

# Appendix

## Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Additional Information on Textual Data</b>	<b>2</b>
2.1	Term Frequency Counts . . . . .	2
2.2	Social Stability Example . . . . .	3
2.3	Law Enforcement Examples . . . . .	3
2.4	Qualitative Validation of Social Stability Topic . . . . .	3
<b>3</b>	<b>Democratic, Political, and Cultural Anniversaries</b>	<b>5</b>
3.1	Pro-Democracy Anniversaries . . . . .	5
3.2	Political Anniversaries . . . . .	7
3.3	Cultural Anniversaries . . . . .	10
<b>4</b>	<b>Additional Information on Protest Data</b>	<b>12</b>
4.1	Geographic Variation . . . . .	12
4.2	Temporal Variation . . . . .	13
4.3	Comparison to Other Datasets . . . . .	14
<b>5</b>	<b>Migration Patterns</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>6</b>	<b>Threats and Pro-Regime Propaganda</b>	<b>17</b>
6.1	From Text to Article Level Data on Propaganda . . . . .	17
6.2	Results . . . . .	18
<b>7</b>	<b>Naive Model for Threats and Protest</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>8</b>	<b>IV Sensitivity Analysis</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>9</b>	<b>Protest Discourse</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>10</b>	<b>Additional Tables and Figures</b>	<b>28</b>

# 1 Introduction


This appendix includes supporting materials for the main text. Section 2 gives additional information on our textual variables. Section 3 gives more information on the democratic, political, and cultural anniversaries controlled for in the main text. Section 4 gives additional information on our protest data. Section 5 shows that there is very little migration from Xinjiang and Tibet into other provinces, especially those that we include in our final sample. Section 6 shows that threats and pro-regime propaganda are correlated, as our theory and existing literature predict. Section 7 presents the results of a naive model of the relationship between threats and protests. Section 8 introduces Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2012)’s method of sensitivity testing for instrumental variables analysis, and shows that our IV estimates are robust to non-trivial violations of the exclusion restriction. Section 9 shows that protest discourse during separatist anniversaries is similar to protest discourse during other days of the year. Section 10 reports other tables and figures that were referenced in the main text.

## 2 Additional Information on Textual Data

### 2.1 Term Frequency Counts

Figure 1 presents histograms of “stability” and “harmony” references. The left panel gives the distribution of “stability” references per day. The right panel gives the distribution of “harmony” references per day. Mean values are shown in red.

Figure 1: Histogram of word frequency counts



## 2.2 Social Stability Example

We reproduce an example article below that our classifier labeled with the social stability topic. It is clearly threatening. “Social stability management,” it claims, “promot[es] the cause of the Party and the state.” The “fundamental point purpose of our efforts...is to maintain social order...and create a favorable social environment for the development of our Party.” In the context of China, readers understand this as a threat because social order is described as necessary for continued CCP rule.

“Strengthening and innovating in social stability management is an inevitable requirement for continuing to build on the important strategic opportunity for our country in promoting the cause of the Party and the state, an inevitable requirement for building a harmonious socialist society, and a necessary requirement for safeguarding the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the people. ...In a country like ours with a population of 1.3 billion and rapid economic and social development, the task of social stability management is increasingly arduous. The fundamental purpose of our efforts to strengthen and innovate social management is to maintain social order, promote social harmony, ensure that the people live and work in peace and contentment, and create a favorable social environment for the development of our Party and our country.”

## 2.3 Law Enforcement Examples

Below, we reproduce two passages from articles that our classifier labeled with the law enforcement topic. Though they lack explicit references to “social stability maintenance,” they highlight the capabilities and loyalty of the security services.

(1) Qin Tie public security department is “enhancing its ability to perform its duties” through increased combat training and ideological education.

(2) Linfen Railway Public Security Bureau has “continuously increased investment in scientific and technological equipment to provide strong support for routine reconnaissance, detection, and prevention in public security work.”

## 2.4 Qualitative Validation of Social Stability Topic

In the main text, we presented a quantitative validation of our threat topic models. Here, we validate our classifier qualitatively. Table 1 reports the 50 most commonly mentioned terms, in descending order, in our corpus of social stability articles. These 50 words are indeed quite threat-

ening for a Chinese readership: stability, harmony, thought management, supervision, and protect, among others.

Table 1: Most Common Terms in Social Stability Articles

Chinese	English	Chinese	English
社会	society	月	month
工作	work	依法	according to law
思想	thought	机制	mechanism
管理	management	社会主义	socialism
加强	strengthen	稳定	stability
政治	political	解决	solve
发展	development	和谐	harmony
建设	construction	利益	interest
企业	enterprise	推进	promote
群众	masses	日	day
司法	legal	人	people
问题	problem	主要	main
维护	maintain	年	year
创新	innovation	报告	report
服务	serve	矛盾	contradiction
人	people	活动	activity
改革	reform	数据	data
新	new	更加	more
坚持	adhere	我国	homeland
监督	supervision	不断	constantly
完善	perfect	提高	improve
保障	protect	政府	government
教育	educate	员工	employee
促进	promote	接受	accept
经济	economic	方面	area

### 3 Democratic, Political, and Cultural Anniversaries

This section gives details on the pro-democracy, political, and cultural anniversaries that we control for in the main text.

#### 3.1 Pro-Democracy Anniversaries

Below we provide more information about contemporary China’s five pro-democracy movements, as well as how we identify the candidate focal point date. These five pro-democracy movements are the Tiananmen Square protests, Democracy Wall, Constitution Day, Charter 08, and the National Peoples’ Congress (NPC) Direct Election Movement. We employed four critical criteria for coding. First, these citizen movements must make explicit calls for democratic reforms. Movements such as the 1976 Qing Ming Movement, which called on the CCP to make internal reforms and fight corruption, are not sufficient. Second, these movements must be driven by domestic actors, rather than foreign ones. Third, we code a single date for each movement as the focal moment: the date on which the movement reached its peak or was violently repressed by the CCP government. This criterion ensures that we do not select on the dependent variable. Finally, we exclude pro-democracy movements that have been co-opted by the regime. For example, the May 4 Movement of 1919 began with democratic connotations but has since been rebranded as a nationalist holiday that is actively celebrated by the CCP (Buckley and Qin 2019). Such co-opting drowns out the democratic focality of a date, for protesters are unwilling to stage rallies that could be seen as supportive of the regime.

#### **Democracy Wall: November 27, 1978**

In November 1978, citizens in Beijing’s Xidan neighborhood hung pro-democracy posters on a public wall. Sensing an opportunity, activists formed the Democratic Assembly Group and, on November 27, led a 10,000-person march from “Democracy Wall” to Tiananmen Square. Protest leader Wei Jingsheng demanded that the government adopt democracy as its “fifth modernization,” a rejoinder to Deng Xiaoping’s four modernizations. The CCP arrested participants, including Wei, who spent 18 years in prison and, upon release, was exiled to the United States. After demolishing Democracy Wall in December 1979, Deng called for revoking the constitutional right to hang posters. The “four great [freedoms of] speaking out freely, airing views fully, holding great debates, and writing big character posters,” he proclaimed, “have never played a positive role in China.”<sup>1</sup> We code the focal moment as November 27, the date of the movement’s largest protest.

---

<sup>1</sup>The CCP removed these rights from the state constitution in 1982.

### **National People’s Congress Direct Election Movement: December 19, 1986**

In 1986, public intellectual Fang Lizhi gave a series of lectures in Shanghai and Ningbo, during which he called on the government to respect freedom of expression. Constitutional rights, he declared, should be treated as “actual rights.” Students were electrified. On December 5, students at the Hefei University of Science and Technology demanded the right to directly elect representatives to the National People’s Congress. The protests spread to Shanghai, Tianjin, Nanjing, Kunming, Hangzhou, Suzhou, Guangzhou, and Beijing. The Beijing and Shanghai protests alone drew some 30,000 participants. There were protests at 150 universities, and roughly 2% of all students participated (Kwong 1988). On December 19, Shanghai authorities dispersed protesters with force. In response, students in Hefei staged a sit-in in front of government offices on December 23, demanding that Hefei officials condemn the Shanghai government. Fang brokered a compromise between the students and the Hefei government, which agreed to communicate their demands to Shanghai. Anticipating reforms, the students called off their protests, but the government ultimately refused the reforms to which it agreed. We code the focal moment as December 19, when the movement reached its peak and the government repressed students.

### **Tiananmen Square: June 4, 1989**

In April 1989, following the death of a prominent liberal leader, tens of thousands of students launched a protest in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. They constructed a giant “Goddess of Democracy” statue, positioned across from Mao Zedong’s portrait that hangs on the Forbidden City. Following an April 26 editorial in the *People’s Daily*, which accused the students of being manipulated by foreign agents, over 100,000 citizens joined the protest. CCP leaders regarded the participation of workers as representative of a broader cross-section of society, and therefore as particularly threatening. Following weeks of indecision among senior leaders, the People’s Liberation Army cleared the square on June 4, murdering between several hundred and several thousand citizens. Discussion of the incident has been forbidden in print and online. We code the focal moment as June 4, when the movement reached its peak and the government repressed protesters.

### **Charter 08: December 10, 2008**

On December 10, 2008, 303 Chinese intellectuals, scholars, lawyers, and officials signed a manifesto that demanded independent courts, respect for basic human rights, and an end to one-party rule. Entitled “Charter 08,” it was inspired by the “Charter 77” pro-democracy manifesto released by Czech dissidents in 1977.<sup>2</sup> The document’s first sentence referred to the sort of focal moments privileged by our theory: “This year is the 100th year of China’s Constitution, the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 30th anniversary of the birth of the Democracy

---

<sup>2</sup>Note that it was signed only by prominent Chinese citizens living within China. See Link (2009).

Wall, and the 10th year since China signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” The document quickly collected 10,000 additional signatures from other prominent citizens, compelling the government to forbid discussion of Charter 08 in the media and censor it online. Citizens responded by distributing the document on Beijing streets (Wines 2009). Although Charter 08 did not culminate in major street protests, it still constituted collective action: prominent citizens signed the document and made it public. The leading signatory, Liu Xiaobo, was widely regarded by the regime and by citizens as China’s most important pro-democracy activist until his death in 2017. We code Charter 08’s publication as the focal moment.

