**Appendix**

**How Does International Intervention Work?**

**Mechanisms for Securing Peace Settlements in Civil Conflicts**

July 2021

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## 1.1 U.N. Peacekeeping Missions, by Mandate Type

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | |  |
|  | **Conflict** | **Post-Conflict** | Total |
| **No Military Coercion Mandate** | 9 (39%) | 17 (49%) | 26 (45%) |
| **Military Coercion Mandate** | 14 (61%) | 18 (51%) | 32 (55%) |
| Total | 23 (100%) | 35 (100%) | 58 (100%) |

*Fisher’s exact* = 0.59

## 1.2 U.N. Peacekeeping Missions, by Time Period (Post-Conflict only)

Based on their start dates, we separate post-conflict peacekeeping missions into three major time periods: pre-1995, when new peacekeeping mechanisms were being developed; 1995-2001, when casualties during operations in Somalia in particular, and also Bosnia and Rwanda, diminished international support for peacekeeping across mission types; and post-2001, when the release of the Brahimi Report helped renew support for peacekeeping, but with still relatively few but large and militarized missions regardless of whether they were necessary.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Mission Start Date** | |  |  |
|  | *Pre-1995* | *1995-2001* | *Post-2001* | Total |
| **No Military Coercion Mandate** | 9 (82%) | 5 (42%) | 3 (25%) | 17 (49%) |
| **Military Coercion Mandate** | 2 (18%) | 7 (58%) | 9 (75%) | 18 (51%) |
| Total | 11 (100%) | 12 (100%) | 12 (100%) | 35 (100%) |

*Fisher’s exact* = 0.02\*\*



|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | |  |  |
|  | *Pre-1995* | *1995-2001* | *Post-2001* | Total |
| **No Conditional Incentives (CI)** | 3 (27%) | 4 (33%) | 8 (67%) | 15 (43%) |
| **Conditional Incentives (CI)** | 8 (73%) | 8 (67%) | 4 (33%) | 20 (57%) |
| Total | 10 (100%) | 12 (100%) | 12 (100%) | 34 (100%) |

*Fisher’s exact* = 0.17

## 1.3 Comparison of Mission Composition

We used personnel commitments from Kathman (2013), which captures the average monthly deployment of armed troops, police, and military observers in each peacekeeping mission. Below are summary statistics for the average number of troops, unarmed personnel, total personnel, and personnel dispatched per capita (per 100,000 civilians) by mandate type and conflict stage. On average, coercive missions deployed substantially more troops *and* unarmed personnel than those that did not, while conditional incentives (CI) missions deployed significantly more unarmed personnel than any other type of mission.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | **Mandate Type** | | | | **Conflict Stage** | |  |
| **Average Number of Mission Personnel** | | *No Military Coercion (N=20)* | *Military Coercion*  *(N=31)* | *No CI*  *(N=21)* | *CI*  *(N=19)* | *Post-Conflict (N=34)* | *Conflict (N=20)* | *All Missions*  *(N=51)* |
| **Troops** | Mean | 3393 | 7123 | 4771 | 3717 | 3963 | 8520 | 5660 |
| Median | 16 | 4255 | 1448 | 2959 | 2672 | 1291 | 1448 |
| St. Dev. | 6849 | 8178 | 6933 | 4334 | 4704 | 10887 | 7832 |
| Per Capita | 72 | 164 | 69 | 101 | 84 | 205 | 129 |
| **Unarmed Personnel** | Mean | 454 | 875 | 549 | 961 | 774 | 651 | 710 |
| Median | 178 | 607 | 253 | 597 | 426 | 229 | 323 |
| St. Dev. | 757 | 862 | 612 | 892 | 779 | 954 | 840 |
| Per Capita | 11 | 23 | 13 | 32 | 24 | 9 | 18 |
| **Total Personnel** | Mean | 3370 | 7998 | 5323 | 4210 | 4445 | 8716 | 6027 |
| Median | 227 | 4466 | 1770 | 2268 | 2453 | 1434 | 1740 |
| St. Dev. | 6940 | 8464 | 7293 | 4865 | 5141 | 11217 | 1740 |
| Per Capita | 69 | 179 | 74 | 119 | 97 | 191 | 132 |

**Figure 1.3a: Mission Composition, Mandates for Military Coercion vs. Non-Coercive**

## 1.4 Robustness Checks for Military Coercion(Table 1)

This section provides robustness checks regarding our coding of military coercion. Instead of our coding, we use Doyle & Sambanis (2006)’s and Fortna (2008)’s coding of Chapter VI (traditional) and Chapter VII (enforcement) missions to replicate Table 1 in the paper (post-conflict peacekeeping only).

**Table 1.4a: Cross Tabs of Mandate Types (Fortna’s Coding)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Mandate Type** | **Conditional Incentives (CI)** | **No Conditional Incentives (CI)** | Total |
| *Chapter VII* | 7 (44%) | 7 (50%) | 14 (100%) |
| *Chapter VI* | 9 (56%) | 7 (50%) | 16 (100%) |
| Total | 16 (100%) | 14 (100%) | 30 (100%) |

*Fisher’s exact* = 1.00

**Table 1.4b: Cross Tabs of Mandate Types (D&S’s Coding)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Mandate Type** | **Conditional Incentives (CI)** | **No Conditional Incentives (CI)** | Total |
| *Chapter VII* | 6 (37%) | 5 (36%) | 16 (100%) |
| *Chapter VI* | 10 (63%) | 9 (64%) | 14 (100%) |
| Total | 16 (100%) | 14 (100%) | 30 (100%) |

*Fisher’s exact* = 1.00

## 

## 

## 1.5 Combinations of Peacekeeping Types (Robustness Checks)

This section presents further results comparing exclusive categories of each of the four combinations of peacekeeping types (post-conflict only). These combinations are:

1. Missions with mandates for military coercion (coercion) *and* CI (9 cases in all U.N. missions, 6 cases in the post-conflict peace period data)
2. Coercive missions that did not employ CI (11 cases in all U.N. missions, 10 cases in the post-conflict peace period data)
3. Missions lacking mandates for military coercion that employed CI (13 cases in all U.N. missions, 11 cases in the post-conflict peace period data)
4. Missions that employed neither military coercion nor CI (8 cases in all U.N. missions, 5 cases in the post-conflict peace period data)

Robustness checks for Table 3 in the paper where only Chapter VII missions were coded as military coercion (using Doyle & Sambanis 2006 and Fortna 2008) yielded similar results (Tables 1.6a and 1.6b).

**Table 1.5a: Cross Tabs of Combinations of Mandate Types (D&S’s Coding)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | **Fortna’s Coding (2008), post-conflict missions only** | | | | |
|  | **No Peacekeeping** | **PKO: CI & Chap. VII** | | **PKO: CI &**  **Chap. VI** | **PKO: No CI & Chap. VII** | **PKO: No CI & Chap. VI** |
| **Conflict Recurs** | 59 (67%) | 2 (29%) | | 2 (22%) | 5 (71%) | 5 (71%) |
| **No Recurrence** | 29 (33%) | 5 (71%) | | 7 (78%) | 2 (29%) | 2 (29%) |
| **Total** | 88 (100%) | 7 (100%) | | 9 (100%) | 7 (100%) | 7 (100%) |
| *Fisher’s exact (vs. no PKO)* | | | *0.09\** | *0.01\*\** | *1.00* | *0.12* |

**Table 1.5b: Cross Tabs of Combinations of Mandate Types (Fortna’s Coding)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | **D&S’s Coding (2006), post-conflict missions only** | | | | |
|  | **No Peacekeeping** | **PKO: CI & Chap. VII** | | **PKO: CI &**  **Chap. VI** | **PKO: No CI & Chap. VII** | **PKO: No CI & Chap. VI** |
| **Conflict Recurs** | 59 (67%) | 2 (33%) | | 2 (20%) | 3 (60%) | 7 (78%) |
| **No Recurrence** | 29 (33%) | 4 (67%) | | 8 (80%) | 2 (40%) | 2 (22%) |
| **Total** | 88 (100%) | 6 (100%) | | 10 (100%) | 5 (100%) | 9 (100%) |
| *Fisher’s exact (vs. no PKO)* | | | *0.18* | *0.01\*\*\** | *1.00* | *0.71* |

## 1.6 Selection Model Results, Possible Predictors of Peacekeeping Types (Post-Conflict)

This section presents results of selection models for different types of post-conflict peacekeeping missions on a variety of possible predictors. The predictors, for which sources are listed in Section 2.5a, include the following:

*Information about the previous conflict:*

* Number of battle deaths, logged
* Duration of the conflict, in months
* Dummy variables for whether the conflict was ethnic, territorial, or was fought against Marxist rebels
* The number of rebel groups that fought in the conflict
* The strength of the rebels and balance of capabilities between government and rebels
* The outcome of the conflict, including whether it ended in a peace agreement, ceasefire, victory for the government, victory for the rebels, or low activity

*Country characteristics:*

* Degree of ethnic fractionalization
* Population size, logged
* Extent of mountainous terrain
* Number of military personnel, logged
* GDP per capita
* Level of democratization (Polity IV score)
* Regional dummy variables for Europe, Latin America, Asia, Africa, the Middle East

*Peacekeeping deployments*

* Whether a peacekeeping mission (U.N. or non-U.N.) was deployed *during* the conflict preceding the peace period
* Whether other non-U.N. missions were deployed during the peace period, such as regional peacekeeping (e.g. by NATO or the African Union).

*Elections*

* Whether a peace period contained a peace agreement with electoral participation provisions, according to Matanock 2017 (*Electoral PA provisions*) and whether elections were held at any point during the peace period, according to the NELDA database, including both executive and legislative elections (*Elections, Nelda*), and executive elections only (*Elections, Nelda/Exec.)*

*Peace agreement provisions*:

* The type of the country’s peace agreement (full agreement, partial agreement, or peace process agreement)
* Dummy variables for whether the agreement included provisions for security sector reform (*SSR*), integration of rebels into the government (*Intgov*), disarmament (*DDR*), power-sharing (*Shagov*), the autonomy or independence of a disputed region (*AutInd*), and peacekeeping (*PKO*).

*Group of friends (GoF):*

* Whether any “groups of friends” – informal groups of states and international organizations formed to support U.N. peacemaking – existed during the peace period (*GoF: Any*), and whether the “friends” included at least one of the permanent U.N. Security Council members (*GoF: Powers*) and whether the U.N. was an active participant (*GoF: UN*).

*Aid:* How much aid a country received pre-treatment (e.g., before the peace period, 3-5 year averages), including

* U.S. military aid
* Development aid from USAID (democracy and governance aid and non-D&G aid)
* Total Overseas Development Assistance (*ODA*)
* Share of ODA in total GDP in 2005 dollars (*Share Aid*)

*Alliances:*

* Dummy variables for whether the country had an alliance with the U.S. or any of the permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council.
* Dummy variables for whether the country is a former British or French colony.

Table 1.7a shows the results of a series of logistic regressions on our unmatched peace period sample to test whether these covariates predict the deployment of any type of U.N. mission and then focusing on the deployment of those with CI (e.g., compared to peace periods that received no peacekeeping). The first set of models are bivariate logistic regressions with the dependent variable being all missions and then the particular peacekeeping type (military coercion missions, and then CI missions), and the independent variable being each potential confounder described above. The second set of models focus on, and include controls for, confounders originally identified by G&S, including *battle deaths, war duration, ethnic fractionalization, population size, mountainous terrain*, number of *military personnel*, *GDP per capita, Polity IV* score, and regional dummy variables. These models also include controls for the deployment of alternative types of peacekeeping (so for assessing coercive missions, the model controls for the deployment of non-coercive missions, and vice versa).[[1]](#footnote-1) The third set of models are multivariate regressions where those covariates not identified by G&S (e.g. those pertaining to peace agreement provisions, aid, GoF, alliances) were run in a separate model with G&S’s covariates included as controls.

The fourth set of models show results for multinomial logits with the dependent variable being the deployment of different combinations of peacekeeping types compared to a baseline of no peacekeeping in a country-level peace period (PKO type = 0 if no UN mission, 1 = coercive and CI mission, 2 = coercive and non-CI mission, 3 = CI mission with no coercion, 4 = mission with neither coercion nor CI). The fifth set of models show results for selection models comparing CI-only missions to coercive-only missions. For both the fourth and fifth sets of models, no control variables are included because the number of cases are so small (and thus the models do not converge if controls are included).

Note that *peace agreement* was not included in the fourth set of models; because the existence of a peace agreement significantly increases the likelihood of a peacekeeping deployment of any type – as the results below demonstrate – due to the small sample size for combinations of mission types, including it in the model substantially skews the results. We also omitted the regional dummies from the covariates for the fourth set of models because otherwise they would not run (likely due to the small sample size). We otherwise took the same approach to including controls for each G&S covariate as in the second and third set of models.

Our results show that a PKO *of any type* is predicted by factors that make certain conflicts more difficult to secure, including more battle deaths in the conflict, fewer government troops, and more mountainous terrain, as well as whether a settlement was in place (and whether it had provisions for peacekeepers). They are also associated with having had peacekeepers in the past and with establishing a “groups of friends” (informal collection of actors dedicated to assisting the peace process).

Both missions with *military coercion* and those with *conditional incentives* had the same relationship as *any PKO* with peace agreements, past peacekeepers, groups of friends (which is often a mechanism through which CI is employed), electoral participation provisions in peace agreements, and the occurrence of post-conflict elections in the peace period whether or not a settlement called for them. But coercive and CI missions were less predicted by other variables. Coercive missions were also associated with more militant groups, while CI missions were more common with fewer government troops (similarly hard cases as *any PKO*), but also with lower population sizes. Interestingly, CI missions were more common in peace agreements that lacked security sector reform (SSR) provisions, which other scholars have identified as one mechanism that can help resolve commitment problems among combatants without external intervention (e.g. Hoddie and Hartzell 2007, Toft 2009). So again, this may denote contexts in which peace is harderto secure.

In general, while both coercive and CI missions seem to follow all peace operations in being deployed to cases where it is harder to maintain peace, there are other dimensions that drive where certain missions are sent, such as supply-side factors (which cases receive groups of friends, for example). This is not surprising given recent work showing that such factors are as important in deciding mandates as context-specific factors (Howard and Dayal 2018). Moreover, according to the fifth set of models, virtually no set of factors – with the exception of polity score and time period – predict CI-only missions compared to coercive-only missions. This indicates that CI-only missions are generally not sent to cases where peace is harder or easier to secure than cases where coercive-only missions are sent, further mitigating selection concerns.

