

**Online Appendix for**  
*The Price of Probity: Anticorruption and Adverse Selection in the Chinese Bureaucracy*

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## A Summary Statistics

Table A.1: Summary Statistics


	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Number of activities in college	2.13	1.69	0	9	555
Number of achievements in college	1.81	1.38	0	5	555
Official parents	0.39	0.49	0	1	791
Farmer parents	0.18	0.38	0	1	791
Past economic hardship	1.69	0.78	0	3	555
Participation in work-study	0.59	0.49	0	1	555
Graduated after 2013 × Xi province	0.048	0.21	0	1	791
Graduated after 2013	0.32	0.47	0	1	791
Anticorruption cases (major)	0.99	1.38	0	10	791
Anticorruption cases (all)	7.07	4.64	0.28	26.5	791
Party membership	0.81	0.40	0	1	791
Administrative rank	1.40	0.81	0	5	791
Age	28.6	2.97	23	47	791
Female	0.57	0.50	0	1	791
Graduation year (linear)	2011.9	2.60	2004	2015	791
Ethnic minority	0.049	0.22	0	1	791
Length of work	3.26	0.78	1	5	791
Level of work (1 = grassroots, 6 = central govt)	3.48	1.05	1	6	791
Monetary motivation (self)	0.92	0.80	0	2	791
Monetary motivation (parents)	0.21	0.41	0	1	555
Commitment to public-sector job	2.49	0.76	1	4	791
Support for property tax on second home	2.67	0.75	1	4	555
Support for special medical services for the rich	2.44	0.76	1	4	555

## B Survey Procedures

We fielded all our surveys between September 2018 and April 2019. We began with a pilot survey in a southern university. This university has one of the largest MPA programs in southern China, taking in civil servants not only from its home province but also from several neighboring provinces. After the pilot, we conducted preliminary data analysis, added several more questions,<sup>36</sup> and then fielded the survey in eight other institutions. In all institutions, we worked closely with local partners. We typically fielded the survey at the beginning of first-year MPAs' compulsory classes. Students were asked to scan a QR code and answer survey questions on their phones. Attendance at these classes was generally high (>95%) and virtually all attending students completed our survey. During the survey, we carefully monitored the respondents' IP addresses to ensure that there were no repeat takers. To protect the respondents' privacy, we did not collect any information that could easily reveal their identities (e.g., name, student ID, undergraduate institution, etc.).

<sup>36</sup>Specifically, the questions on college activities and past economic experience were added after the pilot.

Figure A.1: Locations of MPA Programs



## B.1 Questionnaire

1. Have you had the following experience in college (multiple choice)? 在本科期间,你是否有以下经历?(多选)
  - (a) Receiving a university-level (or above) scholarship 获得校级或以上奖学金
  - (b) Participating in work-study programs during spare time 在课余时间打工或参加勤工俭学活动<sup>37</sup>
  - (c) Serving as minister (or above) of student union or youth league branch 担任学生会或团委部长级别及以上的干部
  - (d) Representing the school sports team and obtaining an award in sports competition 代表校运动队参加比赛,获得名次
  - (e) Representing the school art club and obtaining an award in performance/competition 代表校艺术社团参加演出/比赛,获得名次
  - (f) Participating in academic competitions (such as the Challenge Cup) and obtaining province-level (or above) awards 参加科技或学术竞赛(如挑战杯)并获省级以上奖励
  - (g) Having one semester (or more) exchange study at an overseas university 在海外高校有一个学期或以上的交流学习
  - (h) Serving as leader of a student organization 在学生社团中担任组织领导角色
  - (i) Participating in a university-level (or above) English speech/debate competition and obtaining an award 参加校级或以上的英语演讲/辩论比赛并获奖

<sup>37</sup>This question is used to construct the variable on *Participation in Work-Study*, and is excluded from calculating activities or achievements in college.