### **Constitution Day: December 4, 2014**

On December 4, 1982, the CCP adopted the state constitution, which grants citizens a range of basic rights: freedom of speech, assembly, and religion; equality before the law; and the right to vote and stand for election. The constitution enshrined a right to privacy and protected citizens against unlawful detention. In 2014, the CCP attempted to buttress its legitimacy by creating a new holiday: Constitution Day, which would be celebrated on December 4.<sup>3</sup> Ironically, on the very day the CCP created the holiday, “constitution” was the most censored word on Chinese internet. Dissident bloggers sought to post quotes from the constitution, but were blocked (Allen-Ebrahimian 2014). The government’s Constitution Day proclamation sparked a backlash. On December 4, nearly 1,000 citizens protested outside the CCTV building in Beijing, and dozens of prominent lawyers signed an open letter demanding that the CCP respect the rights enshrined in the 1982 constitution. We code the focal moment as December 4.

## **3.2 Political Anniversaries**

A brief description of each of our political anniversaries follows. These include historical events, regularly scheduled political meetings, and national holidays that are political in nature.

### **Death of Zhao Ziyang**

On January 17, 2005, Zhao Ziyang died. He was a liberal leader who sided with protesters during Tiananmen and was placed under house arrest for the rest of his life. He nonetheless managed to have his memoirs smuggled out of China. The death of liberal leaders is a sensitive topic in China, as they sometimes spur calls for more liberalization. The death of Hu Yaobang, for instance, was the immediate pretext for the weeks of protest that led to Tiananmen.

---

<sup>3</sup>Appropriating concepts like democracy and human rights is common in autocratic propaganda, Carter and Carter (2020) find.

## **Youth Day (May 4 Movement)**

On May 4, 1919, young people in Beijing launched a movement against imperialism. In particular, they were angry that the Treaty of Versailles required China to cede Shandong province to Japan. This movement is often seen as the birth of modern popular nationalism in China. Crucially, we do not regard May 4 as a democratic holiday. May 4 began with democratic connotations, due to the “Mr. Democracy” and “Mr. Science” demands of the original anti-imperialist movement in 1919. However, the CCP has tried very hard to co-opt May 4 a nationalist holiday. For instance, textbooks teach the anti-imperial and patriotic lessons of May 4 but not their pro-democracy leanings. The CCP explicitly commemorates May 4 as a nationalist holiday. For example, President Xi Jinping “seized on the event Tuesday [May 4, 2019] to burnish his brand of authoritarian nationalism...In a speech marking the centenary of the event, Mr. Xi extolled the patriotic image of May 4 while ignoring its anti-authority themes,” according to the *New York Times* (Buckley and Qin 2019). He concluded that “Chinese youth in the new era must obey the party and follow the party.” Our view is that this effort has drowned out the democratic focality of the date.

## **Labor Day**

May 1 is touted as a “red” ideological holiday in China. On this day, the CCP propagandizes its commitment to workers. Labor Day is potentially embarrassing to the CCP, as many of China’s retired pensioners do not receive their pensions. More, China, an ostensibly communist country, has higher income inequality than the United States.

## **Founding of the Chinese Communist Party**

On July 1, 1921, the CCP was founded in Shanghai. This date could be a focal moment for citizens who are unhappy with CCP policies.

## **Founding of the Peoples’ Liberation Army**

On August 1, 1933, the CCP founded the People’s Liberation Army. It could be a focal moment for citizens who are unhappy with PLA corruption, abuse, or who recall the PLA’s role in the Tiananmen massacre.

## **Senior Leadership Retreat**

For two weeks in mid-August, on or around August 15, senior CCP leaders decamp for a seaside resort three hours outside of Beijing, where they discuss policy and swim (a tradition among senior leaders since Mao). This could be a salient focal moment for citizens who wish to protest CCP policies or corruption among government officials.



### **Mukden Incident**

On September 18, 1931, Japan invaded northeast China. Japan conquered large parts of China during the war. The date recalls the failure of Chinese authorities to protect citizens. Accordingly, it could be a focal moment for expressing discontent about CCP softness in foreign policy.

### **National Day**

On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong declared the Chinese people had stood up. Like Independence Day in the United States, China's National Day day is associated with parades and fireworks. It could be a focal moment for citizen discontent about CCP policy.

### **Belgrade Embassy Bombing**

On May 9, 1999, the US accidentally bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Mainstream opinion in China considers this event a conspiracy in which the United States was trying to test Chinese resolve. The date could be a focal moment for protest among nationalist citizens who regard the CCP as too accommodating to foreign powers.

### **Anti-Japanese War**

On July 7, 1937, Japanese and Chinese troops were involved in an incident that escalated into a battle. So began the Second Sino-Japanese War, which would not end until after the conclusion of World War II. This date could be construed as potentially embarrassing for the CCP in terms of failing to defend Chinese sovereignty.

### **Nanjing Massacre**

On December 13, 1937, Japan captured Nanjing. So began the six-week period known as the Nanjing Massacre, during which Japanese troops killed approximately 300,000 Chinese civilians and disarmed combatants. This date could be construed as potentially embarrassing for the CCP in terms of failing to defend Chinese citizens and sovereignty.

### **Party Congress**

Every five years in early November, the CCP holds its major political meeting. Accordingly, it could be a focal moment for expressing discontent about CCP policies. In our sample, the Party Congress starts on November 8, 2012.

## **National People's Congress**

Every March, the 3,000 member National People's Congress meets for two weeks. Though a rubber stamp parliament, the meeting is still widely televised across China. Accordingly, it could be a focal moment for expressing discontent about CCP policies. It typically starts on March 3.

## **3.3 Cultural Anniversaries**

### **Lunar New Year**

This two-week holiday celebrates the turning of the traditional lunar calendar. We record the start date of the holiday each year. It constitutes the largest annual migration in the world. Every year, some of China's 300 million migrant workers cannot afford railway tickets home, and consequently protest unpaid wages in railway stations. The dates are February 7, 2009; February 14, 2010; February 3, 2011; January 23, 2012; February 10, 2013; January 31, 2014; February 19, 2015; and February 8, 2016.

### **Qing Ming**

This lunar holiday is for honoring ancestors. People traditionally visit grave sites and sweep tombs. The dates are April 4, 2009; April 5, 2010; April 5, 2011; April 4, 2012; April 4, 2013; April 5, 2014; April 5, 2015; and April 4, 2016.

### **Lantern Festival**

On this lunar holiday, children carry red lanterns at night and solve riddles. The holiday is also associated with family reunions. The dates are February 9, 2009; February 28, 2010; February 17, 2011; February 6, 2012; February 24, 2013; January 1, 2014; February 19, 2015; and February 22, 2016.

### **Dragon Boat Festival**

This lunar holiday celebrates filial piety. Because the summer is traditionally associated with male energy, this holiday is associated with the masculine image of the dragon. Therefore, dragon boat racing is customary. The dates are May 28, 2009; June 16, 2010; June 6, 2011; June 23, 2012; June 12, 2013; June 2, 2014; June 20, 2015; and June 17, 2016.

### **Double Seventh**

This lunar holiday is drawn from a 2600 year old poem which celebrates two lovers: a weaver maid and a cowherd. They were banished to opposite ends of the galaxy because their love was forbidden, but they are reunited on this day every year by a bridge of magpies. Today, the holiday

is sometimes referred to as Chinese Valentine's Day. The dates are August 26, 2009; August 16, 2010; August 6, 2011; August 23, 2012; August 13, 2013; August 2, 2014; August 20, 2015; and August 9, 2016.

### **Ghost**

On this lunar holiday, ghosts are believed to visit the world of the living. Accordingly, people honor the dead, prepare meals for them, and burn incense. The dates are September 3, 2009; August 24, 2010; August 14, 2011; August 31, 2012; August 21, 2013; August 10, 2014; August 28, 2015; and August 17, 2016.

### **Mid-Autumn Festival**

This lunar holiday celebrates the harvest. It takes place during a full moon and is celebrated with moon cakes. It is associated with family gatherings. The dates are October 3, 2009; September 22, 2010; September 12, 2011; September 30, 2012; September 19, 2013; September 8, 2014; September 27, 2015; and September 15, 2016.

### **Double Ninth**

On this lunar holiday, it is customary for people to eat cake, climb mountains, wear chrysanthemum, and drink chrysanthemum tea or wine. The dates are October 26, 2009; October 16, 2010; October 5, 2011; October 23, 2012; October 13, 2013; October 2, 2014; October 21, 2015; and October 9, 2016.

### **Singles' Day**

This holiday originated at Nanjing University in 1993 as "Bachelor's Day," a day to celebrate being single. Today, both declarations of love and shopping trips are common on Singles' Day. The date is November 11.

### **Winter Solstice**

This traditional holiday celebrates the fact that after the winter solstice, there will be more sunlight and positive energy flowing in. It is associated with family gatherings and large meals that feature dumplings. The date is December 22.

### **New Year's Day**

Though the Gregorian New Year is less important in China than the Lunar New Year, it is nonetheless a public holiday with parties and fireworks. The date is January 1.


## 4 Additional Information on Protest Data

Collecting protest data in authoritarian contexts is an inherently difficult enterprise. Since the Chinese government does not release official data on protests (Cai 2010; Wallace and Weiss 2015), crowd-sourced reports are an accepted way to measure unrest in China. This section provides additional detail on the Elfstrom/CLB protest data across provinces, across time, and in comparison to other datasets.

### 4.1 Geographic Variation

There are considerable differences in the number of protests reported across provinces, as shown in Figure 2. The left panel gives the total number of protests reported in each province. On an absolute basis, the greatest number of protests were reported in Guangdong, followed by Shandong, Jiangsu, Henan, and Hebei. All save Henan are relatively wealthy coastal provinces. The right panel gives the average number of protests reported per capita each year. On a per capita basis, the greatest number of protests were reported in Guangdong, Ningxia, Beijing, Shaanxi, and Shanghai. These provinces are very different. Guangdong, Beijing, and Shanghai are coastal and wealthy, whereas Ningxia and Shaanxi are poor and located in the interior. We suspect that more protests are reported in Guangdong because that is where the CLB is headquartered, and in other provinces where there are more social media users. We expect that some variation is due to economic conditions across provinces. In the dataset, 7.4% of province-days experienced at least one protest. At the national level, 62.0% of days experienced a protest anywhere in the country.


Figure 2: Provincial protest rates



## 4.2 Temporal Variation


Figure 3 suggests that the protest rate has risen considerably since 2006. This may partly reflect the data collection process. By relying on social media reports, the Elfstrom and CLB measures may underreport protests prior to the recent boom in internet penetration and social media. There are good reasons to believe, however, that this increase does not only reflect rising social media rates. The Chinese government reported roughly 10,000 protests in 1994 and 80,000 protests in 2008. Then, since its own dataset indicated rising popular discontent, the government stopped releasing it. One Chinese sociologist estimated that, in 2010, there were 180,000 protests across the country. The CLB estimates that its dataset contains approximately 15% of the total number of collective action incidents in China.<sup>4</sup> The time trend in Figure 3 also reflects this genuine rise in popular frustration. Figure 4 gives a histogram of the number of protests per day.