**Table 1.6A: Selection Model Results, Post-Conflict Peacekeeping (compared to no peacekeeping)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | **First Set of Models (no controls)** | | **Second Set of Models (G&S confounders only, w/ controls)** | | **Third Set of Models (all other confounders w/ G&S controls)** | |
| **Mission Type (DV)** | **Independent Variable** | **Coefficient** | **T-stat** | **Coefficient** | **T-stat** | **Coefficient** | **T-stat** |
|  | *Previous Conflict* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Any UN** | Battle deaths (logged) | 0.18\*\* | 2.51 | 0.38\*\*\* | 2.33 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | Duration (months) | 0.00 | 0.72 | 0.00 | -0.14 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | Ethnic Conflict | 0.33 | 0.73 | — | — | 0.41 | 0.73 |
|  | Territorial Conflict | 0.15 | 0.36 | — | — | 0.43 | 0.78 |
|  | Marxist Rebels | -0.12 | -0.21 | — | — | -0.08 | -0.11 |
|  | No. Militant Groups | 0.49\*\* | 2.18 | — | — | 0.35 | 1.20 |
|  | Rebel Strength | 0.54 | 1.94 | — | — | 0.23 | 0.66 |
|  | Balance | -0.73 | -1.82 | — | — | -0.19 | -0.39 |
|  | Outcome | -0.74\*\*\* | -3.87 | — | — | -1.07\*\*\* | -3.62 |
|  | Outcome2 | 0.81\*\* | 2.19 | — | — | -0.23 | -0.56 |
|  | *Country Information* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Any UN** | Ethnic fractionalization | -0.01 | -1.40 | -0.01 | -0.56 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | Population size (logged) | -0.60\*\*\* | -2.93 | 0.02 | 0.04 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | Mountainous terrain | 0.30\* | 1.81 | 0.59\* | 1.77 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | No. Military Personnel | -0.35\*\* | -2.45 | -0.76\* | -1.66 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | Polity IV | 0.00 | 0.04 | -0.04 | -0.64 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | GDP Per Capita | -0.06 | -0.28 | 0.13 | 0.29 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | Eastern Europe | 1.25\*\* | 2.49 | 0.74 | 0.49 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | Latin America | 0.56 | 0.93 | 0.29 | 0.17 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | Asia | -1.13 | -1.45 | -3.33 | -1.69 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | Africa | -0.36 | -0.84 | -1.62 | -0.98 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | Middle East/N. Africa | -1.20 | -1.11 | 0.00 | N/A | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | *Elections* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Electoral PA provisions | 2.17\*\*\* | 4.28 | — | — | 0.96 | 0.99 |
|  | Elections, NELDA | 0.88 | 1.73 | — | — | 0.83 | 1.42 |
|  | Elections, NELDA/Exec. | 1.06\* | 2.39 | — | — | 1.08\* | 1.99 |
|  | *Peace Agreement Provisions* | |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Any UN** | Peace agreement (PA) | 2.41\*\*\*\* | 4.82 | 3.18\*\*\*\* | 3.72 | 2.76\*\*\* | 4.06 |
|  | PA Type | 0.05 | 0.12 | — | — | 0.24 | 0.39 |
|  | SSR | -0.26 | -0.43 | — | — | -0.21 | -0.23 |
|  | Rebel Integration | 0.56 | 0.78 | — | — | 0.60 | 0.59 |
|  | DDR | 0.21 | 0.32 | — | — | 0.74 | 0.72 |
|  | Power-sharing | 0.00 | — | — | — | 0.00 | — |
|  | Autonomy/Independence | 1.16 | 1.31 | — | — | 1.32 | 1.13 |
|  | PA calls for a PKO | 3.39\*\* | 3.05 | — | — | 6.13\*\* | 2.80 |
|  | *Peacekeeping Deployments* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Any UN** | Time Period | 0.19 | 0.76 | 0.90\*\* | 2.05 | — | — |
|  | PKO During Previous War | 2.94\*\*\*\* | 5.59 | — | — | 4.71\*\*\* | 4.46 |
|  | Other PKO After War | 1.70\*\*\*\* | 3.72 | — | — | 1.44\*\* | 2.46 |
|  | Other PK w/ Coercion | 1.62\*\* | 3.14 | — | — | 1.45\*\* | 2.17 |
|  | Past PKO | 2.78\*\*\* | 4.93 | — | — | 2.97\*\*\* | 4.31 |
|  | *Group of Friends* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Any UN** | GoF: Any | 3.62\*\* | 5.89 | — | — | 3.90\*\*\* | 5.06 |
|  | GoF: Powers | 3.82\*\*\* | 6.09 | — | — | 4.87\*\*\* | 4.94 |
|  | GoF: UN | 3.02\*\*\* | 5.36 | — | — | 3.31\*\*\* | 4.33 |
|  | *Aid* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Any UN** | USAID D&G | 0.01 | 0.31 | — | — | 0.06 | 1.35 |
|  | USAID non-D&G | -0.00 | -0.48 | — | — | 0.00 | 0.36 |
|  | U.S. Military Aid (logged) | -0.02 | -0.16 | — | — | 0.10 | 0.69 |
|  | ODA (logged) | -0.19 | -1.68 | — | — | -0.06 | -0.42 |
|  | Share Aid | 5.42 | 1.21 | — | — | 5.87 | 0.98 |
|  | *Alliances* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Any UN** | U.S. Ally | 0.73 | 1.44 | — | — | 1.18 | 1.68 |
|  | U.N. P5 Ally | 0.29 | 0.60 | — | — | 0.26 | 0.46 |
|  | British Colony | -0.44 | -0.74 | — | — | -0.33 | -0.45 |
|  | French Colony | -0.50 | -1.07 | — | — | -0.83 | -1.31 |
|  | *Previous Conflict* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Military Coercion** | Battle deaths (logged) | 0.19\* | 2.00 | 0.62\*\* | 2.48 | Inc. | Inc. |
| Duration (months) | 0.00 | -0.01 | -0.01 | -1.10 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | Ethnic Conflict | 0.39 | 0.68 | — | — | 0.63 | 0.90 |
|  | Territorial Conflict | -0.31 | -0.54 | — | — | -0.23 | -0.32 |
|  | Marxist Rebels | 0.00 | — | — | — | — | — |
|  | No. Militant Groups | 0.73\*\*\* | 2.92 | — | — | 0.75\*\* | 2.35 |
|  | Rebel Strength | 0.25 | 0.71 | — | — | -0.18 | -0.36 |
|  | Balance | -1.00 | -1.92 | — | — | -0.86 | -1.39 |
|  | Outcome | -0.68\*\*\* | -2.75 | — | — | -0.93\* | -2.73 |
|  | Outcome (dummy) | 1.15\*\* | 2.41 | — | — | 0.34 | -0.60 |
|  | *Country Information* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Military Coercion** | Ethnic fractionalization | 0.00 | -0.13 | -0.02 | -1.14 | Inc. | Inc. |
| Population Size (logged) | -0.43 | -1.81 | 0.43 | -1.29 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | Mountainous Terrain | 0.14 | 0.67 | 0.21 | 0.49 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | No. Military Personnel | -0.30 | -1.70 | -0.97 | -1.79 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | Polity IV | -0.05 | -0.94 | -0.14 | -1.55 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | GDP Per Capita | -0.32 | -1.12 | 0.26 | 0.42 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | Eastern Europe | 1.25\* | 2.12 | 1.77 | 1.19 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | Latin America | -0.78 | -0.73 | 0.20 | 0.12 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | Asia | -1.10 | -1.03 | -1.58 | -0.93 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | Africa | 0.16 | 0.29 | 0.00 | — | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | Middle East/N. Africa | 0.00 | — | 0.00 | — | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | *Elections* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Electoral PA provisions | 2.01\*\*\* | 3.49 | — | — | 0.28 | 0.30 |
|  | Elections, NELDA | 0.10 | 0.16 | — | — | -0.01 | -0.01 |
|  | Elections, NELDA/Exec. | 0.71 | 1.28 | — | — | 0.45 | 0.71 |
|  | *Peace Agreement Provisions* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Military Coercion** | Peace agreement (PA) | 2.34\*\*\* | 2.84 | 2.94 \*\*\* | 2.77 | 2.40\*\* | 3.02 |
| PA Type | -0.01 | -0.02 | — | — | 0.80 | 1.28 |
|  | SSR | 1.36 | 1.91 | — | — | 1.76 | 1.72 |
|  | Rebel Integration | 0.92 | 1.25 | — | — | 0.86 | 0.91 |
|  | DDR | 0.66 | 0.87 | — | — | 0.66 | 0.71 |
|  | Power-sharing | 0.00 | — | — | — | — | — |
|  | Autonomy/Independence | 0.41 | 0.49 | — | — | 0.53 | 0.54 |
|  | PA calls for a PKO | 2.81\*\*\* | 3.43 | — | — | 3.63\*\* | 2.96 |
|  | *Peacekeeping Deployments* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Military Coercion** | Time Period | 0.85\*\* | 2.36 | 2.35\*\*\* | 2.92 | 1.61\*\* | 3.04 |
| PKO During Previous War | 2.14\*\*\* | 3.61 | — | — | 2.60\*\*\* | 3.39 |
|  | Other PKO After War | 1.69\*\*\* | 2.98 | — | — | 2.20\*\* | 2.22 |
|  | Other PK w/ Coercion | 1.67\*\* | 2.86 | — | — | 2.04\*\* | 2.37 |
|  | Past PKO | 2.69\*\*\* | 3.38 | — | — | 2.86\*\* | 3.13 |
|  | *Group of Friends* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Military Coercion** | GoF: Any | 3.07\*\*\* | 3.89 | — | — | 3.12\*\*\* | 3.55 |
| GoF: Powers | 3.18\*\*\* | 4.01 | — | — | 3.49\*\*\* | 3.82 |
|  | GoF: UN | 2.71\*\*\* | 4.41 | — | — | 2.84\*\*\* | 3.59 |
|  | *Aid* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Military Coercion** | USAID D&G | -0.01 | -0.18 | — | — | 0.02 | 0.38 |
| USAID non-D&G | -0.01 | -0.82 | — | — | -0.02 | -0.91 |
|  | U.S. Military Aid (logged) | -0.21 | -1.27 | — | — | -0.21 | -0.80 |
|  | ODA (logged) | -0.11 | -0.80 | — | — | -0.03 | -0.17 |
|  | Share Aid | 0.01 | 0.00 | — | — | -11.76 | -1.00 |
|  | *Alliances* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Military Coercion** | U.S. Ally | 0.00 | 0.00 | — | — | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| U.N. P5 Ally | -0.25 | -0.39 | — | — | -0.71 | -0.87 |
|  | British Colony | -0.47 | -0.59 | — | — | 0.14 | 0.15 |
|  | French Colony | -0.54 | -0.87 | — | — | -0.72 | -0.98 |
|  | *Previous Conflict* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **CI** | Battle deaths (logged) | 0.18 | 1.92 | 0.44 | 1.84 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | Duration (months) | 0.00 | 0.23 | -0.00 | -0.41 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | Ethnic Conflict | 0.07 | 0.13 | — | — | -0.05 | -0.06 |
|  | Territorial Conflict | 0.90 | 1.65 | — | — | 0.79 | 1.12 |
|  | Marxist Rebels | 0.50 | 0.78 | — | — | 1.00 | 1.08 |
|  | No. Militant Groups | 0.36 | 1.43 | — | — | 0.05 | 0.13 |
|  | Rebel Strength | 0.48 | 1.43 | — | — | 0.22 | 0.52 |
|  | Balance | -1.00 | -1.92 | — | — | -0.56 | -0.93 |
|  | Outcome | -1.11\*\*\* | -3.14 | — | — | -1.32\*\* | -2.60 |
|  | Outcome2 | 0.93\*\* | 2.01 | — | — | -0.31 | -0.63 |
|  | *Country Information* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **CI** | Ethnic Fractionalization | 0.00 | -0.26 | 0.01 | 0.48 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | Population Size (logged) | -0.74\*\* | -2.73 | -0.98 | -1.61 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | Mountainous Terrain | 0.21 | 1.01 | 0.23 | 0.62 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | No. Military Personnel | -0.37\*\* | -2.05 | 0.16 | 0.29 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | GDP Per Capita | 0.28 | 1.06 | 0.25 | 0.42 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | Polity IV | 0.08 | 1.70 | 0.17 | 1.72 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | Eastern Europe | 1.25\* | 2.12 | 1.99 | 1.28 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | Latin America | 1.12 | 1.68 | 3.02 | 1.86 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | Asia | -0.26 | -0.33 | -0.33 | -0.20 | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | Africa | -1.10 | -1.80 | — | — | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | Middle East/N. Africa | 0.00 | N/A | — | — | Inc. | Inc. |
|  | *Elections* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Electoral PA provisions | 1.68\*\* | 2.95 | — | — | 1.23 | 1.16 |
|  | Elections, NELDA | 0.00 | — | — | — | — | — |
|  | Elections, NELDA/Exec. | 2.30\*\* | 2.94 | — | — | 2.88\*\* | 2.89 |
|  | *Peace Agreement Provisions* | |  |  |  |  |  |
| **CI** | Peace agreement (PA) | 2.86\*\*\* | 3.64 | 3.30\*\* | 2.78 | 3.18\*\* | 3.19 |
|  | PA Type | -0.29 | -0.65 | — | — | -0.46 | -0.74 |
|  | SSR | -1.65\* | -2.19 | — | — | -1.50 | -1.43 |
|  | Rebel Integration | -0.99 | -1.15 | — | — | -0.48 | -0.42 |
|  | DDR | -1.15 | -1.66 | — | — | -0.17 | -0.18 |
|  | Power-sharing | 0.04 | 0.04 | — | — | 0.06 | 0.04 |
|  | Autonomy/Independence | 2.32\*\* | 2.54 | — | — | 2.55 | 1.90 |
|  | PA calls for a PKO | 1.93\*\* | 2.68 | — | — | 3.96\* | 2.25 |
|  | *Peacekeeping Deployments* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **CI** | Time Period | -0.15 | -0.47 | 0.56 | 0.85 | 0.24 | 0.56 |
|  | PKO During Previous War | 1.91\*\*\*\* | 3.26 | — | — | 1.71\*\* | 2.34 |
|  | Other PKO After War | 2.02\*\*\*\* | 3.43 | — | — | 2.32\*\* | 2.70 |
|  | Other PK w/ Coercion | 2.02\*\*\* | 3.43 | — | — | 1.70\* | 2.20 |
|  | Past PKO | 1.72\*\* | 2.72 | — | — | 1.58\* | 2.15 |
|  | *Group of Friends* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **CI** | GoF: Any | 3.07\*\*\* | 3.89 | — | — | 3.15\*\*\* | 3.40 |
|  | GoF: Powers | 3.18\*\*\* | 4.01 | — | — | 3.35\*\*\* | 3.58 |
|  | GoF: UN | 2.71\*\*\* | 4.41 | — | — | 3.22\*\*\* | 3.60 |
|  | *Aid* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **CI** | USAID D&G | 0.03 | 0.80 | — | — | 0.07 | 1.40 |
|  | USAID non-D&G | 0.00 | 0.00 | — | — | 0.00 | 0.67 |
|  | U.S. Military Aid (logged) | 0.03 | 0.22 | — | — | 0.16 | 0.87 |
|  | ODA (logged) | -0.12 | -0.93 | — | — | 0.10 | 0.51 |
|  | Share Aid | 0.27 | 0.05 | — | — | 8.93 | 1.20 |
|  | *Alliances* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **CI** | U.S. Ally | 0.98 | 1.60 | — | — | 1.20 | 1.54 |
|  | U.N. P5 Ally | 0.49 | 0.81 | — | — | 0.72 | 0.99 |
|  | British Colony | -0.47 | -0.59 | — | — | -0.78 | -0.73 |
|  | French Colony | -0.95 | -1.41 | — | — | -1.10 | -1.29 |

*Note*: Statistically significant estimates are denoted by \*(p = .10); \*\*(p = .05); \*\*\*(p = .01); \*\*\*\*(p = .001).

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Fourth Set of Models (Combinations of PKO Types, compared to no Peacekeeping, Post-conflict)** | | |
| |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | |  | **Coercion, CI (1)** | | **Coercion, No CI (2)** | | **No Coercion, CI (3)** | | **No Coercion,**  **No CI (4)** | | |  | **Coeff** | **T-stat** | **Coeff** | **T-stat** | **Coeff** | **T-stat** | **Coeff** | **T-stat** | | Battle Deaths (log) | 0.28 | 1.65 | 0.15 | 1.35 | 0.17 | 1.47 | 0.21 | 1.30 | | Duration (months) | -0.00 | -0.55 | 0.00 | 0.53 | 0.00 | 0.92 | 0.00 | 0.41 | | Ethnic Conflict | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.48 | 0.66 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 1.02 | 0.89 | | Territorial Conflict | 0.97 | 1.03 | -0.83 | -1.01 | 0.56 | 0.84 | 0.15 | 0.16 | | Marxist Rebels | -14.94 | -0.01 | -14.94 | -0.01 | 1.09 | 1.55 | 0.10 | 0.09 | | No. Militant Groups | 1.06\* | 2.90 | 0.63\* | 2.05 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01 | | Rebel Strength | 0.66 | 1.17 | 0.28 | 0.62 | 0.60 | 1.45 | 0.77 | 1.55 | | Balance | -1.79 | -1.85 | -0.88 | -1.37 | -0.88 | -1.37 | 0.50 | 0.61 | | Ethnic fractionalization | 0.03 | 1.05 | -0.01 | -1.21 | -0.02 | -1.56 | -0.01 | -0.91 | | Population (log) | -1.05\* | -2.22 | -0.32 | -1.12 | -0.77\* | -2.31 | -0.51 | -1.23 | | Mountainous terrain | -0.22 | -0.66 | 0.31 | 1.19 | 0.55 | 1.88 | 0.42 | 1.11 | | No. Military Personnel | -0.48 | -1.51 | -0.27 | -1.21 | -0.47 | -2.01 | -0.20 | -0.67 | | Polity IV | 0.07 | 0.79 | -0.09 | -1.30 | 0.10 | 1.58 | -0.11 | -1.12 | | GDP Per Capita | 0.03 | 0.07 | -0.43 | -1.17 | 0.25 | 0.76 | -0.11 | -0.24 | | Eastern Europe | 1.54 | 1.59 | 1.10 | 1.44 | 1.10 | 1.44 | 1.54 | 1.59 | | Latin America | -14.51 | -0.01 | -0.02 | -0.02 | 1.77\* | 2.40 | -14.51 | -0.01 | | Asia | 0.12 | 0.10 | -14.15 | -0.02 | -0.69 | -0.64 | -14.15 | -0.01 | | Africa | -0.36 | -0.38 | 0.45 | 0.66 | -1.34 | -1.64 | -0.36 | -0.38 | | Middle East/N. Africa | -16.24 | -0.00 | -16.24 | -0.01 | -16.24 | -0.01 | 0.79 | 0.67 | | Electoral PA provisions | 3.56\*\* | 3.04 | 1.77\* | 2.40 | 1.77\* | 2.40 | 2.58\*\* | 2.63 | | Elections, NELDA | 15.46 | 0.01 | -0.11 | -0.15 | 15.46 | 0.02 | -0.11 | -0.11 | | Elections, NELDA/Exec. | 15.94 | 0.01 | 0.37 | 0.55 | 1.75\* | 2.14 | -0.04 | -0.04 | | Peace agreement | 16.13 | 0.02 | 2.07\* | 2.82 | 2.61\*\* | 3.14 | 1.63 | 1.72 | | PA Type | -1.41 | -1.21 | 0.64 | 1.16 | 0.09 | 0.16 | -0.24 | -0.26 | | SSR | -0.41 | -0.40 | 1.79 | 1.53 | -1.95 | -1.68 | -0.69 | -0.53 | | Rebel Integration | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.10 | 1.16 | -0.56 | -0.46 | 2.08 | 1.54 | | DDR | -0.21 | -0.21 | 1.17 | 1.00 | -0.62 | -0.73 | 14.76 | 0.01 | | Power-sharing | 18.61 | 0.01 | 18.73 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 18.32 | 0.01 | | Autonomy | 1.79 | 1.52 | 0.41 | 0.31 | 1.69 | 1.62 | -12.55 | -0.01 | | PKO calls for PA | 19.77 | 0.01 | 3.23\* | 2.53 | 2.43 | 1.93 | 3.64\*\* | 2.28 | | Time period | 0.72 | 1.18 | 0.91 | 1.94 | -0.52 | -1.18 | -0.20 | -0.35 | | PKO During Previous War | 2.16\* | 2.25 | 3.95\*\* | 3.60 | 2.60\*\* | 3.45 | 3.14\*\* | 2.71 | | Other PKO After War | 3.14\* | 2.71 | 1.75\* | 2.50 | 2.16\*\* | 3.03 | 1.35 | 1.40 | | Other PKO w/ Coercion | 3.56\*\* | 3.04 | 1.32 | 1.71 | 1.32 | 1.71 | 0.79 | 0.67 | | Past PKO | 2.37\* | 2.01 | 3.35\*\* | 3.07 | 1.97\*\* | 2.61 | 17.43 | 0.01 | | GoF: Any | 19.53 | 0.01 | 3.14\*\* | 3.71 | 3.14\*\* | 3.71 | 19.53 | 0.01 | | GoF: Powers | 18.44 | 0.01 | 3.33\*\* | 3.90 | 3.33\*\* | 3.90 | 18.44 | 0.01 | | GoF: UN | 18.27 | 0.02 | 2.62\*\* | 3.44 | 2.62\*\* | 3.44 | 3.02\*\* | 3.00 | | USAID D&G | 0.01 | 0.10 | -0.01 | -0.13 | 0.03 | 0.88 | -0.21 | -0.56 | | USAID non-D&G | -0.02 | -0.64 | -0.01 | -0.58 | 0.00 | 0.40 | -0.07 | -0.95 | | U.S. Military Aid (log) | -0.45 | -1.45 | -0.09 | -0.47 | 0.11 | 0.64 | 0.23 | 0.83 | | ODA (logged) | -0.04 | -0.17 | -0.17 | -0.91 | -0.18 | -1.07 | -0.35 | -1.77 | | Share Aid | -17.50 | -0.91 | 7.53 | 1.15 | 7.19 | 1.17 | 8.24 | 1.10 | | U.S. Ally | 0.48 | 0.38 | 0.25 | 0.29 | 1.39 | 1.93 | 0.07 | 0.06 | | U.N. P5 Ally | -0.67 | -0.54 | -0.26 | -0.33 | 1.28 | 1.53 | 0.03 | 0.03 | | British Colony | -15.01 | -0.01 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.05 | -15.01 | -0.01 | | French Colony | -0.88 | -0.77 | -0.34 | -0.46 | -0.88 | -1.07 | 0.11 | 0.11 | | Outcome | -15.35 | -0.02 | -0.60\* | -2.20 | -0.85\* | -2.54 | -0.37 | -1.14 | | Outcome2 | -0.56 | -0.85 | -0.93 | -1.63 | -0.99 | -1.88 | -0.17 | -0.27 | | | |
| **Fifth Set of Models (Comparing CI-only missions to Coercive-only missions, post-conflict)** | | |
|  | **CI-only** |
| Battle Deaths (logged) | -0.03 (-0.16) |
| Duration (months) | 0.00 (0.04) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | -0.01 (-0.18) |
| Population Size (logged) | -1.64 (-1.51) |
| Mountainous terrain | 0.02 (0.06) |
| No. Military Personnel | -0.07 (-0.20) |
| GDP Per Capita | 0.91 (1.75) |
| Polity IV | 0.22\* (2.00) |
| Time period | -1.41\*\* (-2.16) |
| Outcome | -0.42 (-1.05) |
| Outcome2 | 0.07 (0.08) |
| Ethnic Conflict | -0.29 (-0.31) |
| Territorial Conflict | 2.38 (1.96) |
| Marxist Rebels | -16.83 (-0.01) |
| No. Militant Groups | -0.69 (-1.26) |
| Rebel Strength | 0.58 (0.67) |
| Balance | 0.13 (0.12) |
| Electoral PA provisions | 1.14 (1.06) |
| Elections, NELDA | 18.94 (0.00) |
| Elections, NELDA/Exec. | 1.91 (1.88) |
| PA Type | -0.31 (-0.57) |
| SSR | -20.54 (-0.01) |
| Rebel Integration | -2.37 (-1.81) |
| DDR | -17.75 (-0.01) |
| Power-sharing | -20.34 (-0.00) |
| Autonomy/Independence | 17.35 (0.01) |
| PA calls for a PKO | -0.51 (-0.50) |
| PKO During Previous War | -1.22 (-0.97) |
| Other PKO After War | 0.18 (0.21) |
| Other PKO w/ Coercion | 0.41 (0.39) |
| Past PKO | -1.23 (-0.97) |
| GoF: Any | 0.12 (0.11) |
| GoF: Powers | 0.12 (0.11) |
| GoF: UN | 0.18 (0.21) |
| USAID D&G | 0.24 (1.24) |
| USAID non-D&G | 0.04 (1.12) |
| U.S. Military Aid (logged) | 0.00 (0.59) |
| ODA (logged) | 0.01 (0.04) |
| Share Aid | -1.17 (-0.19) |
| U.S. Ally | 0.92 (0.87) |
| U.N. P5 Ally | 0.56 (0.54) |
| British Colony | -0.12 (-0.11) |
| French Colony | -0.66 (-0.63) |

**Balance Tests**

Table 1.6b presents the results of balance tests comparing military coercion and non-coercion missions, and CI and non-CI missions (compared to non-peacekeeping cases, post-conflict only). Table 1.6c presents the results of balance tests comparing cases that received coercive-only peacekeeping missions to those that received CI-only missions. We ran t-tests and K-S tests to evaluate whether the differences in means between each type of mission were statistically significant.[[2]](#footnote-2) These results should be interpreted with caution given the small sample size. There are some differences that are statistically significant across both tests, which generally match the findings from the selection models. In general, the table indicates that covariates were well-balanced across mission types.

