SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS FOR "CIVIL WAR AND CITIZENS' DEMAND FOR THE STATE: AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF HOBBESIAN THEORY"

A MAP AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Figure A.1 maps the communities in my sample. Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 provide descriptive statistics.

B SELECTION OF RESPONDENTS

My sample consists of 20 randomly-selected residents and four purposively-selected local leaders per community—typically a town chief, women's group leader, youth group leader, and minority ethnic group leader. Sampling of residents followed the random walk method. A team of enumerators walked the length of each community and divided it into roughly equal blocks, counted all houses along the "major pathways" separating those blocks, and selected households at even intervals along the major pathways. Respondents were selected at random from among the consenting adult inhabitants of each household.

C SELECTION OF COMMUNITIES AND COMPARISON TO NATIONALLY REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE

The 242 communities in my sample constitute the smallest unit of administration in Liberia. Importantly, these communities are not representative of Liberia, nor of the counties from which they were sampled. The survey was originally conducted for purposes of a randomized controlled trial evaluating an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) program. The communities in the sample were selected by government officials and other stakeholders because they were believed to be at disproportionately high risk of violence. However, while this is an important scope condition for my analysis, it is not as restrictive as it may seem. Comparison to a nationally representative survey conducted at the same time (Vinck, Pham and Kreutzer 2011) suggests the communities in my sample were not much more conflicted than the average Liberian town or village, either in these

three counties or nationwide.

For example, 4% of respondents in the Vinck, Pham and Kreutzer (2011) survey reported being victims of armed violence in Lofa, 5% in Nimba, 4% in Grand Gedeh, and 7% nationwide. In my sample, 1% of respondents reported being victims of armed violence in Lofa, 3% in Nimba, and 3% in Grand Gedeh. These rates are comparable across surveys in all counties. Rates of robbery and burglary are similar as well: in Vinck, Pham and Kreutzer (2011), 12% of respondents reported a robbery or burglary in Lofa, 11% in Nimba, 18% in Grand Gedeh, and 15% nationwide. In my sample, 14% of respondents reported a robbery or burglary in Lofa, 25% in Nimba, and 13% in Grand Gedeh. Except for Nimba, these rates are comparable across surveys.

The communities in my sample are similar to those in Vinck, Pham and Kreutzer (2011) along demographics as well. The average respondent in my sample is 41 years old, compared to 37 years old in Vinck, Pham and Kreutzer (2011). 42% of my sample has no education, compared to 35% in Vinck, Pham and Kreutzer (2011)—a difference attributable to the much higher rate of educational attainment among Monrovia residents in the latter sample. (83% of Monrovia residents have at least some primary education.) 13% of my sample is Muslim, compared to 10% in Vinck, Pham and Kreutzer (2011). I interpret these parallels as evidence that my results are likely to generalize to other parts of Liberia. (I discuss generalizability to other countries in the conclusion of the paper.)

D DISAGGREGATING BY TYPE OF WARTIME VIOLENCE

The survey contains data on different types of exposure to wartime violence in Liberia. Tables A.4 and A.5 distinguish between combatants (top panel), victims and witnesses of sexual violence (middle panel), and witnesses of lethal and non-lethal violence (bottom panel). (I focus on witnesses rather than victims of non-lethal violence for the sake of symmetry with my measure of lethal violence; respondents obviously cannot themselves be victims of lethal violence.) Tables A.4 and A.5 test the correlation between these four types of exposure and reliance on the state in

hypothetical and actual criminal cases, respectively. My results are substantively similar to those in the paper, with one exception: the correlation between wartime violence and reliance on the state in actual criminal cases is either weakly or not statistically significant when I distinguish between lethal and non-lethal violence (though they are highly jointly significant when I focus on all respondents in column 2).

E USING FATALITIES

In addition to the number and location of violent events, ACLED includes data on the number of fatalities associated with each violent event. This data is especially noisy, as the number of fatalities resulting from violent events in rural Liberia is difficult and sometimes impossible to estimate, especially in the midst of civil war. Nonetheless, as a robustness check, Tables A.6 and A.7 replicate Tables 2 and 4, respectively, using the number of fatalities in each community in my sample. My results are substantively similar to those in the paper.

F DISAGGREGATING BY PERPETRATOR OF WARTIME VIOLENCE

In addition to the number and location of violent events and the number of fatalities associated with them, ACLED also includes data on the actors involved—in particular, whether attacks on civilians were perpetrated by state or rebel forces. This data is especially noisy, due in part to the difficulty of gathering timely, reliable information on attacks in the midst of an ongoing civil war. Indeed, the third most common perpetrator of attacks on civilians in ACLED is "unidentified armed group," accounting for 16.2% of all such attacks in the dataset. The most common perpetrator is the Liberian army, accounting for 17.3% of attacks, followed by LURD, accounting for 16.9%. With this caveat about missingness in mind, Tables A.8 and A.9 report the correlation between reliance on the state in hypothetical and actual criminal cases, respectively, and community-level wartime violence in ACLED, focusing on attacks on civilians and disaggregating by perpetrator.

