

Online Appendix

Online Appendix for: Berliner, Daniel. Forthcoming. "Partisan Context and Procedural Values: Attitudes Towards Presidential Secrecy Before and After the 2016 United States Election." *British Journal of Political Science*.

Figures




Figure A1: Three histograms showing the distribution of support for constraints on presidential secrecy, in the pre-election and post-election survey waves, and of individual changes. A positive change reflects a shift towards supporting greater constraints on secrecy. All three based on the 789 respondents that took both survey waves and answered both questions. Dashed line indicates the mean value.




Figure A2: Color version of main manuscript Figure 1. Average within-person changes in support for constraints on presidential secrecy (100-point scale), moving from the pre-election survey wave to the post-election survey wave, for all individual, individuals below mean political knowledge, and above. Dotted lines show 90% confidence intervals.




Figure A3: Marginal effects of Republican partisan identification at varying levels of political knowledge, based on simulations from results of Models 3 and 9 in Table 1 in the main paper. Dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence interval.

Robustness Checks

Table A3 presents models replacing the measure of partisan identification with an indicator for Trump vote, either reported vote intention in pre-election survey, or reported vote choice in post-election survey. Results are highly similar both for the main models and the interaction terms with political knowledge.

Table A4 retains Independents in the sample (which were omitted from the sample in the main results), comparing either Republicans to the set of Democrats and Independents, or Democrats to the set of Republicans and Independents. Results are highly similar to the main results.

Table A5 includes additional control variables to test for alternative explanations of the results. In case the results were an artifact of varying initial attitudes towards transparency across partisan groups, Models 1-3 control for an index of principled support for transparency. This is an additive index of six questions, asked prior to the outcome variable question. These questions assess both support for transparency and tradeoffs between transparency and competing values like secrecy and national security. Respondents chose from a 5-point Likert scale for each of the following statements. Responses to the latter three were subsequently flipped so that higher values for each represents greater value for a principle of transparency.

- Citizens have a right to get the information they want from the government.
- More information about what the government does would help me make better decisions about how to vote.
- More information about what the government does would help fight corruption.
- It is important for the government to keep some information secret to protect national security.
- It is important for the government to keep some information secret to protect the privacy of other citizens.
- Answering citizens' requests for information is a waste of the government's time and resources.

The transparency index has no effect on the outcome variable and does not substantively change the main results.

Another alternate explanation for this paper’s main findings might be simple reversion to the mean, as individuals with extreme positions on the scale of attitudes towards presidential secrecy simply tend to adopt less extreme positions at a later point in time. To address this possibility, I include a robustness check controlling for the initial response in the pre-election survey wave (Models 4-6 in Table A4). However, as these initial responses already capture a substantial element of partisanship, this is a difficult test. Although the effects are more uncertain and smaller in magnitude, all remain in the expected direction and some are statistically significant.

Although it is difficult to envision, one might argue that the changes in attitudes towards Presidential secrecy might be due to some other change that took place in between survey waves, unrelated to the Presidential election itself. To address this possibility, I can control for responses to an additional question that posed an identical prompt about keeping documents secret, but pertaining to the governor of the respondent’s state rather than to the President. By controlling for changes in this response (Models 7-9 in Table A5), I capture any broader shifts in attitudes towards secrecy - distinct from the presidency - that may have taken place in the intervening period. (The two change variables are correlated at only 0.53.) The main results of interest remain very similar, even though the coefficient on Governor Secrecy Change is also large and significant.

Table A6 shows alternative interaction terms between partisanship and other variables. The first of these (Model 1) is an alternative measurement approach to political knowledge, using an indicator of high reported interest in following the news, in place of the index of factual items correctly answered. The results are highly similar. The remaining models in Table A6 assess a potential concern that some other factor might be more relevant than political knowledge in explaining variation in the ‘partisan flip’ in attitudes. However, no other interaction terms are identified as statistically significant, confirming the importance of political knowledge.