Figure 3: Protests over time



<sup>4</sup>They arrive at this figure by comparing their data to the data on the number of “mass incidents” – very large protests – to official government data released until the mid-2000s.

Figure 4: Histogram of protests. The left panel gives the distribution of protests per day. The right panel gives the distribution of protests per week. Mean values are shown in red.



### 4.3 Comparison to Other Datasets

As shown above, the Elfstrom/CLB data records more protests in areas with greater internet penetration, stronger media outlets, and more international linkages. This may reflect reporting bias. In turn, Göbel and Steinhardt (2019) argue that social media records represent the least biased data on collective action in China. They suggest that social media captures 110 times as many protests as English-language news and 11 times as many protests as dissident blogs like CLB. However, they regard CLB, which has “extreme overlap” with their social media records, as a special case. Between 2013 and 2016, 97% of CLB protests appeared in Wickedonna, a blog that represents their gold standard social media data (Göbel and Steinhardt 2019, 8). In their view, CLB “is the most comprehensive collection of event data from Chinese dissident sources.”

We regard replicating our work with Wickedonna data an important step when this dataset becomes public. Nonetheless, we are convinced that potential selection biases in the Elfstrom/CLB data do not prohibit inference. First, the CLB data appears to be quite similar to Göbel and Steinhardt (2019)’s gold standard social media data. Given the “extreme overlap,” we are confident that our protest records represent the best data currently available on collective action in China. Second, where appropriate, we use year fixed effects to soak up intertemporal variation, and province fixed effects to soak up unobserved sources of geographic variation in measures like internet penetration, local media environments, and international linkages.

## 5 Migration Patterns

To assess outmigration from Tibet and Xinjiang, we use data from China's most recent population census, conducted in 2010. We focus on the number of migrants from Tibet and Xinjiang registered as residing in other provinces. Figure 5 confirms that there is very little outmigration from Tibet to other provinces, especially outside the nine provinces we drop in our instrumental variable analysis. Figure 6 confirms that the same is true for Xinjiang.

Figure 5: Outmigration from Tibet





Figure 6: Outmigration from Xinjiang





## 6 Threats and Pro-Regime Propaganda

Scholars increasingly understand Chinese propaganda as a signal to citizens: that the government’s capacity for repression is so substantial that it can compel citizens to consume propaganda content that everyone knows to be false (Huang 2015). In a sense, spikes in pro-regime propaganda are themselves implicitly threatening. Accordingly, we might expect spikes in pro-regime propaganda to be correlated with propaganda-based threats. Both, after all, are threatening.

### 6.1 From Text to Article Level Data on Propaganda

We scraped the *Workers’ Daily* from its online archives. To convert newspaper text into article level data on propaganda, we identified each instance that the newspaper referenced the executive or ruling party (e.g, 习近平, 党, or 共产党) in article  $i$  on day  $t$ . The variable  $References_{it}$  counts these references. For each, we then extracted the 10 words before and after the identifier, a string known as a “concordance segment.” Drawing on a standard semantic dictionary (Dong and Dong 2014), we measured how fulsome or critical were these 20 words. We removed numbers, symbols, and punctuation from the corpus before generating the concordance segments from which we extracted our measure of tone. We split Chinese text into constituent word chunks with the `jieba` segmenting algorithm.<sup>5</sup>

The variable  $Positive\ Coverage_{it}$  constitutes our measure of pro-regime propaganda, and it measures the number of fulsome words, less critical words, among the 20, summed for article  $i$ . This operationalization reflects our view that propaganda should be defined as the magnitude of coverage bias, not simply whether an assertion is strictly true or false. We validated our parsing algorithm by randomly drawing 300 articles from the *Workers’ Daily*. We had a team of research assistants who were fluent in Chinese record the number of true references to each class of identifiers in each document. We then compared these true counts to the predicted counts from our algorithm. We consider our algorithm accurate if the number of predicted references to each identifier class in document  $d$  was the same as the number of true references to each identifier class in document  $d$ , as recorded by our research assistants. Our algorithm was 95% accurate at identifying references to the CCP. The 5% of articles that were incorrectly classified referenced foreign parties, such as the Democratic Party of the United States. Our results are robust to exclusively employing “Chinese Communist Party” (共产党) as the identifier. Doing so, however, reduces the number of observations. Results are available upon request.

To substantively scale our measure of positive coverage, Table 2 displays example concordance segments. We underline references to the executive or ruling party and show the 10 words on either side. Positive words are rendered in *blue*, while negative words are rendered in *red*. The most flattering concordance, listed first, describes how social stability has made “important contributions”

---

<sup>5</sup>For further discussion of these methods, see Grimmer and Stewart (2013) and Lowe et al. (2010). Our results are robust to reducing the length of concordance segments to 10 words.

to China’s development. The next most flattering concordance describes workers asking their superiors to faithfully carry out Xi Jinping’s spirit and governance ideas. In contrast, less flattering concordances admit genuine problems. The third concordance mentions “peace” and “stability,” but also notes that regulatory supervision was “seriously lacking” in the international financial crisis. This concordance contains three positive words and one negative word, and so has a score of 2. The most critical concordance asserts the “strength” of the CCP with Xi Jinping at the “core,” yet admits “complicated” and “severe” issues in the domestic and international environment. In short, our measure of propaganda captures variation in how effusively the leadership is described.

Table 2: Example concordance segments

Tone	Concordance Segment	English Translation
6	和 社会 稳定 服务经济社会发展作出了 重要 贡献 习近平 强调年 是 我们党和国 家历史 上 具有特殊 重要	And social <b>stability</b> has made <b>important contributions</b> to economic and social development. <u>Xi Jinping</u> emphasized that the year is of special <b>importance</b> to our party’s and country’s history.
5	都 仔细 询问 悉心 叮嘱并要求工会干部 深入贯彻 习近平 总书记系列重要讲话 精 神 和 治国理政新理念 新 思想	They <b>thoughtfully</b> asked <b>careful</b> questions and asked the trade union cadres to carry out the <b>spirit</b> of General Secretary <u>Xi Jinping</u> ’s speech <b>and</b> his <b>new</b> governance ideas
2	是 谋求 和平 推动和解恢复 稳定 关于国 际金融危机 习近平 主席强调这是金融资 本过度逐利金融监管 严重 缺失的	<b>is</b> seeking to promote <b>peace</b> , reconciliation, and restore <b>stability</b> . President <u>Xi Jinping</u> stressed that the international financial crisis stems from excessive exploitation of financial capital. Financial supervision is <b>seriously</b> lacking.
-1	的一年面对 复杂 严峻 的国内外环境在以 习近平 同志为 核心 的党中央 坚强 领导 下 我国经济社会	In a year facing a <b>complicated</b> and <b>severe</b> domestic and international environment, <b>under</b> the <b>strong</b> leadership of the Party Central Committee with Comrade <u>Xi Jinping</u> as the <b>core</b> , China’s economic society

## 6.2 Results

Since we are interested in *spikes* in pro-regime propaganda, we define a “high propaganda day” as when the observed level of *Positive Coverage<sub>t</sub>* is greater than or equal to the sample mean plus  $\kappa$

standard deviations. To ensure robustness, we let  $\kappa$  range from 0.25 to 2.0. We estimate the model

$$y_t = \alpha + \beta (\text{High Propaganda Day}_t) + \epsilon \quad (1)$$

where  $t$  indexes day. In Table 3, the top two panels report results for social stability and law enforcement topic threats; the bottom two panels results for “stability” and “harmony” counts. Across outcome variables and  $\kappa$  threshold values, we find, the Chinese government’s propaganda apparatus employs pro-regime propaganda and threats of repression at roughly the same moments. Most strikingly, from the bottom two panels, high propaganda days are associated with roughly four additional references to “stability” and six additional references to “harmony.”

This is consistent with our theory of threats and existing research that understands Chinese propaganda as itself implicitly threatening. They appear to be complements, with threats of repression most common during moments of profound political tension.

Table 3: Threats and Propaganda

		<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
		Social Stability Topic						
	$\kappa = 0.25$	$\kappa = 0.5$	$\kappa = 0.75$	$\kappa = 1.0$	$\kappa = 1.25$	$\kappa = 1.5$	$\kappa = 1.75$	$\kappa = 2.0$
High Propaganda	0.006* (0.003)	0.011*** (0.004)	0.013*** (0.004)	0.016*** (0.005)	0.018*** (0.006)	0.015** (0.007)	0.006 (0.007)	0.008 (0.008)
Constant	0.004*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)
Observations	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288
R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.0002	0.0003
		<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
		Law Enforcement Topic						
	$\kappa = 0.25$	$\kappa = 0.5$	$\kappa = 0.75$	$\kappa = 1.0$	$\kappa = 1.25$	$\kappa = 1.5$	$\kappa = 1.75$	$\kappa = 2.0$
High Propaganda	0.003 (0.005)	0.012* (0.006)	0.015** (0.007)	0.016** (0.008)	0.024** (0.010)	0.025** (0.012)	0.019 (0.012)	0.024* (0.013)
Constant	0.013*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.002)
Observations	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001
		<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
		"Stability"						
	$\kappa = 0.25$	$\kappa = 0.5$	$\kappa = 0.75$	$\kappa = 1.0$	$\kappa = 1.25$	$\kappa = 1.5$	$\kappa = 1.75$	$\kappa = 2.0$
High Propaganda	4.587*** (0.338)	4.113*** (0.399)	3.687*** (0.470)	3.520*** (0.554)	3.670*** (0.670)	3.034*** (0.766)	3.117*** (0.817)	2.977*** (0.870)
Constant	7.639*** (0.146)	7.969*** (0.142)	8.163*** (0.140)	8.271*** (0.139)	8.337*** (0.137)	8.395*** (0.137)	8.404*** (0.137)	8.418*** (0.136)
Observations	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288
R <sup>2</sup>	0.053	0.031	0.018	0.012	0.009	0.005	0.004	0.004
		<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
		"Harmony"						
	$\kappa = 0.25$	$\kappa = 0.5$	$\kappa = 0.75$	$\kappa = 1.0$	$\kappa = 1.25$	$\kappa = 1.5$	$\kappa = 1.75$	$\kappa = 2.0$
High Propaganda	6.108*** (0.503)	6.040*** (0.591)	6.460*** (0.692)	6.137*** (0.818)	5.550*** (0.992)	5.575*** (1.132)	6.089*** (1.207)	6.234*** (1.285)
Constant	7.773*** (0.217)	8.140*** (0.211)	8.332*** (0.207)	8.523*** (0.205)	8.675*** (0.203)	8.730*** (0.202)	8.737*** (0.202)	8.754*** (0.202)
Observations	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288
R <sup>2</sup>	0.043	0.031	0.026	0.017	0.009	0.007	0.008	0.007

Note:

\*p&lt;0.1; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*\*p&lt;0.01

## 7 Naive Model for Threats and Protest

Determining whether threats reduce protests is complicated by the fact that threats are strategic. The CCP is more likely to threaten repression against citizens during politically sensitive moments and in response to protests on day  $t - 1$ . This creates two competing effects on protests: a negative effect due to the threat, and a positive effect due to the tensions that compelled the threat.

