Supplementary materials for "Foreign Aid and Soft Power: Great Power Competition in Africa in the Early 21st Century"

A Maps and descriptive statistics

Figure A.1 plots the locations of Afrobarometer respondents and Chinese, US, and UK aid projects across all African countries for which data is available. Figure A.2 tabulates the number of Chinese projects in each country in the Afrobarometer dataset for which AidData data is available. Figure A.3 tabulates the number of Chinese, US, and UK projects in each country in the Afrobarometer dataset for which AidData and AIMS data are both available. Table A.1 reports descriptive statistics for Afrobaromater respondents' exposure to aid. Table A.2 reports descriptive statistics for Afrobaromater respondents' perceptions and beliefs. Table A.3 reports descriptive statistics for the control variables used in our analysis.

B Coding rules

Our analysis relies on AidData to operationalize exposure to Chinese aid. Unfortunately, the AidData dataset is missing precise temporal and/or geographic information for many Chinese projects. Our goal in addressing missingness is to maximize statistical power while minimizing ambiguities that might confound our results. With this goal in mind, we exclude projects for which there is no precise geographic information within 25km of a known location (AidData precision code 1 or 2). Because we are interested in the effects of Chinese projects on citizens who live near them, we also exclude projects that provide only general administrative or budgetary support to the recipient government.

We then code whether each Afrobarometer respondent lives within 30km of a planned (future) or completed Chinese project. AidData includes a scheduled and actual start and end year for most projects, as well as the year that an agreement was signed for all projects. AidData also includes the status of each project: planned, active, or completed. The year the status refers to, though, is ambiguous. Consequently, we primarily rely on the agreement

year and project start and end dates to determine status. For projects with both scheduled and actual start years, the actual start year occurs 0.76 years on average after the scheduled start year. For projects with both scheduled and actual end years, the actual end year occurs one year on average after the scheduled end year. We rely on actual start and end years whenever possible. When either the actual start year or actual end year is unavailable, we rely on the scheduled start or end year instead, but add one year to reflect the fact that most projects both start and end roughly one year behind schedule.

We code respondents as living near a planned project if they were surveyed anytime before the agreement year of any project within a 30km radius. We code respondents as living near a completed project if they were surveyed anytime after or during the end year. Some projects are missing both a scheduled and actual start year. In these cases, if the survey was conducted after the agreement year, we cannot tell whether the project was planned or completed by the time of the survey; we drop these respondents from the analysis. Some projects are also missing both a scheduled and actual end year. In these cases we code respondents as living near a completed project if the status is completed and the survey was conducted in 2014 or after, the last year AidData is available. (If the status is completed but the survey was conducted before 2014, we cannot tell by which round the project was completed.)

For our analyses that rely on Afrobarometer round 6, we cannot depend on start and end dates or status alone: Afrobarometer round 6 was conducted in 2014 and 2015, but AidData only includes projects up to 2014. It is possible that some projects that were in the planning phase in 2014 began or were completed by the time Afrobarometer round 6 was implemented. In these cases, we assume that projects were still in the planning phase at the time of the survey if AidData classified them as "pipeline" in 2014 (i.e. pledged but not yet implemented) *and* if the pledge year was 2010 or after. We assume that if the pledge year was before 2010, then project implementation likely had already begun by the time of the survey.

Our results using Afrobarometer round 6 are robust to alternate cut-off years, as we show in Appendix F below. We also show in Appendix G that our conclusions about the effects of Chinese aid on perceptions of China and the US are unchanged if we use data from Afrobarometer round 4 instead. Round 4 includes fewer questions on perceptions of China and the US, but was conducted in 2008, before the last year of the AidData panel. This allows us to avoid inferring the future status of planned projects. Importantly, we also avoid inferring the future status of planned projects in our analysis of the effects of Chinese aid on liberal democratic values. Since questions on liberal democratic values are available for rounds 2 through 5 of the Afrobarometer survey, we avoid any ambiguity by simply excluding round 6 from our analysis.

To operationalize exposure to US aid, we use data from the Aid Information Management Systems (AIMS) of the finance and planning ministries of the six African countries for which such data is available, and which were also surveyed by Afrobarometer: Burundi, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Uganda. As with our analysis of Chinese aid, we exclude projects that lack precise geographic information, as well as those that are classified as completed but that do not have corresponding start or end dates. We discuss the potential implications of these coding rules for our analysis in Appendix C below.

C Missing data

Our coding rules introduce additional missingness into the AidData and AIMS datasets. In Tables A.4 and A.5 we explore the potential consequences of this missingness by comparing the subset of projects in our sample to all projects in the AidData and AIMS datasets by sector. If the distribution of projects by sector changes after we apply our coding rules, that would suggest that we are disproportionately excluding certain types of projects, which may, in turn, cause us to over- or underestimate the impact of Chinese and/or US aid. But this does not appear to be the case. From Table A.4, the proportions of Chinese projects in

each sector are similar in the two versions of the dataset. From Table A.5, the proportions of US projects in each sector are similar as well. While not definitive,[1] we interpret these similarities as evidence that our coding rules do not dramatically change the distribution of projects in the AidData or AIMS datasets.

D Planned projects as counterfactuals for completed ones

Our identification strategy involves comparing respondents who live within 30km of a completed Chinese or US project to those who live within 30km of a planned (future) project. This identification strategy assumes that planned projects are valid counterfactuals for completed ones, and that respondents who live near planned projects are therefore valid counterfactuals for respondents who live near completed ones. This assumption may be violated if donors or recipient governments complete the highest priority projects first. To explore this possibility, Tables A.6 and A.7 compare the distribution of planned Chinese and US projects across sectors to the distribution of completed Chinese and US projects. If the distributions are different, this would suggest that certain types of projects are being completed before others.