**Table 1.6b: Comparisons of Means, PKO Types (Post-Conflict)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Coercive** | | **Non-Coercive** | |  |  | **CI** | | **Non-CI** | | |  | |  | |
| *Variable* | N | Mean | N | Mean | T-Test p-value | K-S  p-value | N | Mean | | N | Mean | | T-Test p-value | | K-S  p-value | |
| *Previous Conflict* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Battle Deaths (logged) | 16 | 8.19 | 14 | 7.72 | 0.64 | 0.74 | 16 | 8.13 | | 14 | 7.79 | | 0.73 | | 0.27 | |
| Duration (months) | 16 | 54.56 | 14 | 75.07 | 0.46 | 0.78 | 16 | 59.19 | | 14 | 69.79 | | 0.71 | | 0.96 | |
| Ethnic Conflict | 16 | 0.69 | 14 | 0.64 | 0.80 | 1.00 | 16 | 0.71 | | 14 | 0.63 | | 0.62 | | 1.00 | |
| Territorial Conflict | 16 | 0.31 | 14 | 0.50 | 0.31 | 0.96 | 16 | 0.56 | | 14 | 0.21 | | 0.06\* | | 0.33 | |
| Marxist Rebels | 16 | 0.00 | 14 | 0.36 | 0.01\*\*\* | 0.30 | 16 | 0.25 | | 14 | 0.07 | | 0.20 | | 0.97 | |
| No. Militant Groups | 16 | 2.19 | 14 | 1.43 | 0.06\* | 0.18 | 16 | 1.81 | | 14 | 1.86 | | 0.92 | | 0.55 | |
| Rebel Strength | 14 | -0.71 | 13 | -0.46 | 0.39 | 1.00 | 14 | -0.57 | | 13 | -0.62 | | 0.88 | | 1.00 | |
| Balance | 14 | 0.71 | 13 | 0.92 | 0.27 | 1.00 | 14 | 0.71 | | 13 | 0.92 | | 0.27 | | 1.00 | |
| Outcome | 16 | 1.75 | 14 | 1.86 | 0.82 | 0.96 | 16 | 1.44 | | 14 | 2.21 | | 0.09\* | | 0.54 | |
| Outcome2 | 14 | 0.71 | 14 | 0.71 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 16 | 0.88 | | 14 | 0.71 | | 0.38 | | 1.00 | |
| *Country Information* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | 16 | 53.99 | 14 | 42.85 | 0.31 | 0.06\* | 16 | 53.15 | | 14 | 43.81 | | 0.39 | | 0.42 | |
| Population (logged) | 16 | 8.81 | 14 | 8.65 | 0.59 | 0.66 | 16 | 8.50 | | 14 | 9.00 | | 0.08\* | | 0.09\* | |
| Mountainous Terrain | 16 | 2.55 | 14 | 2.94 | 0.43 | 0.85 | 16 | 2.66 | | 14 | 2.82 | | 0.75 | | 0.21 | |
| Military Personnel (logged) | 16 | 3.10 | 14 | 3.12 | 0.97 | 0.78 | 16 | 2.97 | | 14 | 3.28 | | 0.54 | | 0.35 | |
| GDP Per Capita | 16 | 6.23 | 14 | 6.70 | 0.26 | 0.07\* | 16 | 6.75 | | 14 | 6.12 | | 0.13 | | 0.00\*\*\* | |
| Polity IV | 16 | -1.88 | 14 | 0.86 | 0.17 | 0.10 | 16 | 1.63 | | 14 | -3.14 | | 0.01\*\* | | 0.03\*\* | |
| Eastern Europe | 16 | 0.38 | 14 | 0.29 | 0.62 | 1.00 | 16 | 0.38 | | 14 | 0.29 | | 0.62 | | 1.00 | |
| Latin America | 16 | 0.06 | 14 | 0.29 | 0.11 | 0.85 | 16 | 0.25 | | 14 | 0.07 | | 0.20 | | 0.95 | |
| Asia | 16 | 0.06 | 14 | 0.07 | 0.93 | 1.00 | 16 | 0.13 | | 14 | 0.00 | | 0.18 | | 1.00 | |
| Africa | 16 | 0.50 | 14 | 0.29 | 0.25 | 0.88 | 16 | 0.25 | | 14 | 0.57 | | 0.08\* | | 0.32 | |
| Middle East | 16 | 0 | 14 | 0.07 | 0.29 | 1.00 | 16 | 0 | | 14 | 0.07 | | 0.29 | | 1.00 | |
| *Elections* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Electoral PA provisions | 13 | 0.54 | 10 | 0.50 | 0.87 | 1.00 | 16 | 0.50 | | 14 | 0.50 | | 1.00 | | 1.00 | |
| Elections, NELDA | 16 | 0.68 | 14 | 0.93 | 0.11 | 0.78 | 16 | 1.00 | | 14 | 0.57 | | 0.02\*\* | | 0.08\* | |
| Elections, NELDA/Exec. | 16 | 0.63 | 14 | 0.71 | 0.62 | 1.00 | 16 | 0.88 | | 14 | 0.43 | | 0.01\*\* | | 0.06\* | |
| *Peace Agreement Provisions* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PA Type | 13 | 1.46 | 10 | 1.5 | 0.92 | 0.91 | 14 | 1.36 | | 9 | 1.67 | | 0.40 | | 1.00 | |
| SSR | 13 | 0.69 | 10 | 0.10 | 0.03\*\*\* | 0.04\*\* | 14 | 0.21 | | 9 | 0.78 | | 0.01\*\*\* | | 0.03\*\* | |
| Intgov | 13 | 0.38 | 10 | 0.20 | 0.36 | 0.99 | 14 | 0.14 | | 9 | 0.56 | | 0.04\*\* | | 0.21 | |
| DDR | 13 | 0.77 | 10 | 0.60 | 0.41 | 0.99 | 14 | 0.50 | | 9 | 1.00 | | 0.01\*\*\* | | 0.08\* | |
| Shagov | 13 | 0.46 | 10 | 0.00 | 0.01\*\* | 0.18 | 14 | 0.14 | | 9 | 0.44 | | 0.12 | | 0.59 | |
| Autonomy/Ind | 13 | 0.23 | 10 | 0.30 | 0.72 | 1.00 | 14 | 0.43 | | 9 | 0.00 | | 0.02\*\* | | 0.18 | |
| Elections | 13 | 0.54 | 10 | 0.50 | 0.86 | 1.00 | 14 | 0.64 | | 9 | 0.33 | | 0.16 | | 0.55 | |
| PA Calls for a PKO | 13 | 0.77 | 10 | 0.40 | 0.08\* | 0.42 | 14 | 0.64 | | 9 | 0.56 | | 0.69 | | 1.00 | |
| *Peacekeeping Deployments* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PKO During Previous War | 16 | 0.81 | 14 | 0.71 | 0.54 | 1.00 | 16 | 0.69 | | 14 | 0.86 | | 0.29 | | 0.97 | |
| Other PKO After War | 16 | 0.63 | 14 | 0.50 | 0.75 | 1.00 | 16 | 0.69 | | 14 | 0.43 | | 0.16 | | 0.59 | |
| Other PKO w/ Military Coercion | 16 | 0.44 | 14 | 0.29 | 0.41 | 1.00 | 16 | 0.50 | | 14 | 0.21 | | 0.94 | | 1.00 | |
| Past PKO | 14 | 0.86 | 13 | 0.77 | 0.57 | 1.00 | 14 | 0.71 | | 13 | 0.92 | | 0.18 | | 0.88 | |
| *Group of Friends* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| GoF: Any | 16 | 0.88 | 14 | 0.86 | 0.89 | 1.00 | 16 | 0.88 | | 14 | 0.86 | | 0.89 | | 1.00 | |
| GoF: Powers | 16 | 0.88 | 14 | 0.86 | 0.89 | 1.00 | 16 | 0.88 | | 14 | 0.86 | | 0.89 | | 1.00 | |
| GoF: UN | 16 | 0.69 | 14 | 0.50 | 0.31 | 0.96 | 16 | 0.69 | | 14 | 0.50 | | 0.31 | | 0.92 | |
| *Aid* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| USAID D&G (millions USD) | 13 | 2.76 | 9 | 4.64 | 0.33 | 0.63 | 13 | 4.69 | | 9 | 1.86 | | 0.14 | | 0.30 | |
| USAID non-D&G (millions USD) | 13 | 12.77 | 9 | 43.89 | 0.13 | 0.36 | 13 | 34.99 | | 9 | 11.79 | | 0.26 | | 0.41 | |
| US Military Aid (millions USD) | 15 | 1.92 | 14 | 14.90 | 0.08\* | 0.46 | 16 | 10.60 | | 13 | 5.21 | | 0.48 | | 0.73 | |
| U.S. Military Aid (logged) | 9 | 12.86 | 9 | 14.62 | 0.15 | 0.24 | 11 | 13.97 | | 7 | 13.38 | | 0.66 | | 0.70 | |
| ODA (millions USD) | 14 | 947.00 | 14 | 575.00 | 0.59 | 0.24 | 16 | 1010.00 | | 12 | 434.00 | | 0.41 | | 0.40 | |
| Share Aid | 14 | 0.04 | 14 | 0.06 | 0.48 | 0.85 | 16 | 0.04 | | 12 | 0.06 | | 0.44 | | 0.02\*\* | |
| U.S. Ally | 11 | 0.27 | 12 | 0.50 | 0.29 | 0.88 | 13 | 0.46 | | 10 | 0.30 | | 0.45 | | 1.00 | |
| U.N. P5 Ally | 11 | 0.45 | 12 | 0.67 | 0.33 | 0.93 | 13 | 0.62 | | 10 | 0.50 | | 0.60 | | 1.00 | |
| **Table 1.6C: Comparisons of Means, Coercive-Only and CI-Only Missions** | | | | | | | | | | | | | |  | |
|  | **CI only** | | **Coercive only** | |  | |
| *Variable* | N | Mean | N | Mean | T-Test p-value | K-S p-value |
| *Previous Conflict* | | | | | | |
| Battle Deaths (logged) | 11 | 7.69 | 10 | 7.89 | 0.88 | 0.70 |
| Duration (months) | 11 | 71.27 | 10 | 69.80 | 0.97 | 1.00 |
| Ethnic Conflict | 11 | 0.64 | 10 | 0.70 | 0.77 | 1.00 |
| Territorial Conflict | 11 | 0.55 | 10 | 0.10 | 0.03\*\* | 0.25 |
| Marxist Rebels | 11 | 1.45 | 10 | 2.00 | 0.20 | 0.29 |
| No. Militant Groups | 11 | 0.36 | 10 | 0.00 | 0.03\*\* | 0.49 |
| Rebel Strength | 10 | -0.60 | 9 | -0.78 | 0.52 | 1.00 |
| Balance | 10 | 0.80 | 9 | 0.78 | 0.91 | 1.00 |
| Outcome | 11 | 1.64 | 10 | 2.20 | 0.30 | 0.70 |
| Outcome (dummy) | 11 | 0.82 | 10 | 0.80 | 0.94 | 1.00 |
| *Country Information* | | | | | | |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | 11 | 41.81 | 10 | 43.99 | 0.87 | 0.37 |
| Population (logged) | 11 | 8.54 | 10 | 9.05 | 0.09\* | 0.11 |
| Mountainous Terrain | 11 | 2.96 | 10 | 2.93 | 0.95 | 0.37 |
| Military Personnel (logged) | 11 | 2.97 | 10 | 3.08 | 0.85 | 0.70 |
| GDP Per Capita | 11 | 6.90 | 10 | 5.95 | 0.06\* | 0.00\*\*\* |
| Polity IV | 11 | 1.91 | 10 | -3.20 | 0.03\*\* | 0.03\*\* |
| Eastern Europe | 11 | 0.36 | 10 | 0.30 | 0.77 | 1.00 |
| Latin America | 11 | 0.36 | 10 | 0.10 | 0.17 | 0.86 |
| Asia | 16 | 0.06 | 14 | 0.07 | 0.93 | 1.00 |
| Africa | 11 | 0.09 | 10 | 0.00 | 0.35 | 1.00 |
| *Elections* | | | | | | |
| Electoral PA provisions | 11 | 0.36 | 10 | 0.50 | 0.55 | 1.00 |
| Elections, NELDA | 11 | 1.00 | 10 | 0.50 | 0.01\*\* | 0.15 |
| Elections, NELDA/Exec. | 11 | 0.82 | 10 | 0.40 | 0.05\* | 0.32 |
| *Peace Agreement Provisions* | | | | | | |
| PA Type | 9 | 1.44 | 7 | 1.71 | 0.60 | 1.00 |
| SSR | 9 | 0.11 | 7 | 1.00 | 0.00\*\*\* | 0.04\*\* |
| Intgov | 9 | 0.11 | 7 | 0.57 | 0.05\* | 0.37 |
| DDR | 9 | 0.44 | 7 | 1.00 | 0.02\*\* | 0.18 |
| Shagov | 9 | 0.00 | 7 | 0.57 | 0.01\*\* | 0.15 |
| Autonomy/Ind | 9 | 0.33 | 7 | 0.00 | 0.11 | 0.77 |
| Elections | 9 | 0.56 | 7 | 0.29 | 0.31 | 0.94 |
| PA Calls for a PKO | 9 | 0.44 | 10 | 0.57 | 0.64 | 1.00 |
| *Peacekeeping Deployments* | | | | | | |
| PKO During Previous War | 11 | 0.72 | 10 | 0.90 | 0.34 | 1.00 |
| Other PKO After War | 11 | 0.55 | 10 | 0.55 | 0.81 | 1.00 |
| Other PKO w/ Military Coercion | 11 | 0.27 | 10 | 0.20 | 0.71 | 1.00 |
| Past PKO | 10 | 0.70 | 9 | 0.89 | 0.34 | 1.00 |
| *Group of Friends* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GoF: Any | 11 | 0.82 | 10 | 0.80 | 0.92 | 1.00 |
| GoF: Powers | 11 | 0.82 | 10 | 0.80 | 0.92 | 1.00 |
| GoF: UN | 11 | 0.55 | 10 | 0.50 | 0.85 | 1.00 |
| *Aid* | | | | | | |
| USAID D&G (millions USD) | 8 | 5.77 | 7 | 2.18 | 0.17 | 0.31 |
| USAID non-D&G (millions USD) | 8 | 50.10 | 7 | 14.92 | 0.23 | 0.35 |
| US Military Aid (millions USD) | 11 | 1310007 | 9 | 247855 | 0.16 | 0.53 |
| U.S. Military Aid (logged) | 8 | 13.99 | 5 | 12.64 | 0.38 | 0.43 |
| ODA (millions USD) | 11 | 4.82e+08 | 8 | 2.59e+08 | 0.19 | 0.18 |
| Share Aid | 11 | 0.05 | 8 | 0.06 | 0.86 | 0.32 |
| U.S. Ally | 10 | 0.50 | 7 | 0.29 | 0.41 | 0.99 |
| U.N. P5 Ally | 10 | 0.70 | 7 | 0.57 | 0.61 | 1.00 |

## 

## 1.7 Unmatched Cox Model Results, Peace Periods Data

The Cox proportional hazards models below compare the outcomes of “treated” cases (peace periods that received peacekeeping) to “control” cases (peace periods that did not) on our unmatched post-conflict peace periods sample. We ran three sets of models. The first includes G&S’s correlates, in addition to indicators for a *peace agreement* and *time period.* The second includes controls for *war type, number of militant groups,* and the four other peacekeeping correlates described in the paper. We also include an indicator for other types of missions aside from the one being analyzed, since our untreated cases in this specification include peace periods that received no peacekeeping *and* that received peacekeeping of a different type.[[3]](#footnote-3),[[4]](#footnote-4) Only missions *without* mandates to use military coercion, and those that employ conditional incentives, experience statistically significant reductions in the hazard rate of renewed conflict (70 and 79 percent in the first model, for instance), compared to countries that do not receive peacekeeping. The third set of models runs the same analyses in the first and second set of models, except it compares the outcomes exclusively for missions that only employed CI missions against missions that only employed military coercion. These findings also reveal that CI-only missions experienced statistically significant reductions in the hazard rate of renewed conflict (from between 88 percent to more than 99 percent) compared to coercion-only missions, even when controlling for different set of confounders. Given the small sample size, however, these results should be met with caution.

**Cox Models on Peace Duration, By Mandate Type**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **First Set of Models** | | | | | | | | |
|  | **Any UN Mission** | | | **Coercive/Non-Coercive Missions** | | | **CI/No CI Missions** | | |
|  | Hazard Ratio | Standard error | T-stat | Hazard Ratio | Standard error | T-stat | Hazard Ratio | Standard error | T-stat |
| Any UN | 0.56 | 0.23 | -1.44 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Coercive | – | – | – | 0.88 | 0.42 | -0.26 | 0.94 | 0.60 | -0.09 |
| Non-Coercive | – | – | – | 0.71 | 0.40 | -0.59 | – | – | – |
| CI | – | – | – | 0.35\* | 0.22 | -1.64 | 0.29\*\* | 0.18 | -1.96 |
| No CI | – | – | – | – | – |  | 0.98 | 0.59 | -0.04 |
| Battle Deaths | 1.04 | 0.06 | 0.89 | 1.05 | 0.06 | 0.83 | 1.04 | 0.06 | 0.79 |
| Conflict Duration | 1.00 | 0.00 | -1.39 | 1.00 | 0.00 | -1.34 | 1.00 | 0.00 | -1.35 |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | 1.01 | 0.01 | 1.36 | 1.01 | 0.01 | 1.38 | 1.01 | 0.01 | 1.40 |
| Population Size (logged) | 1.33\* | 0.22 | 1.79 | 1.26\* | 0.21 | 1.44 | 1.26 | 0.21 | 1.41 |
| Mountainous Terrain | 1.20\* | 0.13 | 1.70 | 1.19\* | 0.13 | 1.63 | 1.19 | 0.13 | 1.59 |
| Military Personnel | 0.94 | 0.15 | -0.26 | 1.00 | 0.16 | 0.02 | 1.01 | 0.16 | 0.07 |
| GDP Per Capita | 0.79 | 0.13 | -1.44 | 0.80 | 0.13 | -1.41 | 0.80 | 0.13 | -1.41 |
| Polity IV | 0.98 | 0.02 | -0.99 | 0.98 | 0.02 | -0.81 | 0.99 | 0.02 | -0.58 |
| Eastern Europe | 2.03 | 1.13 | 1.27 | 2.30 | 1.32 | 1.24 | 2.46 | 1.42 | 1.55 |
| Latin America | 0.95 | 0.69 | -0.10 | 1.05 | 0.79 | -0.12 | 1.10 | 0.83 | 0.13 |
| Asia | 1.13 | 0.66 | 0.21 | 1.27 | 0.75 | 0.25 | 1.36 | 0.81 | 0.52 |
| Africa | 2.47 | 1.43 | 1.56 | 2.92 | 1.74 | 1.73 | 3.10 | 1.85 | 1.89 |
| Middle East |  | – | – | 1.00 | – | – | – | – | – |
| Time Period | – | – | – | 0.83 | 0.14 | -1.11 | 0.83 | 0.14 | -1.17 |
| Peace Agreement | 0.66 | 0.22 | -1.27 | 0.71 | 0.23 | -1.23 | 0.68 | 0.22 | -1.18 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Second Set of Models** | | | | | | | | |
|  | **Any UN Mission** | | | **Coercive/Non-Coercive Missions** | | | **CI/No CI Missions** | | |
|  | Hazard Ratio | Standard error | T-stat | Hazard Ratio | Standard error | T-stat | Hazard Ratio | Standard error | T-stat |
| Any UN | 0.53 | 0.23 | -1.46 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Coercive | – | – | – | 0.85 | 0.39 | -0.36 | 0.91 | 0.58 | -0.15 |
| Non-Coercive | – | – | – | 0.69 | 0.43 | -0.58 | – | – | – |
| CI | – | – | – | 0.28\* | 0.19 | -1.88 | 0.23\*\* | 0.16 | -2.18 |
| No CI | – | – | – | – | – |  | 0.99 | 0.63 | -0.01 |
| Ethnic Conflict | 2.10 | 0.60 | 2.54 | 2.00\*\* | 0.59 | 2.39 | 2.01\*\* | 0.59 | 2.40 |
| Territorial Conflict | 0.78 | 0.22 | -0.89 | 0.90 | 0.26 | -0.36 | 0.89 | 0.25 | -0.43 |
| Marxist Conflict | 0.70 | 0.27 | -0.95 | 0.74 | 0.29 | -0.77 | 0.72 | 0.28 | -0.85 |
| PKO During War | 1.27 | 0.49 | 0.64 | 1.36 | 0.54 | 0.78 | 1.35 | 0.54 | 0.78 |
| Non-U.N. PKO | 0.96 | 0.30 | -0.18 | 1.11 | 0.39 | 0.30 | 1.13 | 0.39 | 0.35 |
| Past PKO | 0.70 | 0.24 | -1.05 | 0.66 | 0.23 | -1.21 | 0.63 | 0.22 | -1.32 |
| Group of Friends | 1.23 | 0.43 | 0.58 | 1.40 | 0.48 | 0.97 | 1.33 | 0.46 | 0.82 |
| Electoral Provisions | 0.51\* | 0.20 | -1.72 | 0.51\* | 0.21 | -1.64 | 0.49\* | 0.20 | -1.71 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Third Set of Models (Comparing CI-only missions to Coercive-only missions, post-conflict)** | | | | | | | | |
|  | **Model 3a** | | | **Model 3b** | | | **Model 3c** | | |
|  | Hazard Ratio | Standard error | T-stat | Hazard Ratio | Standard error | T-stat | Hazard Ratio | Standard error | T-stat |
| CI only | 0.12\*\*\* | 0.10 | -2.63 | 0.001\*\*\* | 0.00 | -2.66 | 0.04 | 0.09 | – |
| Battle Deaths | – | – | – | 2.25 | 0.79 | 2.29 | – | – | – |
| Conflict Duration | – | – | – | 0.96 | 0.17 | -2.29 | – | – | – |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | – | – | – | 0.96 | 0.19 | -1.90 | – | – | – |
| Population Size (logged) | – | – | – | 0.00 | 0.01 | -2.34 | – | – | – |
| Mountainous Terrain | – | – | – | 0.87 | 0.53 | -0.23 | – | – | – |
| Military Personnel | – | – | – | 11.03 | 11.29 | 2.34 | – | – | – |
| GDP Per Capita | – | – | – | 0.21 | 0.16 | -2.06 | – | – | – |
| Polity IV | – | – | – | 2.24 | 0.72 | 2.51 | – | – | – |
| Ethnic Conflict | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3.05 | 4.76 | 0.71 |
| Territorial Conflict | – | – | – | – | – | – | 0.85 | 1.52 | -0.09 |
| Marxist Conflict | – | – | – | – | – | – | 0.00 | – | – |
| PKO During War | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1.44 | 1.74 | 0.30 |
| Non-U.N. PKO | – | – | – | – | – | – | 13.20 | 24.36 | 1.40 |
| Past PKO | – | – | – | – | – | – | 0.61 | 0.75 | -0.40 |
| Group of Friends | – | – | – | – | – | – | 32.10 | 66.56 | 1.67 |
| Electoral Provisions | – | – | – | – | – | – | 0.25 | 0.35 | -0.99 |

