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A Social Democratic governments with left-wing support

To assess the frequency of mainstream left parties relying on other left-wing parties in government, we consulted the ParlGov database[?] which includes information on the composition of parliaments and governments for 37 countries, including all EU countries and most OECD countries.

For each country, we examined all governments which were led by a Social Democratic party since the year 2000. This came out to 97 governments across 28 countries. For those governments with coalition partners, we coded whether at least one of the coalition partners were left-wing, right-wing or both. To identify whether a coalition partner was left-wing or right-wing we use the `left_right` variable from the ParlGov database, representing the left-right position of the party on a continuous scale from 0-10. We identify a party as right-wing if it scores above 5 and left-wing if it scores below 5.

Of the 97 Social Democratic governments, 22 were single party governments, 33 had at least one left-wing coalition partner and no right-wing partners, 17 had at least one right-wing and no left-wing partners, and 25 had coalition parties from both ends of the political spectrum. Figure A1 shows the distribution of cabinet types across the 97 cases.

If we look broadly at Social Democratic governments the past 20 years, at least 34 percent of them would thus be in a situation similar to the Danish Social Democrats in 2019, where they could see an advantage of moving right on immigration, leaving pro-immigration voters to support other left-wing parties while attracting anti-immigrant voters from right-wing parties. In addition to this, any Social Democratic single-party minority government reliant on support from more left-wing parties in parliament would be in a similar situation. However, since we do not have any firm data on such informal coalitions, we cannot say how common this is.

Social Democratic-led governments by cabinet composition




Figure A1: Distribution of cabinet types for 148 Social Democratic governments across 31 OECD and EU countries since 2000.

B Media coverage of Social Democrats’ position

To substantiate our claim that the Social Democrats’ position on immigration was salient and uncertain during the government negotiations, we conduct a content analysis of how the negotiations were covered in the news.

We focus on five daily broadsheet newspapers, including both right-leaning (*Jyllands-Posten*, *Berlingske*, and *Kristeligt Dagblad*) and left-leaning newspapers (*Politiken* and *Information*). We target all articles that used the phrase “government negotiations” (“*regeringsforhandlinger*”) from the day after the election (June 6th, the start of the negotiations) until our data collection ended 12 days later (June 17th). In this period the six newspapers published 236 articles online and in print. Research assistants coded all these articles based on whether they mentioned the immigration issue, the issue of climate change or the issue of the economy. If the article mentioned the immigration issue it was coded for what (if any) prediction it made about the results of the negotiations (i.e., whether the article predicted that the Social Democrats would have to make meaningful concessions on immigration or not). Figure B1 shows the share of articles mentioning each of the three topics in the full set of 236 articles.

Around one third of the articles (32 percent) were on the subject of immigration. This was more than the two other main points of contention in the negotiations, the economy and climate, which was mentioned in 28 and 17 percent of the articles respectively. Figure B2 shows the distribution of media predictions about the results of the negotiations.

12 percent of the immigration articles suggested that the Social Democrats would not make concessions to the left-wing parties they were negotiating with, 26 percent suggested that they would, and the remaining 62 percent made no predictions one way or the other.

In analyzing the media coverage, we can thus conclude that immigration was a dominant issue in the negotiations, and that there was disagreement in the media about whether the Social Democrats would have to make meaningful concessions on immigration.




Figure B1: Share of articles mentioning each policy area in media coverage of government negotiations.

Media predictions about Social Democrats' immigration policy concessions (pct.)




Figure B2: Distribution of media predictions about Social Democrats' policy concessions to other left parties on immigration. Based on content coding of 95 news stories in daily broadsheet news media during the government negotiations.

C Experimental treatments

Table C1: Experimental treatments with English translations

Condition	Original text	English translation
Control	Socialdemokratiet forhandler lige nu med Radikale Venstre, SF og Enhedslisten om, hvilken udlændingepolitik en ny socialdemokratisk ledet regering, med Mette Frederiksen som statsminister, skal føre.	The Social Democrats are currently negotiating with the Social Liberals, the Socialist People’s Party, and the Red/Green Alliance about what kind of immigration policy a Social Democrat government, with Mette Frederiksen as Prime Minister, should lead.
Accommodative	<i>Control text</i> + Iagttagere peger på, at Socialdemokratiet vil videreføre den stramme udlændingepolitik, som den tidligere regering førte. Blandt andet har Socialdemokratiet ligesom den tidligere regering afvist, at Danmark igen skal tage imod kvoteflygtninge. Socialdemokratiets formand, Mette Frederiksen, har selv argumenteret for en stram udlændingepolitik. Hun har blandt andet tidligere udtalt, at det er nødvendigt at stramme op på udlændingeområdet for at sikre at det danske samfund kan fungere i fremtiden.	<i>Control text</i> + Observers point out that the Social Democrats are expected to continue the restrictive immigration policy of the former government. Like the former government, the Social Democrats have refused to accept quota refugees. The leader of the Social Democrats, Mette Frederiksen, has herself argued for a restrictive policy. For example, she has said that it is necessary to tighten immigration law to ensure that the Danish society will be able to function properly in the future.
Adversarial	<i>Control text</i> + Iagttagere peger på, at Socialdemokratiet kommer til at føre en mindre stram udlændingepolitik end den tidligere regering. Blandt andet har Socialdemokratiet åbnet for, at Danmark igen skal tage imod kvoteflygtninge, som den tidligere regering afviste. Socialdemokratiets formand, Mette Frederiksen, har selv argumenteret for en mindre stram udlændingepolitik. Hun har blandt andet tidligere udtalt, at Danmark skal have mere fokus på integration og mindre fokus på hvor mange flygtninge, der kommer til Danmark.	<i>Control text</i> + Observers point out that the Social Democrats are expected to set a less restrictive immigration policy than the former government. The Social Democrats have proposed accepting quota refugees, which the former government refused. The leader of the Social Democrats, Mette Frederiksen, has herself argued for a less restrictive immigration policy. For example, she has said that Denmark should focus more on integration and less on the number of refugees coming to Denmark.