In general, this does not appear to be the case. From Table A.6, among the sectors that comprise more than 1% of the total, there are slightly more completed Chinese projects in the education, government and civil society, and health sectors, and slightly more planned Chinese projects in the communications and transport and storage sectors. But the differences are small. The differences are somewhat more marked for US projects in Table A.7, though, with the exception of agriculture, forestry, and fishing, they remain small. Moreover, the most common sectors represented among completed projects—agriculture, government,

[1]There are some projects that lack geographic, temporal, *and* sectoral data. For obvious reasons we cannot include these projects in our comparisons. We suspect that these projects are likely to be relatively small scale (which would explain the absence of information about them), though we cannot be sure.

and health—are also the most common among planned projects. Again, while not definitive, we interpret these similarities as evidence in favor of our identifying assumption.

E Attribution of Chinese-funded projects to China

In our theoretical framework, the causal chain linking foreign aid to perceptions of donors begins with attribution: citizens of recipient countries must accurately attribute donor-funded projects to the donor that funded them. Unfortunately, Afrobarometer does not include questions on attribution. To explore the plausibility of this first link in the causal chain, we instead use original household survey data from an unrelated project in Liberia (Blair and Roessler 2021), one of the world's most aid-dependent countries.

The survey was administered to a random sample of 18 respondents in each of 38 rural towns and villages throughout three counties: Bong, Lofa, and Nimba. We focused on these counties because they have been priorities for both economic development and state consolidation since the end of the Liberian civil war in 2003. They also host a large number Chinese-funded projects. While these 38 communities are not representative of Liberia, comparison to a nationally representative survey from 2011 (Vinck, Pham and Kreutzer 2011) suggests that they do not differ dramatically from the average Liberian town or village, either in these three counties or in the country as a whole.[2]

The survey contains a battery of questions designed to measure prior exposure to Chinese aid, including whether respondents (1) could name or (2) had used any Chinese-provided services, and also whether (3) they or (4) any of their friends or family members had worked for a Chinese-funded contractor. We merge respondents' answers to these questions with AidData data on the locations of planned and completed Chinese projects in Liberia. Intuitively, if citizens accurately attribute donor-funded projects to the donor that funded them,

[2]For example, the average age of respondents in our sample is 38 years, compared to 37 nationwide. 86% of our respondents are Christian, compared to 86% nationwide. 30% of our sample has no education, compared to 35% nationwide. 61% of our respondents work in agriculture, compared to 43% nationwide, but compared to 72% in Bong, 73% in Lofa, and 60% in Nimba, the three counties covered in our survey.

then we should expect to observe a positive correlation between respondents' proximity to the nearest completed Chinese project in AidData and their self-reported exposure to Chinese services and contractors in the survey, either as consumers or as labor. (Unfortunately we do not have data on US aid in Liberia, and so cannot replicate this exercise for the US.)

Table A.8 tests this proposition. The dependent variable in the first column is an additive index of four dummies capturing four different types of exposure to Chinese projects; the dependent variables in the remaining columns are two dummies disaggregating exposure into users of Chinese-provided services and workers for Chinese-funded contractors. While this analysis is not causally identified, we mitigate potential confounding by including a variety of individual-[3] and community-level controls.[4] Because none of the communities in our sample is located within 30km of a planned Chinese project, we use continuous measures of proximity rather than binary ones. We measure proximity in units of 10km, with larger values indicating closer proximity. Standard errors are clustered by community.

Consistent with our intuitions, we find a strong positive correlation between self-reported exposure to Chinese projects in the survey and proximity to the nearest completed Chinese project in AidData. Equally important, we find that the correlation between self-reported exposure to Chinese projects in the survey and proximity to the nearest *planned* Chinese project in AidData is null or even negative. While not conclusive, taken together, these results help lend credence to the first crucial link in the causal chain described in the paper. They also help substantiate our assumption that planned projects are unlikely to have anticipation effects, since citizens of recipient countries are unlikely to know about them.

[3] We control for age, gender, and religion at the individual level. These controls are either fixed over time or are extremely unlikely to be affected by exposure to Chinese aid.

[4] At the community level we control for number of households in the community, dummies indicating whether there are any schools or health clinics in the community, a dummy indicating whether the community is accessible by road in the rainy season, and an estimate for the proportion of residents of each community that were disabled during the Liberian civil war. These controls are gleaned from a 2004 Rapid Needs Assessment conducted by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

F Effects of Chinese aid on perceptions of China and the US, using alternate cut-off years

Our analyses in Figures 1 and 3 of the paper rely on round 6 of the Afrobarometer survey, which was conducted in 2014 and 2015. As discussed in Appendix B, this requires inferring the future status of projects that were still in the planning phase as of 2014, the last year AidData is available. As a robustness check, Figures A.4 and A.5 replicate Figures 1 and 3, respectively, using 2008 as the cutoff year. Figures A.6 and A.7 replicate Figures 1 and 3, respectively, using 2009 as the cutoff year. (Ideally we could test robustness to later cut-off years, but unfortunately this would leave us with too few planned projects to estimate off of.) Our results are similar or identical to those in the paper, suggesting that they are unlikely to be artifacts of this particular coding rule.

G Effects of Chinese and US aid on perceptions of China and the US, using round 4 Afrobarometer data

As a second robustness check, in Figure A.8 we test the effects of Chinese aid on perceptions of China and the US using questions from round 4 of the Afrobarometer survey. Because this survey was conducted in 2008, it allows us to avoid inferring the future status of planned Chinese projects in the latter years of the AidData panel. (Unfortunately we cannot include US projects in this analysis, as the AIMS dataset only begins in 2008, leaving us with too few projects to estimate off of.) Round 4 respondents were asked how much they believe different countries do to help their own country. To operationalize support for China, we code a 1 for respondents who said they believe China helps "somewhat" or "a lot." We operationalize support for the US in the same way. Consistent with our results in the paper,

we find that Chinese aid has a net positive effect on perceptions of the US. Chinese aid does not appear to affect perceptions of China in this smaller, earlier sample.

