Learning at Home and Abroad: How Competition Conditions the Diffusion of Party Strategies

Supplementary Materials

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Overview

This document contains additional information on the sample and all the supplementary analyses and robustness tests referred to in the article. More specifically, the sections below provide the following information:

A a list of all countries and political parties as well as their party family affiliation contained in the sample

B an empirical analysis using an alternative connectivity scheme based on ideological blocs rather than party families

C a test for conditional spatial effects

D a more detailed treatment and additional empirical analyses on the riding the wave hypothesis

E an empirical assessment of the curvilinear effect of the domestic issue owner's electoral performance

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A   List of All Parties in the Sample

Country	Party	Party Family
Austria	Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ)	Social Democrats
	Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ)	Nationalist
	Austrian People's Party (ÖVP)	Christian Democrats
	Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ)	Nationalist
Belgium	Belgian Socialist Party (BSP/PSB)	Social Democrats
	Party of Liberty and Progress (PVV)	Liberals
	Party of Walloon Reform and Liberty (PRLW)	Liberals
	Liberal Party (PL)	Liberals
	Christian People's Party (CVP)	Christian Democrats
	Christian Social Party (PSC)	Christian Democrats
	Flemish Socialist Party (SP)	Social Democrats
	Francophone Socialist Party (PS)	Social Democrats
	Liberal Reformation Party (PRL)	Liberals
	Flemish Liberals and Democrats (VLD)	Liberals
	Christian Democratic and Flemish (CD&V)	Christian Democrats
	Socialist Party Different - Spirit (SP.a-SPIRIT)	Social Democrats
	Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Open VLD)	Liberals
	Reform Movement (MR)	Liberals
	Socialist Party Different (SP.a)	Social Democrats
	List Dedecker (LDD)	Liberals
Bulgaria	Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB)	Christian Democrats
	National Union Attack (ATAKA)	Nationalist
Cyprus	Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL)	Social Democrats
	United Democratic Union of Cyprus (EDEK)	Social Democrats
	Democratic Party (DiKo)	Liberals
	European Party (EVROKO)	Liberals
	Democratic Coalition (DISY)	Nationalist
Czech Republic	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)	Socialists
	Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD)	Social Democrats
	Civic Democratic Party (ODS)	Conservatives
	Christian and Democratic Union - Czech People's Party (KDU-ČSL)	Christian Democrats
	Tradition, Responsibility, Prosperity 09 (TOP09)	Christian Democrats
Denmark	Left Socialist Party (VS)	Socialists
	Danish Communist Party (DKP)	Socialists
	Socialist People's Party (SF)	Socialists
	Social Democratic Party (SD)	Social Democrats
	Centre Democrats (CD)	Social Democrats
	Danish Social-Liberal Party (RV)	Liberals
	Liberals (V)	Liberals
	Christian People's Party (KrF)	Christian Democrats
	Conservative People's Party (KF)	Conservatives
	Red-Green Unity List (EL)	Socialists

	Danish People's Party (DF)	Nationalist
	Liberal Alliance	Liberals
Estonia	Social Democratic Party (SDE)	Social Democrats
	Estonian Center Party (K)	Liberals
	Estonian Reform Party (ER)	Liberals
	Pro Patria and Res Republica Union (IRL)	Conservatives
Finland	Left Wing Alliance (VAS)	Socialists
	Finnish Social Democrats (SSDP)	Social Democrats
	Finnish Christian Union (SKL)	Christian Democrats
	National Coalition (KK)	Conservatives
	Christian Democrats in Finland (SSDP)	Christian Democrats
France	French Communist Party (PCF)	Socialists
	Socialist Party (PS)	Social Democrats
	Rally for the Republic - Gaullist (RPR)	Conservatives
	National Centre of Independents and	
	Peasants - Conservatives (CNIP)	Conservatives
	Union for a New Majority - Gaullists/ Conservatives	Conservatives
	Union for French Democracy (UDF)	Conservatives
	Front National (FN)	Nationalist
	Rally for the Republic (RPR)	Conservatives
	Democratic Movement (MoDem)	Conservatives
	Union for a Popular Movement (UMP)	Conservatives
Germany	Social Democratic Party (SPD)	Social Democrats
	Free Democratic Party (FDP)	Liberals
	Christian Democratic Union/ Christian	
	Social Union (CDU/CSU)	Christian Democrats
	Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)/ The Left (LINKE)	Socialists
Greece	Communist Party of Greece (KKE)	Socialists
	Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)	Social Democrats
	New Democracy (ND)	Christian Democrats
	Progressive Left Coalition (SYN)	Socialists
	Political Spring (Pola)	Christian Democrats
	Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA)	Socialists
	Democratic Left (DIMAR)	Socialists
	Golden Dawn (XA)	Nationalist
	Independent Greeks (ANEL)	Nationalist
	Coalition of the Radical Left - Unionist	
	Social Front (SYRIZA-EKN)	Socialists
Hungary	Alliance of Federation of Young	
	Democrats - Hungarian Civic Union - Christian	
	Democratic People's Party (FiDeSz-MPSz-KDNP)	Liberals
	Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP)	Social Democrats
	Federation of Young Democrats - Hungarian	
	Civic Union (FiDeSz)	Conservatives
	Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)	Nationalist

