How Does Uncertainty Affect Voters' Preferences?[1]

Online Appendix

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A A Bayesian Interpretation of the Theoretical Model

Suppose that a policy, P, will have some outcome, which is not perfectly known by the voter. For simplicity, we assume higher values of the outcome variable is always better. Following the convention in the literature, suppose that the voter has a prior belief about the outcome of the reform, $\hat{\mu}_0$, which is distributed $\hat{\mu}_0 \sim \mathcal{N}(\hat{\mu}_0, \sigma^2)$. $\hat{\mu}_0$ is the expected outcome of the distribution, and can be understood as the voter's best guess. The variance component, σ_0^2, represents the certainty of this belief, where higher variance implies less certainty.

Now let the voter receive a prediction, x, from some sender. Assuming that the prediction is distributed normal with known variance, $x \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_x, \sigma_x^2)$, we can express the updated belief, $\hat{\mu}_1 \sim \mathcal{N}(\hat{\mu}_1, \sigma_1^2)$, as

$$\hat{\mu}_1 = \hat{\mu}_0 \left(\frac{\sigma_x^2}{\sigma_x^2 + \sigma_0^2} \right) + x \left(\frac{\sigma_0^2}{\sigma_x^2 + \sigma_0^2} \right), \tag{1}$$

$$\sigma_1^2 = \frac{\sigma_x^2 \sigma_0^2}{\sigma_x^2 + \sigma_0^2} = \frac{1}{\tau_x + \tau_0}, \tag{2}$$

by a well-known results of Bayes' theorem.[2] That is, the posterior belief is an average of the prior belief and the prediction weighted by their respective credibility parameters. Intuitively, the stronger the prior, the lesser the updating and the stronger the prediction, the stronger the updating.

First, let us examine what happens to $\hat{\mu}_1$ when the prediction x changes. Taking the partial derivative with respect to x,

$$\frac{\partial \hat{\mu}_1}{\partial x} = \frac{\sigma_0^2}{\sigma_x^2 + \sigma_0^2} > 0 \tag{3}$$

we find that the derivative is always positive, and meaning that the voter updates toward the new information. Assuming that higher outcomes are better, a higher (lower) prediction decreases (increases) the distance between the voter's ideal point and the voter's outcome beliefs, thus making the policy more (less) appealing. This gives us H_1.

[2] An obvious limitation of assuming that the variance is known is that posterior uncertainty is always smaller than prior uncertainty. However, since the theory and experimental design principally compares beliefs and attitudes toward the same reform under different prediction scenarios, this simple version of Bayesian updating can account for the main predictions. With different distributional assumptions, it is possible to create a Bayesian updating model where posterior uncertainty is greater than prior uncertainty. Specifically, assuming that both the mean and the variance are unknown and that prior beliefs are distributed normal-gamma, uncertainty can increase in face of unexpected information.

Second, what happens to σ_1^2 when σ_x^2 changes? Taking the derivative with respect to σ_x^2,

$$\frac{\partial \sigma_1^2}{\partial \sigma_x^2} = \frac{\sigma_0^2}{(\sigma_x^2 + \sigma_0^2)^2} > 0, \tag{4}$$

we find that the posterior uncertainty grows as σ_x^2 increases. Thus, more credible predictions result in less posterior uncertainty compared to less credible predictions, keeping the expected outcome of the prediction constant. If individuals are risk averse, as implied by the canonical quadratic utility function, the utility of the policy will decreases as the variance increases keeping the expected outcome constant.[3] This gives us H_2.

Lastly, we show that, in the Bayesian learning model, the magnitude of the updating depends on both the credibility of the prediction and the strength of the prior belief. Taking the cross-partial derivative of $\hat{\mu}_1$ with respect to x and σ_x^2,

$$\frac{\partial^2 \hat{\mu}_1}{\partial x \partial \sigma_x^2} = -\frac{\sigma_0^2}{(\sigma_x^2 + \sigma_0^2)^2} < 0, \tag{5}$$

meaning that the magnitude of updating is decreasing in σ_x^2. In other words, as the credibility of the prediction decreases, we expect the magnitude of updating to decrease keeping the central tendency of x constant. This empirical implication is conditional on the Bayesian updating model and thus gives some insight into whether the updating process actually is consistent with Bayesian updating or not.

[3] Mas-Colell, Andreu, Michael Dennis Whinston, Jerry R Green et al. 1995. *Microeconomic Theory*. Oxford University Press.

B Consistency with and Deviations from Pre-Analysis Plan

Sample Data was originally collected on 6000 respondents. After excluding respondents from outside the US and respondents who finished the survey in less than the 100 seconds limit specified in the pre-analysis plan, 5888 respondents remained.

Main analyses and results All the main results, as defined in the pre-analysis plan, presented in Table 3 and Table 4, follow the pre-registration exactly.

Heterogeneity analyses The pre-analysis plan stated that heterogeneity with respect to partisanship, risk preferences, the prediction domain and material exposure to the reform would be performed. It did not, however, include exact specifications for these analyses.

The main results of the partisan heterogeneity and risk preference heterogeneity are included in the main paper. The full models are available in the appendix. The heterogeneity analysis with respect to the prediction domain is shown in the appendix.

I explored heterogeneity with respect to material exposure by examining how respondent education moderated the assessment of predictions for the minimum wage reform. The tentative results, available in the replication files or from the author upon request, suggest individuals with low education decrease their support as prediction spread increases. However, the statistical power of the analysis is low and no strong conclusions can be made from this analysis.

The heterogeneity analysis with respect to different operationalizations of *prediction spread* was not included in the pre-registration. This was added after the null effect of *prediction spread* was established to examine whether this was driven by the pre-registered operationalization of the *prediction spread* variable.

Sensitivity analyses Three robustness tests are included in the pre-analysis plan: dropping the no change prediction, estimating the main results with an ordered probit instead of OLS for the outcome variables measured on a Likert scale and the simplified difference of means specification using dummy variables. The results of the ordered probit and simplified specification are presented in the appendix and the main findings are summarized in the paper. Dropping

the no change prediction, that is, when *prediction center* is 0 and there is no uncertainty, does not affect the main results. The results are available in the replication files or from the author upon request.

Dropping the single prediction treatments was not included in the pre-analysis plan. These were added after the null effect of *prediction spread* was found to examine whether the null-effect was driven by respondents not comprehending the two prediction treatment.

The sensitivity analyses with respect to numerical literacy and the multilevel models were not pre-registered.

The pre-registered specification also includes a vector of control variables to increase precision. The main results are robust for controlling for a range of demographic variables including income, age, education and gender.

Additional analyses The analysis of the strength of priors for the different reforms among respondents in the control group was not included in the pre-analysis plan. This test was added after the null-findings on the minimum wage proposal were established.

An IV analysis, regressing support for the reform on beliefs instrumented with predictions, is available in the appendix. As expected, since this captures the average treatment effect among compliers, this scales up the treatment effect.

The analysis of belief uncertainty was not pre-registered.

C Treatment Example

Figure 1: Example of Minimum Wage Treatment

To increase the living standard of Americans with low income, some people think that the minimum wage should be increased to $10.10. The state average minimum wage today is $8.49.

In the public debate, some people believe that increasing the minimum wage will also increase unemployment, especially among those with low education. Other people believe that this will decrease unemployment.

The current unemployment rate among individuals with low education is 8%. If the minimum wage is not increased, unemployment among individuals with low education will remain at this level.

Representatives from the Republican party estimate that increasing the minimum wage will leave unemployment among individuals with low education unaffected at 8%. Representatives from the Democratic party estimate that increasing the minimum wage will decrease unemployment down to 6%.