Perhaps surprisingly, with some exceptions it appears that the positive correlation between

reliance on the state and community-level wartime violence is driven as much (or more) by state-perpetrated attacks as by rebel-perpetrated attacks. While surprising, these results are not necessarily inconsistent with Hobbesian theory. As discussed in the paper, the end of the Liberian civil wars resulted in the creation of an almost entirely new Liberian state, and Liberians who were victimized by predatory state security forces during the conflict may have been more likely to demand protection from the (relatively) capable and benevolent state of the post-conflict period. But given the problems of noise and missingness described above, these results should be interpreted with caution. Ideally I could test the correlation between reliance on the state and individual-level wartime violence, disaggregating by *perceived* perpetrator, since the perception arguably matters more than the reality for shaping citizen/state relations in the post-conflict period. Unfortunately the survey did not include questions on perceived (or actual) perpetrator.

G USING UCDP GEOREFERENCED EVENT DATASET (GED)

Data on wartime violence is inevitably noisy, prone to missingness and measurement error. As a robustness check, Tables A.10, A.11, A.12, and A.13 replicate Tables 2, 4, 5, and 7, respectively, using the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) in lieu of the ACLED dataset. My results are substantively similar to those in the paper, with one exception: the correlation between fear and community-level exposure to wartime violence in UCDP is only statistically significant at conventional levels in one specification, and then only weakly so.

H DISAGGREGATING BY COUNTY

If citizens who were more severely victimized by wartime violence differ from those who were not, and if those differences correlate with attitudes towards state and non-state authorities today, then my results may be biased. As a robustness check, I test whether my results hold when I estimate them for Lofa, Nimba, and Grand Gedeh counties separately. As discussed in the paper, these three counties differ in their ethnic compositions and in the forms and levels of violence that they

witnessed during the Liberian civil wars. If my results are nonetheless consistent across the three counties, then it seems less likely that they are artifacts of selection bias alone.

Tables A.14, A.15, and A.16 replicate my analyses in Table 1 for Lofa, Nimba, and Grand Gedeh, respectively. Tables A.17, A.18, and A.19 replicate my analyses in Table 2 for Lofa, Nimba, and Grand Gedeh, respectively. Tables A.20, A.21, and A.22 replicate my analyses in Table 3 for Lofa, Nimba, and Grand Gedeh, respectively. And Tables A.23, A.24, and A.25 replicate my analyses in Table 4 for Lofa, Nimba, and Grand Gedeh, respectively. My results are substantively similar (albeit sometimes statistically weaker) to those in the paper, with a few exceptions. First, the correlation between reliance on the state and exposure to wartime violence is generally not statistically significant in Grand Gedeh, perhaps due to the much smaller sample size, though for the most part the point estimates have the same sign as those in the paper. Second, the correlation between reliance on the UN in hypothetical criminal cases and community-level exposure to wartime violence is more negative when I disaggregate in this way. Otherwise my results are substantively similar to those in the paper.

I WARTIME VIOLENCE AND POLITICAL PREFERENCES

Demand for state-provided security may be an artifact of support for President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and her Unity Party (UP). Liberians who held particular political views (opposing Charles Taylor, for example) may have been more likely to participate in the civil war, or to be victims of it. They may also have been more likely to became supporters of Sirleaf and the UP in the post-conflict period. If this is the case, then what I interpret as a correlation between exposure to wartime violence and demand for the state may in fact be a more mechanical association between opposition to Taylor and support for Sirleaf.

Table A.26 explores this possibility. Respondents were asked which political party, if any, they supported at the time of data collection. I code dummies indicating support for the UP on one hand and support for the Congress for Democratic Change on the other (CDC, the most prominent

opposition party). I also code a third dummy for respondents who said they did not support any political party. Table A.26 reports the relationship between exposure to wartime violence and each of these three dummies, using the same specification as in equation (1) in the paper. Consistent with research showing higher levels of political interest and engagement among victims of conflict (Bauer et al. 2016; Blattman 2009), I find that citizens who were more severely affected by wartime violence are more likely to support a political party. As with other results reported in the paper, this relationship is driven by direct rather than indirect victimization.

In general, however, exposure to wartime violence appears to be equally weakly correlated with support for the UP and support for the CDC. There are some nuances—for example, direct victimization is more strongly correlated with support for the CDC, while indirect victimization is more strongly correlated with support for the UP—but overall, I find little evidence to suggest that exposure to wartime violence robustly predicts subsequent support for the incumbent over the opposition. Indeed, if anything, the forms of direct victimization that are more positively correlated with demand for the state are also more positively correlated with support for the CDC. This suggests that confounding between demand for the state and support for Sirleaf is unlikely to explain my results.

J SUBSETTING TO RESPONDENTS BORN IN SAME COMMUNITY WHERE THEY WERE SURVEYED

In the paper I test the correlation between demand for the state and three different measures of community-level exposure to wartime violence in ACLED. This analysis is potentially susceptible to ecological inference problems if respondents migrated to the communities where they were surveyed *after* the violence occurred. These respondents might not have been exposed to wartime violence at all, at least not directly. To address this possibility, Tables A.27 and A.28 replicate Tables 2 and 4, respectively, subsetting to respondents who were born in the same community where they were surveyed. The results are substantively similar to those in the paper.