Ireland	Labour Party (Labour)	Social Democrats
	Family of the Irish	Christian Democrats
	Soldiers of Destiny	Conservatives
	Workers' Party (WP)	Socialists
	Progressive Democrats (PD)	Liberals
	Democratic Left Party (DLP)	Socialists
Italy	Italian Communist Party (PCI)	Socialists
	Italian Socialist Party (PSI)	Social Democrats
	Italian Democratic Socialist Party (PSDI)	Social Democrats
	Italian Republican Party (PRI)	Liberals
	Italian Liberal Party (PLI)	Liberals
	Christian Democrats (DC)	Christian Democrats
	Italian Social Movement - National Right (MSI-DN)	Nationalist
	Proletarian Unity of Party for Communism (PdUP)	Socialists
	Radical Party (PR)	Social Democrats
	Proletarian Democracy (DP)	Socialists
	Democratic Party of the Left (PDS)	Socialists
	Pannella List (LP)	Social Democrats
	Communist Refoundation Party (PRC)	Socialists
	Pannella-Riformatori List	Social Democrats
	Italian Popular Party (PPI)	Christian Democrats
	National Alliance (AN)	Nationalist
	Northern League (NL)	Nationalist
	Pannella-Sgarbi List	Social Democrats
	Democratic Alliance (AD)	Christian Democrats
	Go Italy (FI)	Conservatives
	Democrats of the Left (DS)	Socialists
	Party of Italian Communist (PdCI)	Socialists
	Olive Tree	Social Democrats
	New Italian Socialist Party (NPSI)	Conservatives
	List Di Pietro - Italy of Values (IdV)	Liberals
	Union of the Center (UdC)	Christian Democrats
	People of Freedom (PdL)	Conservatives
	Democratic Party (PD)	Liberals
Latvia	Concord Centre (SC)	Socialists
	Unity	Conservatives
	National Alliance "All For Latvia!" - "For Fatherland and Freedom" - Latvian National Independence Movement	Nationalist
Lithuania	Liberal and Centre Union (LiCS)	Liberals
	Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (LSDP)	Social Democrats
	Liberal Movement (LRLS)	Liberals
	Order and Justice (PTT)	Liberals
	Homeland Union - Lithuanian Christian Democrats (TS-LKD)	Conservatives
Luxembourg	Communist Party of Luxembourg (KPL/PCL)	Socialists
	Socialist Workers' Party of Luxembourg	