Table A7 employs an alternate measure of partisanship, using the seven-point partisan identification scale itself in place of an indicator for Republicans (or Democrats, as in Table A4). Results remain highly similar. Models 7 and 8 in this table estimate specific categorical effects for each level of the seven-point scale. This reveals surprisingly large effects (in the hypothesized directions) for weak partisans (Lean Republican and Lean Democrat), yet smaller effects for strong partisans.

Finally, Table A8 shows a placebo test using the change in attitudes towards gubernatorial

secrecy as an alternative outcome variable. This further helps to assess an alternative explanation that some other change over the intervening period is responsible for the main results. Models 1-3 include all respondents, while Models 4-6 exclude respondents from the twelve states with gubernatorial elections in 2016. In all cases, partisanship plays no significant role in explaining variation in attitudes towards gubernatorial secrecy, emphasizing the prime role played by the change in national party-of-the-president.

Tables

	Min.	Max.	Mean	SD
Pres. Secrecy: Pre	0.00	100.00	58.60	25.48
Pres. Secrecy: Post	0.00	100.00	61.57	26.12
Pres. Secrecy: Change	-97.00	100.00	1.87	32.02
Pres. Secrecy: Positive Change Dummy	0.00	1.00	0.49	0.50
Pres. Secrecy: Positive Change (at least 10 points) Dummy	0.00	1.00	0.34	0.47
Republican	0.00	1.00	0.35	0.48
Democrat	0.00	1.00	0.45	0.50
Party ID (7-point)	1.00	7.00	3.67	2.14
Ideology	1.00	7.00	4.11	1.66
Trump Vote Intention	0.00	1.00	0.33	0.47
Pol. Knowledge	0.00	8.00	4.63	2.79
Female	0.00	1.00	0.52	0.50
Age	18.00	89.00	46.73	17.09
White	0.00	1.00	0.73	0.45
Military Family	0.00	1.00	0.52	0.50
Education	0.00	5.00	2.22	1.52
Income	0.00	1.00	0.40	0.31
Income: No Answer	0.00	1.00	0.11	0.32
Transparency Index	9.00	30.00	19.88	3.51
High News Interest	0.00	1.00	0.48	0.50