D Treatment Vignettes

Table D1: Treatment Vignettes for Minimum Wage Reform

Preamble	To increase the living standard of Americans with low income, some people think that the minimum wage should be increased to $10.10. The state average minimum wage today is $8.49. In the public debate, some people believe that increasing the minimum wage will also increase unemployment, especially among those with low education. Other people believe that this will decrease unemployment. The current unemployment rate among individuals with low education is 8%. If the minimum wage is not increases, unemployment among individuals with low education will remain at this level.
Expert certainty	Non-partisan experts, not aligned with any political party, estimate that increasing the minimum wage will [increase/decrease] unemployment among individuals with low education [up/down] to [8% + prediction].
Expert uncertainty	Some non-partisan experts, not aligned with any political party, estimate that increasing the minimum wage will [increase/decrease] unemployment among individuals with low education [up/down] to [8% + prediction 1]. Other non-partisan experts estimate that increasing the minimum wage will [increase/decrease] unemployment among individuals with low education [up/down] to [8% + prediction 2].
Expert null	Non-partisan experts, not aligned with any political party, estimate that increasing the minimum wage will leave the unemployment rate among individuals with low education unaffected at 8%.
Partisan certainty	Representatives from the Republican and Democratic parties estimate that increasing the minimum wage will [increase/decrease] unemployment among individuals with low education [up/down] to [8% + prediction] if the minimum wage is increased.
Partisan uncertainty	Representatives from the Republican party estimate that increasing the minimum wage will [increase/decrease] unemployment among individuals with low education [up/down] to [8% + prediction 1]. Representatives from the Democratic party estimate that increasing the minimum wage will [increase/decrease] unemployment among individuals with low education [up/down] to [8% + prediction 2].
Partisan null	Representatives from the Democratic and Republican parties estimate that increasing the minimum wage will leave the unemployment rate among individuals with low education unaffected at 8%.

Table D2: Treatment Vignettes for Corporate Tax Reform

Preamble	To increase economic growth, some people think that taxes on corporations should be low. The corporate tax rate was recently lowered from 35% to 21%. In the public debate, some people believe that lowering the corporate tax rate to 21% will increase employment. Other people believe that this will decrease employment. The current employment rate is 60%. If the corporate tax rate is restored to 35%, employment will remain at this level.
Expert certainty	Non-partisan experts, not aligned with any political party, estimate that lowering the corporate tax rate to 21% will [increase/decrease] employment to [60% + prediction].
Expert uncertainty	Some non-partisan experts, not aligned with any political party, estimate that lowering the corporate tax rate to 21% will [increase/decrease] employment [up/down] to [60% + prediction 1]. Other non-partisan experts estimate that lowering the corporate tax rate to 21% will [increase/decrease] employment [up/down] to [60% + prediction 2].
Expert null	Non-partisan experts, not aligned with any political party, estimate that lowering the corporate tax rate to 21% will leave employment unaffected at 60%.
Partisan certainty	Representatives from the Republican and Democratic parties estimate that lowering the corporate tax rate to 21% will [increase/decrease] employment to [60% + prediction].
Partisan uncertainty	Representatives from the Republican party estimate that lowering corporate the tax rate to 21% will [increase/decrease] employment [up/down] to [61% + prediction 1]. Representatives from the Democratic party estimate that lowering the corporate tax rate to 21% will [increase/decrease] employment [up/down] to [60% + prediction 2].
Partisan null	Representatives from the Republican and Democratic parties estimate that lowering the corporate tax rate to 21% will leave employment unaffected at 60%.

Table D3: Treatment Vignettes for Trans-Pacific Partnership Reform

Preamble	To increase economic growth, some people think that the U.S. should join the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The Trans-Pacific Partnership is a free trade agreement, aiming to increase trade between the U.S. and a number of countries surrounding the Pacific Ocean. In the public debate, some people think that joining the agreement will increase the number of manufacturing jobs in the U.S. Other people think that this will decrease the number of manufacturing jobs in the U.S. Approximately 12.6 million people are employed in manufacturing today. If the U.S. does not join the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the number of manufacturing jobs will remain at this level.
Expert certainty	Non-partisan experts, not aligned with any political party, estimate that joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership will [increase/decrease] the number of manufacturing jobs to [12.6 million $\times$ (1 + prediction)].
Expert uncertainty	Some non-partisan experts, not aligned with any political party, estimate that joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership will [increase/decrease] the number of manufacturing jobs [up/down] to [12.6 million $\times$ (1 + prediction 1)]. Other non-partisan experts estimate that joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership will [increase/decrease] the number of manufacturing jobs [up/down] to [12.6 million $\times$ (1 + prediction 2)]
Expert null	Non-partisan experts, not aligned with any political party, estimate that joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership will leave the number of manufacturing jobs unaffected at 12.6 million.
Partisan certainty	Representatives from the Republican and Democratic parties estimate that joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership will [increase/decrease] the number of manufacturing jobs to [12.6 million $\times$ (1 + prediction)].
Partisan uncertainty 1	Representatives from the Republican party estimate that joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership will [increase/decrease] the number of manufacturing jobs [up/down] to [12.6 million $\times$ (1 + prediction 1)]. Representatives from the Democratic party estimate that joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership will [increase/decrease] the number of manufacturing jobs [up/down] to [12.6 million $\times$ (1 + prediction 2)].
Partisan uncertainty 2	Representatives from the Democratic party estimate that joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership will [increase/decrease] the number of manufacturing jobs [up/down] to [12.6 million $\times$ (1 + prediction 1)]. Representatives from the Republican party estimate that joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership will [increase/decrease] the number of manufacturing jobs [up/down] to [12.6 million $\times$ (1 + prediction 2)].
Partisan null	Representatives from the Republican and Democratic parties estimate that joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership will leave the number of manufacturing jobs unaffected at 12.6 million.

E Wordings of Questions

Table E1: Moderators

Risk preferences
How do you see yourself: are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?
(Not willing at all to take risks) 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 (Very willing to take risks)
Partisanship
Do you think of yourself as a Democrat, Republican or Independent?
Democrat, Republican, Independent
If Republican or Democrat:
Would you call yourself a strong [Republican/Democrat] or a not very strong [Republican/Democrat]?
Strong, Not very strong
If Independent:
Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party?
Republican Party, Democratic Party, Neither

Table E2: Outcome Variables: Composite Attitudes and Idealistic Preferences

Composite attitude measure
Consider the proposal to increase the federal minimum wage to $10.10. Do you favor or oppose the proposal?
[Strongly oppose] 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 [Strongly favor]
Consider the recent lowering of the corporate tax rate to 21%. Do you favor or oppose the tax decrease?
[Strongly oppose] 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 [Strongly favor]
Consider the proposal to join the free trade agreement the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Do you favor or oppose the proposal?
[Strongly oppose] 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 [Strongly favor]
Idealistic preferences
Some people feel that the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a good standard of living. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on their own. Which is closer to the way you feel?
[Government should see to standard of living] 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 [Let each person get ahead on their own]
Some people think that the government in Washington does too many things that should be left to individuals and private businesses. Others think that the government does too little to solve our country's problems. Which is closer to the way you feel?
[Gov't does too much] 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 [Gov't does too little]
Some people think that the US should think less in international terms and concentrate more on its own national problems. Other people think that the US should think more in international terms and help other countries deal with their problems. Which is closer to the way you feel?
[US should focus on national problems] 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 [US should focus on international problems]

Table E3: Outcome Variables: Outcome Beliefs

Outcome beliefs
If the federal minimum wage was increased to $10.10, do you believe that the unemployment rate among individuals with low education would increase, stay the same, or decrease?
Increase, Stay the same, Decrease
How certain do you feel about this effect?
Very certain, certain, Neither certain nor uncertain, uncertain, highly uncertain
If you had to guess, by how many percentage units do you think it will increase or decrease?
As a reminder, the current unemployment rate among individuals with low education is 8%.
[slider from -15 to +15 percentage units]
If the corporate tax rate was kept at 21%, do you believe that employment would increase, stay the same, or decease?
Increase, Stay the same, Decrease
How certain do you feel about this effect?
Very certain, certain, Neither certain nor uncertain, uncertain, highly uncertain
If you had to guess, by how many percentage units do you think it will increase or decrease?
As a reminder, the current employment rate is 60%.
[slider from -15 to +15 percentage units]
How certain do you feel about this effect?
Very certain, certain, Neither certain nor uncertain, uncertain, highly uncertain
If the US would join the Trans-Pacific Partnership, do you believe that manufacturing employment would increase, stay the same, or decrease?
Increase, Stay the same, Decrease
If you had to guess, by how many million jobs do you think it will increase or decrease?
As a reminder, approximately 12.6 million people are employed in manufacturing today in the U.S.
[slider from -2 to +2 million]

F Additional Analyses

F.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table F1 shows descriptive statistics for the sample. There is a slight over-representation of women and an underrepresentation of respondents with no high school diploma. For income and partisanship, the sample mirrors a nationally representative sample. The average respondent is slightly more risk seeking than risk averse, similar to the findings of ?.