	(LSAP/POSL)	Social Democrats
	Democratic Party (DP/PD)	Liberals
	Christian Social People's Party (CSV/PCS)	Christian Democrats
	The Left	Socialists
Netherlands	Radical Political Party (PPR)	Social Democrats
	Labour Party (PvdA)	Social Democrats
	Democrats 66 (D66)	Social Democrats
	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD)	Liberals
	Democratic Socialists '70 (DS'70)	Christian Democrats
	Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)	Christian Democrats
	Reformed Political League (GPV)	Christian Democrats
	Reformatory Political Federation (RPF)	Christian Democrats
	Centre Democrats	Nationalist
	Socialist Party (SP)	Socialists
	Livable Netherlands (LN)	Liberals
	Christian Union (CU)	Christian Democrats
	List Pim Fortuyn (LPF)	Nationalist
	Party of Freedom (PVV)	Nationalist
Poland	Civic Platform (PO)	Liberals
	Law and Justice (PiS)	Conservatives
Portugal	Portuguese Communist Party (PCP)	Socialists
	Socialist Party (PS)	Social Democrats
	Social Democratic Party (PSD)	Conservative
	Social Democratic Center Party (CDS)	Christian Democrats
	Unified Democratic Coalition (CDU)	Socialists
	Social Democratic Center - Popular Party (CDS-PP)	Christian Democrats
	Left Bloc (BE)	Socialists
Slovakia	Direction-Social Democracy (Smer)	Social Democrats
	Christian Democratic Movement (KDH)	Christian Democrats
	Slovak Democratic and Christian Union - Democratic Party (SDKÚ-DS)	Christian Democrats
	Slovak National Party (SNS)	Nationalist
	Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS)	Nationalist
	Freedom and Solidarity (SaS)	Liberals
Slovenia	Social Democratic Party (Sd)	Social Democrats
	Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS)	Conservatives
	Liberal Democratic Party (LDS)	Liberals
	Slovenian People's Party (SLS)	Christian Democrats
	New Slovenian Christian People's Party (Nsi)	Christian Democrats
	Slovenian National Party (SNS)	Nationalist
	For Real	Liberals
Spain	United Left (IU)	Socialists
	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)	Social Democrats
	Centre Democrats (CDS)	Christian Democrats

	Popular party (PP)	Conservatives
	Convergence and Union (CiU)	Conservatives
Sweden	Left Party (V)	Socialists
	Social Democratic Labour Party (SAP)	Social Democrats
	Liberal People's Party (FP)	Liberals
	Christian Democrats (Kd)	Christian Democrats
	Moderate Coalition Party (MSP)	Conservatives
United Kingdom	Labour Party	Social Democrats
	Liberal Party	Liberals
	Conservative Party	Conservatives
	Social Democratic Party (SDP)	Social Democrats
	Liberal Democrats (LibDems)	Liberals
	Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)	Conservatives
	We Ourselves (SF)	Socialists

B Connecting Parties Based on Ideological Blocs

As stated in the manuscript, each party has on average only 0.49 family members within its party system and there are some electoral contexts where there are not two parties within the same party family. This raises the concern that the results are sensitive to outlier electoral contexts in which many parties from the same party family compete against each other.

In order to address this concern, we changed the specification of the four connectivity matrices. Instead of their family affiliation, the new matrices connect parties based on their ideological bloc membership. More specifically, we follow Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009, 834) and classify communist and social democratic parties as "left," liberals as "centrist," and conservative, christian democratic, and nationalist parties "right."[1] By differentiating between ideological blocs instead of party families, the average number of domestic competitors from the same bloc increases to 1.18. Using the amended matrices, we reestimate the three models presented in the manuscript (for a similar approach, see Böhmelt et al., 2017; Böhmelt et al., 2016). Table B.1 presents the results.

While most coefficient estimates are not affected by the choice of the connectivity scheme, some of the spatial parameters differ in magnitude. However, it is important to note that the spatial parameter estimates cannot be interpreted as marginal effects and that these differences can be caused by the increase in the number of non-zero elements in the connectivity matrices (for a detailed discussion on this point, see Whitten, Williams and Wimpy, 2019). To facilitate the substantive interpretation, we follow our approach in the main manuscript and calculate the average marginal effects (AMEs) of the spatial short-term effects.

As Table B.2 illustrates, the substantive short-term effects of all four spatial lags are

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[1]Recall that in our analysis, we omit green parties as well as regional, agrarian, and other small single-issue party families.

