.34	0.88
Performance	+	0.35	0.19	0.17	0.29	0.69	**0.04**	0.85	**0.04**
Performance	–	0.90	0.08	0.31	0.29	0.22	0.08	0.30	0.27
Elite type									
CSO	+	0.42	0.28	0.39	0.14	0.86	0.07	0.36	0.08
CSO	–	0.27	0.42	0.12	**0.03**	0.91	0.09	0.53	0.86
IO	+	0.07	0.07	0.10	0.15	0.64	**0.04**	0.87	0.28
IO	–	0.58	0.11	0.95	0.52	**0.02**	0.08	0.12	0.99
Government	+	0.93	0.24	0.33	0.80	0.78	0.58	0.70	0.14
Government	–	0.37	0.52	0.20	0.18	0.52	0.31	0.63	0.26
Valence									
Positive		0.28	0.08	0.13	0.18	0.70	0.06	0.63	0.07
Negative		0.54	0.19	0.22	0.08	0.48	0.05	0.25	0.58

Notes: Numbers are *p*-values. Figures in bold: p<.05. Results from two-tailed *t*-tests of covariates using dummy variables indicating receiving a treatment (=1) or not (=0). See questionnaire in Appendix A for question wording. Variables coded as in Table B1.

TABLE H2. *Balance tests*

Treatment group (actual treatments as presented in Table 1)	*Valence*	*Education*	*Age*	*Gender*	*Left-right*	*Generalized trust*	*Cosmopolitan identity*	*Confidence in domestic government*	*Discuss politics with friends*
Procedure-CSOs	+	0.93	0.27	0.45	0.27	0.93	0.19	0.18	0.44
Procedure-CSOs	–	0.33	0.89	0.13	0.08	0.37	0.54	0.38	0.81
Performance -CSOs	+	0.17	0.56	0.55	0.23	0.72	0.12	0.93	**0.05**
Performance-CSOs	–	0.44	0.17	0.35	0.10	0.48	**0.04**	0.90	0.60
Procedure-IOs	+	0.07	0.08	0.37	0.17	0.84	0.07	0.87	0.48
Procedure-IOs	–	0.71	0.44	0.58	0.60	0.12	0.13	0.46	0.67
Performance-IOs	+	0.30	0.30	0.09	0.37	0.60	0.18	0.68	0.31
Performance-IOs	–	0.21	0.08	0.65	0.62	**0.03**	0.22	0.09	0.68
Procedure-Governments	+	0.80	0.48	0.36	0.80	0.64	0.49	0.90	0.41
Procedure- Governments	–	0.22	0.66	0.75	**0.04**	0.44	0.23	0.71	0.72
Performance- Governments	+	0.69	0.26	0.53	0.88	0.98	0.12	0.47	0.13
Performance- Governments	–	0.83	0.58	0.09	0.91	0.80	0.67	0.71	0.16

Notes: Numbers are *p*-values. Figures in bold: p<.05. Results from two-tailed *t*-tests of covariates using dummy variables indicating receiving a treatment (=1) or not (=0). See questionnaire in Appendix A for question wording. Variables coded as in Table B1.

TABLE H3. *Balance tests (round 1, UN)*

Treatment group (as collapsed for analysis in Figures 1-3)	*Valence*	*Education*	*Age*	*Gender*	*Left-right*	*Generalized trust*	*Cosmopolitan identity*	*Confidence in domestic government*	*Discuss politics with friends*
Object									
Procedure	+	0.96	**0.01**	0.13	0.96	0.30	0.73	0.31	**0.03**
Procedure	–	0.68	0.91	0.93	0.68	0.45	0.35	0.95	0.90
Performance	+	0.39	0.97	0.19	0.32	0.91	0.26	0.53	0.63
Performance	–	0.34	0.60	0.72	0.53	0.99	0.19	0.73	0.91
Elite type									
CSO	+	0.21	0.67	0.13	0.23	0.96	0.45	0.44	0.70
CSO	–	0.49	0.75	0.95	0.88	0.32	0.63	0.73	0.54
IO	+	0.73	0.08	0.24	0.65	0.19	0.48	0.47	0.64
IO	–	0.18	0.33	0.30	0.23	0.62	0.16	0.94	0.82
Government	+	0.62	0.23	0.27	0.82	0.88	0.60	0.48	0.17
Government	–	0.92	0.65	0.45	0.99	0.61	0.24	0.90	0.61
Valence									
Positive		0.63	0.14	0.10	0.55	0.51	0.39	0.34	0.34
Negative		0.74	0.71	0.87	0.55	0.67	0.19	0.86	0.89

Notes: Numbers are *p*-values. Figures in bold: p<.05. Results from two-tailed *t*-tests of covariates using dummy variables indicating receiving a treatment (=1) or not (=0). See questionnaire in Appendix A for question wording. Variables coded as in Table B1.

TABLE H4. *Balance tests (round 1, UN)*

Treatment group (actual treatments as presented in Table 1)	*Valence*	*Education*	*Age*	*Gender*	*Left-right*	*Generalized trust*	*Cosmopolitan identity*	*Confidence in domestic government*	*Discuss politics with friends*
Procedure-CSOs	+	0.88	0.12	0.77	0.93	0.41	0.72	0.80	0.51
Procedure-CSOs	–	0.38	0.58	0.81	0.82	0.65	0.75	0.36	0.47
Performance -CSOs	+	0.07	0.38	**0.04**	0.07	0.47	0.13	0.33	0.97
Performance-CSOs	–	0.82	0.31	0.74	0.99	0.27	0.67	0.74	0.81
Procedure-IOs	+	0.62	**0.02**	0.45	0.93	0.43	0.08	0.22	0.39
Procedure-IOs	–	0.68	0.49	0.86	0.26	0.66	0.28	0.82	0.54
Performance-IOs	+	0.96	0.66	0.27	0.54	0.19	0.51	0.92	0.89
Performance-IOs	–	0.09	0.39	0.07	0.43	0.22	0.26	0.92	0.80
Procedure-Governments	+	0.45	0.12	**0.03**	0.94	0.56	0.50	0.51	**0.00**
Procedure- Governments	–	0.66	0.94	0.81	0.62	0.48	0.57	0.42	0.29
Performance- Governments	+	0.98	0.72	0.68	0.78	0.75	0.13	0.65	0.39
Performance- Governments	–	0.56	0.44	0.16	0.61	0.91	0.21	0.33	0.80

Notes: Numbers are *p*-values. Figures in bold: p<.05. Results from two-tailed *t*-tests of covariates using dummy variables indicating receiving a treatment (=1) or not (=0). See questionnaire in Appendix A for question wording. Variables coded as in Table B1.