- (j) Publishing papers in academic journals 在学术期刊发表论文
  - (k) Receiving university-level (or above) merit award 获得校级或以上先进个人称号(如三好学生,优秀学生干部等)
2. What is your father's occupation (current or the last before retirement)? 您父亲从事的职业是(当前或者退休前最后一份工作)?
- (a) Farmer, herdsman, or fisherman 农、牧、渔民
  - (b) Staff person in commercial or service organization 商业服务业职工
  - (c) Individual household business 个体工商户
  - (d) Private business owner 私营企业主
  - (e) Worker 工人
  - (f) Government employee/cadre 党政机关职工/干部
  - (g) Technician or professional 专业技术人员
  - (h) Other 其他 (请注明)
3. What is your mother's occupation (current or the last before retirement)? 您母亲从事的职业是(当前或者退休前最后一份工作)?
- (a) Farmer, herdsman, or fisherman 农、牧、渔民
  - (b) Staff person in commercial or service organization 商业服务业职工
  - (c) Individual household business 个体工商户
  - (d) Private business owner 私营企业主
  - (e) Worker 工人
  - (f) Government employee/cadre 党政机关职工/干部
  - (g) Technician or professional 专业技术人员
  - (h) Other 其他 (请注明)
4. What kind of organizations are you currently working in? 您主要在哪个部门工作?
- (a) Party and government branch 党政机关
  - (b) Public institution 事业单位
  - (c) State-owned enterprise 国有企业
  - (d) Private firm 民营企业
  - (e) Social organization 社会组织
  - (f) Other 其他
5. Among the following career goals, which one is most important to you? Which one is the second most important? 在职业选择中,请将以下几个目标按照重要程度进行选择,您觉得最重要的是? 第二重要的是?

- (a) High income 获得较高的收入
  - (b) Realizing parents' expectations 实现父母的期望
  - (c) New and interesting work 工作新鲜有趣
  - (d) Career stability 工作稳定性高
  - (e) Improving skills and knowledge 提升自己的知识和能力
  - (f) Making contributions to the public and society 为公众和社会做贡献
6. What are your parents' expectations about your current career choice (maximum two choices)?  
您父母对您当前职业选择的期望主要是? 第二重要的是?
- (a) Making money to support family 能够挣钱养家
  - (b) Job stability 工作稳定
  - (c) Good promotion opportunity 晋升机会大
  - (d) High social reputation 社会声誉高
  - (e) Honing skills and developing personal connections 可以锻炼能力,积累人脉资源
7. Would you consider working for a private firm or a non-governmental organization after the MPA program? 经过MPA阶段的学习后, 您是否考虑去民营企业或其他体制外机构工作?
- (a) Very much—will consider it as a priority choice 非常愿意,优先考虑
  - (b) Somewhat—will consider it as an alternative 有一定的意愿,可以作为备选
  - (c) Not very much, but can give it a try if necessary 不太愿意,但也可以尝试
  - (d) Not interested at all—will not consider 没有兴趣,基本不会考虑
8. How often did your family experience financial difficulties when you were growing up? 在成长过程中,您的家庭是否遇到过经济拮据的状况?
- (a) Never 完全没遇到过
  - (b) Seldom 基本没遇到过
  - (c) Sometimes 有时遇到
  - (d) Frequently 常常遇到
9. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: For families that own two or more apartments, the government should levy a certain percentage of the property tax each year based on the value of the excess property? 对于拥有两套或以上房产的家庭,国家应该根据其多余房产的价值,每年征收一定比例的房产税
- (a) Strongly disagree 非常不同意
  - (b) Disagree 不同意
  - (c) Agree 同意

(d) Strongly agree 非常同意

10. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Public hospitals should set up fast-track, special outpatient, and special-purpose wards to provide value-added services to those who are willing to pay high prices? 公立医院应该设立快速通道,特别门诊,特需病房,为愿意支付高价的人提供增值服务

(a) Strongly disagree 非常不同意

(b) Disagree 不同意

(c) Agree 同意

(d) Strongly agree 非常同意

## C Validating Measures for Ability and Socioeconomic Status

Table A.2: Validating Ability Measures

	Activities in college			Achievements in college		
	(1) Full sample	(2) Civil servant sample	(3) Non-civil servant sample	(4) Full sample	(5) Civil servant sample	(6) Non-civil servant sample
MPA school ranking (QS)	0.206** (0.030)			0.165** (0.027)		
Administrative rank		0.295** (0.113)			0.179* (0.087)	
CCP membership		1.156** (0.164)	1.046** (0.176)		0.990** (0.136)	0.902** (0.146)
College province FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Individual-level controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	910	555	355	910	555	355

**Note:** This table presents the regression results on the relationship between our ability measures and several other indicators of group or individual quality, including MPA program reputation, CCP membership, and (for civil servants) administrative rank. *MPA School Ranking* is a 4-level variable based on the 2019 QS Mainland China University Rankings (Top 2=4, 3rd-10th=3, 11th-50th=2, the rest/unranked=1). *Administrative Rank* is a 6-level variable that measures the respondents' formal rank within the government. *CCP Membership* is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent is a CCP member and 0 otherwise. The results suggest that respondents with a higher number of activities/achievements in college are more likely to get into better MPA programs, be selected into the CCP, and reach higher ranks within the government. Individual-level controls include gender, age, ethnicity, and career length. Standard errors clustered at the MPA program level are reported in parentheses.