Table B.1: Fractional Logit Model Estimates of Environmental Issues Emphasis Based on Party Bloc Membership

	DV: Issue Emphasis (Proportion)	
	Model 3 (Family)	Model 4 (Bloc)
Constant	-3.091^{***}	-2.988^{***}
	(0.556)	(0.555)
DV_{t-1}	-1.527	-1.415
	(1.077)	(1.076)
$\theta_1 \mathbf{W}^{F_W} \boldsymbol{y}$	0.809^{***}	0.405^{**}
	(0.299)	(0.189)
$\theta_2 \mathbf{W}^{F_L} \boldsymbol{y}$	-0.129	-0.064
	(0.246)	(0.168)
$\theta_3 \mathbf{W}^{D_W} \boldsymbol{y}$	0.001	0.103
	(1.225)	(0.819)
$\theta_4 \mathbf{W}^{D_L} \boldsymbol{y}$	-0.824	1.155
	(1.276)	(0.846)
$VSGreen_{t-1}$	-0.202^{***}	-0.190^{***}
	(0.043)	(0.043)
$VSGreen^2_{t-1}$	0.011^{***}	0.010^{***}
	(0.004)	(0.004)
$AvgGreen_{n-1}$	0.332^{**}	0.293^{*}
	(0.164)	(0.166)
GDP_{n-1}	0.025	0.024
	(0.021)	(0.021)
$Incumbent_t$	-0.047	-0.044
	(0.071)	(0.071)
$Incumbent_{DV_{t-1}}$	4.704^{***}	4.428^{***}
	(1.663)	(1.659)
VS_{t-1}	0.010	0.010
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Party and Year FEs	✓	✓
ψ	0.0192	0.0191
Observations	733	733
RMSE	0.0233	0.0234

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; two-tailed. SEs in parentheses.

very similar to the ones reported in the article. Despite differences in the spatial parameter estimates, connecting parties based on their ideological bloc membership instead of their party family does not affect the substantive results. Again, we find that the data does not provide evidence for the diffusion of saliency strategies at the domestic level which is consistent with our theory. Overall, this analysis confirms that the substantive inferences presented in the manuscript also hold if we assume that parties learn from foreign members of their ideological bloc rather than their party family.

Table B.2: Average Marginal Effect Estimates of the Spatial Short-Term Effects (Ideological Blocs)

	Estimate	95%-CI
$\theta_1 \boldsymbol{W}^{F_W} \boldsymbol{y}$	0.443	$[0.101; \quad 0.903]$
$\theta_2 \boldsymbol{W}^{F_L} \boldsymbol{y}$	-0.083	$[-0.423; \quad 0.274]$
$\theta_3 \boldsymbol{W}^{D_W} \boldsymbol{y}$	0.002	$[-0.051; \quad 0.062]$
$\theta_4 \boldsymbol{W}^{D_L} \boldsymbol{y}$	-0.021	$[-0.091; \quad 0.052]$

C Conditional Spatial Dependence

In this section, we explore a possible conditioning effect of the strength of a domestic issue owner on the parties' learning efforts. Specifically, it is reasonable to expect that parties who face a strong issue owner are less likely to learn from their family members abroad. To test this expectation empirically, we interact the two foreign spatial lags with the green's lagged vote share. Table C.1 compares the estimates of the full model presented in the article (Model 3) with a model that features conditional spatial effects (Model 5).

The results suggest that the strength of a domestic issue owner does not condition the parties' learning abilities. While the spatial parameter estimate for successful foreign parties is statistically significant, the interaction term does not achieve conventional levels of statistical significance. This suggests that parties in systems with a strong Green party are as likely to take cues from foreign family members as parties who face a weak domestic issue owner.