To illustrate this, we present the results of a naive regression model that shows essentially no effect of propaganda-based threats on protest. The model is:

$$\text{Protest}_{t+1:t+7} = \alpha + \beta (\text{Threat}_t) + \phi X_t + \psi W_s + \gamma_s + \epsilon \quad (2)$$

where  $t$  indexes day,  $s$  indexes year,  $\gamma_s$  gives year fixed effects, and the vectors  $X_t$  and  $W_s$  include day- and year-level covariates, respectively. Since our outcome variable is effectively continuous – the number of protests across the country over the next seven days – we employ OLS. The estimated coefficients for social stability and law enforcement topics hover around 0. For “stability” and “harmony” word counts, the estimated effect on protest levels is negative but insignificant or weakly significant.

Table 4: Naive Estimates of Threats and Protest

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Protests <sub>t+1:t+7</sub>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Social Stability	-0.174 (2.711)			
Law Enforcement		0.297 (1.624)		
“Stability”			-0.052* (0.028)	
“Harmony”				-0.028 (0.019)
Protests <sub>t-1</sub>	2.773*** (0.469)	2.774*** (0.469)	2.871*** (0.472)	2.811*** (0.470)
Separatist Anniversary	-2.671*** (0.717)	-2.680*** (0.717)	-2.558*** (0.719)	-2.620*** (0.717)
Democratic Anniversary	5.366*** (0.698)	5.365*** (0.698)	5.363*** (0.698)	5.366*** (0.698)
Political Anniversary	-1.434*** (0.461)	-1.434*** (0.461)	-1.407*** (0.461)	-1.386*** (0.462)
Cultural Anniversary	-1.378*** (0.488)	-1.376*** (0.488)	-1.416*** (0.488)	-1.410*** (0.488)
Log GRP	394.125*** (76.174)	394.088*** (76.174)	401.390*** (76.232)	392.847*** (76.152)
Log Population	-12,581.520*** (1,229.924)	-12,579.170*** (1,229.848)	-12,687.840*** (1,230.500)	-12,611.800*** (1,229.578)
Rural Population Share	-5,323.193*** (348.009)	-5,322.289*** (347.983)	-5,334.747*** (347.841)	-5,338.717*** (348.008)
Sex Ratio	24,481.290*** (3,119.935)	24,478.920*** (3,119.899)	24,782.890*** (3,122.395)	24,439.770*** (3,118.935)
Urban Unemployment Rate	161.156*** (14.804)	161.137*** (14.804)	161.840*** (14.800)	161.459*** (14.800)
Constant	120,596.200*** (11,476.460)	120,571.000*** (11,475.500)	121,461.300*** (11,478.610)	121,017.600*** (11,474.870)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,273	3,273	3,273	3,273
R <sup>2</sup>	0.684	0.684	0.684	0.684

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

This analysis excludes red and green provinces from Figure 4.

## 8 IV Sensitivity Analysis

Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2012)’s “plausibly exogenous” method enables us to understand how sensitive IV results are to violations of the exclusion restriction. To see this, Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2012, 260) consider the following simultaneous equation model

$$Y = X\beta + Z\gamma + \epsilon \quad (3)$$

$$X = Z\lambda + \nu \quad (4)$$

where  $Y$  is the outcome,  $X$  is the endogenous treatment,  $\beta$  is the treatment parameter of interest,  $\epsilon$  is the error term,  $Z$  is the instrument uncorrelated with  $\epsilon$ ,  $\lambda$  is the first-stage coefficient, and  $\gamma$  measures the extent to which the exclusion restriction is violated.

The standard exclusion restriction is equivalent to the assumption that  $\gamma \equiv 0$ . That is, instrument  $Z$  conditions outcome  $Y$  only through its effect on  $X$ . When  $\gamma \neq 0$ , the exclusion restriction is subject to some violation. Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2012)’s sensitivity analysis essentially probes the effect of deviations from the dogmatic prior on  $\gamma$ . Put differently, Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2012) let the exclusion restriction fail by some amount  $\gamma$ , and then determine the  $\gamma$  parameter value must be for the IV estimate to be statistically indistinguishable from zero.<sup>6</sup>

Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2012) identify two sets of methods for inference about  $\beta$  without assuming  $\gamma$  is exactly 0. The first is the “union of confidence” (UCI) approach, which estimates how large  $\gamma$  can be such that the negative coefficient on propaganda-based threats of repression remains statistically significant. The other approach is Bayesian. It requires that the user specify some prior distribution on  $\gamma$ , and then estimates whether the coefficient of interest remains statistically significant given this prior distribution. This generally produces more precise estimates, but at the cost of forcing the analyst to assign an explicit prior distribution, which may not be plausible. Since Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2012)’s first approach is more conservative, we employ it. We use Clarke (2019)’s `plausexog` module in Stata and we adapt the R code from Zhu (2016). The results are identical, as expected.

In our case, we are more interested in negative values of  $\gamma$ , since the most likely violations of the exclusion restriction entail negative direct effects of ethnic separatist anniversaries on the rate of protest in Han-dominated provinces. That is, the most likely violations of the exclusion restriction – and those that would potentially explain away the IV estimates in the main text – are those that would entail negative reductions of the protest rate via ethnic separatist anniversaries not through the propaganda-based pathway.

The results appear in Table 5. The top panel reports the results for the “stability” outcome;

---

<sup>6</sup>This can also be thought of as decomposing the total effect of  $Z$  on  $Y$  into an indirect effect through  $X$  and a direct effect captured by  $\gamma$ . This indirect effect represents the instrumented (treatment) effect, while the direct effect represents the effect of all violations of the exclusion restriction. When the exclusion restriction holds perfectly and  $\gamma \equiv 0$ , the total effect of  $Z$  and  $Y$  goes exclusively through  $X$ .

Models 1 through 3 correspond to Models 1 through 3 in Table 7 of the main text. The bottom panel reports the results for the “harmony” outcome; Models 1 through 3 correspond to Models 4 through 6 in Table 7 of the main text.

Model 3 makes clear that, for the IV estimates in the main text to be indistinguishable from zero, it must be that  $\gamma < -1.585$ . This  $\gamma$  value implies that violations of the exclusion restriction must be associated with more than  $-1.585 \times 7 = -11.095$  fewer protests in Han-dominated provinces per (seven day) ethnic separatist anniversary window. To put this effect in context, note that the mean number of protests in Han-dominated provinces over a given subsequent week is 17, with a third quartile value of 27 protests. This implies that, for the effect of propaganda-based threats of repression to be statistically indistinguishable from zero, exclusion restriction violations must reduce the protest rate by an amount that is 110% greater than the difference between the mean and third quartile values of the outcome variable.<sup>7</sup> The analogous percentage reduction from Model 1 is 81.2% and from Model 2 is 132%. The results for “harmony” in the bottom panel are similar, with  $\gamma$  values ranging from  $-0.455$  to  $-1.513$ .

At these critical values of  $\gamma$ , the IV point estimates ( $\beta$ ) for “stability” range from  $-0.438$  to  $-0.877$  and for “harmony” range from  $-0.656$  to  $-1.298$ . Note that the analogous IV point estimates from Table 7 in the main text range from  $-1.217$  to  $-1.395$  and from  $-1.361$  to  $-1.520$ . This means that, after we subtract the direct effect of ethnic separatist anniversaries on protests from our final province sample, the effects from the main text for “stability” are attenuated by between 37% and 64%. The effects from the main text for “harmony” are somewhat less attenuated: by between 14% and 51%. That is, even after subtracting a potential direct effect of ethnic separatist anniversaries on protests from our final province sample, the effect of propaganda-based threats of repression remains substantively meaningful.

To be clear, we find no evidence that the exclusion restriction is violated. In the Han-dominated provinces that we retain, there is no evidence that citizens are aware of ethnic separatist anniversaries or that the security apparatus is on high alert. Moreover, migration from Tibet and Xinjiang is to our final sample of Han-dominated provinces is minimal. This suggests that the effect of propaganda-based threats on protest in Han-dominated provinces is not sensitive to reasonable violations of the exclusion restriction.

---

<sup>7</sup>From Figure 4, the distribution of the outcome variable is heavily skewed. The median value for the outcome variable is 11. Consequently, for the effect of propaganda-based threats of repression to be statistically indistinguishable from zero, exclusion restriction violations must reduce the protest rate by an amount that is 65% greater than the difference between the median and third quartile values of the outcome variable.



Table 5: IV Sensitivity Analysis

Threat Measure	"Stability"		
Dependent Variable	Protests (M1)	Protests (M2)	Protests (M3)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Max $\gamma$ for significant $\beta$	-1.160	-1.890	-1.585
Point estimate $\beta$ ("stability")	-0.877	-0.438	-0.495
95% Confidence interval	[-1.750, -0.003]	[-0.876, -0.000]	[-0.989, -0.002]


Threat Measure	"Harmony"		
Dependent Variable	Protests (M4)	Protests (M5)	Protests (M6)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Max $\gamma$ for significant $\beta$	-0.455	-1.513	-0.575
Point estimate $\beta$ ("harmony")	-1.298	-0.656	-1.122
95% Confidence interval	[-2.596, -0.000]	[-1.312, -0.000]	[-2.243, -0.000]

## 9 Protest Discourse

Are protests that emerge during separatist anniversaries different in character? To probe this, we exploit an image repository maintained by the CLB, which provides images of all protests in its dataset. These images generally feature banners, signs, manifestos, or tweets from a given protest. We scraped all 38,078 protest images, and then used `tesseract`, an optical character recognition program, to extract the words that these images contain. The result is a corpus of words, by protest, that participants used to describe their demands and grievances. We conducted the analysis in Chinese, but present results in English.