Table F1: Descriptive Statistics

	Observations	Mean	Std	Min	Max
Female	5,888	0.55	0.50	0	1
Age	5,888	46.16	15.97	18	90
Risk seeking	5,869	5.69	2.68	0	10
Partisanship					
Democrat	5,854	0.33	0.47	0	1
Republican	5,854	0.33	0.47	0	1
Independent	5,854	0.34	0.47	0	1
Education					
College degree	5,888	0.46	0.50	0	1
High school graduate, some college	5,888	0.48	0.50	0	1
No high school	5,888	0.06	0.23	0	1
Income					
<50K	5,888	0.46	0.50	0	1
50K - 100K	5,888	0.29	0.45	0	1
100K - 150K	5,888	0.16	0.37	0	1
>150K	5,888	0.09	0.28	0	1

F.2 Idealistic Preferences Predict Support

One of the hypothesis in the paper states that "predictions do not change idealistic preferences," which is also corroborated by the experiment. This could have two explanations. First, as I claim, this is because respondents are competent enough to separate relevant from irrelevant information. Second, this could be because the measure of idealistic preferences is so poor that voters fail to see a connection between the policy and the measure. If respondents do not relate the measures of idealistic preferences to policy preferences in a meaningful way, this would be a

very poor test. For example, it could be that predictions do indeed change outcome preferences (i.e., changing your preferences depending on what is attainable), but that the measurement of idealistic preferences was so poor that no association between the changing beliefs and idealistic preferences was found. Although such a finding is still consistent with the hypothesis, it is not very informative.

Thus, the purpose of examining the association between idealistic preferences and policy preferences is to show that the idealistic preference measures are meaningfully related to the policy preferences. Only then does the null-finding of predictions on idealistic preferences, compared to the positive findings on outcome beliefs and attitudes, become interesting and informative.

To validate the measurement of idealistic preferences, I consequently regress support for the policy on its measure of idealistic preferences. The results are shown in Table F2. I present the measurement details in Table E2.

Table F2: Idealistic Preferences Predict Support for Reform

	Minimum Wage		Corporate Tax		Trans-Pacific Partnership	
Idealistic preference	-0.40 ***	-0.40 ***	-0.26 ***	-0.26 ***	0.26 ***	0.26 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Demographic controls		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	5430	5430	5433	5433	5432	5432

Note: All models are estimated using least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Support for reform is measured on on a seven-point Likert scale, where higher values imply stronger support for reform. Demographic controls include age, education, income and gender.
$^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.01, ^{***}p < 0.001$

The table shows a robust and significant association between policy support and idealistic preferences for all three reforms. The more respondents think that the government should let each person get ahead on their own, the less they support a minimum wage increase. The more respondents think that the governments should intervene in the economy, the less they support the corporate tax rate decrease. And the more respondents think that the US should focus on international problems and be less nativist, the more they support the TPP. Thus, idealistic

or principled beliefs are associated with policy support in meaningful ways. This strengthens the conclusion that the null-effect of predictions on idealistic preferences is not driven by poor measurement, but by voter competence.

F.3 Strength of Priors in Control Group

Table F3: Priors for Minimum Wage Reform are Stronger

	Certainty
Intercept	2.09 ***
	(0.04)
Corporate tax	0.14 **
	(0.05)
Trans-Pacific Partnership	0.32 ***
	(0.04)
Observations	1274

Note: The model is estimated using least squares with robust standard errors clustered on the respondent level in the control group. Lower values imply higher certainty. The intercept shows the mean level of certainty for the minimum wage reform. The corporate tax and Trans-Pacific Partnership dummies shows deviations from this mean.
$^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.01, ^{***}p < 0.001$

F.4 IV Analysis: Does Changing Beliefs Change Support?

Rational attitude formation does not require respondents to shift their beliefs when presented with new information. If a voter has a strong prior belief, new predictions will only have a small effect on the posterior belief. However, rational attitude formation requires that respondents change their support for a policy when their beliefs about important outcomes of the policy change. I examine how support for the proposals change among respondents conditional on their beliefs changing. I do this by instrumenting respondent beliefs with the experimental treatments.

The IV estimator produces a consistent estimate of the local average treatment effect, that is, the treatment effect among the respondents who complied with the treatment. Since the

treatments changed respondent beliefs, the validity of the instrumental variables estimator is in this case conditional on the exclusion restriction and the monotonicity assumption. The exclusion restriction is strengthened by the absence of significant treatment effects on the idealistic attitude component in table ??. Another possible violation of the exclusion restriction would be if manipulating one outcome belief also changes correlated outcome beliefs. I mitigate this by focusing the respondents' attention to one outcome variable. The monotonicity assumption would be violated if respondents updated "away from" the treatment prediction. Experimental research examining the backlash effect finds that they are the exception rather than the rule.[4] Further, a backlash effect would produce estimated effects in the opposite direction of what I expect. Lastly, by only comparing respondents who received some treatment, I avoid the issue of individuals with different priors updating in different directions conditional on their priors, ameliorating the monotonicity problem.

In table F4, I present the findings from the instrumental variables analysis. The first stage is identical to the specification in equation ??. The second stage is a simple bivariate regression of support for the reform on instrumented beliefs. For both the corporate tax and the Trans-Pacific Partnership proposal, beliefs strongly influence support for the reforms. On average, increasing the expected shift of the employment rate by one unit increases support by 0.35 scale steps (0.18 standard deviation) for the corporate tax proposal. For the Trans-Pacific Partnership reform, increasing the expected shift in the number of manufacturing jobs by 1% (126,000 jobs) increases support by 0.14 scale steps (0.08 standard deviation). The size of the effect on support for the minimum wage reform is, once again, weaker and not statistically significant. This is consistent with the weak effects of the treatments on the outcome beliefs for the minimum wage reform. Table ?? shows that the results are robust to instrumenting the qualitative measurement of outcome beliefs.

[4]Guess, Andrew. and Alexander Coppock. n.d. Does counter-attitudinal information cause backlash? Results from three large survey experiments. *British Journal of Political Science*, pp. 1-19.

Figure F1: The Effect of Instrumented Beliefs on Support for Reforms



Note: The figure shows the effect of the models from table F4. The shading shows the 95% confidence interval. Higher values imply stronger support for the policy. The questions used to measure beliefs are provided in table E3.

Table F4: Instrumented Beliefs Affect Reform Support

	Minimum Wage	Corporate Tax	Trans-Pacific Partnership
Outcome belief	-0.20	0.35 ***	2.27 ***
	(0.23)	(0.09)	(0.24)
Observations	4983	4949	5065

Note: All models are estimated using 2SLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Higher values imply stronger support for the policy. The first stage is presented in table ??. The outcome belief variables for minimum wage and corporate tax are percentage point increase in unemployment rate and employment rate, respectively, and for Trans-Pacific Partnership in millions of manufacturing jobs.
$^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.01, ^{***}p < 0.001$

In figure F1, I plot the change in support for the proposals as a function of the instrumented outcome beliefs, ranging from the median to the third quartile of beliefs. For the corporate tax and Trans-Pacific Partnership reforms, increasing beliefs from median to the third quartile increases support for the reform by approximately one scale step. For the minimum wage increase, expected levels of support decreases slightly as expected unemployment increases, but the uncertainty about the effect is substantial.

The findings from the instrumental variables analysis show that outcome beliefs substantially influence public opinion on policy proposals. As beliefs about salient outcomes changes, respondents update their attitude to the policy, congruent with rational attitude formation.

Table F5: Instrumented Qualitative Beliefs Affect Reform Support

	Minimum Wage	Corporate Tax	Trans-Pacific Partnership
Qualitative belief increase	-2.63	2.79 ***	2.80 ***
	(1.63)	(0.65)	(0.25)
Observations	5408	5385	5403

Note: All models are estimated using 2SLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses.The first stage is identical to the main specification but using an indicator variable for an increase in outcome beliefs as the dependent variable. The first stage is presented in table F20.
$^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.01, ^{***}p < 0.001$

F.5 Effects on Belief Uncertainty

I find that respondents are not repelled by the uncertainty inherent in conflicting predictions. Is this because conflicting predictions do not affect the uncertainty of their beliefs? I examine this be regressing certainty of beliefs, measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from very uncertain to very certain, on the main specification. I show the results in Table F6.