D Balance checks

Figure D1 reports results from a series of balance tests.




Figure D1: Balance tests for pre-treatment covariates.

For each pre-treatment variable, we regress treatment status on the pre-treatment

variable in a multinomial logit. For all pre-treatment variables we report the effects of each value on the ‘Accommodative’ and ‘Adversarial’ conditions with the ‘Control’ condition as reference category. Because the model estimates are log odds, 1 represents a null effect.

Out of a total of 86 coefficients, 5 are significantly different from zero at the 95 pct. level, a number consistent with the expected false positive rate. However, there are some notable imbalances in the treatment assignment. Most notably, the ‘Accommodation’ condition has high proportions of former left bloc voters, unemployed, and ph.d. degree holders compared to the ‘Control’ condition.

In the main analyses, we present results with and without covariate adjustment for these imbalances. As shown in these analyses, covariate adjustment for these pre-treatment characteristics does not substantially alter the results.

E Regression tables

Table E1: Models of propensity to vote for Social Democrats

	Perceived SD pos.		SD PTV		Left bloc vote int	
Intercept	0.55*** (0.01)	0.44*** (0.02)	0.37*** (0.02)	0.22*** (0.03)	0.56*** (0.02)	0.22*** (0.03)
Accommodative treatment	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)
Adversarial treatment	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	0.04* (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Covariate adjustment		✓		✓		✓
Adj. R ²	0.02	0.11	0.00	0.17	0.00	0.41
Num. obs.	1809	1809	1755	1755	1660	1660

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table E2: Interaction models: Social Democrats PTV

	Moderator: anti-imm. att.		Moderator: frm. vote	
Intercept	0.41*** (0.03)	0.27*** (0.04)	0.37*** (0.03)	0.37*** (0.04)
Anti-immigration	-0.06 (0.05)	0.14*** (0.04)		
Accommodative	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)
Adversarial	0.09** (0.04)	0.08** (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)
Anti-imm. x Accommodative	0.11* (0.06)	0.11* (0.06)		
Anti-imm. x Adversarial	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.06)		
DPP		-0.20*** (0.03)	-0.17*** (0.05)	-0.19*** (0.05)
Left bloc		0.20*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.04)	0.17*** (0.04)
Other right		-0.15*** (0.03)	-0.13*** (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.04)
DPP x Accommodative			0.16** (0.07)	0.17** (0.07)
DPP x Adversarial			-0.00 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.07)
Left bloc x Accommodative			0.04 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)
Left bloc x Adversarial			0.05 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)
Other right x Accommodative			0.05 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)
Other right x Adversarial			0.01 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)
Covariate adjustment		✓		✓
Adj. R ²	0.01	0.19	0.16	0.17
Num. obs.	1750	1750	1755	1755

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table E3: Interaction models: Left bloc vote intention

	Moderator: anti-imm. att.		Moderator: frm. vote	
Intercept	0.94*** (0.03)	0.80*** (0.04)	0.62*** (0.03)	0.58*** (0.04)
Anti-immigration	-0.64*** (0.04)	-0.41*** (0.04)		
Accommodative	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)
Adversarial	0.01 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)
Anti-imm. x Accommodative	0.08 (0.06)	0.11** (0.05)		
Anti-imm. x Adversarial	-0.01 (0.06)	0.01 (0.05)		
DPP		-0.18*** (0.03)	-0.42*** (0.04)	-0.39*** (0.04)
Left bloc		0.21*** (0.02)	0.19*** (0.04)	0.21*** (0.04)
Other right		-0.21*** (0.02)	-0.26*** (0.04)	-0.26*** (0.04)
DPP x Accommodative			0.21*** (0.06)	0.20*** (0.06)
DPP x Adversarial			0.03 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)
Left bloc x Accommodative			0.09 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)
Left bloc x Adversarial			0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)
Other right x Accommodative			0.01 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)
Other right x Adversarial			-0.04 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)
Covariate adjustment		✓		✓
Adj. R ²	0.28	0.48	0.40	0.41
Num. obs.	1657	1657	1660	1660

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

F Test of linear interaction effect assumption

Figure F1 presents a test of the linear interaction effect assumption (LIE), as presented in ?, for the statistically significant interaction between the accommodation treatment and the propensity to vote for the Social Democrats. The figure was created using the `interflex` package for R. As shown, the marginal effect increases linearly along the moderator, showing that the linear interaction effect assumption holds.




Figure F1: Marginal effect of the accommodation condition on Social Democrats PTV across the observed range of anti-immigration attitudes.