K SUBSETTING TO RESPONDENTS NEVER DISPLACED

More subtly, even respondents who were born in the same community where they were surveyed may have fled their communities before the violence occurred, then returned after the fighting stopped but before the survey was conducted. Again, these respondents might not have been exposed to wartime violence at all. To address this possibility, Tables A.29 and A.30 replicate Tables 2 and 4, respectively subsetting to the 16% of respondents ($N = 756$) who were never displaced during the conflict. Even in this relatively small subsample, the results are substantively similar to those in the paper, with two exceptions. First, the correlation between the number of incidents in ACLED and reliance on the state in hypothetical criminal cases is positive but substantively small and not statistically significant when I subset in this way. Second, the correlation between the number of incidents in ACLED or any incident in ACLED and reliance on the state in actual criminal cases is positive but imprecisely estimated.

L WARTIME VIOLENCE AND KNOWLEDGE OF AND PROXIMITY TO THE POLICE

The Liberian government may have provided more services (especially security) to communities that were more severely affected by violence during the civil war. If this is the case, then the positive correlation I observe between exposure to wartime violence and demand for the state may be an artifact of increased state service provision, rather than exposure per se. One way to assess this possibility might be to test whether police officers are more likely to patrol or respond to criminal complaints in communities that were more severely affected by wartime violence. But this test would be misleading, since police patrols and responses to criminal complaints may be a function of citizen demand. This is especially true in rural areas, where the police cannot easily learn about crimes unless citizens report them.

As a more informative test, I focus on proximity to police stations. Building new police

stations is a costly commitment, and the government is unlikely to choose where to build them on the basis of citizen demand alone.[1] In the survey I ask respondents (1) whether they know the location of the nearest police station, (2) whether they know the phone number of any police officer,[2] and (3) how long it takes them to travel to the nearest police station.[3] I use answers to these three questions to disentangle demand for state security providers from state security provision itself. If citizens who were more severely affected by wartime violence are more likely to demand state-provided security, then they should also be more likely to seek information about where and how to access state security providers. Citizens can acquire this information whether or not they live near a police station, and whether or not the police proactively provide it to them.

In contrast, unless the government favors their communities when deciding where to build new police stations, citizens who were more severely affected by wartime violence should be no more or less likely to live near a police station. (To rule out the possibility that citizens move in order to be closer to the police, I restrict this analysis to respondents who were born in the same community where they surveyed.) If demand for the state is driven by state security provision, and if the state is more likely to provide security to communities that were more severely affected during the civil war, then we should expect to observe a negative correlation between exposure to wartime violence and distance from the nearest police station. If, in contrast, demand for the state is driven by exposure to wartime violence per se, then we should expect to observe a positive correlation between exposure and knowledge of the police, and a null or even positive correlation between exposure and distance from the nearest police station.

My results in Table A.31 suggest that citizens who were more severely victimized during the civil wars are more knowledgeable of the police today, but no more likely to live near a police station. For every one standard deviation increase on my index of direct and indirect victimization, respondents are 4 percentage points more likely to know the location of the nearest police

[1] It is possible that citizens might petition the government to build a police station near their community, and that the government might comply. While I cannot rule out this possibility, I view it as highly unlikely given the resource constraints under which the Liberian government operates.

[2] Liberia does not have a nationwide 911 system.

[3] Ideally I could combine answers to this question with government data on the locations of actual police stations at the time of the survey. Unfortunately I do not have access to this data.

station and 2 percentage points more likely to know the phone number of a police officer. These correlations are driven primarily by direct exposure, though the coefficients on indirect exposure are positive as well (and, in the case of knowledge of a police officer's phone number, weakly statistically significant). In contrast, respondents who were more severely victimized tend to live no closer to the nearest police station on average, and if anything live further away. These are not the patterns we would expect to observe if the state were providing more security to communities that were more severely affected by violence during the civil war.

M USING MULTINOMIAL LOGIT

Figures A.2 and A.4 replicate Tables 1 and 2 using a multinomial logit estimator instead of a linear probability model. The advantage of multinomial logit is that it allows me to more directly estimate the correlation between wartime violence and demand for the state *relative* to non-state alternatives. The disadvantage is that multinomial logit cannot accommodate the nearly 250 community fixed effects in equation (1) in the paper. Community fixed effects facilitate causal inference by eliminating *all* community-level confounders in the cross-section. Figures A.2 and A.4 use district fixed effects instead. Both figures report marginal effects with all controls held at their means.

Figures A.3 and A.5 visualize the same marginal effects across the range of values for my continuous measures of wartime violence at the individual and community levels, respectively. (Note that in Figure A.3 I do not standardize my survey-based measures of direct and indirect exposure. Note, too, that in Figure A.5, proximity to the nearest ACLED event is reverse-coded such that less negative values indicate closer proximity.) My results suggest that wartime violence is correlated with demand for the state both in absolute terms and, in most specifications, relative to both non-state authorities and the UN. My results also suggest that while wartime violence is not consistently positively correlated with demand for the UN in an absolute sense, it *is* correlated with demand for the UN relative to non-state authorities in most specifications.