H Effects of Chinese and US aid on liberal democratic values, disaggregating index

In the paper we test the effects of Chinese and US aid on an additive index of liberal democratic values derived from five questions in the Afrobarometer survey. The index captures respondents' dichotomized answers to questions about the desirability of competition between multiple political parties, a free and open civil society, democracy in general, and "regular, open, and honest" elections. In Figure A.9 we disaggregate this index into its component parts. We find that the weakly positive net effect of Chinese aid on liberal democratic values in the full sample is driven in particular by a belief in the desirability of competition between multiple political parties. We also find that the strongly positive net effect of US aid on liberal democratic values in the full sample is consistent across all five proxies, but is especially strong for the belief that democracy is the best system, and that elections are good.

I Effects of Chinese and US aid on liberal democratic values, using only planned projects we know were completed

As discussed in the paper and in Section D above, some planned projects are never completed. If planned projects that are never completed differ systematically from those that are, then respondents who live near planned projects may not be valid counterfactuals for those who live near completed ones. In Section D above we explore this possibility by comparing

the distribution of planned and completed Chinese and US projects by sector. As a more stringent robustness check, in Figure A.10 we replicate our analysis in Figure 2 using only planned projects that we know for certain were eventually completed.

Using start and end dates (where available) in the AidData dataset, we were able to confirm that at least 54% of all planned Chinese-funded projects in our analysis were eventually completed. (It is likely that some if not most of the remaining planned projects were eventually completed as well, but we cannot be sure, as these projects lack an end date.) We subset AidData to include only these projects. Because we cannot use end dates to identify planned projects that were completed by round 6 of the Afrobarometer survey (for reasons discussed in Section B above), we are only able to replicate Figure 2 using this approach. With these caveats in mind, our results in Figure A.10 are similar to those in Figure 2, suggesting they are unlikely to be artifacts of planned projects that were never completed.

J Effects of Chinese and US aid on liberal democratic values, using first administrative level fixed effects

In the paper we use country fixed effects in all models, and country and Afrobarometer round fixed effects when estimating models with more than one round of Afrobarometer data. While our spatial difference-and-differences estimator should help eliminate unobserved sources of selection, as a robustness check, in Figure A.11 we replicate our analysis in Figure 2 using fixed effects for the first administrative level.[5] Due to problems of multicollinearity in the cross-section,[6] using first administrative level fixed effects requires a panel, and we are only

[5]The first administrative level differs by country, and refers to whatever level the Database of Global Administrative Area (GADM) defines as "ADM1." For example, the first administrative level refers to provinces in Algeria, departments in Benin, districts in Botswana, etc.

[6]Some ADM1 have very few respondents in them. This creates problems of multicollinearity when multiple respondents in a single ADM1 all live within the same radius of the nearest planned or completed project, or when they happen to give identical answers to certain Afrobarometer questions. This problem is less severe when we use a panel.

able to replicate Figure 2 using this approach. With this caveat in mind, our results in Figure A.11 are similar to those in Figure 2, suggesting they are unlikely to be artifacts of our use of country (rather than first administrative level) fixed effects.

K Effects of Chinese and US aid, varying bandwidth

In the paper we operationalize exposure to Chinese and US aid by coding whether each Afrobarometer respondent lives within 30km of a Chinese- or US-funded project. Narrower or wider bandwidths are of course possible, but are potentially problematic. Because we only have precise geographic information for projects within 25km of a known location (AidData precision code 1 or 2), at narrower bandwidths we cannot be sure that the respondent actually lives within the specified radius of a donor-funded project. (Narrower bandwidths also reduce statistical power.) At wider bandwidths, it becomes less likely that the respondent will actually be exposed to donor-funded projects within the specified radius.

Nonetheless, conducting our analysis within a particular bandwidth raises the possibility of a modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP). If our results change dramatically and discontinuously as the bandwidth expands or contracts, this would suggest the presence of a MAUP. As a robustness check, in Figures A.12, A.13, and A.14, respectively, we test the sensitivity of our results in Figures 1, 2, and 3 to wider and narrower bandwidths. While the magnitude of the difference-in-difference inevitably varies as the bandwidth changes, we do not observe the sorts of discontinuities we would expect in the presence of a MAUP. (The only partial exception appears to be the coefficient on planned Chinese projects in our analysis of respondents' belief that the Chinese model is best, in the fifth panel of Figure A.12. But this is an exception.)

L Effects of Chinese and US aid, including additional controls

In order to avoid post-treatment bias, in the paper we only include controls that are either fixed over time or very unlikely to be affected by exposure to aid. As a robustness check, in Figures A.15, A.16, and A.17, respectively, we replicate Figures 1, 2, and 3 including additional controls from the Afrobarometer survey. These controls may reduce the risk of residual selection bias in the spatial difference-and-differences estimator, but may increase the risk of post-treatment bias. We include controls for poverty (an index capturing the frequency with which respondents have gone without enough food to eat in the past year), employment (a dummy for respondents who are employed), education (a dummy for respondents with any formal schooling), and civil society group membership (a dummy for respondents who are active members or official leaders in any group). In addition, for models using Afrobarometer round 6 data only, we also include connectivity (an index capturing the frequency with which respondents use a cell phone or the internet) and asset ownership (an index of assets including radios, televisions, vehicles, and cell phones).[7] Our results are similar to those in the paper.

M Effects of Chinese and US aid, including spatial lag of dependent variable

In the paper we assume there are no spatial dependencies in the distribution of our dependent variables. This assumption may be violated if, for example, residents of nearby villages tell each other about their positive or negative experiences with services funded by particular donors. To address this possibility, Tables A.9, A.10, and A.11, respectively, replicate Figures

[7] Questions about connectivity were only asked in round 6. Questions about asset ownership were asked beginning in round 3, and are not available for round 2—the first round in our analysis of liberal democratic values.

1, 2, and 3 including a spatial lag of the corresponding dependent variable. We also report the p-value on the Moran's I for each panel of each table. We uniformly fail to reject the null hypothesis that the data is randomly distributed, suggesting that any spatial autocorrelation is minor, and that no correction is needed. We include a spatial lag of the dependent variable as a precaution. The results are similar to those in the paper.