+  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$  (two-tailed test)

Figure A.2: Correlation between Occupation- and Experience-based Measure of Socioeconomic Status




Table A.3: Correlation between Ability and Economic Background

	Activities in college		Achievements in college	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Farmer parents	-0.016 (0.199)		0.111 (0.161)	
Official parents	0.078 (0.165)		0.107 (0.135)	
Past economic hardship		-0.148 (0.107)		-0.073 (0.086)
Female	0.278 <sup>+</sup> (0.161)	0.256 (0.162)	0.340* (0.132)	0.329* (0.133)
Ethnic minority	-0.215 (0.280)	-0.235 (0.283)	-0.373 (0.228)	-0.390 <sup>+</sup> (0.233)
Age	0.044 (0.049)	0.045 (0.050)	0.026 (0.042)	0.028 (0.043)
Graduation year (linear)	-0.018 (0.055)	-0.015 (0.055)	-0.048 (0.047)	-0.047 (0.047)
Province and MPA program fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	555	555	555	555

**Note:** This table presents the correlation between the civil servants' ability and their family and economic backgrounds.

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$  (two-tailed test)

## D Additional Information for the IV Design

### D.1 Anticorruption Enforcement and Public Attention

Figure A.3: Public Attention to Anticorruption: Google Search Interest




Figure A.4: Public Attention to Anticorruption: Baidu Index






Table A.4: Anticorruption Enforcement and Public Attention

	Baidu index for "anticorruption"		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Anticorruption cases (major)	13.296** (4.388)	5.911** (1.889)	6.231** (1.458)
GDP (100 million yuan)			0.010** (0.002)
Population (10,000)			0.224* (0.107)
Year fixed effects	✓	✓	✓
Province fixed effects		✓	✓
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.69	0.87	0.95
Observations	155	155	155

*Note:* This table presents the regression results on the relationship between province-level enforcement intensity and public attention to anticorruption. The dependent variable is province-level Baidu Search Index (Baidu Zhishu) for the Chinese keyword "反腐" (*fanfu*, or anticorruption) between 2011 and 2015. Standard errors clustered at province level are reported in parentheses.  
<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$  (two-tailed test)

## D.2 First-Stage

Table A.5: First-Stage Results

	Anticorruption cases (major)		Anticorruption cases (all)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
After 2013	1.543** (0.175)	1.464** (0.179)	3.713** (0.433)	3.438** (0.434)
After 2013 × Xi province	-1.129** (0.381)	-1.116** (0.381)	-2.410* (0.944)	-2.294* (0.924)
Year (linear)	0.010 (0.018)	-0.065+ (0.037)	0.045 (0.045)	-0.298** (0.090)
GDP (100 million yuan)		-0.000 (0.000)		-0.000* (0.000)
Fiscal expenditure (100 million yuan)		0.000* (0.000)		0.001** (0.000)
Population (10,000)		0.001 (0.000)		0.002+ (0.001)
Private sector share of industrial output		0.152 (1.376)		4.360 (3.334)
Province fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
First stage F on <i>After 2013</i> and <i>After 2013 × Xi province</i>	39.04	33.74	36.82	31.49
Observations	372	372	372	372

**Note:** This table presents the first stage regression of our IV design. The dependent variable is the number of disciplined officials per province from 2003 to 2016. Province fixed effect and a linear time trend are controlled in all models.

