

Appendix

Untying Hands: Deescalation, Reputation, and Dynamic Audience Costs

Appendix 1 – Experimental Instrument

This appendix reproduces the text used in the U.S. experiment. The crisis scenario is adopted from Tomz (2007).¹

Introduction Screen

[All respondents]

The following questions are about U.S. foreign relations.

You will read about a type of situation our country has faced in the past and could face again in the future. Different leaders have handled the situation in different ways. We will describe one approach U.S. leaders have taken, and ask whether you approve or disapprove.

Scenario Screen 1

[All respondents]

- **A country sent its military to take over a neighboring country.**

Scenario Screen 2

[All respondents]

- A country sent its military to take over a neighboring country.
- **The U.S. president said that if the attack continued, the U.S. military would push out the invaders.**

Scenario Screen 3

[All respondents]

- A country sent its military to take over a neighboring country.

¹ Following Levy et al. (2015) and Quek (2017), we focused on the main part of Tomz's (2007) experiment without the additional treatments that varied the level of escalation, and did not include the randomized contextual variables (regime type, invader's motive, power, and interest). The same approach was also adopted in Trager and Vavreck (2011) and Levendusky and Horowitz (2012).

- The U.S. president said that if the attack continued, the U.S. military would push out the invaders.
- **The attacking country continued to invade.**

Scenario Screen 4

- A country sent its military to take over a neighboring country.
- The U.S. president said that if the attack continued, the U.S. military would push out the invaders.
- The attacking country continued to invade.
- [*For Threat treatment group, show:*]
The attacking country threatened to make it very costly for the U.S. if the U.S. intervened in the conflict.
- [*For Reassurance treatment group, show:*]
The attacking country promised that it would cooperate with the U.S. to ensure regional stability after the war.
- [*For Non-Interference treatment group, show:*]
The attacking country said that the conflict is purely between the two countries, and that external actors should not be involved in it.
- [*For UN treatment group, show:*]
The UN Secretary General said that it would be inappropriate for the U.S. to unilaterally intervene in the conflict.
- [*For Experts treatment group, show:*]
Military experts said that it would be very costly for the U.S. if the U.S. intervened in the conflict.

Scenario Screen 5

- A country sent its military to take over a neighboring country.
- The U.S. president said that if the attack continued, the U.S. military would push out the invaders.
- The attacking country continued to invade.
- [*Add: Treatment Sentence*]
- **In the end, the U.S. president did not send troops, and the attacking country took over its neighbor.**

Approval Rating Screen 1**[All respondents]**

Do you approve or disapprove of the way the U.S. president handled the situation? [*Approve / Disapprove / Neither approve nor disapprove*]

Approval Rating Screen 2**[If “Approve”]**

Do you approve very strongly, or only somewhat? [*Approve very strongly / Approve somewhat*]

[If “Disapprove”]

Do you disapprove very strongly, or only somewhat? [*Disapprove very strongly / Disapprove somewhat*]

[If “Neither”]

Do you lean toward approving of the way the U.S. president handled the situation, lean toward disapproving, or don't you lean either way? [*Lean toward approving / Lean toward disapproving / Lean neither way*]

Reputational Assessment Screen 1**[All respondents]**

In your view, has America's reputation been improved or damaged by the President's handling of the situation? [*Improved / Damaged / Neither improved nor damaged*]

Reputational Assessment Screen 2**[If “Improved”]**

How much is America's reputation improved as a result of the President's handling of the situation? [*A lot / Somewhat / A little*]


[If “Damaged”]

How much is America's reputation damaged as a result of the President's handling of the situation? [*A lot / Somewhat / A little*]

Appendix 2 – Balance on Pre-Treatment Covariates

Figure A1 shows the univariate distributions of different demographic variables across experimental groups. While there is some random fluctuation, the covariates are balanced across groups, as expected from randomization. Appendix 3 shows ordered-logit estimates of treatment effects that control for respondent demographic characteristics.