To understand whether protests around separatist anniversaries express different demands and grievances than others, we adapt Kessler (2018)’s work in computational linguistics. His key idea is that, across any two corpora, words common to both are generally uninformative. These common words are pronouns, conjugations of the verb “to be,” question words like “who” and “where,” and generic words associated with a given topic (like “sports” for sports). Similarly, words uncommon to both corpora are also uninformative. These are peculiar, low frequency words. By contrast, words common in one corpus but uncommon in another convey something meaningful about content in one corpus relative to another. If the demands and grievances of protest during ethnic separatist anniversaries is distinctive, then this algorithm will detect how.

Figure 7: Visualizing semantic distinctiveness.



Kessler (2018)’s algorithm positions words in two-dimensional space based on their frequency in

two corpora, which we denote  $A$  and  $B$ . Figure 7 illustrates this. For each word across corpora  $A$  and  $B$ , the algorithm computes its coordinates in two-dimensional space as a function of its frequency in each corpora, standardized by the frequency of the most common word in each corpora. This yields a measure of word frequency in each corpora on the  $[0, 1]$  interval. Words in the bottom left of Figure 7 are uncommon to both; words in the top right are common to both. Words in the bottom right are distinctive to corpus  $A$ ; words in the top left are distinctive to corpus  $B$ .

We restrict attention to words where  $x_A \geq 0.7$  and  $x_B \leq 0.3$ . For each, we count the number of references in corpus  $A$ , and standardize this by total articles in corpus  $A$ . This yields a measure of distinctiveness that incorporates not only a word’s relative frequency to others, but also its relative frequency across articles. We compute an analogous measure for corpus  $B$ .

We define corpus  $A$  as all protest content during the three days before and after each of the separatist anniversaries in the main text, and the other corpus as all protest content during the rest of the year. The results appear in Figure 8. The left panel displays words that are distinctive to separatist anniversaries; the right panel displays words that are distinctive to other protests. The results suggest that there are no substantively meaningful differences in the discourse used in protests during separatist anniversaries compared to protests that occur during other times of the year.

Figure 8: Distinctive protest discourse.



## 10 Additional Tables and Figures

Table 6 reports nation-day level summary statistics and sources for all variables used in the paper. Table 7 gives these data at the protest level. Table 8 confirms that the four measures of threats that we use in the main text are correlated.

Subsequent tables replicate the instrumental variable models in the main text with some modifications. Tables 9 through 14 take the number of protests over the next one, two, or three days as the outcome, rather than protests over the next week. Tables 15 and 16 restrict attention to the 2009-2012 period. Tables 17 and 18 exclude Guangdong province. Tables 19 and 20 exclude winter months. Tables 21 and 22 exclude the March 10 Tibetan Rebellion and the May 23 Tibetan Liberation from the instrument, since they are proximate to the March 4 start date of the National People's Congress and the June 4 Tiananmen anniversary, respectively. Tables 23 and 24 control for pre-emptive detentions over the previous 7, 14, and 30 days.

Table 25 shows that there is no evidence that protests are rescheduled for the three days before and after separatist anniversary windows, perhaps due to planning by protest organizers. Table 26 reports intent-to-treat models that show that the reduction in the number of protests over the subsequent week across the country during separatist anniversaries is almost entirely accounted for by our measures of propaganda based threats of repression. The mean number of stability references outside separatist anniversaries is 8.3. During separatist anniversaries, the mean number of stability references rises to 10.6. This difference of 2.4 references implies that the results from the intent-to-treat models are almost fully accounted for by our measures of propaganda based threats of repression from Table 7 in the main text.

Finally, we report additional data about our survey. Tables 27 confirms that our sample is similar to China's national population on gender, age, income, and province. Figure 9 shows that there is no evidence of close guesses for anniversary dates. Figure 10 reports CCP member recall of separatist dates.

Table 6: Summary Statistics

	Nbr. Val.	Nbr. NA	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev	Source
Social Stability <sub>t</sub>	3288.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.07	Authors
Law Enforcement <sub>t</sub>	3288.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.01	0.12	Authors
“Stability” <sub>t</sub>	3288.00	0.00	0.00	63.00	8.49	7.74	Authors
“Harmony” <sub>t</sub>	3288.00	0.00	0.00	168.00	8.91	11.46	Authors
Separatist Anniversary <sub>t</sub>	3287.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.01	0.10	Authors
Democratic Anniversary <sub>t</sub>	3288.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.01	0.11	Authors
Political Anniversary <sub>t</sub>	3288.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.03	0.18	Authors
Cultural Anniversary <sub>t</sub>	3288.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.03	0.16	Authors
Protests <sub>t</sub>	3288.00	0.00	0.00	32.00	2.93	4.11	Elfstrom, CLB
Protests <sub>t</sub> <sup>Han</sup>	3288.00	0.00	0.00	30.00	2.48	3.46	Elfstrom, CLB
Protests <sub>t+1:t+7</sub>	3273.00	15.00	0.00	144.00	20.57	23.05	Elfstrom, CLB
Protests <sub>t+1:t+7</sub> <sup>Han</sup>	3273.00	15.00	0.00	111.00	17.41	19.14	Elfstrom, CLB
Log GRP <sub>s</sub>	3288.00	0.00	10.17	11.00	10.64	0.25	NBS
Log Population <sub>s</sub>	3288.00	0.00	11.80	11.84	11.82	0.01	NBS
Rural Population Share <sub>s</sub>	3288.00	0.00	0.41	0.52	0.46	0.03	NBS
Sex Ratio <sub>s</sub>	3288.00	0.00	1.05	1.06	1.05	0.00	NBS
Urban Unemployment Rate <sub>s</sub>	3288.00	0.00	3.90	4.30	4.09	0.10	NBS

Table 7: Protest Level Summary Statistics

	Nbr. Val.	Nbr. NA	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev	Source
Repression <sub>j</sub>	4496.00	8983.00	0.00	1.00	0.71	0.46	Elfstrom, CLB
Separatist Anniversary <sub>t</sub>	13479.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.01	0.07	Authors
Democratic Anniversary <sub>t</sub>	13479.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.01	0.12	Authors
Political Anniversary <sub>t</sub>	13479.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.03	0.18	Authors
Cultural Anniversary <sub>t</sub>	13479.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.02	0.14	Authors
Protests <sub>t-1</sub>	13479.00	0.00	0.00	8.00	0.39	0.80	Elfstrom, CLB
Log GRP <sub>s</sub>	12427.00	1052.00	6.29	11.49	10.32	0.75	NBS
Log Population <sub>s</sub>	12427.00	1052.00	5.73	9.34	8.67	0.58	NBS
Rural Population Share <sub>s</sub>	9365.00	4114.00	0.10	0.77	0.41	0.11	NBS
Sex Ratio <sub>s</sub>	9300.00	4179.00	95.07	120.43	106.00	4.72	NBS
Urban Unemployment Rate <sub>s</sub>	10724.00	2755.00	1.20	6.50	3.18	0.65	NBS

Table 8: Correlation Between Term Counts and Topic Models

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	“Stability” (1)	“Harmony” (2)	“Stability” (3)	“Harmony” (4)
Social Stability	6.666*** (1.937)	4.050 (2.871)		
Law Enforcement			1.845 (1.162)	0.387 (1.720)
Constant	8.459*** (0.135)	8.888*** (0.200)	8.466*** (0.136)	8.902*** (0.201)
Observations	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288
R <sup>2</sup>	0.004	0.001	0.001	0.00002

Notes:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 9: IV Results: Second Stage (Next Day)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Protests <sub>t+1</sub>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Stability	-0.026*	-0.023*	-0.027**			
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.013)			
Harmony				-0.029*	-0.025*	-0.032*
				(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.018)
Democratic Anniversary			0.045			0.046
			(0.029)			(0.033)
Political Anniversary			-0.021			0.018
			(0.020)			(0.037)
Cultural Anniversary			-0.072***			-0.088***
			(0.023)			(0.033)
Protests <sub>t-1</sub>		0.122***	0.126***		0.112***	0.117***
		(0.029)	(0.031)		(0.028)	(0.032)
Log GRP			9.315**			4.095
			(3.663)			(3.729)
Log Population			-178.211***			-157.672**
			(57.827)			(61.998)
Rural Population Share			-41.798***			-53.530***
			(14.703)			(19.575)
Sex Ratio			367.254**			163.946
			(150.678)			(151.190)
Urban Unemployment Rate			1.047			1.034
			(0.637)			(0.734)
Constant	0.861***	0.514***	1,637.027***	0.893***	0.506***	1,669.235***
	(0.122)	(0.173)	(524.860)	(0.149)	(0.185)	(614.733)
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288
R <sup>2</sup>	-0.039	0.180	0.143	-0.198	0.011	-0.144

Notes:

\*p&lt;0.1; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*\*p&lt;0.01

This analysis excludes red and green provinces from Figure 4.

Table 10: IV Results: First Stage (Next Day)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	"Stability"			"Harmony"		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Separatist Anniversary	2.240*** (0.506)	2.351*** (0.444)	2.196*** (0.450)	2.060*** (0.750)	2.137*** (0.667)	1.864*** (0.674)
Democratic Anniversary			-0.079 (0.438)			-0.041 (0.656)
Political Anniversary			0.487* (0.289)			1.639*** (0.433)
Cultural Anniversary			-0.687** (0.305)			-1.099** (0.457)
Protests <sub>t-1</sub>		1.872*** (0.294)	1.862*** (0.294)		1.313*** (0.442)	1.306*** (0.441)
Log GRP			139.199*** (47.716)			-46.170 (71.508)
Log Population			-2,051.149*** (769.901)			-1,094.758 (1,153.787)
Rural Population Share			-227.096 (218.147)			-562.187* (326.919)
Sex Ratio			5,793.777*** (1,954.086)			-1,482.372 (2,928.428)
Urban Unemployment Rate			12.935 (9.288)			10.590 (13.920)
Constant	8.320*** (0.140)	13.884*** (0.361)	16,728.730** (7,185.216)	8.750*** (0.208)	12.295*** (0.542)	15,216.800 (10,767.890)
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288
R <sup>2</sup>	0.006	0.236	0.238	0.002	0.214	0.219
F Statistic	19.588***	101.459***	78.857***	7.536***	89.218***	70.728***

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
This analysis excludes red and green provinces from Figure 4.