Table F6: Treatment Effects on Certainty of Belief

	Minimum Wage	Corporate Tax	Trans-Pacific Partnership
Prediction center	0.00	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Partisan sender	0.01	0.07	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Prediction spread	0.02	0.05 *	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Prediction center × partisan	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Prediction spread × partisan	-0.01	-0.05	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	5438	5433	5436

Note: All models are estimated using least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Higher values of the outcome variable means more uncertain beliefs.
$^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.01, ^{***}p < 0.001$

Although the coefficients are in the expected direction for the minimum wage and corporate tax reform, the effect is only significant for the corporate tax reform when experts are senders. The maximum spread increases the uncertainty of beliefs by approximately .11 standard deviations. Thus, there is some evidence that conflicting predictions does actually increase the uncertainty of beliefs. In spite of this, I find no effect of prediction spread on attitudes for all three reforms. This suggests that uncertainty does not matter because respondents ignore it all together, but that they discount it in forming their attitudes.

F.6 Heterogeneity: Risk Preferences

The hypothesis that increasing uncertainty will decrease support for the policy proposals is contingent on respondents being either risk or ambiguity averse. I examine if risk preferences induce different responses to increasing uncertainty by adding an interaction term between the level of risk seekingness, operationalized as a linear continuous variable and *prediction spread*. The results are shown in table F7 and F8. For support for the reforms, the interaction between *prediction spread* and risk preferences is never statistically significant and often a precisely estimated null. The same is true for belief formation, where only 1 of 9 interactions is statistically significant. This suggests that risk preferences matter little for the evaluation of treatment. Risk seeking respondents, however, consistently show higher support for the reforms, independent of the treatments. This finding is striking, as support for the corporate tax and minimum wage reforms are negatively correlated.

Table F7: Heterogeneity: Risk Preferences and Support

	Minimum Wage			Corporate Tax			Trans-Pacific Partnership		
	All	Expert	Partisan	All	Expert	Partisan	All	Expert	Partisan
Prediction center	-0.02 *	-0.02	-0.02	0.05 ***	0.06 ***	0.04 *	0.10 ***	0.08 ***	0.13 ***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Prediction spread	-0.08	0.07	-0.23	0.04	-0.12	0.20	0.07	0.03	0.10
	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Risk seeking	0.07 ***	0.09 ***	0.05 *	0.09 ***	0.05	0.12 ***	0.09 ***	0.08 ***	0.10 ***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Age	0.00 *	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	0.36 ***	0.40 ***	0.32 ***	-0.33 ***	-0.37 ***	-0.29 ***	0.10 *	0.15 *	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)
College degree	-0.01	-0.05	0.03	-0.25 ***	-0.19 *	-0.31 ***	0.17 ***	0.19 **	0.15 *
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)
No high school	0.06	0.04	0.06	-0.05	-0.04	-0.06	-0.09	0.04	-0.21
	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Inc $\leq$ 50K	0.28 ***	0.22 *	0.34 ***	-0.12	-0.07	-0.17 *	0.07	0.17 *	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Inc 100K150K	-0.12	-0.11	-0.13	0.04	0.14	-0.07	-0.04	-0.08	-0.01
	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Inc $\geq$ 150K	-0.21	-0.07	-0.34 *	0.32 **	0.26	0.39 *	0.23 **	0.26 *	0.19
	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Spread $\times$ risk seeking	0.01	-0.01	0.03	-0.00	0.02	-0.02	-0.00	0.01	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	5418	2696	2722	5424	2696	2728	5421	2696	2725

Note: All models are estimated using least squares with robust standard errors. The first column per reform includes both the expert treatment and the partisan treatment, while the second and third column subsets the sample only to expert and partisan treatments, respectively. Risk seeking is measured on a 0-10 scale, where higher values indicate higher levels of risk seeking. Support is measured on a seven-point Likert scale, where higher values imply higher support for the policy.
$^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.01, ^{***}p < 0.001$

Table F8: Heterogeneity: Risk Preferences and Beliefs

	Minimum Wage			Corporate Tax			Trans-Pacific Partnership		
	All	Expert	Partisan	All	Expert	Partisan	All	Expert	Partisan
Prediction center	0.03	0.07	-0.00	0.14 ***	0.18 ***	0.11 *	0.05 ***	0.04 ***	0.05 ***
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Prediction spread	-0.08	-0.57	0.41	0.20	0.54	-0.16	0.01	0.02	0.02
	(0.27)	(0.39)	(0.37)	(0.28)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Risk seeking	0.20 ***	0.14	0.26 ***	0.26 ***	0.31 ***	0.20 **	0.03 ***	0.03 **	0.03 *
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	-0.03 ***	-0.02 **	-0.03 ***	-0.01	-0.02 *	-0.00	-0.00 ***	-0.00 ***	-0.00 ***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	0.14	0.27	0.02	-0.33 *	-0.61 **	-0.06	0.09 ***	0.10 **	0.07 *
	(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
College degree	-0.19	-0.07	-0.30	-0.23	0.09	-0.53 *	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01
	(0.16)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.16)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
No high school	0.67	0.31	1.03	0.33	0.01	0.66	0.07	-0.05	0.17 *
	(0.40)	(0.59)	(0.56)	(0.39)	(0.56)	(0.55)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Inc $\leq$ 50K	0.54 **	0.66 **	0.43	0.08	0.13	0.01	0.12 ***	0.13 ***	0.10 **
	(0.17)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.18)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Inc 100K150K	0.29	0.24	0.32	0.14	0.16	0.07	0.03	0.05	0.01
	(0.22)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.23)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Inc $\geq$ 150K	0.56	0.12	0.96 *	1.00 ***	0.77	1.20 **	0.13 **	0.14 *	0.12
	(0.31)	(0.43)	(0.46)	(0.30)	(0.41)	(0.43)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Spread $\times$ risk seeking	0.02	0.12 *	-0.06	-0.02	-0.07	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	4983	2487	2496	4947	2456	2491	5062	2517	2545

Note: All models are estimated using least squares with robust standard errors. The first column per reform includes both the expert treatment and the partisan treatment, while the second and third column subsets the sample only to expert and partisan treatments, respectively. Risk seeking is measured on a 0-10 scale, where higher values indicate higher levels of risk seeking.
$^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.01, ^{***}p < 0.001$

F.7 Heterogeneity: Partisanship

The sizable literature on partisan bias and party cues suggests that how voters evaluate the signals sent by parties depends on their partisanship.[5] For the minimum wage and corporate tax proposals, a party cue effect cannot be credibly identified, because the partisan senders always send the optimistic or pessimistic prediction. To circumvent this issue, I randomly assign whether Democrats or Republicans send the optimistic prediction for the Trans-Pacific Partnership pro-

[5] See Bartels, L. M. (2002). Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions. *Political Behavior*, 24(2), 117-150, and Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., & Donald, E. (1960). Stokes. *The American Voter*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

posal.

The findings, presented in Table F10, show that especially Republican respondents react strongly to the cue from their favored party. When the partisan senders send conflicting predictions about outcomes, Republican respondents gravitate to the prediction from the Republican party, regardless of the Republican prediction is the optimistic or pessimistic one. The effect is even more pronounced for reform support than outcome beliefs. This supports the notion that voters rely on party cues, not only when forming support for reform proposals, but also when forming beliefs about what the effect of these proposals will be. Importantly, the party cue effect provides evidence that respondents understand and respond to the multiple prediction treatments. There is little evidence of a moderating effect of partisanship when experts are senders, as shown in Table F9.