TABLE H5. *Balance tests (round 2, regional organizations)*

Treatment group (as collapsed for analysis in Figures 1-3)	*Valence*	*Education*	*Age*	*Gender*	*Left-right*	*Generalized trust*	*Cosmopolitan identity*	*Confidence in domestic government*	*Discuss politics with friends*
Object									
Procedure	+	0.85	0.70	0.56	0.11	0.50	0.42	0.65	0.38
Procedure	–	0.92	0.84	0.23	0.92	0.84	0.82	0.91	0.41
Performance	+	0.38	0.08	0.92	0.76	0.62	0.50	0.79	0.22
Performance	–	0.51	0.21	**0.03**	0.33	0.34	0.50	0.18	0.37
Elite type									
CSO	+	0.73	0.19	0.86	0.48	0.72	**0.02**	0.39	0.68
CSO	–	0.93	0.47	**0.00**	0.49	0.70	0.80	0.22	0.58
IO	+	0.33	0.90	0.63	0.55	0.11	0.95	0.15	0.20
IO	–	0.40	0.39	0.82	0.92	0.10	0.23	0.11	0.88
Government	+	0.89	0.68	0.73	0.20	0.73	0.72	0.40	0.67
Government	–	0.99	0.71	0.07	0.70	0.75	0.82	0.20	0.12
Valence									
Positive		0.53	0.43	0.78	0.27	0.50	0.39	0.91	0.84
Negative		0.75	0.40	**0.05**	0.62	0.50	0.60	0.47	0.32

Notes: Numbers are *p*-values. Figures in bold: p<.05. Results from two-tailed *t*-tests of covariates using dummy variables indicating receiving a treatment (=1) or not (=0). See questionnaire in Appendix A for question wording. Variables coded as in Table B1.

TABLE H6. *Balance tests (round 2, regional organizations)*

Treatment group (actual treatments as presented in Table 1)	*Valence*	*Education*	*Age*	*Gender*	*Left-right*	*Generalized trust*	*Cosmopolitan identity*	*Confidence in domestic government*	*Discuss politics with friends*
Procedure-CSOs	+	0.13	0.55	0.96	0.47	0.44	**0.04**	0.07	0.15
Procedure-CSOs	–	0.73	0.87	**0.02**	0.70	0.36	0.95	0.16	0.70
Performance -CSOs	+	**0.04**	0.15	0.75	0.69	0.84	0.11	0.63	0.46
Performance-CSOs	–	0.83	0.32	**0.02**	0.13	0.76	0.64	0.60	0.62
Procedure-IOs	+	0.62	0.52	0.72	0.10	0.27	0.72	0.26	0.29
Procedure-IOs	–	0.70	0.97	0.64	0.63	0.23	0.97	0.47	0.79
Performance-IOs	+	0.30	0.41	0.69	0.49	0.16	0.80	0.27	0.33
Performance-IOs	–	0.34	0.19	0.92	0.54	0.16	0.06	0.07	0.98
Procedure-Governments	+	0.16	0.45	0.41	0.29	0.27	0.51	0.80	0.13
Procedure- Governments	–	0.82	0.83	0.45	0.53	0.87	0.61	0.65	0.29
Performance- Governments	+	0.23	0.16	0.77	0.33	0.57	0.93	0.28	0.38
Performance- Governments	–	0.81	0.70	**0.04**	0.98	0.74	0.39	0.12	0.16

Notes: Numbers are *p*-values. Figures in bold: p<.05. Results from two-tailed *t*-tests of covariates using dummy variables indicating receiving a treatment (=1) or not (=0). See questionnaire in Appendix A for question wording. Variables coded as in Table B1.

TABLE H7. *Balance tests (round 3, IMF)*

Treatment group (as collapsed for analysis in Figures 1-3)	*Valence*	*Education*	*Age*	*Gender*	*Left-right*	*Generalized trust*	*Cosmopo-litan identity*	*Confidence in domestic government*	*Discuss politics with friends*
Object									
Procedure	+	0.81	0.69	0.77	0.49	0.50	0.18	0.87	0.22
Procedure	–	0.52	0.53	0.53	0.11	0.83	0.60	0.63	0.99
Performance	+	0.83	0.93	0.30	0.33	0.68	0.37	0.80	**0.05**
Performance	–	**0.01**	0.18	0.72	0.30	0.39	0.33	0.99	0.58
Elite type									
CSO	+	0.47	0.96	0.77	0.51	0.89	0.51	0.91	**0.02**
CSO	–	0.10	0.97	0.33	**0.05**	0.92	0.06	0.78	0.53
IO	+	0.99	0.48	0.41	0.36	0.74	**0.05**	0.91	0.67
IO	–	0.53	0.17	0.64	0.95	0.26	0.91	0.34	0.69
Government	+	0.47	0.99	0.93	**0.05**	0.44	0.74	0.58	0.09
Government	–	**0.05**	0.21	0.90	0.11	0.87	0.81	0.54	0.77
Valence									
Positive		0.99	0.78	0.66	0.86	0.89	0.20	0.81	0.06
Negative		0.07	0.25	0.57	0.13	0.71	0.39	0.78	0.75

Notes: Numbers are *p*-values. Figures in bold: p<.05. Results from two-tailed *t*-tests of covariates using dummy variables indicating receiving a treatment (=1) or not (=0). See questionnaire in Appendix A for question wording. Variables coded as in Table B1.