Table 11: IV Results: Second Stage (Next Two Days)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Protests <sub>t+1:t+2</sub>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Stability	-0.379** (0.187)	-0.342** (0.137)	-0.353** (0.149)			
Harmony				-0.412* (0.219)	-0.376** (0.178)	-0.416* (0.215)
Democratic Anniversary			1.355*** (0.319)			1.366*** (0.391)
Political Anniversary			-0.418* (0.222)			0.092 (0.438)
Cultural Anniversary			-0.821*** (0.256)			-1.035*** (0.382)
Protests <sub>t-1</sub>		1.379*** (0.327)	1.334*** (0.343)		1.232*** (0.336)	1.220*** (0.376)
Log GRP			189.582*** (40.360)			121.266*** (43.617)
Log Population			-4,715.062*** (637.075)			-4,446.259*** (725.188)
Rural Population Share			-1,642.912*** (161.976)			-1,796.454*** (228.962)
Sex Ratio			10,221.050*** (1,660.000)			7,560.209*** (1,768.457)
Urban Unemployment Rate			45.441*** (7.013)			45.278*** (8.580)
Constant	8.176*** (1.590)	5.172*** (1.944)	43,547.580*** (5,782.304)	8.627*** (1.950)	5.049** (2.236)	43,969.110*** (7,190.468)
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288
R <sup>2</sup>	-0.025	0.396	0.395	-0.186	0.160	0.089

Notes:

\*p&lt;0.1; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*\*p&lt;0.01

This analysis excludes red and green provinces from Figure 4.

Table 12: IV Results: First Stage (Next Two Days)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	"Stability"			"Harmony"		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Separatist Anniversary	2.240*** (0.506)	2.351*** (0.444)	2.196*** (0.450)	2.060*** (0.750)	2.137*** (0.667)	1.864*** (0.674)
Democratic Anniversary			-0.079 (0.438)			-0.041 (0.656)
Political Anniversary			0.487* (0.289)			1.639*** (0.433)
Cultural Anniversary			-0.687** (0.305)			-1.099** (0.457)
Protests <sub>t-1</sub>		1.872*** (0.294)	1.862*** (0.294)		1.313*** (0.442)	1.306*** (0.441)
Log GRP			139.199*** (47.716)			-46.170 (71.508)
Log Population			-2,051.149*** (769.901)			-1,094.758 (1,153.787)
Rural Population Share			-227.096 (218.147)			-562.187* (326.919)
Sex Ratio			5,793.777*** (1,954.086)			-1,482.372 (2,928.428)
Urban Unemployment Rate			12.935 (9.288)			10.590 (13.920)
Constant	8.320*** (0.140)	13.884*** (0.361)	16,728.730** (7,185.216)	8.750*** (0.208)	12.295*** (0.542)	15,216.800 (10,767.890)
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288
R <sup>2</sup>	0.006	0.236	0.238	0.002	0.214	0.219
F Statistic	19.588***	101.459***	78.857***	7.536***	89.218***	70.728***

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
This analysis excludes red and green provinces from Figure 4.

Table 13: IV Results: Second Stage (Next Three Days)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Protests <sub>t+1:t+3</sub>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Stability	-0.567** (0.266)	-0.512*** (0.186)	-0.529*** (0.202)			
Harmony				-0.617** (0.314)	-0.563** (0.249)	-0.623** (0.303)
Democratic Anniversary			2.099*** (0.434)			2.115*** (0.551)
Political Anniversary			-0.618** (0.303)			0.145 (0.617)
Cultural Anniversary			-1.275*** (0.348)			-1.596*** (0.539)
Protests <sub>t-1</sub>		2.069*** (0.445)	2.002*** (0.467)		1.849*** (0.471)	1.830*** (0.531)
Log GRP			276.322*** (54.938)			174.038*** (61.562)
Log Population			-6,981.365*** (867.284)			-6,580.510*** (1,023.350)
Rural Population Share			-2,461.727*** (220.539)			-2,692.254*** (322.941)
Sex Ratio			15,015.770*** (2,259.618)			11,032.300*** (2,496.157)
Urban Unemployment Rate			68.716*** (9.550)			68.460*** (12.103)
Constant	12.274*** (2.268)	7.734*** (2.647)	64,657.430*** (7,872.153)	12.955*** (2.807)	7.549** (3.134)	65,307.420*** (10,144.830)
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,285	3,285	3,285	3,285	3,285	3,285
R <sup>2</sup>	-0.020	0.447	0.446	-0.202	0.185	0.105

Notes:

\*p&lt;0.1; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*\*p&lt;0.01

This analysis excludes red and green provinces from Figure 4.

Table 14: IV Results: First Stage (Next Three Days)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	"Stability"			"Harmony"		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Separatist Anniversary	2.240*** (0.506)	2.351*** (0.444)	2.196*** (0.450)	2.060*** (0.750)	2.137*** (0.667)	1.864*** (0.674)
Democratic Anniversary			-0.079 (0.438)			-0.041 (0.656)
Political Anniversary			0.487* (0.289)			1.639*** (0.433)
Cultural Anniversary			-0.687** (0.305)			-1.099** (0.457)
Protests <sub>t-1</sub>		1.872*** (0.294)	1.862*** (0.294)		1.313*** (0.442)	1.306*** (0.441)
Log GRP			139.199*** (47.716)			-46.170 (71.508)
Log Population			-2,051.149*** (769.901)			-1,094.758 (1,153.787)
Rural Population Share			-227.096 (218.147)			-562.187* (326.919)
Sex Ratio			5,793.777*** (1,954.086)			-1,482.372 (2,928.428)
Urban Unemployment Rate			12.935 (9.288)			10.590 (13.920)
Constant	8.320*** (0.140)	13.884*** (0.361)	16,728.730** (7,185.216)	8.750*** (0.208)	12.295*** (0.542)	15,216.800 (10,767.890)
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288
R <sup>2</sup>	0.006	0.236	0.238	0.002	0.214	0.219
F Statistic	19.588***	101.459***	78.857***	7.536***	89.218***	70.728***

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
This analysis excludes red and green provinces from Figure 4.

Table 15: IV Results: Second Stage (2009-2012)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Protests <sub>t+1:t+7</sub>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Stability	-0.221** (0.100)	-0.205** (0.086)	-0.182** (0.092)			
Harmony				-0.208* (0.111)	-0.193** (0.093)	-0.181* (0.105)
Democratic Anniversary			1.552*** (0.327)			1.489*** (0.387)
Political Anniversary			-0.711*** (0.201)			-0.233 (0.373)
Cultural Anniversary			-0.310 (0.274)			-0.394 (0.349)
Protests <sub>t-1</sub>		0.983*** (0.234)	0.884*** (0.235)		0.913*** (0.249)	0.845*** (0.256)
Log GRP			-2.085 (6.259)			24.735 (17.567)
Log Population			1,802.028*** (384.972)			1,329.908*** (329.495)
Rural Population Share			505.448*** (172.163)			592.588** (232.055)
Sex Ratio						
Urban Unemployment Rate						
Constant	6.396*** (1.145)	4.471*** (1.221)	-21,502.250*** (4,649.294)	6.780*** (1.544)	3.975*** (1.162)	-16,248.790*** (4,019.327)
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,455	1,455	1,455	1,455	1,455	1,455
R <sup>2</sup>	-0.211	0.080	0.154	-0.661	-0.205	-0.121

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

This analysis excludes red and green provinces from Figure 4.

Table 16: IV Results: First Stage (2009-2012)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	"Stability"			"Harmony"		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Separatist Anniversary	3.635*** (0.830)	3.725*** (0.809)	3.389*** (0.817)	3.879*** (1.333)	3.951*** (1.315)	3.403** (1.324)
Democratic Anniversary			-0.548 (0.836)			-0.908 (1.355)
Political Anniversary			0.110 (0.525)			2.743*** (0.851)
Cultural Anniversary			-1.557*** (0.555)			-2.027** (0.900)
Protests <sub>t-1</sub>		1.758*** (0.463)	1.748*** (0.463)		1.471* (0.753)	1.510** (0.750)
Log GRP			4.164 (16.357)			152.594*** (26.514)
Log Population			2,850.599*** (745.873)			291.270 (1,209.084)
Rural Population Share			1,135.657*** (360.702)			1,637.723*** (584.709)
Sex Ratio						
Urban Unemployment Rate						
Constant	11.115*** (0.230)	13.802*** (0.445)	-34,256.170*** (9,044.288)	13.630*** (0.369)	12.124*** (0.723)	-5,823.710 (14,661.090)
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,462	1,462	1,462	1,462	1,462	1,462
R <sup>2</sup>	0.013	0.066	0.071	0.006	0.035	0.047
F Statistic	19.181***	20.489***	13.908***	8.470***	10.627***	8.889***

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
This analysis excludes red and green provinces from Figure 4.

Table 17: IV Results: Second Stage (Ex Guangdong)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Protests <sub>t+1:t+7</sub>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Stability	-1.221** (0.501)	-1.208*** (0.363)	-1.185*** (0.390)			
Harmony				-1.330** (0.608)	-1.312** (0.516)	-1.380** (0.620)
Democratic Anniversary			4.543*** (0.792)			4.566*** (1.082)
Political Anniversary			-0.426 (0.556)			1.271 (1.244)
Cultural Anniversary			-1.909*** (0.662)			-2.610** (1.112)
Protests <sub>t-1</sub>						
Log GRP			494.989*** (104.540)			265.376** (120.559)
Log Population			-13,144.180*** (1,658.882)			-12,198.360*** (2,069.046)
Rural Population Share			-4,982.087*** (411.941)			-5,478.252*** (661.424)
Sex Ratio			28,514.030*** (4,292.947)			19,566.950*** (4,899.042)
Urban Unemployment Rate			156.010*** (17.743)			154.863*** (24.091)
Constant	122.040*** (4.269)	116.695*** (5.268)	121,899.200*** (15,008.040)	123.522*** (5.430)	115.903*** (6.580)	122,812.100*** (20,717.480)
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,273	3,273	3,273	3,273	3,273	3,273
R <sup>2</sup>	-0.067	0.437	0.454	-0.322	0.037	-0.020

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
This analysis excludes red and green provinces from Figure 4.