Table F9: Heterogeneity: Partisanship on Beliefs and Support for Trans-Pacific Partnership

	Trans-Pacific Partnership	
	Beliefs	Support
Prediction center	0.05 ***	0.12 ***
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Democrat	0.25 ***	0.45 **
	(0.07)	(0.14)
Republican	0.14	0.07
	(0.08)	(0.15)
Prediction spread	0.08 *	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.07)
Republican forecast high	-0.04	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.10)
Age	-0.01 ***	-0.00 *
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	0.02	-0.07
	(0.03)	(0.06)
College degree	-0.03	0.11
	(0.04)	(0.07)
No high school	0.17 *	-0.26
	(0.07)	(0.14)
Income $\leq$ 50K	0.08 *	-0.10
	(0.04)	(0.07)
Income 100K-150K	0.00	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.09)
Income $\geq$ 150K	0.12	0.20
	(0.07)	(0.13)
Prediction center $\times$ Democrat	0.00	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Prediction center $\times$ Republican	0.00	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Prediction spread $\times$ Democrat	-0.01	0.12
	(0.06)	(0.11)
Prediction spread $\times$ Republican	-0.15 *	-0.28 *
	(0.06)	(0.12)
Prediction spread $\times$ Democrat $\times$ Republican high	-0.06	-0.24 *
	(0.05)	(0.10)
Prediction spread $\times$ Republican $\times$ Republican high	0.14 **	0.37 ***
	(0.05)	(0.10)
Observations	2541	2719

Note: All models are estimated using least squares with robust standard errors. Support is measured on a seven-point Likert scale, where higher values imply higher support for the policy. Outcome beliefs is a continuous variable refering to the respondent's numerical estimates of the effect of the reform on the respective outcome variable. *Democrat* and *Republican* are dummy variables, indicating what party a respondent identifies with. *Independents* are the reference category.
$^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.01, ^{***}p < 0.001$

Table F10: Heterogeneity: Partisanship on Beliefs and Support for Trans-Pacific Partnership when Experts are Senders

	Trans-Pacific Partnership	
	Beliefs	Support
Prediction center	0.03 *	0.06 *
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Democrat	0.11	0.48 ***
	(0.06)	(0.12)
Republican	0.04	-0.29 *
	(0.07)	(0.12)
Prediction spread	0.01	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.06)
Age	-0.01 ***	-0.00 *
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	0.06	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.06)
College degree	-0.03	0.18 **
	(0.04)	(0.07)
No high school	-0.04	0.04
	(0.08)	(0.14)
Income $\leq$ 50K	0.13 ***	0.11
	(0.04)	(0.07)
Income 100K-150K	0.05	-0.06
	(0.05)	(0.09)
Income $\geq$ 150K	0.15 *	0.30 *
	(0.06)	(0.12)
Prediction center × Democrat	0.03	0.05
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Prediction center × Republican	-0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Prediction spread × Democrat	0.02	0.00
	(0.05)	(0.09)
Prediction spread × Republican	-0.00	0.13
	(0.05)	(0.09)
F-test: Prediction center × Democrat = Prediction center × Republican (p)	0.10	0.18
F-test: Prediction center × Democrat × Partisan = Prediction center × Republican × Partisan (p)	0.61	0.19
Observations	2510	2688

Note: All models are estimated using least squares with robust standard errors. Support is measured on a seven-point Likert scale, where higher values imply higher support for the policy. Outcome beliefs is a continuous variable refering to the respondent's numerical estimates of the effect of the reform on the respective outcome variable. *Democrat* and *Republican* are dummy variables, indicating what party a respondent identifies with. *Independents* are the reference category.
$^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.01, ^{***}p < 0.001$

In Table F11, I present the results for the corporate tax and minimum wage reforms. The findings do not suggest any partisan heterogeneity for the minimum wage reform. Of course, this may be because the beliefs of the minimum wage reform were hard to treat due to strong pre-treatment.

The findings for the corporate tax reform, on the other hand, mirror the results from analysis of the TPP. There is a significant difference (albeit at the 10% level) between how Republicans and Democrats form beliefs about the effect of the corporate tax reform when partisans are senders. As expected, Republicans are more optimistic about the effect of the corporate tax

reform. The results also suggest that this affects attitude formation. Republicans respond more optimistically both to the *prediction center* and *prediction spread* treatment. The findings for when experts are senders are similar, but are not as strong as when partisans are senders. The analysis of partisan heterogeneity from the corporate tax reform are consistent with the findings from the TPP reform.

Table F11: Partisan Heterogeneity: Beliefs and Support for Minimum Wage and Corporate Tax Reforms

	Minimum Wage		Corporate Tax	
	Outcome beliefs	Support	Outcome beliefs	Support
Prediction center	0.04	-0.02	0.21 *	0.06 *
	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.03)
Democrat	0.38	0.91 ***	-0.14	-0.49 ***
	(0.41)	(0.14)	(0.44)	(0.15)
Partisan sender	0.10	0.21	-0.10	0.15
	(0.42)	(0.15)	(0.41)	(0.14)
Republican	0.38	-0.43 **	2.25 ***	1.31 ***
	(0.42)	(0.15)	(0.43)	(0.14)
Prediction spread	0.15	0.09	0.18	0.13
	(0.23)	(0.08)	(0.26)	(0.08)
Age	-0.03 ***	0.00 *	-0.02 ***	-0.00 **
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	-0.11	0.20 ***	-0.48 **	-0.32 ***
	(0.15)	(0.05)	(0.15)	(0.05)
College degree	-0.20	-0.08	-0.16	-0.18 **
	(0.16)	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.06)
No high school	0.72	0.04	0.30	-0.02
	(0.40)	(0.12)	(0.39)	(0.11)
Income $\leq$ 50K	0.47 **	0.17 **	0.16	-0.05
	(0.18)	(0.06)	(0.18)	(0.06)
Income 100K-150K	0.31	-0.11	0.17	0.04
	(0.22)	(0.08)	(0.22)	(0.08)
Income $\geq$ 150K	0.61	-0.15	1.02 ***	0.30 **
	(0.31)	(0.10)	(0.29)	(0.10)
Prediction center × Democrat	-0.01	-0.03	0.01	0.02
	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.04)
Prediction center × Partisan	0.01	-0.01	-0.06	-0.02
	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.04)
Democrat × Partisan	0.40	-0.33	0.41	-0.04
	(0.58)	(0.19)	(0.61)	(0.20)
Prediction center × Republican	0.08	0.00	-0.14	-0.04
	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.04)
Republican × Partisan	-0.15	-0.15	-0.17	-0.38 *
	(0.60)	(0.21)	(0.60)	(0.19)
Prediction spread × Democrat	0.01	-0.07	0.05	-0.11
	(0.32)	(0.11)	(0.35)	(0.11)
Prediction spread × Partisan	-0.32	-0.21	0.11	-0.10
	(0.32)	(0.12)	(0.33)	(0.11)
Prediction spread × Republican	0.09	-0.12	-0.43	-0.28 *
	(0.33)	(0.12)	(0.34)	(0.11)
Prediction center × Democrat × Partisan	-0.14	0.02	-0.09	-0.02
	(0.16)	(0.05)	(0.16)	(0.05)
Prediction center × Republican × Partisan	-0.08	0.02	0.06	0.03
	(0.17)	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.05)
Prediciton spread × Democrat × Partisan	-0.11	0.24	-0.58	0.06
	(0.46)	(0.15)	(0.49)	(0.16)
Prediciton spread × Republican × Partisan	0.38	0.15	0.24	0.31 *
	(0.47)	(0.17)	(0.47)	(0.15)
F-test: Prediction center × Democrat = Prediction center × Republican (p)	0.70	0.99	0.34	0.35
F-test: Prediction center × Democrat × Partisan = Prediction center × Republican × Partisan (p)	0.44	0.49	0.15	0.08
F-test: Prediction spread × Democrat = Prediction spread × Republican (p)	0.81	0.66	0.14	0.12
F-test: Prediction spread × Democrat × Partisan = Prediction spread × Republican × Partisan (p)	0.30	0.56	0.09	0.11
Observations	4971	5406	4935	5406

Note: All models are estimated using least squares with robust standard errors. Outcome beliefs is a continuous variable refering to the respondent's numerical estimates of the effect of the reform on the respective outcome variable. *Democrat* and *Republican* are dummy variables, indicating what party a respondent identifies with. *Independents* are the reference category.
$^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.01, ^{***}p < 0.001$

F.8 Heterogeneity: Alternative Operationalizations of Uncertainty

An explanation for the null-effect of *prediction spread* is that the operationalization of uncertainty as the distance between competing predictions does not adequately capture uncertainty. Respondents may perceive uncertainty differently depending on both the distance between and the direction of the predictions. For instance, respondents may perceive uncertainty as greater if *prediction spread* contains predictions across both the loss and gain domain, includes zero or lies in the loss domain.

I examine this by estimating a series of models, where I interact *prediction spread* with *prediction center*, a dummy variable indicating whether both predictions are in the loss domain, a dummy variable indicating whether *prediction spread* contains the null prediction and a dummy variable indicating whether the *prediction spread* contains both loss and gain predictions, with policy support as the dependent variable. To facilitate interpretation, I do not interact the measures with the *sender* variable. Instead, I estimate all models with both senders, including a dummy for whether the sender is partisan and then subset the sample to expert and partisan senders, respectively. In sum, this results in 2 dependent variables $\times$ 3 policies $\times$ 4 moderating variables $\times$ 3 groups of senders $\times$ 2 marginal effects $=$ 144 marginal effects of *prediction spread* that are estimated. For the sake of transparency, note that these models were not pre-registered.