N Effects of US and UK aid on liberal democratic values

In Figure 2 of the paper we find that US aid induces greater alignment with the liberal democratic values more typically associated with the US than with China. Is this effect specific to situations in which the US competes with a geopolitical rival? Or does US aid have similar effects on support for liberal democratic values when it is delivered alongside aid by a geopolitical ally? In Figure A.18 we address this question using a specification identical to the one in Figure 2, but substituting AidData data on the locations of Chinese projects for AIMS data on the locations of British projects. By necessity these analyses focus exclusively on the six countries for which Afrobarometer and AIMS data are both available. Consistent with our results in the paper, we find that US aid again has a positive net effect on liberal democratic values, though the magnitude of the effect is smaller. UK aid appears to have a null net effect on liberal democratic values, though this may be an artifact of the relatively small number of planned UK-funded projects in the AIMS dataset.

O Effects of Chinese aid on perceptions of China and the US, disaggregating by sector

Across African countries, a plurality of Afrobarometer respondents (30%) cite China's investment in infrastructure as the most important factor contributing to positive images of

China. As we show in Figure 4, however, this enthusiasm is more muted among respondents who are more directly affected by Chinese aid. Exposure to Chinese-funded projects appears to diminish the appeal of what is otherwise the most attractive feature of China's aid regime. To explore this possibility further, in Figure A.19 we distinguish Chinese-funded infrastructure projects[8] from Chinese-funded projects in all other sectors.[9] Our specification is otherwise identical to the left panel of Figure 1 in the paper. (Unfortunately we do not have enough AIMS data to disaggregate US aid in this way.)

Our results suggest that the effects of Chinese aid on the perceptions of beneficiaries is most pronounced for infrastructure projects. Infrastructure projects tend to be sited in locations where respondents are more likely to describe Chinese influence as positive, and more likely to believe the Chinese model of development is best. Respondents in these locations are also less likely believe the US model of development is best. All of these correlations are attenuated or reversed after project completion, resulting in a net negative effect on perceptions of China, and a net positive effect on perceptions of the US. While this analysis requires stretching AidData rather thin, and should therefore be interpreted with some caution, our results are consistent with Figure 4, and suggest that China's focus on infrastructure may have the unintended adverse effect of alienating beneficiaries.

P Results and effect sizes in table form

Tables A.12 through A.19 replicate the results in the paper in table form. Table A.20 reports the difference-in-difference effect sizes from Tables A.12 through A.19 as point and percentage changes in the mean of the dependent variable.

[8]These include projects classified as belonging to any one of the following sectors: communications; energy generation and supply; industry, mining, and construction; transport and storage; or water supply and sanitation.

[9]These include projects classified as health; population policies/programmes and reproductive health; education; agriculture, forestry, and fishing; emergency response; government and civil society; other multi-sector; and other social infrastructure and services.

Figure A.1: Map of Afrobarometer respondents and Chinese, US, and UK aid projects



Figure A.2: Distribution of Chinese aid projects by country, full sample

ISO	N planned Chinese projects	N completed Chinese projects
ALG	0	8
BDI	0	440
BEN	332	16
BFO	28	0
BOT	756	199
CAM	0	8
CDI	106	0
CVE	492	294
EGY	46	111
ETH	0	0
GAB	88	0
GHA	865	381
GUI	16	56
KEN	1781	502
LES	412	249
LIB	72	63
MAD	50	64
MAR	34	453
MAU	0	0
MLI	635	8
MOZ	253	95
MWI	1126	611
NAM	319	472
NGR	0	0
NIG	1193	255
SAF	728	431
SEN	728	40
SRL	72	426
STP	0	0
SUD	10	194
SWZ	0	0
TOG	0	255
TUN	149	561
TZA	1130	1168
UGA	1946	112
ZAM	651	102
ZIM	190	80

Figure A.3: Distribution of Chinese, US, and UK aid projects by country, restricted sample

ISO	N planned Chinese projects	N completed Chinese projects	N planned US projects	N completed US projects	N planned UK projects	N completed UK projects
BDI	0	424	0	616	0	112
MWI	367	470	364	2169	1225	2802
NIG	1193	255	0	0	56	40
SEN	728	40	582	0	0	0
SRL	32	362	0	331	16	670
UGA	1140	8	2319	193	0	0

Table A.1: Exposure to aid

	N	Mean
Full Sample		
% of respondents within 30km of a planned Chinese project	136,193	0.1
% of respondents within 30km of a completed Chinese project	136,193	0.06
Restricted Sample		
% of respondents within 30km of a planned Chinese project	25,706	0.13
% of respondents within 30km of a completed Chinese project	25,706	0.06
% of respondents within 30km of a planned US project	25,706	0.13
% of respondents within 30km of a completed US project	25,706	0.13
% of respondents within 30km of a planned UK project	25,706	0.05
% of respondents within 30km of a completed UK project	25,706	0.14

Table A.2: Perceptions and beliefs

	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max	First round available	Last round available
Perceptions of Former Colonial Powers							
Believes former colonial power is most influential	38,167	0.22	0.42	0	1	6	6
Believes former colonial power is best model	38,164	0.13	0.34	0	1	6	6
Factors Contributing to Positive Image of China							
Chinese people and culture	38,179	0.02	0.14	0	1	6	6
Chinese business investment	38,179	0.16	0.37	0	1	6	6
Chinese infrastructure investment	38,179	0.26	0.44	0	1	6	6
Chinese policy of non-interference	38,179	0.04	0.2	0	1	6	6
Chinese support in international affairs	38,179	0.06	0.24	0	1	6	6
Cost of Chinese products	38,179	0.23	0.42	0	1	6	6
Factors Contributing to Negative Image of China							
Chinese cooperation w/ undemocratic leaders	38,179	0.04	0.19	0	1	6	6
Behavior of Chinese citizens	38,179	0.05	0.23	0	1	6	6
Chinese extraction of natural resources	38,179	0.1	0.29	0	1	6	6
Chinese firms taking local jobs and businesses	38,179	0.13	0.34	0	1	6	6
Chinese land grabbing	38,179	0.07	0.25	0	1	6	6
Quality of Chinese products	38,179	0.34	0.47	0	1	6	6
Perceptions of China and US							
Believes China is influential (Index)	31,113	1.08	0.65	0	2	6	6
Believes Chinese presence is positive (index)	28,732	1.67	0.95	0	3	6	6
Believes Chinese model is most influential	38,167	0.25	0.43	0	1	6	6
Believes US model is most influential	38,167	0.23	0.42	0	1	6	6
Believes Chinese model is best	38,164	0.24	0.43	0	1	6	6
Believes US model is best	38,164	0.3	0.46	0	1	6	6
Liberal Democratic Values							
Liberal democratic values (index)	59,283	3.74	1.15	0	5	3	5
Believes multiple parties are good	70,280	0.79	0.41	0	1	3	5
Believes multiple parties create choice	92,674	0.64	0.48	0	1	2	5
Believes citizens should join any CSO	71,541	0.66	0.47	0	1	3	5
Believes democracy is best system	88,678	0.74	0.44	0	1	2	5
Believes elections are good	94,334	0.83	0.37	0	1	2	5