Table C.1: Fractional Logit Model Estimates of Environmental Issues Emphasis with Conditional Spatial Effects

	DV: Issue Emphasis (Proportion)	
	Model 3	Model 5
Constant	−3.091***	−3.072***
	(0.556)	(0.558)
DV_{t-1}	−1.527	−1.605
	(1.077)	(1.082)
$\theta_1 \mathbf{W}^{FW} \boldsymbol{y}$	0.809***	0.793**
	(0.299)	(0.374)
$\theta_2 \mathbf{W}^{FL} \boldsymbol{y}$	−0.129	0.107
	(0.246)	(0.318)
$\theta_3 \mathbf{W}^{DW} \boldsymbol{y}$	0.001	−0.006
	(1.225)	(1.229)
$\theta_4 \mathbf{W}^{DL} \boldsymbol{y}$	−0.824	−0.840
	(1.276)	(1.282)
$VSGreen_{t-1} \times \mathbf{W}^{FW} \boldsymbol{y}$	-	−0.005
		(0.077)
$VSGreen_{t-1} \times \mathbf{W}^{FL} \boldsymbol{y}$	-	−0.075
		(0.063)
$VSGreen_{t-1}$	−0.202***	−0.185***
	(0.043)	(0.048)
$VSGreen^2_{t-1}$	0.011***	0.012***
	(0.004)	(0.004)
$AvgGreen_{n-1}$	0.332**	0.308*
	(0.164)	(0.167)
GDP_{n-1}	0.025	0.023
	(0.021)	(0.021)
$Incumbent_t$	−0.047	−0.044
	(0.072)	(0.072)
$Incumbent_{DV_{t-1}}$	4.704***	4.549***
	(1.673)	(1.673)
VS_{t-1}	0.010	0.009
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Party and Year FEs	✓	✓
ψ	0.0192	0.0193
Observations	733	733
RMSE	0.0233	0.0232

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; two-tailed. SEs in parentheses.

D Riding the Wave Hypothesis

In contrast to saliency-based theories of party competition, the riding the wave literature suggests that parties do not simply talk about the issues most favorable to them. Instead, they focus on the issues most salient to the electorate during their campaigns

in an attempt to highlight their responsiveness to the voters' demands (e.g., Klüver and Sagarzazu, 2016; Spoon and Klüver, 2015; Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1994). As a consequence, the theory expects a considerable overlap in the parties' issue emphasis since parties converge on the topics most important to the electorate.

If parties are "riding the wave" and campaign on issues salient to the electorate prior to an election, we would find a positive pattern of spatial dependence at the domestic level. In this case, the saliency strategies employed by domestic competitors would in fact be informative as they facilitate the identification of the issues most important to the voters. Hence, imitating domestic competitors would be a promising strategy.

In order to test this argument, we define the new spatial lag $\mathbf{W}^{D^{all}}$ that connects all domestic parties to one another. Since the riding the wave hypothesis identifies imitation rather than conscious learning as the diffusion process at work, differentiating between successful and unsuccessful competitors is not necessary in order to evaluate the theoretically expected mechanism. The average number of neighbors as defined by $\mathbf{W}^{D^{all}}$ is 3.861. Table D.1 compares the results of the main model (Model 3) to the estimates derived from a model that connects all domestic parties irrespective of their electoral performance and family affiliation (Model 6) as well as a model that includes all five spatial lags (Model 7).

Regarding the transnational level, the inferences remain identical. Parties consciously learn about the most promising saliency strategy from successful foreign family members. With respect to the domestic level, this analysis also confirms the results displayed in the article. Irrespective of the electoral fortunes of domestic family members, parties cannot use their performance as a heuristic.

More importantly, Table D.1 also allows us to assess the expectation that parties converge to the issues most important to the electorate. Although the riding the wave hypothesis expects a positive spatial pattern among parties within the same national party system ($\theta_5 > 0$), the statistically insignificant spatial parameter indicates that party strategies do not diffuse domestically. Therefore, at least based on party manifestos, our analysis does not provide evidence for the riding the wave hypothesis.

Table D.1: Fractional Logit Model Estimates of Environmental Issues Emphasis with Spatial Lags Connecting all Domestic Parties