TABLE H8. *Balance tests (round 3, IMF)*

Treatment group (actual treatments as presented in Table 1)	*Valence*	*Education*	*Age*	*Gender*	*Left-right*	*Generalized trust*	*Cosmopolitan identity*	*Confidence in domestic government*	*Discuss politics with friends*
Procedure-CSOs	+	0.89	0.83	0.52	0.33	0.82	0.49	0.81	**0.05**
Procedure-CSOs	–	0.67	0.93	0.19	0.09	0.25	0.37	0.47	0.39
Performance -CSOs	+	0.33	0.77	0.87	0.93	0.67	0.72	0.68	0.11
Performance-CSOs	–	**0.03**	0.98	0.80	0.14	0.33	**0.04**	0.79	0.89
Procedure-IOs	+	0.84	0.27	0.75	0.10	0.44	**0.01**	0.75	0.86
Procedure-IOs	–	0.80	0.48	0.73	0.89	0.51	0.46	0.97	0.99
Performance-IOs	+	0.87	0.99	0.33	0.86	0.82	0.50	0.89	0.40
Performance-IOs	–	0.22	0.15	0.70	0.96	0.26	0.37	0.13	0.53
Procedure-Governments	+	0.41	0.64	0.12	0.27	**0.05**	0.75	0.37	0.39
Procedure- Governments	–	0.22	0.60	0.76	0.07	0.97	0.59	0.74	0.38
Performance- Governments	+	0.74	0.67	0.17	**0.05**	0.50	0.40	1.00	0.07
Performance- Governments	–	**0.05**	0.15	0.91	0.49	0.77	0.37	0.20	0.68

Notes: Numbers are *p*-values. Figures in bold: p<.05. Results from two-tailed *t*-tests of covariates using dummy variables indicating receiving a treatment (=1) or not (=0). See questionnaire in Appendix A for question wording. Variables coded as in Table B1.

TABLE H9. *Balance tests (round 4, WTO)*

Treatment group (as collapsed for analysis in Figures 1-3)	*Valence*	*Education*	*Age*	*Gender*	*Left-right*	*Generalized trust*	*Cosmopo-litan identity*	*Confidence in domestic government*	*Discuss politics with friends*
Object									
Procedure	+	0.81	0.44	0.58	0.86	0.78	0.88	0.97	0.70
Procedure	–	0.19	0.92	0.77	**0.02**	0.47	0.13	0.10	0.28
Performance	+	0.74	0.43	0.59	0.08	0.39	0.12	0.81	0.11
Performance	–	0.27	0.73	0.88	0.57	0.50	0.62	0.74	0.37
Elite type									
CSO	+	0.51	0.66	0.97	0.74	0.37	0.94	0.79	0.17
CSO	–	0.78	0.63	0.36	0.13	0.16	0.42	**0.04**	0.85
IO	+	**0.02**	0.33	0.40	0.37	0.31	0.18	0.78	0.97
IO	–	0.55	0.99	0.30	0.99	0.14	0.33	0.54	0.75
Government	+	0.59	0.49	0.54	0.16	0.67	0.51	0.78	0.73
Government	–	0.95	0.89	0.99	0.44	0.32	0.38	0.95	0.75
Valence									
Positive		0.28	0.37	0.53	0.26	0.51	0.41	0.91	0.47
Negative		0.90	0.79	0.93	0.34	0.42	0.25	0.25	0.93

Notes: Numbers are *p*-values. Figures in bold: p<.05. Results from two-tailed *t*-tests of covariates using dummy variables indicating receiving a treatment (=1) or not (=0). See questionnaire in Appendix A for question wording. Variables coded as in Table B1.

TABLE H10. *Balance tests (round 4, WTO)*

Treatment group (actual treatments as presented in Table 1)	*Valence*	*Education*	*Age*	*Gender*	*Left-right*	*Generalized trust*	*Cosmopolitan identity*	*Confidence in domestic government*	*Discuss politics with friends*
Procedure-CSOs	+	0.17	0.82	0.58	0.65	0.21	0.76	0.73	0.64
Procedure-CSOs	–	0.80	0.98	0.33	**0.04**	0.40	0.97	0.09	0.30
Performance -CSOs	+	0.71	0.36	0.61	0.94	0.87	0.67	0.95	0.08
Performance-CSOs	–	0.49	0.46	0.63	0.76	0.18	0.22	0.14	0.48
Procedure-IOs	+	**0.00**	0.43	0.73	0.50	0.39	0.34	0.91	0.63
Procedure-IOs	–	0.06	0.91	0.27	0.62	0.09	0.21	0.30	0.63
Performance-IOs	+	0.39	0.45	0.33	**0.04**	0.45	**0.00**	0.58	0.70
Performance-IOs	–	0.34	0.90	0.59	0.59	0.55	0.77	0.94	0.98
Procedure-Governments	+	0.29	0.27	0.78	0.55	0.11	0.74	0.74	0.39
Procedure- Governments	–	0.55	0.94	0.68	**0.02**	0.27	0.06	0.43	0.44
Performance- Governments	+	0.85	0.99	0.50	0.10	0.37	0.49	0.91	0.18
Performance- Governments	–	0.50	0.89	0.71	0.34	0.63	0.65	0.50	0.22

Notes: Numbers are *p*-values. Figures in bold: p<.05. Results from two-tailed *t*-tests of covariates using dummy variables indicating receiving a treatment (=1) or not (=0). See questionnaire in Appendix A for question wording. Variables coded as in Table B1.

Appendix I: Predictive margins across experimental rounds

FIGURE I1. *Predictive margins across experimental rounds, elite type*

(a)



(b)



FIGURE I2. *Predictive margins across experimental rounds, procedure vs performance*



FIGURE I3. *Predictive margins across experimental rounds, valence*



Appendix J: Analysis of missing values

Taking cues from the literature on political knowledge, we assume that the missing values indicate either that people do not know enough about IOs to give a substantive answer or are undecided. In the realm of global governance, well-informed individuals may be better positioned to receive and understand elite communication and know more about the world beyond their locality,[2] and may be younger.[3] One of the main and robust findings in the broader political knowledge literature is that well-educated and older males are more knowledgeable than less educated individuals or females.[4]

To examine what causes missing outcomes in our data set, we code a variable MISSING that equals 1 if an individual takes on a missing value on the CONFIDENCE variable and 0 if otherwise. We then regress MISSING on education, age, and gender using logistic regression analysis. *Education* is a four-point indicator coded 1 "No formal qualifications or primary school", 2 "Secondary education", 3 "Post-secondary non-tertiary education", and 4 "Tertiary education". AGE is a continuous variable. GENDER is a dummy variable (1=females).