N FEAR OF CIVIL WAR RECURRENCE AND DEMAND FOR STATE AUTHORITY

In Hobbes's account, exposure to the "miseries" and "horrible calamities" of civil war instills fear of renewed conflict, which, in turn, motivates rational, self-interested citizens to seek protection from the state (Hobbes 2010, 112). Fear is thus the mechanism linking wartime violence to demand for state authority. While it is difficult if not impossible to isolate this mechanism empirically, in the paper I show that wartime violence is positively correlated with fear of civil war recurrence in Liberia nearly a decade after the conflict ended. This is consistent with Hobbesian theory.

In Tables A.32 and A.33 I test whether fear of conflict recurrence is also positively correlated with reliance on the state in hypothetical and actual criminal cases, respectively. These analyses should be interpreted with caution. Beyond the more general challenges of testing mechanisms, even in the context of an experiment (Bullock, Green and Ha 2010), I do not have a plausible identification strategy that would allow me to cleanly estimate the effect of fear on demand for the state. Fear may be correlated with any number of demographic, social, political, and economic confounders, any one of which may also be correlated with demand for state authority. These confounders may bias my results in unknown and probably unknowable directions. With this caveat in mind, my results in Tables A.32 and A.33 are mixed. Respondents who fear civil war recurrence are *less* likely to rely on the state in hypothetical criminal cases, but, if anything, are *more* likely to rely on the state in actual ones.

O PEACETIME VIOLENCE AND DEMAND FOR STATE AUTHORITY

Liberia has been mostly stable since the end of the civil wars in 2003, but has nonetheless witnessed sporadic incidents of collective violence. A number of these incidents occurred in the three

counties in my study. Indeed, perhaps the single most destabilizing incident occurred in Voinjama, Lofa County—one of the communities in my sample—when a riot between Lorma and Mandingo residents left four dead, many more injured, and much of the town's infrastructure destroyed. Were these incidents sufficiently serious to rupture the nascent social contract between citizens and the Liberian state? To answer this question, I use the survey of local leaders to operationalize collective violence in the post-conflict period. Local leaders were asked to report on various types of instability in their communities. I focus on mob justice, violent strikes and protests, and riots between ethnic groups—incidents of collective violence that were potentially severe enough to escalate into regional or national crises (Blair, Blattman and Hartman 2017). I code a dummy that takes a one if two or more local leaders reported that any of these incidents occurred in their community in the year prior to data collection. I take the modal response across local leaders in order to mitigate measurement error resulting from recall bias.

Tables A.34 and A.35 report the correlation between peacetime collective violence and reliance on the state in hypothetical and actual criminal cases, respectively. I use a specification identical to equation (2) in the paper, but include additional community-level controls gleaned from a 2004 Rapid Needs Assessment conducted by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.[4] My results suggest that, if anything, peacetime collective violence only reinforces citizens' preference to rely on the state over non-state alternatives. As I discuss in the paper, this may reflect Liberians' optimism about the government's ability to sustain the peace process. As with wartime violence, peacetime collective violence is not correlated with a preference for UNMIL one way or the other, perhaps for similar reasons.

[4]These controls include the number of houses in each community, dummies indicating whether there were any schools or clinics in the community, and a dummy indicating whether the community was accessible by road in the rainy season. I omit these controls when estimating the correlation between demand for the state and exposure to wartime violence in order to avoid post-treatment bias. Since the Rapid Needs Assessment was conducted long before any of the incidents of peacetime collective violence in the survey, there is no risk of post-treatment bias in Tables A.34 or A.35.

Figure A.1: Survey sample



Notes: Distribution of communities in Lofa (top left), Nimba (middle), and Grand Gedeh (bottom right) counties.

Table A.1: Reliance on state and exposure to wartime violence

	Mean	S.D.	N
Demand for state			
Rely on state	0.56	0.50	4,799
Rely on non-state	0.32	0.46	4,799
Rely on UN	0.12	0.33	4,799
Reported crime to police (conditional)	0.14	0.35	1,128
Reported crime to police (unconditional)	0.03	0.18	4,800
Fears ex-generals	0.19	0.39	4,799
Individual-level exposure to wartime violence			
Direct and indirect exposure (index)	5.08	3.29	4,801
Direct exposure (index)	2.92	2.59	4,801
Indirect exposure (index)	2.16	1.36	4,801
Community-level exposure to wartime violence			
# of violent events (ACLED)	1.43	7.52	245
Any violent event (ACLED)	0.10	0.30	245
Distance from nearest violent event (ACLED)	16.73	13.97	245

Notes: Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables.

Table A.2: Perceptions of state

	Mean	S.D.	N
State is corrupt	0.61	0.49	4,368
State is biased	0.33	0.47	4,615
Non-state is corrupt	0.30	0.46	4,419
Non-state is biased	0.11	0.31	4,721
UN is corrupt	0.15	0.36	3,642
UN is biased	0.09	0.28	4,343

Notes: Descriptive statistics for perceptions of state and non-state authorities and UNMIL.