Table 18: IV Results: First Stage (Ex Guangdong)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	“Stability”			“Harmony”		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Separatist Anniversary	2.240*** (0.506)	2.241*** (0.447)	2.087*** (0.452)	2.060*** (0.750)	2.058*** (0.668)	1.785*** (0.674)
Democratic Anniversary			0.030 (0.440)			0.033 (0.657)
Political Anniversary			0.462 (0.291)			1.618*** (0.434)
Cultural Anniversary			-0.740** (0.307)			-1.140** (0.458)
Protests <sub>t-1</sub>		-0.731 (6.826)	-0.683 (6.820)		7.587 (10.200)	7.474 (10.172)
Log GRP			150.229*** (47.976)			-38.666 (71.551)
Log Population			-2,291.364*** (773.671)			-1,258.788 (1,153.852)
Rural Population Share			-296.725 (219.201)			-610.258* (326.916)
Sex Ratio			6,209.292*** (1,964.915)			-1,197.626 (2,930.473)
Urban Unemployment Rate			14.403 (9.342)			11.639 (13.933)
Constant	8.320*** (0.140)	15.000** (6.817)	19,041.970*** (7,219.888)	8.750*** (0.208)	5.000 (10.186)	16,787.770 (10,767.740)
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288	3,288
R <sup>2</sup>	0.006	0.227	0.229	0.002	0.212	0.217
F Statistic	19.588***	96.216***	74.857***	7.536***	88.167***	69.919***

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

This analysis excludes red and green provinces from Figure 4.



Table 19: IV Results: Second Stage (Ex Winter)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Protests <sub>t+1:t+7</sub>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Stability	-1.139** (0.523)	-1.036*** (0.312)	-1.057*** (0.344)			
Harmony				-1.275** (0.634)	-1.162** (0.465)	-1.281** (0.593)
Democratic Anniversary			3.169*** (0.987)			2.612* (1.471)
Political Anniversary			-2.333*** (0.519)			-0.334 (1.303)
Cultural Anniversary			-1.475** (0.674)			-2.151* (1.165)
Protests <sub>t-1</sub>		3.117*** (0.715)	3.031*** (0.751)		3.040*** (0.931)	3.150*** (1.106)
Log GRP			524.853*** (112.519)			212.608* (127.975)
Log Population			-9,520.543*** (1,910.998)			-7,958.994*** (2,275.324)
Rural Population Share			-3,094.572*** (456.831)			-3,699.436*** (830.414)
Sex Ratio			25,258.410*** (4,745.021)			13,282.820*** (5,068.273)
Urban Unemployment Rate			192.000*** (16.652)			197.916*** (23.958)
Constant	26.560*** (4.536)	15.894*** (4.437)	81,050.450*** (17,322.800)	28.309*** (5.782)	16.510*** (6.141)	78,772.800*** (23,926.740)
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,476	2,476	2,476	2,476	2,476	2,476
R <sup>2</sup>	-0.067	0.580	0.580	-0.253	0.258	0.151

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

This analysis excludes red and green provinces from Figure 4.

Table 20: IV Results: First Stage (Ex Winter)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	"Stability"			"Harmony"		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Separatist Anniversary	2.124*** (0.519)	2.242*** (0.457)	2.062*** (0.464)	1.898** (0.759)	1.998*** (0.672)	1.700** (0.679)
Democratic Anniversary			-0.265 (0.637)			-0.654 (0.933)
Political Anniversary			0.336 (0.331)			1.838*** (0.485)
Cultural Anniversary			-0.874** (0.366)			-1.248** (0.536)
Protests <sub>t-1</sub>		1.613*** (0.352)	1.611*** (0.352)		1.371*** (0.517)	1.422*** (0.515)
Log GRP			212.172*** (55.798)			-68.740 (81.790)
Log Population			-3,842.632*** (899.540)			-1,950.240 (1,318.549)
Rural Population Share			-690.971*** (254.661)			-1,041.987*** (373.283)
Sex Ratio			9,297.277*** (2,284.745)			-1,679.877 (3,348.987)
Urban Unemployment Rate			2.233 (10.865)			6.459 (15.926)
Constant	8.436*** (0.166)	13.837*** (0.422)	33,702.900*** (8,392.571)	8.911*** (0.242)	12.863*** (0.620)	26,017.750*** (12,301.860)
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,476	2,476	2,476	2,476	2,476	2,476
R <sup>2</sup>	0.007	0.235	0.237	0.003	0.222	0.229
F Statistic	16.727***	75.575***	58.787***	6.259**	70.262***	56.154***

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.1; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*\*p&lt;0.01

This analysis excludes red and green provinces from Figure 4.

Table 21: IV Results: Second Stage (Ex 3/10 Tibetan Rebellion, 5/23 Tibetan Liberation)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Protests <sub>t+1:t+7</sub>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Stability	-2.010** (0.928)	-1.885*** (0.670)	-1.649** (0.657)			
Harmony				-2.514 (1.567)	-2.349* (1.322)	-2.723 (2.094)
Democratic Anniversary			4.707*** (0.832)			4.285*** (1.614)
Political Anniversary			-1.318** (0.585)			1.727 (2.659)
Cultural Anniversary			-2.862*** (0.801)			-5.083* (2.971)
Protests <sub>t-1</sub>		6.579*** (1.405)	5.787*** (1.347)		6.330*** (2.104)	6.563** (3.131)
Log GRP			615.690*** (148.857)			315.200 (213.294)
Log Population			-16,214.010*** (2,390.418)			-16,474.070*** (4,749.875)
Rural Population Share			-5,880.184*** (546.100)			-7,021.080*** (1,624.685)
Sex Ratio			34,076.120*** (6,205.572)			22,365.540*** (8,642.175)
Urban Unemployment Rate			180.976*** (21.816)			177.882*** (41.587)
Constant	34.156*** (7.658)	26.250*** (9.004)	151,271.900*** (21,318.840)	39.613*** (13.741)	29.014* (15.796)	170,415.700*** (51,779.480)
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,075	3,075	3,075	3,075	3,075	3,075
R <sup>2</sup>	-0.250	0.307	0.408	-1.279	-0.735	-1.205

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
This analysis excludes red and green provinces from Figure 4.

Table 22: IV Results: First Stage (Ex 3/10 Tibetan Rebellion, 5/23 Tibetan Liberation)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	"Stability"			"Harmony"		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Separatist Anniversary	1.718*** (0.541)	1.767*** (0.475)	1.685*** (0.480)	1.378* (0.821)	1.413* (0.731)	1.012 (0.737)
Democratic Anniversary			0.209 (0.360)			-0.035 (0.552)
Political Anniversary			-0.028 (0.253)			1.088*** (0.388)
Cultural Anniversary			-0.753*** (0.257)			-1.285*** (0.395)
Protests <sub>t-1</sub>		1.822*** (0.289)	1.797*** (0.290)		1.338*** (0.444)	1.358*** (0.444)
Log GRP			153.997*** (46.988)			-18.355 (72.114)
Log Population			-2,455.284*** (758.148)			-1,558.861 (1,163.553)
Rural Population Share			-340.030 (214.803)			-620.818* (329.665)
Sex Ratio			6,557.098*** (1,924.331)			-376.338 (2,953.328)
Urban Unemployment Rate			7.966 (9.146)			3.804 (14.036)
Constant	8.131*** (0.137)	13.311*** (0.355)	20,618.280*** (7,075.327)	8.668*** (0.208)	11.899*** (0.547)	19,298.540* (10,858.720)
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,090	3,090	3,090	3,090	3,090	3,090
R <sup>2</sup>	0.003	0.234	0.236	0.001	0.211	0.217
F Statistic	10.080***	93.855***	73.050***	2.815*	82.528***	65.533***

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

This analysis excludes red and green provinces from Figure 4.

Table 23: IV Results: Second Stage (Pre-emptive Detentions)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Protests <sub>t+1:t+7</sub>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Stability	-1.222*** (0.405)	-1.235*** (0.411)	-1.239*** (0.412)			
Harmony				-1.447** (0.645)	-1.455** (0.651)	-1.468** (0.659)
Democratic Anniversary	5.283*** (0.869)	5.292*** (0.872)	5.225*** (0.880)	5.343*** (1.166)	5.339*** (1.171)	5.369*** (1.180)
Political Anniversary	-0.836 (0.607)	-0.876 (0.607)	-0.866 (0.615)	0.943 (1.314)	0.930 (1.319)	0.830 (1.302)
Cultural Anniversary	-2.243*** (0.703)	-2.224*** (0.703)	-2.315*** (0.720)	-2.990*** (1.155)	-2.983** (1.157)	-3.046** (1.183)
Protests <sub>t-1</sub>	5.035*** (0.932)	5.073*** (0.943)	5.042*** (0.936)	4.668*** (1.130)	4.693*** (1.140)	4.703*** (1.149)
Log GRP	563.383*** (110.042)	560.340*** (110.140)	564.375*** (111.532)	325.952** (130.697)	321.684** (131.694)	314.734** (133.043)
Log Population	-15,096.150*** (1,739.431)	-15,142.720*** (1,754.176)	-15,057.860*** (1,741.089)	-14,212.190*** (2,177.517)	-14,229.760*** (2,190.294)	-14,244.290*** (2,202.501)
Rural Population Share	-5,610.109*** (443.068)	-5,654.215*** (448.903)	-5,585.945*** (445.721)	-6,169.256*** (693.446)	-6,203.100*** (704.556)	-6,251.144*** (716.280)
Sex Ratio	31,531.350*** (4,525.078)	31,481.370*** (4,538.327)	31,583.900*** (4,575.216)	22,310.790*** (5,294.441)	22,198.580*** (5,326.255)	22,016.720*** (5,368.184)
Urban Unemployment Rate	177.154*** (19.127)	178.127*** (19.293)	177.330*** (19.229)	176.891*** (25.690)	177.594*** (25.885)	178.637*** (26.124)
Detentions <sub>t-1:t-7</sub>	0.009 (0.031)			0.028 (0.043)		
Detentions <sub>t-1:t-14</sub>		0.027 (0.023)			0.030 (0.031)	
Detentions <sub>t-1:t-30</sub>			-0.002 (0.015)			0.025 (0.021)
Constant	141,178.700*** (15,795.350)	141,830.600*** (15,955.900)	140,648.700*** (15,781.460)	143,219.800*** (21,650.780)	143,603.800*** (21,826.230)	144,058.800*** (21,985.130)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,273	3,266	3,250	3,273	3,266	3,250
R <sup>2</sup>	0.514	0.510	0.508	0.120	0.113	0.104