*Note*: Statistically significant estimates are denoted by \*(p = .10); \*\*(p = .05); \*\*\*(p = .01); \*\*\*\*(p = .001).

## 1.8 Matched Pairs, Post-Conflict Peace Periods

*Match 1: All U.N. Missions**Match 2: All U.N. Missions*

Treated, peace period start date Control, peace period start date Treated, peace period start date Control, start date

Bosnia Jan 1996 Georgia Feb 1992 Bosnia Jan 1996 Philippines Oct 1996

Burundi Oct 2006 Rwanda Mar 2002Burundi Oct 2006 Somalia Nov 2002

Burundi Sept 2008 Somalia Nov 2002 Burundi Sept 2008 Somalia Nov 2002

CAR Dec 2006 CAR July 2001 CAR Dec 2006 CAR July 2001

Croatia Jan 1994 Azerbaijan Aug 1994 Croatia Jan 1994 Azerbaijan Aug 1994

Croatia Jan 1996 Azerbaijan Aug 1994 Croatia Jan 1996 Azerbaijan Aug 1994

El Salvador Jan 1992 Peru Jan 2000 El Salvador Jan 1992 Cambodia Jan 1999

Georgia Jan 1994 Azerbaijan Aug 1994 Georgia Jan 1994 Georgia Feb 1992

Georgia Sept 2004 Macedonia Sept 2001 Georgia Sept 2004 Macedonia Sept 2001

Georgia Sept 2008 Moldova Aug 1992 Georgia Sept 2008 Macedonia Sept 2001

Guatemala Jan 1996 Peru Jan 2000 Guatemala Jan 1996 Lebanon Jan 1991

Haiti Jan 1992 Paraguay Mar 1989 Haiti Jan 1992 Panama Nov 1989

Haiti Jan 2005 Paraguay Mar 1989 Haiti Jan 2005 Lesotho Oct 1998

Ivory Coast Dec 2004 Chad Jan 1995 Ivory Coast Dec 2004 Philippines Oct 1996

Liberia Sept 1995 Chad Jan 1995 Liberia Sept 1995 Guinea-Bissau June 1999

Liberia Dec 2003 Niger Jan 1995 Liberia Dec 2003 Guinea-Bissau June 1999

Morocco Jan 1990 Iraq Jan 1997 Morocco Jan 1990 Chad Jan 1989

Mozambique Nov 1992 Chad Jan 2004 Mozambique Nov 1992 Cambodia Jan 1999

Namibia Jan 1990 Chad Jan 1989 Namibia Jan 1990 Sri Lanka Jan 2002

Nicaragua Jan 1990 Paraguay Mar 1989 Nicaragua Jan 1990 Yemen Aug 1994

Papua New Guinea Jan 1997 Papua New Guinea Jan 1991 Papua New Guinea Jan 1997 P. New Guinea Jan 1991

Rwanda Jan 1995 Burundi Jan 1993 Rwanda Jan 1995 Burundi Jan 1993

Serbia Jan 1992 Georgia Feb 1992 Serbia Jan 1992 Chad Jan 1995

Serbia July 1999 Moldova Aug 1992 Serbia July 1999 Chad Jan 2004

Sierra Leone Jan 2001 Chad Jan 1995 Sierra Leone Jan 2001 Chad Jan 1995

South Sudan July 2011 Somalia Jan 1997 South Sudan July 2011 Azerbaijan Aug 1994

Tajikistan Jan 1997 Azerbaijan Aug 1994 Tajikistan Jan 1997 Burundi Jan 1993

Tajikistan Jan 1999 Georgia Feb 1992 Tajikistan Jan 1999 Laos Jan 1991

Timor Leste Oct 1999 Papua New Guinea Jan 1991 Timor Leste Oct 1999 CAR Jan 2003

DRC Jan 2002 Uganda Jan 1992 DRC Jan 2002 Uganda Jan 1992

*Match 1: Coercive Missions**Match 2: Coercive Missions*

Treated, peace period start date Control, peace period start date Treated, peace period start date Control, start date

Bosnia Jan 1996 Philippines Oct 1996 Bosnia Jan 1996 Philippines Oct 1996

Burundi Oct 2006 Rwanda March 2002 Burundi Oct 2006 Rwanda March 2002

CAR Dec 2006 CAR July 2001 CAR Dec 2006 CAR July 2001

Croatia Jan 1996 Azerbaijan Aug 1996 Croatia Jan 1996 Azerbaijan Aug 1996

Haiti Jan 2005 Macedonia Sept 2001 Haiti Jan 2005 CAR Jan 2003

Ivory Coast Dec 2004 Senegal Jan 2002 Ivory Coast Dec 2004 Guinea Jan 2002

Liberia Dec 2003 Senegal Jan 2002 Liberia Dec 2003 Guinea Jan 2002

Rwanda Jan 1995 Rwanda March 2002 Rwanda Jan 1995 Rwanda March 2002

Serbia Jan 1992 Azerbaijan Aug 1994 Serbia Jan 1992 Azerbaijan Aug 1994

Serbia July 1999 Philippines Oct 1996 Serbia July 1999 Philippines Oct 1996

Sierra Leone Jan 2001 Guinea Jan 2002 Sierra Leone Jan 2001 Guinea Jan 2002

South Sudan July 2011 Angola Jan 2003 South Sudan July 2011 Angola Jan 2003

Tajikistan Jan 1997 Georgia Feb 1992 Tajikistan Jan 1999 Burundi Jan 1993

Tajikistan Jan 1999 Lesotho Oct 1998 Tajikistan Jan 1999 Lesotho Oct 1998

Timor Leste Oct 1999 Guinea-Bissau June 1999 Timor Leste Oct 1999 Niger Jan 1995

DRC Jan 2002 Sri Lanka Jan 2002 DRC Jan 2002 Chad Jan 1995

*Match 1: Non-Coercive Missions Match 2: Non-Coercive Missions*

Treated, peace period start date Control, peace period start date Treated, peace period start date Control, start date

Burundi Sept 2008 Somalia Nov 2002 Burundi Sept 2008 Somalia Nov 2002

Croatia Jan 1994 Azerbaijan 1994 Croatia Jan 1994 Azerbaijan 1994

Croatia Jan 1996 Azerbaijan 1996 Croatia Jan 1996 Azerbaijan 1996

El Salvador Jan 1992 Haiti Jan 1990 El Salvador Jan 1992 Cambodia Jan 1999

Georgia Jan 1994 Georgia Feb 1992 Georgia Jan 1994 P. New Guinea Jan 1991

Georgia Sept 2004 Macedonia Sept 2001 Georgia Sept 2004 Macedonia Sept 2001

Georgia Sept 2008 Macedonia Sept 2001 Georgia Sept 2008 Macedonia Sept 2001

Guatemala Jan 1996 Peru Jan 2000 Guatemala Jan 1996 Lebanon Jan 1991

Haiti Jan 1992 Panama Nov 1989 Haiti Jan 1992 Panama Nov 1989

Liberia Sept 1995 Guinea-Bissau June 1999 Liberia Sept 1995 Djibouti Jan 1995

Morocco Jan 1990 Iraq Jan 1997 Morocco Jan 1990 Chad Jan 1989

Mozambique Nov 1992 Chad Jan 2004 Mozambique Nov 1992 Cambodia Jan 1999

Namibia Jan 1990 Chad Jan 1989 Namibia Jan 1990 Sri Lanka Jan 2002

Nicaragua Jan 1990 Paraguay March 1989 Nicaragua Jan 1990 Yemen Aug 1994

Papua New Guinea Jan 1997 P. New Guinea Jan 1991 P. New Guinea Jan 1997 P. New Guinea Jan 1991

Sierra Leone Jan 2001 Chad Jan 1995 Sierra Leone Jan 2001 Chad Jan 1995

*Match 1: CI Missions Match 2: CI Missions*

Treated, peace period start date Control, peace period start date Treated, peace period start date Control, start date

Bosnia Jan 1996 Georgia Feb 1992 Bosnia Jan 1996 Philippines Oct 1996

Croatia Jan 1996 Azerbaijan Aug 1994 Croatia Jan 1996 Azerbaijan Aug 1994

El Salvador Jan 1992 Peru Jan 2000 El Salvador Jan 1992 Cambodia Jan 1999

Georgia Jan 1994 Azerbaijan Aug 1994 Georgia Jan 1994 Georgia Feb 1992

Georgia Sept 2004 Macedonia Sept 2001 Georgia Sept 2004 P. New Guinea Jan 1991

Georgia Sept 2008 Macedonia Sept 2001 Georgia Sept 2008 P. New Guinea Jan 1991

Guatemala Jan 1996 Peru Jan 2000 Guatemala Jan 1996 Chad Jan 1991

Haiti Jan 1992 Paraguay Mar 1989 Haiti Jan 1992 Panama Nov 1989

Ivory Coast Dec 2004 Chad Jan 1995 Ivory Coast Dec 2004 Chad Jan 1995

Liberia Dec 2003 Niger Jan 1995 Liberia Dec 2003 Guinea-Bissau June 1999

Mozambique Nov 1992 Chad Jan 2004 Mozambique Nov 1992 Sri Lanka Jan 2002

Namibia Jan 1990 Chad Jan 1989 Namibia Jan 1990 Chad Jan 1989

Nicaragua Jan 1990 Paraguay March 1989 Nicaragua Jan 1990 Yemen Aug 1994

Papua New Guinea Jan 1997 Papua New Guinea Jan 1991 P. New Guinea Jan 1997 P. New Guinea Jan 1991

Serbia July 1999 Moldova Aug 1992 Serbia July 1999 Chad Jan 2004

Timor Leste Oct 1999 Papua New Guinea Jan 1991 Timor Leste Oct 1999 Djibouti Jan 1995

*Match 1: Non-CI Missions Match 2: Non-CI Missions*

Treated, peace period start date Control, peace period start date Treated, peace period start date Control, start date

Burundi Oct 2006 Rwanda March 2002 Burundi Oct 2006 Rwanda March 2002

Burundi Sept 2008 Lesotho Oct 1998 Burundi Sept 2008 Somalia Nov 2002

CAR Dec 2006 CAR July 2001 CAR Dec 2006 CAR July 2001

Croatia Jan 1994 Romania Jan 1990 Croatia Jan 1994 Azerbaijan Aug 1994

Haiti Jan 2005 Haiti Jan 1990 Haiti Jan 2005 Haiti Jan 1990

Liberia Sept 1995 Guinea-Bissau June 1999 Liberia Sept 1995 Congo Jan 2003

Morocco Jan 1990 Iraq Jan 1997 Morocco Jan 1990 Chad Jan 1989

Rwanda Jan 1995 Burundi Jan 1993 Rwanda Jan 1995 Burundi Jan 1993

Serbia Jan 1992 Georgia Feb 1992 Serbia Jan 1992 Chad Jan 1995

Sierra Leone Jan 2001 Chad Jan 1995 Sierra Leone Jan 2001 Congo Jan 2000

South Sudan July 2011 Angola Jan 2003 South Sudan July 2011 Afghanistan Jan 2002

Tajikistan Jan 1997 Azerbaijan Aug 1994 Tajikistan Jan 1997 Burundi Jan 1993

Tajikistan Jan 1999 Azerbaijan Aug 1994 Tajikistan Jan 1999 Georgia Feb 1992

DRC Jan 2002 Uganda Jan 1992 DRC Jan 2002 Nigeria Nov 2004

## 1.9 Effect of U.N. Peacekeeping on Conflict Recurrence (Post-Conflict), Additional Models (Matched Data)

**Table 1.9a: Effect of U.N. Peacekeeping on Conflict Recurrence**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Match 1 Cox Model** | | **Match 2 Cox Model** | | **Average Treatment Effect for the Treated (ATT)** | | | | | |
| **Mission Type** | *Estimate* | *T-stat* | *Estimate* | *T-stat* | *Estimate* | *SE* | *T-stat* | *Estimate* | *SE* | *T-stat* |
| **Control category: peace periods receiving no peacekeeping** | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Any UN (N=60)* | 0.19\*\*\*\* | -3.55 | 0.24\*\*\* | -3.19 | 1.13\*\*\* | 0.43 | 2.62 | 0.97\*\*\* | 0.37 | 2.58 |

**Table 1.9b: Effect of U.N. Peacekeeping Combinations on Conflict Recurrence, Logistic Regression**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Mission Type** | *Match 1 Logit* | *Match 2 Logit* |
| CI, Military Coercion | -2.30\*  (-1.65) | -3.22\*\*  (-2.08) |
| CI, No Military Coercion | -1.54\*  (-1.67) | -1.54\*\*  (-1.67) |
| No CI, Military Coercion | 0.54  (0.51) | — |
| No CI, No Military Coercion | -0.00  (-0.00) | -0.81  (-0.63) |

**Table 1.9c: Effect of CI-only Missions Compared to Coercive-Only Missions, Post-conflict**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Mission Type** | *Match 1 Cox Model* | *Match 2 Cox Model* |
| CI-only (*N=11*) | 0.16\*\*  (-2.25) | 0.04\*\*\*  (-3.04) |

*Note*: Statistically significant estimates denoted \*(p = .10); \*\*(p = .05); \*\*\*(p = .01); \*\*\*\*(p = .001). T-statistics in parentheses.

## 2.0 Robustness Checks

**Table 2.0a: Robustness Check for Table 4 (Control for Covariates Identified in Selection Models, Post-Conflict)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **CI/No CI Missions** | | | | | | | | **Military Coercion/Non-Coercion Missions** | | | | | |
|  | **Match 1 (Cox)** | | **Match 2 (Cox)** | | **Match 1 (Cox)** | | **Match 2 (Cox)** | | **Match 1 (Cox)** | | **Match 2 (Cox)** | | **Match 1 (Cox)[[5]](#footnote-5)** | |
| CI | 0.08\*  (-1.75) | 0.27  (-1.20) | 0.21\*\*  (-1.96) | 0.26\*  (-1.50) | – | – | – | – | 0.09\*\* (-2.08) | 0.08\*  (-1.95) | 0.05\*\*\* (-2.59) | 0.13  (-1.62) | 0.22  (-1.40 | 0.33  (-1.01) |
| No CI | – | – | – | – | 0.80  (-0.22) | 0.91  (-0.09) | 0.25  (-1.37) | 0.20  (-1.50) | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Mandate for Coercion | 0.24  (-0.79) | 0.19  (-1.11) | 0.55  (-0.47) | 0.53  (-0.95) | 1.06 (0.07) | 0.90  (-0.12) | 1.13 (0.15) | 1.14  (0.15) | 1.06 (0.07) | 1.27  (0.38) | 0.27\*  (-1.80) | 0.33  (-1.62) | – | – |
| No Mandate for Coercion | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1.15 (0.12) | 3.63 (1.09) |
| PKO During War | 42.93 (1.63) | 6.76 (1.40) | 0.51  (-0.62) | 0.48  (-0.65) | 3.27 (1.29) | 0.76  (-0.29) | 3.83 (1.65) | 3.83 (1.65) | 0.77  (-0.29) | 0.23  (-1.52) | 4.40 (1.22) | 1.47 (0.32) | 2.21 (0.72) | 0.74  (-0.32) |
| Non-U.N. PKO | 23.39\*\* (2.40) | 17.22\*\* (2.17) | 1.38 (0.60) | 3.07\* (1.74) | 0.84  (-0.28) | 1.06 (0.10) | 0.92  (-0.16) | 0.95  (-0.20) | 2.47 (1.18) | 2.07 (1.23) | 2.09 (1.37) | 1.95 (1.27) | 0.95  (-0.09) | 2.24 (1.10) |
| Past PKO | 0.01\*\*\* (-2.62) | 0.01\*\*\* (-2.33) | 1.60 (0.36) | 2.45 (0.76) | 0.47  (-1.01) | 0.50  (-0.86) | 0.36  (-1.48) | 0.36  (-1.48) | 0.65  (-0.70) | 0.67  (-0.55) | 0.28  (-1.23) | 0.29  (-1.24) | 0.36  (-1.13) | 0.44  (-0.95) |
| Group of Friends | 0.47  (-0.58) | 0.34  (-1.01) | 0.67  (-0.51) | 2.01  (0.73) | 0.96  (-0.06) | 1.89 (0.86) | 1.28 (0.44) | 1.11 (0.54) | 1.06 (0.09) | 1.83 (0.90) | 3.50\* (1.83) | 2.97 (1.46) | 1.09 (0.09) | 0.52  (-0.87) |
| Electoral Provisions | 0.10  (-1.26) | – | 0.91  (-0.08) | – | 0.42  (-1.18) | – | 0.50  (-1.20) | – | 0.48  (-0.93) | – | 2.03 (0.80) | – | 0.14\*  (-1.72) | – |
| Elections (NELDA) | – | 0.06\*\*\* (2.96) | – | 0.02\*\*\* (-3.13) | – | 0.05\*\*\*  (-3.84) | – | 0.02\*\*\* (3.23) | – | 0.25\*\*\* (-3.94) | – | 0.04\*\*\* (-3.74) | – | 0.03\*\*\* (-3.53) |

*Note*: Statistically significant estimates denoted \*(p = .10); \*\*(p = .05); \*\*\*(p = .01); \*\*\*\*(p = .001). T-statistics in parentheses.