Table A1: Summary statistics.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
1	1.00	0.23	-0.61	-0.43	-0.49	0.09	-0.16	0.11	0.07	0.19	0.18	-0.09	0.09	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.33	0.21
2	0.23	1.00	0.63	0.45	0.41	-0.05	-0.04	0.00	-0.08	-0.01	0.08	-0.08	0.09	0.01	0.07	-0.02	-0.02	0.07	0.23	0.16
3	-0.61	0.63	1.00	0.71	0.73	-0.11	0.09	-0.09	-0.12	-0.16	-0.08	0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.04	-0.02	-0.03	0.03	-0.08	-0.04
4	-0.43	0.45	0.71	1.00	0.73	-0.11	0.12	-0.10	-0.08	-0.14	-0.07	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.01	-0.01	-0.06	-0.04
5	-0.49	0.41	0.73	0.73	1.00	-0.10	0.12	-0.09	-0.06	-0.13	-0.09	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.02	-0.03	0.03	-0.12	-0.03
6	0.09	-0.05	-0.11	-0.11	-0.10	1.00	-0.68	0.86	0.57	0.68	0.04	0.02	0.06	0.24	0.10	-0.01	-0.01	0.09	0.02	0.03
7	-0.16	-0.04	0.09	0.12	0.12	-0.68	1.00	-0.88	-0.53	-0.66	0.02	0.03	-0.01	-0.20	-0.13	0.02	0.01	-0.07	-0.11	0.00
8	0.11	0.00	-0.09	-0.10	-0.09	0.86	-0.88	1.00	0.62	0.71	0.00	-0.01	0.04	0.25	0.11	-0.04	-0.02	0.09	0.06	-0.03
9	0.07	-0.08	-0.12	-0.08	-0.06	0.57	-0.53	0.62	1.00	0.56	0.01	-0.05	0.20	0.17	0.10	-0.04	-0.02	0.09	0.03	-0.02
10	0.19	-0.01	-0.16	-0.14	-0.13	0.68	-0.66	0.71	0.56	1.00	0.12	-0.06	0.16	0.21	0.16	-0.06	-0.07	0.10	0.08	0.11
11	0.18	0.08	-0.08	-0.07	-0.09	0.04	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.12	1.00	-0.20	0.29	0.10	0.16	0.31	0.17	0.11	0.09	0.50
12	-0.09	-0.08	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03	-0.01	-0.05	-0.06	-0.20	1.00	-0.05	-0.00	-0.03	-0.01	-0.12	0.05	-0.20	-0.18
13	0.09	0.09	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.06	-0.01	0.04	0.20	0.16	0.29	0.29	1.00	0.12	0.27	-0.03	-0.04	0.07	-0.06	0.21
14	0.02	0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.02	0.24	-0.20	0.25	0.17	0.21	0.10	-0.00	0.12	1.00	0.01	0.01	0.05	-0.02	0.04	0.08
15	0.02	0.07	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.10	-0.13	0.11	0.10	0.16	0.16	-0.03	0.27	0.01	1.00	-0.11	-0.06	0.09	0.00	0.17
16	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.02	-0.01	0.02	-0.04	-0.04	-0.06	0.31	-0.01	-0.03	0.01	-0.11	1.00	0.37	-0.03	0.02	0.15
17	0.01	-0.02	-0.03	0.01	-0.03	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.07	0.17	-0.12	-0.04	0.05	-0.06	0.37	1.00	-0.47	0.01	0.09
18	0.04	0.07	0.03	-0.01	0.03	0.09	-0.07	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.05	0.07	-0.02	0.09	-0.03	-0.47	1.00	-0.05	0.09
19	0.33	0.23	-0.08	-0.06	-0.12	0.02	-0.11	0.06	0.03	0.08	0.09	-0.20	-0.06	0.04	0.00	0.02	0.01	-0.05	1.00	0.14
20	0.21	0.16	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03	0.03	0.00	-0.03	-0.02	0.11	0.50	-0.18	0.21	0.08	0.17	0.15	0.09	0.09	0.14	1.00

Table A2: Correlation matrix.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Trump Vote Intention	-0.60** (0.20)	-0.66** (0.21)	0.43 (0.51)			
Trump Vote (Reported Post-Election)				-0.67*** (0.20)	-0.74*** (0.21)	0.97 (0.52)
Trump Intention \times Pol. Knowl.			-0.21** (0.08)			
Trump Vote \times Pol. Knowl.						-0.30*** (0.08)
Pol. Knowledge		-0.09* (0.04)	-0.01 (0.05)		-0.11* (0.05)	0.04 (0.06)
Female		-0.07 (0.20)	-0.06 (0.21)		-0.14 (0.21)	-0.15 (0.21)
Age		0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)		0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
White		0.19 (0.25)	0.16 (0.26)		-0.01 (0.27)	-0.13 (0.26)
Military Family		0.25 (0.20)	0.29 (0.21)		0.33 (0.21)	0.34 (0.21)
Education		0.08 (0.08)	0.08 (0.08)		0.09 (0.08)	0.09 (0.08)
Income		0.09 (0.37)	0.09 (0.38)		0.18 (0.37)	0.16 (0.38)
Income: No Answer		0.16 (0.37)	0.23 (0.38)		0.41 (0.38)	0.53 (0.38)
Constant	0.19 (0.12)	-0.22 (0.46)	-0.65 (0.50)	0.31* (0.14)	0.25 (0.53)	-0.46 (0.57)
AIC	1054.65	1071.23	1061.57	828.91	840.7	822.46
Num. obs.	788	788	788	676	676	676