The findings in Table I1 indicate that better-educated and older males are more likely to give a substantive answer. Hence, we replicate all analyses presented in the paper by controlling for education, age, and gender, thereby relaxing the assumption that the randomization was successful (see Tables I2-I5). This change in model specification does not change the interpretation of our results, which underlines that it is unlikely that item non-response has compromised the randomization in the experiment.

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[2] Inglehart, Ronald. 1970. Cognitive Mobilization and European Identity. *Comparative Politics* 3(1): 45–70; Inglehart Ronald and Jacques-René Rabier. 1978. Economic Uncertainty and European Solidarity: Public Opinion Trends. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 440 (1): 66–87.

[3] Norris, Pippa. 2000. Global Governance and Cosmopolitan Citizens. In *Governance in a Globalizing World,* edited by Joseph S. Nye Jr. and John D. Donahue, 155–177. Washington D.C.: Brookings.

[4] Delli Carpini, Michael X. and Scott Keeter. 1996. *What Americans Know about Politics and Why it Matters.* New Haven: Yale University Press; Althaus, Scott L. 2003. *Collective Preferences in Democratic Politics: Opinion Surveys and the Will of the People*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

TABLE J1. *Missing data by experimental round and country*

Experimental round	**Round 1**	**Round 2**		**Round 3**	**Round 4**	**Pooled data across all rounds**
	UN	EU	NAFTA	IMF	WTO	Concomitant model
EDUCATION	–0.372***	–0.335***	–0.284***	–0.241***	–0.269***	–0.256***
	(–9.374)	(–5.317)	(–5.400)	(–7.794)	(–9.190)	(–10.020)
AGE	–0.035***	–0.038***	–0.035***	–0.036***	–0.025***	–0.032***
	(–14.591)	(–10.667)	(–9.717)	(–19.358)	(–14.277)	(–21.108)
GENDER	–1.139***	–1.297***	–1.035***	–1.108***	–0.899***	–1.008***
	(–14.153)	(–9.791)	(–10.222)	(–19.410)	(–17.029)	(–20.871)
Constant	1.907***	1.532***	2.346***	2.487***	1.952***	1.870***
	(10.788)	(5.441)	(9.548)	(16.964)	(14.173)	(15.579)
N	9550	6415	3135	9550	9550	38200
Log likelihood	5548.610	2515.232	2839.814	8723.508	9577.966	30579.215

Notes: Significance levels: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Figures are unstandardized coefficients from logistic regression analyses, with *t*-values in parentheses. We adjust the covariance matrices for within-person correlations in order to take non-observed individual characteristics into account.

TABLE J2. *Replication of Table 2 including education, age, and gender*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
CSO vs control (+)	0.342***											
	(4.322)											
CSO vs control (–)		–0.248**										
		(–3.266)										
IO vs control (+)			0.082									
			(1.049)									
IO vs control (–)				–0.355***								
				(–4.631)								
Gov. vs control (+)					0.271***							
					(3.360)							
Gov. vs control (–)						–0.254**						
						(–3.165)						
CSO vs IO (+)							0.261***					
							(4.595)					
CSO vs IO (–)								0.109*				
								(2.024)				
Gov. vs IO (+)									0.190**			
									(3.092)			
Gov. vs IO (–)										0.100		
										(1.630)		
CSO vs gov. (+)											0.071	
											(1.141)	
CSO vs gov. (–)												0.008
												(0.137)
Education	0.123*	0.113*	0.119*	0.121*	0.105*	0.125*	0.110*	0.100*	0.089	0.117*	0.094	0.105*
	(2.420)	(2.321)	(2.424)	(2.421)	(2.109)	(2.456)	(2.115)	(2.042)	(1.927)	(2.296)	(1.862)	(2.130)
Age	–0.017***	–0.018***	–0.017***	–0.020***	–0.018***	–0.019***	–0.016***	–0.021***	–0.017***	–0.022***	–0.017***	–0.020***
	(–6.155)	(–6.627)	(–6.438)	(–7.235)	(–6.496)	(–6.802)	(–6.182)	(–7.909)	(–6.703)	(–8.043)	(–6.195)	(–7.280)
Gender	0.231**	0.167*	0.254**	0.106	0.187*	0.117	0.259**	–0.016	0.203*	–0.075	0.175*	–0.001
	(2.803)	(2.045)	(3.116)	(1.304)	(2.249)	(1.401)	(3.195)	(–0.206)	(2.525)	(–0.970)	(2.124)	(–0.018)
Constant	4.164***	4.272***	4.177***	4.354***	4.289***	4.307***	4.221***	4.166***	4.375***	4.198***	4.549***	4.202***
	(18.299)	(19.112)	(18.957)	(19.257)	(19.189)	(18.943)	(18.573)	(17.825)	(21.394)	(17.806)	(20.364)	(17.672)
N	10828	10723	10867	10854	10829	10758	8653	8535	8654	8570	8615	8439

Notes: Significance levels: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. We adjust the covariance matrices for within-person correlations in order to take non-observed individual characteristics into account.

TABLE J3. *Replication of Table 2 including education, age, and gender*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Procedure vs control (+)	0.234**					
	(3.069)					
Procedure vs control (–)		–0.291***				
		(–3.942)				
Performance vs control (+)			0.227**			
			(3.036)			
Performance vs control (–)				–0.282***		
				(–3.830)		
Procedure vs perform. (+)					0.006	
					(0.120)	
Procedure vs perform. (–)						–0.010
						(–0.216)
Education	0.121**	0.111*	0.106*	0.124**	0.099*	0.106*
	(2.692)	(2.431)	(2.332)	(2.773)	(2.219)	(2.360)
Age	–0.018***	–0.019***	–0.017***	–0.020***	–0.017***	–0.021***
	(–7.239)	(–7.519)	(–6.915)	(–8.003)	(–7.179)	(–8.579)
Gender	0.205**	0.099	0.238**	0.108	0.211**	–0.030
	(2.722)	(1.348)	(3.226)	(1.478)	(2.869)	(–0.437)
Constant	4.215***	4.345***	4.215***	4.347***	4.465***	4.233***
	(20.882)	(20.639)	(20.600)	(21.167)	(22.808)	(19.763)
N	12936	12826	13067	12988	12961	12772

Notes: Significance levels: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.Numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. We adjust the covariance matrices for within-person correlations in order to take non-observed individual characteristics into account.