**Table 2.0b: Robustness Check for Table 4 (Control for Governance Indicators, Post-Conflict)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **CI/No CI Missions** | | | | **Coercion/Non-Coercion Missions** | | | |
|  | **Model 1** | **Model 2** | **Model 3** | **Model 4** | **Model 5** | **Model 6** | **Model 7** | **Model 8** |
| CI | 0.05\*\*\*  (-2.69) | 0.05\*\*\*  (-2.63) | – | – | 0.06\* (-1.80) | 0.21  (-1.22) | 0.22  (-1.01) | 0.27  (-1.18) |
| No CI | – | – | 1.20  (0.21) | 0.88  (-0.16) | – | – | – | – |
| Mandate for Coercion | 16.47  (1.51) | 16.17  (1.51) | 1.99 (0.77) | 2.90 (1.07) | 0.93 (-0.12) | 1.04  (0.06) | – | – |
| No Mandate for Coercion | – | – | – | – | – | – | 0.38 (-1.00) | 0.48  (-0.81 |
| Battle Deaths | 0.81 (-0.61) | 0.72 (-0.95) | 1.28 (1.45) | 1.30 (1.45) | 1.07  (0.47) | 0.93  (-0.47) | 0.85  (-0.73) | 0.88  (-0.68) |
| Duration of Last War | 1.00 (0.43) | 1.00 (-0.25) | 1.00  (-0.77) | 1.00  (0.37) | 1.01\* (1.70) | 1.01\*\* (2.01) | 1.00  (-0.98) | 1.00  (-0.18) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | 1.03\* (1.84) | 1.00\* (-.49) | 0.99  (-1.21) | 1.00  (-0.37) | 1.01  (0.99) | 1.01  (0.45) | 1.02\*  (1.74) | 1.02  (1.45) |
| Population | 7.61\*\*  (2.22) | 8.88\*\*  (2.24) | 0.77  (-0.58) | 0.54  (-1.19) | 0.44 (-1.25) | 1.21 (0.43) | 2.65 (1.38) | 2.76  (1.45) |
| Mountainous | 2.21\*  (1.79) | 2.79\*\*  (2.46) | 1.22  (0.62) | 1.46  (1.30) | 1.32  (1.05) | – | 1.90  (1.46) | 1.82 (1.44) |
| Military Personnel | 0.29 (-1.70) | 1.07 (0.12) | 1.49 (1.02) | 0.79 (-0.60) | 1.51 (1.08) | 1.00\*\*\* (-0.00) | 0.49  (-1.28) | 0.52  (-1.54) |
| GDP | 0.28\*\* (-2.01) | 0.15\*\* (-2.60) | 0.90 (-0.38) | 1.02 (0.06) | 0.33\*\*  (-2.48) | 0.78 (0.46) | 0.62  (-1.28) | 0.65  (-1.19) |
| Rule of Law | 0.48 (-0.60) | – | 0.21 (-1.57) | – | 0.16  (-1.41) | – | 0.77  (-0.23) | – |
| Voice and Accountability | 10.82 (1.14) | – | 3.55 (1.31) | – | 11.06\* (1.79) | – | 1.72 (0.33) | – |
| Freedom of the Press | – | 1.05\*\* (2.18) | – | 1.03 (1.02) | – | 1.00 (0.14) | – | 1.01 (1.20) |

**Table 2.0c: Results of Other Robustness Checks for Main Analysis (Table 4, Post-Conflict)[[6]](#footnote-6)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Mission Type** (*N = unmatched sample, matched sample*) | **Unmatched Cox Model Result** | | **Match 1 Cox Model Result** | | **ATT (Match 1)** | | **Balance Statistics** | **Match 2 Cox Model Result** | | **ATT (Match 2)** | | **Balance Statistics[[7]](#footnote-7)** |
| *Estimate* | *T-stat* | *Estimate* | *T-stat* | *Estimate (SE)* | *T-stat* | *Post-match min. p-val.* | *Estimate* | *T-stat* | *Estimate (SE)* | *T-stat* | *Post-match min. p-val.* |
| **Increasing Population Size for GenMatch to *N = 5,000*** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| All UN (*N=118, 30)* | 0.52\* | -1.61 | 0.18\*\*\*\* | -3.88 | 1.28\*\* (0.40) | 3.16 | 0.32 | 0.80 | -0.45 | 0.77\*\* (0.39) | 1.97 | 0.48 |
| Coercive (*N=104,* *32*) | 0.68 | -0.81 | 0.46 | -1.42 | 1.01\*\* (0.51) | 1.99 | 0.19 | 0.46 | -0.88 | 1.00 (0.63) | 1.59 | 0.17 |
| Non-Coer (*N=104, 32*) | 0.42\* | -1.67 | 0.08\*\*\* | -3.07 | 1.29\*\*\* (0.48) | 2.68 | 0.37 | 0.31 | -1.54 | 0.90\* (0.46) | 1.92 | 0.38 |
| CI (*N=104,* *32*) | 0.27\*\* | -2.15 | 0.02\*\*\* | -3.25 | 1.43\*\*\* (0.54) | 2.65 | 0.52 | 0.30\* | -1.33 | 1.71\*\*\* (0.53) | 3.25 | 0.53 |
| No CI (*N=102, 28*) | 0.86 | -0.36 | 0.26 | -2.43 | 0.89\*\* (0.43) | 2.07 | 0.63 | 0.41 | -0.91 | 0.80 (0.59) | 1.36 | 0.40 |
| **Increasing Population Size for GenMatch to *N = 10,000*** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| All UN (*N=118, 30)* | 0.52\* | -1.61 | 0.18\*\*\*\* | -3.88 | 1.28\*\*\* (0.40) | 3.16 | 0.30 | 0.22\*\* | -2.09 | 0.95\*\* (0.41) | 2.32 | 0.36 |
| Coercive (*N=104,* *32*) | 0.68 | -0.81 | 0.36\* | -1.82 | 1.07\*\* (0.49) | 2.19 | 0.21 | 0.36 | -0.98 | 0.96\* (0.54) | 1.78 | 0.19 |
| Non-Coer (*N=104, 32*) | 0.42\* | -1.67 | 0.04\*\*\* | -2.90 | 1.30\*\*\* (0.47) | 2.73 | 0.54 | 0.42 | -0.97 | 0.71 (0.51) | 1.40 | 0.40 |
| CI (*N=104,* *32*) | 0.27\*\* | -2.15 | 0.02\*\*\* | -3.25 | 1.43\*\*\* (0.54) | 2.65 | 0.51 | 0.30\* | -1.33 | 1.71\*\*\* (0.53) | 3.25 | 0.54 |
| No CI (*N=102, 28*) | 0.86 | -0.36 | 0.35\* | -1.84 | 0.89 (0.64) | 1.39 | 0.44 | 0.41 | -0.91 | 0.80 (0.59) | 1.36 | 0.40 |
| **Adding Sudan to the peace periods data to create one extra observation (peace period) and one extra case of peacekeeping** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| All UN (*N=119, 31)* | 0.46\*\* | -2.29 | 0.17\*\*\*\* | -3.87 | 1.27\*\*\* (0.40) | 3.15 | 0.33 | 0.40\*\* | -1.97 | 1.31\*\*\*\* (0.35 | 3.72 | 0.45 |
| Coercive (*N=105,* *34*) | 0.59 | -1.21 | 0.44 | -1.40 | 0.78\*\* (0.36) | 2.19 | 0.15 | 0.19\*\* | -2.00 | 1.17\*\* (0.47) | 2.50 | 0.36 |
| Non-Coer (*N=104, 32*) | 0.32\*\* | -2.36 | 0.08\*\*\* | -3.07 | 1.29\*\*\* (0.48) | 2.68 | 0.39 | 0.33\* | -1.69 | 1.09\*\*\* | 2.60 | 0.35 |
| CI (*N=104,* *32*) | 0.20\*\*\* | -2.76 | 0.03\*\*\* | -3.06 | 1.95\*\*\*\* (0.50 | 3.94 | 0.33 | 0.01\*\*\* | -3.00 | 2.02\*\*\*\* (0.40 | 5.06 | 0.11 |
| No CI (*N=103, 30*) | 0.70 | -0.95 | 0.93 | -0.13 | 0.14 (0.53) | 0.27 | 0.56 | 0.11\*\* | -2.21 | 0.30 (0.41) | 0.73 | 0.52 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | **Unmatched Cox Model Result** | | **Match 1 Cox Model Result** | | **ATT (Match 1)** | | **Balance Statistics** | **Match 2 Cox Model Result** | | **ATT (Match 2)** | | **Balance Statistics** |
|  | *Estimate* | *T-stat* | *Estimate* | *T-stat* | *Estimate (SE)* | *T-stat* | *Post-match min. p-val.* | *Estimate* | *T-stat* | *Estimate (SE)* | *T-stat* | *Post-match min. p-val.* |
| **Adding UNIFIL (Lebanon) to peace periods data to create one additional case of peacekeeping[[8]](#footnote-8)** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| All UN (*N=119, 31)* | 0.49\* | -1.79 | 0.17\*\*\*\* | -3.81 | 1.13\*\*\* (0.43) | 2.62 | 0.31 | 0.67 | 0.37 | 0.97\*\*\* (0.37) | 2.58 | 0.15 |
| Coercive (*N=105,* *34*) | 0.60 | -1.06 | 0.38\* | -1.77 | 1.17\*\*\* (0.44) | 2.67 | 0.13 | 0.21 | -1.51 | 1.15\* (0.59) | 1.93 | 0.34 |
| Non-Coer (*N=104, 32*) | 0.40\* | -1.75 | 0.08\*\*\* | -3.07 | 1.29\*\*\* (0.48) | 2.68 | 0.35 | 0.19\*\* | -2.21 | 1.14\*\* (0.52) | 2.20 | 0.36 |
| CI (*N=104,* *16*) | 0.26\*\* | -2.23 | 0.16\*\*\* | -3.39 | 1.96\*\*\*\* (0.40 | 4.93 | 0.35 | 0.05\*\* | -2.53 | 1.83\*\*\*\* (0.48 | 3.83 | 0.07[[9]](#footnote-9) |
| No CI (*N=103, 15*) | 0.77 | -0.59 | 0.96 | -0.08 | -0.14 (0.52) | -0.28 | 0.49 | 0.30 | -1.37 | 0.58 (0.49) | 1.20 | 0.48 |
| **Removing UNPROFOR for Serbia, resulting in one fewer case of peacekeeping** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| All UN *(N=118, 29*) | 0.49\* | -1.73 | 0.19\*\*\* | -3.17 | 0.98\*\* (0.42) | 2.37 | 0.15 | 1.15 | 0.25 | 1.08\*\*\* (0.41) | 2.63 | 0.65 |
| Coercive (*N=104,* *30*) | 0.63 | -0.89 | 0.26\*\* | -2.01 | 0.84\* (0.49) | 1.70 | 0.14 | 1.22 | 0.25 | 0.71 (0.58) | 1.23 | 0.48 |
| Non-Coer (*N=104, 32*) | 0.42\* | -1.69 | 0.09\*\* | -2.45 | 0.91\* (0.52) | 1.76 | 0.51 | 0.49 | -0.99 | 0.98\*\* (0.48) | 2.05 | 0.54 |
| CI (*N=105, 32*) | 0.27\*\* | -2.14 | 0.02\*\*\* | -2.99 | 2.01\*\*\*\* (0.50 | 4.01 | 0.31 | 1.11 | 0.10 | 1.38\*\*\* (0.47) | 2.95 | 0.58 |
| No CI (*N=102, 26*) | 0.87 | -0.31 | 1.24 | 0.38 | -0.23 (0.46) | -0.50 | 0.44 | 0.48 | -0.85 | 0.27 (0.52) | 0.51 | 0.68 |
| **Changing coding of CI for Sierra Leone from no CI to CI** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| CI (*N=105, 34*) | 0.25\*\* | -2.29 | 0.01\*\*\* | -3.37 | 1.65\*\*\* (0.52) | 3.18 | 0.35 | 0.88 | -0.14 | 1.72\*\*\* (0.54) | 3.19 | 0.49 |
| No CI (*N=101, 26*) | 0.93 | -0.16 | 0.81 | -0.40 | 0.29 (0.56) | 0.52 | 0.49 | 0.88 | -0.19 | 0.34 (0.58) | 0.59 | 0.51 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | **Unmatched Cox Model Result** | | **Match 1 Cox Model Result** | | **ATT (Match 1)** | | **Balance Statistics** | **Match 2 Cox Model Result** | | **ATT (Match 2)** | | **Balance Statistics** |
|  | *Estimate* | *T-stat* | *Estimate* | *T-stat* | *Estimate (SE)* | *T-stat* | *Post-match min. p-val.* | *Estimate* | *T-stat* | *Estimate (SE)* | *T-stat* | *Post-match min. p-val.* |
| **Removing All Yugoslavia countries from the dataset (Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia)** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| All UN *(N=113, 25*) | 0.47\* | -1.78 | 0.09\*\*\*\* | -4.25 | 1.35\*\*\* (0.42) | 3.23 | 0.38 | 0.17\*\* | -2.46 | 1.09\*\*\* (0.40) | 2.75 | 0.31 |
| Coercive (*N=104,* *24*) | 0.80 | -0.42 | 1.81 | 0.63 | 0.93\* (0.55) | 1.70 | 0.05[[10]](#footnote-10) | 0.13\* | -1.89 | 0.20 (0.38) | 0.55 | 0.30 |
| Non-Coer (*N=102, 28*) | 0.31\*\* | -2.08 | 0.03\*\*\* | -2.78 | 0.98\* (0.50) | 1.95 | 0.28 | 0.04\*\* | -2.42 | 1.31\*\*\* (0.42) | 3.10 | 0.49 |
| CI (*N=101, 26*) | 0.35\* | -1.76 | 0.02\*\*\* | -3.08 | 1.63\*\*\*\* (0.44 | 3.67 | 0.43 | 0.01\*\*\* | -2.80 | 1.72\*\*\*\* (0.47 | 3.66 | 0.24 |
| No CI (*N=100, 24*) | 0.65 | -0.85 | 0.36\* | -1.69 | 0.52 (0.60) | 0.87 | 0.38 | 1.33 | 0.28 | 0.71 (0.58) | 1.24 | 0.34 |
| **Adding a Control for Other Peacekeeping Missions/Interventions[[11]](#footnote-11)** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| All UN *(N=118, 30*) | 0.52\* | -1.61 | 0.44\* | -1.74 | 0.58 | 1.22 | 0.31 | 0.74 | -0.62 | 0.76\* (0.42) | 1.79 | 0.44 |
| Coercive (*N=104,* *32*) | 0.68 | -0.81 | 0.39 | -1.59 | 1.05\* | 1.78 | 0.17 | 0.69 | -0.50 | 1.00 (0.63) | 1.57 | 0.15 |
| Non-Coer (*N=104, 32*) | 0.42\* | -1.67 | 0.07\*\*\* | -2.60 | 0.63\* | 1.67 | 0.35 | 0.23\*\* | -2.04 | 0.85\*\* (0.38) | 2.25 | 0.27 |
| CI (*N=104,* *32*) | 0.27\*\* | -2.15 | 0.06\*\* | -2.18 | 0.77 | 1.54 | 0.07 | 0.43 | -0.75 | 1.19\*\* (0.60) | 1.99 | 0.31 |
| No CI (*N=102, 28*) | 0.86 | -0.36 | 0.75 | -0.58 | 0.42 | 0.91 | 0.53 | 0.17\*\* | -2.18 | 0.63 (0.53) | 0.81 | 0.20 |
| **Adding a Control for Other Peacekeeping Missions/Interventions with Military Coercion** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| All UN *(N=118, 30*) | 0.55 | -1.43 |  |  | 1.14\*\* | 2.53 | 0.47 |  |  | 1.26\*\*\* | 2.76 | 0.50 |
| Coercive (*N=104,* *32*) | 1.14 | 0.31 | 0.19 | -0.98 | 1.00\*\* | 2.23 | 0.18 | 0.20 | -1.32 | 1.02\*\* | 2.05 | 0.02 |
| Non-Coer (*N=104, 32*) | 0.69 | -1.93 | 4.18 | 0.96 | 0.89\*\* | 2.03 | 0.34 | 0.79 | -0.24 | 1.33\*\*\* | 2.83 | 0.18 |
| CI (*N=104,* *32*) | 0.23\*\*\* | -2.60 | 0.51 | -0.54 | 1.58\*\*\* | 3.20 | 0.28 | 0.08\*\* | -2.34 | 1.82\*\*\*\* | 4.00 | 0.28 |
| No CI (*N=102, 28*) | 2.24 | 1.60 |  |  | 0.64 | 1.22 | 0.14 |  |  | 0.10 | 0.19 | 0.47 |

*Note*: Statistically significant estimates are denoted by \*(p = .10); \*\*(p = .05); \*\*\*(p = .01); \*\*\*\*(p = .001)

## 2.1 Effect of Peacekeeping Missions, Within-PKO Matching (Post-Conflict)

This section shows results from matching within the sample of post-conflict peace periods that received peacekeeping, to evaluate the relative effect of receiving each type versus receiving any other type. A logit model for the combination of mission types (second set of four treatments) is used because the sample sizes are too small for a Cox model. We also removed controls for the matched covariates because the models would not converge otherwise, likely due to the sample size. Results from both matches, per the main analysis, are presented. Due to the small sample size, the covariates are not well-balanced and the results should be interpreted with caution. However, they are consistent with our other findings: CI missions have a statistically significant effect in these models, reducing the hazard rate of renewed war compared to all other peacekeeping missions.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Match 1** | | | | | **Match 2** | | | | |
|  | **Cox Model (Matched Pairs)** | | **Avg. Treatment Effect (ATT)** | | **Balance** | **Cox Model (Matched Pairs)** | | **ATT** | | **Balance** |
| **Mission Type** | *Estimate* | *T-stat* | *Estimate* | *T-stat* | *Post-match min. p-value* | *Estimate* | *T-stat* | *Estimate* | *T-stat* | *Post-match min. p-value* |
| *Coercive* (*N=32*) | 1.00 | -0.00 | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.05 | 0.63 | -1.03 | 0.27 | 0.39 | 0.07 |
| *Non-Coercive* (*N=32*) | 0.49 | -1.20 | 0.63 | 0.50 | 0.03 | 0.47 | -1.33 | 1.01\*\* | 2.33 | 0.01 |
| *CI* (*N=32*) | 0.20\*\* | -2.22 | 1.10\*\*\*\* | 3.53 | 0.04 | 0.14\*\*\* | -2.87 | 1.03\*\*\*\* | 3.56 | 0.00 |
| *No CI* (*N=28*) | 5.36\*\*\* | 2.74 | -1.27\*\*\* | -2.55 | 0.10 | 5.15\*\* | 2.91 | -1.40\*\*\* | -3.12 | 0.01 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | **Logit Results (Matched Pairs)** | | **ATT** | | **Balance** | **Logit Results (Matched Pairs)** | | **ATT** | | **Balance** |
|  | *Estimate* | *T-stat* | *Estimate* | *T-stat* | *Post-match min. p-value* | *Estimate* | *T-stat* | *Estimate* | *T-stat* | *Post-match min. p-value* |
| *CI & Force* *(N= 12*) | -2.30\* | -1.65 | 0.99\*\* | 2.44 | 0.36 | -2.30\* | -1.65 | 1.05\*\* | 2.30 | 0.18 |
| *CI & No Force* *(N= 22*) | -0.80 | -0.88 | 1.40\*\* | 2.53 | 0.06\* | 0.52 | 0.51 | 0.51 | 1.03 | 0.02 |
| *No CI & Force* (*N=20*) | 2.78\*\* | 2.48 | -1.11\*\* | -2.36 | 0.28 | 2.78\*\* | 2.48 | -1.04 | -1.58 | 0.13 |
| *No CI & Force* (*N=10*) | -0.81 | -0.63 | 0.05 | 0.10 | 0.37 | – | – | -1.22\*\* | -2.18 | 0.17 |

*Note*: Statistically significant estimates are denoted by \*(p = .10); \*\*(p = .05); \*\*\*(p = .01); \*\*\*\*(p = .001)

## 2.2 Post-Conflict Peace Periods with Peace Agreements Only

The following section shows results for cross-tabs, Cox models, and the average treatment effect (ATT) of different peacekeeping types on peace duration for a re-matched sample of peace periods that all experienced a negotiated settlement. For the match, the balance statistics indicated excellent balance, as all p-values are above standard levels. The results are consistent with the findings from the primary analysis: compared to no peacekeeping, missions that employ CI have a large effect on peace duration and are most consistently statistically significant across models than other types of peacekeeping.