The results show no systematic effects of uncertainty regardless of the specification or the policy. Between 72 estimated marginal effects of uncertainty on attitudes, only four (i.e. 6%) are statistically significant at the 5% level or higher. Of these, three show positive effects of *prediction spread* and one shows a negative effect of uncertainty. On outcome beliefs, only four effects are statistically significant, and three of these have a positive effect. These results show that that the does not null-finding mask any heterogeneity in the response to uncertainty across the outcome domain.

Table F12: Minimum Wage: Alternative Specifications for Uncertainty Treatment

	Interaction			Loss Domain			Spread Contains Zero			Spread Crosses Domains		
Prediction Center	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Prediction Spread	-0.02	0.00	-0.05	-0.05	-0.03	-0.07	-0.05	-0.04	-0.07	-0.06	-0.03	-0.08
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Partisan	-0.03			-0.03			-0.03			-0.03		
	(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.05)		
Loss Domain				-0.05	-0.06	-0.05						
				(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.17)						
Contains Zero							-0.09	-0.04	-0.14			
							(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.16)			
Crosses Zero										-0.44*	-0.42	-0.45
										(0.19)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Spread ×												
Center	0.00	0.00	0.00									
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)									
Loss Domain				0.04	0.05	0.03						
				(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.10)						
Contains Zero							0.08	0.07	0.09			
							(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.11)			
Crosses Zero										0.27*	0.27	0.28
										(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Spread + Interaction = 0 (p)	0.56	0.97	0.39	0.94	0.71	0.63	0.67	0.70	0.84	0.04	0.12	0.19
Sender	All	Experts	Partisan	All	Experts	Partisan	All	Experts	Partisan	All	Experts	Partisan
Observations	5434	2704	2730	5434	2704	2730	5434	2704	2730	5434	2704	2730

Note: All models are estimated using least squares with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is support for the policy. *Loss Domain* is a dummy variable indicating whether all predictions are in the loss domain. *Contains zero* is a dummy variable indicating whether the predictions contain the zero prediction. *Crosses zero* is a dummy variable indicating whether the predictions include are located in both the loss and gain domain.
$^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.01, ^{***}p < 0.001$

Table F13: Corporate Tax: Alternative Specifications for Uncertainty Treatment

	Interaction			Loss Domain			Spread Contains Zero			Spread Crosses Domains		
Prediction Center	0.02	0.04	0.00	0.07***	0.05	0.09***	0.05***	0.06***	0.04*	0.04***	0.06***	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Prediction Spread	0.02	-0.00	0.05	0.04	-0.00	0.08	0.06	-0.02	0.14*	0.06	-0.01	0.12*
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Partisan	0.04			0.04			0.04			0.04		
	(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.05)		
Loss Domain				0.13	-0.02	0.29						
				(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.16)						
Contains zero							0.09	0.18	-0.00			
							(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.15)			
Crosses zero										0.03	-0.02	0.07
										(0.20)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Spread ×												
Center	0.02	0.01	0.03									
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)									
Loss Domain				0.01	-0.03	0.04						
				(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.11)						
Contains zero							-0.09	-0.04	-0.13			
							(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.11)			
Crosses zero										-0.08	0.02	-0.17
										(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Spread + Interaction = 0 (p)	0.22	0.84	0.13	0.48	0.74	0.17	0.63	0.45	0.88	0.87	0.97	0.78
Sender	All	Experts	Partisan	All	Experts	Partisan	All	Experts	Partisan	All	Experts	Partisan
Observations	5436	2701	2735	5436	2701	2735	5436	2701	2735	5436	2701	2735

Note: All models are estimated using least squares with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is support for the policy. *Loss Domain* is a dummy variable indicating whether all predictions are in the loss domain. *Contains zero* is a dummy variable indicating whether the predictions contain the zero prediction. *Crosses zero* is a dummy variable indicating whether the predictions include are located in both the loss and gain domain.
$^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.01, ^{***}p < 0.001$

Table F14: Trans-Pacific Partnership: Alternative Specifications for Uncertainty Treatment

	Interaction			Loss Domain			Spread Contains Zero			Spread Crosses Domains		
Prediction Center	0.12***	0.09***	0.18***	0.06***	0.02	0.09***	0.10***	0.08***	0.13***	0.11***	0.08***	0.13***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Prediction Spread	0.04	0.09*	-0.02	-0.03	0.04	-0.13*	0.01	0.00	0.02	-0.00	0.02	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Partisan	-0.03			-0.03			-0.03			-0.02		
	(0.04)			(0.04)			(0.04)			(0.04)		
Loss Domain				-0.39***	-0.32*	-0.55***						
				(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.15)						
Contains Zero							0.12	0.02	0.24			
							(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.14)			
Crosses Zero										0.14	-0.04	0.27
										(0.16)	(0.23)	(0.22)
Spread ×												
Center	-0.02	-0.02	-0.04									
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)									
Loss Domain				0.09	-0.01	0.24*						
				(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)						
Contains Zero							-0.01	0.12	-0.14			
							(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.09)			
Crosses Zero										0.00	0.13	-0.10
										(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Spread + Interaction = 0 (p)	0.59	0.09	0.19	0.34	0.69	0.18	0.98	0.08	0.09	0.99	0.21	0.26
Sender	All	Experts	Partisan	All	Experts	Partisan	All	Experts	Partisan	All	Experts	Partisan
Observations	5435	2703	2732	5435	2703	2732	5435	2703	2732	5435	2703	2732

Note: All models are estimated using least squares with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is support for the policy. *Loss Domain* is a dummy variable indicating whether all predictions are in the loss domain. *Contains zero* is a dummy variable indicating whether the predictions contain the zero prediction. *Crosses zero* is a dummy variable indicating whether the predictions include are located in both the loss and gain domain.
$^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.01, ^{***}p < 0.001$

Table F15: Minimum Wage: Alternative Specifications for Uncertainty Treatment on Beliefs

	Interaction			Loss Domain			Spread Contains Zero			Spread Crosses Domains		
Prediction Center	0.06	0.10	0.02	-0.08	-0.09	-0.07	0.04	0.07	0.01	0.03	0.07	0.00
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Prediction Spread	0.06	0.17	-0.05	0.07	0.19	-0.04	0.09	0.33	-0.10	0.07	0.17	-0.03
	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Partisan	-0.01			-0.00			-0.01			-0.01		
	(0.15)			(0.15)			(0.15)			(0.15)		
Loss Domain				0.82*	1.07*	0.55						
				(0.34)	(0.48)	(0.48)						
Contains Zero							-0.23	-0.12	-0.32			
							(0.31)	(0.41)	(0.46)			
Crosses Zero										-0.78	-0.73	-0.81
										(0.54)	(0.75)	(0.77)
Spread ×												
Center	-0.03	-0.04	-0.02									
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)									
Loss Domain				-0.18	-0.24	-0.12						
				(0.20)	(0.28)	(0.28)						
Contains Zero							0.05	-0.15	0.21			
							(0.22)	(0.31)	(0.32)			
Crosses Zero										0.38	0.36	0.36
										(0.33)	(0.45)	(0.47)
Spread + Interaction = 0 (p)	0.76	0.39	0.68	0.43	0.78	0.40	0.42	0.45	0.69	0.15	0.21	0.44
Sender	All	Experts	Partisan	All	Experts	Partisan	All	Experts	Partisan	All	Experts	Partisan
Observations	4994	2491	2503	4994	2491	2503	4994	2491	2503	4994	2491	2503

Note: All models are estimated using least squares with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is outcome beliefs. *Loss Domain* is a dummy variable indicating whether all predictions are in the loss domain. *Contains zero* is a dummy variable indicating whether the predictions contain the zero prediction. *Crosses zero* is a dummy variable indicating whether the predictions include are located in both the loss and gain domain.
$^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.01, ^{***}p < 0.001$

Table F16: Corporate Tax: Alternative Specifications for Uncertainty Treatment on Beliefs