Table A.3: Control variables

	Mean	S.D.	N
Age	41.39	16.34	4,801
Male	0.48	0.50	4,801
Born in community	0.72	0.45	4,801
Local leader before civil war	0.19	0.39	4,800
Related to local leader before civil war	0.56	0.50	4,800
Unemployed before civil war	0.15	0.35	4,798
Owned land before civil war	0.81	0.40	4,797
Bassa tribe	0.01	0.09	4,798
Belle tribe	0.00	0.05	4,798
Fula tribe	0.00	0.03	4,798
Gbandi tribe	0.08	0.26	4,798
Gbei tribe	0.00	0.05	4,798
Gio tribe	0.17	0.38	4,798
Gola tribe	0.00	0.04	4,798
Grebo tribe	0.01	0.10	4,798
Kissi tribe	0.09	0.29	4,798
Kpelle tribe	0.04	0.19	4,798
Krahn tribe	0.18	0.39	4,798
Kru tribe	0.01	0.08	4,798
Lorma tribe	0.13	0.34	4,798
Mandingo tribe	0.06	0.24	4,798
Mano tribe	0.20	0.40	4,798
Mende tribe	0.01	0.11	4,798
Vai tribe	0.00	0.06	4,798
Other tribe	0.00	0.05	4,798

Notes: Descriptive statistics for control variables.

Table A.4: Individual-level exposure to wartime violence and reliance on state in hypothetical criminal cases disaggregating by type

	Rely on state	Rely on non-state	Rely on UN
Combatant (dummy)	0.070	-0.046	-0.024
	[0.029]**	[0.024]*	[0.019]
Victim or witness of sexual violence (dummy)	0.047	-0.064	0.017
	[0.020]**	[0.018]***	[0.014]
Witness of lethal violence (dummy)	0.025	-0.054	0.029
	[0.016]	[0.018]***	[0.014]**
Witness of non-lethal violence (dummy)	0.063	-0.035	-0.027
	[0.022]***	[0.019]*	[0.014]*
Observations	4,771	4,771	4,771
Controls	Y	Y	Y
Community FE	Y	Y	Y
District FE	N	N	N

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.5: Individual-level exposure to wartime violence and reliance on state in actual criminal cases disaggregating by type

	Reported crime to police	
	Conditional	Unconditional
Combatant (dummy)	0.133	0.051
	[0.044]***	[0.019]***
Victim or witness of sexual violence (dummy)	0.074	0.034
	[0.030]**	[0.010]***
Witness of lethal violence (dummy)	0.038	0.011
	[0.029]	[0.008]
Witness of non-lethal violence (dummy)	0.018	0.016
	[0.043]	[0.009]*
Observations	1,123	4,772
Controls	Y	Y
Community FE	Y	Y
District FE	N	N

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clus
community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.6: Community-level exposure to wartime violence and reliance on state in hypothetical criminal cases using fatalities

	Rely on state	Rely on non-state	Rely on UN
# of fatalities (ACLED)	0.001	-0.001	0.000
	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]
Observations	4,771	4,771	4,771
Controls	Y	Y	Y
Community FE	N	N	N
District FE	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.7: Community-level exposure to wartime violence and reliance on state in actual criminal cases using fatalities

	Reported crime to police	
	Conditional	Unconditional
# of fatalities (ACLED)	0.002	0.001
	[0.000]***	[0.000]***
Observations	1,123	4,772
Controls	Y	Y
Community FE	N	N
District FE	Y	Y

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.8: Community-level exposure to wartime violence and reliance on state in hypothetical criminal cases disaggregating by perpetrator

	Rely on state	Rely on non-state	Rely on UN
# of state attacks on civilians (ACLED)	0.001	0.009	-0.010
	[0.030]	[0.041]	[0.018]
# of rebel attacks on civilians (ACLED)	0.044	-0.056	0.012
	[0.045]	[0.061]	[0.026]
Any state attack on civilians (ACLED)	0.184	-0.177	-0.008
	[0.039]***	[0.049]***	[0.022]
Any rebel attack on civilians (ACLED)	0.026	-0.011	-0.015
	[0.038]	[0.048]	[0.023]
Proximity to nearest state attack on civilians (ACLED)	0.015	-0.015	0.000
	[0.008]*	[0.008]**	[0.004]
Proximity to nearest rebel attack on civilians (ACLED)	0.007	-0.008	0.001
	[0.010]	[0.010]	[0.005]
Observations	4,771	4,771	4,771
Controls	Y	Y	Y
Community FE	N	N	N
District FE	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.9: Community-level exposure to wartime violence and reliance on state in actual criminal cases disaggregating by perpetrator

	Reported crime to police	
	Conditional	Unconditional
# of state attacks on civilians (ACLED)	-0.100	-0.043
	[0.031]***	[0.025]*
# of rebel attacks on civilians (ACLED)	0.207	0.080
	[0.044]***	[0.038]**
Any state attack on civilians (ACLED)	0.099	0.068
	[0.079]	[0.028]**
Any rebel attack on civilians (ACLED)	0.158	0.043
	[0.082]*	[0.025]*
Proximity to nearest state attack on civilians (ACLED)	0.019	0.008
	[0.011]*	[0.003]***
Proximity to nearest rebel attack on civilians (ACLED)	0.023	0.008
	[0.010]**	[0.003]**
Observations	1,123	4,772
Controls	Y	Y
Community FE	N	N
District FE	Y	Y