TABLE J4. *Replication of Table 4 including education, age, and gender*

	(1)	(2)	(2)
Positive vs control	0.230**		
	(3.233)		
Negative vs control		–0.286***	
		(–4.093)	
Negative vs positive			–0.518***
			(–14.118)
Education	0.109**	0.114**	0.104**
	(2.834)	(2.946)	(2.657)
Age	–0.017***	–0.020***	–0.019***
	(–8.385)	(–9.419)	(–9.123)
Gender	0.218***	0.060	0.093
	(3.445)	(0.975)	(1.501)
Constant	4.223***	4.400***	4.602***
	(24.302)	(24.158)	(26.220)
N	19482	19293	25733

Notes: Significance levels: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. We adjust the covariance matrices for within-person correlations in order to take non-observed individual characteristics into account.

TABLE J5. *Replication of Appendix Table D (Figures 1-3), UN, including education, age, and gender*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Procedure vs control (+)	0.513***											
	(4.498)											
Procedure vs control (–)		-0.270*										
		(-2.413)										
Performance vs control (+)			0.141									
			(1.182)									
Performance vs control (–)				-0.581***								
				(-5.229)								
CSO vs control (+)					0.401***							
					(3.295)							
CSO vs control (–)						-0.187						
						(-1.620)						
IO vs control (+)							0.410***					
							(3.885)					
IO vs control (–)								-0.240*				
								(-2.311)				
Gov. vs control (+)									0.299**			
									(2.847)			
Gov. vs control (–)										-0.447***		
										(-4.529)		
Positive vs control											0.353***	
											(3.929)	
Negative vs control												-0.345***
												(-3.930)
Education	0.110	0.083	0.066	0.161*	0.166*	0.096	0.098	0.155*	0.127	0.067	0.114*	0.107*
	(1.539)	(1.237)	(0.960)	(2.327)	(2.283)	(1.411)	(1.491)	(2.414)	(1.943)	(1.102)	(2.076)	(2.075)
Age	-0.015***	-0.015***	-0.012**	-0.014***	-0.016***	-0.019***	-0.013***	-0.017***	-0.016***	-0.016***	-0.014***	-0.017***
	(-4.089)	(-4.064)	(-3.123)	(-3.908)	(-3.909)	(-4.913)	(-3.518)	(-4.732)	(-4.486)	(-4.875)	(-4.684)	(-6.037)
Gender	0.415***	0.437***	0.547***	0.273*	0.403***	0.256*	0.378***	0.282**	0.527***	0.291**	0.448***	0.222**
	(3.735)	(3.995)	(4.798)	(2.510)	(3.488)	(2.291)	(3.636)	(2.737)	(5.030)	(2.957)	(5.171)	(2.694)
Constant	4.326***	4.417***	4.263***	4.225***	4.207***	4.621***	4.277***	4.352***	4.261***	4.572***	4.247***	4.531***
	(15.362)	(15.273)	(14.517)	(13.958)	(13.207)	(15.913)	(14.482)	(15.362)	(16.319)	(17.254)	(18.115)	(19.497)
N	2930	2873	2913	2915	2905	2879	3481	3423	3510	3487	5234	5153

Notes: Significance levels: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. We adjust the covariance matrices for within-person correlations in order to take non-observed individual characteristics into account.

TABLE J6. *Replication of Appendix Table D (Figures 1-3), IMF, including education, age, and gender*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Procedure vs control (+)	0.352**											
	(2.786)											
Procedure vs control (–)		-0.159										
		(-1.406)										
Performance vs control (+)			0.079									
			(0.731)									
Performance vs control (–)				-0.264*								
				(-2.261)								
CSO vs control (+)					0.205							
					(1.815)							
CSO vs control (–)						-0.232						
						(-1.836)						
IO vs control (+)							0.212*					
							(1.994)					
IO vs control (–)								-0.298**				
								(-2.854)				
Gov. vs control (+)									0.211*			
									(2.090)			
Gov. vs control (–)										-0.152		
										(-1.412)		
Positive vs control											0.211*	
											(2.345)	
Negative vs control												-0.222*
												(-2.438)
Education	0.097	0.055	0.110	0.180*	0.055	0.170*	0.097	0.183*	0.045	0.083	0.042	0.126*
	(1.199)	(0.754)	(1.579)	(2.317)	(0.746)	(2.285)	(1.518)	(2.533)	(0.633)	(1.277)	(0.765)	(2.239)
Age	-0.011**	-0.012**	-0.009*	-0.015***	-0.008*	-0.007	-0.010**	-0.012***	-0.008*	-0.011**	-0.009**	-0.013***
	(-2.583)	(-3.000)	(-2.496)	(-3.772)	(-2.028)	(-1.735)	(-3.010)	(-3.355)	(-2.261)	(-3.034)	(-3.207)	(-4.117)
Gender	-0.015	-0.102	0.061	0.002	0.014	-0.055	0.014	0.020	-0.002	-0.177	-0.021	-0.135
	(-0.127)	(-0.920)	(0.570)	(0.021)	(0.130)	(-0.464)	(0.133)	(0.194)	(-0.024)	(-1.673)	(-0.247)	(-1.558)
Constant	3.819***	4.036***	3.683***	3.766***	3.794***	3.453***	3.803***	3.630***	3.853***	3.958***	3.927***	3.883***
	(10.498)	(11.999)	(12.001)	(10.906)	(12.521)	(10.678)	(13.686)	(11.036)	(12.017)	(13.460)	(15.758)	(14.733)
N	2519	2540	2560	2552	2581	2523	3025	3025	3106	3061	4602	4557

Notes: Significance levels: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. We adjust the covariance matrices for within-person correlations in order to take non-observed individual characteristics into account.