Table A.3: Control variables

	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max	First round available	Last round available
Age	136,193	37.18	14.75	18	130	2	6
Muslim	136,193	0.23	0.42	0	1	2	6
Urban	136,193	0.31	0.46	0	1	2	6
Male	136,193	0.5	0.5	0	1	2	6
Distance to capital (km)	136,193	340.26	297.33	0	1885.55	2	6
Lives in leader's home region	136,193	0.1	0.29	0	1	2	6
Avg. annual riots & protests	136,193	0.09	0.46	0	11.86	2	6

Table A.4: Comparison of Chinese projects in full sample and our sample by sector

	N		Proportion	
	All	Sample	All	Sample
Action Relating to Debt	6	5	0.003	0.005
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing	72	49	0.04	0.047
Banking and Financial Services	4	4	0.002	0.004
Business and Other Services	4	2	0.002	0.002
Communications	264	138	0.148	0.133
Education	161	116	0.09	0.112
Emergency Response	22	10	0.012	0.01
Energy Generation and Supply	139	50	0.078	0.048
Food Security Assistance	5	4	0.003	0.004
Government and Civil Society	174	129	0.098	0.124
Health	180	123	0.101	0.118
Industry, Mining, Construction	40	20	0.022	0.019
Other	105	53	0.059	0.051
Reproductive Health	13	12	0.007	0.012
Social Services	124	86	0.07	0.083
Support to NGOs	1	1	0.001	0.001
Trade and Tourism	24	20	0.013	0.019
Transport and Storage	358	158	0.201	0.152
Water Supply and Sanitation	79	54	0.044	0.052
Women in Development	7	4	0.004	0.004
Total	1782	1038	1	1

Table A.5: Comparison of US projects in full sample and our sample by sector

	N		Proportion	
	All	Sample	All	Sample
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing	218	109	0.209	0.252
Banking/Financial Services	14	0	0.013	0
Bio-Diversity	11	2	0.011	0.005
Education	33	4	0.032	0.009
Emergency Response	2	1	0.002	0.002
Environmental Policy	15	0	0.014	0
Food Aid	14	0	0.013	0
Government and Civil Society	150	76	0.144	0.176
Health	481	205	0.46	0.475
Industrial Development	1	0	0.001	0
Multisector Aid	12	0	0.011	0
Other	24	0	0.023	0
Reproductive Health	57	31	0.055	0.072
Social Services	10	3	0.01	0.007
Women in Development	3	1	0.003	0.002
Total	1045	432	1	1

Table A.6: Comparison of completed and planned Chinese projects by sector

	N		Proportion	
	Completed	Planned	Completed	Planned
Action Relating to Debt	5	2	0.008	0.002
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing	33	30	0.053	0.037
Banking and Financial Services	2	3	0.003	0.004
Business and Other Services	2	2	0.003	0.002
Communications	63	123	0.102	0.152
Education	90	91	0.145	0.112
Emergency Response	5	7	0.008	0.009
Energy Generation and Supply	33	28	0.053	0.035
Food Security Assistance	4	2	0.006	0.002
Government and Civil Society	90	89	0.145	0.11
Health	90	95	0.145	0.117
Industry, Mining, Construction	7	19	0.011	0.023
Other	6	50	0.01	0.062
Reproductive Health	10	6	0.016	0.007
Social Services	54	69	0.087	0.085
Support to NGOs	0	1	0	0.001
Trade and Tourism	17	15	0.027	0.019
Transport and Storage	75	138	0.121	0.171
Water Supply and Sanitation	29	37	0.047	0.046
Women in Development	4	2	0.006	0.002
Total	619	809	1	1

Table A.7: Comparison of completed and planned US projects by sector

	N		Proportion	
	Completed	Planned	Completed	Planned
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing	28	81	0.102	0.224
Bio-Diversity	2	2	0.007	0.006
Education	4	2	0.015	0.006
Emergency Response	1	0	0.004	0
Government and Civil Society	73	69	0.265	0.191
Health	133	200	0.484	0.552
Reproductive Health	31	5	0.113	0.014
Social Services	2	3	0.007	0.008
Women in Development	1	0	0.004	0
Total	275	362	1	1

Table A.8: Correlation between survey- and AidData-based proxies for Chinese aid in rural Liberia

	Index of exposure to Chinese projects	User of Chinese projects	Worker for Chinese contractors
Proximity to completed Chinese projects	0.09	0.03	0.02
	(0.03)***	(0.01)**	(0.01)**
Proximity to planned Chinese projects	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Completed vs. planned p-value	0.021	0.075	0.041
Observations	685	685	685
Individual-level controls	Y	Y	Y
Community-level controls	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Correlation between self-reported exposure to Chinese aid in rural Liberia and proximity to the nearest Chinese project recorded by AidData, measured in units of 10km. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Figure A.4: Effects of Chinese and US aid on perceptions of China and the US, using 2008 as cutoff year



Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from OLS regression using data from round 6 of the Afrobarometer survey. The left panel displays results for the 38 countries for which Afrobarometer data is available. The right panel displays results for the six countries for which Afrobarometer and AIMS data are available. Standard errors are clustered by community.