**Cross Tabs of Conflict Recurrence in Peace Periods with Peace Agreements**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Peace Periods with Peace Agreements* | | *Peace Periods without Peace Agreements* | |
|  | **No Peacekeeping** | **Peacekeeping** | **No Peacekeeping** | **Peacekeeping** |
| **Conflict Recurs** | 12 (60%) | 10 (43%) | 47 (69%) | 4 (57%) |
| **No Recurrence** | 8 (40%) | 13 (57%) | 21 (31%) | 3 (43%) |
| **Total** | 20 (100%) | 23 (100%) | 68 (100%) | 7 (100%) |

*Fisher’s exact: 0.36 Fisher’s exact: 0.67*

**Peace Duration in Matched Pairs, Peace Periods with Peace Agreements**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Match 1** | | | | | **Match 2** | | | | |
|  | **Cox Model (Matched Pairs)** | | **Avg. Treatment Effect (ATT)** | | **Balance** | **Cox Model (Matched Pairs)** | | **ATT** | | **Balance** |
| **Mission Type** | *Estimate* | *T-stat* | *Estimate* | *T-stat* | *Post-match min. p-value* | *Estimate* | *T-stat* | *Estimate* | *T-stat* | *Post-match min. p-value* |
| *UN (N=23)* | 0.12\*\*\* | -2.89 | 0.58 | 1.23 | 0.14 | 0.08\*\* | -2.98 | 1.04\*\* | 2.16 | 0.20 |
| *Coercive* (*N=13*) | 0.55 | -1.11 | 0.60 | 0.76 | 0.04 | 0.51 | -1.32 | 0.79 | 1.12 | 0.21 |
| *Non-Coercive* (*N=12*) | 0.25\*\* | -2.04 | 1.06\*\* | 2.34 | 0.15 | 0.24\*\* | -1.98 | 1.32\*\*\* | 2.97 | 0.26 |
| *CI* (*N=14*) | 0.30\* | -1.74 | 1.48\*\* | 2.41 | 0.10 | 0.15\*\*\* | -2.14 | 1.73\*\*\*\* | 4.62 | 0.21 |
| *No CI* (*N=9*) | 0.90 | -0.19 | -0.23 | -0.34 | 0.05 | 1.05 | 0.10 | -0.40 | -0.69 | 0.02 |

*Note*: statistically significant estimates are denoted by \*(p = .10); \*\*(p = .05); \*\*\*(p = .01); \*\*\*\*(p = .001)

## 

## 2.3 Coding Procedures

Peacekeeping missions were updated through 2012 from Fortna (2008) using Franke & Warnecke (2009), Mullenbach (2013), and the [UN Peacekeeping Operations List](https://accounts.google.com/ServiceLogin?service=mail&passive=true&rm=false&continue=https://mail.google.com/mail/&ss=1&scc=1&ltmpl=default&ltmplcache=2&emr=1). The cases included in our analysis match the U.N. list, which do not include police support missions (e.g. United Nations Police Support Group in Yugoslavia) or political missions such as MINUGUA (Guatemala pre-1997), UNAMA (Afghanistan, 2002-present), UNAMI (Iraq, 2003-present), UNMIN (Nepal, 2007-2009), and MINUCI (Ivory Coast, 2003-2004).[[12]](#footnote-12)

We also drop all primarily *interstate* peacekeeping missions, which include:

* UNTSO (Israel/Palestine)
* UNMOGIP (India/Pakistan)
* UNEF (Israel/Egypt), (Indonesia/Netherlands in West New Guinea)
* UNYOM (Yemen/Saudi Arabia)
* UNIPOM (India/Pakistan)
* UNGOMAP (Afghanistan, Pakistan)
* UNIIMOG (Iran/Iraq)
* UNIKOM (Iraq/Kuwait)
* UNOMUR (Uganda/Rwanda)
* UNASOG (Libya/Chad)
* UNMEE (Ethiopia/Eritrea)
* UNIFIL (Israel/Lebanon)[[13]](#footnote-13)

In addition, we code the following for multi-country missions:

* We apply the Kosovo mission to Serbia until independence (2008).
* We apply UNMOP to Serbia, since it covered both territories (Croatia and Serbia), and changed the dates from 1999-2007 to the accurate ones, 1996-2002.[[14]](#footnote-14)
* We apply Timor Leste missions to Indonesia until independence.
* We apply UNPROFOR (1992-1995) to Serbia, in addition to Bosnia, Croatia, and Macedonia, per the mission’s location profile.[[15]](#footnote-15)

**A. VARIABLES**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Code** | **Explanation** | | **Source** | **Notes** |
| **ALL MISSIONS (1946-2012) DATA** | | | | |
| **force** | | PKO mandate allows the use of military coercion;  1=military coercion, 2=no military coercion | **See Section B** |  |
| **csfire** | | Whether a ceasefire was signed before or immediately upon PKO deployment. | Mullenbach 2013 |  |
| **pagree** | | Whether a peace agreement, beyond ceasefires, was signed before or immediately upon PKO deployment, *and* there was a cessation of fighting, 0 = conflict, 1 = post-conflict. | UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Högbladh 2011). |  |
| **p\_fail** | | Resumption/continuation of military hostilities at any point during the PKO or within five years after the end of the mission, 1=yes, 0=no. | UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset |  |
| **avgtroops** | | Average monthly number of troops in PKO. | Kathman (2013) | Figures not available for some missions. |
| **avgpol** | | Average monthly number of police in PKO. | Kathman (2013) | Figures not available for some missions. |
| **avgobs** | | Average monthly number of military observers in PKO. | Kathman (2013) | Figures not available for some missions. |
| **avgtotal** | | Average monthly total number of personnel (troops + police + observers). | Kathman (2013) | Figures not available for some missions. |
| **avguntotal** | | Average monthly total number of unarmed personnel (police + observers). | Kathman (2013) | Figures not available for some missions. |
| **trooppop** | | Average monthly number of troops in PKO per 100,000 civilians | Kathman 2013, World Bank Population Data | Figures not available for some missions. |
| **totpop** | | Average monthly number of total personnel (armed + unarmed) in PKO per 100,000 civilians | Kathman 2013, World Bank Population Data | Figures not available for some missions. |
| **untotpop** | | Average monthly number of unarmed personnel in PKO per 100,000 civilians | Kathman 2013, World Bank Population Data | Figures not available for some missions. |
| **tperiod** | | Time period of mission start date:  0 = pre-1995; 1 = 1995-2001; 2 = post-2001 |  |  |
| **nfc** | | Conditional incentives; 0= no, 1= yes (monitoring/verification *and* conditionality) | **See Section C** | Coded post-conflict missions only |
| **nfcalt** | | Alternative coding of nfc | **See Section C** |  |
| **forcenfc** | | Mandate allows military coercion *and* PKO used conditional incentives (CI) |  |  |
| **forcenonfc** | | Mandate allows military coercion *and* PKO did not employ CI |  |  |
| **noforcenfc** | | Mandate does not allow for military coercion and PKO used CI |  |  |
| **noforcenfc** | | Mandate does not allow for military coercion and PKO did not employ CI |  |  |
| **unc7** | | Indicator of Chapter VII missions coded based on Fortna, also applying the Kosovo mission to Serbia and the Timor Leste mission to Indonesia until independence. | Fortna 2008 |  |
| **ds\_enforce** | | Alternative indicator of Chapter VII missions coded by Doyle and Sambanis. | Doyle & Sambanis 2000 |  |
| **POST-CONFLICT PEACE PERIODS DATA** | | | | |
| **date0** | | Date peace period began | UCDP Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002) |  |
| **date1** | | Date peace period ended | Gleditsch et al. 2002 | Resumption of hostilities (country re-enters UCDP) |
| **UN** | | UN PKO was present at some point, 1= yes, 0 = no |  |  |
| **pa** | | Combatants signed a peace agreement in the peace period. | UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Högbladh 2011). |  |
| **force** | | PKO mandated for military coercion was present at some point, 1= yes, 0 = no | **See Section B** |  |
| **noforce** | | PKO not mandated for military coercion was present at some point during the peace period, 1= yes, 0 = no | **See Section B** |  |
| **nfc** | | PKO employing CI was present at some point during the peace period, 1= yes, 0 = no | **See Section C** |  |
| **nonfc** | | PKO not employing CI was present at some point during the peace period, 1= yes, 0 = no | **See Section C** |  |
| **PKOtype** | | Type of peacekeeping deployed at some point during the peace period; 1 = Force and CI; 2 = Force and No CI; 3 = No Force and CI; 4 = No Force, No CI |  |  |
| **pfail** | | Whether peace failed in the peace period, 1=yes, 0 = no. We correct for right-censoring by taking the minimum peace duration cut off by right censoring in the matched sample and noting whether peace in each peace period lasted until or beyond that duration.[[16]](#footnote-16) | Gleditsch et al. 2002 |  |
| **dur** | | Duration of peace in months. | Gleditsch et al. 2002 |  |
| **ldur** | | Duration of peace in months, logged |  |  |
| **lwdeaths** | | Cumulative battle deaths from the previous war, logged. | Lacina & Gleditsch 2005. | Best estimates for battle deaths were used; where best estimates were not available, we used the lowest battle death estimate. |
| **lwdurat** | | Conflict duration in months. | Gleditsch et al. 2002 |  |
| **ethfrac** | | Ethnic fractionalization in the country. | Fearon & Laitin 2003 | For South Sudan, scores for Sudan were used. |
| **pop** | | Size of the country’s population size for the first peace year (logged). | [World Bank Population Database.](http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL) |  |
| **lmtnest** | | Degree of mountainous terrain in the country. | Fearon & Laitin 2003 | For South Sudan, scores for Sudan were used. |
| **milper** | | Number of military personnel in the country (logged). | While G&S used Singer (1987), we drew from the [World Bank Armed Personnel databank](http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1).), because the numbers are more current. | A comparison of the data from each source revealed them to be very similar, and using one measure over the other did not affect the results. |
| **bwplty2** | | Country’s level of democracy before the war measured by Polity IV score of -10 (authoritarian) to 10 (democratic). | Marshall & Jaggers 2002. | For South Sudan, scores for Sudan were used. |
| **bwgdp** | | GDP per capita before the war (logged) | [World Bank Database](http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD) |  |
| **eeurope** | | Regional control for Eastern Europe |  |  |
| **lamerica** | | Regional control for Latin America |  |  |
| **asia** | | Regional control for Asia |  |  |
| **ssafrica** | | Regional control for Africa |  |  |
| **nafrme** | | Regional control for Middle East/North Africa |  |  |
| **ethnicwar** | | War was an ethnic conflict, 1 = yes, 0 = no | Sambanis 2001; Kalyvas & Balcells 2010 |  |
| **terr** | | War was a territorial conflict, 1 = yes, 0 = no. If UCDP *Incompat* = 1 or 3 | UCDP Conflict Dataset |  |
| **marxist** | | Rebel party to the conflict was a Marxist group, 1 = yes, 0 = no | Kalyvas & Balcells 2010 |  |
| **pa\_type** | | 0 = No peace agreement  1 = Full agreement: one or more dyad agrees to settle the whole conflict incompatibility.  2 = Partial agreement: one or more dyad agrees to settle a part of the incompatibility.  3 = Peace process agreement: one or more dyad agrees to initiate a process that aims to settle the incompatibility. | Högbladh 2011, Joshi et al. 2015 | Timor Leste /Indonesia is not coded in UCDP (Högbladh), so coded by the authors using text of the agreement from [the PAM](https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/agreement-between-republic-indonesia-and-portuguese-republic-question-east-timor) (Joshi et al. 2015) |
| **ssr** | | Peace agreement provided for the creation of a new national army or integration of rebels into the army, 1 = yes, 0 = no. | Högbladh 2011, Joshi et al. 2015 |  |
| **intgov** | | Peace agreement provided for the integration of rebels into the government, 1 = yes, 0 = no. | Högbladh 2011 |  |
| **ddr** | | Peace agreement included provisions for the disarmament of the warring parties, 1 = yes, 0 = no. Coded as yes even if the disarmament only concern one of the warring parties. | Högbladh 2011 |  |
| **shagov** | | Peace agreement included provisions for extensive power-sharing in new government, 1 = yes, 0 = no. | Högbladh 2011 |  |
| **autind** | | Peace agreement granted the disputed region autonomy or independence, 1 = yes, 0 = no | Högbladh 2011 |  |
| **elections\_pa** | | Peace agreement provided for elections or stipulated electoral reforms, 1 = yes, 0 = no. | Högbladh 2011 |  |
| **elections\_mn** | | Elections after a peace agreement that called for rebel participation were in place during the peace period, according to Matanock, 1 = yes, 0 = no. | Matanock 2017 |  |
| **elections\_nelda** | | Elections were held during the peace period according to NELDA, 1 = yes, 0 = no. | NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012) | Includes executive and/or legislative elections. |
| **elections\_exec\_nelda** | | Elections were held during the peace period according to NELDA (executive elections only), 1 = yes, 0 = no. | NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012) |  |
| **pkoduring** | | A PKO of any type (UN or non-UN) was deployed *during* the conflict preceding the peace period, 1 = yes, 0 = no | Mullenbach 2013 |  |
| **pko\_pa** | | Peace agreement provided for the deployment of a PKO, 1 = yes, 0 = no | Högbladh 2011 |  |
| **gof** | | “Groups of friends” – informal groups of states and international organizations formed to support U.N. peacemaking – existed during the PKO and/or the peace period in question, 1 = yes, 0 = no. | Whitfield 2005 |  |
| **gof\_powers** | | “Groups of friends” included at least one of the P5 powers: China, France, Russia, the U.S., U.K., 1 = yes, 0 = no. | Whitfield 2005 |  |
| **gof\_un** | | U.N. either took the initiative to convene the “Groups of friends” or is listed as a participant, 1 = yes, 0 = no. | Whitfield 2005 |  |
| **aid100** | | Total democracy and governance aid from USAID (millions 2000 $). Pre-treatment: took the average of the three years before the beginning of the peace period. If less than three years elapsed between the beginning of one peace period and the beginning of another in the same country, took the average of two years or for the one year in between. | Finkel et al. 2008 | Missing all years before 1991 and after 2005. |
| **aid000** | | Total democracy and governance aid from USAID (millions 2000 $). Pre-treatment: took the average of the three years before the beginning of the peace period. If less than three years elapsed between the beginning of one peace period and the beginning of another in the same country, took the average of two years or for the one year in between. | Finkel et al. 2008 | Missing all years before 1991 and after 2005. |
| **usmilaid** | | U.S. military aid in constant millions of dollars. Pre-treatment: took the average of the three years before the first year of the peace period. If less than three years elapsed between the beginning of one peace period and the beginning of another in the same country, took the average of two years or for the one year in between. | Greenbook | Missing was coded as no aid since USAID, which keeps the Greenbook, notes that “no data available” means that none was provided through that  program in that year, except for the U.S. and North and South Yemen, which were not clear in the data. |
| **lusmilaid** | | Logged “usmilaid” | Greenbook |  |
| **milaiddum** | | Binary indicator of any U.S. military aid within five years of the beginning of the peace period, 1 = yes, 0 = no. | Greenbook |  |
| **USally** | | Binary indicator of an alliance with the U.S., 1 = yes, 0 = no | Leeds et al. 2005 | Missing years 2005 and onwards. |
| **lmp5ally** | | Binary indicator of an alliance with any of the permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council, 1 = yes, 0 = no | Leeds et al. 2005 | Missing years 2005 and onwards. |
| **oda\_aidta** | | ODA in constant US 2009 dollars. Pre-treatment: took the average of the five years before the first year of the peace period. If less than five years elapsed between the beginning of one peace period and the beginning of another in the same country, took the average of however many years were in between. | AidData.org |  |
| **log\_oda\_aidta** | | Log “oda\_aidta” | AidData.org |  |
| **share\_aid** | | Share of ODA in total GDP in US 2005 constant prices. Pre-treatment: took the average of the five years before the first year of the peace period. If less than five years elapsed between the beginning of one peace period and the beginning of another in the same country, took the average of however many years were in between. | AidData.org |  |
| **rebstrength** | | Estimate of rebel strength during prior period of the conflict, - is weaker, + is stronger | Cunningham et al. 2009 | If a conflict consisted of multiple dyads, we used measures for the strongest rebel group. |
| **balance** | | Balance of strength between conflict parties; 0 = parity, 1 = either side somewhat stronger, 2 = either side much stronger | Cunningham et al. 2009; Matanock 2012 | If a conflict consisted of multiple dyads, we used measures for the strongest rebel group. |
| **pastpk** | | Binary indicator of any past UN peacekeeping mission, 1 = yes, 0 = no | Franke & Warnecke (2009); Mullenbach 2013 |  |
| **pastun** | | Binary indicator of any past peacekeeping mission, 1 = yes, 0 = no | Franke & Warnecke (2009); Mullenbach 2013 |  |
| **colbrit:** | | Former British colony, 1 = yes, 0 = no | Kalyvas & Balcells 2010 |  |
| **colfra** | | Former French colony, 1 = yes, 0 = no | Kalyvas & Balcells 2010 |  |
| **expend** | | Cumulative financial expenditures of the mission, in millions of USD. Calculated by adding yearly expenditures together. | Nygard et al 2011 | No data available for BINUB (Burundi), UNCRO, UNMOP (Croatia), UNSCOB (Greece), UNOMB (P. New Guinea), and UNAMIL (Sierra Leone). For South Sudan, UNGA Resolution A/66/592 (7 December 2011) appropriated 738,266,500 for UNMISS for 1 July 2011-30 June 2012. |
| **hightroops** | | PKO with a high number of troops (more than 10,000) was present at some point during the peace period, 1= yes, 0 = no | Kathman 2013 |  |
| **lowtroops** | | PKO with a low number of troops (less than 10,000) was present at some point during the peace period, 1= yes, 0 = no | Kathman 2013 |  |
| **highpersonnel** | | PKO with a high number of total personnel (more than 10,000) was present at some point during the peace period, 1= yes, 0 = no | Kathman 2013 |  |
| **lowpersonnel** | | PKO with a low number of personnel (less than 10,000 was present at some point during the peace period, 1= yes, 0 = no | Kathman 2013 |  |

**B. CODING MILITARY COERCION**

We coded whether a mission used military coercion based on the classification of missions by Miller (2013), Franke & Warnecke (2009), Mullenbach (2013), Fortna (2008), and Doyle & Sambanis (2006), updated by Brancati (2013). How each author’s classification of missions translates into a coercive or non-coercive coding is explained below (post-conflict missions only). For each mission, if **ANY** author’s classification translates into a mandate to use military coercion, we code it as coercive. Sinceany indication of a PKO’s ability to use coercion creates the potential for its use, we only code cases as non-coercive where such potential did not exist.