TABLE J7. *Replication of Appendix Table D (Figures 1-3), WTO, including education, age, and gender*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
CSO vs control (+)	0.398***											
	(3.438)											
CSO vs control (–)		-0.204										
		(-1.843)										
IO vs control (+)			0.172									
			(1.514)									
IO vs control (–)				-0.332**								
				(-3.067)								
Gov. vs control (+)					0.327*							
					(2.560)							
Gov. vs control (–)						-0.339**						
						(-2.760)						
Procedure vs control (+)							0.217*					
							(2.128)					
Procedure vs control (–)								-0.238*				
								(-2.379)				
Performance vs control (+)									0.379***			
									(3.500)			
Performance vs control (–)										-0.348***		
										(-3.382)		
Positive vs control											0.299***	
											(3.340)	
Negative vs control												-0.293***
												(-3.356)
Education	-0.095	0.001	0.021	0.002	0.060	0.008	0.020	-0.070	-0.032	0.081	-0.006	0.007
	(-1.404)	(0.011)	(0.306)	(0.032)	(0.887)	(0.096)	(0.326)	(-1.132)	(-0.482)	(1.192)	(-0.119)	(0.131)
Age	-0.014***	-0.019***	-0.021***	-0.021***	-0.021***	-0.020***	-0.019***	-0.018***	-0.018***	-0.022***	-0.018***	-0.020***
	(-3.879)	(-5.150)	(-5.676)	(-5.659)	(-5.304)	(-4.814)	(-5.647)	(-5.147)	(-4.930)	(-5.955)	(-6.219)	(-6.745)
Gender	0.242*	0.092	0.195	-0.047	0.101	0.122	0.242*	0.005	0.132	0.046	0.193*	-0.020
	(2.147)	(0.853)	(1.777)	(-0.442)	(0.861)	(1.068)	(2.378)	(0.052)	(1.227)	(0.451)	(2.215)	(-0.240)
Constant	4.646***	4.638***	4.631***	4.800***	4.576***	4.664***	4.522***	4.847***	4.693***	4.562***	4.590***	4.733***
	(17.189)	(16.942)	(15.448)	(16.821)	(14.323)	(13.039)	(17.420)	(17.542)	(15.914)	(14.989)	(19.582)	(18.934)
N	2517	2428	2504	2518	2476	2458	2985	2932	3013	2973	4499	4406

Notes: Significance levels: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. We adjust the covariance matrices for within-person correlations in order to take non-observed individual characteristics into account.

TABLE J8. *Replication of Appendix Table D (Figures 1-3), EU, including education, age, and gender*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
CSO vs control (+)	0.109											
	(0.950)											
CSO vs control (–)		-0.230*										
		(-2.053)										
IO vs control (+)			-0.003									
			(-0.028)									
IO vs control (–)				-0.254*								
				(-2.213)								
Gov. vs control (+)					0.126							
					(1.100)							
Gov. vs control (–)						-0.261*						
						(-2.360)						
Procedure vs control (+)							0.070					
							(0.685)					
Procedure vs control (–)								-0.376***				
								(-3.736)				
Performance vs control (+)									0.083			
									(0.817)			
Performance vs control (–)										-0.121		
										(-1.195)		
Positive vs control											0.078	
											(0.883)	
Negative vs control												-0.246**
												(-2.795)
Education	0.371***	0.370***	0.290***	0.272***	0.225**	0.297***	0.259***	0.254***	0.314***	0.364***	0.272***	0.304***
	(5.327)	(5.307)	(4.173)	(3.891)	(3.127)	(4.380)	(4.008)	(4.073)	(4.969)	(5.830)	(5.266)	(6.047)
Age	-0.022***	-0.019***	-0.022***	-0.018***	-0.018***	-0.021***	-0.023***	-0.019***	-0.021***	-0.021***	-0.024***	-0.022***
	(-5.769)	(-5.257)	(-6.116)	(-4.713)	(-4.823)	(-5.839)	(-6.771)	(-5.774)	(-6.124)	(-6.430)	(-8.688)	(-8.061)
Gender	0.106	0.189	0.098	0.075	0.149	0.018	0.080	0.038	0.164	0.155	0.130	0.095
	(0.950)	(1.710)	(0.887)	(0.671)	(1.335)	(0.163)	(0.784)	(0.377)	(1.627)	(1.546)	(1.574)	(1.170)
Constant	3.607***	3.474***	3.871***	3.732***	3.869***	3.855***	4.020***	3.890***	3.704***	3.599***	3.997***	3.832***
	(12.151)	(11.710)	(13.356)	(12.998)	(12.958)	(13.510)	(14.856)	(14.681)	(13.753)	(13.701)	(17.943)	(17.683)
N	2021	2042	2036	2015	2031	2053	2437	2436	2424	2447	3634	3656

Notes: Significance levels: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. We adjust the covariance matrices for within-person correlations in order to take non-observed individual characteristics into account.

TABLE J9. *Replication of Appendix Table D (Figures 1-3), NAFTA, including education, age, and gender*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
CSO vs control (+)	0.045											
	(0.166)											
CSO vs control (–)		-0.638*										
		(-2.369)										
IO vs control (+)			-0.178									
			(-0.602)									
IO vs control (–)				-0.228								
				(-0.917)								
Gov. vs control (+)					0.162							
					(0.570)							
Gov. vs control (–)						-0.252						
						(-1.044)						
Procedure vs control (+)							0.109					
							(0.414)					
Procedure vs control (–)								-0.393				
								(-1.687)				
Performance vs control (+)									-0.125			
									(-0.510)			
Performance vs control (–)										-0.309		
										(-1.353)		
Positive vs control											0.011	
											(0.050)	
Negative vs control												-0.348
												(-1.719)
Education	0.386**	0.203	0.265	-0.064	0.010	0.060	0.270	-0.007	0.221	0.068	0.276*	-0.010
	(2.692)	(1.360)	(1.783)	(-0.472)	(0.071)	(0.401)	(1.917)	(-0.052)	(1.682)	(0.521)	(2.493)	(-0.091)
Age	-0.038***	-0.038***	-0.033***	-0.050***	-0.044***	-0.046***	-0.039***	-0.042***	-0.032***	-0.048***	-0.032***	-0.043***
	(-4.308)	(-4.277)	(-3.733)	(-6.269)	(-4.877)	(-5.392)	(-4.650)	(-5.434)	(-4.009)	(-6.137)	(-4.681)	(-6.870)
Gender	0.416	0.259	0.291	0.382	0.161	0.337	0.263	0.152	0.291	0.429	0.233	0.258
	(1.682)	(1.007)	(1.069)	(1.562)	(0.602)	(1.376)	(1.057)	(0.663)	(1.222)	(1.892)	(1.149)	(1.397)
Constant	4.176***	4.790***	4.329***	6.058***	5.649***	5.523***	4.636***	5.596***	4.439***	5.545***	4.299***	5.631***
	(5.916)	(6.613)	(6.058)	(10.188)	(9.425)	(8.331)	(7.211)	(9.411)	(7.141)	(9.222)	(8.235)	(11.502)
N	841	840	854	854	836	845	1008	1010	1014	1020	1513	1521

Notes: Significance levels: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. We adjust the covariance matrices for within-person correlations in order to take non-observed individual characteristics into account.