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.10: Community-level exposure to wartime violence and reliance on state in hypothetical criminal cases using UCDP

	Rely on state	Rely on non-state	Rely on UN
# of violent events (UCDP)	0.028	-0.025	-0.003
	[0.005]***	[0.006]***	[0.002]
Any violent event (UCDP)	0.087	-0.068	-0.019
	[0.032]***	[0.032]**	[0.013]
Proximity to nearest violent event (UCDP)	0.027	-0.019	-0.009
	[0.013]**	[0.012]	[0.006]
Observations	4,771	4,771	4,771
Controls	Y	Y	Y
Community FE	N	N	N
District FE	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.11: Community-level exposure to wartime violence and reliance on state in actual criminal cases using UCDP

	Reported crime to police	
	Conditional	Unconditional
# of violent events (UCDP)	0.035	0.010
	[0.007]***	[0.004]***
Any violent event (UCDP)	0.094	0.028
	[0.036]**	[0.013]**
Proximity to nearest violent event (UCDP)	0.017	0.006
	[0.018]	[0.005]
Observations	1,123	4,772
Controls	Y	Y
Community FE	N	N
District FE	Y	Y

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Column 1 reports estimates conditional on being a victim of crime; column 2 reports unconditional estimates. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.12: Community-level exposure to wartime violence and reliance on state in actual criminal cases using local leaders survey and UCDP

	Any cases reported to police	Any cases reported to paramount chief
# of violent events (UCDP)	0.035	0.016
	[0.011]***	[0.012]
Any violent event (UCDP)	0.083	0.073
	[0.056]	[0.050]
Proximity to nearest violent event (UCDP)	0.055	0.021
	[0.022]**	[0.021]
Observations	932	933
Controls	Y	Y
Community FE	N	N
District FE	Y	Y

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.13: Community-level exposure to wartime violence and fear of civil war recurrence using UCDP

	Fears ex-generals
# of violent events (UCDP)	0.006
	[0.004]*
Any violent event (UCDP)	0.007
	[0.019]
Proximity to nearest violent event (UCDP)	-0.004
	[0.009]
Observations	4,771
Controls	Y
Community FE	N
District FE	Y

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.14: Individual-level exposure to wartime violence and reliance on state in hypothetical criminal cases in Lofa

	Rely on state	Rely on non-state	Rely on UN
Direct and indirect exposure (std. index)	0.036	-0.039	0.003
	[0.012]***	[0.012]***	[0.010]
Direct exposure (std. index)	0.027	-0.041	0.014
	[0.015]*	[0.014]***	[0.011]
Indirect exposure (std. index)	0.017	-0.001	-0.016
	[0.013]	[0.014]	[0.010]
Observations	1,886	1,886	1,886
Controls	Y	Y	Y
Community FE	Y	Y	Y
District FE	N	N	N

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.15: Individual-level exposure to wartime violence and reliance on state in hypothetical criminal cases in Nimba

	Rely on state	Rely on non-state	Rely on UN
Direct and indirect exposure (std. index)	0.038	-0.042	0.004
	[0.014]***	[0.012]***	[0.009]
Direct exposure (std. index)	0.045	-0.055	0.010
	[0.016]***	[0.015]***	[0.011]
Indirect exposure (std. index)	-0.000	0.006	-0.006
	[0.016]	[0.014]	[0.010]
Observations	1,936	1,936	1,936
Controls	Y	Y	Y
Community FE	Y	Y	Y
District FE	N	N	N

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.16: Individual-level exposure to wartime violence and reliance on state in hypothetical criminal cases in Grand Gedeh

	Rely on state	Rely on non-state	Rely on UN
Direct and indirect exposure (std. index)	0.038	-0.022	-0.016
	[0.023]	[0.022]	[0.012]
Direct exposure (std. index)	0.012	-0.008	-0.004
	[0.022]	[0.021]	[0.011]
Indirect exposure (std. index)	0.042	-0.022	-0.019
	[0.018]**	[0.018]	[0.013]
Observations	949	949	949
Controls	Y	Y	Y
Community FE	Y	Y	Y
District FE	N	N	N

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.17: Community-level exposure to wartime violence and reliance on state in hypothetical criminal cases in Lofa

	Rely on state	Rely on non-state	Rely on UN
# of violent events (ACLED)	0.004	-0.004	-0.000
	[0.001]***	[0.001]***	[0.000]
Any violent event (ACLED)	0.118	-0.073	-0.045
	[0.040]***	[0.042]*	[0.016]***
Proximity to nearest violent event (ACLED)	0.030	-0.016	-0.014
	[0.024]	[0.021]	[0.011]
Observations	1,886	1,886	1,886
Controls	Y	Y	Y
Community FE	N	N	N
District FE	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.18: Community-level exposure to wartime violence and reliance on state in hypothetical criminal cases in Nimba