Figure A.5: Effects of Chinese and US aid on perceptions of former colonial powers, using 2008 as cutoff year



Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from OLS regression using data from round 6 of the Afrobarometer survey. The left panel displays results for the 38 countries for which Afrobarometer data is available. The right panel displays results for the six countries for which Afrobarometer and AIMS data are available. Standard errors are clustered by community.

Figure A.6: Effects of Chinese and US aid on perceptions of China and the US, using 2009 as cutoff year



Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from OLS regression using data from round 6 of the Afrobarometer survey. The left panel displays results for the 38 countries for which Afrobarometer data is available. The right panel displays results for the six countries for which Afrobarometer and AIMS data are available. Standard errors are clustered by community.

Figure A.7: Effects of Chinese and US aid on perceptions of former colonial powers, using 2009 as cutoff year



Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from OLS regression using data from round 6 of the Afrobarometer survey. The left panel displays results for the 38 countries for which Afrobarometer data is available. The right panel displays results for the six countries for which Afrobarometer and AIMS data are available. Standard errors are clustered by community.

Figure A.8: Effects of Chinese aid on perceptions of China and the US, using round 4 only



Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from OLS regression using data from round 4 of the Afrobarometer survey. The left panel displays results for the 38 countries for which Afrobarometer data is available. The right panel displays results for the six countries for which Afrobarometer and AIMS data are available. Standard errors are clustered by community.

Figure A.9: Effects of Chinese and US aid on liberal democratic values, disaggregating index



Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from OLS regression using data from rounds 2-5 of the Afrobarometer survey. The left panel displays results for the 38 countries for which Afrobarometer data is available. The right panel displays results for the six countries for which Afrobarometer and AIMS data are available. Standard errors are clustered by community.

Figure A.10: Effects of Chinese and US aid on liberal democratic values, using only planned projects that we know were completed



Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from OLS regression using data from rounds 2-5 of the Afrobarometer survey. The left panel displays results for the 38 countries for which Afrobarometer data is available. The right panel displays results for the six countries for which Afrobarometer and AIMS data are available. Standard errors are clustered by community.

Figure A.11: Effects of Chinese and US aid on liberal democratic values, using first administrative level fixed effects



Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from OLS regression using data from rounds 2-5 of the Afrobarometer survey. The left panel displays results for the 38 countries for which Afrobarometer data is available. The right panel displays results for the six countries for which Afrobarometer and AIMS data are available. Standard errors are clustered by community.

Figure A.12: Effects of Chinese and US aid on perceptions of China and the US, varying bandwidth



Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from OLS regression using data from round 6 of the Afrobarometer survey. The left panel displays results for the 38 countries for which Afrobarometer data is available. The right panel displays results for the six countries for which Afrobarometer and AIMS data are available. Standard errors are clustered by community.

Figure A.13: Effects of Chinese and US aid on liberal democratic values, varying bandwidth



Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from OLS regression using data from rounds 2-5 of the Afrobarometer survey. The left panel displays results for the 38 countries for which Afrobarometer data is available. The right panel displays results for the six countries for which Afrobarometer and AIMS data are available. Standard errors are clustered by community.

Figure A.14: Effects of Chinese and US aid on perceptions of former colonial powers, varying bandwidth



Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from OLS regression using data from round 6 of the Afrobarometer survey. The left panel displays results for the 38 countries for which Afrobarometer data is available. The right panel displays results for the six countries for which Afrobarometer and AIMS data are available. Standard errors are clustered by community.

Figure A.15: Effects of Chinese and US aid on perceptions of China and the US, including additional controls



Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from OLS regression using data from round 6 of the Afrobarometer survey. The left panel displays results for the 38 countries for which Afrobarometer data is available. The right panel displays results for the six countries for which Afrobarometer and AIMS data are available. Standard errors are clustered by community.

Figure A.16: Effects of Chinese and US aid on liberal democratic values, including additional controls



Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from OLS regression using data from rounds 2-5 of the Afrobarometer survey. The left panel displays results for the 38 countries for which Afrobarometer data is available. The right panel displays results for the six countries for which Afrobarometer and AIMS data are available. Standard errors are clustered by community.

Figure A.17: Effects of Chinese and US aid on perceptions of former colonial powers, including additional controls



Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from OLS regression using data from round 6 of the Afrobarometer survey. The left panel displays results for the 38 countries for which Afrobarometer data is available. The right panel displays results for the six countries for which Afrobarometer and AIMS data are available. Standard errors are clustered by community.

Table A.9: Effects of Chinese and US aid on perceptions of China and the US, including spatial lag of dependent variable

	Believes Chinese presence is positive (index)	Believes Chinese model is best	Believes US model is best
Full sample			
Near completed Chinese project	-0.05	0.004	0.004
	(0.02)**	(0.01)	(0.01)
Near planned Chinese project	0.08	0.07	-0.05
	(0.05)	(0.03)***	(0.03)*
China: Completed vs. planned p-value	0.024	0.012	0.058
Observations	28,732	38,164	38,164
Moran's I p-value	0.82	0.19	0.77
Restricted sample			
Near completed Chinese project	-0.11	-0.004	-0.005
	(0.04)**	(0.02)	(0.02)
Near planned Chinese project	-0.005	0.09	0.004
	(0.18)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Near completed US project	0.05	-0.01	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)*
Near planned US project	0.50	0.02	-0.13
	(0.08)***	(0.06)	(0.07)*
China: Completed vs. planned p-value	0.563	0.212	0.912
US: Completed vs. planned p-value	0	0.7	0.172
Observations	4,867	6,654	6,654
Moran's I p-value	0.52	0.26	0.48
Buffer	30km	30km	30km
Cut-off year	2010	2010	2010
Country FE	Y	Y	Y
Round FE	N	N	N
Controls	Y	Y	Y
Spatial lag of DV	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Each panel reports coefficients from a separate OLS regression using data from round 6 of the Afrobarometer survey. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.10: Effects of Chinese and US aid on liberal democratic values, including spatial lag of dependent variable