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A3: Robustness checks replacing measure of partisan identification with Trump vote, either reported vote intention in pre-election survey, or reported vote choice in post-election survey. Logistic regressions of indicator for positive within-individual change (reflecting a shift towards supporting greater constraints on secrecy) in response from pre-election to post-election survey wave. Standard errors clustered by state.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Republican	-0.47* (0.20)	-0.53** (0.20)	0.60 (0.45)			
Democrat				0.49* (0.19)	0.58** (0.20)	-0.83 (0.48)
Rep. × Pol. Knowl.			-0.22** (0.08)			
Dem. × Pol. Knowl.						0.28*** (0.08)
Pol. Knowledge		-0.09* (0.04)	-0.02 (0.05)		-0.10* (0.04)	-0.21*** (0.05)
Female		-0.03 (0.20)	-0.07 (0.21)		-0.06 (0.20)	-0.09 (0.21)
Age		0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)		0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
White		0.19 (0.25)	0.14 (0.25)		0.19 (0.25)	0.09 (0.26)
Military Family		0.22 (0.20)	0.28 (0.20)		0.26 (0.20)	0.25 (0.20)
Education		0.09 (0.08)	0.07 (0.07)		0.09 (0.08)	0.08 (0.07)
Income		0.17 (0.37)	0.11 (0.37)		0.17 (0.37)	0.14 (0.38)
Income: No Answer		0.18 (0.37)	0.14 (0.39)		0.17 (0.37)	0.13 (0.38)
Constant	0.14 (0.12)	-0.22 (0.49)	-0.55 (0.51)	-0.25* (0.12)	-0.61 (0.49)	-0.01 (0.58)
AIC	1060.8	1077.45	1065.32	1059.32	1074.26	1053.64
Num. obs.	788	788	788	788	788	788

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A4: Robustness checks retaining Independents in the sample, comparing either Republicans to the set of Democrats and Independents, or Democrats to the set of Republicans and Independents. Logistic regressions of indicator for positive within-individual change (reflecting a shift towards supporting greater constraints on secrecy) in response from pre-election to post-election survey wave. Standard errors clustered by state.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Republican	-0.56** (0.21)	-0.60** (0.22)	1.05* (0.53)	-0.38 (0.22)	-0.43 (0.22)	1.12* (0.53)	-0.62** (0.23)	-0.68** (0.23)	1.13* (0.54)
Rep. × Pol. Knowl.			-0.32*** (0.09)			-0.30*** (0.09)			-0.35*** (0.09)
Pol. Knowledge		-0.07 (0.05)	0.08 (0.06)		-0.02 (0.05)	0.11 (0.06)		-0.10 (0.06)	0.06 (0.07)
Transparency Index	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)						
Pres. Secrecy: Pre				-0.04*** (0.00)	-0.04*** (0.00)	-0.04*** (0.00)			
Gov. Secrecy: Change							0.03*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Female		-0.19 (0.23)	-0.25 (0.24)		-0.27 (0.23)	-0.31 (0.23)		-0.39 (0.22)	-0.45 (0.23)
Age		0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)		0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)		0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
White		0.05 (0.28)	-0.08 (0.28)		0.06 (0.30)	-0.05 (0.30)		0.06 (0.29)	-0.11 (0.29)
Military Family		0.22 (0.22)	0.27 (0.23)		0.13 (0.24)	0.18 (0.25)		0.15 (0.23)	0.21 (0.24)
Education		0.08 (0.08)	0.06 (0.08)		0.07 (0.09)	0.06 (0.09)		0.12 (0.09)	0.11 (0.09)
Income		-0.21 (0.42)	-0.29 (0.42)		-0.14 (0.42)	-0.21 (0.43)		-0.04 (0.49)	-0.09 (0.48)
Income: No Answer		0.02 (0.42)	-0.06 (0.44)		0.15 (0.47)	0.09 (0.45)		0.01 (0.42)	-0.07 (0.43)
Constant	0.37 (0.62)	0.44 (0.85)	-0.41 (0.88)	2.23*** (0.31)	1.89** (0.58)	1.21 (0.63)	0.10 (0.15)	0.20 (0.53)	-0.59 (0.58)
AIC	855.57	878.13	856.19	754.62	774.3	758.49	743.18	756.85	734.37
Num. obs.	627	627	627	627	627	627	620	620	620