	Rely on state	Rely on non-state	Rely on UN
# of violent events (ACLED)	0.011	-0.009	-0.002
	[0.002]***	[0.002]***	[0.001]*
Any violent event (ACLED)	0.233	-0.186	-0.047
	[0.036]***	[0.046]***	[0.022]**
Proximity to nearest violent event (ACLED)	0.054	-0.052	-0.001
	[0.013]***	[0.014]***	[0.009]
Observations	1,936	1,936	1,936
Controls	Y	Y	Y
Community FE	N	N	N
District FE	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.19: Community-level exposure to wartime violence and reliance on state in hypothetical criminal cases in Grand Gedeh

	Rely on state	Rely on non-state	Rely on UN
# of violent events (ACLED)	0.024	-0.017	-0.007
	[0.011]**	[0.010]	[0.003]***
Any violent event (ACLED)	0.202	-0.139	-0.063
	[0.064]***	[0.067]**	[0.020]***
Proximity to nearest violent event (ACLED)	0.021	-0.007	-0.013
	[0.022]	[0.020]	[0.007]*
Observations	949	949	949
Controls	Y	Y	Y
Community FE	N	N	N
District FE	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.20: Individual-level exposure to wartime violence and reliance on state in actual criminal cases in Lofa

	Reported crime to police	
	Conditional	Unconditional
Direct and indirect exposure (std. index)	0.084	0.015
	[0.024]***	[0.005]***
Direct exposure (std. index)	0.103	0.017
	[0.027]***	[0.005]***
Indirect exposure (std. index)	-0.030	-0.002
	[0.032]	[0.004]
Observations	316	1,886
Controls	Y	Y
Community FE	Y	Y
District FE	N	N

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.21: Individual-level exposure to wartime violence and reliance on state in actual criminal cases in Nimba

	Reported crime to police	
	Conditional	Unconditional
Direct and indirect exposure (std. index)	0.033	0.026
	[0.019]*	[0.007]***
Direct exposure (std. index)	0.033	0.024
	[0.022]	[0.009]***
Indirect exposure (std. index)	0.005	0.007
	[0.012]	[0.005]
Observations	648	1,937
Controls	Y	Y
Community FE	Y	Y
District FE	N	N

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.22: Individual-level exposure to wartime violence and reliance on state in actual criminal cases in Grand Gedeh

	Reported crime to police	
	Conditional	Unconditional
Direct and indirect exposure (std. index)	-0.004	0.019
	[0.062]	[0.013]
Direct exposure (std. index)	0.023	0.026
	[0.051]	[0.014]*
Indirect exposure (std. index)	-0.068	-0.008
	[0.043]	[0.006]
Observations	159	949
Controls	Y	Y
Community FE	Y	Y
District FE	N	N

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. $^{***}\ p < 0.01$, $^{**}\ p < 0.05$, $^{*}\ p < 0.1$.

Table A.23: Community-level exposure to wartime violence and reliance on state in actual criminal cases in Lofa

	Reported crime to police	
	Conditional	Unconditional
# of violent events (ACLED)	0.006	0.002
	[0.001]***	[0.001]***
Any violent event (ACLED)	0.160	0.045
	[0.056]***	[0.020]**
Proximity to nearest violent event (ACLED)	0.052	0.017
	[0.028]*	[0.008]**
Observations	316	1,886
Controls	Y	Y
Community FE	N	N
District FE	Y	Y

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.24: Community-level exposure to wartime violence and reliance on state in actual criminal cases in Nimba

	Reported crime to police	
	Conditional	Unconditional
# of violent events (ACLED)	0.003	0.001
	[0.004]	[0.001]
Any violent event (ACLED)	0.053	0.02
	[0.054]	[0.019]
Proximity to nearest violent event (ACLED)	0.042	0.016
	[0.016]***	[0.006]***
Observations	648	1,937
Controls	Y	Y
Community FE	N	N
District FE	Y	Y

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.25: Community-level exposure to wartime violence and reliance on state in actual criminal cases in Grand Gedeh

	Reported crime to police	
	Conditional	Unconditional
# of violent events (ACLED)	-0.010	-0.001
	[0.015]	[0.003]
Any violent event (ACLED)	-0.114	-0.015
	[0.097]	[0.018]
Proximity to nearest violent event (ACLED)	0.005	0.002
	[0.033]	[0.005]
Observations	159	949
Controls	Y	Y
Community FE	N	N
District FE	Y	Y

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.26: Individual-level exposure to wartime violence and political preferences

	Supports UP	Supports CDC	Supports no party
Direct and indirect exposure (std. index)	0.016	0.009	-0.034
	[0.009]*	[0.006]	[0.008]***
Direct exposure (std. index)	0.002	0.012	-0.032
	[0.009]	[0.006]*	[0.009]***
Indirect exposure (std. index)	0.021	-0.003	-0.007
	[0.009]**	[0.006]	[0.008]
Observations	4,767	4,767	4,767
Controls	Y	Y	Y
Community FE	Y	Y	Y
District FE	N	N	N

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. $^{***}\ p < 0.01$, $^{**}\ p < 0.05$, $^{*}\ p < 0.1$.