+  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$  (two-tailed test)

### D.3 Evidence on Exclusion Restriction


Table A.6: Results on Exclusion Restriction

	GDP	Population	# of college graduates	Total private sector output	Wage: government job	Wage: urban average	Total government employment	Total urban employment
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
After 2013	-1001.827 (780.666)	-5.364 (16.036)	-0.234 (0.279)	-23.640 (24.648)	2099.572 (1569.158)	665.017 (1163.869)	-0.555 (0.524)	-52.725 (33.202)
After 2013 $\times$ Xi province	1328.382 (1023.104)	3.861 (19.249)	-0.008 (0.459)	14.579 (43.558)	701.421 (1735.947)	3576.914 (2206.218)	0.853 (0.949)	7.133 (27.100)
Joint significance ( $p$ value)	0.32	0.94	0.68	0.63	0.22	0.14	0.48	0.28
Province fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Linear year	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	248	248	248	248	248	248	248	248

*Note:* This table presents the regression estimates for the relationship between the two instruments and the province-level confounders shown in Figure 2. Province fixed effect and a linear time trend are controlled in all models. We conduct F-tests on the joint significance of the two instruments and report the  $p$  values at the bottom of the table. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

+  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$  (two-tailed test)

Figure A.5: Comparing Pre-2013 Corruption Levels between Xi and non-Xi Provinces



Note: This figure shows the difference between Xi and non-Xi provinces on several corruption measures using data collected by Cai, Fang, and Xu (2011) and Zhu (2016). Each circle represents the group average and the horizontal bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals. The comparison suggests that before the campaign was launched, Xi provinces were not significantly less corrupt than non-Xi provinces according to all our corruption measures.

## E Additional Robustness

Table A.7: Estimation on Data Collapsed to Province-Year Spells

	Activities in college	Achievements in college	Farmer parents	Official parents	Past economic hardship	Participa- tion in work- study
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Anticorruption cases	-0.322 <sup>+</sup> (0.195)	-0.356* (0.169)	-0.104** (0.029)	0.137** (0.052)	-0.202* (0.091)	-0.070 (0.062)
Province fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
First-stage F	17.52	17.52	23.43	23.43	17.52	17.52
Hansen's J (p value)	1.00	0.98	0.20	0.31	0.41	0.99
Observations	167	167	194	194	167	167

**Note:** This table presents the IV results using a sample that collapses all variables to province-year level.  
<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$  (two-tailed test)

Table A.8: Significance Tests Based on Alternative Standard Errors/Methods

Variable	Pr ( $\delta_{\text{enforcement}} = 0$ ) based on ...	
	Robust standard error	Wild Bootstrap
Activities in college	0.006	< 0.0001
Achievements in college	0.002	< 0.0001
Farmer parents	0.002	< 0.0001
Official parents	0.004	0.07
Past economic hardship	0.038	0.04
Participation in work-study	0.006	0.03

*Note:* This table presents (the  $p$  values of) two alternative significance tests on the estimated effect of anticorruption enforcement. The first column reports tests based on (unclustered) heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors, and the second column reports results from the Wild Restricted Efficient Bootstrap method (Davidson and MacKinnon 2010).

Table A.9: Reduced-Form Results

	Activities in college	Achievements in college	Farmer parents	Official parents	Past economic hardship	Participation in work-study
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Graduated after 2013	-0.625* (0.231)	-0.601** (0.185)	-0.110** (0.031)	0.150* (0.065)	-0.211* (0.092)	-0.184** (0.058)
Graduated after 2013 $\times$ Xi province	0.491* (0.183)	0.559** (0.117)	0.070 (0.140)	-0.125 (0.089)	0.098 (0.291)	0.204** (0.050)
Joint significance test (p-value)	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.07	0.00
College province FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
MPA program FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Individual-level controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	555	555	791	791	555	555

*Note:* This table presents the reduced-form results using *After 2013* and *After 2013  $\times$  Xi province* as the key independent variables. The p values from the joint significance test of the two variables are shown at the bottom of the table. Standard errors are clustered at the college province level.

+  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$  (two-tailed test)

Table A.10: Using *After 2013*  $\times$  *Xi province* as the Only Instrument

	Activities in college	Achievements in college	Farmer parents	Official parents	Past economic hardship	Participa- tion in work- study
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Anticorruption cases (major)	-0.363*** (0.115)	-0.404*** (0.106)	-0.029 (0.088)	0.083 (0.059)	-0.071 (0.159)	-0.171*** (0.042)
College province FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
MPA program FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Individual-level controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	555	555	791	791	555	555

**Note:** This table presents the instrumental variables results using *After 2013*  $\times$  *Xi province* as the only instrument while controlling for the graduation year fixed effects (which absorbs *After 2013*). Standard errors are clustered at the college province level.