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A5: Robustness checks controlling for index of principled support for transparency (Models 1-3), controlling for initial response in the pre-election wave (Models 4-6), and controlling for change in attitude towards Governor's secrecy (Models 7-9). Logistic regressions of indicator for positive within-individual change (reflecting a shift towards supporting greater constraints on secrecy) in response from pre-election to post-election survey wave. Independents omitted from sample. Standard errors clustered by state.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Republican	0.04 (0.33)	1.32 (1.22)	-1.08** (0.34)	-0.49 (0.76)	-0.78 (0.54)	-0.22 (0.33)	-0.43 (0.48)	-0.20 (0.47)
High News Interest	0.35 (0.32)							
Rep. × High News Interest	-1.18** (0.42)							
Transparency Index		0.04 (0.04)						
Republican × Transparency Index		-0.10 (0.06)						
Female	-0.21 (0.23)	-0.20 (0.23)	-0.53 (0.31)	-0.18 (0.23)	-0.18 (0.23)	-0.20 (0.23)	-0.19 (0.22)	-0.22 (0.22)
Republican × Female			0.82 (0.43)					
Age	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Republican × Age			-0.00 (0.01)					
White	-0.00 (0.28)	0.03 (0.28)	0.03 (0.28)	0.05 (0.28)	0.00 (0.33)	0.05 (0.28)	0.04 (0.28)	0.05 (0.27)
Republican × White					0.20 (0.59)			
Military Family	0.22 (0.22)	0.19 (0.22)	0.25 (0.23)	0.22 (0.22)	0.22 (0.22)	0.50 (0.30)	0.22 (0.22)	0.25 (0.22)
Republican × Military Family						-0.66 (0.44)		
Education	0.06 (0.08)	0.08 (0.08)	0.09 (0.08)	0.08 (0.08)	0.08 (0.08)	0.08 (0.08)	0.11 (0.11)	0.08 (0.08)
Republican × Education							-0.07 (0.15)	
Income	-0.22 (0.43)	-0.17 (0.43)	-0.20 (0.42)	-0.21 (0.42)	-0.20 (0.42)	-0.22 (0.42)	-0.20 (0.42)	0.02 (0.55)
Income: No Answer	-0.04 (0.42)	0.06 (0.43)	0.05 (0.43)	0.01 (0.42)	0.03 (0.43)	0.02 (0.43)	0.02 (0.43)	0.83 (0.63)
Republican × Income								-0.57 (0.78)
Republican × Income: No Answer								-1.53 (0.86)
Pol. Knowledge	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)
Constant	0.00 (0.54)	-0.51 (1.07)	0.37 (0.53)	0.21 (0.58)	0.29 (0.53)	0.15 (0.53)	0.18 (0.56)	0.23 (0.55)
AIC	867.74 627	877.11 627	872.68 627	878.71 627	877.71 627	874.65 627	878.66 627	874.54 627