**Miller (2013)** codes missions as Observer (O = monitoring & encouraging reform), Trainer (T = actively training and equipping local forces), and Administrator (A = assume sovereign authority). Administrator missions are coded as **military coercion,** while observer, trainer, and traditional missions are coded as non-forceful

**Franke & Warnecke (2009)** provide details on the language of each peacekeeping mandate. We code whether the mission is coercive or non-coercive based on the following language:

*Coercive*

“Deploy peace enforcement force

“Execute combat operations/internal defense”

“Establish military government/transitional authority”

“Create security”

*Non-Coercive (Observer, Trainer*)

“Deploy peacekeeping force”

“Monitor and verify ceasefire, disengagement, peace agreement”

“Facilitate DDR”

“Monitor security forces”

“Provide security assistance”

“Observe elections”

“Coordinate humanitarian activities”

“Promote human rights”­

“Assist in capacity building”

“Train police or military forces”

“Encourage reforms”

“Investigate violations”

**Mullenbach (2013)** codes the primary and secondary purpose of each PKO. These include:

1-Maintaining Law and Order (military troops or civilian police).

2-Monitoring/Verifying Ceasefire Agreement (military observation).

3-Monitoring/Verifying Disarmament, Demobilization, or Disengagement of Combatants.

4-Protecting/Delivering Humanitarian Assistance (humanitarian protection).

5-Providing Security (refugee camps, airports, elections, government buildings, etc).

6-Maintaining Buffer Zone (interpositionary deployment)

If the primary *and* secondary purpose of a PKO is 2-4, we code the mission as non-coercive. If the primary *or* secondary purpose of a PKO is 1, 5 or 6, we code it as coercive. If it is coded as 7 (“Other”) we code the mission as non-coercive.

**Fortna (2008)** codes whether missions fall under Chapter VI of the UN Charter or Chapter VII. We code Chapter VI missions as non-forceful, and Chapter VII missions as forceful.

**Doyle & Sambanis (2006),** which is updated by **Brancati (2013),** code whether a PKO is traditional, observer, multi-dimensional or enforcement. We code traditional and observer missions as non-forceful, and multi-dimensional or enforcement as forceful.

Each author’s coding of each mission in our dataset is listed below, with our coding decision listed in the last column. If the entry is blank, it is because the respective author did not include that particular mission in his/her dataset.

**Number of missions (post-conflict only): 38**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **State** | **Mission** | **Doyle & Sambanis/Brancati** | **Fortna** | **Miller\*** | **Franke & Warnecke** | **Mullenbach** | **Military Coercion Y/N?** |
| Angola | UNAVEM II | Traditional PKO | Chapter VI | Armed PKO - O | No Coercion | Monitor/Verify (2) | N |
| Angola | UNAVEM III | Traditional PKO | Chapter VI | N/A | No Coercion | Monitor/Verify (3) | N |
| Angola | MONUA | Traditional PKO | Chapter VI | N/A | No Coercion | Monitor/Verify (2) | N |
| Bosnia | UNMIBH | Multidimensional PKO | Chapter VII | Armed PKO - A | No Coercion | Maintain Law & Order (1) | Y |
| Burundi | ONUB | Enforcement | Chapter VII | Armed PKO - A | Coercion | Monitor/Verify (2) | Y |
| Burundi | BINUB | N/A |  | Traditional PKO | No Coercion | Monitor/Verify (3) | N |
| Cambodia | UNAMIC | Observer Mission | Chapter VI | Traditional PKO | No Coercion | Monitor/Verify (2) | N |
| Cambodia | UNTAC | Multidimensional PKO | Chapter VI | Armed PKO - T | No Coercion | Monitor/Verify (3) | N |
| CAR | MINURCA | Multidimensional PKO | Chapter VI | Armed PKO - O, T | No Coercion | Maintain Law & Order (1) |  |
| CAR | MINURCAT | Traditional/MD/Enforcement | Chapter VI | Armed PKO - A | Coercion | Provide Security (5) |  |
| Cote D'Ivoire | ONUCI | Enforcement | Chapter VII | N/A | Coercion | Monitor/Verify (2) | Y |
| Croatia | UNCRO | Traditional PKO | Chapter VI | Traditional PKO | No Coercion | Monitor/Verify (2) | N |
| Croatia | UNTAES | Observer/Enforcement | Chapter VII | Armed PKO - O | Coercion | Maintain Law & Order (1) | Y |
| Croatia | UNMOP | Observer Mission | Chapter VI | Traditional PKO | No Coercion | Monitor/Verify (3) | N |
| Cyprus | UNFICYP | Traditional PKO | Chapter VI | Traditional PKO | No Coercion | Buffer Zone (6) | Y |
| DRC | MONUSCO | Enforcement | Chapter VII | Armed PKO - A | Coercion | Provide Security (5) | Y |
| Timor Leste | UNTAET | Multidimensional PKO | Chapter VI | Armed PKO - A | Coercion | Maintain Law & Order (1) | Y |
| Timor Leste | UNMISET | Multidimensional PKO | Chapter VI | N/A | Coercion | Maintain Law & Order (1) | Y |
| Timor Leste | UNMIT | Multidimensional PKO | Chapter VII | N/A | Coercion | Maintain Law & Order (1) | Y |
| El Salvador | ONUSAL | Multidimensional PKO | Chapter VI | Armed PKO - T | No Coercion | Monitor/Verify (2) | N |
| Georgia | UNOMIG | Observer Mission | Chapter VI | Traditional PKO | No Coercion | Monitor/Verify (2) | N |
| Guatemala | MINUGUA | Traditional PKO | Chapter VI | Armed PKO - T | No Coercion | Monitor/Verify (2) | N |
| Haiti | UNMIH | Enforcement | Chapter VII | Armed PKO - A | Coercion | Maintain Law & Order (1) | Y |
| Indonesia | UNAMET | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Provide Security (5) | Y |
| Indonesia | UNTAET | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Maintain Law & Order (1) | Y |
| Kosovo | UNMIK | Enforcement | Chapter VII | Armed PKO - A | Coercion | Maintain Law & Order (1) | Y |
| Liberia | UNOMIL | Observer Mission | Chapter VI | Armed PKO - O | No Coercion | Monitor/Verify (2) | N |
| Liberia | UNMIL | Enforcement | Chapter VII | Traditional PKO | Coercion | Monitor/Verify (2) | Y |
| Morocco | MINURSO | Observer Mission | Chapter VI | Traditional PKO | No Coercion | Monitor/Verify (2) | N |
| Mozambique | ONUMOZ | Multidimensional PKO | Chapter VI | Armed PKO - T | No Coercion | Monitor/Verify (2) | N |
| Namibia | UNTAG | Multidimensional PKO | Chapter VI | Armed PKO - O | No Coercion | Monitor/Verify (2) | N |
| Nicaragua | ONUCA | Observer Mission | Chapter VI | Armed PKO - O | No Coercion | Monitor/Verify (2) | N |
| Papua New Guinea | UNOMB | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Monitor/Verify (3) | N |
| Rwanda | UNAMIR | Multidimensional PKO | Chapter VII | Armed PKO - A | Coercion | Provide Security (5) | Y |
| Serbia | UNPROFOR | Traditional PKO | Chapter VI | Traditional PKO | No Coercion | Buffer Zone (6) | Y |
| Sierra Leone | UNAMSIL | Enforcement | Chapter VII | Armed PKO - A | Coercion | Monitor/Verify (3) | Y |
| Sierra Leone | UNAMIL | N/A | N/A | N/A | No Coercion | Other (7) | N |
| South Sudan | UNMISS | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Maintain Law & Order (1) | Y |
| Sudan | UNMIS | Enforcement | Chapter VII | Armed PKO - A | Coercion | Monitor/Verify (2) | Y |
| Tajikistan | UNMOT | Multidimensional PKO | Chapter VII | Traditional PKO | No Coercion | Monitor/Verify (2) | Y |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Haiti | UNMIH | Enforcement | Chapter VII | Armed PKO - A | Coercion | Maintain Law & Order (1) |
| Haiti | UNSMIH | Observer/Traditional PKO | Chapter VI | Armed PKO - A | Coercion | Maintain Law & Order (1) |
| Haiti | MIPONUH | Observer Mission | Chapter VI | Traditional PKO | No Coercion | N/A |
| Haiti | MINUSTAH | Enforcement | Chapter VII | Armed PKO - A | Coercion | Provide Security (5) |

**C. CODING CONDITIONAL INCENTIVES (CI)**

Coding decisions for CI for each case are listed below, with relevant evidence cited. In addition to qualitative data, we refer to Dunno’s (2013) coding of “conditionality”[[17]](#footnote-17) for elections within a particular country conducted during, immediately before, or immediately after a PKO deployment. According to the author’s coding, “Election conditionalityis coded as occurring if one or more actors threatened/imposed punishments, or promised/granted rewards conditional on good electoral conduct.” A coding of conditionality pre- and post- elections provides evidence of conditionality, whereas a coding of non-conditionality, since it only covers the period four months before and four months after the elections (and since conditional incentives can be tied to aspects of a peace process other than elections), is not within itself evidence of no conditionality, though it can be used as additional evidence where other sources either provide evidence of non-conditionality or there is no evidence of conditionality.

For cases coded as non-conditionality by Donno, and those that did not experience elections, we coded CI based on a search of primary and secondary sources for each mission. Primary sources included the PKO mandate, UN Security Council Resolutions regarding the mission, U.N. DPKO mission reports and evaluations, and a LexisNexissearch of news articles during the PKO. Secondary sources included books, case studies, and other academic and/or policy studies of peacekeeping and/or international involvement in the conflict in question (of which there are far too many to provide a comprehensive list).

To meet the *conditionality* standard, the threat or use of sanction or incentives by an international actor must be tied to verification of compliance provided by or through the peacekeeping missions. If sanctions were levied against a government or rebel group before the implementation of a peace process or the mobilization of a UN mission – or did so but not in response to reports from peacekeepers – then it was not considered conditionality.

A mission was coded “0” (no CI) if a review of primary and secondary sources yielded either no reports of neutral monitoring/verification or the use of conditional incentives or sanctions by the PKO, or evidence of the absence of either component, and “1” (CI if there was evidence of both verification and the use of conditional incentives or sanctions. Coding decisions for each case are described below.

For two cases, UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone and UNMIS in Sudan, evidence of CI is ambiguous. We make a note of this below, cite the relevant evidence, and incorporate alternative coding of these cases into our robustness check. We also code CI for non post-conflict missions in Serbia (1992-1995), Central African Republic (2007-2010), Haiti (1996-2004; 2004-2012), and Morocco (1991-2012). This is because these cases fall into our matching analysis, as the countries received a PKO during a peace period even though there was no peace agreement in place. As our theory would expect, peacekeepers do not employ CI in these instances. Finally, several cases coded below (such as Angola and Cambodia) do not fall into our sample for matching because the countries involved did not experience a peace period during the time under study (1989 - 2012). Again, this approach is consistent with the initial analysis by G&S (2008).

**Angola (UNAVEM II, III): No CI**

* International involvement pre- and post-1992 elections did not include conditionality, according to Donno (2013).
* UNITA's Jonas Savimbi “was emboldened in his recalcitrance by continued foreign support. As late as June 1991, Washington provided UNITA with $30 million in covert aid” despite the group failing to promos to respect the electoral results (Adehajo 2001: 170).
* The timetable for the peace process, including elections, was “unrealistic…from the very beginning” and “The demobilization plan was openly mocked by both parties. UNITA had deliberately slowed the process of demobilizing its soldiers, partially in protest at the formation of a new government” (Krška 1997: 87).
* “Had the 1993 sanctions over [Angola’s] procurement of fuel and weapons been rigorously applied this might have changed, but enforcement was never seriously undertaken” (Tvedten 2002: 25). Conditionality in Angola was limited (Vines 1998: 26), and threatening withdrawal of the UN force became the primary negotiation tactic.

**Angola (MONUA): CI**

* The U.N.’s use of threats in Angola, such as the withdrawal of international assistance, and enticements, in the form of trust funds, enabled peacekeepers to “steer demobilization to completion” (Howard 2008: 198) as the rebel group, UNITA, was stripped of international aid and legitimacy (Fortna 2008: 91).

**Bosnia (UNMIBH): CI**

* International involvement pre-1998 and pre-2000 elections included conditionality, according to Donno (2013)
* Once the Dayton Accords were in place, external economic assistance and reconstruction aid “played an important role in ensuring the implementation” of the peace process in Bosnia. Donors sought to link aid to the protection of human rights, cooperation with the war crimes tribunals, and the return of displaced civilians, with the UN mission helping to verify compliance (Vayrynen 1997: 158).[[18]](#footnote-18)

**Burundi (ONUB, BINUB): No CI**

* International involvement pre-2005 elections did not include conditionality, according to Donno (2013)
* “…no official conditionalities have been attached to support given by the international partners in Burundi…Although donors finance over 50% of the national budget, they are highly reluctant to react upon critical political developments with financial consequences. Various diplomatic representatives described a responsibility trap, which creates a serious dilemma for engagement and provides an almost insurmountable obstacle to imposing effective conditionalities. They fear the responsibility – real and attributed by the government – if they cut financial contributions…This responsibility trap is deepened by a very low level of economic development and a high aid dependency…Such considerations and diverging stances within the donor community reduce their leverage to influence political developments through coercive as well as cooperative means due to a lack of coordination, and/or inconsequence” (Mrob 2015: 59).

**Cambodia (UNAMIC, UNTAC): CI**

* “The establishment of incentives like economic assistance to make the peace sustainable with the rehabilitation of the country should be addressed” as it was in Cambodia,” where the UN implementation plan recognized the holding of elections as the “focal point of the comprehensive settlement” (Doyle et al. 1997: 92).
* “The strategy of the UN mission in Cambodia (UNTAC) to marginalize the Khmer Rouge cost the rebels donor assistance and contributed to their eventual downfall” (Fortna 2008: 91).

**Central African Republic/Chad (MINURCAT): No CI**

* No conditionality or enforcement by international actors, according to Donno (2013).
* No evidence of conditional incentives or punishments tied to UN monitoring; mission ended in 2010 at the request of the Chadian government.

**Cote D’Ivoire (ONUCI): CI**

* “On the UN side, the Security Council took a tougher stand. It threatened to impose sanction against individuals. The measures were targeting people opposed to the peace process, especially those obstructing the work by ONUCI, UN forces in Cote d'Ivoire... Regarding the political process in Cote d'Ivoire, the UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan, explained to Philippe Bolopion what he expected from President Gbagbo: ‘He must work closely with the prime minister. There is no choice, the timetable is very tight and it has to be respected. It has to be pushed as far as possible’” (BBC 2006a).
* “The UN Security Council has warned "all those obstructing the peace process in Cote d'Ivoire" in view of the 30 October elections, saying that it is ready to "impose targeted sanctions’…The Security Council added that the sanctions would be imposed also against those who attack or obstruct activities of the UN mission in Cote d' Ivoire (ONUCI), entrusted with the supervision of the disarmament of the rebel forces and the loyalist militias.” (BBC 2006b).

**Croatia (UNCRO): No CI**

* International involvement pre- or post-1995 elections did not include conditionality, according to Donno (2013).
* No evidence of conditional incentives or punishments in place for Croatia before 1996 (by which UNCRO had ended).

**Croatia (UNTAES/UNMOP): CI**

* International involvement pre- and post-2000 elections included conditionality, according to Donno (2013).
* In 1997, the European Commission established political and economic conditions to be fulfilled by Bosnia and Croatia, as the basis for a coherent and transparent policy towards the development of bilateral relations in the field of trade, financial assistance and economic cooperation, as well as of contractual relations (European Commission 1998).
* “The support of the United States in particular…[was] also important factors in the mission’s success. As a result of this strong support, and in cases of non-compliance by the Croatians, it was possible for the international community to put pressure on them in an effective manner. For example, the United States blocked financial loans for Croatia in the IMF and the World Bank (Shitaka 1998: 13)

**DRC (MONUSCO): No CI**

* International involvement pre- and post-2006 elections did not include conditionality, according to Donno (2013).
* “Not strategically important to the five permanent members of the Security Council, the Congo got a peacekeeping operation designed for a conducive conflict environment – respect for the cease-fire by the warring parties, a cooperative and consensual central government, and voluntary disarmament by the foreign armed groups. The Security Council was not prepared to have the United Nations shoulder the de facto combat tasks thrust upon it by the Lusaka signatories. But neither did the council impose aid conditionality or engage in more assertive diplomacy on behalf of peace. In place of a coherent strategy, the Security Council and DPKO adopted a phased approach that used the *prospect* of outside support to encourage positive developments in the field…When the warring parties failed to implement the bargain they had struck at Lusaka, and the government of Laurent Kabila refused to let the United Nations implement even its limited initial mandate, the phased approach was shown to lack all political leverage. It degenerated into piecemeal peacekeeping that the warring parties could use as a further excuse to flout the Lusaka Agreement” (Roessler & Prendergast 2006: 302).
* “MONUC could not put on the table incentives (or sanctions) sufficient to overcome…impediments to [security sector] reform” (Doss 2015: 668).

**Timor-Leste, Indonesia (UNTAET): CI**

* International involvement pre-2002 elections did not include conditionality, according to Donno (2013).
* “Once the opportunity came to assist the Timorese in 1999, the SC held eight discussions and unanimously passed six resolutions. A crescendo of diplomatic pressure was applied against the Indonesian government…. International pressure forced Indonesia to publically accept independence for the Timorese, even if it resisted implicitly. The United States in particular was instrumental in securing Indonesian consent for peacekeepers, an SC prerequisite to authorize an international force. After the Asian economic crisis of 1997–98, Indonesia was indebted to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United States. The Clinton administration proceeded to sever military ties (training and support) with Jakarta and exerted leverage through economic sanctions to persuade the Indonesian government to accept a peacekeeping force.66 Coercing Indonesia into accepting a PKO was a crucial step on the road to an independent Timor-Leste…” (Pushkina & Maier 2012: 335-36).
* UNTAET official Peter Galbraith: “the Timorese thought they had little choice but to ratify whatever was put in front of them. They were essentially told ‘if you don’t do this, there’ll be dire consequences with no money to follow’’ (Steele 2002:79).

**Timor-Leste (UNMISET): No CI**

* No evidence of conditionality[[19]](#footnote-19) (*Note: the lessoning of commitment problems in Timor-Leste for these missions (which were deployed after the withdrawal of Indonesian troops)[[20]](#footnote-20) may explain the lack of IBV, and why peacekeeping in these instances was successful in a post-conflict context despite the lack of IBV mechanisms).*

**Timor-Leste (UNMIT): No CI**

* International involvement pre-2007 elections did not include conditinality, according to Donno (2013).
* No evidence of conditionality. Secondary sources consulted included Howard (2008), Pushkina & Maier (2012), and Smith, Michael G. and Moreen Dee (2007), “East Timor,” in William J. Durch (ed.) *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, Martin & Mayer-Rieckh (2005), Nicolas Lemay-Hebert, 2011, “The ‘Empty-Shell’ Approach: The Setup Process of International Administrations in Timor-Leste and Kosovo, Its Consequences and Lessons,” *International Studies Perspectives,* 12: 190–210; Ludovic Hood, ‘Missed Opportunities: The United Nations, Police Service and Defence Force Development in Timor-Leste, 1999–2004’ Civil Wars, 8/2 (2006) pp.143–62, 154–55

**El Salvador (ONUSAL): CI**

* International involvement pre and post-1991 and 1994 elections included conditionality, according to Donno (2013)
* See Case Study section, and Boyce (2002).

**Georgia (UNOMIG): CI**

* International involvement included conditionality pre-2003 elections but not pre- and post-2003 and 2004 elections, according to Donno (2013).
* “Although most pressing humanitarian needs were being met elsewhere in Abkhazia by the ICRC and a handful of international NGOs, UN and U.S. donor policies proscribed significant assistance to insurgent-held areas until relatively recently. The rationale for this was that withholding aid would help to affirm Georgia’s territorial integrity and exert pressure on the Abkhaz leadership to adopt a more moderate stance in political negotiations” (Hansen 2009: 39).
* “…the EU’s policy towards Georgia was designed to provide technical and economic aid to the region and to support the already existing negotiations under the auspices of the UN and OSCE, rather than to resolve the conflicts directly and actively. Brussels preferred long-term and indirect policies regarding the resolution of the conflicts in the region. Despite the increasing profile of the region in the EU after 2003, Brussels deliberately preferred not to exploit the potential of the Action Plans to promote conflict resolution, mainly as a result of the intergovernmental status of the CFSP/ESDP within the EU, which prompted the EU to keep a low profile on controversial policy areas involving conflicts” (Bardakci 2010: 225).
* Regional countries introduced sanctions against Abkhazia in January 1996, and maintained them for years…the UN and U.S. threatened Russia with sanctions in the mid-2000s in response to its encroachments in the territory (see MacFarlane et al. 1996, Nichol 2008).