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$  (two-tailed test)

Table A.11: Excluding Government Officials' Children

	Activities in college	Achievements in college	Past economic hardship	Participation in work-study
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Anticorruption cases (major)	-0.450* (0.188)	-0.407** (0.144)	-0.219** (0.073)	-0.127** (0.044)
Hansen's J (p value)	0.52	0.34	0.92	0.22
Observations	347	347	347	347

**Note:** This table presents the IV results using a sample that excludes all civil servants whose parents are also government officials. All models control for gender, ethnic minority, age, and MPA and college province fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the college province level.

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$  (two-tailed test)

Table A.12: Parents who are High- vs. Low-Ranking Officials

	Official parents (high-ranking)	Official parents (low-ranking)
	(1)	(2)
Anticorruption cases (major)	0.013 (0.018)	0.069** (0.026)
Hansen's J (p value)	0.72	0.63
Observations	791	791


**Note:** This table presents the IV results that distinguish between parents' administrative rank. The dependent variable in the first column takes the value of 1 if either of a respondent's parents has a rank above full-department level (正处级), and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in the second column takes the value of 1 if a respondent has at least one parent in government but no parent at or above the full-department level, and 0 otherwise. The results suggest that anticorruption enforcement caused an increase in the shares of both high- and low-ranking officials' children in newly recruited civil servants, and the increase is somewhat more salient for children of low-ranking officials.

+  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$  (two-tailed test)

## F External Validity

### F.1 Results by Subsample

Figure A.6: Results by Subsample



**Note:** This figure shows the baseline results by subsample. Each panel displays six subsample results for the same dependent variable (indicated in the panel title). The circles represent the coefficient estimates and the vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The first four subsamples (from the left) are based on school characteristics and the next five subsamples are based on the respondents' characteristics. We see that the signs of the coefficients are largely consistent across the different subsamples.



## F.2 Results with Post-Stratification

Another common strategy to address non-representativeness in non-probabilistic samples is through post-stratification. This procedure reweighs the sample data in a way that makes the joint distributions of key demographic groups in the sample the same as those in a predefined population. Given that it is inherently difficult to define a sampling frame in a study of officials, we conducted four different post-stratification exercises, each based on a different idea of what the population is. The procedures and results are detailed below.

The first exercise aims at making our civil servant sample representative of entry-level civil servants in each province. To that end, we collected information about the average size of civil service recruitment for each province (excluding Tibet) between 2009 and 2015. In an ideal design, the probability that a newly recruited civil servant from a given province  $A$  is sampled is:

$$\pi_A^{pop} = \frac{\text{No. of new recruits in province } A}{\text{No. of new recruits in all provinces}},$$

and the actual probability in our sample is:

$$\pi_A^{sample} = \frac{\text{No. of respondents working in province } A}{\text{Total civil servant sample size}}$$

The post-stratification weight for province  $A$  can be computed as:

$$\omega_A = \frac{\pi_A^{pop}}{\pi_A^{sample}}$$

The second exercise follows a similar procedure but uses fresh college graduates between 2004-2015 as the target population. We calculated the share of graduates each province produced in a given year as a percentage of the national sum in that year, and used this share as our  $\pi^{pop}$ . The share of respondents graduating from a given province-year spell in our sample is used as  $\pi^{sample}$ .


Finally, we created two additional sets of post-stratification weights that focus on making the sample representative of the population of individuals enrolled in MPA programs. We collected data on the size of incoming cohorts of all certified Chinese MPA programs in 2018, as well as the geographic location and academic ranking of their institutions.<sup>38</sup> The first set of weights target the geographic distribution of first-year MPA students in the population,<sup>39</sup> and the second set of weights target the shares of top, middle, and bottom-ranked programs in all MPA programs.

The results from the post-stratification exercises are presented in Figure A.7. We see that the variances of our estimates become larger as a result of the weight adjustments. Reassuringly, though, the magnitudes of most of the coefficients remain quite stable and are close to the original (unweighted) results. This gives us further confidence about the external validity of our findings.

<sup>38</sup>Information is available for 94 out of 103 universities that are eligible to offer MPA programs. The remaining 9 universities are mainly medical schools and have relatively small cohorts.

<sup>39</sup>Essentially, the weights are aimed at making the geographic distribution of MPA enrollment in the sample the same as the distribution in the population.