FIGURE A1 Univariate Balance on Pre-Treatment Covariates (United States)



Appendix 3 – Ordered Logit Estimates of Treatment Effects

Tables A1 and A2 show the ordered logit estimates of the treatment effects on public approval and reputational assessment respectively. The conclusions in the main text remain unchanged across different model specifications controlling for respondent demographic characteristics including age, gender, race, partisanship, education, and income.

TABLE A1 Determinants of Public Approval (Ordered Logit Estimates)

| | <i>Model 1</i> | <i>Model 2</i> | <i>Model 3</i> | <i>Model 4</i> | <i>Model 5</i> | <i>Model 6</i> | <i>Model 7</i> |
|--------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| THREAT | 0.464*** (0.155) | 0.448*** (0.155) | 0.463*** (0.155) | 0.452*** (0.155) | 0.448*** (0.155) | 0.434*** (0.156) | 0.434*** (0.156) |
| REASSURANCE | 0.490*** (0.156) | 0.479*** (0.156) | 0.479*** (0.156) | 0.459*** (0.157) | 0.451*** (0.157) | 0.462*** (0.157) | 0.462*** (0.157) |
| NORMFRAMING | 0.697*** (0.156) | 0.677*** (0.157) | 0.686*** (0.157) | 0.686*** (0.157) | 0.678*** (0.157) | 0.710*** (0.158) | 0.710*** (0.158) |
| UN | 0.550*** (0.157) | 0.535*** (0.157) | 0.540*** (0.157) | 0.528*** (0.158) | 0.512*** (0.158) | 0.503*** (0.158) | 0.503*** (0.158) |
| EXPERTS | 0.510*** (0.154) | 0.508*** (0.154) | 0.528*** (0.155) | 0.524*** (0.155) | 0.513*** (0.155) | 0.493*** (0.155) | 0.493*** (0.155) |
| FEMALE | | -0.167* (0.0908) | -0.181** (0.0910) | -0.172* (0.0912) | -0.154* (0.0916) | -0.108 (0.0924) | -0.108 (0.0926) |
| AGE | | | -0.00825*** (0.00271) | -0.00920*** (0.00279) | -0.00945*** (0.00279) | -0.0103*** (0.00281) | -0.0103*** (0.00281) |
| WHITE | | | | 0.145 (0.0977) | 0.0924 (0.1000) | 0.0887 (0.100) | 0.0887 (0.100) |
| REPUBLICAN | | | | | 0.240** (0.0980) | 0.227** (0.0981) | 0.227** (0.0982) |
| EDUCATION | | | | | | 0.122*** (0.0305) | 0.122*** (0.0342) |
| INCOME | | | | | | | 7.95e-06 (0.0133) |
| Observations | 1,531 | 1,527 | 1,527 | 1,527 | 1,527 | 1,527 | 1,527 |

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Significance tests are two-tailed. Constant cuts are omitted.

TABLE A2 Determinants of Perceived Reputational Impact (Ordered Logit Estimates)