Table A.27: Community-level exposure to wartime violence and reliance on state in hypothetical criminal cases subsetting to respondents born in community

	Rely on state	Rely on non-state	Rely on UN
# of violent events (ACLED)	0.004	-0.004	0.000
	[0.001]***	[0.001]***	[0.001]
Any violent event (ACLED)	0.129	-0.081	-0.048
	[0.036]***	[0.035]**	[0.015]***
Proximity to nearest violent event (ACLED)	0.040	-0.032	-0.008
	[0.012]***	[0.011]***	[0.007]
Observations	3,417	3,417	3,417
Controls	Y	Y	Y
Community FE	N	N	N
District FE	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.28: Community-level exposure to wartime violence and reliance on state in actual criminal cases subsetting to respondents born in community

	Reported crime to police	
	Conditional	Unconditional
# of violent events (ACLED)	0.006	0.003
	[0.001]***	[0.001]***
Any violent event (ACLED)	0.108	0.032
	[0.050]**	[0.017]*
Proximity to nearest violent event (ACLED)	0.032	0.011
	[0.016]**	[0.005]**
Observations	784	3,417
Controls	Y	Y
Community FE	N	N
District FE	Y	Y

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.29: Community-level exposure to wartime violence and reliance on state in hypothetical criminal cases subsetting to respondents who were never displaced

	Rely on state	Rely on non-state	Rely on UN
# of violent events (ACLED)	0.003	-0.011	0.008
	[0.006]	[0.004]***	[0.004]*
Any violent event (ACLED)	0.138	-0.093	-0.045
	[0.077]*	[0.093]	[0.058]
Proximity to nearest violent event (ACLED)	0.065	-0.076	0.011
	[0.020]***	[0.018]***	[0.011]
Observations	755	755	755
Controls	Y	Y	Y
Community FE	N	N	N
District FE	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.30: Community-level exposure to wartime violence and reliance on state in actual criminal cases subsetting to respondents who were never displaced

	Reported crime to police	
	Conditional	Unconditional
# of violent events (ACLED)	0.025	0.006
	[0.017]	[0.005]
Any violent event (ACLED)	0.159	0.031
	[0.116]	[0.021]
Proximity to nearest violent event (ACLED)	0.095	0.029
	[0.028]***	[0.011]***
Observations	181	756
Controls	Y	Y
Community FE	N	N
District FE	Y	Y

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.31: Individual-level exposure to wartime violence and knowledge and proximity to the police subsetting to respondents born in community

	Knows location of nearest police station	Knows phone number of police officer	Distance to nearest police station (min.)
Direct and indirect exposure (std. index)	0.039	0.024	1.666
	[0.008]***	[0.007]***	[6.861]
Direct exposure (std. index)	0.036	0.016	2.082
	[0.008]***	[0.008]**	[8.443]
Indirect exposure (std. index)	0.009	0.014	-0.289
	[0.008]	[0.007]*	[7.491]
Observations	3,417	3,417	2,430
Controls	Y	Y	Y
Community FE	Y	Y	Y
District FE	N	N	N

Notes: Sample is restricted to respondents born in the same community where they were surveyed. Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Figure A.2: Individual-level exposure to wartime violence and reliance on state in hypothetical criminal cases using multinomial logit





Notes: Marginal effects from multinomial logit regressions with all controls held at their means. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors are clustered by community. Bars denote 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A.3: Individual-level exposure to wartime violence and reliance on state in hypothetical criminal cases using multinomial logit



Notes: Marginal effects from multinomial logit regressions with all controls held at their means. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors are clustered by community. Bars denote 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A.4: Community-level exposure to wartime violence and reliance on state in hypothetical criminal cases using multinomial logit



Notes: Marginal effects from multinomial logit regressions with all controls held at their means. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors are clustered by community. Bars denote 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A.5: Community-level exposure to wartime violence and reliance on state in hypothetical criminal cases using multinomial logit



Notes: Marginal effects from multinomial logit regressions with all controls held at their means. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors are clustered by community. Bars denote 95% confidence intervals.

Table A.32: Fear of civil war recurrence and reliance on state in hypothetical criminal cases

	Rely on state	Rely on non-state	Rely on UN
Fears ex-generals	-0.070	0.066	0.004
	[0.020]***	[0.021]***	[0.015]
Observations	4,771	4,771	4,771
Controls	Y	Y	Y
Community FE	Y	Y	Y
District FE	N	N	N

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.33: Fear of civil war recurrence and reliance on state in actual criminal cases

	Reported crime to police	
	Conditional	Unconditional
Fears ex-generals	0.012	0.017
	[0.027]	[0.008]**
Observations	1,123	4,771
Controls	Y	Y
Community FE	Y	Y
District FE	N	N

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.34: Community-level exposure to peacetime collective violence and reliance on state in hypothetical criminal cases

	Rely on state	Rely on non-state	Rely on UN
Any peacetime collective violence	0.080	-0.059	-0.022
	[0.031]***	[0.030]**	[0.017]
Observations	4,493	4,493	4,493
Controls	Y	Y	Y
Community FE	N	N	N
District FE	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.35: Community-level exposure to peacetime collective violence and reliance on state in actual criminal cases

	Reported crime to police	
	Conditional	Unconditional
Any peacetime collective violence	0.124	0.030
	[0.040]***	[0.015]**
Observations	1,073	4,494
Controls	Y	Y
Community FE	N	N
District FE	Y	Y

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of sampling. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.