Figure A.7: Results with Post-Stratification



**Note:** This figure presents coefficient estimates from three post-stratification strategies: (1) weighting by the size of civil service recruitment, (2) weighting by the size of the college graduating cohort, (3) weighting by 2018 MPA enrollment in each of the six geographic locations, and (4) weighting by 2018 MPA enrollment in top, middle, and bottom-ranked programs. These estimates are benchmarked against the original ones (no re-weighting). The vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. We can see that the estimates remain largely consistent across the different weighting approaches.

## G Mechanism and Alternative Explanations

### G.1 Evidence on Mechanism

Table A.13: Effect of Anticorruption Enforcement on Public Perceptions and Civil Service Applications

	% change in public perception of benefits from government jobs		# of civil service applicants (in 10,000)	
	(1) IV	(2) IV	(3) IV	(4) IV
Anticorruption cases (major)	-49.725** (15.100)	-52.307** (12.247)	-1.891** (0.684)	-2.463** (0.922)
GDP per capita		-38.400** (13.975)		-2.380* (0.987)
Population (10,000)		0.010 (0.046)		-0.001 (0.004)
Fiscal expenditure (100 million yuan)		0.024 (0.017)		0.002* (0.001)
Private-sector share of industrial output		-281.690 (316.577)		3.210 (9.596)
Year (linear)	6.892** (2.403)	16.318+ (9.466)	1.167** (0.150)	1.417** (0.410)
Province fixed effects		✓		✓
First-stage F	10.50	9.23	20.04	17.03
Observations	80	80	254	254

**Note:** This table presents the regression results of the effect of anticorruption enforcement on public perceptions of returns to government employment and the number of civil service applicants. The dependent variable for the first two columns is based on multiple years of the Chinese General Social Survey (2005, 2006, 2013, and 2015). These surveys contain a common question that asks the respondents to identify the group that "benefited the most from the past economic reforms". We create a variable that measures the percentage change (from the previous survey) in the share of respondents who view "government cadre" as the greatest beneficiary group from the economic reforms. The dependent variable for Columns 3 and 4 is the number of civil service applicants. The data are collected from the Civil Service Exam Network (<http://www.offcn.com/>), one of the largest companies specializing in preparation for the civil service examination. The IV estimation uses the same two instruments as the baseline. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

+  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$  (two-tailed test)

Table A.14: Mechanism Behind the Deterrence Effect: Higher Ability Individuals Less Committed to Government Jobs

	DV: Commitment to Government Job (4 level)	
	(1)	(2)
Number of activities in college	-0.048** (0.017)	
Number of achievements in college		-0.052** (0.020)
Age	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.007 (0.009)
Ethnic minority	-0.269** (0.096)	-0.273** (0.097)
Female	0.140* (0.056)	0.144** (0.056)
Length of work	0.086** (0.031)	0.087** (0.031)
Level of government	-0.060* (0.024)	-0.058* (0.024)
MPA and college fixed effects	✓	✓
Observations	910	910

*Note:* This table presents the effect of ability on civil servants' commitment to government jobs. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is based on a survey question that asks the respondents the extent to which they would consider private-sector jobs after finishing their MPA study, with possible answers ranging from "very much" (1) to "not at all" (4).

+  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$  (two-tailed test)


Table A.15: Mechanism Behind the Compositional Effect: Individuals from Poorer Families Place Greater Value on Monetary Returns

	Monetary Motivation (Self)			Monetary Motivation (Parents)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Farmer parents	-0.012 (0.071)			0.085* (0.042)		
Official parents	0.046 (0.060)			-0.031 (0.033)		
Past economic hardship		0.021 (0.034)			0.093** (0.018)	
Participation in work-study			-0.000 (0.055)			0.068* (0.030)
Individual controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
MPA and college fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	910	910	910	910	910	910

**Note:** This table presents the effect of socioeconomic status on the respondents' job motivation. The dependent variable for the first two columns is based on a question that asks survey respondents the first and second most important issues that they consider in choosing a career (question 5). The dependent variable from the third and fourth columns is based on a question that asks what the respondents think their parents expect from them (question 6). Both variables take the value of 2 if "making money" was selected as the most important consideration for the respondent/their parents, respectively, 1 if it was selected as the second most important, and 0 if it was not selected at all. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The sample includes all MPA respondents. <sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$  (two-tailed test)

## G.2 Alternative Explanations

Figure A.8: Stability in Attributes across Birth Cohorts



Note: This figure shows the trends in several demographic variables across birth cohorts. The plots are based on nationally representative data from the 2014 China Family Panel Survey (CFPS). The cohorts displayed here correspond to the birth cohorts of the respondents in our MPA survey. We see that the shares of farmers parents and self-evaluation of family status are both very stable across different cohorts. The level of intelligence (as revealed in verbal and math tests) is also quite stable and even gradually increasing over time.