| | <i>Model 1</i> | <i>Model 2</i> | <i>Model 3</i> | <i>Model 4</i> | <i>Model 5</i> | <i>Model 6</i> | <i>Model 7</i> |
|--------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| THREAT | 0.434*** (0.156) | 0.423*** (0.157) | 0.429*** (0.157) | 0.393** (0.158) | 0.398** (0.159) | 0.390** (0.159) | 0.390** (0.159) |
| REASSURANCE | 0.490*** (0.159) | 0.487*** (0.159) | 0.487*** (0.159) | 0.431*** (0.160) | 0.407** (0.160) | 0.424*** (0.160) | 0.424*** (0.160) |
| NORMFRAMING | 0.282* (0.155) | 0.260* (0.156) | 0.260* (0.156) | 0.255 (0.157) | 0.235 (0.158) | 0.257 (0.158) | 0.256 (0.158) |
| UN | 0.529*** (0.158) | 0.529*** (0.159) | 0.532*** (0.159) | 0.497*** (0.159) | 0.455*** (0.160) | 0.443*** (0.160) | 0.444*** (0.160) |
| EXPERTS | 0.316** (0.155) | 0.323** (0.156) | 0.336** (0.156) | 0.316** (0.157) | 0.277* (0.158) | 0.271* (0.158) | 0.271* (0.158) |
| FEMALE | | -0.355*** (0.0919) | -0.364*** (0.0920) | -0.335*** (0.0924) | -0.292*** (0.0928) | -0.258*** (0.0935) | -0.258*** (0.0937) |
| AGE | | | -0.00546** (0.00276) | -0.00846*** (0.00284) | -0.00913*** (0.00286) | -0.00991*** (0.00288) | -0.00992*** (0.00288) |
| WHITE | | | | 0.470*** (0.0992) | 0.289*** (0.102) | 0.282*** (0.102) | 0.282*** (0.102) |
| REPUBLICAN | | | | | 0.800*** (0.100) | 0.792*** (0.100) | 0.793*** (0.101) |
| EDUCATION | | | | | | 0.0997*** (0.0309) | 0.101*** (0.0347) |
| INCOME | | | | | | | -0.00105 (0.0135) |
| Observations | 1,531 | 1,527 | 1,527 | 1,527 | 1,527 | 1,527 | 1,527 |

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Significance tests are two-tailed. Constant cuts are omitted.

Appendix 4 – Treatment Effects by Demographic Subsets

This appendix breaks down the results to explore whether the approval ratings of citizens in particular demographics or with particular attitudes are more responsive to the treatment.

FIGURE A2 Treatment Effects on Approval Score by Gender







FIGURE A3 Treatment Effects on Approval Score by Nativism




Note. Respondents are coded as nativists if they agree or strongly agree that “people should support their own country even if what it does is wrong.”

FIGURE A4 Treatment Effects on Approval Score by Internationalism


Note. Three yes/no questions are devised to measure the respondents' degree of internationalism: (i) "Have you been abroad in 2019?"; (ii) "Among your good friends, is anyone currently or has anyone ever studied, worked or lived abroad?"; and (iii) "Do you know any foreign language(s)?" Respondents are coded as internationalists if they answered "yes" to two or more of the questions.

FIGURE A5 Treatment Effects on Approval Score by Education



Note. Respondents are considered to have completed university education if they have received a 4-year college degree or any higher academic qualification.

FIGURE A6 Treatment Effects on Approval Score by Age


Note. Respondents are coded as adolescents if they are 24 or younger, based on the current UN definition of the “youth” demographic.

FIGURE A7 Treatment Effects on Approval Score by Partisanship


Note. Respondents are coded as Republicans if they either consider themselves Republicans, or think of themselves as closer to the Republican Party.

FIGURE A8 Treatment Effects on Reputation Score by Gender

FIGURE A9 Treatment Effects on Reputation Score by Nativism



Note. Respondents are coded as nativists if they agree or strongly agree that “people should support their own country even if what it does is wrong.”

FIGURE A10 Treatment Effects on Reputation Score by Internationalism


Note. Three yes/no questions are devised to measure the respondents' degree of internationalism: (i) "Have you been abroad in 2019?"; (ii) "Among your good friends, is anyone currently or has anyone ever studied, worked or lived abroad?"; and (iii) "Do you know any foreign language(s)?" Respondents are coded as internationalists if they answered "yes" to two or more of the questions.

FIGURE A11 Treatment Effects on Reputation Score by Education

Note. Respondents are considered to have completed university education if they have received a 4-year college degree or any higher academic qualification.

FIGURE A12 Treatment Effects on Approval Score by Age

Note. Respondents are adolescents if they are 24 or younger, based on the current UN definition of the “youth” demographic.

FIGURE A13 Treatment Effects on Approval Score by Partisanship

Note. Respondents are coded as Republicans if they either consider themselves Republicans, or think of themselves as closer to the Republican Party.