	DV: Issue Emphasis (Proportion)		
	Model 3	Model 6	Model 7
Constant	−3.091***	−3.072***	−3.070***
	(0.556)	(0.560)	(0.561)
DV_{t-1}	−1.527	−1.506	−1.504
	(1.077)	(1.075)	(1.080)
$\theta_1 \mathbf{W}^{F_W} \boldsymbol{y}$	0.809***	0.802***	0.805***
	(0.299)	(0.298)	(0.299)
$\theta_2 \mathbf{W}^{F_L} \boldsymbol{y}$	−0.129	−0.119	−0.120
	(0.246)	(0.246)	(0.248)
$\theta_3 \mathbf{W}^{D_W} \boldsymbol{y}$	0.001	-	−0.114
	(1.225)		(1.287)
$\theta_4 \mathbf{W}^{D_L} \boldsymbol{y}$	−0.824	-	−0.958
	(1.276)		(1.356)
$\theta_5 \mathbf{W}^{D^{all}} \boldsymbol{y}$	-	0.043	0.125
		(0.392)	(0.424)
$VSGreen_{t-1}$	−0.202***	−0.198***	−0.200***
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.044)
$VSGreen_{t-1}^2$	0.011***	0.011***	0.011***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
$AvgGreen_{n-1}$	0.332**	0.322*	0.318*
	(0.164)	(0.171)	(0.172)
GDP_{n-1}	0.025	0.026	0.025
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.021)
$Incumbent_t$	−0.047	−0.047	−0.047
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)
$Incumbent_{DV_{t-1}}$	4.704***	4.482**	4.426**
	(1.663)	(1.907)	(1.913)
VS_{t-1}	0.010	0.010	0.010
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Party and Year FEs	✓	✓	✓
ψ	0.0192	0.0192	0.0193
Observations	733	733	733
RMSE	0.0233	0.0233	0.0233

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; two-tailed. SEs in parentheses.

E   Test for an U-shaped Relationship

Whether the quadratic term in the model ($VSGreen_{t-1}^2$) is statistically significant and the estimated extreme point is within the data range are necessary but insufficient for the existence of an U-shaped relationship. The possibility remains that the relationship is convex but monotone over the empirically observed range of the variable (Lind and

Mehlum, 2010). To test for this possibility, we follow the suggestions by Lind and Mehlum (2010) and test the joint null hypothesis $H_0 : \beta_1 + 2 \times \beta_2 X_{min} \leq 0$ and/or $\beta_1 + 2 \times \beta_2 X_{max} \geq 0$, where X_{min} and X_{max} are the minimum (0) and the maximum value (14.35) of the variable $VSGreen_{t-1}$ in the data. Intuitively, the test evaluates whether the estimated slope of the function significantly decreases and increases within a specified range of values. Table E.1 reports the results of the test.

Table E.1: Test for an U-shaped Relationship

	$X_{min} = 0$	$X_{max} = 14.35$
Slope	−0.202***	0.108
	(0.043)	(0.070)
Lind-Mehlum test statistic	−4.633	1.528
p-value	0.000	0.127

***p<0.01; two-tailed. SEs in parentheses.

While the slope at both points X_{min} and X_{max} is correctly signed, it fails to reach statistical significance at X_{max}, suggesting that the relationship is monotone over the relevant range of values. For low levels of electoral support for green issue owners, an additional increase in the domestic green parties' support significantly decreases the share of quasi-sentences dedicated to environmental issues in the other parties' manifestos. This negative effect, however, diminishes as the green parties' support increases. For high levels of electoral support for the issue owner, an additional increase in support for green parties does not have a significant impact on its competitors' emphasis of the valence issue. Figure E.1 graphically illustrates this finding by showing how the marginal effect of domestic green parties' vote share after the previous election changes as the variable increases. The ticks at the horizontal axis represent the observed data points. Again, uncertainty estimates are obtained via simulation.

In sum, although the coefficient of the quadratic term in the analysis is statistically significant and the estimated extreme point lies within the empirically observed data range, the test suggested by Lind and Mehlum (2010) fails to reject the combined H_0 at conventional levels of statistical significance. While the relationship between the strength of an issue owner and the other parties' issue emphasis is a convex function, it monotonically decreases over the relevant range of values. Instead of an U-shaped relationship, the analysis reveals a non-linear or, more precisely, a diminishing effect of the issue owning green parties' strength on the other parties' emphasis of the valence issue. Therefore, the strength of the issue owner alters the other parties' strategies but the data does not support the expectation that they respond to a strong issue owner by emphasizing the issue.

Figure E.1: Marginal Effect of Green Parties' Electoral Support

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