Table A.16: Placebo Analysis Using the Non-Civil Servant Sample

	Activities in college	Achieve- ments in college	Farmer parents	Official parents	Past economic hardship	Participa- tion in work- study
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Anticorruption cases (major)	0.164 (0.134)	0.124 (0.096)	-0.021 (0.020)	-0.009 (0.033)	-0.049 (0.054)	-0.017 (0.030)
Hansen's J (p value)	0.27	0.14	0.41	0.79	0.71	0.27
Observations	355	355	420	420	355	355

**Note:** This table presents the IV results using the non-civil servant sample. All models control for gender, ethnic minority, age, and MPA and college province fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the college province level.


<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$  (two-tailed test)

Figure A.9: Placebo on Individual Level Demographics



Note: This figure shows the estimated effects of anticorruption enforcement on respondents' other demographic attributes. Each circle indicates an IV estimate, and the horizontal bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals.


Figure A.10: Temporal Variations in Recruitment Criteria from Government



Note: This figure shows the demand-side variation in civil service recruitment between 2011 and 2016. We collect data on the number and required qualifications of government job openings from the civil servant recruitment brochures (公务员考试职位表), which are available at the Civil Service Exam Network (for an example, see <https://bit.ly/2NlKsse>). We combine information from both the provincial and city government brochures to compute the total number of postings and the number of postings with specific requirements for each province-year. We present the averages separately for Xi and non-Xi provinces. The vertical bars indicate 90% confidence intervals.



Figure A.11: Temporal Variations in Other Policy Priorities of the Xi Administration



Note: This figure shows the temporal variations in several of Xi administration’s other policy priorities (as appearing in central government work reports) that might have contributed to the change in civil service recruitment. These policies include, for example, the tightening of top-down accountability (*wenze*), an initiative that might have affected civil servants’ career security, and the massive poverty alleviation program (*fupin*), which might have increased some civil servants’ workload. The shaded areas indicate the years 2014 and 2015.

Table A.17: Excluding Civil Servants at the Grassroots Level

	Activities in college	Achievements in college	Farmer parents	Official parents	Past economic hardship	Participation in work-study
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Anticorruption cases (major)	-0.351** (0.115)	-0.355** (0.104)	-0.057** (0.021)	0.104** (0.040)	-0.156+ (0.093)	-0.160** (0.060)
Hansen’s J (p value)	0.23	0.56	0.96	0.85	0.92	0.54
Observations	477	477	681	681	477	477

**Note:** This table presents the IV results from a sample that excludes all civil servants at the grassroots level. All models control for gender, ethnic minority, age, and MPA and college province fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the college province level.

+  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$  (two-tailed test)

## H Additional Evidence on Policy Preferences

Table A.18: Evidence on Divergent Policy Preferences

	Property tax on second homes	Special medical services for the rich in public hospitals
	(1)	(2)
Farmer parents	0.278** (0.064)	-0.181* (0.071)
Official parents	-0.089 (0.057)	-0.022 (0.059)
A–B ( $\beta$ )	0.37	-0.16
A–B (p value)	0.000	0.040
College province FE	✓	✓
MPA program FE	✓	✓
Observations	910	910
	Property tax on second homes	Special medical services for the rich in public hospitals
	(3)	(4)
Past economic hardship	0.114** (0.033)	-0.059+ (0.035)
College province FE	✓	✓
MPA program FE	✓	✓
Observations	910	910

**Note:** This table presents the relationship between respondents' socioeconomic status and their political attitudes and policy preferences. The dependent variables are based on questions 9 and 10 from Section B.1, respectively. The top panel shows the coefficient estimates for respondents with farmer and official parents and tests on the statistical significance of their differences. In the bottom panel, we replicate the same analysis using the alternative experience-based measure of past economic hardships. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The following controls are included in all models: graduation year, gender, ethnic minority, and party membership.

+  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$  (two-tailed test)

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