**Guatemala (MINUGUA): CI**

* The UN and regional bodies tied compliance with the peace process to the local electoral calendar and conditioned international assistance on meeting fiscal and other benchmarks (see Arnault 2001, Boyce 2013: Chapter 3).

**Haiti (UNMIH): CI**

* International involvement pre- and post-1995 elections included conditionality, according to Donno (2013).
* UNMIH helped trigger UNSC sanctions and a naval blockade: “Between 1995 and 1998 foreign aid payments dropped by about 35 per cent, 37 ostensibly due to limited absorptive capacity and non-approval of available loans by the Haitian parliament but donor fatigue played a significant role. By mid-1998, at least $340 million in aid was held up by foreign exasperation at the lack of a trustworthy government….More recently, there have been hints that international development actors are sensitive to the appearance and reality that withholding loans in some respects played into Aristide’s position that the international community was out to harm Haitians. Donor conditionality was lost on Aristide, who had portrayed meeting international conditions as moral corruption…” (Malone & von Einsiedel 179).

**Haiti (UNSMIH, MINPONUH, MINUSTAH): No CI**

* International involvement pre-1997 elections and pre- and post-2000 elections did not include conditionality, according to Donno (2013)
* No evidence of conditionality.

**Indonesia (UNAMET): CI**

* International involvement pre-1999 elections did not include conditionality, according to Donno (2013).
* “UNAMET was also active in promoting communication between Falintil (the armed wing of the East Timorese resistance), the Indonesian army and the pro-Indonesian militia, aimed at a mutual laying-down of arms. Meanwhile bilateral pressure was applied by governments directly to the Indonesian political and military leadership, seeking to contain current violence and to make it conscious of the cost to Indonesia’s international relations were violence to intensify. Pressure was exerted, too, by the Secretary-General, personally and through his representatives, and by the Security Council in repeated statements and periodic summonses to the Indonesian Permanent Representative to hear the Council’s concern…Japan was also a major contributor to the voluntary funding of UNAMET, was a member of the Core Group, and was diplomatically active in Jakarta, where it carried the weight of Indonesia’s largest investor and trading partner (Martin & Mayer-Rieckh 2005: 130-31).

**Kosovo (UNMIK): CI**

* “Clear-cut policies of linkage and democratic conditionality can be identified, especially in respect to UNMIK and the EU. SRSG Steiner’s rather punitive policy of ‘Standards-before Status’, which led to an extensive catalogue of KSIP criteria, to be fulfilled by the PISG government before considering Kosovo’s future status and potential independence…was the most visible example of direct conditionality by the side of UNMIK. These criteria were aimed at establishing democratic conditionality, with a specific sectoral approach relevant to the democratization process in fields such as democratic institutions, rule of law, freedom of movement, returns and reintegration, the economy, property rights, dialogue with Belgrade, and the Kosovo Protections Corps. More rewarding than punitive, UNMIK’s selective and often non-transparent policy of gradual transfer of reserved powers to the PISG provides another example of conditionality set by UNMIK…KSIP criteria and status standards imposed by UNMIK were later incorporated into the EU’s European Partnership Action Plan for Kosovo’s as a core evaluation pattern for an annual review of Kosovo’s progress in the fulfilment of these standards. This took place in order to inform Kosovo’s further integration process to European structures and access to the European market as well as for potential allowance of financial benefits from the Stabilisation and Association Process…Overall, Kosovo has always been dependent on external (conditioned) financial, economic and political support mainly provided by West states and organization” (Narten 2009: 52-53).

**Liberia (UNOMIL): No CI**

* International involvement pre- and post-1997 elections did not include conditionality, according to Donno (2013).
* “The demobilization process was more or less openly mocked by both parties - both were cheating and the assembly and demobilization of troops was therefore a total failure. In the field, UN observers witnessed members of the two ex-belligerent monitoring teams expressing mutual hatred and making accusations against each other rather than fruitful cooperation” (Krska 1997: 93).

**Liberia (UNMIL): CI**

* International involvement pre- and post-2005 elections included conditionality, according to Donno (2013).
* ECOWAS foreign ministers met with conflict parties and threatened to exclude them from the election process (Adebajo, 2002: 616-17). ECOMOG threatened to punish those factions that had not disarmed by the deadline of 31 January 1997 with enforced disarmament (Adebajo, 2002: 616-17). See also Cook (2005).

**Morocco (MINURSO): No CI**

* No conditionality coded pre- or post-elections in 1993, 1997, 2007, according to Donno (2013).
* No evidence of conditionality.
* “[MINURSO] is in jeopardy because of mismanagement and possible financial irregularities in its $ 58 million budget, according to a report by the powerful Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate. The report released Wednesday condemns the UN for failing to respond to ceasefire violations and threats by Moroccan forces to fire on unarmed British, American, Canadian and other officers acting as UN military observers. Moroccan soldiers have threatened the military observers at gunpoint and threatened to open fire if the UN persisted in patrolling certain areas…” (Doyle 1992).

**Mozambique (UNOMOZ): CI**

* The Mozambican government was particularly vulnerable to economic inducements because “the impending reduction in military assistance to Mozambique following both the policy changes in the Soviet Union and, ultimately, the collapse of the socialist states in Eastern Europe, sparked a financial crisis for the Mozambican government” (Alden 1995: 10).
* While implementation of these provisions of the peace process was delayed, the provision of $308 million in electoral finances from international donors – including $15 million to Renamo to facilitate its transformation into a political party – in addition to a $50 million trust fund (overseen and audited by the UN) to provide demobilized soldiers with eighteen months of cash subsidies, offered both individual and organizational-level incentives to refrain from violating the terms of the peace deal (AWEPA, Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, May 1993, No. 3, p. 2). The UN threatened to withdraw the funds and its troops if Renamo did not comply (Manning 2002: 30)
* “…international actors in the Mozambican peace process employed a broad spectrum of non-coercive incentives, from purchase, to insurance, to legitimization. Even after the formal role of the international community in the process ended, Mozambique’s aid dependence…has created a situation in which the international community continues to provide “insurance” and “legitimation” that help to keep the process, particularly in the early phases, from derailing” (Manning 2002: 31).
* In Mozambique, the UN “served as a neutral body that could either vouch for or undermine the reputation of the parties as they tried to woo the Mozambican public for votes” and direct economic aid and other economic benefits conditional on compliance: “Both Ajello and Boutros-Ghali threatened to withdraw international support if the parties dragged their feet in demobilizing troops” (Fortna 2008: 130).

**Namibia (UNTAG): CI**

* “Pressure from Prime Minister Thatcher during a visit to Pretoria in early April played a large role in convincing the South Africans to uphold the UN framework” (Howard 2002: 109).

**Nicaragua (ONUCA): CI**

* Conditionality coded post-1990 elections, according to Donno (2013)
* “…the disintegration of the Soviet Union in November 1990, the lack of military and economic aid from Cuba and the lack of economic support to the Contras from the US Congress were the critical factors that forced the Sandinistas and the Contras to the negotiating table rather than any real commitment to forge a peace settlement. The Sandinistas found themselves politically and militarily isolated and were forced to abandon their Marxist–Leninist revolution for a more conventional political role inside the system…The massive international scrutiny focused on the February 1990 elections completely legitimated the electoral process thus making it impossible for the Sandinistas to contest the validity of the elections. Any attempt to invalidate the peace process would have been perceived by the Nicaraguan people as well as regional and international governments to be an attempt to renege on the peace process. The consequences probably would have meant that the Sandinistas would be ostracized even more in the eyes of the international community, eliminating any possibilities of economic aid. In December 1990 the Central American presidents issued the Declaration of Punta Arenas, Costa Rica. This declaration underlined the support of the Central American presidents for the peace effort and condemned violent actions putting both the Sandinistas and Contras on notice. Concomitantly the Nicaraguan government’s perceived legitimacy increased as it continued the democratization/demobilization process” (Fernandez 2004: 78-79).
* “The Sandinistas’ lack of outside support created a situation in which allowing the Nicaraguan Resistance’s participation in civil society became more attractive than armed insurrection. Conversely, US support for the Contras was substantially reduced in the US Congress, forcing the Contras to make the best deal possible and accept demobilization. ONUCA’s role in the Central America peace process was then essentially to provide the necessary support to peacefully demobilize as a pre-requisite for compliance with the Esquipulas II Peace Agreement. ONUCA’s role was particularly important in demonstrating objective and fair and balanced treatment between the opposing forces; thereby contributing to the legitimacy of the process among all parties, which was essential for the demobilization process to continue” (Fernandez 2004: 80).

**Papua New Guinea (UNOMB): CI**

* In Bougainville, External actors “sought to utilize [development] funding to create incentives for parties to support the peace process or particular aspects of it (such as weapons disposal)…the parties found creative ways of sequencing and linking stages of implementation of each of these aspects to provide incentives to each side to implement what they had agreed” (Reagan 2008: 44).

**Rwanda (UNAMIR): No CI**

* In the period leading up to the genocide, a few bilateral donors publicly criticized the government’s flagrant human rights abuses, but they did not cut aid on this basis, sending ‘the message that human rights conditionality was…not practiced’ (Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda 1996: 32; Qtd. In Boyce 2002: 1033)

**Serbia (UNPROFOR): No CI**

* Non-conditional enforcement pre- and post-elections in 1992 and 1993, according to Donno (2013)
* Under UNPROFOR, “Initially, the international community refrained from reacting to acts of non-compliance, out of fear of the repercussions such responses could have for the position of the UN forces. It was only after much hesitation that the use of force was authorized “in self-defense’, strictly within the constraints of the peace-keeping concept. In this context, ‘self-defense’ has always included the use of force under two specifically circumscribed situations: either in cases where the lives of UN peace-keeping personnel are directly threatened, or in situations in which armed persons attempt by force to prevent UN troops from carrying out their mandate” (IPS 1997: 73).
* Under UNPROFOR the use of force by peacekeepers “was plagued by ambiguities and contradictions” (Bratt 1997: 45) and “provided only for protective support of UNHCR convoys” (IPS 1997: 75) as force “was applied primarily by NATO, which the Security Council had authorized” (Bratt 1997: 45).

**Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL/UNAMIL): No CI, but ambiguous, thus alternatively coded CI in robustness checks.**

* No conditionality coded pre- and post-2002 and 2007 elections; non-conditional enforcement coded pre- and post-2007 elections.
* RUF fighters refused to register on agreed disarmament sites and continued to commit ceasefire violations (Hirsch, 2001:86-87; Malmin Binningsbø & Dupuy, 2009:98). But the international community did not respond aggressively, as DDR under the Lomé Agreement was voluntary, and depended on the unforced compliance of the parties…
* In Sierra Leone, the government was “quite dependent on international aid” and “while it is hard to know for sure, the UN’s ability to bring resources into Sierra Leone probably helped it to restrain the government from launching an offensive against the RUF…” (Fortna 2008: 140). Yet the Lome agreement granted the RUF control over diamond-mining proceeds, providing a source of funding that “gave peacekeepers no leverage over the RUF and gave [RUF leader Foday Saybana] Sankoh no incentive to cooperate with peacekeepers to maintain his source of funding. In fact, it was the UN’s attempt to deploy into diamond-mining regions that sparked the crisis and renewed warfare in 2000. The presence of diamonds in Sierra Leone meant that peacekeepers had much less economic leverage relative to the belligerents than they did in Mozambique…” (Fortna 2008: 142).
* The Lomé Agreement guaranteed UN officials and UNAMSIL unhindered and safe access to all areas in the country despite isolated insecurity where 53 the RUF attacked and captured UN peacekeepers. The support of British soldiers in May 2000 managed to keep UNAMSIL on the path of success. They managed to drive away the RUF rebels.
* **Source of ambiguity:** In May 2001, sanctions were imposed on Liberia because of its support for the rebels, and UN peacekeepers began to make headway in disarming the various factions. The US then led the effort to impose a full-scale embargo on diamond trading in Liberia (Woods 2008). The DDR process in Sierra Leone rapidly became more effective in mid 2001 after the diamond embargoes took effect and after UNAMSIL began to aggressively challenge the RUF (Keen 2005, 287; Woods 2008).

**South Sudan (UNMISS): No CI**

* No evidence of conditionality before the outbreak of violence in 2012; South Sudan continued to receive substantial international aid and support, from both the U.S./EU and China: “Unhindered by an arms embargo or sanctions, Machar and Pres. Salva Kiir continue down their chosen paths, squandering every opportunity for a political solution when they’ve sat down at the negotiating table” (Kelly 2015).

**Sudan (UNMIS): No CI, but ambiguous, thus alternatively coded CI in robustness checks.**

* The Sudanese government has suffered from international sanctions and a withdrawal of foreign aid since the late 1990s. But most of this occurred *before* the end of the second Sudanese civil war and beginning of the peace process in 2005, and before the deployment of peacekeepers. Thus while punishments were levied, it is not clear the degree to which they were tied to this specific peace process.
* “The international community has largely failed to hold the parties accountable for what they agreed in the Machakos and Naivasha protocols” (Schumann 2010: 112).
* “Although protection of civilians was part of the mandate for the larger and well-funded UN mission, UNMIS has barely been able to monitor the ceasefire arrangements, and it has failed significantly in terms of peacebuilding and the protection of civilians against local violence” (Rolandsen 2011: 556).

**Tajikistan (UNMOT): No CI**

* Non-conditional enforcement coded pre-election in 1994, 1995, 1999, and 2000 (and post-election in 1999 and 2000).
* “In Tajikistan, the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission of Observers to Tajikistan through November 1998. However, U.N. policy on Tajikistan floundered. The U.N. had been deeply involved since 1993 in peace negotiations, but in 1998 UNMOT had no coherent response to the parties’ failure to meet most deadlines established by the peace accords. After four UNMOT staff were murdered in July, UNMOT recalled all U.N. staff to the capital, Dushanbe” (HRW 1999)
* “Western donors did not work well with Russia, which had significant leverage over the government [in Tajikistan]. Donors lost the opportunity to forge a common agenda, giving the government an alternative source of support” (Zurcher et al. 2013: 106).

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1. The sample size is too small to allow for the inclusion of all covariates in Model 2 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. We ran unpaired t-tests; paired t-tests yielded similar results. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. For example, for the model assessing the effect of coercive missions, we include as a control an indicator for non-coercive missions. This helps minimize the confounding effects of receiving a mission regardless of whether it used coercion or not (or CI or not) versus receiving no mission at all. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. For the *non-U.N. PKO* variable, we ran an alternative measure that only captures non-U.N. missions that had a coercive mandate, and the results did not change. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Results for Match 2 for missions lacking military coercion are similar to those of Match 1 (hazard rate = 0.53 (-0.68) and 1.04 (0.04), respectively; no controls were statistically significant except for *Elections (NELDA)*, = 0.02\*\*\* (-3.38) [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. For all of these robustness checks, we ran the same models used in the main analysis (Table 4). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. All pre-match minimum p-values were 0.01 or below, meaning that balance improved after the match in all cases. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. For the robustness check, UNIFIL is coded as *forceful* (as it is categorized as Chapter VII by Fortna 2008) and *non-CI*. While monitoring was the primary purpose of the mission (see Mullenbach 2013), international involvement in post-conflict elections in Lebanon did not include conditionality, according to Donno (2013). The post-war parliamentary elections (1992-2002) violated the Taif Agreement, and Lebanon’s confessional system has not been revoked as stipulated in the agreement (See Are Knudsen, “Precarious peacebuilding: Post-war Lebanon, 1990-2005,” WP 2005, 12: 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. This p-value is for the variable *GDP per capita*. The rest of the covariates improve after matching, with p-values well above standard levels. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. This p-value is for the variable *GDP per capita*. The rest of the covariates improve after matching, with p-values well above standard levels. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. The control variable, *otherpko.* denotes the number of other missions active at the same time as the PKO, such as regional peacekeeping (e.g. by NATO or the African Union) or *inter-state* UN operations. Source is Mullenbach (2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Note that Hultman et al. record missions in Angola 2002-2003 and Ivory Coast back to 2003, but the U.N. list and our records suggest that these missions were not in place, except a political mission, MINUCI in the Ivory Coast (deployed in 2003 before ONUCI, the PKO, was launched in April 2004). [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. While some authors (e.g. Fortna 2008, Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2005, Giligan & Sergenti 2008) include UNIFIL as an intra-state mission, our reading of the case is that it was primarily, if not solely, an inter-state mission. It started in 1978 as a mission to oversee Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon (per Security Council resolutions 425 and 426) and while its mandate has been adjusted twice, both times it has been following an increase or decrease in hostilities between Israel and Lebanon, but not 1990, when the civil war ended. The UN's [description of events](http://unifil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=11554#para4) makes no mention of Lebanon’s civil war (which started in 1975 and lasted until 1990) and according to Murphy (2007: 34-35), “When the Lebanese civil war was at its height during 1975 and 1976, serious efforts were made to determine the feasibility and value of establishing a UN peacekeeping force for the country. Ultimately, however, no such force was established after strong reservations were expressed regarding its practicality in what was essentially a civil war situation.” As the UN mission went on, it was clear that UNIFIL did not wanted to be involved in Lebanon’s civil war, according to Murphy (2007: 64). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. We include UNMOP since others (Hultman et al., for example) consider it to be intrastate, although it is between Croatia and Serbia once both are independent states. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. See “United Nations Protection Force: Profile,” Department of Public Information, United Nations, 31 August 1996: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unprof_p.htm> [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. For example, if one sample was comprised of 8 cases and of those that were right censored (e.g. peace duration ended on December 1, 2012), the one with the shortest peace duratiosn was 118 months, we coded all cases as a “1” where peace ended before 118 months, and the rest “0” if peace lasted for longer than 118 months. If peace terminated at 118 months, we coded a case as “1” if the peace period actually ended (e.g. before December 1, 2012) and “0” if the peace period was just right-censored at December 2012. The longest “cut-off” peace duration was 108 months (9 years) for Force/CI, and the shortest was 51 months (4.25 years) for No Force/CI and No Force/No CI. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Donno codes conditional and non-conditional enforcement. Conditional enforcement includes the tools described above (aid, sanctions, threats) whereas non-conditional enforcement encompasses “mediation and diplomatic missions – which “impose political or reputational costs (domestic and international) but are less overtly punitive than conditionality” – and “shaming,” or official declarations, resolutions, or statements that criticize electoral misconduct.” As the author explains, these enforcement mechanisms differ from conditionality “in that they are “one-shot” events, and the costs they impose are not conditional on future changes in behavior.” [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Security Council - 8 - Press Release SC/6455 Resumed 3842nd Meeting (AM) 19 December 1997, <http://www.un.org/press/en/1997/19971219.SC6455.html>. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Secondary sources consulted included Howard (2008), Pushkina & Maier (2012), and Smith, Michael G. and Moreen Dee (2007), “East Timor,” in William J. Durch (ed.) *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, Martin & Mayer-Rieckh (2005), Nicolas Lemay-Hebert, 2011, “The ‘Empty-Shell’ Approach: The Setup Process of International Administrations in Timor-Leste and Kosovo, Its Consequences and Lessons,” *International Studies Perspectives,* 12: 190–210; Ludovic Hood, ‘Missed Opportunities: The United Nations, Police Service and Defence Force Development in Timor-Leste, 1999–2004’ Civil Wars, 8/2 (2006) pp.143–62, 154–55, Steele (2002). [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. As evidence of the lack of commitment problems in Timor, Chopra (2000: 28) observes that “by the time UNTAET began to deploy in November, there were conditions for success that are rarely available to peace missions. The belligerent power had completely withdrawn, and an effective multinational force could credibly guarantee internal and external security.” Likewise, Howard (2014: 128) writes that by this time, “no factions of Timor-Leste were fighting one another, since they had united as a single political force with Gusmao at the lead. The Timorese leadership also benefitted from considerable international legitimacy.” [↑](#footnote-ref-20)