Appendix K: Results with interaction terms

TABLE K1. *Robustness check, testing if effect of credibility of national government depends on partisan identification*

	(1)	(2)
Governments (positive)	0.360***	
	(3.428)	
Partisan identification	1.359***	1.359***
	(11.698)	(11.698)
Governments (positive) * Partisan identification	-0.280	
	(-1.799)	
Governments (negative)		-0.076
		(-0.731)
Governments (negative) * Partisan identification		-0.492**
		(-3.115)
Constant	3.297***	3.297***
	(41.028)	(41.028)
N	10966	10871

Notes: Significance levels: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. We adjust the covariance matrices for within-person correlations in order to take non-observed individual characteristics into account. Partisan identification is a dummy variable coded 1 if a person identifies with one of the political parties at the time of the data collection, and 0 otherwise.

FIGURE K1. *Marginal effect of negative government treatment at different levels of partisan identification*



TABLE K2. *Robustness check, testing if effect of credibility of national government depends on trust in government*

	(1)	(2)
Governments (positive)	0.205	
	(1.633)	
National government confidence	0.477***	0.477***
	(24.612)	(24.612)
Governments (positive) * National government confidence	0.004	
	(0.137)	
Governments (negative)		0.080
		(0.621)
Governments (negative) * National government confidence		-0.086**
		(-3.022)
Constant	1.839***	1.839***
	(20.275)	(20.275)
N	10945	10846

Notes: Significance levels: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. We adjust the covariance matrices for within-person correlations in order to take non-observed individual characteristics into account. National government confidence coded as in Table B1.

FIGURE K2. *Marginal effect of negative government treatment at different levels of partisan identification*



TABLE K3. *Replication of Appendix Table D1 (Figure 1), testing if treatment effects depend on political awareness (discussion of politics with friends)*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Discussion of politics	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008
	(-0.086)	(-0.086)	(-0.086)	(-0.086)	(-0.086)	(-0.086)
CSOs (positive)	0.512**					
	(2.762)					
CSOs (positive) * Discussion of politics	-0.106					
	(-0.886)					
CSOs (negative)		0.088				
		(0.488)				
CSOs (negative) * Discussion of politics		-0.226				
		(-1.943)				
IOs (positive)			0.188			
			(0.994)			
IOs (positive) * Discussion of politics			-0.071			
			(-0.573)			
IOs (negative)				-0.139		
				(-0.768)		
IOs (negative) * Discussion of politics				-0.149		
				(-1.254)		
Governments (positive)					0.462*	
					(2.357)	
Governments (positive) * Discussion of politics					-0.117	
					(-0.877)	
Governments (negative)						-0.081
						(-0.402)
Governments (negative) * Discussion of politics						-0.125
						(-0.893)
Constant	3.833***	3.833***	3.833***	3.833***	3.833***	3.833***
	(26.572)	(26.572)	(26.572)	(26.572)	(26.572)	(26.572)
N	10842	10735	10891	10855	10842	10759

Notes: Significance levels: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. We adjust the covariance matrices for within-person correlations in order to take non-observed individual characteristics into account. Discussion of politics coded as in Table B1.

TABLE K3. Cont'd

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Discussion of politics	-0.079	-0.157*	-0.079	-0.157*	-0.125	-0.133
	(-0.964)	(-2.148)	(-0.964)	(-2.148)	(-1.310)	(-1.276)
Diff CSOs-IOs (positive)	0.324*					
	(2.455)					
Diff CSOs-IOs (positive) * Discussion of politics	-0.035					
	(-0.430)					
Diff CSOs-IOs (negative)		0.228				
		(1.834)				
Diff CSOs-IOs (negative) * Discussion of politics		-0.078				
		(-0.977)				
Diff Governments-IOs (positive)			0.275			
			(1.811)			
Diff Governments-IOs (positive) * Discussion of politics			-0.046			
			(-0.440)			
Diff Governments-IOs (negative)				0.058		
				(0.361)		
Diff Governments-IOs (negative) * Discussion of politics				0.024		
				(0.200)		
Diff CSOs-Governments (positive)					0.050	
					(0.336)	
Diff CSOs-Governments (positive)* Discussion of politics					0.011	
					(0.110)	
Diff CSOs-Governments (negative)						0.170
						(1.061)
Diff CSOs-Governments (negative) * Discussion of politics						-0.101
						(-0.879)
Constant	4.021***	3.694***	4.021***	3.694***	4.296***	3.752***
	(32.984)	(33.629)	(32.984)	(33.629)	(32.315)	(26.380)
N	8683	8540	8683	8564	8634	8444

Notes: Significance levels: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. We adjust the covariance matrices for within-person correlations in order to take non-observed individual characteristics into account. Discussion of politics coded as in Table B1.

TABLE K4. *Replication of Appendix Table D2 (Figure 2), testing if treatment effects depend on political awareness (discussion of politics with friends)*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Discussion of politics	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008	-0.104	-0.172*
	(-0.086)	(-0.086)	(-0.086)	(-0.086)	(-1.566)	(-2.575)
Procedures (positive)	0.379*					
	(2.048)					
Procedures (positive)* Discussion of politics	-0.097					
	(-0.774)					
Procedures (negative)		-0.040				
		(-0.226)				
Procedures (negative) * Discussion of politics		-0.167				
		(-1.432)				
Performance (positive)			0.387*			
			(2.187)			
Performance (positive) * Discussion of politics			-0.096			
			(-0.837)			
Performance (negative)				-0.052		
				(-0.292)		
Performance (negative) * Discussion of politics				-0.164		
				(-1.432)		
Diff. procedures-performance (positive)					-0.008	
					(-0.071)	
Diff. procedures-performance (positive) * Discussion of politics					-0.001	
					(-0.015)	
Diff. procedures-performance (negative)						0.012
						(0.105)
Diff. procedures-performance (negative) * Discussion of politics						-0.002
						(-0.034)
Constant	3.833***	3.833***	3.833***	3.833***	4.221***	3.782***
	(26.573)	(26.573)	(26.573)	(26.573)	(41.057)	(36.964)
N	12974	12827	13076	12997	13000	12774

Notes: Significance levels: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. We adjust the covariance matrices for within-person correlations in order to take non-observed individual characteristics into account. Discussion of politics coded as in Table B1.