	Interaction			Loss Domain			Spread Contains Zero			Spread Crosses Domains		
Prediction Center	0.09	0.10	0.07	0.20***	0.20**	0.21**	0.15***	0.18***	0.11*	0.14***	0.18***	0.11*
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Prediction Spread	0.08	0.07	0.09	0.18	0.11	0.24	0.08	0.26	-0.09	0.11	0.10	0.13
	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.17)
Partisan	-0.02			-0.02			-0.02			-0.01		
	(0.15)			(0.15)			(0.15)			(0.15)		
Loss Domain				0.52	0.21	0.82						
				(0.34)	(0.47)	(0.48)						
Contains zero							-0.30	0.49	-1.11*			
							(0.31)	(0.43)	(0.45)			
Crosses zero										-0.60	-0.54	-0.65
										(0.58)	(0.85)	(0.80)
Spread ×												
Center	0.06	0.08	0.04									
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)									
Loss Domain				-0.18	-0.13	-0.25						
				(0.23)	(0.33)	(0.33)						
Contains zero							0.11	-0.46	0.68*			
							(0.23)	(0.32)	(0.32)			
Crosses zero										0.23	0.22	0.25
										(0.35)	(0.50)	(0.48)
Spread + Interaction = 0 (p)	0.23	0.35	0.41	0.98	0.97	0.99	0.27	0.41	0.02	0.29	0.50	0.40
Sender	All	Experts	Partisan	All	Experts	Partisan	All	Experts	Partisan	All	Experts	Partisan
Observations	4960	2462	2498	4960	2462	2498	4960	2462	2498	4960	2462	2498

Note: All models are estimated using least squares with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is outcome beliefs. *Loss Domain* is a dummy variable indicating whether all predictions are in the loss domain. *Contains zero* is a dummy variable indicating whether the predictions contain the zero prediction. *Crosses zero* is a dummy variable indicating whether the predictions include are located in both the loss and gain domain.
$^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.01, ^{***}p < 0.001$

Table F17: Trans-Pacific Partnership: Alternative Specifications for Uncertainty Treatment on Beliefs

	Interaction			Loss Domain			Spread Contains Zero			Spread Crosses Domains		
Prediction Center	0.05***	0.05***	0.06***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.05***	0.04***	0.05***	0.05***	0.04***	0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Prediction Spread	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Partisan	-0.05*			-0.05*			-0.05*			-0.05*		
	(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)		
Loss Domain				-0.02	0.02	-0.08						
				(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.08)						
Contains Zero							-0.11*	-0.15*	-0.05			
							(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)			
Crosses Zero										-0.10	-0.20	-0.01
										(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Spread ×												
Center	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00									
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)									
Loss Domain				-0.01	-0.01	0.00						
				(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)						
Contains Zero							0.09*	0.09	0.07			
							(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)			
Crosses Zero										0.09	0.15*	0.04
										(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Spread + Interaction = 0 (p)	0.28	0.52	0.42	0.65	0.55	0.70	0.00	0.01	0.14	0.04	0.03	0.46
Sender	All	Experts	Partisan	All	Experts	Partisan	All	Experts	Partisan	All	Experts	Partisan
Observations	5074	2523	2551	5074	2523	2551	5074	2523	2551	5074	2523	2551

Note: All models are estimated using least squares with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is outcome beliefs. *Loss Domain* is a dummy variable indicating whether all predictions are in the loss domain. *Contains zero* is a dummy variable indicating whether the predictions contain the zero prediction. *Crosses zero* is a dummy variable indicating whether the predictions include are located in both the loss and gain domain.
$^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.01, ^{***}p < 0.001$

F.9 Heterogeneity: Loss and Gain Domain

The results from the experiment show that respondents do not assign more weight to pessimistic predictions than optimistic predictions. This does not mean that negative information cannot elicit a stronger response than positive information, as shown in previous research.[6] I explore this by regressing outcome beliefs and support on dummy variables indicating whether the *prediction center* is in the gain or loss domain. The results, presented in table F18, show that negative predictions are not disproportionately influential on outcome beliefs. However, they have a stronger impact than positive predictions on support for both the corporate tax and Trans-

[6]Cobb, M. D., & Kuklinski, J. H. (1997). Changing Minds: Political Arguments and Political Persuasion. *American Journal of Political* Science, 41(1):88-121., Lau, R. R. (1985). Two Explanations for Negativity Effects in Political Behavior. *American Journal of Political Science* 29(1):119-138.

Pacific Partnership proposals. In other words, negative predictions are not more persuadable or credible than positive predictions but compared with positive predictions, they induce a stronger response among respondents.

Table F18: Heterogeneity: Predictions in Loss and Gain Domain

	Minimum Wage		Corporate Tax		Trans-Pacific Partnership	
	Outcome beliefs	Support	Outcome beliefs	Support	Outcome beliefs	Support
Prediction center: gain	-0.24	0.05	0.43 *	0.04	0.09 **	0.19 ***
	(0.18)	(0.06)	(0.20)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Prediction center: loss	0.14	-0.04	-0.23	-0.16 *	-0.16 ***	-0.38 ***
	(0.20)	(0.07)	(0.19)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Prediction spread	0.04	-0.10	0.13	0.03	0.02	0.04
	(0.17)	(0.06)	(0.17)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Partisan	-0.01	-0.03	-0.01	0.04	-0.05 *	-0.02
	(0.15)	(0.05)	(0.15)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Observations	4994	5434	4960	5436	5074	5435

Note: All models are estimated using least squares with robust standard errors. *Prediction center: gain* is a dummy indicating whether the prediction center is in the gain domain relative to the status quo. *Prediction center: loss* is a dummy indicating whether the prediction center is in the loss domain relative to the status quo. Support is measured on a seven-point Likert scale, where higher values imply higher support for the policy. Outcome beliefs is a continuous variable refering to the respondent's numerical estimates of the effect of the reform on the respective outcome variable.
$^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.01, ^{***}p < 0.001$

This interpretation reconciles two seemingly inconsistent findings from the experiment. Although respondents do not give more weight to pessimistic than to optimistic predictions, respondents react more strongly to predictions predominantly in the loss domain. For risk preferences to matter, voters must consider the spread of the possible outcomes in addition to the most likely outcome. But the experiment suggests that, when voters average over predictions, they collapse this information into one prediction and ignore the spread. Technically, the finding that losses matter more than equal sized gains implies decreasing marginal utility and a concave utility function. The finding that the spread of predictions does not matter implies a linear utility function. However, the finding that the spread of predictions does not matter is also consistent with voters collapsing multiple predictions into one prediction, even if the utility function is concave.

F.10 Sensitivity: Difference of Means

Table F19: Results are Robust to a Difference of Means Specification

	Minimum Wage			Corporate Tax			Trans-Pacific Partnership		
	Outcome beliefs	Idealistic preference	Support	Outcome beliefs	Idealistic preference	Support	Outcome beliefs	Idealistic preference	Support
Prediction increase	0.43 *	-0.01	-0.10	0.66 **	-0.10	0.22 **	0.16 ***	-0.03	0.30 ***
	(0.21)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.22)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Prediction spread	0.33	0.05	-0.08	0.08	-0.14	-0.00	0.03	-0.04	0.08
	(0.23)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.24)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Partisan sender	0.51	0.01	-0.02	0.01	-0.21 *	-0.00	-0.03	0.02	0.00
	(0.30)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.31)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Prediction increase × partisan	-0.21	-0.07	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.11	0.21 *
	(0.30)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.30)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Prediction spread × partisan	-0.61	0.05	-0.02	-0.04	0.18	0.05	-0.04	-0.09	-0.14
	(0.32)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.34)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Observations	4994	5452	5434	4960	5453	5436	5074	5451	5435

Note: All models are estimated using least squares with robust standard errors. *Prediction increase* is a dummy indicating whether *prediction center* is greater than zero. The reference category are predictions were *prediction center* is either 0 or decreasing. *Prediction spread* is a dummy indicating whether there are conflicting predictions. Changing the reference category to be predictions when *prediction center* = 0 and adding the variable *prediction decrease* produces the same results.
$^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.01, ^{***}p < 0.001$

F.11 Sensitivity: The Effect of Treatments on Qualitative Outcome Beliefs

Table F20: Effects of Treatments on Qualitative Outcome Beliefs

	Minimum Wage Outcome belief	Corporate Tax Outcome belief	Trans-Pacific Partnership Outcome belief
Prediction center	0.01	0.01 ***	0.04 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Partisan sender	0.02	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Prediction spread	0.02	-0.01	0.03 *
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Prediction center × partisan	-0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Prediction spread × partisan	-0.01	0.01	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Center + Center × Partisan = 0 (p)	0.26	0.00	0.00
Spread + Spread × Partisan = 0 (p)	0.54	0.86	0.98
Observations	5423	5397	5415