	Liberal democratic values (index)
Full sample	
Near completed Chinese project	-0.04
	(0.03)
Near planned Chinese project	-0.09
	(0.03)***
China: Completed vs. planned p-value	0.198
Observations	59,283
Moran's I p-value	0.87
Restricted sample	
Near completed Chinese project	-0.17
	(0.08)**
Near planned Chinese project	-0.07
	(0.06)
Near completed US project	0.18
	(0.05)***
Near planned US project	-0.11
	(0.06)*
China: Completed vs. planned p-value	0.311
US: Completed vs. planned p-value	0
Observations	11,511
Moran's I p-value	0.88
Buffer	30km
Cut-off year	2010
Country FE	Y
Round FE	N
Controls	Y
Spatial lag of DV	Y

Notes: Each panel reports coefficients from a separate OLS regression using data from rounds 2-5 of the Afrobarometer survey. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.11: Effects of Chinese and US aid on perceptions of former colonial powers, including spatial lag of dependent variable

	Believes former colonial power is best model
Full sample	
Near completed Chinese project	0.01
	(0.01)
Near planned Chinese project	-0.03
	(0.02)*
China: Completed vs. planned p-value	0.024
Observations	38,164
Moran's I p-value	0.76
Restricted sample	
Near completed Chinese project	0.01
	(0.01)
Near planned Chinese project	-0.07
	(0.03)***
Near completed US project	-0.01
	(0.01)
Near planned US project	-0.01
	(0.05)
China: Completed vs. planned p-value	0.003
US: Completed vs. planned p-value	0.871
Observations	6,654
Moran's I p-value	0.12
Buffer	30km
Cut-off year	2010
Country FE	Y
Round FE	N
Controls	Y
Spatial lag of DV	Y

Notes: Each panel reports coefficients from a separate OLS regression using data from round 6 of the Afrobarometer survey. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Figure A.18: Effects of US and UK aid on liberal democratic values



Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from OLS regression using data from rounds 2-5 of the Afrobarometer survey. Standard errors are clustered by community.

Figure A.19: Effects of Chinese aid on perceptions of China and the US, disaggregating by sector



Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from OLS regression using data from round 6 of the Afrobarometer survey for the 38 countries for which Afrobarometer data is available. Standard errors are clustered by community.

Table A.12: Effects of Chinese aid on perceptions of China and the US (full sample)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Believes Chinese presence is positive (index)	Believes Chinese model is best	Believes US model is best
Chinese Aid Completed	-0.06	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)***	(0.01)	(0.01)
Chinese Aid Planned	0.14	0.10	-0.06
	(0.06)**	(0.03)***	(0.03)**
Completed vs. planned p-value	0.002	0.002	0.021
Buffer	30km	30km	30km
Cut-off year	2010	2010	2010
Country FE	Y	Y	Y
Round FE	N	N	N
Controls	Y	Y	Y
Observations	28,732	38,164	38,164

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regression using data from round 6 of the Afrobarometer survey. The table displays results for the 38 countries for which Afrobarometer data is available. Standard errors are clustered by community. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.13: Effects of Chinese and US aid on perceptions of China and the US (restricted sample)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Believes Chinese presence is positive (index)	Believes Chinese model is best	Believes US model is best
Chinese Aid Completed	-0.12	-0.01	-0.001
	(0.04)***	(0.02)	(0.03)
Chinese Aid Planned	0.01	0.11	0.01
	(0.20)	(0.09)	(0.09)
USA Aid Completed	0.06	0.002	-0.06
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)**
USA Aid Planned	0.63	0.04	-0.19
	(0.06)***	(0.05)	(0.06)***
China: Completed vs. planned p-value	0.525	0.161	0.857
China: Completed vs. planned p-value	0.000	0.478	0.029
Buffer	30km	30km	30km
Cut-off year	2010	2010	2010
Country FE	Y	Y	Y
Round FE	N	N	N
Controls	Y	Y	Y
Observations	4,867	6,654	6,654

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regression using data from round 6 of the Afrobarometer survey. The table displays results for the six countries for which Afrobarometer and AIMS data are available. Standard errors are clustered by community. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.14: Effects of Chinese aid on liberal democratic values (full sample)

	Liberal democratic values (index)
Chinese Aid Completed	-0.04
	(0.03)
Chinese Aid Planned	-0.13
	(0.03)***
Completed vs. planned p-value	0.007
Buffer	30km
Cut-off year	N/A
Country FE	Y
Round FE	Y
Controls FE	Y
Observations	59,283

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regression using data from rounds 2-5 of the Afrobarometer survey. The table displays results for the 38 countries for which Afrobarometer data is available. Standard errors are clustered by community. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.15: Effects of Chinese and US aid on liberal democratic values (restricted sample)

	Liberal democratic values (index)
Chinese Aid Completed	-0.15
	(0.08)*
Chinese Aid Planned	-0.11
	(0.06)*
USA Aid Completed	0.18
	(0.05)***
USA Aid Planned	-0.19
	(0.06)***
China: Completed vs. planned p-value	0.713
USA: Completed vs. planned p-value	0.000
Buffer	30km
Cut-off year	2010
Country FE	Y
Round FE	Y
Controls	Y
Observations	11,511

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regression using data from rounds 2-5 of the Afrobarometer survey. The table displays results for the six countries for which Afrobarometer and AIMS data are available. Standard errors are clustered by community. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.16: Effects of Chinese aid on perceptions of former colonial power (full sample)

	Believes former colonial power is best model
Chinese Aid Completed	0.01
	(0.01)
Chinese Aid Planned	-0.04
	(0.02)**
Completed vs. planned p-value	0.009
Buffer	30km
Cut-off year	N/A
Country FE	Y
Round FE	N
Controls FE	Y
Observations	38,164