TABLE K5. *Replication of Appendix Table D3 (Figure 3), testing if treatment effects depend on political awareness (discussion of politics with friends)*

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Discussion of politics	-0.008	-0.008	-0.105
	(-0.086)	(-0.086)	(-1.625)
Positive	0.383*		
	(2.241)		
Positive * Discussion of politics	-0.096		
	(-0.851)		
Negative		-0.046	
		(-0.273)	
Negative * Discussion of politics		-0.166	
		(-1.511)	
Diff negative-positive			-0.429***
			(-4.740)
Diff negative-positive * Discussion of politics			-0.069
			(-1.114)
Constant	3.833***	3.833***	4.217***
	(26.575)	(26.575)	(45.906)
N	19525	19299	25774

Notes: Significance levels: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. We adjust the covariance matrices for within-person correlations in order to take non-observed individual characteristics into account. Discussion of politics coded as in Table B1.

TABLE K6. *Replication of Appendix Table D1 (Figure 1), testing if treatment effects depend on political awareness (education)*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Education	0.131	0.131	0.131	0.131	0.131	0.131
	(1.721)	(1.721)	(1.721)	(1.721)	(1.721)	(1.721)
CSOs (positive)	0.410					
	(1.258)					
CSOs (positive) * Education	-0.021					
	(-0.204)					
CSOs (negative)		-0.108				
		(-0.359)				
CSOs (negative) * Education		-0.046				
		(-0.490)				
IOs (positive)			0.191			
			(0.614)			
IOs (positive) * Education			-0.038			
			(-0.389)			
IOs (negative)				-0.275		
				(-0.863)		
IOs (negative) * Education				-0.027		
				(-0.277)		
Governments (positive)					0.489	
					(1.553)	
Governments (positive) * Education					-0.073	
					(-0.750)	
Governments (negative)						-0.179
						(-0.546)
Governments (negative) * Education						-0.023
						(-0.226)
Constant	3.443***	3.443***	3.443***	3.443***	3.443***	3.443***
	(14.148)	(14.148)	(14.148)	(14.148)	(14.148)	(14.148)
N	10828	10723	10867	10854	10829	10758

Notes: Significance levels: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. We adjust the covariance matrices for within-person correlations in order to take non-observed individual characteristics into account. Education coded as in Table B1.

TABLE K6. Cont'd

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Education	0.093	0.104	0.093	0.104	0.058	0.108
	(1.567)	(1.653)	(1.567)	(1.653)	(0.956)	(1.614)
Diff CSOs-IOs (positive)	0.219					
	(0.963)					
Diff CSOs-IOs (positive) * Education	0.017					
	(0.239)					
Diff CSOs-IOs (negative)		0.166				
		(0.795)				
Diff CSOs-IOs (negative) * Education		-0.019				
		(-0.292)				
Diff Governments-IOs (positive)			0.298			
			(1.186)			
Diff Governments-IOs (positive) * Education			-0.035			
			(-0.463)			
Diff Governments-IOs (negative)				0.095		
				(0.360)		
Diff Governments-IOs (negative) * Education				0.004		
				(0.055)		
Diff CSOs-Governments (positive)					-0.079	
					(-0.310)	
Diff CSOs-Governments (positive)* Education					0.052	
					(0.670)	
Diff CSOs-Governments (negative)						0.071
						(0.297)
Diff CSOs-Governments (negative) * Education						-0.023
						(-0.319)
Constant	3.634***	3.168***	3.634***	3.168***	3.932***	3.264***
	(18.793)	(15.454)	(18.793)	(15.454)	(19.699)	(14.824)
N	8653	8535	8654	8570	8615	8439

Notes: Significance levels: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. We adjust the covariance matrices for within-person correlations in order to take non-observed individual characteristics into account. Education coded as in Table B1.

TABLE K7. *Replication of Appendix Table D2 (Figure 2), testing if treatment effects depend on political awareness (education)*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Education	0.131	0.131	0.131	0.131	0.078	0.116*
	(1.721)	(1.721)	(1.721)	(1.721)	(1.391)	(2.262)
Procedures (positive)	0.321					
	(1.071)					
Procedures (positive) * Education	-0.030					
	(-0.317)					
Procedures (negative)		-0.131				
		(-0.430)				
Procedures (negative) * Education		-0.051				
		(-0.537)				
Performance (positive)			0.388			
			(1.275)			
Performance (positive) * Education			-0.053			
			(-0.562)			
Performance (negative)				-0.242		
				(-0.821)		
Performance (negative) * Education				-0.015		
				(-0.159)		
Diff procedures-performance (positive)					-0.067	
					(-0.326)	
Diff procedures-performance (positive) * Education					0.024	
					(0.373)	
Diff procedures-performance (negative)						0.112
						(0.595)
Diff procedures-performance (negative) * Education						-0.036
						(-0.622)
Constant	3.443***	3.443***	3.443***	3.443***	3.831***	3.201***
	(14.148)	(14.148)	(14.148)	(14.148)	(20.933)	(19.131)
N	12936	12826	13067	12988	12961	12772

Notes: Significance levels: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. We adjust the covariance matrices for within-person correlations in order to take non-observed individual characteristics into account. Education coded as in Table B1.

TABLE K8. *Replication of Appendix Table D3 (Figure 3), testing if treatment effects depend on political awareness (education)*

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Education	0.131	0.131	0.089*
	(1.721)	(1.721)	(1.987)
Positive	0.355		
	(1.251)		
Positive * Education	-0.042		
	(-0.470)		
Negative		-0.187	
		(-0.655)	
Negative * Education		-0.033	
		(-0.368)	
Diff negative-positive			-0.542***
			(-3.695)
Diff negative-positive * Education			0.009
			(0.198)
Constant	3.443***	3.443***	3.798***
	(14.149)	(14.149)	(25.901)
N	19482	19293	25733

Notes: Significance levels: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients with *t*-values in parentheses. We adjust the covariance matrices for within-person correlations in order to take non-observed individual characteristics into account. Education coded as in Table B1.