Note: All models are estimated using least squares with robust standard errors. Qualitative is a binary variable refering to whether the respondent believes that the reform will lead to an increase in the outcome variable for each respective reform. The wording of questions are available in the appendix.
$^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.01, ^{***}p < 0.001$

F.12 Sensitivity: Ordered Probit Estimates

Table F21: Sensitivity: Ordered Probit Results for Idealistic Preference and Support

	Minimum Wage		Corporate Tax		Trans-Pacific Partnership	
	Idealistic	Support	Idealistic	Support	Idealistic	Support
Prediction center	0.007	-0.017	-0.008	0.030 ***	-0.004	0.050 ***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Prediction spread	0.015	0.001	-0.036	-0.008	-0.035	0.059 *
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)
Partisan sender	0.001	0.007	-0.072	-0.013	-0.016	0.063
	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.050)
Prediction center × partisan sender	-0.018	0.005	-0.003	-0.009	0.020	0.035 **
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Prediction spread × partisan sender	0.009	-0.023	0.029	0.034	0.015	-0.072
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.037)
Observations	5452	5434	5453	5436	5451	5435

Note: All models are estimated using ordered probit regression. Support is measured on a seven-point Likert scale, where higher values imply higher support for the policy. Outcome beliefs is a continuous variable refering to the respondent's numerical estimates of the effect of the reform on the respective outcome variable.
$^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.01, ^{***}p < 0.001$

F.13 Sensitivity: Dropping Single Prediction Treatment

Table F22: Dropping Single Prediction Treatments: Outcome Beliefs and Support

	Minimum Wage		Corporate Tax		Trans-Pacific Partnership	
	Outcome belief	Support	Outcome belief	Support	Outcome belief	Support
Prediction center	0.07	-0.01	0.21 ***	0.05 **	0.03 ***	0.07 ***
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Partisan sender	-0.63	0.14	-0.24	-0.07	-0.12	0.18
	(0.55)	(0.19)	(0.55)	(0.19)	(0.08)	(0.16)
Prediction spread	0.02	0.14	0.07	-0.02	0.04	0.17 *
	(0.25)	(0.09)	(0.26)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.07)
Prediction center × partisan	-0.08	-0.01	-0.08	0.00	0.02	0.05 *
	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Prediction spread × partisan	0.31	-0.13	0.15	0.09	0.04	-0.16
	(0.36)	(0.13)	(0.36)	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.10)
Observations	3481	3783	3476	3810	3809	4077

Note: All models are estimated using least squares with robust standard errors. Support is measured on a seven-point Likert scale, where higher values imply higher support for the policy. Outcome beliefs is a continuous variable refering to the respondent's numerical estimates of the effect of the reform on the respective outcome variable.
$^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.01, ^{***}p < 0.001$

F.14 Sensitivity: Numerical Literacy

Do respondents react to the magnitude of the prediction or is it only the direction that matters? I examine this by re-estimating the main specification on outcome beliefs separately for respondents who received a positive or negative prediction. Thus, the estimates are estimated only using the variation across qualitatively identical but quantitatively different predictions. I show the results in Table F23.

Table F23: Effects within Qualitatively Equivalent Treatments

	Minimum Wage		Corporate Tax		Trans-Pacific Partnership	
Prediction center	-0.11	-0.19	0.38 *	0.15	0.05 †	0.04 †
	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Partisan sender	0.27	0.55	1.20 †	0.40	0.03	-0.11
	(0.63)	(0.61)	(0.66)	(0.67)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Prediction spread	-0.04	0.32	0.38 †	0.07	0.00	0.03
	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Prediction center × partisan	-0.14	0.02	-0.42 †	0.05	-0.03	-0.00
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Prediction spread × partisan	-0.07	-0.36	-0.28	-0.09	0.00	0.01
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Prediction Center	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
Observations	2186	2147	2124	2158	2163	2248

Note: All models are estimated using least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
$^{\dagger}p < 0.10^{*}p < 0.05,^{**}p < 0.01,^{***}p < 0.001$

I focus on the results on the corporate tax and TPP reforms. For corporate tax, both effects are in the expected direction, although the point estimate is twice as large (and significant) for the positive domain treatment. For the TPP reform, there is little difference between the positive and the negative domain and both effects are significant at the 10% level. The results show that respondents do discern differences between predictions of different magnitude in the same outcome domain.

F.15 Sensitivity: Multilevel Models

Using the identical structure of treatments across policies, I pool the data and further explore the treatment effects using two multilevel models. Here, I present a summary of these findings. The full models are available in the replication material or from the author upon request.

First, I pool the data on the respondent-policy-question level and estimate a model with random intercepts for outcomes and policies and random slopes for prediction center across

Figure F2: Heterogeneity in Effect of Prediction Center across Outcomes and Policies



Note: The graph shows the marginal effect of prediction center across the three outcomes and the policies. Estimates from a normal-linear multilevel model, pooled at the respondent-policy-outcome level, with random intercepts for policy and outcomes and random prediction center slopes over outcomes and policies. Lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

outcomes and policies.[7] I present the results of this model in Figure F2.[8]. In the figure, I plot the marginal effect of *prediction center* across outcomes and policies. Examining the effect of *prediction center* across outcomes, in the left panel, we see that the effects are strongest for beliefs and approximately half as strong for attitudes. The effect on idealistic preferences is not significant at all, and the point estimate is very close to zero. Turning to the right panel, we see that the effect of *prediction center* is strongest for the TPP reform followed by the corporate tax reform. The effect on the minimum wage reform is not statistically significant from zero, and the point estimate is very close zero. These results corroborate the findings from the pre-registered analysis. While respondents rely strongly on predictions for forming beliefs, but also for forming attitudes, predictions do not affect the idealistic preferences of the respondents.

Second, I pool the data on the respondent-policy level and estimate non-linear effects of *prediction center* and *prediction spread*, including an interaction with partisan sender for the three outcomes. The model includes random intercepts for policies but no random slopes.[9]

[7] Convergence and singularity issues arise when respondent random intercepts or random slopes for *prediction spread* are included. This suggests that there is little meaningful variation explained by these modeling choices and I therefore omit them.

[8] Full models are available from the author upon request

[9] Once again, convergence and singularity issues arise when respondent random intercepts or random slopes

Figure F3: Non-Linear Effects of Prediction Center



Note: The graph shows the marginal effect of prediction center across the three outcomes. Estimates from a normal-linear multilevel model, pooled at the respondent-policy level, with random intercepts for policy. Lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

I present the results for *prediction center* in Figure F3. I model the effect of *prediction center* as a set of dummy variables with 0 as the reference category. First, we see that the estimated effects of prediction center are very close to zero for the idealistic outcomes regardless of the value of the prediction. For beliefs, we instead see strong effects of predictions in the expected direction for both expert and partisan senders. Somewhat surprisingly, the effects are attenuated when experts are senders for attitude formation. The non-linear analysis suggests that the effect of predictions is quite uniform and that the direction of the prediction may be more important than the actual numeric value of the prediction. This could explain why I do not find any effect of *prediction spread* on attitudes. Yet, the analysis of numerical literacy in section F.14, shows that respondents do discriminate between predictions of different quantitative magnitude in the same direction.

In Figure F4, I show the effect of *prediction spread*. As in the main analysis, I find little evidence of *prediction spread* having any effect on the outcome measures. Especially for idealistic preferences and attitudes, these effects are precisely estimated null-effects.

Taken together, the results from the multilevel analysis corroborate the findings in the main

prediction center or *prediction spread* are included. This suggests that there is little meaningful variation explained by these modeling choices and I therefore omit them.

Figure F4: Non-Linear Effects of Prediction Spread



Note: The graph shows the marginal effect of prediction spread across the three outcomes. Estimates from a normal-linear multilevel model, pooled at the respondent-policy level, with random intercepts for policy. Lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

paper. Two findings are worth emphasizing. No treatment variable has an affect on idealistic preferences. This is not because the effects are imprecise. Instead, it is a precise null. Second, the effect of *prediction spread* on any of the outcome variables is also a precise null. Further, the analysis of alternative operationalizations of prediction uncertainty in section F.8, shows that there are no effects of *prediction spread* even when the predictions point in different directions. This strongly indicates that respondents are not repelled by the uncertainty implied by conflicting predictions.