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A6: Alternative interaction terms with partisanship. Logistic regressions of indicator for positive within-individual change (reflecting a shift towards supporting greater constraints on secrecy) in response from pre-election to post-election survey wave. Independents omitted from sample. Standard errors clustered by state.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Party ID (7-point)	-0.09 (0.04)	-0.10* (0.05)	0.18 (0.11)					
Party ID × Pol. Knowledge			-0.05** (0.02)					
Ideology				-0.10 (0.05)	-0.12* (0.05)	0.20 (0.16)		
Ideology × Pol. Knowl.						-0.06* (0.03)		
Pol. Knowledge		-0.10* (0.04)	0.11 (0.08)		-0.10* (0.04)	0.14 (0.11)		-0.11** (0.04)
Female		-0.05 (0.20)	-0.10 (0.21)		-0.07 (0.20)	-0.08 (0.21)		-0.05 (0.20)
Age		0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)		0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)		0.01 (0.01)
White		0.18 (0.25)	0.11 (0.25)		0.10 (0.25)	0.06 (0.25)		0.13 (0.25)
Military Family		0.23 (0.20)	0.23 (0.20)		0.20 (0.20)	0.26 (0.20)		0.30 (0.20)
Education		0.09 (0.08)	0.08 (0.07)		0.08 (0.08)	0.08 (0.08)		0.10 (0.07)
Income		0.16 (0.37)	0.13 (0.37)		0.15 (0.38)	0.08 (0.37)		0.16 (0.37)
Income: No Answer		0.17 (0.37)	0.12 (0.39)		0.15 (0.37)	0.09 (0.39)		0.11 (0.38)
'Strong Democrat'							0.29 (0.29)	0.40 (0.29)
'Not very strong Democrat'							0.09 (0.34)	0.09 (0.35)
'Lean Democrat'							0.92* (0.39)	1.10** (0.42)
'Lean Republican'							-0.69 (0.37)	-0.68 (0.35)
'Not very strong Republican'							-0.12 (0.35)	-0.10 (0.33)
'Strong Republican'							-0.06 (0.31)	-0.07 (0.30)
Constant	0.29 (0.19)	0.03 (0.49)	-1.00 (0.65)	0.38 (0.24)	0.13 (0.54)	-1.13 (0.78)	-0.10 (0.21)	-0.49 (0.52)
AIC	1063.89	1080.22	1066.72	1063.44	1080.18	1074.52	1063.38	1075.27
Num. obs.	788	788	788	787	787	787	788	788

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A7: Robustness checks using seven-point partisan identification scale, or Ideology scale, in place of dichotomous partisanship variable. Models 7 and 8 treat the seven-point partisan identification scale as categorical, with Independent as the reference category.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Republican	-0.17 (0.21)	-0.25 (0.22)	0.48 (0.51)	-0.14 (0.23)	-0.27 (0.23)	0.36 (0.55)
Rep. × Pol. Knowl.			-0.14 (0.08)			-0.12 (0.09)
Pol. Knowledge		-0.01 (0.05)	0.05 (0.06)		-0.00 (0.05)	0.06 (0.07)
Female		0.24 (0.23)	0.22 (0.23)		0.34 (0.25)	0.33 (0.25)
Age		0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)		0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
White		0.12 (0.28)	0.07 (0.28)		0.13 (0.30)	0.10 (0.30)
Military Family		0.47* (0.22)	0.49* (0.22)		0.62** (0.23)	0.64** (0.23)
Education		0.05 (0.08)	0.04 (0.08)		0.05 (0.09)	0.05 (0.09)
Income		-0.32 (0.41)	-0.36 (0.42)		-0.36 (0.44)	-0.39 (0.45)
Income: No Answer		-0.29 (0.42)	-0.32 (0.42)		-0.37 (0.45)	-0.40 (0.45)
Constant	0.20 (0.14)	-0.23 (0.53)	-0.53 (0.59)	0.16 (0.15)	-0.38 (0.57)	-0.65 (0.65)
AIC	868.54	886.03	884.54	763.62	776.49	776.69
Num. obs.	634	634	634	556	556	556

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A8: Placebo test employing dependent variable focused on change in attitudes towards gubernatorial secrecy. Logistic regressions of indicator for positive within-individual change (reflecting a shift towards supporting greater constraints on governor's secrecy) in response from pre-election to post-election survey wave. Independents omitted from sample. Sample for Models 4-6 also excludes respondents from twelve states with gubernatorial elections in 2016. Standard errors clustered by state.