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 24: IV Results: First Stage (Pre-emptive Detentions)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	"Stability"		"Harmony"			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Separatist Anniversary	2.196*** (0.450)	2.177*** (0.450)	2.176*** (0.449)	1.853*** (0.674)	1.846*** (0.674)	1.835*** (0.674)
Democratic Anniversary	-0.071 (0.438)	-0.059 (0.438)	-0.132 (0.438)	-0.021 (0.656)	-0.020 (0.657)	-0.015 (0.657)
Political Anniversary	0.492* (0.289)	0.464 (0.290)	0.497* (0.290)	1.643*** (0.433)	1.633*** (0.434)	1.573*** (0.436)
Cultural Anniversary	-0.710** (0.306)	-0.688** (0.306)	-0.757** (0.305)	-1.114** (0.458)	-1.103** (0.459)	-1.135** (0.458)
Protests <sub>t-1</sub>	1.851*** (0.295)	1.854*** (0.295)	1.823*** (0.295)	1.311*** (0.441)	1.313*** (0.442)	1.308*** (0.443)
Log GRP	139.703*** (47.738)	136.658*** (47.761)	141.758*** (47.710)	-46.802 (71.526)	-48.759 (71.611)	-51.124 (71.624)
Log Population	-2,064.777*** (769.916)	-2,084.474*** (770.015)	-1,995.653*** (768.687)	-1,119.907 (1,153.570)	-1,127.862 (1,154.527)	-1,116.888 (1,153.970)
Rural Population Share	-230.887 (218.677)	-260.448 (219.188)	-183.021 (219.951)	-578.953* (327.645)	-595.595* (328.641)	-605.110* (330.195)
Sex Ratio	5,809.454*** (1,954.248)	5,732.800*** (1,954.525)	5,853.615*** (1,950.997)	-1,495.749 (2,928.063)	-1,545.155 (2,930.528)	-1,607.071 (2,928.880)
Urban Unemployment Rate	12.923 (9.292)	13.473 (9.295)	12.406 (9.283)	10.785 (13.922)	11.116 (13.937)	11.408 (13.936)
Detentions <sub>t-1:t-7</sub>	0.001 (0.016)			0.014 (0.024)		
Detentions <sub>t-1:t-14</sub>		0.016 (0.011)			0.016 (0.016)	
Detentions <sub>t-1:t-30</sub>			-0.009 (0.007)			0.010 (0.011)
Constant	16,869.770** (7,187.232)	17,226.990** (7,189.970)	15,964.480** (7,182.130)	15,541.780 (10,768.680)	15,714.920 (10,780.320)	15,678.710 (10,781.980)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,281	3,274	3,258	3,281	3,274	3,258
R <sup>2</sup>	0.237	0.237	0.239	0.219	0.220	0.221
F Statistic	72.513***	72.275***	72.912***	65.585***	65.517***	65.586***

Note:

\*p&lt;0.1; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*\*p&lt;0.01

Table 25: Separatist Anniversaries and Deferred Protests (+/-3 Day Donut)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Protests <sub>t+1:t+7</sub>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Social Stability	-0.133 (2.706)			
Law Enforcement		0.380 (1.621)		
'Stability'			-0.041 (0.028)	
'Harmony'				-0.027 (0.019)
Protests <sub>t-1</sub>	2.776*** (0.469)	2.777*** (0.469)	2.853*** (0.471)	2.811*** (0.469)
Separatist Anniversary	-2.906*** (0.719)	-2.916*** (0.719)	-2.806*** (0.721)	-2.856*** (0.719)
Separatist Anniversary Donut	-2.761*** (0.766)	-2.763*** (0.766)	-2.631*** (0.771)	-2.736*** (0.766)
Democratic Anniversary	5.152*** (0.699)	5.150*** (0.699)	5.159*** (0.699)	5.153*** (0.699)
Political Anniversary	-1.316*** (0.461)	-1.316*** (0.461)	-1.300*** (0.461)	-1.272*** (0.462)
Cultural Anniversary	-1.455*** (0.487)	-1.453*** (0.487)	-1.481*** (0.487)	-1.484*** (0.487)
Log GRP	393.830*** (76.035)	393.789*** (76.034)	399.589*** (76.109)	392.624*** (76.015)
Log Population	-12,577.800*** (1,227.667)	-12,575.290*** (1,227.587)	-12,662.070*** (1,228.517)	-12,606.690*** (1,227.365)
Rural Population Share	-5,323.123*** (347.370)	-5,322.138*** (347.343)	-5,332.268*** (347.274)	-5,337.889*** (347.382)
Sex Ratio	24,470.960*** (3,114.210)	24,468.370*** (3,114.164)	24,709.950*** (3,117.376)	24,431.880*** (3,113.318)
Urban Unemployment Rate	161.191*** (14.777)	161.164*** (14.777)	161.731*** (14.776)	161.477*** (14.773)
Constant	120,566.200*** (11,455.400)	120,539.400*** (11,454.410)	121,251.900*** (11,460.050)	120,967.600*** (11,454.210)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,273	3,273	3,273	3,273
R <sup>2</sup>	0.685	0.685	0.685	0.685

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 26: Intent to Treat Models

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Protests <sub>t+1:t+7</sub>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Separatist Anniversary	-3.122** (1.254)	-2.922*** (0.716)	-2.673*** (0.716)	-3.122** (1.254)	-2.922*** (0.716)	-2.673*** (0.716)
Democratic Anniversary			5.366*** (0.698)			5.366*** (0.698)
Political Anniversary			-1.433*** (0.461)			-1.433*** (0.461)
Cultural Anniversary			-1.378*** (0.487)			-1.378*** (0.487)
Protests <sub>t-1</sub>		2.976*** (0.474)	2.774*** (0.469)		2.976*** (0.474)	2.774*** (0.469)
Log GRP			394.112*** (76.162)			394.112*** (76.162)
Log Population			-12,580.550*** (1,229.643)			-12,580.550*** (1,229.643)
Rural Population Share			-5,322.861*** (347.917)			-5,322.861*** (347.917)
Sex Ratio			24,480.390*** (3,119.426)			24,480.390*** (3,119.426)
Urban Unemployment Rate			161.165*** (14.801)			161.165*** (14.801)
Constant	17.654*** (0.348)	1.344** (0.586)	120,585.600*** (11,473.520)	17.654*** (0.348)	1.344** (0.586)	120,585.600*** (11,473.520)
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,273	3,273	3,273	3,273	3,273	3,273
R <sup>2</sup>	0.002	0.676	0.684	0.002	0.676	0.684

Note:

\*p&lt;0.1; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*\*p&lt;0.01



Table 27: Survey Balance

Variable	Survey	Census
<i>Sex</i>		
Female	53.8	49
Male	46.2	51
<i>Age</i>		
18-24	14.7	16
25-34	19.7	22
35-44	22.7	24
45-54	18.3	17
55-64	7.6	11
65-75	2.7	10
<i>Income (CNY)</i>		
< 15,000	10.9	20
15,000-24,999	16.2	22
25,000-64,999	19.8	42
65,000-149,999	23.3	10
149,999-249,999	14.3	5
≥ 250,000	5.3	1
<i>Province</i>		
Anhui	4.3	5
Beijing	5.3	1
Chongqing	1.8	2
Fujian	2.5	3
Gansu	1.1	2
Guangdong	7.6	6
Guangxi	2.4	4
Guizhou	1.3	3
Hainan	0.46	1
Hebei	4.3	5
Heilongjiang	2.2	3
Henan	5.5	8
Hubei	4.1	5
Hunan	3.8	5
Inner Mongolia	1.4	2
Jiangsu	5.8	6
Jiangxi	2.1	3
Jilin	1.7	2
Liaoning	3.4	3
Ningxia	0.076	0
Qinghai	0.15	0
Shaanxi	2.1	3
Shandong	5.9	7
Shanghai	2.6	1
Shanxi	2.1	3
Sichuan	6.5	7
Tianjin	1.1	1
Tibet	0	0
Xinjiang	0.84	2
Yunnan	2.0	3
Zhejiang	3.9	4

*Notes:* Most recent census data from 2010.

Figure 9: No Evidence of Clustering Around Correct Anniversary Dates. Accuracy of guesses, with the correct date represented by vertical bars. “Don’t know” and illegible answers not shown.





Figure 10: CCP Member Anniversary Recall.



## References

- Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany. 2014. “On First Annual Constitution Day, China’s Most Censored Word Was ‘Constitution.’” *Foreign Policy* December 5.
- Buckley, Chris and Amy Qin. 2019. “Xi Praises a Student Protest in China. From 100 Years Ago.” *The New York Times* April 29.
- Cai, Yongshun. 2010. *Collective Resistance in China: Why Popular Protests Succeed or Fail*. Stanford University Press.
- Carter, Erin Baggott and Brett L. Carter. 2020. *Propaganda in Autocracies*. Under contract, Cambridge University Press.
- Clarke, Damian C. 2019. “PLAUSEXOG: Stata Module to Implement Conley et al’s Plausibly Exogenous Bounds.” Statistical Software Components, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Conley, Timothy G., Christian B. Hansen and Peter E. Rossi. 2012. “Plausibly Exogenous.” *Review of Economics and Statistics* 94(1):260–272.
- Dong, Zhendong and Qiang Dong. 2014. “Positive and Negative Valence Dictionaries.” HowNet, [www.keenage.com](http://www.keenage.com).
- Göbel, Christian and H. Christoph Steinhardt. 2019. “Better Coverage, Less Bias.” University of Vienna, Department of East Asian Studies.
- Grimmer, Justin and Brandon Stewart. 2013. “Text as Data: The Promise and Pitfalls of Automatic Content Analysis Methods for Political Texts.” *Political Analysis* 21(3):267–297.
- Huang, Haifeng. 2015. “Propaganda as Signaling.” *Comparative Politics* 47(4):419–444.
- Kessler, Jason. 2018. “scattertext.” <https://github.com/JasonKessler/scattertext>.
- Kwong, Julia. 1988. “The 1986 Student Demonstrations in China: A Democratic Movement?” *Asian Survey* 28.
- Link, Perry. 2009. “China’s Charter 08.” *New York Review of Books* January 15.
- Lowe, Will, Kenneth Benoit, Slava Mikhaylov and Michael Laver. 2010. “Scaling Policy Preferences from Coded Political Texts.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* XXXVI(1):123–155.
- Wallace, Jeremy L. and Jessica Chen Weiss. 2015. “The Political Geography of Nationalist Protest in China: Cities and the 2012 Anti-Japanese Protests.” *China Quarterly* 222:403–429.

Wines, Michael. 2009. "A Manifesto on Freedom Sets China's Persecution Machinery in Motion."  
*The New York Times* April 30.

Zhu, Boliang. 2016. "MNCs, Rents, and Corruption: Evidence from China." *American Journal of Political Science* 61(1):84–99.