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regression using data from round 6 of the Afrobarometer survey. The table displays results for the 38 countries for which Afrobarometer data is available. Standard errors are clustered by community. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.17: Effects of Chinese and US aid on perceptions of former colonial power (restricted sample)

	Former Colonial Power Best Model
China Aid Completed	0.01
	(0.01)
China Aid Planned	-0.08
	(0.02)***
USA Aid Completed	-0.01
	(0.01)
USA Aid Planned	-0.02
	(0.04)
China: Completed vs. planned p-value	0.000
USA: Completed vs. planned p-value	0.709
Buffer	30km
Cut-off year	N/A
Country FE	Y
Round FE	N
Controls FE	Y
Observations	6,654

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regression using data from round 6 of the Afrobarometer survey. The table displays results for the six countries for which Afrobarometer and AIMS data are available. Standard errors are clustered by community. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.18: Effects of Chinese aid on factors contributing to positive image of China (full sample)

	(1) Cost of products	(2) Support in int'l affairs	(3) Policy of non-interference	(4) People and culture	(5) Infrastructure investment	(6) Business investment
China Completed	0.02	-0.005	0.001	-0.001	0.004	-0.005
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.01)	(0.01)
China Planned	-0.01	0.004	0.01	-0.01	0.09	-0.05
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)***	(0.02)***
Completed vs. planned p-value	0.145	0.444	0.434	0.412	0.000	0.011
Buffer	30km	30km	30km	30km	30km	30km
Cut-off year	2010	2010	2010	2010	2010	2010
Country FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Round FE	N	N	N	N	N	N
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	38,179	38,179	38,179	38,179	38,179	38,179

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regression using data from round 6 of the Afrobarometer survey. The table displays results for the 38 countries for which Afrobarometer data is available. Standard errors are clustered by community. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.19: Effects of Chinese aid on factors contributing to negative image of China (full sample)

	(1) Quality of products	(2) Land Grabbing	(3) Firms taking jobs local	(4) Extraction of natural resources	(5) Cooperation with undemoc. leaders	(6) Behavior of citizens
Chinese Aid Completed	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.004	0.001	0.004
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Chinese Aid Planned	0.03	-0.02	0.05	-0.02	-0.01	0.003
	(0.02)	(0.01)**	(0.02)**	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Completed vs. planned p-value	0.416	0.184	0.055	0.188	0.118	0.964
Buffer	30km	30km	30km	30km	30km	30km
Cut-off year	2010	2010	2010	2010	2010	2010
Country FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Round FE	N	N	N	N	N	N
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	38,179	38,179	38,179	38,179	38,179	38,179

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regression using data from round 6 of the Afrobarometer survey. The table displays results for the 38 countries for which Afrobarometer data is available. Standard errors are clustered by community. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.20: Effect sizes in table form

			All respondents		Respondents near planned projects	
Dependent variable	Aid	Diff-in-diff	DV mean	% Δ from mean	DV mean	% Δ from mean
Effects of Chinese and US aid on perceptions of China and the US						
Full sample						
Believes Chinese presence is positive (index)	Chinese	-0.2	1.67	-11.9%	1.86	-10.7%
Believes Chinese model is best	Chinese	-0.09	0.24	-39.1%	0.32	-29.5%
Believes US model is best	Chinese	0.07	0.3	22.9%	0.32	21.2%
Restricted sample						
Believes Chinese presence is positive (index)	Chinese	-0.13	1.64	-7.8%	1.89	-6.8%
Believes Chinese model is best	Chinese	-0.12	0.2	-62.1%	0.36	-33.7%
Believes US model is best	Chinese	-0.02	0.37	-4.2%	0.44	-3.6%
Believes Chinese presence is positive (index)	US	-0.57	1.64	-34.9%	2.43	-23.6%
Believes Chinese model is best	US	-0.03	0.2	-17.8%	0.19	-18.5%
Believes US model is best	US	0.13	0.37	36.2%	0.19	71.1%
Effects of Chinese and US aid on liberal democratic values						
Full sample						
Liberal democratic values (index)	Chinese	0.1	3.74	2.6%	3.63	2.7%
Restricted sample						
Liberal democratic values (index)	Chinese	-0.04	3.72	-0.9%	3.62	-1%
Liberal democratic values (index)	US	0.37	3.72	9.8%	3.76	9.7%
Effects of Chinese and US aid on perceptions of former colonial powers						
Full sample						
Believes former colonial power is best model	Chinese	0.05	0.13	36.9%	0.1	48.9%
Restricted sample						
Believes former colonial power is best model	Chinese	0.09	0.1	90.9%	0.02	593.6%
Believes former colonial power is best model	US	0.02	0.1	16.6%	0.06	27%
Effects of Chinese aid on factors contributing to positive image of China						
Full sample						
Cost of Chinese products	Chinese	0.03	0.23	12.3%	0.18	15.4%
Chinese support in international affairs	Chinese	-0.01	0.06	-14%	0.05	-18.3%
Chinese policy of non-interference	Chinese	-0.01	0.04	-18.9%	0.06	-14.3%
Chinese people and culture	Chinese	0.01	0.02	28.8%	0.02	29.2%
Chinese infrastructure investment	Chinese	-0.09	0.26	-33.4%	0.49	-18.2%
Chinese business investment	Chinese	0.04	0.16	25.7%	0.11	38.4%
Effects of Chinese aid on factors contributing to negative image of China						
Full sample						
Quality of Chinese products	Chinese	-0.02	0.34	-5.9%	0.44	-4.6%
Chinese land grabbing	Chinese	0.01	0.07	20%	0.04	37.6%
Chinese firms taking local jobs and businesses	Chinese	-0.04	0.13	-29.9%	0.18	-21.7%
Chinese extraction of natural resources	Chinese	0.02	0.1	20.9%	0.09	21.3%
Chinese cooperation w/ undemocratic leaders	Chinese	0.01	0.04	33.4%	0.03	49.7%
Behavior of Chinese citizens	Chinese	0.0005	0.05	0.9%	0.06	0.8%